-
George Berkeleys language of vision
intrusion of linguistic Platonism, i.e. occult conceptions of
language, into linguistic theories in mod-
sider. In the history of semiotics, he is known for his account
of signs. For historians of
* Tel.: +49 6221 542827.E-mail address:
[email protected]
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792
www.elsevier.com/locate/langcom
LANGUAGE
&
COMMUNICATION0271-5309/$ - see front matter 2007 Elsevier Ltd.
All rights reserved.ern times. The assumption underlying the study
is that occult linguistic thought has played an impor-tant role in
the formation of all modern theories of language which argue for a
cognitive functionalongside, or instead of, the communicative
function of language. In Section 3, I argue that theapparent
contradictions and inconsistencies of Berkeleys statements on
language can be reconciled,if and only if we view them as grounded
in the complex architecture of the two-languages metaphys-ics, or
linguistic Platonism. Section 4 places the results in the wider
perspective of linguistic theoriz-ing in modern times. 2007
Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
3. George Berkeley: some preliminaries
In the history of philosophy, George Berkeley gures as a
notorious, if brilliant, out-and linguistic Platonism
Michael M. Isermann *
Department of English Language and Literature,
Ruprecht-Karls-Universitat Heidelberg,
Kettengasse 12, D-69117 Heidelberg, Germany
Abstract
This case study on the linguistic ideas of George Berkeley is
intended to exemplify the clandestineGeorge Berkeleys language of
vision and theoccult tradition of linguistic Platonism. Part
II:doi:10.1016/j.langcom.2007.05.001
-
linguistic ideas and of the philosophy of language, Berkeley is
almost non-existent.1 Evenso, what Berkeley has to say on language
in general is no less bold and original than hisphilosophy, of
which it forms an integral part. For reasons that will soon become
appar-ent, Berkeley can be called a linguistphilosopher. His
linguistic lines of argument are sointerwoven into the various
strands of his philosophical thought that Berkeley couldremark that
John Locke, whom he admired, would have fared much better had he
onlyduly recognized the importance of language to his
epistemology.2 I suspect that the dispar-ity between the coverage
Locke has received in the histories of linguistic ideas and the
phi-losophy of language and the tabula rasa that Berkeley left is
as much due to the rstsimmediate success in the European history of
ideas as to the latters somewhat extravagantviews.3
Already as a young man, Berkeley contended that the objects we
perceive exist in pre-cisely the way they appear to the senses.
More specically, the objects as perceived are saidto be the only
objects that exist. There is no material object, no independently
existingexternal physical world that is the cause of our sense
impressions. Whatever is, is eithercontent of a mind or a thinking
substance, i.e. a mind. Following Locke, Berkeley callsthe contents
of the mind ideas, whether these are actual sense perceptions or
productsof the memory or imagination. Minds or spirits, as Berkeley
prefers to say, are eithernite and imperfect as mine or yours or
innite and perfect as Gods mind. If matterin motion is rejected as
the cause of our experience, and if ideas, being inert, cannot
them-selves cause ideas, the question arises as to what it is that
makes us have ideas. Berkeleysanswer is that it is spirits or minds
that bring about ideas. Finite minds generate ideas in
58 M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 57921
As for linguists proper, the situations is probably still worse.
Although the combination of Berkeley andlinguistics, entered into
any major internet search machine, will yield more than 100,000
nds, the famousBerkeley Linguistics Society, to name just one
typical result, has not shown any interest in the linguistic ideas
ofits ultimate namegiver. As regards the history of the philosophy
of language, Berkeley is noted by Coseriu (2003),mentioned passim
in the two bulky volumes of the Handbook
Sprachphilosophie/Philosophy of Language/Laphilosophie du langage
(1992, 1996), but absent from Borsches anthology (1996), Lamarque
& AshersEncyclopedia (1997), as also fromMeier-Oesers (1998)
and Trabants (1998) surveys. For the history of semiotics,cf. the
brief article by Armstrong in the Encyclopaedic Dictionary of
Semiotics (1994) and the few scatteredremarks in the weighty four
volumes of the Handbook Semiotik/Semiotics (19972004). Of the four
recent large-scale publications in linguistic historiography, only
Schmitters Geschichte der Sprachtheorie (1987) coversBerkeley
(Isermann, 1999c) in some detail. Aurouxs Histoire des idees
linguistique (19892000) and theHandbook History of the Language
Sciences/Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaften/Histoire des sciences
du langage(20002005) touch on Berkeley, while Lepschys History of
Linguistics (19941998) ignores him altogether. So doKoerner and
Asher (1995), Robins (1997), Harris and Taylor (1989) and the
earlier historiographies, such asArens (1969).2 Cf. Phil. Comment.,
467, 567, 717. Since Berkeley almost invariably numbered his
paragraphs the
exception to the rule being the Three Dialogues, I follow the
common practice in restricting references to his textsto an
abbreviated, yet recognizable title of the work, followed by the
number that Berkeley assigned to therespective paragraph. Whenever
the need arises, such as in referring to the Three Dialogues, I
supplement thereference by supplying volume and page number of the
standard edition of The Works of George Berkeley by A.A.Luce and
T.E. Jessop (nine volumes, 19481957). The abbreviated titles are:
New Theory of Vision (An Essaytowards a New Theory of Vision,
1709); Principles (A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human
Knowledge,1710); Three Dialogues (Three Dialogues between Hylas and
Philonous, 1713); Phil. Comment. (PhilosophicalCommentaries,
notebooks published posthumously); Alciphron (Alciphron: or the
Minute Philosopher, 1732);Vision Vindicated (The Theory of Vision,
or Visual Language shewing the immediate Presence and Providence of
ADeity, Vindicated and Explained, 1733); Siris (Siris, 1744).3 For
the Lockean legacy, see Aarsle (1982). Berkeleys inuence does not
seem to extend far beyond Hume,Reid and, with some qualications,
Schopenhauer and Peirce.
-
themselves through memory and imagination, in others and
themselves through (writtenor spoken) language. As a matter of
fact, Berkeley argues that it is from our fellowhumans speech and
writing, i.e. from linguistic ideas, that we can legitimately infer
theexistence of other nite minds, which cannot themselves be the
object of possible senseimpressions. It is the regular occurrence
and the smooth functioning of interpersonal com-munication which
suggests the presence of other intelligent minds (Alciphron, IV.
