George Herbert Meads Theory of the Self.pdf

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10-1-1970

George Herbert Mead's Teory of the SelfRaymond Meyer Lichtman

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Recommended CitationLichtman, Raymond Meyer, "George Herbert Mead's Teory of the Self " (1970). Open Access Dissertations and Teses. Paper 5775.
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G ORG HERBERT MEAD S TH ORY OF TH SELF


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GEORGE HERBERT MEAD S

THEORY OF THE SELF

ByRAYMOND MEYER LICHTMAN

A Thesi sSubmit ted to the Facul ty o f Graduate Stud ie s

in p a r t i a l Fulf ilmen t o f t he Requirementsfo r the DegreeMaster o f r t s

McMaster Unive rs i tyOctober 1970


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M STER OF ARTS (1970)(Philosophy)

McM STER UNIVERSITYHamilton g n t a r i o ~

TITLE: George Herber t Mead s Theory o f the S e l f

AUTHOR: Raymond Meyer Lichtman, BeA (George WashingtonUnivers i ty

SUPERVISOR: Profe ssor Alber t Shalom

NUMBER OF PAGES: i i i 34

SCOPE ND CONTENTS: This t hes i s explores Mead s thoughtfrom h i s soc: ia l psychology through h i s cosmology.t argues t ha t Mead f e l t compelled to in t roducethe specu la t ive pr inc ip l e s o f soc ia l i t y andtemporal i ty in to h i s soc ia l psychology in o rderto do f u l l j u s t i ce to the exper ience o f theind iv idual . In so doing he developed a rad ica lt heory o f the s e l f .

:i


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wish to express my g ra t i t u d e to Dr ar l Pfuntnerwho irst in t roduced me to Mead and my apprec ia t ion to DrShalom fo r h i s patd ence and i n s t ruc t ive comments


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I IvlIND, SELF ANP SOCIETYI I MIND SELF AJ\T[ SOCIETY: 'THE SELFI I I o THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIV THE NEED FOR A THEORY OF TEIvJ.PORALITYV.. TEJ.'1POR. l\LITY AND SOCIALITYV I THE THEORY OF THE SELFFOOTNOTESBIBLIOGRAPHY

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537288

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I

MIl\TD SELF AND SOCIETY

George Herber t Mead wa.s born in South Hadley,Massachuset ts , in 1863. His: formal educa t ion took himfrom Ober l in College to Harvard, Leipz ig and Ber l in .Mead t augh t a t Michigan for a few years and went to theUnive rs i ty o f Chicago in 1893 where he remained u n t i lh i s death in 1931.

As a phi losopher Mead was a pragma t i s t ; as as c i e n t i s t he was a soc ia l psycho log i s t . 1 In n e i t h e rf i e l d did he share the qua l i t y o f sys temat ic th inkingassoc ia ted with men l i k e Dewey o r Cooley. Mead s p u b l i -ca t i o n s were r e s t r i c t e d to t.he jou rna l s o f h i s profe ss ion .Afte r h i s death h i s unpubl ished manuscr ip t s , l e c t u re s andnotes were co l l e c t ed , ed i t ed and publ i shed in four volumes.The f i r s t to be publ i shed, desp i te i t s being the l a s t tobe wri t t en , vlas JJhe Philosophy o f the Present hereaf te r : pp).This cons i s t s o f the Carus Lectures which Mead presented a tBerkeley three weeks be fore h i s dea.th. t i s supplementedby a fe\\7 prev ious ly pu.bl ished a r t i c l e s . The nex t volume tobe publ i shed was . ~ i i n d Sel f , and Socie ty h e r ea f t e r : MSS).


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This i s made up o f se t s of s tudent notes from Mead scourse in Socia l Psychology which he gave a t Chicagofrom 1900 u n t i l the year o f h i s death.

The next volume to be publ i shed was The Movementso f Thought in the Nine teenth Century (he rea f t e r : MT).This was a lso made up o f s tudent notes and unpubl ishedmanuscr ip t s . t r ep resen t s Mead s view o f the h i s to ryo f ideas . The l a s t volume was publ i shed in 1938 asThe Philosophy o f the Act (he rea f t e r : PA). This volumer ep resen t s Mead si pragmatism as formulated over the l a s tt en o r f i f t een years o f h i s l i f e . 2 t i s obvious fromt h i s sketch t ha t the order o f pub l ica t ion i s independento f the order o f composi t ion. I n t e l l e c t u a l l y the chrono-l og ica l order o f Mead s l i f e would be : MSS PA and PP.MT has been l e f t ou t o f t h i s scheme because the view o fh i s t o ry e ~ p r e s s e in t ha t work i s covered by P and PP.

MSS appears f i r s t on the list - ye t it i s basedon notes taken as l a t e as 1930. This placement i s j u s t i f i e dbecause o f the genera l na ture o f undergraduate courses and at e a c he r s r e s pons ib i l i t y to s tuden ts . Mead was cons tan t lyrev i s ing h i s l e c t u re s to inc lude r ecen t exper imenta l f ind ingsas wel l as the re f inements o f h i s own thought . Considera t ionsto a theory o f mind o r s e l f which are ou ts ide the f i e l d o fsoc ia l psychology could not :be inc luded in such a course .The l ec tures s t i ck to the l eve l o f the audience as wel l asto the genera l conf ines o f soc ia l psychology.


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SS i s Mead s attempt. to show t ha t mind and thes e l f are withou t res idue soc ia l emergents; and tha tlanguage, in the form o f a voca l ges tu re , provides themechanism for t he i r emergence., ,3 For Mead mind evolvesin a soc ia l context . Previous psychologies , such asthose o f Tarde, Baldwin and lil]undt cannot expla in theor ig in o f mind within the framework o f observablebehaviour . 4 Al l o f these views assume t ha t mind i snecessary for the incept ion o f a soc ia l process . Meadd isagrees with t h i s kind o f ana lys i s because they area t tempt ing to exp la in the evo lu t ion o f mind in a soc ia lcontext and, a t the same t ime, they are asse r t ing t ha tthe soc ia l con tex t i s only poss ib le because the re are minds.A fur the r reason why Mead r e j e c t s these psychologies i st ha t they have not shown how those aspec ts o f mind whichthey cla im have evolved in a soc ia l manner could havebeen s oc i a l l y i n i t i a t e d .

Mead r e f e r s to h i s soc ia l psychology as soc ia lbehaviourism. He does t h i s fo r a number o f reasons. nthe f i r s t p lace , Mead fee l s t:hat no c l e a r l i ne can bedrawn between ind iv idua l and soc ia l psychology. Thepar t i cu l a r ana lys i s o f soc ia l psychology i s concernedwith the or ig ins o f the se l f , o f mind and o f ind iv idua lconsc iousness . Ind iv idua l psychology a bs t r a c ts c e r t a infac tors from the Sl i tuat ion wi t h which soc ia l psychology


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dea l s more near ly in i t s concre te r ea l i t y . S Mead wishesto mainta in the behav iour i s t i c approach because behaviourismfor Mead i s s imply an approach to the s tudy o f the ex-per ience o f the ind iv idua l flcom the po in t o f view o f h i sconduct , par t i cu l a r l y , bu t not exc lus ive ly , the conduct

6as t i s observab le by o thers . uTo c l e a r the ground for h i s O\ vn methodology Mead

begins MSS with a c r i t i c i s m o f the dominant force inpsychology in h i s day watson and h i s behaviourism.Mead has no quar re l with the watsonians so long as theykeep to t h e i r or i9 ina l f i e l d o f i nves t iga t ion , t ha t o fanimal psychology. Animal psychology had long agodropped any reference to consc iousness on the groundst ha t t was not t e s t ab l e . The pre-Watsonians who adaptedt h i s model o f i nves t iga t ion 1:0 human psychology had a lsoomi t ted the reference to consc iousness . Watson, however,went a s tep fu r the r and removed the reference to the en t i r ei n t ro sp e c t i v e f i e l d o f pr iva te sub jec t ive exper ience with inh d d 1 7e J.n l V l ua

Watson arcgues t ha t thought i s ac tua l ly subcutaneousspeech. Thought, word, symbol and vocal ges ture are a l lsynonomous te rms for Watson. Words become associa ted wi t hth ings and our responses to it:he th ings o f our language i sthought . There i s an i n t e r a c t ion between the word and tha t


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which the word r ep resen t s ; t h i s i n t e r a c t ion becomes acondi t ioned re f lex . When our responses have become con-d i t ioned in t h i s manner the word i s su f f i c i en t to evokethe act ion which has become assoc ia ted with it Allphenomena must be reduced to the terminology o f thecondi t ioned re f lex . What cannot be so reduced, suchas mind, consc iousness o r i n t rospec t ion , i s denied.Denied, not j u s t as an explana t ion o f behaviour bu t ase x i s t i ng in any sense. What Mead argued a t t h i s poin ti s t ha t though it i s imposs ib le to reduce mind, e .g . ,to behav iour i s t i c terms, t h i s does not ru le out thep o s s i b i l i t y o f expla in ing mind in those terms. Meadi s arguing t ha t mind o r consc iousness can be shown tob 8e unc t lonlng.

Mead has many s pe c i f i c c r i t i c i s m s o f watson inthe f i r s t sec t ion o f MSS,9 bu t I wi l l only concern mysel fwi th h i s most impor tant c r i t i c i sm as it i s the one whichmost d i r ec t ly in t roduces Mead's own t heor i es and methodology.Mead's major c r i t i c i s m o f watson grew ou t o f Mead Sunderstanding o f John Dewey's work Psychology. In t h i swork Dewey was arguing aga ins t the preva i l ing t he o re t i c a lo r i e n t a t i on in psychology before the tu rn o f the century .This or i e n t a t i on was ' e lementa l i sm' and i t s psychologicalcoun te rpar t , re f lexism. lO Dewey re jec ted t h i s analys is


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because the reflelx arc i s not a comprehensive, o r organicun i ty , bu t a p t c h ~ o r k o f d i s jo in t e d pa r t s , a mechanicalconjunc t ion or una l l i ed process . l l Dewey c o r re c t s t h i sview o f the s t imulus-response problem by showing t ha t"sensory s t imulus , con t ro l connec t ions and motor responsess ha l l be viewed, not as separa te and complete e n t i t i e s inthemselves, b u t as d iv i s ions o f labor , func t ioning fac to rs ,with in the s ing le concre te whole, now des igna ted ther e f l ex arc .