4). Inmuch the same vein, Berkeley argues with a version of the
argument from design, we cansafely assume the existence of God: In
consequence, I say, [. . .] you have as much reasonto think the
Universal Agent or God speaks to your eyes, as you can have for
thinking any
that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our
bodies, as also to avoid
It willanguto digThat
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792
59most coherent, entertaining, and instructive [. . .] language or
discourse (Siris, 254; cf.Alciphron, IV. 12), seemed, however, a
bit too much to swallow. For though similaritiesbetween the manner
in which we make use of visual data and the way we use languagemay
readily be admitted, to suppose that vision is a language is not
only paradoxicalbut borders on the absurd (Creery, 1991, p. 25).5
As one critic noted, Berkeleys exten-sion of language to include
the divine visual language has not in fact found acceptance
4 Alciphron, IV. 12. For the full argument, see Kline (1987, p.
130).5 For further criticism of Berkeleys notion of vision as a
language, see e.g. Creery (1973, p. 212n); Moore (1984,
p. 331); Armstrong (1994, p. 81). Even Blumenberg takes the
language of nature for a metaphor (1986, chapterxi). Berkeley,
foreseeing the objections, retorted almost 300 years ago: [N]othing
can be more evident to anyonethat is capable of the least reexion,
than the existence of God, or a spirit who is intimately present to
our minds,producing in them all that variety of ideas or
sensations, which continually aect us [. . .]. That the discovery
ofthis great truth which lies so near and obvious to the mind,
should be attained by the reason of so very few, is asad instance
of the stupidity and inattention of men, who, though they are
surrounded with such clearmanifestations of the Deity, are yet so
little aected by them, that they seem as it were blinded with
excess of
lightwhatever may be hurtful and destructive of them. It is by
their information that weare principally guided in all the
transactions and concerns of life. And the mannerwherein they
signify and mark unto us the objects which are at a distance is the
samewith that of languages and signs of human appointment, which do
not suggest thethings signied by any likeness or identity of
nature, but only by an habitual connex-ion that experience has made
us to observe between them. (New Theory of Vision, I,147)
l not come as a surprise that those who have commented on
Berkeleys concept of aage of nature were not willing to take the
whole theory at face value. It was one thingest Berkeleys reliance
on language at two of the critical joints of his overall theory.the
phenomena of nature should form not only a magnicent spectacle, but
also aparticular person speaks to your ears.4 So orderly, variable,
constant and meaningful arethe ideas of visual sense experience
that they form a language of nature. Since it is clearthat neither
we nor other nite minds can evoke the sense impressions that we
receive,their miraculous presence calls for an appropriate
explanation. Berkeley contends thatthey are directly and
continuously caused in us by the divine mind, the author of the
lin-guistic fabric of nature. Here is the conclusion of a standard
version of the argument:
Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that the proper
objects of visionconstitute the universal language of Nature [1733
ed.: of the Author of Nature],whereby we are instructed how to
regulate our actions in order to attain those things(Principles,
III. 149).
-
even within the connes of British philosophy at any time in a
period of over 200 yearssince his death. I would not seem rash to
predict that it will not nd acceptance in the nearfuture (King,
1991, p. 43). From what I know of British philosophy, the
prediction seemswell-founded. But neither would it seem rash if I
may pick up the thread to predict thathistorians of linguistic
ideas, if they began to interest themselves in Berkeley, would
followsuit. Like historians of philosophy, they have either
completely disregarded the construalof the sensible world of things
as a language of nature or discarded it as fantastical or
inap-propriately metaphorical.6
Absurd or not, there can be no doubt that Berkeley wants the
term language of natureto be understood literally.7 Nowhere does he
suggest that the visual sense data are merelylike a language.
Instead, he takes pains to convince his readers time and again that
they area language in the strict sense of the word:
That is really and in truth my opinion; and it should be yours
too, if you are consis-tent with yourself, and abide by your own
denition of language, since you cannotdeny that the great Mover and
Author of Nature constantly explaineth Himself tothe eyes of men by
the sensible intervention of arbitrary signs, which have no
simil-
have for thinking any particular person speaks to your ears.
3.1. B
I slangucally
6 Cf.modersweepi
60 M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792a
longer and more venerable tradition than that ushered in through
its adaptation by Berkeley. A notableexception in modern
historiography of linguistic ideas is Nates (1999) contribution to
Schmitters Geschichte derSprachtheorie (vol. IV, 1999). Once again,
however, the exception proves the rule. For Nates linguistic
studies onthe concept of a language of nature (1993, 1995, 1999)
undermine their own eorts when the author admits thatthe texts he
has discussed do not primarily deal with linguistic questions
(1993, p. 178). In the same vein, Natestates: The Language of
Nature can be experienced in a language, but it is no language
(Nate, 1995, p. 194).The same unwillingness to follow unfamiliar
historical demarcations of the historiographic object language
canbe found in Vickers inuential articles (1982, 1984, 1991) and in
Demonets study of Renaissance ideas oflanguage (1992, p. 575). The
irony here is that the implicit or explicit complaints about an
undue meaningextension of the term language are voiced by
historiographers who have been trained to disapprove of
theallegedly naive idea that the true object of linguistics might
be found in concrete, verbal communication.7 This is admitted,
though not really appreciated, by Creery (1973, p. 212), Kline
(1987, pp. 131, 134), Creery
(1991, I, p. 26f), Turbayne (1991, I, p. 56), Land (1991, p.
107).8 Alciphron, IV. 12; cf. ibid. IV. 5; Siris, 254.9 Cf. Gelber
(1952, pp. 492, 501), Creery (1973, p. 219), Moore (1984, p. 327),
Creery (1991, p. 30), King (1991,p. 46),erkeleys version of a
representational theory of language
uspect that a good many of the misgivings concerning Berkeleys
concept of a divineage of nature have their roots in the diculty of
accommodating it to what practi-all critics agree is a general, if
incoherent, theory of language.9 However, this problem
also Armstrong, who speculates that Berkeleys metaphysics of
signication may be as fantastic to then reader as it was to most of
Berkeleys contemporaries (Armstrong, 1994, p. 83). Not
surprisingly, theng rejection of the underlying model of language
by theorists of language and historians of philosophy hasitude or
connexion with the things signied; so as, by compounding and
disposingthem, to suggest and exhibit an endless variety of
objects, diering in nature, time,and place; thereby informing and
directing men how to act with respect to things dis-tant and
future, as well as near and present. In consequence, I say [. . .]
you have asmuch reason to think the Universal agent or God speaks
to your eyes, as you can
8Armstrong (1994).
-
can easily be handled if we assume that underlying Berkeleys
philosophy is not one, buttwo theories of language. Accordingly, I
will argue in the following, rstly, that there aretwo theories of
language in Berkeley and, secondly, that they join to produce a
modernversion of the two-languages metaphysics. In order to
condense my account, I will focusthe discussion on what I think is
a covert presentational theory of language. Seeing thatthere is
general agreement that Berkeleys is basically a representational
theory of lan-guage which grants overall priority to thought, I
will presuppose rather than argue thatBerkeleys description of
ordinary language (what he calls articial language) meets
allrequirements of a representational or Aristotelian theory of
language.10 However, asBerkeleys version of a representational
theory of language is markedly dierent fromthose of its
predecessors in the Aristotelian tradition, a few remarks might be
helpful.
As might be expected, written words are said to stand for spoken
words, and spokenwords, in turn, to represent idea-things.11 As to
the latter two, it is imperative to pointto the merging of things
and thought in Berkeleys philosophy, which leaves us with
ideasinstead of things as the ultimate signied. However, on close
inspection, things are notquite so simple. For Berkeleys inclusion
of the world of things in the mental world does
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792
61not prevent the newly established mental things from displaying
clear traces of their des-cent. There is, in fact, a strict
dividing line in the mental world that separates perceptionfrom
conception, i.e. ideas of sense from those of memory and
imagination. In ordinaryconversation, then, words will for all
practical purposes evoke ideas in a listener thatare imagined or
memorized. And this is what they represent or stand for. But how do
theseconcepts relate to the original ideas of sense? What, for
example, is the relationshipbetween an imagined apple and one
presented to the senses? Given that in Berkeleys meta-physics the
world of sense has taken over the function of the world behind
sense, the pro-totypical representational model predicts that an
object present to the senses and the sameobject as imagined relate
in terms of representation. In fact, the prediction is entirely
borneout when Berkeley writes that the ideas imprinted on the
senses by the Author of Natureare called real things: and those
excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid andconstant,
are more properly termed Ideas, or images of things, which they
copy and rep-resent.12 The fact that words in ordinary discourse
regularly represent or stand for ideas
10 For an account of the continuity of representation from Locke
to Berkeley, see Land (1991, pp. 9096).Kearney (1991) argues at
length for a representational theory of language in Berkeley. Cf.
also Creery (1991, I, p.21f), Woozley (1991).11 Cf. Alciphron, VII.
13. Ideas are clearly prior to words (Phil. Comment., 356, 522,
638), although Berkeleydeparts from Lockes position in admitting
the usefulness of discourse unaccompanied by ideas (cf. Sections
3.5and 4). However, speakers have to make sure they can cash in
their words for ideas whenever the need arises:Words, it is agreed,
are signs: it may not therefore be amiss to examine the use of
other signs, in order to knowthat of words. Counters, for instance,
at a card table are used, not for their own sake, but only as signs
substitutedfor money, as words are for ideas. Say now, Alciphron,
is it necessary every time these counters are usedthroughout the
progress of a game, to frame an idea of the distinct sum or value
that each represents? [. . .] it beingsucient that we have it in
our power to substitute things or ideas for their signs when there
is occasion(Alciphron, VII. 5).12 Principles, 33. Cf. the opening
sentence of the Principles: It is evident to anyone who takes a
survey of theobjects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas
actually imprinted on the senses, [. . .] or lastly ideasformed by
help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or
barely representing those originallyperceived in the aforesaid ways
(Principles, 1; my italics, MMI). Cf. also Three Dialogues, where
ideas are said to
be images and representations of real things (Three Dialogues,
I, Works II, p. 203).
-
of the imagination, which, in turn, stand for the respective
ideas of sense, does, however,
62not seem to preclude that words may also represent ideas of
sense directly.Recognition must also be given to the fact that
since there are nothing but ideas and
minds in Berkeleys universe, written words and spoken words are,
strictly speaking, typesof ideas, a conclusion which might prompt
us to rename them accordingly as linguisticideas or ideas of
written and spoken words. But as things are, this does not seem to
preventthem from occupying the respective position in the
traditional chain of representation con-necting writing, speech,
thought and the world (see Fig. 15; cf. part I, Fig. 1). Except
forthese minor alterations, the representational model seems to
remain unaected.
3.2. Berkeleys presentational theory of language: the language
of vision
Compared to Berkeleys fairly transparent treatment of verbal
language in a represen-tational framework, the mapping of his
divine language of nature on what I have calledthe presentational
theory of language is not quite so straightforward. I think there
is a sim-ple reason for that: Berkeley does not, and cannot,
embrace a presentational theory of lan-guage in the strict sense of
the word (cf. Section 4). I will argue, however, that
henevertheless relies heavily on it. Let me begin the discussion
with one of Berkeleys manylinguistic portrayals of the divine
language of nature. Characteristically, the introductionof the
language of vision is preceded by a denition of language in
general:IDEAS (ideas of written words)
IDEAS (ideas of spoken words)
IDEAS (ideas of imagination/memory)
IDEAS (ideas of sense)
Fig. 15. Berkeleys representational theory of language.
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792What
I mean is not the sound of speech as such, but the arbitrary use of
sensiblesigns, which have no similitude or necessary connexion with
the things signied;so as by the apposite management of them to
suggest and exhibit to my mind an end-less variety of things,
diering in nature, time, and place; thereby informing
me,entertaining me, and directing me how to act, not only with
regard to things nearand present, but also with regard to things
distant and future. No matter whetherthese signs are pronounced or
written; whether they enter by the eye or ear: they havethe same
use, and are proofs of an intelligent, thinking, designing cause.
[. . .] it shallappear plainly that God speaks to men by the
intervention and use of arbitrary, out-ward, sensible signs, having
no resemblance or necessary connexion with the thingsthey stand for
and suggest; [. . .] by innumerable combinations of these signs, an
end-less variety of things is discovered and made known to us; and
[. . .] we are therebyinstructed or informed in their dierent
natures; [. . .] we are taught and admonishedwhat to shun, and what
to pursue; and are directed how to regulate our motions, and
-
how to act with respect to things distant from us, as well in
time as place [. . .] thereinconsists the force, and use, and
nature of language. (Alciphron, IV. 7)
It is obvious that this characterization is meant to bridge the
dierences between ordin-ary language and the language of nature.
Since his aim is to argue for the linguistic natureof vision, the
tendency is for Berkeley to play down the peculiarities of each
medium aswell as to emphasize the common ground. Thus, for example,
both are said to consistof sensible signs that stand in arbitrary
relationship to their signieds. In addition, bothare described as
rich systems of signication with an almost innite expressive power,
serv-ing various communicative purposes.13
But whatever we can make of this without having treated the
universal language ofvision in some more detail, nothing so far
suggests that Berkeley shaped his universal lan-
languathe infPrincip17 Cf.
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792 63ge
that do not seem to require concomitant ideas as their meaning. It
is clear, though, that Berkeley viewsormative function, i. e. the
conveying of ideas, as primary and fundamental. Cf. Introd. to
Principles, 25;les, 22, 24, and below.guage of vision in the mould
of a presentational theory of language except for the termlanguage
of nature itself. Quite on the contrary: similitude, a concept that
followingFoucault is often said to epitomize the thinking of
Renaissance occultism, is expresslyexcluded from linguistic
signication.14 Instead, linguistic signs including the visual
signsof the language of nature are said to rest on what looks like
a Berkeleian linguistic prin-ciple of arbitrariness: the foremost
criterion for something to be a language is that there isan
arbitrary relationship between sign and signied.15 According to the
argument of partI, however, arbitrariness can be seen to be a
reliable indicator for a representational theoryof language (cf.
part I, Fig. 7). Adding to this major incompatibility, Berkeleys
languageof nature is said to function as a medium of communication
between spirits, no less thanordinary language. And it is said to
do so not only in the traditional terms of conveyinginformation,
but also in terms of more mundane functions such as entertaining us
and reg-ulating our daily life.16
As things stand, this is not all that can be brought to bear
against the assumption thatBerkeleys language of vision rests on a
presentational theory of language. Thus, Berkeleyconsistently
employs a representational terminology in his account of the
workings of thedivine language. In a manner reminiscent of the
Aristotelian tradition of representation,visual signs are said to
represent or stand for ideas of touch.17 Related to the
terminologicalissue but clearly more disconcerting is the
observation that sign and signied in thedivine language of nature,
i.e. visual sense data and tactile sense data, do not seem tobe
identical in any tolerable sense of the word. On the contrary, they
are said to maketwo species, entirely distinct and heterogeneous
(Principles, 44). This divergence is allthe more disturbing
considering that the identity of sign and signied was singled
out
13 Cf. Forest (1997, p. 443).14 In repudiating necessary
deductions and similitudes to the fancy from linguistic
signication, Berkeleyprimarily opposes rival theories of visual
perception that would block a construal of visual perception in
terms ofsigns and signieds and thus, ultimately, in linguistic
terms. See Luce & Jessops introduction to Theory of
Vision(1948, Works I, pp. 143163).15 Cf. New Theory of Vision, 64,
65; Vision Vindicated, 43.16 The latter functions are repeatedly
pointed to by Berkeley in order to instantiate (against Locke)
usages ofNew Theory of Vision, 144, 152; Alciphron, III. 4 (Works
III, p. 149).
-
as the principal axiom of a presentational theory of language on
which all other criteriamore or less depend (part I, Fig. 7).
To make things worse, there does not seem to be anything like a
mystic descent intothings or words involved in Berkeleys account of
visual perception. The occult subjectsassimilation to the world of
sign-signied objects, one of the corollaries of the Neoplato-nist
vjectsniteits peof being ostudy
64 M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792to
the extent that they are familiar with most of its words and
letters, others may devotetheir time to discovering the grammatical
rules of the divine language. Thus, in a furtherextension of what
the majority of historians have seen as too bold a metaphor,
Berkeleyrefers to the natural philosopher as the grammarian of
nature (Principles, 65, 66). That, inturn, seems to imply that the
divine language can be learned and studied in a way similarto
learning and studying ordinary languages. In a nutshell, the
evidence to the contrary isso impressive that it might seem to
prohibit the placing of Berkeley in the tradition of
thetwo-languages metaphysics.
On the other hand, the amount of evidence for the assumption
that underlying Berke-leys thought is a version of Linguistic
Platonism is just as compelling. If, for example, thescientist is
at the same time a grammarian of nature (and a psychologist at
that), then thissurely presupposes the fusion of language, thought,
and the world that is characteristic ofthe Neoplatonist tradition.
It is also due to this merging of the semiotic levels that
Berke-ley can address the contents of the mind variably as things,
ideas, or linguistic items in away that is basically in accordance
with occult parlance.18 Even the medial distinctionbetween writing
and speech is leveled out into a transient yet permanent divine
idiom thatpreserves the distinctive features of both. In visual
sense experience the voice of theAuthor of nature [. . .] speaks to
our eyes in a constant creation, an instantaneous pro-duction and
reproduction of a viva voce stretch of writing.19 Accordingly,
science or nat-ural philosophy cannot protably be carried out with
the instruments and methods ofcontemporary mechanical philosophy.