I 2Jns tead o f t r ea t i ng the r e f l e x arc , o r

the st imUlus-response mechanism, as a s e r i e s o f t echnica lunre la ted sub-actSi, Dewey i s seeking the mechanism o f thecoordinat ion o f the ac t as a un i t a ry func t ion .

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In f i l l i ng t h i s view out , Dewey denies the poss ib i l i t yof e xpe r i e n t i a l l y making a rad ica l d i s t i nc t i on between thes t imulus and the response. The "response i s necessary to

t t t t ' t ,,13ons u e ne s lmu us . . A response i s a media t iono f a s t imulus . Considered from the poin t o f 'view o f ex-per ience Dewey i s saying t ha t our conduct in the world i st ha t o f a un i f i ed ac to r and t ha t any explana t ion of t ha tconduct must be ab.le to expla in the un i ty o f ac t ion . Themodel o f an arc is not appropr i a t e for the explana t ion o fthe responses o f a minded organism. Dewey's model i s t ha to f Ita c i r c u i t , not an arc o r broken segment o f a ci rc le . , ,14Dewey i s saying t ha t the d i s t i nc t i on between s t imulus andresponse i s a funct ional or t e l e o log ic a l d i s t i nc t i on andno t an ex i s t en t i a l o r on to log ica l d i s t i nc t i on . A response


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i s an i n t e rp r e t a t i on o f a s t imulus . Response i s a processwhereby organisms s t ruc ture o r organize exper ience andt h e i r behaviour with re fe rence to reaching o r mainta in ingan end. IS

Mead, fol lowing Dewey, c r i t i c i z e s watson on thegrounds t ha t the mechanis t ic concept ion o f response tos t imul i i s inadequate to expla in the major i ty o f humanac t ions . That i s a mechanist ic model can of fe r explana-t i ons only in a very l imi ted number o f s i t ua t ions . Forexample, hab i tua l behaviour o r the behaviour o f a companyof s o ld i e r s can be exp la ined under t h i s model bu t thecond i t ion ing model cannot expla in the incept ion o f theha b i t nor the or ig ins o f the commands to which the t roopsare mechanica l ly responding. For Mead, responses arealways ad jus t ive . This i s to say t ha t s t imul i alwaysrequ i re i n t e rp r e t a t i on . The t o t a l f i e l d o f sensuouss t imula t ion i s always much g re a t e r than the ac tua l aspec to f the f i e l d to which a response i s made. This se lec t iveelement o f a respanse changes the na ture o f the s t imulus .Responses have to be seen on an i n t e r ac t ion i s t model andnot on a mechanical model whi.ch has an i somorphic cor res -pondence between s t imulus and response . The environment i sa f fec ted and changed by the :response j u s t as much as theorganism i s a f fec ted by the s t imulus

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watson s model i s a simple S R de te rmina t ion .Mead I S model i s more l i ke t h i s S (r s) R. The cap i t a lS a n d R are the same as watson I s from the po in t o f view o fan observer bu t for Mead the or i g i na l S i s in te rpre ted (smallr) and t h i s i n t e rp re t a t i on changes the nature o f the S (hencechanging the environment for lthe organism). t i s the i n t e r -pre ted S which l eads to ac t ion (R). Mead i s hold ing tha twatson s model does not requ i re an actor , i . e . , we canmechan is t i ca l ly s t imula te a l l possib le responses withoutreference to the organism. Mead r e j e c t s t h i s complete lyby holding t ha t the i n t e rp re t a t i on i s r e l a t i v e to the needso r the i n t e r e s t s o f the organism being s t imula ted . To putt h i s another way, which w i l l be c l a r i f i e d in grea te r d e t a i ll a t e r in the paper for Mead minded organisms have ah i s t o ry indeed, in Mead s extended sense of h i s to ry ,minded organisms are t he i r his tory . watson s concept iono f mind makes h i s t o ry i r r e l evan t . For watson, the con-di t ion ing process Qccurred in t ime but t ime i s essen t i a l l yi r r e l evan t to the condi t ioning process . For Mead, as wesha l l see , the not ion o f temporal i ty i s c ruc i a l to thegenes is o f the se l f .

Mead i s asking for the cond i t ions w i th in which thef h d d 1 6exper lence 0 t e ~ lVl ua a r l se s . The key mechanism

a l lowing for the development o f mind and s e l f i s language.


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Language "has to be s tudied from the poin t o f view o f theg e s t u ra l type o f c:onduct with in which t ex i s t ed withoutbe ing as such a de f in i t e language. And we have to see howthe communicative func t ion could have a r i sen out o f t ha t

. 17p r i o r s o r t o f conduct . I The bas ic . form o f a l l cornmunica-t i on i s ges tu re . For animals t h i s i s t h e i r only form o fcommunication. Mead's famous example i s t ha t o f a dogf i gh t . In t h i s example one animal recognizes the i n t en t iono r a t t i t ude o f the o ther . Each movement o f one animalse rves as a s t imulus to which the o ther animal responds.Mead c a l l s t h i s a conversa t ion o f gestures . I o assurnp-t i on o f consc iousness o r o f r e f l ec t i on i s necessary fo rsuch a conversa t ion . Any act.ion which one ind iv idua lperforms and which ano ther ind iv idua l t akes to 'be a

. 1 . . . t 18stJJnU us requ1r1ng a response 1S a g e s ure .Wha t i s l acking in the conversa t ion o f ges tu res to

q u a l i fy t as a language i s t:he ob jec t ive ba s i s o f secureo r sha rab le meanings. That i s , a ges ture by A need notcommunicate anything to B except what B happened to takethe ges tu re as s igni fy ing . But the s ign i f i c a n t po in tabout ges tu res i s t ha t they are the or ig ina l and rudimentaryform o f a l l soc ia l ac t s . They do not r equ i re consciousness .All they r equ i re i s the a b i l i t y to make a response whichad jus t s the behaviour o f one animal to the ges tu re o f

19another . Objec t ive communication i s imposs ib le un t i l


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A s ges tu re can ~ o u s e the s c ~ e response in B as it wasin tended to arouse by A. For Head it i s the voca l ges tu ret ha t makes t h i s possib le .

Mead holds t ha t the unique ro le o f the vocal ges ture ,in the genes is o f the se l f , i s t ha t it alone among ges tu resi s observab le o ~ access ib le to both p a r t i e s o f theconversa t ion l We cannot see our hands and shou lders in

ges tu r ing , we canmot see our f a c i a l movements in conver-sa t ion , we cannot observe t he i r i n t e rp l a y in an argumentb u t we can hea r the i n f l e c t i on o f tone the p i t c h and thet imbre o f our voca l gestures. . This i s no t to say t ha t wecan necessa r i ly hea r our voc.al g ~ s t u r e s with the ears o fthe o ther pa r ty b ~ t voca l ges tu re i s the f i r s t form o fconversa t ion in which the p o s s i b i l i t y ex i s t s fo r ob jec t ivecommunication. Im vocal ges tu res , because can observethe ges tu re , along with " 3, the poss ib i l i t y ex i s t s for thees tabl i shment o f the i den t i t y o f what i s be ing communicatedand ~ v h t i s be ing rece ived in the communication.

Vocal ges tu res a re o f C01 1rSe s igns for th ings in theworld a t l e a s t they were with r espec t to or ig ins . In

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l a t e r s tages o f development t.hese s igns became symbols i . e . ,they were no longer t i ed down to the presence o f the th ingsbe ing voca l ized . vm n the voca l ges ture o f serves as as t imulus for as wel l as a s t imulus for Bls response t ha tdef ines the r e l a t i on as a s ign i f i c a n t ges tu re . t i s no


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longer a s imple gelsture because, i the re i s to be communi-ca t ion the response can no longer be a rb i t r a ry . Thetendency o f A to r 'espond to h i s vocal ges tu re in the sameway as B wi l l respond o r t ends to respond presupposes acommon soc ia l (sha.red) mode o f behaviour . This commonelement , t h i s element which se rves to c rea te an i den t i t ybetween the two relsponses A Us and B s) i s meaning. Themeaning i s independent o f the th ing i t s e l f bu t i s dependenton shared common forms o f ac t ion .

Meaning i s a t r i a d i c re la t ionship . Meaning i s thecement which holds a socia.l a c t toge ther from the incept iono f the shared a c t i v i t y through the or ig ina l s t imulus and thel a t e r s tages o f the ac t . By ac t and soc ia l ac t I do notmean e labora te o r over ly compl icated s e t s o f behaviour .A soc ia l ac t i s s imply one in which more than one ind iv idua li s impl ica ted and the impl ica t ion need not r equ i re phys ica lpresence . Thus, the buying o f a g i f t i s a soc ia l acto asi s the of f e r ing o f a c ha i r to ano ther person . Meaning doesnot r equ i re consc iousness bu t it does r equ i re some ob jec t iveshared charac te r i s l t i c . Mead c a l l s t h i s common cha rac t e r i s t i c 4a t t i t udes . 20At t i tudes are the beginnings of a c t s . They arethe s oc i a l l y condi t ioned d i spos i t ions which have accompaniedour l ea rn ing o f a language and the way o f l i f e involved int ha t language. That i s a t t i t udes are the behavioura l d i spos i -t ions co r re l a t ed to meanings. At t i tudes are the funct ional

1 f 'd 21equJ.va en t 0 J. ea s.


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For Mead the re are phys io log ica l coun te rpar t s toh i s psychology. Mead's para l l e l i sm i s much broader thanthe assoc i a t i on i s t i c model which had dominated psycho-logys ince Hume. 22 His i s designed to account for the dynamicforms o f experience. Mead sees para l l e l i sm as the a t t emptto f ind analogues between act : ion and exper ienced conten-ts. ,,23

Answering to a t t i tudE s are pathways o f the c e n t r a lnervous system. What Mead i s doing i s to analogize fromthe r e f l e x pathways such as t:he knee- je rk r e f l e x to the va s tcomplexi ty o f the c e n t r a l nex'Vous system i t s e l f . He holdst ha t a t t i t udes o r ideas are rep re sen ted in the cent ra l n e r vous sys tem's pathways j u s t as the phys io log ica l func t ionsa re represented . He i s a t tempt ing to f ind some phys io log ica lmechanism which wi l l a l low him to re in t roduce consc iousnessi n to psychology without v io l a t i ng h i s behav iour i s t i c demands.I th ink t ha t Mead f e l t cons t ra ined to do t h i s because o fthe power o f the watso_nian inf luence in psychology. Another,and more impor tant reason, goes back to Dewey and h i s work.