If nature is a text, science must be a thoroughlyhermeneutic
business:
Hence it is evident, that those things which under the notion of
a cause co-operatingor concurring to the production of eects, are
altogether explicable, and run us intogreat absurdities, may be
very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvioususe assigned
them, when they are considered only as marks or signs for our
informa-tion. And it is the searching after, and endeavouring to
understand those signs insti-tuted by the Author of Nature, that
ought to be the employment of the natural
18 See e.g. Principles, 33, 34, 38. In response to some critics,
Berkeley emphasizes that through his philosophywe are not deprived
of any one thing in Nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear or any wise
conceive or understand,remains as secure as ever, and is as real as
ever (Principles, 34; cf. 51). And: I take not away substances. [.
. .] Ionely reject the Philosophic sense (which in eect is no
sense) of the word substance (Phil. Comment., 517).
19 Alciew of the language of nature, is certainly not a
precondition for the Berkeleian sub-capacity of reading in that
great volume of nature (Principles, 109). Berkeleysspirits act
autonomously with regard to nature, being exposed to, and
acquiring,culiar dialect in a most natural setting from the cradle
(Alciphron IV. 11). And insteading granted access to the secrets of
nature, they actively advance in their understand-f Gods visual
language, the more industry, care, and observation they invest into
its(Siris, 253, 254). While human beings cannot help but acquire
Gods idiom at leastiphron, IV. 14. Cf. ibid., 11, 12; New Theory of
Vision, 152.
-
philosopher, and not the pretending to explain things by
corporeal causes; whichdoctrine seems to have too much estranged
the minds of men from that active prin-ciple, that supreme and wise
spirit, in whom we live, move, and have our being.20
Notice also that the elements of Berkeleys language of vision
cannot be used to refer, atleast in the sense that whatever they
can refer to is already pre-established by the author ofnature. But
even for the innite spirit, visual sense data cannot in the
remotest sense besaid to represent ideas of touch. It is true that
Berkeley condently employs a representa-tional metalanguage that
makes divine signs stand for, represent, refer to or even
substitute
23 Thp. 72),Oeseras a syagree w
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792 65is
is a point on which Berkeley scholars are agreed. Cf. Land (1975,
p. 199), Hardwick (1981), Pfeifer (1978,Moore (pp. 184, 333, 336),
McGowan (1991, I, p. 115f), Land (1991, p. 89); Forest (1997, p.
439f), Meier-(1997, p. 382). For Turbayne (1991, I, p. 52) and
Moore (1984, p. 338), Berkeleys conception of the worldstem of
signs is a unique feature and his most interesting and original
contribution, respectively. Idivine signieds.21 And there is no
reason to assume that this practice was an insinceremove meant to
underpin his arguments for the essentially linguistic nature of
vision.Rather, Berkeley seems to have treated representation as the
most typical function ofsigns, albeit not the only one.22 And one
must not forget that he lacked an appropriatenon-representational
terminology. Yet visual impressions escape such
representationaldescription in that they are co-original with
tactile sense impressions. Clearly, Berkeleydoes not want to imply
that the tactile world of sense should be accorded logical and
onto-logical priority, while the visual world was created by God in
order for him to be able totalk or write about ideas of touch.
Ignoring for the moment the fact that Berkeley arguesfor a
linguistic priority of vision over the other senses (cf. Section
3.4), all sense data arelogically and ontologically on a par by
virtue of their being constantly and indiscriminatelyissued by
God.
This being incontestable, it does not, however, follow that they
are all signs. But clearly,in order for Berkeleys language of
vision to follow the pattern of a presentational modelof language,
what is signied by the visual sense data, i.e. ideas of touch,
would have toform, in turn, a system of signs with other ideas as
their signieds and so on, innitely.Considering that all sense
impressions are directly engendered by the author of nature,it
would indeed seem natural to assume that they are all meaningful
elements of the divinelanguage. Berkeley, however for reasons to be
discussed later (Section 3.5) recom-mends that the term language be
reserved for vision only. But notwithstanding his appar-ent
hesitation to reduce the whole world of sense to one or several
languages, Berkeleyreadily concedes that it constitutes a world of
signs. Even the ideas of smell and touchagree in the general nature
of sign (Alciphron, IV. 12). Thus, the whole universe formsa huge
semiotic superstructure in which vision is assigned the dominating
role of a fullyelaborated system of signs, or language.23
For two reasons, this is precisely what one might expect. For
one thing, it would cer-tainly be odd, if not downright incoherent,
to have God speak in an ideal language con-trived with such
wonderful skill (Alciphron, IV. 15), while with respect to ideas of
theother senses he would appear to produce meaningless gibberish at
whim. Secondly, and
20 Principles, 66; cf. Alciphron, IV. 14; Three Dialogues (Works
II, p. 236.)21 See e.g. Alciphron, IV. 7, p. 149 (stand for); VII.
5 (substitute); New Theory of Vision, 152 (represent).22 See
Alciphron, VII. 5.ith the predicate interesting.
-
more importantly, the concept of a semiotic universe of sense
derives directly from Berke-leys denition of signs:
Ideas which are observed to be connected with other ideas come
to be considered assigns, by means whereof things not actually
perceived by sense are signied or sug-gested to the imagination,
whose objects they are, and which alone perceives them.And as
sounds suggest other things, so characters suggest those sounds;
and, in gen-eral, all signs suggest the things signied, there being
no idea which may not oer to the
mind another idea which hath been frequently joined with it. In
certain cases a sign maysuggest its correlate as an image, in
others as an eect, in others as a cause. Butwhere there is no such
relation of similitude or causality, nor any necessary connex-ion
whatsoever, two things, by their mere coexistence, or two ideas,
merely by beingperceived together, may suggest or signify one the
other, their connexion being allthe while arbitrary; for it is the
connexion only, as such, that causeth this eect.(Vision Vindicated,
39; my italics, MMI)
Since the ideas caused by God are all contextually embedded and
recurring (as opposedto isolated and singular), Berkeleys
associationist denition of signs imposes the following
24 MuArmstsignicdenitthat coseem town splength,sign:
fainstantand Be25 A fpresenwhat iWhile
66 M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008)
5792Renaissance (and, no less, in the diverse mystic traditions),
the latter doubtlessly describes the Modern and, evenmore, the
Postmodern experience. Cf. note 58. In Isermann (1999a,b) I argued
that the contrast between the twohistorical attitudes towards
innite semiosis is due to a replacement of the pre-modern
primordial category of
substatual signication as a corollary of Berkeleys
associationist semiotics is noted by Land (1991, p. 104) androng
(1994, p. 82). It is interesting to see, especially with regard to
the direction of Agrippas chain ofation, that from among the
various types of semiotic relationship which are licensed by his
associationistion (listed by Armstrong, 1994), Berkeley utilizes
only the paradigmatic, or cross-sensory ones, i.e. thosennect the
data of one sense with those of another. In particular, it is worth
mentioning that he does noto consider the potential for visual
sense data to entertain semiotic relationships with other qualities
of theirecies, although such is assumed by many a commentator. In
fact, as Land (1975, 1991) has argued atsimultaneous or contiguous
sense data serve the function of specifying the contextual use of a
particularintness of a visual impression, for example, signies the
distance of a visual object not in each and everyof occurrence, but
only in the appropriate visual context. For this and other anities
between Agripparkeley, see Section 3.5.urther, semantic consequence
of innite semiosis, which is also absent from the list of
corollaries of thetational theory of language (part I, Fig. 7), is
the ubiquity, fullness and eternal presence of meaning or,s
genetically and fundamentally the same, the nowhereness and
complete absence of sense (cf. Section 4).the rst seems to have
been the peculiar mental condition of the subject in the occult
tradition of theconsequences on the elements of the sensory world:
rstly, every sense impression is(meant to be) a sign and has
meaning; secondly, the meaning of a sense impression is by virtue
of its being an idea itself a meaningful sign; thirdly, if
arbitrary, sign and sig-nied may suggest or signify one the other,
i.e. they stand in the relationship of mutualsignication24;
fourthly, an idea-sign has as many meanings as there are ideas
habituallyconnected to it, i.e. there is multiple signication; and,
as a necessary consequence ofmutual and multiple signication, there
is, fthly, innite semiosis: there is no end tothe divine chain of
signication. For whichever reason, then, Berkeleys
terminologymerely suggests that tactile ideas are the ultimate
signieds of the language of nature.Vision as the language of
nature, standing out clearly against the non-visual ideas causedby
God, is itself suspended in a network of interrelated signs which
is not tied to the ulti-mate signieds of a representational model
of language.25nce by the modern category of relation, or plainly
put, of a world of things by a world of written words.
-
On balance, then, the majority of linguistic and semiotic
features of Berkeleys divine
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792
67language of vision are at variance with a representational theory
of language, but fullyconsistent with a presentational one. Given
that a linguistic theory with a foothold inboth representation and
presentation borders on the impossible, the assumption sug-gests
itself that the impression of incoherence might arise from
Berkeleys representa-tional terminology rather than from a
representational foundation of the language ofvision. Indeed, in
Section 3.5, I will argue that most of the problematic
conclusionsarrived at above may be accounted for in just this way.
As a prelude to that, I will rsttry to corroborate the ndings by
locating what we have good reasons to regard asBerkeleys
presentational theory of language in the larger framework of
linguisticPlatonism.
3.3. Linguistic Platonism in Berkeley
A central feature of linguistic Platonism, and certainly the
most Platonic one, is thepeculiarly Platonic relationship between
the two languages and, from a more general per-spective, between
the two theories of language that dene Neoplatonist metaphysics.
Thesignicance of the two-world-metaphysics for linguistic Platonism
demands a separate anddetailed treatment of the topic. The feature
is missing from the list (cf. part I, Fig. 7),because it sits
astride the juxtaposition of a presentational and a
representational (theoryof) language. As I have passed over this
central feature in the introduction to linguisticPlatonism (part I,
Section 2), I will occasionally draw a parallel between Berkeley
andthe occult Renaissance, pointing to the structural similarity in
the way in which the pre-carious treatment of the relationship
between the two languages makes itself felt. I willapproach the
topic rst from a more linguistic point of view, starting out from
what seemsto be a property of linguistic Neoplatonism only.
Following that, I will look at Berkeleystwo-languages metaphysics
with a view to the recurrent elements of Neoplatonism in gen-eral,
leaving till the next Section (3.4) the issue of why a critique of
language forms anindispensable part of linguistic Platonism.
First, the linguistic perspective: Among the eects of linguistic
Neoplatonism thatlack a counterpart in the Platonic two-world
metaphysics, there is one that needs par-ticular attention: The
relationship between the divine, presentational language of
visionand the ordinary, communicative language of representation is
such that the latterappears to be the metalanguage of the rst.26
After all, even Berkeley himself has tofall back on ordinary
language in order to argue that what we talk about when we
talkabout things we have seen is, in fact, the divine language of
nature. Indeed, this is pre-cisely the situation that motivated
many of Berkeleys writings: His main objectiveoften is to convince
the reader that the world around us is nothing but Gods meansof
literally expressing himself. In other words, it is Berkeleys
self-proclaimed task toget the reader to recognize that what he has
been referring to in everyday discourse(in the sense of ultimate
signieds) are really signs that are themselves signs of signsand so
on, innitely. This raises the following question: If the language
of nature isa self-sucient and self-referential system of signs
without a representational founda-tion, then does this not mean
that the ordinary (meta-)language of representation26 Cf. Gelber
(1952, p. 501); Turbayne (1991, p. 52).
-
would also lack an ultimate signied? Does the reformulation of
the world of things asa language of nature without a
representational grounding not do away with an ulti-mate signied
altogether?
I believe that such a compact view of the interplay of the two
languages is little morethanimpladistinvisuasentetwo u
68 M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008)
5792functions or two languages with a common joint (cf. part I,
Fig. 5). As long as we under-stand the term metalanguage to mean
simply that a language is used to talk aboutanother, it is
appropriate that we call Berkeleys articial language the
metalanguageof the divine language of vision. In all other respects
it is not. Two implications of the com-parison are particularly
misleading: For one thing, object language and metalanguage
areneither dierent languages nor dierent functions of the same
language in Berkeleys meta-physics. Secondly, Berkeleys ordinary
language does not perform the function of a meta-language. Whereas
usually the typical function of a metalanguage is to make the
objectlanguage accessible to the linguistic understanding, Berkeley
sees ordinary language asconcealing the divine language of nature
(cf. Section 3.4). In short, it is the Platonic rela-tionship
between the two languages that blocks their interpretation in terms
of object lan-guage and metalanguage.
So instead of cutting the ground from under the feet of the
ordinary language user, thelanguage of nature serves as the safe
ground on which the representational signicationprocess comes to
rest. It is, to quote Berkeley, of excellent use in giving
stability and per-manency to human discourse (Alciphron, IV. 15).
No doubt, the same is true of scienticdiscourse, even if it is
about the language of nature. Whether or not we accept
Berkeleysmetaphysics, we (including Berkeley himself) generally
talk about what we believe we see,hear, and touch, not about what
these things might turn out to be when subjected to thescientic
linguistic scrutiny of the philosopher or the grammarian of nature.
This is whatBerkeley is prepared to accept as inevitable and
sensible at the same time. What he lamentsis that not even when we
stop and contemplate do we recognize that what we have beentalking
about all along is evidently the language of the author of nature,
a spirit, who is soactually and intimately present (Alciphron IV.
14) to our minds and in whom, Berkeleyadds with St. Paul, we live,
and move, and have our being (Principles, 149). A commonman, says
Berkeley with an air of indignation,
would probably be more convinced of the being of God by one
single sentence heardonce in his life from the sky than by all the
experience he has had of this Visual Lan-guage, contrived with such
an exquisite skill, so constantly addressed to his eyes, andso
plainly declaring the nearness, wisdom, and providence of Him with
whom wehave to do.2727 Alca theoretical speculation, and a highly
implausible one at that. It is theoreticallyusible, because it
combines two opposing theories of languages that have to be keptct.
In ordinary, practical aairs of life the elements of the language
of nature, i.e.l impressions, do indeed function as ultimate
signieds, as what is ultimately repre-d. In this respect, and in
some others too, Berkeleys two languages behave more likenrelated
languages (as depicted in part I, Fig. 6) than like one language
with twoiphron, IV. 15; cf. Principles, 57.
-
The disappointment about his fellow men not recognizing the
language of nature forwhat it is is probably that of the theologian
Berkeley. As a grammarian-philosopher ofnaturencenot le
Innomefacul
ent. Twe seare sereveavisuaimprecond
Byourseilarlysee, t
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792
69argument, that rock only in the same sense that I may be said to
hear it, when the wordrock is pronounced (Alciphron, IV. 10). We
believe we have direct access to what some-body means by assuming
it to be what we read or hear:
[I]t comes to pass that the mind often overlooks them [i.e.