In order to have a c i r c u i t as opposed to an arc theremust be more than j u s t a spat : ia l dimension to the phys ica lsystem i t s e l f . t must a l so have a temporal dimension. Im holding t ha t Mead himse l f was never very c l ea r on h i s

para l l e l i sm. He was never sure hm.. f a r he wished to go tokeep with in a r igorous s c i e n t i f i c , L e . , empir ica l account


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o f behaviour . What he was searching for were funct ionalequ iva len t s which conce ivably could account fo r h i spsychology. The not ion o f ha bi t s plays a grea t ro le inh i s thought and hence he needs a way o f account ing forthe pa s t with in presen t condu.ct. Mead w r i t e s :

The pa s t t ha t i s in our presen t exper ience i st he re because o f the c e n t r a l nervous systemin r e l a t i on to the r e s t o f the organism The pa s t must be found in the presen t world .From the s tandpoint of b e ha v io r i s t ic psychology we pick ou t the c e n t r a l nervous system onlybecause t i s t ha t which i s the immediatemechanism through whi.ch our organism opera tesin br inging the pa s t to opera te on the presen t .I f we vlant to underst:and the way in \-lhich anorganism responds to a c e r t a in s i t ua t i on whichhas a pas t we have t:o g e t in to the e f fec t s o fthe p a s t ac t ions on t :hat organism which havebeen l e f t in the c e n t r a l nervous system. Therei s no ques t ion about t ha t f a c t . 24

The main reason for my wishing to emphasize t h i s passage

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i s t ha t t i s so uncharacter i . s t ic o f Mead. In o ther p laceswhen Mead t a lks o f fac t s he presen t s some. Here he doesno t . The whole tone o f the passage i s more l i ke a man whoi s t ry ing to convince himself: than the reader . But I th inkt ha t a l l t ha t Mead i s unsure o f i s the exac t mechanism fo rt h i s process . 1: vhat he i s convinced o f i s t ha t the c e n t r a lnervous system has a temporal dimension o f some so r t whicha l lows fo r the i nh ib i t i on o f presen t conduct .

consc iousness i s a response to a problemat ic s i t ua t ion .When h a b i t u a l behaviour becomes inadequa te to dea l wi th a


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presen t s i t ua t ion when nevI meanings are being ind ica tedin a s i t ua t ion o r when a novel experience i s encounteredwe then become conscious o f the symbols we are usingthe s igns we are i nd ica t ing a nd the ob jec t s around us.Unt i l a presen t course o f act ion i s thwar ted we are notconsc ious for Mead Consciousness i s a response whicha l lows for an adjus tment o f behaviour The i nh ib i t i ono f conduct occurs a t a po in t in t ime a f t e r an ac t has

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been i n i t i a t e d . t i s the temporal dimension o f the cent ra lnervous system which al lows fo r the e a r l i e r s tages o f thea c t to be re t a ined as the ob jec t s o f thought o r conscious-ness whi le we th ink through poss ib le modes o f the con-t i nua t ion o f the conduct Hence consciousness i s func-t i ona l fo r Mead and not sUbst:antive 25

The b ra i n has the meehanism for ach iev ing conscious-ness b u t consc iousness i t s e l f i s a p a r t o f the human en-vironment Our mode o f experiencing the environment i sas much a p a r t o f the environment as the a c t u a l phys icalob jec t s with in the environment There i s no food inna tu re except in so fa r as t he re ex i s t s an organism whichcan use those ob jec t s as food In the same way the re a reno problemat ica l s i t ua t ions in the environment exceptr e l a t i v e to an organism whicft has i n t e r e s t s and needssuch t ha t the environment becomes problemat ica l . But


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r e l a t i v e to t h a t organism the environment i t s e l f i sprob lema t i ca l .

15

Mead sees consc iousness as the response to s i t ua t ionsand as the mechanism fo r t he p o s s i b i l i t y o f the con t ro l o fconduct in mode unique to man and fundamental ly d i f f e r e n tfrom the - t r i a l and e r ro r method o f con t ro l used by animals .Consciousness i s not on ly aware o f the ac tu a l i n h i b i t o ryelements o f t he environment bu t it holds t he i n h i b i t i o nup to s t andard 1. e . the i n t e r e s t o r need whichi n i t i a t e d the ac t ion in the f i r s t place .

The phys io log ica l b a s i s for Mead s p a r a l l e l i s m i st he d i s t i n c t i o n between motor processes and sensoryprocesse s . Motor processes are non-conscious; sensoryprocesses a re conscious . The sensory processes s e l e c tcourses o f ac t ion which are given by the a l t e rna t ivemodes av a i l ab l e in the motor processes . For example, welo se the keys to our ca r . e pause and t r y to th ink o fwhere they can be. e focus our a t t e n t ion on our day.

e look in to t he car and see the keys still in the i gn i t ion .e look to see if the window i s cracked little, if it

i s we look for long t h in ob jec t . I f it isn t we mayhave to break the window. e look fo r heavy ob jec t .In a l l o f these pr:ocesses the re i s an i n t e r e s t o r p u r pose he ld f i rmly in mind. This i n t e r e s t d ic t a t e s to our


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sensory processes a c r i t e r ion which they then a t tend toon the ba s i s o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s ava i l ab le to them fromthe motor processes . The sensory processes inform ust ha t our f inger s cannot ge t through t ha t t i ny crack in thewindow. This i n i t i a t e s the process o f r e f l e c t i on seekings imi la r c l a sses o f exper ience which correspond to apathway o r a t t i t ude with in the motor processes .

Consciousness o f the s i t ua t ion i s mit i a t ed whenthe s tandard motor processes are no longer adequate int h e i r performance. In o ther words, when ac t ion can nolonger be hab i tua l , the response to t ha t s i t ua t i on by aminded organism i s ca l led conscious. Consciousness i sa s e l e c t i ve mechanism; se lec t ion i s sens i t i z ing the organto s t imu l i . . 26 Consciousness s e l e c t s contents wi th inexperience; consc iousness makes ce r t a i n contents acces-s i b l e to the ind iv idua l . In so doing, an observer i sa l so given access to the contents o f consciousness .

This se lec t ive func t ion o f consc iousness l eadsto Mead1s theory o f un iversa l s . A p a r t i c u l a r ob jec t i sc a l l e d a soc ia l ob jec t by Mead i two o r more ind iv idua l smay impl ica te t ha t ob jec t , i . e . , use it i de n t i c a l l y ,

h ' 27W1t 1n an ac The capac i ty o f more than one indiv idualto share i de n t i c a l a t t i t udes toward the same o b j e c t makest ha t ob jec t a soc ia l ob jec t . Consciousness func t ions to


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i so l a t e those cha rac t e r i s t i c s o f ob jec t s which are usefu lin a par t i cu l a r s i t ua t i on . Behav iour i s t i ca l ly conscious-ness has i t s or ig in in the s ~ n processes which give r i s eto un iversa l s .

Any ob jec t o r aspect o f an ob jec t which w i l l s a t i s -fy a need without necessa r i ly cor responding to presen tob jec t s i s a un iver sa l fo r Mead. 28 Methodologica l ly ti s the t a sk o f behaviourism to account for conduct fromthe po in t o f view o f observed responses . Mead i s arguingt ha t we are not s t imula t ed by a p a r t i c u l a r when our responsescan be c a l l e d consc ious i . e . when the ind iv idua l i sopera t ing in a problemat ica l s i t ua t i on and not in a hab i tua lone. Universa ls are responses j u s t as consc iousness i s aresponse . But j u s t as the mechanism fo r consc iousness i salways presen t so the mechanism fo r un iver sa l s i s alwayspresen t in the symbols o f language. The symbolic na tureo f language and the temporal dimension o f the nervous systema l low abs t rac t ions to be en te r t a ined and he ld whi le aprocess o f th inking or s e l e c t i ve obse rva t ion i s going on.

e always th ink in un iver sa l s because thought a r i s e s inthe i nh ib i t i on o f conduct . 29 Mead i s t ry ing to accountfo r un iver sa l s w i th in h i s behav iour i s t i c or i e n t a t i on . edoes t h i s by seeing the s t imul i as a p a r t i c u l a r whichi nh i b i t s conduct and the response to the i nh ib i t i on asthe un iversa l . In the i nh ib i t i on a so lu t ion i s sought forthe problem. This search i s r e f l ec t i on and involves the


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ac t ive a t tend ing to memory and the presen t f i e l d o f percept i on fo r any kind o f a so lu t ion to the problem. In myexample on p 11, we do not look for the key to the ca rbu t we look for something which i s key- l ike somethingwhich w i l l serve to open the ca r . e are seeking a p a r t i c u l a r so lu t ion to a p a r t i c u l a r problem bu t our responseinvolves a bs t r a c t genera l aspects o f the s i t ua t ion whichare \vhat Mead ca l l s un iversa l s . Thought a l so shares thecha rac t e r i s t i c o f so much o f Mead s th inking t ha t o fbe ing ad jus t ive . Thought i s a process o f ad jus t ing needsto s i tua t i ons


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MIND, SELF A1 TD SOCIETY: TH SELF

As l n g u ~ g e i s necessary for the emergence o f mindso t i s necessary fo r the emergence o f a s e l f . Mindemerged as the mechanism which al lowed an ad ju s t i v e responsebased on the meaning o f so c i a l ac ts . Language func t ionsto i nd ica te charac te r s o f ob jec t s which can be meaningfu l lycormnunicated and ac ted toward ,,y ith re fe rence to the f i e l do f coopera t ive behaviour . Sel f , l i k e mind has a h i s t o ry .Neither_c is: wi th in the ind iv idua l a t b i r t h : liThe s e l f i ssomething which has a development; t i s not i n i t i a l l ythe re , at b i r t h , b u t a r i s e s in the process o f soc ia l ex-pe r i ence and ac t i v i t y , t ha t develops in the given in -d iv idua l as a r e s u l t o f h i s r e l a t i ons to ' t h a t process asa It/hole and to o ther ind iv idua l s wi t h in t h a t process . IThe foca l po in t fo r the organ iza t ion o f experience i s these l f . The s e l f and i t s organ iza t ion i s r a d i c a l ly d i s t i n c tfrom the psycho log ica l and phys io log ica l p rocesse s whichch a r ac t e r i z e mind. Our organ iza t ion o f bodi ly experiencei s s t ruc-tured around a s e l f ; b u t the s e l f i s d i s t i n c t fromthese o b jec t i v e exper iences . Objec t ive i s being used he rein the sense o f p e r t a in in g to an ob jec t , in t h i s case thebody. The s e l f i s the on ly sub jec t which has i t s e l f fo ran ob jec t .

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Mind and consc iousness are a l l charac te r i za t ionso f the ob jec t which have been ca l l i ng the ind iv idua l .As aspects o f exper ience which pe r t a in to the ind iv idua lthey are sub jec t ive modes o f exper ience . Thei r exper iencei s always o f something o ther than themselves . That i s ,consc iousness i s always consc iousness o f something towardwhich consc iousness i s a response . Simi la r ly , mind i salways a response to a ges tu re , to a problem, to a s i t -ua t ion . As these aspec ts o f the ind iv idua l a re cente redon the world in sOme way we can charac te r i ze t h e i r kindo f exper ience as discont inuous . These ana lyses do notaccount fo r the con t inu i ty o f exper ience , memory, or ,most impor tant ly , the i n i t i a t : ion o f act ion .

The s e l f i s what can be both sub jec t and ob jec t .The s e l f i s e n t i r e ly d i s t ingu i shab le from an organismt ha t i s surrounded by th ings and ac t s with reference tot h ings , inc luding pa r t s o f i t s own body. 2 Mead basest h i s on an observa t iona l charac te r i za t ion o f consciousness .That i s , t ha t the re are exper iences in which we are ' immersed'in our ac t iv i ty . Our actions: may be t o t a l l y focused on ourbehaviour o r on the th ings toward which we are act ing .There i s a consc iousness in these ac t ions bu t the re i s notthe consc iousness o f an involvement o f the s e l f with thesea c t i v i t i e s . t i s the problem o f how can an ind iv idua l


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ge t ou ts ide himsel .f (exper ien t ia l ly) in such a way as tobecome an ob jec t to himself? , ,3 In t h i s case , the in -d iv idua l has go t ten comple te ly ou ts ide o f himse l f andi s ac t ing exc lus ive ly in the objec t ive sense .

Through la1nguage and the soc ia l process man canno t only be an ob jec t to himse l f bu t man can be aware t ha the i s be ing an ob jec t . Mead i s i n s i s t i n g on t h i s idea o fob j ec t i v i t y so t ha t he can answer a very o ld phi losophicques t ion: What d les t mean to be a r a t i ona l man?Mead's genera l framework fo r the answer i s given in t h i squote : For the ind iv idua l organism i s obvious ly anessen t i a l and impor tant f a c t o r c o n s t i t u e n t element o fthe empir ica l s i tUiat ion in which t ac ts j and withouttak ing ob jec t ive alCcoun't o f i t s e l f as such, t cannotac t i n t e l l i gen t l y , o r r a t i ona l ly . . 4 To be a r a t i ona lman means to be sei l f-conscious. Rat iona l i ty i s ava lua t ive concept . To be se l f - consc ious i s to have a

se l f To be ra t : ional , man must evaluate h imself as ap a r t o f the f i e l d with in which he i s act ing . The coreo f r a t i o n a l i t y i s the a b i l i t y to o f f e r explana t ions forac t ions . The kind o f explana t ions offe red var i es withthe soc ie ty . Thisi i s t r u e only because the ac t ionsthemselves d i f f e r in d i f fe ren t s oc i e t i e s , i . e . , to sayt h a t behaviour d i f f e r s i s to s t a t e condi t ions for ac t ion


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and thereby cond i t ions fo r explana t ion . The po in t t ha t Meadi s making i s t ha t the goa l i s the same in a l l s oc i e t i e s i.e.to give r a t i ona l accounts o f behaviour . Explana t ions aremodeled along soc ia l l i ne s which demand t ha t behaviourbe exp l icab le .

Rat iona l behaviour i s a cha rac t e r i s t i c o f humanbehaviour because only man has language and thereby symbolicbehaviour . e exp la in the behaviour o f o thers as wel l asour own behaviour in te rms vlhich are communicable. Thecommunication may be in tended fo r ano ther person o raddressed to ourselves . The explana t ion i s so c i a l int he same sense as the behaviour to be exp la ined i s soc ia l .Behaviour i s soc ia l because it i s based on goal achievementwhich can only be a t t a ine d by coopera t ive ad ju s t i v e b e-haviour . Explana t ion i s soc ia l because i t s mode i s t ha to f language which i s the human mechanism which a l lows t hevery processes o f adjus tment which are what we mean bys oc i a l to be e f fec ted .

In h i s behav iour the ac to r assumes the a t t i t udeso f o thers toward himse l f and a c t s with re fe rence to him-s e l f as ob jec t r a the r than as SUbject . The exper ience o fthe ind iv idua l gUq ind iv idua l i s p o s s ib l e because he hasa cornmon s tandard which a l lows s e l f re fe rence ; i . e .language and the world o f soc ia l ob jec t s which arese lec ted by our language to be the environment which givesa l t e rna t ive modes o f ac t ion .


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Once a s e l f has emerged wi th in the i nd iv idua lorganism it i s able to provide a b a s i s for its \>JTl so c i a lexper ience . This i s anolther way o f aff i rming the un i tyo f the soc ia l ac t . That i s , because the s e l f has a r i senwi t h i n and th rough t he soc ia l process t h a t s e l f must beso c i a l . The so c i a l process has involved t he o rgan iza t iono f a t t i t udes in such a way aLS to al low the developmento f a s t ru c t u re which i s able to determine the se lec t ionof c e r t a in a t t i t udes o r courses o f behaviour over o ther swithout , a t the same t ime, being determined by the causa ls e r i e s which a re se lec ted to p a r t i c i p a t e in . The causa ls e r i e s r e f e r s to the d i sce rn ib le pe rcep tua l p a t t e rn swhich are revea led through memory and obse rva t ion . Eveni we gran t a s t r i c , t determinism to the events in theVlOrld, Mead i s a s se r t i n g that the re i s hUman freedomand t h i s freedom e x i s t s in t he i n d i v i d u a l s a b i l i t yto s e l e c t the po in t a t which he s ha l l ent.er the causa lp rocesse s . The d e t a i l s o f t h i s ana lys i s must wai t forthe sec t ion on pelrspect ives . The p o in t I wish to s t r e s shere i s t h a t only a f t e r the s e l f has emerged can it beseen as s o l i t a ry , i e . , t h a t the s e l f can c rea te i t s ownso c i a l experience, .

A d is t inc t ion must be dra\\rr1 between the un i ty o ft he soc ia l ac t , the u n i ty o f mind, and the un i ty o f these l f . The un i ty o f the soc ia l ac t i s the co n t in u i t y


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o f the process o f adjustment. i t s e l f t aken a t any l eve l .To i so l a t e t h i s kind o f co n t in u i t y i s to t ranscend theso c i a l process i t s e l f and fo r Mead t h i s i s imposs ib le

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as we would have t o s t ep out.side o f language to do t h i s .ou ts ide o f a symbolic frarnew ork we would not on ly beincapab le o f communicating the exper ience b u t we couldnot have o r be aware o f dis t . inc t ions wi th in our pe rcep tua lf i e l d and hence could not ha.ve an i d e n t i f i a b l e exper ience .The i so l a t e d ind iv idua l i s i so l a t e d only in t ha t he cani nd ica te h i s i s o l a t i on to himse l f .

The u n i ty o f mind i s an aspec t o f the un i ty o fthe se l f . The u n i ty o f the mind i s the consc iousnesso f the world i n s o f a r as t h i s awareness o f the world canbe r e l a t e d to a po te n t i a l ac t ion . This i s a r a t h e rvague unders tand ing as we CQuld have an exper ience whichwe did no t undersltand and c a l l t a W Q ~ r d experience;t h i s na. 11e would then be s u f f i c i e n t fo r us to a c t i n t e l l i -gen t ly o r meaningful ly . Mind i s the mechanism for themediat ion o f behaviour . Mind l e ads to behav iour basedon ts recept ion o f s t imu l i from wi th in o r withou tthe organism. Mind i t s e l f i s a response to these st irnu-l a t i ons . This a b i l i t y to func t ion as mind i s dependenton i ts adequacy tl c o r re l a t e s t imu l i and responses .I t s un i ty i s ts func t ion . .As mind i s a response t i s


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always consc ious o f the pa r t : i cu la r aspec ts o f theorganism which it i s involving in making its responsesadequate . As y e t t h e r e i s still no reason o r c r i t e r i afo r adequacy o r fo r the no t ion o f s e l ec t i o n i t s e l f .t i s not enough to say thai: success fu l func t ion ing i s

the reason why mind s e l e c t s p a t t e r n s o f behav iour whichw i l l l e ad to comple t ion o f c e r t a in t a sks . The reasonfo r se lec t ion and the c r i t e r i a o f adequacy i e . when

25

to cease t ha t kind o f ac t ion because the goal i s eva lua tedas be ing a t t a i n e d a ~ e given by the s e l f through s e l f -consciousness .

To b r i n g the concept:s o f g e s t u r e language and s e l ft oge the r we must examine in d e t a i l t he genes i s o f the s e l f .The concept o f ro l e t ak ing i s c ru c i a l to the unders tand ingo f language and t he se l f . Role t ak i n g i s the formalmechanism by which one i nd iv idua l assumes the a t t i t u d e o fano ther ind iv idua l ; ro le t ak ing a l lows i d e n t i c a l p a r -t i c i p a t i o n by number o f ind iv idua l s in t he i d e n t i c a lmeaning which to one i n d i v i d u a l may be seen as sub-j e c t i ve . Role t ak ing beg ins in the play o f ch i ld ren .

Chi ld ren play a t something. They observe v a r i o u sp a t t e rn s o f ac t ion around them. In p l a y they invo lvethemselves in these ac t ions and play a t these behav iours .Chi ld ren p l ay a t being mother o r f a th e r pol icemen


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s tore c l e rk s and a h o s t o f olther behavioura l pa t te rns .The chi ld i s conscious o f h i s ro le play ing . e hasorgan ized these behaviours in to h i s consc iousness andi s ac t ing as i he were the o ther . The chi ld cannotconsc ious ly express t h i s orga.nizat ion bu t he can a c ton the ba s i s o f t h i s organiza . t ion. Not only must thec h i ld organize the ro le o f the p a r t i c u l a r ind iv idua lhe i s playing a t be ing bu t must organize the ro l e so f the mUlti tude o f o thers ~ 1 are impl ica ted by t ha tone ro le . For example a mother i s a mother becauseof s pe c i f i c ac t ions she performs wi t h reference tofa the r , ch i ld ren , pe t s and the milkman. The ch i ld . int ak ing the ro l e o f the mother must not only organizethe mother ' s ro l e b u t must organize a l l o f these o therro l e s so t ha t the ch i ld can be a success fu l mother. In

6

p lay the c h i ld i s car ry ing on a conversa t ion o f ges tu res . 6The next s tage o f development i s the organized game.