signs], so as to carry itsattention immediately on to the things
signied. Thus, for example, in reading werun over the characters
with the slightest regard, and pass on to the meaning. Henceit is
frequent for men to say, they see words [as acoustic-auditory
entities], andnotions, and things in reading a book; whereas in
strictness they see only the char-acters which suggest words,
notions and things. And, by parity of reason, may wenot suppose
that men, not resting in, but overlooking the immediate objects of
sight,as in their own nature of small moment, carry their attention
onward to the verything signied, and talk as if they saw the
secondary objects? which, in truth andstrictness, are not seen, but
only suggested and apprehended by means of the properobjects of
sight, which alone are seen.28
Strictly speaking, the articial separation of sign and signied
and, hence, the experien-tial recognition of the language of nature
as such, is almost impossible:
Which will not seem strange to us if we consider how hard it is
for any one to hearthe words of his native language pronounced in
his ears without understanding them.Though he endeavour to disunite
the meaning from the sound, it will neverthelessintrude into his
thoughts, and he shall nd it extremely dicult, if not impossible,to
put himself exactly in the posture of a foreigner that never
learned the language,28 Alchus to draw on one of Berkeleys
favourite examples we take it for granted thate a distant, extended
or moving object, although distance, extension and movementnsible
qualities proper to tactile experience only. Careful introspection,
however, willl that the tactile qualities are merely suggested,
i.e. signied by certain elements ofl perception. Thus, for example,
the faintness, smallness or obscurity of a visualssion signify
greater distance of an object, given appropriate perceptual
contextitions.blending sign and signied into each other, we fail to
distinguish them and deprivelves of the opportunity to grasp the
semiotic nature of vision in the rst place. Sim-, our
discriminating faculty is suspended in the perception of everyday
discourse. Iherefore, in strict philosophical truth, says Berkeley
in a nicely condensed analogicalwith increasing frequency of
occurrence. The more habitual the sequence of two senseimpressions,
the stronger the illusion of the mind to perceive both when only
one is pres-e, Berkeley oers several reasons for human ignorance
vis-a`-vis the immediate pres-of Gods visible voice, one of which
deserves special mention in the present context;ast, because it
relies heavily on a linguistic observation.a line of argument that
anticipates Benjamin Whorfs concept of background phe-non, Berkeley
points out that it is a characteristic feature of the human
perceptivety to assimilate (sensible) sign and (imagined) signied
to the point of identicationiphron, IV. 12; cf. New Theory of
Vision, 48.
-
so as to be aected barely with the sounds themselves, and not
perceive the signi-cation annexed to them. (New Theory of Vision,
159)
Suggesting a thought experiment that is targeted towards the
universality of the lan-guage of nature, Berkeley brings the
argument to its ultimate conclusion:
And there are some grounds to think that if there was one only
invariable and uni-versal language in the world, and that men were
born with the faculty of speaking it,it would be the opinion of
many that the ideas of other mens minds were properlyperceived by
the ear, or had at least a necessary and inseparable tie with the
soundsthat were axed to them.29
At this point, the subtle reproach of human ignorance with
respect to the language of
29 Ne30 Cf.are fam31 Th110, 1
shapesin prinideas ointrodu
70 M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792by
sight only mediately through the customary correlation with ideas
of touch, and since the latter cannotciple resemble visual ideas, a
person born blind could neither correlate his tactile experience
with the novelf vision nor perceive distance or shapes by sight.
For a survey of the discussion, see Luce and Jessops(1690[1975],
II.9.8). Molyneux posed the problem of a man born blind who had
learned to distinguish a cubefrom a sphere by touch. He argued as
did Berkeley that the man would not be able immediately to
distinguishthe two if he were given sight. Berkeleys semiotic
theory of vision predicts that since one perceives distance andw
Theory of Vision, 66; cf. ibid., 144.Euphranor (i.e. Berkeley),
interrupting Alciphron: But they [these strange things] are not
strange, theyiliar; and that makes them be overlooked (Alciphron,
IV. 15).
e famous Molyneux problem that pervades Berkeleys works on
vision (e.g. New Theory of Vision, 41, 79,32f; Vision Vindicated,
71) was already discussed in Lockes Essay Concerning Human
Understandingnature has turned into a full acknowledgment of the
intricacies involved in experiencingthe language of nature. We fail
to perceive the language of nature as such, because we livein it.30
In the absence of other languages of vision that might demonstrate
the arbitraryrelationship between visual and tactile impressions,
we have to resort to a make-shiftdevice in order to grasp the
non-identity of sign and signied. What Berkeley is thinkingof is a
person with a fully developed sense of touch who has never been
exposed to sensa-tions of light and colour. We have to assume the
posture of a foreigner to the languageof nature and perceive it
with the eyes of a person born blind made to see.31
Let me sum up the discussion so far. Although there is some
merit in the view that therelationship between ordinary discourse
and the universal language of vision is like thatbetween language
and metalanguage, there is no evidence in Berkeleys writings that
thisis more than just a theoretical thought-experiment. The two
languages and, for that mat-ter, the two theories of language, are
kept strictly apart and treated as completely auton-omous. Even
when talking about the language of nature, we do so in full
accordance withthe requirements of a representational theory of
language. A distinguishing feature of thelanguage of nature that
has emerged from the above discussion is its paradoxical
statusvis-a`-vis human understanding. Although ever-present and, in
a way, well known to us,it does not seem to be easily and
transparently available to the conscious understandingof those to
whom it addresses itself. It gives order, pattern and meaning to
the ux of per-ceptual phenomena and thereby guides our
understanding, our actions and interactions,though apparently in
largely imperceptible ways. Thus, both the linguistic path and
per-ceptual access to the divine language are barred. The language
of nature eludes our per-ception. Employing Renaissance
Neoplatonist locution, we might say that the languagection to New
Theory of Vision (1948, I, pp. 143163).
-
of nature is at once manifest and occult (in the original sense
of being concealed) or, moreto the Berkeleian point, that it is
occult, because it is absolutely manifest.
The Neoplatonist bent of the relationship between the two
languages stands out moreclearlpersptectusons,that tPlato
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792
71The second, equally important reason why Berkeleys Platonism has
been a closed bookto historians is that the identities of the two
worlds that go into the Platonic two-worldmetaphysics have been
tacitly reversed. What in the Neoplatonist tradition was
predicatedof the intelligible world of forms, accessible only to
pure thought, is now predicated byBerkeley of the world of sense.
Conversely, the attributes of the Platonic world of sense,the realm
of appearance, are collectively transferred onto Berkeleys world of
thought:
There is indeed this dierence between the signication of
tangible gures by visiblegures, and of ideas by words: that whereas
the latter is variable and uncertain,depending altogether on the
arbitrary appointment of men, the former is xed andimmutably the
same in all time and places [. . .]. Hence it is that the voice of
theAuthor of Nature which speaks to our eyes, is not liable to that
misinterpretation
32 Although some authors have pointed out that in his last
publication, Siris (1744), Berkeley shows distinctNeoplatonist
leanings, his mature theory is generally exempted from such a
disreputable classication. Cf. Wenzs
(1991)A great number of arbitrary signs, various and apposite,
do constitute a language. Ifsuch arbitrary connexion be instituted
by men, it is an articial language; if by theAuthor of Nature, it
is a natural language. Innitely various are the modicationsof light
and sound, whence they are each capable of supplying an endless
varietyof signs, and, accordingly, have been employed to form
languages; the one by thearbitrary appointment of mankind, the
other by that of God Himself. A connexionestablished by the Author
of Nature, in the ordinary course of things, may surely becalled
natural; as that made by men will be named articial. And yet this
doth nothinder but the one may be as arbitrary as the other. And,
in fact, there is no morelikeness to exhibit, or necessity to
infer, things tangible from the modications oflight, than there is
in language to collect the meaning from the sound. But, suchas the
connexion is of the various tones and articulations of voice with
their severalmeanings, the same is it between the various modes of
light and their respective cor-relates; or, in other words, between
the ideas of sight and touch. (Vision Vindicated,40)that historians
have not been willing to grant theory-status to occult ideas on
language.Nor is the Platonic background easily identiable in
Berkeley, given that he does not intro-duce the two languages in an
overtly Platonic context. In fact, the systematic pressure
toharmonize the two languages is so strong that their contrastive
properties tend to be con-stantly suppressed, concealed behind a
representational terminology, or, as in the follow-ing quotation,
simply reduced to a contrast of a natural vs. articial origin:y
against the background of Berkeleys philosophy, if we look at it
from the broaderective of Neoplatonism in general.32 In a way,
Berkeleys entire philosophical archi-re can be seen to rest
securely on a (Neo-)Platonic foundation. For basically two rea-this
Platonic foundation was destined to escape the notice of
historians. The rst ishe two-languages metaphysics has not yet been
recognized as an important variant ofnic metaphysics in any
historiographic tradition. The basic reason for that, in turn,
isdiscussion of archetypes in Berkeleys writings and McKims
response (1991).