Here the chi ld i s still playing b u t to p lay a game he hasto know ru les and spec i f i ca l l y which o f those ru les applyto him. e must a l so know Dhat t he re are a va r i e ty o fro les which are i n t eg ra ted in to t h i s t o t a l pa t t e rn c a l l e da game. To p lay he must now know h i s r e l a t i on to a l l o fthe o ther ro l e s in the game. This i s d i f f e r e n t from thef i r s t s tage o f play where the ch i ld had a c e r t a in l i cense


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in the spec i f ic ro l e s he assigned e . g . , to fa the r , ch i ld ,or pe t . In the game the rol,es are def i n i t e and the ch i ldmust accept t h i s de te rmina t ion i he i s to p lay the game.The ru l e s de l inea te a se t o f condi t ions which demand t ha tthe chi ld take the a t t i t ude o f poss ib le fu tu re even t sr a the r than immediate spontaneous c rea t ions o f behavioursas he was a t l i be r ty to c rea te in the case o f play . Inthe game, the ru les desc r ibe p o s s ib i l i t i e s . In baseba l l ,for example, the ru les t e l l one how to score runs and howto prevent the o ther team from scor ing . The ru l e s d i c t a t et ha t the ind iv idua l in the ou t f i e l d thrm l the b a l l to thebase ahead o f the p layer on a p a r t i c u l a r base . Thei n d i v i d u a l s ro l e i s now r e l a t i v e to the s i t ua t ion andl imi t ed by the exis t ing cond i t ions . In knowing the ru l e so f a game and the va r i e ty o f ro les which make up t ha t gamethe ind iv idua l has an organi :zat ion o f a t t i t udes and re -sponses; but , t h i s organ iza t ion does not ye t involve as e l f . The organ iza t ion i s a t a p a r t i c u l a r l eve l and i sno t a genera l ized a t t i t u d e o f behaviour . The game i s stilla game and the ru les are spec i f ic enough to prec lude thei n d i v i d u a l s see ing h imse l f as an ob jec t . That i ss theru l e s are not ye t organized i n to the soc ia l process .

The organ iza t ion of h i s r o l e to the ru les i sstill seen as given to the ind iv idua l . The importance o fthe move from p lay to the gmne i s t ha t the not ion o f the


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o t h e r has become in t roduced to the ch i ld . In play thec h i ld i s the ro le and the o thers involved in t ha t ro leserve to def ine the ro l e t h a t ~ the chi ld i s playing. Inthe game the chi ld l ea rns h i s ro le only in r e l a t i onto o t h e r ro l e s which the c h i ld only has to p lay impl ic i t ly .t i s lithe organized o m m u n i t ~ y o r soc ia l group which gives

to the ind iv idua l h i s un i ty o f s e l f (and th i s ) may bec a l l e d t he genera l ized o ther . , , ,7 This i s the a t t i t u d e o fthe community; it develops from the game in t ha t the en, t i re se t s o f ind iv idua l s involved in the game and the ru lesform the genera l i zed o ther o f t ha t game. v v ~ e n the in -d iv idua l begins to consciousl .y work ou t s t r a t eg i c problems,to ask himself what would I do if I were in such and sucha p o s i t i o n , and when he begins to organize h i s ac t ion inthe game on the ba s i s o f what: he th inks the o thers in -thegame are expec t ing him to do, on a consc ious l eve l , thenthe s e l f i s beginning to forItll The team s p i r i t i s thes p i r i t o f the genera l i zed o ther .

In the i nd iv idua l i s a c t o f r e f e r r ing h i s a t t i t udesto a genera l soc ia l a t t i t u d e which he sees a t work in thegroup the s e l f i s be ing exh ib i ted . The re fe rence hasmeaning because t h i s i den t i f i ca t i on o f a t t i t u d e s with thoseo f the group i s based on the i nd iv idua l s unders tanding andknowledge t ha t they are h i s a . t t i tudes , i e . , they belong to


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himse l f as an ob jec t with which he can i de n t i f y thea t t i t u d e s . In p lay the c h i ld i s only conscious o f h i sro l e in the game a l l o f the ro l e s are ex te rna l to theind iv idua l .

Play and the game a l so in troduce the not ion o fpurpose. Play i s an a c t i v i t y fo r i t s O\Am sake. Thegame in t roduces a goa l . One plays a game to win. I fone i s playing defense he defends in order to win. Thegame not only in t roduces the not ion of u l t im a te goa ls(winning) bu t the not ion o f subs id ia ry goa ls o r means(defending) . At the l eve l of the en t i r e soc ia l group,the goa ls a re se t ou t by the genera l i zed o ther . The

9

v a l i d i t y o f these soc ia l goa ls i s propor t iona l to thea t t i t u d e s o f the ind iv idua l s who make up t ha t soc ie ty .The not ion of p r iva t e propert :y has no force in a soc ie tydependent on th ievery fo r i t s ex is tence . J u s t as in af ragmented soc ie ty you have d i f fe ren t kinds o f s oc i a l i z a -t ion , so the divergence o f goa ls i s a func t ion o f thecohes ion o f the var ious groups with in a socie ty .

On any l eve l t i s the s e t o f conunon responseso f the pa r t i c ipa t ing ind iv idua l s which gives the meaningto the soc ia l goa ls and values . To par t i c i pa t e in soc ia lva lues the c h i ld must move a i.lTay from the kind o f locuso f exper ience which he had in p lay and the game. In both


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a t t i t u d e s o f o thers in ourselves and ac t on the ba s i s o fthese soc ia l ro le s . The con:sciousness i s no t the sameas the consc iousness which i:s a response to the mind, nori s the se lec t ive a b i l i t y o f -the s e l f the same so r t o fs e l e c t ive mechanism as i s at- tent ion. The consc iousnesso f mind a l lows us to f ind a l t e rna t i ve modes o f conductwith in the process o f a t t e n t ion . t i s an a na ly t i c a lo r i so l a t i ng mechanism. This mode o f consc iousness se rvesto i nd ica te the cCl.uses o f a problem; in i t s e l f it i s notcapable o f f inding a l t e rna t i ve kinds o f conduct . t canbe compared to a f l a sh l i gh t which se rves to h igh l igh taspec t s o f our environment and to focus on spec i f ic ob jec t s .The i l lumina t ion o f a problem i s not the so lu t ion o f t ha tproblem. The con t inu i ty o f our behaviour , the purpos ive-ness o f our behaviour , and the i n i t i a t i o n o f one kind o fconduct r a the r than another kind i s the work o f the se l f .

This d i s t i nc t i on i s recognized t e rmino log ica l lyby the I and the me.

The I I ' l ~ e s behind the range o f ~ e d i a t e exper ience . In terms o f soc ia l conduct t h i s i stantamount to saying t ha t we can perce ive ourresponses only as they appear as images frompa s t exper ience , merging with the sensuouss t imula t ion . He cannot presen t the responsewhi le we are responding. e cannot use ourresponses to o ther s as mater i a l s for the cons t ruc t ion o f the s e l f t h i s imagery goes tomake up o ther se lves . e must s oc i a l l y s t i mulate ourselves to place a t our own d isposa lthe mater i a l ou t o f ~ h i c h our own se lves aswel l as those o f o thers must be made.


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The I I therefo l :e never can e x i s t as anob jec t in consciousness , b u t the very conve r :sa t i o n a l ch a r ac t e r o f our i nne r exper ience ,the very process o f reply ing to one IS m llt a lk , ~ p l i e s an I I beh ind the scenes whoans\Vers to the ges tu res , the symbols , t h a ta r i s e in consciousnesso The se l f - consc ious , ac tua l s e l f in so c i a lin te rcourse i s the o b jec t i v e Ime l o r melswith the I1>rocess o f J:esponse co n t in u a l l y goingon and implying a f i c t i t i o u s III always out o fs igh t o f mimself . lO

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Func t iona l ly t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s between hab i tua l behav iourand consc ious behaviour . Ha bi tual behaviour i s not thebehaviour o f the 1 1 1 1 . A ha b i t i s exh ib i ted in t h a t kindo f behav iour ~ l h i c l i l presupposes prev ious exper ience b u tdoes not require r e f l e c t i on to guaran tee t he ongoingnesso f t ha t behaviour . Consciousness i s the human responseto the d i s r u p t i o n o f h a b i t u a l behav iour . This i nd ica test he problem b u t d0es not so lve it The d is t inc t ion be -tween III and m can be i l l u s t r a t e d in te rms o f Mead ISmethodolog ica l c r i t e r i a o f access i b i l i t y .

The consciousness o f an o b j e c t s being problemat ica land t he consciousmess o f an o b j e c t s being an e x p e r i e n t i a li tem wi th in my f i e l d o f memoJ:y fo r eXaITl.ple do not havethe same kind o f access ib i l i1 :y about them. That i s , theprob lema t i ca l ob jec t i s ava i l ab le to a l l who share thesame percep tua l appara tus (wi th in l imi t s ) and p a r t i -c i p a t e in the same kinds o f ac t ion . This i s the kind o faccess which a l lows a fo rma l i za t ion o f the s e l f . It


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i s ind iv idua l only in so fa r as it can be corrununicated,L e . , put in to laJnguage. This kind o f e}"'Perience formsthe core o f Mead's i n t e r - s ub je c t ive theory o f meaning.

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The e x p e r i e n t i a l ,object i s pr iva t e bu t the consc iousnesso f t h i s ob jec t is not se l f - consc ious : "A man a lone has ,fo r tuna te ly o r unfor tunate ly , access to h i s o\ f f i toothache ,bu t t ha t i s not Wlhat we mean by se l f - consc iousness . lIl1

The procelss o f r e f l e c t i on , o f breaking a c t s in topa r t s and removing some a s pe c t s and adding o thers to theact i s the sphere o f conduct vl i th in which the s e l f a r i se s .The s e l f cannot be def ined in terms o f simple a c c e s s ib i l i t y .The s e l f has a development, t he s e l f i s h i s t o r i c a l . These l f , i i de n t i f i e d with the a c c e s s i b i l i t y o f pe rcep t ionsand percep tua l ob jec t s becomes a - h i s t o r i c a l and dependenton the givenness o f objec ts ' INi th in the presen t pe rcep tua lf i e l d . vlemory would be seen according to the Humeianc r i t e r i a o f force and vivacid;:y' The c r i t e r i a forac t i o n would be const .ant con junc t ion o f c e r t a in ~ m p r s s i o n sl eading to a kind o f pred ic t ion about the fu tu re . Meadwants a h i s t o r i c a l s e l f . Memory and ana lys i s cannotbe long to the p a r t o f the s e l f which i n i t i a t e s ac t ion ,L e . , the I . These aspects o f the s e l f belong to theobservable , be ha v iour i s t i c a l l y access ib le se l f , L e. thel ime

Methodologica l ly then , Meadhas an unknown in h i s


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ana lys i s o f the o r i g i n s o f the s e l f . His methodolog ica lcons idera t ions o f a c c e s s i b i l i t y and h i s demand t h a texper ience be recons t ruc ted in the same terms whichformulated t h a t exper ience for the ac to r cannot be met .The I i s not a p a r t o f our experience. t i s a condi-t i on fo r experien


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consequences o f the group ac t ion he could op t out and nosanct ion could be imposed on him which could coerce h i sbehaviour . The :t: ecognition o f the soc ia l pe rsona l i tyr equ i res a d i f fe ren t kind o f move. The soc ia l ex-per ience l i e s ou ts ide o f the ind iv idua l . It i s notsomething which the ind iv idua l can have without h i sac t ing on it The ru les o f a game are ava i l ab le to a l lthrough a process: \vhich does not r equ i re an i den t i f i ca t i ono f the s e l f with the ru le s . The d e s i r e to l ea rn the ru lesand thus to p lay and the reby be accepted by -the groupinvolves the in i t l i a l s tage o f the development o f the se l f .In order to par t i c i pa t e in t h i s soc ia l experience theind iv idua l must alct with in the soc ia l framework as a p a r to f t ha t framework. Soc ia l exper ience does not belong tothe ind iv idua l u n t i l the ind iv idua l ac t s on t ha t kind o fexper ience and makes it h i s .

To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s in the case o f memory, Meads t a t e s : I f we had no memory which i d e n t i f i e s exper ienceswith the se l f , th:en they would ce r t a i n l y disappear so fa ras t h e i r r e l a t i on to the s e l f i s concerned, and ye t theymight cont inue as sensuous o r sens ib le exper iences wi thout

- 12be ing t aken up i n to a se l f . Experience must be takenup i n to the se l f . Experience without the ac t ion o f anac to r i s not -the exper ience o f a se l f . The s e l f i s somekind o f an a c t which makes exper ience a p a r t o f the se l f .The I makes i t s e l f by o b j e c t i fy i n g i t s e l f and eva lua t ing


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i t s behaviaur . The terms a f behaviaur, the terms a f p e r e p ~. d h fIt 13 hl a n an t e terms a eva ua lIOn are p a r t t e pracess

which al lawed the I ta a r i se with in exper ience , L e . , thesac i a l exper ience a f language. The "I" cannat cammunicateits exper ience in terms a the r ' than thase which made up theabjec t ive exper ience in the f i r s t p lace . Only s a c i a l exper i -ence can be cammunicated. Ta be s a c i a l means t ha t we a c tau t s ide a f aurselvtesi ta be a s e l f means -that w i n t e rna l i z ethase ex te rna l exper iences . The s e l f emerges when the ac t i ano f the ind iv idua l i s media'ted by the sac i a l pracess a f i n t e r -p re t i n g the behaviour a f a t h e r s as symbal ic , L e . , t a lk ingover t h e i r behavialur ta a n e se l f and ac t ing an the ba s i s o fthe meaning a f those symbals.

The involv ement a f the s e l f means the tak ing a f theatti udes a f ather 'S taward anese l f . The c h i l d ' s ac t a fr e f e r r ing h i s ac t ion to the genera l i zed a the r a f ' the gamehas a new kind a f meaning ave r t ha t a f r a l e playing in thegame. In the game the meaning carnes fram the i den t i f i ca t i ana f the a t t i t u d e a f the ind iv idua l with t ha t a f the graup asan arganiza ' t i an a f respanses . The a t t i t u d e s a f the ind iv idua lin the game must r e f e r ta a t t i t udes ex te rna l ta the ind iv idua l .i.e. ta thase a f the genera l ized a the r .

This i s a pracess a f a b je c t i f y ing a n e se l f ta be in ab e t t e r pas i t i an ta determine the adequacy a f lOne's respanses .The respanse i s taward the meanings genera ted by the camman


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soc ia l exper ience o f the genera l i zed o ther through symbolic

behaviour . The response i s ra t ional , i e . it i s a con-t r o l l e d response eva lua t ing the means in a s i t ua t ion accor-ding to the des i r ed end

Methodologica l ly Mead i s using h i s c r i t e r i a o fcon t ro l . have shown why a c c e s s i b i l i t y i s not adequateto d i f f e r e n t i a t e s e l f exper ience from consc ious exper ienceOur ac t ion in the coopera t ive so c i a l s i t ua t i on i s success fu lto the ex ten t t h a t soc ia l ac t s can be completed This re -qu i res t ha t the respec t ive sUbjec t iv i t i e s involved in thes oc i a l ac t be de l imi t ed in thE:lir range o f a c t i v i t i e s .That i s , they see themselves as p a r t o f the l a rge r processo f coopera t ion . The var ious se lves coopera ted by ad jus t ingno t only to the s i t ua t ion a t hand bu t to the o ther se lvesinvolved in the soc ia l ac t as wel l . The soc ia l ac t in i t se n t i r e t y i s t h i s process o f ad jus t ive behaviour towardsan end The s e l f i s involved in t h i s kind o f behaviourwhen one sees t ha t the exper ience i t s e l f i s ex te rna l tothe ind iv idua l and t ha t o n e s re la t ionship to the exper iencei s eva lua ted as the o thers eva lua te it The s e l f sees him-s e l f as the r e l a t i o n sh i p within the ac t , as an ob jec t whichi s behaving in a cGntro l lable manner The act ions arei den t i f i ed with the behaving ob jec t and the behaving ob jec ti s the se l f .


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Heaning i s ob jec t ive for Mead. The meaningfulnesso f a ges tu re , a c t o r sy robol fo r the ind iv idua l i s subjec-t i ve , bu t when it i s responded to by the ind iv idua l ther e s u l t i ng ac t ion i s ob jec t ive ly evidenced. Other ind iv idua l sa re s tLmulated by our response . They can judge if our re -sponse i s adequate to the in t : ent ion o f the s t imulus .Language impl ica tes ourse lves as kinds o f act ions in asoc ia l process . Meaning i s only poss ib le through soc ia lexperience. Soc ia l exper ience or ig ina t e s in g e s t u ra lbehaviour . The bu i ld up of s oc i a l exper ience becomesmeaningful as we develop a se l f . A s e l f i s not necessaryto begin soc ia l exper ience .

Mead i s showing t ha t language i s the ba s i s fo rs oc i a l act ion . At t i tudes are a l l t endenc ies to a c t ina ce r t a i n way: liThe response to the vocal ges tu re i sthe doing o f a c e r t a in th ing and you arouse t ha t sametendency i n yourse l f . You aJce always r ep ly ing to yourse l f ,j u s t as o ther people reply . You assume t ha t in some degreethe re must be i den t i t y in ' the r ep ly . t i s ac t ion on acommon bas i s .14 This i s not:. to say t ha t t h i s process i salways on a consc ious l eve l . e i n t e rna l i z e the soc ia lprocess as we ex te rna l i ze i t s meaning. Our voca l ges tu resa re c re a t i n g a cont inual dia logue within ourse lves as if


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we were the o ther . Our conduct i s bu i l t up by seeing our se lves as o thers see us . This i s qu i t e d i f fe ren t fromWatson 's idea o f t h ink ing as the using o f words. Meadi s say ing t ha t the words we use are s t imul i to responsesonly in so f a r as they are wi th in a soc ia l process . Thea l t e rna t ive modes o f behaviour are not the r e s u l t o f var iouskinds o f condi t ioning bu t an: made ava i l ab le through theva r i e t i e s o f soc ia l experience.

In d i s t ingu i sh ing betwee n the I and the me Meadi s asking fo r the s igni f icance o f t h i s d i s t i nc t i on fromthe po in t o f vie\. o f conduc t i t s e l f .15 The lime i s thepercep tua l ly ava i l ab le soc ia l behaviour o f the se l f . Ast i s ahlays in the percep tua l f i e l d t i s ahvays in the

pa s t . The I i s never given in the behaviour , t i swha t i n i t i a t e s the behaviour . The me a s the s t ruc tureo r organ iza t ion o f t endenc ies to ac t i s a given, i s anob jec t , and as s u ~ t i s not only pass ive b u t t i s notrespons ib le for any o f i t s act ions . The me cannot berespons ib le because the me i t s e l f i s only a response . Thelime i s the s t ruc tu r a l condi t ions which a l low hab i tua l response.The me i s the behav iour i s t i c , condi t ioned, a s s oc i a t i on i s -t i c aspect o f the se l f . Human ac t ion requ i res an I . TheI i s al lowable in Mead's behaviourism because t i s physio-


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l og i c a l ly accounted for by the temporal dimension o f thehuman nervous system. What happens when ac t ion i s in -h ib i t e d i s t ha t a so lu t ion i s sought which could not begiven by the hab i tua l assoc ia t ions which are normallys u f f i c i e n t to accc:mnt fo r behaviour . The so lu t ion i salways a novel so lu t ion and nove l ty can only be accountedfo r by the in t roduc t ion o f the ac t ion o f the Iii

We have gone as f a r as we are able with in the bound-a r i e s o f soc ia l psychology. MSS has l a i d the foundat ionsfo r the fu r t h e r aIilalysis o f the s e l f and the ac t i bu t thefu r the r ana lys i s must be a t a d i f fe ren t l e ve l . The un i tyo f the a c t i s exh ib i ted in the ad jus t ive processes charac-t e r i z e d as soc ia l bu t t cannot be exp la ined simply as thefunc t iona l un i ty which guarantees the con t inu i ty o f theseprocesses . The methodological c r i t e r ion and the conceptua lframework o f soc ia l psychology are not adequate to se rve ass o l id founda t ions for the e x p e r ~ e n t a l ana lys i s o f the f i e l d .Spec i f ica l ly the a c t i s not access ib le as a funct ionaluni tYi t r equ i res fur the r ana lys i s to g ive t a formwhich can be t r e a t e d a na ly t i c a l l y . The not ion o f thetemporal dimension o f the nervous system and i t s in t imater e l a t i ons h ip to the s e l f as both III and me needs to bec l a r i f i e d . At a T i\ore bas ic l eve l the exac t unders tanding o fa l i ngu i s t i c symbol and a symbolic ges tu re as conta in ing ameaning needs e luc ida t ion . These problems were presen t inMead s mind and in h i s a t tempts to so lve them he genera ted


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4

concep tua l scheme which has r amif ica t ions fa r beyond thespec i f i c problems which l ed him to t h e i r fo rmula t ion


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I I I

tHE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACT

The f i r s t two chapters have provided all accounto f Head s soc ia l psychology. t i s par t o f my content iont ha t the r e s t o f mead s i n t e l l ec tua l l i f e Vias modeled onh i s soc ia l psychology. We , ,/ill see how, for example, the' s o c i a l ' as a soc ia l -psycho log ica l concept i s c a r r i e d overin h i s genera l phi losophy o f -the a c t and in to h i s l a t e rt heory o f t empora l i ty . The un i t o f ana lys i s in -'ISS wasthe ind iv idua l as a soc ia l be ing. In Mead s genera lphi losophy t h i s un i t o f ana lys i s t akes on a grea te r depthand becomes the exper ience o f the ind iv idua l . A morei n t ens ive ana lys i s o f the s e l f wi l l be undertaken in thef i na l chap te r .