-
and ambiguity that languages of human contrivance are
unavoidably subject to.(New Theory of Vision, 152)
This modication, profound though it may be, leaves the entire
Platonic constructionintact while, at the same time, contributing
greatly to the disguising of it. In stark contrastto all other
kinds of Platonism, the world of sense, i.e. the language of
nature, is invested
33 Pri34 Berp. 337)35 Pri
72 M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008)
5792nciples, 3036; Three Dialogues (Works II, p. 235).keleys
outspoken distrust of language is standardly compared with that of
Wittgenstein. Cf. Moore (1984,; Turbayne (1991, p. 50); Fogelin
(2001, passim).with the attributes of the real, intelligible world.
It is depicted as universal, xed, immu-table, perfect, univocal,
eternal, and addressed as what has a higher degree of realityand
dignity relative to the ideas of human institution. Ideas of sense
are more strong,lively, and distinct from those of the imagination;
they have likewise a steadiness, order,and coherence and can be
said to have more reality in them. Perfectly in line with
thisrearrangement, ideas of human origin attract the opposite
predicates. They are said to beambiguous, heterogeneous,
incoherent, changing, irregular and, with regard to their
onto-logical status, chimeras formed by the imagination or ctions
of the mind.33 Thus,the world of human thought is portrayed as
having a lesser degree of being and the logicaland ontological
secondariness that has always been an essential attribute of the
Platonicworld of appearances.
3.4. Linguistic Platonism and Berkeleys critique of language
With the neoplatonist basis of his metaphysics thus delineated,
we are sucientlyequipped to assign to Berkeleys radical critique of
language its proper systematic andhistorical location. While it is
true that Berkeleys philosophy aims at drawing awaythe curtain of
words from the truths of things in a way that indeed looks forward
tothe early Wittgenstein,34 it is both historically and
systematically more appropriate tosee him in the Baconian or, still
more generally, in the empiricist tradition of languagecriticism.
In keeping with the empiricist tradition, Berkeleys language
criticism aims atthe surrender of human, especially verbal,
authorship over scientic ideas in favour ofan emancipation of
natures own communicative potential. According to Blumenberg(1986,
p. 86), it is the fundamental idea of empiricism to rescue nature
from its role asan underprivileged object of scientic discourse and
to reinstate it as the legitimate nar-rator of its own history,
leaving to the scientist the position of the faithful scribe
writingdown the dictates of nature or, to borrow Berkeleys term,
the grammar of nature. Thebusiness of the philosopher, by contrast,
is to sweep away the verbal dust of uncouthparadoxes, diculties,
and inconsistencies that centuries of human monologue haveheaped
upon the book of nature.35 In other words, the philosopher has to
clear theground of human language (and thought) in order for
natures hand to become visibleto the grammarian of nature. It is
essential to notice at this point that what is clearlymeant as a
metaphor by Blumenberg and, with some likelihood, by the authors in
theempiricist tradition prior to Berkeley, is turned into a literal
programme in Berkeleysphilosophy. And more than that: Berkeleys
philosopher is under the obligation to de-nciples, Introd., 13; cf.
Phil. Comment., 642.
-
intellrecog
Beovergetedilliter
ing. But the attainment of all these advantages doth presuppose
an entire deliverance
InAlcipguistiof thattenviduainstan
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792
73guidance, the philosophers enterprise is incomparably more
complicated. Not only ishe compelled to prolong and sustain the
articial separation of sign and signied throughwhole stretches of
discourse, which I dare hardly promise my self; so dicult a thing
it isto dissolve an union so early begun, and conrmed by so long a
habit as that betwixtwords and ideas (Principles, Introd., 23).
Still worse, he has to convey his glimpses oftruths with the aid of
the same language that is the source of all problems. It seems asif
Berkeley, with all his optimism, was at times aware of the
hopelessness in view of theparadoxical situation that is
characteristic of the two-languages metaphysics:
Once more I desire my Reader may be upon his guard against the
Fallacy of words,Let him beware that I do not impose on him by
plausible empty talk that commondangerous way of cheating men into
absurditys [sic]. Let him not regard my Wordsany otherwise than as
occasions of bringing into his mind determind signicationsso far as
they fail of this [sic] they are Gibberish, Jargon & deserve
not the name offrom the deception of words, which I dare hardly
promise myself; so dicult a thingit is to dissolve an union so
early begun, and conrmed by so long a habit as thatbetwixt words
and ideas. (Principles, Introd., 2123)
terestingly, the philosopher nds himself in precisely the
dilemma that characterizedhrons (i.e. the general readers) problems
of recognizing, and assenting to, the lin-c nature, and in turn,
the divine origin, of vision. Wiping away the theoretical duste
scholarly tradition requires that we attend to the ideas signied,
and draw o ourtion from the words which signify them (Principles,
Introd., 23). But where the indi-ls task to disunite the solid
aggregates of sign and signied, though arduous, istaneously
rewarded with the intuitive knowledge of Gods intimate presence
andcritique of language, it is the philosophical and scholarly
traditions that are pilloried.Above all, Berkeley takes issue with
what he saw as the most dangerous theories, lead-ing inevitably to
scepticism: the doctrine of matter in motion (in science) and that
ofabstract ideas (in philosophy). Both the materialist and the
abstractionist doctrines,Berkeley argues at length, originate from
absurd linguistic theories (cf. e.g. Principles,Introd., 21).
As a remedy against the delusion of words (Principles, Introd.,
25), he recommends,and then promises himself, to
endeavour to take them [the ideas] bare and naked into my view,
keeping out of mythoughts, so far as I am able, those names which
long and constant use hath sostrictly united with them; [. . .] as
long as I conne my thoughts to my own ideasdivested of words, I do
not know how I can easily be mistaken. [. . .] To discernthe
agreement and disagreement there are between my ideas [. . .] there
is nothingmore requisite, than an attentive perception of what
passes in my own understand-ectualize and to de-verbalize human
pseudo-knowledge up to the point where wenize that the language of
nature is not a metaphor.rkeleys most extensive attack on human
language and its attendant vices extendsthe 25 sections of the
lengthy introduction to the Principles. It is clearly not
tar-towards his readership, much less to the generality of men
which are simple andate [and] never pretend to abstract notions
(Principles, Introd., 10). As in BaconsLanguage. I desire &
warn him not to expect to nd truth in my Book or any where
-
but in his own Mind. wtever [sic] I see my self tis impossible I
can paint it out inwords.36
36 Phi37 See
74 M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792l.
Comment., 696. Cf. ibid., 579, 627, 636, 693, 867, 883; New Theory
of Vision, 120; Vision Vindicated, 35.On the whole, Berkeleys
discussion of the two linguistic worlds and the uneasy positionof
the enlightened subject relative to them proves to be a replica of
the relevant argu-ments as presented in the esoteric tradition of
Renaissance Neoplatonism. As an heir tothis tradition, Berkeley
inherits a number of motives attendant on the two-world theoryfrom
earlier strands of the Neoplatonic tradition, namely the ideas, for
example, thatthe phenomenal world of appearances acts as a veil
that covers the true reality ofthings/signs, that the world of
appearances is generally mistaken for the real world/sign-world,
that the demasking of the phenomenal world as such requires eort
and dis-cipline, or that the teaching of the truth will meet with
resistance from the side of thosethat believe in the reality of
appearances. In addition to these general features, Berkeleyssystem
displays those particular aspects of a Platonic metaphysics that
originate in its lin-guistic turn, i.e. the two-languages
metaphysics as buttressing Renaissance occultism. Asargued above,
the phenomenal language (of communication) has taken the position
of theworld of appearances while nature herself has assumed the
role of the ultimate sign-reality:it is presented as a real,
perfect, natural, auto-referential language or, which is the same,
aswhat language essentially is. This linguistic reading of the
two-world theory results in apeculiar linguistic constellation that
is absent from orthodox versions of Neoplatonism.For once the
verbal-intellectual debris covering the reality of language is
removed, the phi-losopher nds himself entangled in the paradoxical
situation that requires him to eitherdraw the cloak of silence over
what he has seen or put the debris back to where it was.This, then,
is the linguistic paradox inherent in the two-languages
metaphysics: the reallanguage dees verbalization. And it is the
awareness of this paradoxical situation thatis behind Berkeleys
pessimistic remark that he cant paint it out in words.