Mead cons iders the ' a c t ' to be the u l t imate u n i to f ana lys i s . The ac t s t re tches beyond the s t imulus tothe response . Mead sees the a c t as a func t iona l un i tywhich can be l og i c a l ly analY2:ed in to th ree s tages : per -cept ion , manipula t ion and consummation.

percept ion i s both a process and a r e l a t i on . Inpercep t ion the re a re a myriad o f a c t i v i t i e s within theorganism. t i s a r e l a t i on between a h igh ly developedphys io log ica l organism and an ob jec t , o r an environmentin which se l e c t i o n emphasizes: ce r t a i n elements ... 2 The

4


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se l e c t i o n within the envirop.men-t i s a func t ion o f the physio-l og i c a l , b io log ica l and phys ica l make up o f the organism, aswel l as the p r t i c u ~ r a c t i v i t i e s in which t i s engaged a tthe t ime o f percept ion . For exaillple, man se l ec t s o r i ss e ns i t i z e d to a c e r t a in range o f l i g h t waves: a c e r t a infrequency o f e t h e r i a l v ib ra t ions and a c e r t a in c l a s s o fora fac to ry phenomena. Other o:J:'ganisms have o ther kindso f s e n s i t i v i t i e s and hence makl o ther kinds o f se lec t ionswith in t h e i r envirohment .

The soc ia l na tu re o f man makes pe rcep t ion a soc ia lac t i v i t y . The objects o f percep t ion have a dua l qua l i ty .They are p a r t i a l l y a produc t o f the world independent ly o fthe perceiv ing organism and p a r t i a l l y a produc t o f theperceiv ing organism. Thus the I same' ob jec t i s perce ivedd i f f e r e n t l y by di f fe ren- t k inds o f organisms and by d i f fe ren tmembers o f the same spec ies .

The d i f fe rence in percep t ion between man and the an i -mals i s t ha t the percep tua l ob jec t , fo r man, i s always prob-l emat ica l . That i s , man can i nd ica te to h imse l f the prob-l emat ica l na-ture o f the percept_ual obj ec t by posing ques t ionsto himself . Does the ob jec t have the cha rac t e r i s t i c s t ha tI perce ive? Is the ob jec t a c tua l ly as t appears? Ob-

d de c t s are always perce1ve a t a 1stance . Some response i snecessary to complete the ac t . Percept ion leads to the nexts tage o f the ac t .


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Manipulat ion can be e i t he r nega t ive o r pos i t i ve .Negat ive manipulat:.ion Vlould be to avoid con tac t exper i -ence i t h the objE'act if it i s perce ived to be, fo re x ~ ~ p l e an enemy. p o s i t i v e manipula t ion i nv i t e s con-t a c t . t i s through manipula t ion t ha t the percep tua lob jec t i s t e s t e d and the prob lemat ic i n s t i ga t e d in per -cept ion becomes resolved.

The a c t i s completed in the consummatory s tage .This i s the s tage o f value experience. Within the f i e l do f consummation a l l the ad jec t ives o f value ob ta in imme-d ia t e ly . There ob jec t s are possessed are good, bad, andi nd i f f e r e n t be a u t i fu l o r ugly, and love ly o r noxious. S

Percept ion i s always i n i t i a l l y o f un iversa l s .e are sens i t i zed according to our pa s t experiences and

our fu tu re expec ta t ions . When our hab i tua l behaviourl eads to unsuccessful conduct. the process of r e f l e c t i onbegins . In r e f l ec t i on the a c t becomes i nh ib i t ed . Ini nh ib i t i on percept ion a t tends to p a r t i c u l a r s r a the r thanto un iversa l s . 6 The i nd iv idua l i t y o f the ob jec t becomesthe sub jec t of a t t e n t ion .

During thel i nh ib i t i on o f the a c t the p a r t i c u l a rc h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the o b j e c t which are unique withreference to pa s t exper ience o r ha b i t s are i so la ted .t i s these novel charac t e r i s t i c s which have made the

hab i tua l response to the percep tua l ob jec t inadequa te .


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The ; individual s e l e c t s out o f the ob jec t asit e x i s t s what answers to the na tu re o f the in d iv idua l in h i s presen t a t t i t u d e a se lec t ionwhich ansilvers both to h i s innnediate s e n s i t i v i t i e sand to h i s exper ience . The mater i a l which f a i l e dto c a l l o u t the appropr ia te response and t ha twhich was found in the ob jec t as t ha t which wouldhave answered to the response which has been in i nh ib i t ed these remain and, with th7 appearanceo f a s e l f are r e f e r r e d to t ha t s e l f .

The s e l f i s a response to the i nh ib i t i on o f act ion . Thefunc t ion o f the s e l f in t h i s s i t ua t i on i s to hold thei s o l a t e d novel cha rac t e r i s t i c s o f the problemat ic ob jec t .This i s the empir ica l s e l f t::he 'me I t holds those novelcha rac t e r i s t i c s u n t i l it can r e -o r i en t i t s e l f and i t sexper ience toward t ha t objecl:1 o r in Mead s terminology,u n t i l it can recons t ruc t the ob jec t .

There are t ~ 7 separai :e kinds o f ques t ions we canask about the p r o ~ s s o f inh ib i t i on . The f i r s t se tconcerns the ac tua l process o f the i nh ib i t i on ana lys i so f the ob jec t and i t s eventua l r econs t ruc t ion and i n t eg ra -t i on in to exper ience and act ion . The second se t concernsthe process o f the i n i t i a t i o n o f the percept ion in thef i r s t p lace the p a r t i c u l a r kinds o f s e n s i t i v i t i e s whichthe organism i s under a t the t ime, the impulses o r needswhich are seek ing express ion or sa t i s fac t ion and why theso lu t ion for the problem must be found within the frameworko f the prob lemat ic and not within a hos t o f a l t e rna t i veapproaches such a r e j e c t i on o f the s i t ua t ion . y concernin t h i s chapte r wi l l be with the f i r s t se t o f ques t ions .


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That i s the province o f the empir ica l s e l f o r the Ime The second se t o f quest ions wi l l wai t u n t i l my discuss iono f the III

As yet I nave not c l a r i f i e d exac t ly why the ac t i sa s t r i c t l y human fonu o f behaviour . In HSS Ivlead drewthe d i s t i nc t i on between a ges tu re and a s ign i f i c a n t ges tu reGestures are fonus o f communication used by a l l organisms.S i g n i f i c a n t ges tures a r i se through language and soc ia li n t e r a c t ion t i s the symbolic nature o f language whicha l lows ges tu res tQ become s ign i f i c a n t ges tu res The mainfea tu re o f these ges tu res i s t ha t they arouse the samea t t i tude in the speaker as they do in the rece ive r Thekey concept which i s being used by Mead i s the not ion o frespons iveness 1he ges ture i s s i gn i f i can t because anyind iv idua l with s imi la r language and s imi la r s oc i a l i z a t i oncan respond to t ha t ges ture in the same way as any o therind iv idua l

To take t l i i s analysis: in to P involves seeing Mead's theory o f ob jec t s be ing extended to inc lude the soc ia l ob-j e c t Objec ts are only percE ived in t he i r i nd iv idua l i tya f t e r the ac t has become i nh ib i t ed Mead c a l l s an ob jec twhich i s a t tended to in i t s i nd iv idua l i t y a phys ica l ob jec tAll phys ica l ob jec t s are soc ia l ob jec t s : a soc ia l ob jec t i sany ob jec t which responds . In order to be se lec ted as a


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7

phys ica l ob jec t , L e . an obj1ect which has the capac i tyto be ac ted toward must be soc ia l because the bas ic modeso f ac t ion a re themselves condi t ioned in the very processby which we come to c or r e l a t e ac t ion with percept ion .For Mead t i s not j u s t the idea t ha t our environment i s at ransac t ion beh leeh our s e n s i t i v i t i e s and the giveness o fthe world ra the r t i s the way in which the exper ience o fthe ind iv idua l makes the world access ib le - access ib le toa s c i e n t i f i c observer o r access ib le to the ind iv idua l asthe cen t re o f the exper ience .

The i nh ib i t i on o f conduct invokes consc iousness .Life becomes conscious a t those po in t s a t which the

organism's own responses en te r as p a r t o f the ob jec t ivef i e l d to which t reac t s . 9 In i nh ib i t i on the par t i cu l a rcha rac t e r i s t i c s o f the pe rcep tua l o r soc ia l ob jec t s aret e s t e d aga ins t the backlog o f previous experience. Topu t t h i s a d i f fe ren t way: the responses o f the ind iv idua la re be ing he ld up agains t the responses o f the ob jec t .What i s in ques t ion i s the responsiveness o f the objec t .Consciousness s e l e c t s those aspects o f the ob jec t whichare not responsive in the s a t i s f a c to ry way and bu i ldsa l t e rna t i ve modes o f response for them. Consciousnessrecons t ruc t s the ob jec t so tha t conduct may proceed.


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The mode o f behaviour for consc iousness i s empir ica l andhence i t s reconstrmctions are based on empir ica l conceptso f con t inu i ty . It i s consc iousness which in t roduces o r p re -se rves causal necess i ty in i t s mode o f r econs t ruc t ion : ourground fo r se lec t ing some a l t e rna t i ve i s to be found inwhat our over t behaviour accepts as r ea l . lIlO

The r e a l i t y o f our world i s bu i l t up through ourcul ture , soc ie ty and language. I t s main reference i s tothe genera l ized ot1t ter This has d i f f e r e d in h i s t o r y andwi l l change in the fu ture . e now o f f e r and at tempt tof ind explana t ions through a causa l order . Not too longago r e a l i t y was a func t ion o f gods and demons. It mustbe s t r e s se d t ha t fGr Mead, the I s tuf f l o f nature i sneut ra l . Nature i s evolving bu t these are through na tu ra lprocesse s which are independent o f a t e l e o log ic a l o r ava lue cla im. Conduct with in t h i s world i s a func t ion o ft ha t world inc luding our s e n s i t i v i t i e s . liThe world t ha ti s t he re does not a r i se from knowledge; in s tead , knowledgea r i s e s from it The world t ha t i s there does not a r i s ewith in consc iousness ; in s tead , consc iousness i s a response toit The world t ha t i s the re does not a r i se within experience;exper ience t akes place within it The arId t ha t i s the redoes not a r i se a t a l l : it i s t he re . ll


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t i s through t h i s I giveness o f the vlOrld t ha tMead i s able to e s t a b l i s h h i s methodological requi rementof access i b i l i t y . The sens i t : iv i t i e s of organisms do notanswer to a s u j e ~ t i v e s t a t e which i s forever c losed o f ffrom objec t ive ana lys i s . The process o f se lec t ion anffi.V ersto "an environment:., which i s e x i s t e n t in na tu re thoughdependent upon i t s re la t ionship to the spec i f ic ind iv idua lfo r i t s exis tence as an environment. I 2 consc iousnessc rea tes responses in ob jec t s by r e l a t i ng the ob jec t tothe s e n s i t i v i t i e s o f the organism. Those ways o f ac t ingtoward the ob jec t which are poss ib le a f t e r the recon-s t ruc t ion o f the ob jec t have a r i sen through the organismsadjus tments and the change in the environment e f fec ted bythose adjus tments . To use a crude example, the kind o ft h ink ing done a f t e r Columbus' voyage made the world in toa d i f f e r e n t place . f rom what it was before . This i s notj u s t in the t h ink ing i t s e l f ~ m i c h was obvious ly expandedbu t in the very ob jec t be ing thought about , i . e . theworld . The world was d i f fe ren t a f t e r Columbus and hencemind had a new ob jec t to t h ink about .

Selec t ion o f an enviJ::onment i s based within thephys io logic -psychologic s t ruc tu r e o f s e n t i e n t organisms.Mead i s fo l lowing the genera l na tu ra l i s t i c -p ragmat i c


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or ienta - t ion wi th an uncr i t i ca l acceptance o f the givenr e a l i t y o f nature . Diffe ren t responses to the na tu ra lorder a re s t r i c t l y a func t ion o f the responding organisms.Nature ex i s t s and we cannot charac te r i ze it beyond ourhuman responses to it Nature i s r ea l i e . of f e r s modeso f sa t i s f ac t i on o f needs, i n t e r e s t s and wants , i n so fa r asit can be ac ted upon. Nature has r e a l i t y only i n so fa r asan organism accepts na ture as o f fe r i n g v iab le a l t e rna t ivemodes o f behaviour . We s ha l l come to see l a t e r in thepaper ho t h i s genera l den ia l o f an on to log ica l commitmentleads Mead in to h i s epis temologica l f i l u r e ~

Now we need to go int:o grea te r de ta i l as tothe exac t mechanisms which a l low our sub jec t ive exper i ence to become objlec t ive and which make ob jec t s soc ia l .In MSS we saw how ro l e playing al lowed our experienceto take on new qua l i t i e s from the s tage o f p lay to thegame to the genera l ized o ther . In P we are now readyto see another qua l i t y o f experience emerge through thead jus t ive mechanism o f ro le playing . In percept ion wet ake the ro l e o f the d i s t an t ob jec t : we endow it withthe r e a l i t y o f e f f e c t ive occupat ion o f space which be longsto ourse lves thus giving the ob jec t an i n s ide contentwhich no surfaces revea led to the eye o r the hand can giveand t h i s p lac ing o f ourse lves w i th in o ther ob jec t s enables


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us t o pe rce ive o th e r -things, and notab ly ourse lves fromthe s tandpoint o f the th ing wi th in which we have p laced

13ourse lves . This i s not to deny any ' i n s ide s ' to theo b jec t as an i tem ' iflithin na tu re r a t h e r it i s to r e l a t et he o b jec t to the exper ience o f the ind iv idua l . Thei nd iv idua l b o t h p ro j e c t s imagined s t a t e s o f r e s i s t an ceto the o b jec t as wel l as having con tac t with the o b jec t

51

in the manipu la to ry s tage o f lthe ac t . The d i s t a n t o b jec thas an i n s id e which ex e r t s a pre ssure upon the exper iencert o the ex ten t t h a t he r e a c t s to the o b jec t by respondingto himse l f as o b jec t . 4

t i s throlllgh t h i s theory t h a t Mead es tab l i shesthe co n t in u i t y o f behav iour wi th in na tu re . f ther e s i s t a n c e o f obj eets i s a func t ion o f the e f f o r texe r t ed to complete the a c t then ob jec t s must be respondingin exac t ly t he same ad ju s t i v e manner as the exe r t ion o fthe e f f o r t . This theory a l so a l lows Mead to show t h a th a b i t s a re only organ iza t iona l s t ru c t u re s which are afunc t ion o f t h e i r o r i g i n . That i s to say, we cou ld neverr eco n s t r u c t o b j ec t s if we could not sepa ra t e s t imul i fromresponses o r h a b i t s . Thus we a c t toward ob jec t s by giv ingthem the k inds o f in s ides which we can con t ro l o r a t l e a s t

f 11 t 15sa t l S ac to r a y lnaorpora e I n our exper lence .In the pe rcep t ion o f t.he d i s t a n t o b jec t we take

the ro l e o f t h a t o b jec t and a c t toward it from the p e r -


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spec t ive o f the d i s t an t ob jec t . e con t ro l our ac t ionnot as sub jec t to ob jec t b u t as ob jec t to ob jec t . Inro l e t ak ing the s e l f becomes ob j ec t i f i ed as ac t ing to rlardan environment which i s the ind iv idua l ac t ing towardh imse l f as a p a r t o f t ha t environment. When the i nd iv i -dual i s able to see himself as an ob jec t with in the f i e l do f behaviour the s e l f as an o b j e c t becomes a p a r t o f theac t ing i n d i v i d u a l ~ 1. e the ind iv idua l has a t t a i n e d whati s c a l l e d se l f -consciousness a se l f -consciousness t ha taccompanies h i s c ~ n d u c t o r may accompany a por t ion o f

16h i s conduct.


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IV

THE NEED FOR A THEORY OF TEl -1PORALITY

The essays co l l ec ted in PA were w r i t t e n over a t ento f i f t een year per iod and they are not presented in chronol og i c a l order . The ac tua l da tes o f many o f the essays areunknown. In order to p r e s en t Mead s work as a con t inu i ty ,I w i l l use t h i s chapte r to develop va r ious a spec t s o f Mead sthought which I see as forc ing him to move beyond a s t r i c t l ys c i e n t i f i c approach. In order to uni fy these diverse aspec tsMead was l ed to develop a specu la t ive pr inc ip l e . He came tor ea l i ze t ha t h i s t heor i es o f -the p a s t , perspec t ives ands o c i a l i t y were being used by lhim in a func t iona l y e t compa r tmenta l i zed sense. Sepa ra t e ly they did not do j u s t i ce tothe fundamental u n i ty o f our exper ience . This l ed him todevelop h i s theory o f t empora l i t y which he sees as the gluewhich binds the o ther d iver se elements o f h i s thoughttoge ther in to a un i f i ed t heory o f t he se l f .

The PA i s being i n t e rp re t e d as an outgrowth o fMead s so c i a l psychology. MeadOs main a t tempt i s to groundh i s view o f man in an adequate theory o f knowlege. Atheory o f knowledge which w i l l a l low him to main ta in h i sd i s t i nc t i on between consc iousness and consc iousness o f whi le mainta in ing the view o f mind as func t iona l and notsubs tan t ive . In doing so Mead dispenses with onto logy asbe ing a problem. Nature and lenvironments are simply the re .

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They have no onto logica l s t a tus independent ly o f the e p i s -t emologica l r e l t i ~ n s h i p with organisms. I t might not beinaccura te to say t ha t for Mead the epis temologica l processdetermines o r covers the onto logica l . There i s no r e a l i t yapar t from the r e a l i t y o f sent : ient c rea tu res . Objectsex i s t apar t from organisms but: it i s impossible to sayanything about them except in so fa r as they are actedupon by organisms.

I s ha l l begin with a discuss ion o f Mead's theoryo f the pas t and present and move through t ha t to h i s theoryo f emergence. For Mead r e a l i t y ex i s t s in a presen t .The presen t i s the ul t imate un i t o f ex is tence . t i s ana c t and i t s temporal spread i s a func t ion o f the a c t i v i t i e sgoing on with in the events which c ons t i t u t e t h a t ac t . Thepresen t thus has dUrat ion o r i:emporal extens ion. t i s afocal po in t for the pa s t o r the perspect ive f rom which thepa s t i s or ien ted t ~ w r d conduct . In order to more fu l l ycharac te r i ze the presen t we should t ake a b r i e f look a tMead i s view o f h i s to ry : All h i s t o ry i s the i n t e rp re t a t i on

f th t 2o e presen His tory i s fundamenta l ly a soc ia lexper ience. As the ind iv idua l t r i e s to capture h i s chi ld-hood exper iences S0 the h i s t o r i an t r i e s to systematize theaccumula-ted experience o f h i s race . The problems o f e i t h e ro f these a t tempts are analogous: When one r e c a l l s h i s


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boyhood days he cannot ge t i n to them as he then was,without t h e i r re lq. t ionship to wha t he has become; andif he could, t ha t i s if he could reproduce the exper ienceas it then took pJiace, he could not use it fo r t h i s wouldinvolve h i s not being in the presen t wi th in which tha t use

3must take p lace .His tory i s not a give

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