With no viable way out of the quandary, but with the natural
desire to communicatethe ineable, Renaissance authors tried to
escape the vicious circle by resorting to make-shift strategies.
They either consciously destroyed the conventional make-up of the
com-municative language, hoping that a spark of the true language
of nature might shinethrough the otherwise opaque fabric of the
veil of words a practice which earned themthe reputation of
promoting aected obscurity. Or they would temporarily, by
plausibleempty talk (cf. last quote), comply with the requirements
of the phenomenal language,leading the hearer-reader to the
critical point where the logic of the language of commu-nication
would break down. Either way, occult writers were well aware that
access to thereal language of nature (or the real nature of
language) could not be taught nor shown nortalked about.
Ultimately, the reader would have to be left to himself. As for
Berkeley,being a philosopher, a bishop and a teacher, he clearly
opted for the second way to dealwith this paradox.37
Instead of taking a closer look at the contents and thrust of
Berkeleys critique of lan-guage, I would rather like to focus on
its structural position within linguistic Platonism.From the point
of view of the history of linguistic ideas, it may well be
important to ana-lyze this part of his linguistic ideas more
carefully. But whatever the philologically veri-able motive or the
proper systematic place of Berkeleys language criticism, the
mostquotation above; cf. Principles, Introd., 25.
-
impobecautwo-lder itit isNeop
Ifguagearmlinguthe ccommbesidcritiqof the critique spans the
entire representational chain (cf. part I, Fig. 6), including
what
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792 75is
immediately represented by language, i.e. human concepts (as
representational entities)and what is ultimately represented by
language: things conceived of as ultimate signieds.For if language
does not tell the truth in the courtroom of epistemology, why
should writ-ing or whatever is merely represented by language do
so? Lurking behind the obvious cul-prit language, then, is the
whole chain of representation, feeding the suspicion that all
ofthem might be involved in the case. In less picturesque wording:
It should not come as asurprise if Berkeleys critique of language
were embedded in a far more radical critique ofrepresentation in
general.
Arguably, these Platonic implications inherent in the
metaphysics of the two lan-guages are entirely borne out by
Berkeleys metaphysics. On the level of his linguistic ideas,the
critique is rather mild and consists in his pointing out many
legitimate uses of wordsthat go beyond the mere recording or
communicating of words (McGowan, 1991, p.121). Much in the same
vein, Berkeley criticizes the linguistic theories that require
wordsto stand generally for ideas in order to be used in a
legitimate and signicant manner,alerting the reader time and again
to the fact that this misapprehension is at the root ofmany
erroneous doctrines:
But to give a farther account how words came to produce the
doctrine of abstractideas, it must be observed that it is a
received opinion, that language has no otherend but the
communicating of our ideas, and that every signicant name standsfor
an idea [. . .]. And a little attention will discover, that it is
not necessary (evenin the strictest reasonings) signicant names
which stand for ideas should [. . .] excitein the understanding the
ideas they are made to stand for: in reading and discours-ing,
names being for the most part used as letters are in algebra, in
which though aparticular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to
proceed right it is not requisitethat in every step each letter
suggest to your thoughts, that particular quantity it wasappointed
to stand for. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words
is notthe chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed.
There are other ends,as the raising of some passion, the exciting
to, or deterring from some action, theputting the mind in some
particular disposition [. . .]. For example, when a School-man
tells me Aristotle hath said it, all I conceive he means by it, is
to dispose mertant fact for the present argument, at least is that
it is there. It is important,se it needs to be there. It is one of
the structural ingredients that is essential for aanguages theory
to make sense. That the critique of language should eventually
ren-self superuous in that it needs to be voiced in the same
communicative medium thatdirected against, is just another natural
consequence following from linguisticlatonism.that is correct,
Berkeleys criticism should be aimed at more than just ordinary
lan-. Recall that the Platonic structure of the two-languages
metaphysics imposes a non-ative context on the entire
representational theory of language. The framework ofistic
Platonism thus predicts, in the abstract at least, that the
critical attitude towardsommunicative language be extended, rstly,
to a critique of theories of language asunication or representation
much in the same way that traditional Neoplatonism,es disapproving
of the material, sensual side of things, always included an
implicitue of materialist ontologies. Linguistic Platonism
predicts, secondly, that the scopeto embrace his opinion with the
deference and submission which custom has annexed
-
to that name [. . .]. Innumerable examples of this kind may be
given, but why should Iinsist on those things, which every ones
experience will [. . .] plentifully suggest untohim?38
ing, the speaker utters nonsense. In order therefore to know
whether any mans
ThAdmVII.accou
38 Pri
in the athe rep
76 M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008)
5792nciples, Introd., 19f; cf. Alciphron, VII. 4, 14; Woozley
(1991). Interestingly, Berkeley seems to recognizebove quotation
and elsewhere (Principles, Introd., 19) a relationship between
communicative function andtional throughout, extending the scope of
representation to include the relationshipbetween ideas and
(material) things. But this should not deceive one into concluding
thatthe remaining components of the attack on representation
remained implicit or evenabsent. It is just dicult to assemble them
in one stretch of argument. In fact, this is alltoo natural, given
that they are not meant by Berkeley to unite in a wholesale
critiqueof representation. All I am saying here is that the
structural make-up of linguistic Plato-nism includes,
theoretically, a critical attitude towards all components of a
representa-tional theory of language. Whether or not such
theoretical implications receive explicittreatment is a question of
the systematic requirements of a particular theory as much asspeech
be senseless and insignicant, we have nothing to do but lay aside
the words,and consider the ideas suggested by them. Men, not being
able immediately to com-municate their ideas one to another, are
obliged to make use of sensible signs orwords; the use of which is
to raise those ideas in the hearer which are in the mindof the
speaker; and if they fail of this end they serve to no purpose. He
who reallythinks hath a train of ideas succeeding each other and
connected in his mind; andwhen he expresseth himself by discourse
each word suggests a distinct idea to thehearer or reader; who by
that means hath the same train of ideas in his which wasin the mind
of the speaker or writer. As far as this eect is produced, so far
the dis-course is intelligible, hath sense and meaning. Hence it
follows that whoever can besupposed to understand what he reads or
hears must have a train of ideas in hismind, correspondent to the
train of words read or heard. (Alciphron, VII. 2)
is is the sort of theory that Berkeley sees at the root of the
aforementioned evils.ittedly, neither Alciphrons endorsement of a
Lockean theory of language (Alciphron,24) nor Euphranors (i.e.
Berkeleys) rejection of it (Alciphron, VII. 5, 14) takesnt of the
fact that a prototypical representational theory of language is
representa-Tacitly, but naturally, this criticism feeds into a
wholesale attack on a representationalor which in the eyes of
Berkeley is basically the same Lockean theory of language. Themost
extensive discussion and rejection of representationalism occurs in
the seventh dia-logue of Alciphron. Before again rejecting what he
believes to be the fallacies of a repre-sentational theory of
language (such as the view that in order for a word to besignicant
it has to stand for an idea on each occasion of its use, or the
notion that thesole and principal end of language is to communicate
ideas), Berkeley lets Euphranors(i.e. his) interlocutor Alciphron
present a summary of a Lockean theory of language thatextends over
nearly four pages. Its opening premises deserve to be quoted at
some length:
Words are signs: they do or should stand for ideas, which so far
as they suggest theyare signicant. But words that suggest no ideas
are insignicant. He who annexeth aclear idea to every word he makes
use of speaks sense; but where such ideas are want-resentation of
ideas as joint features of a Lockean theory of language.
-
it is dependent on the concerns and objectives of a particular
author. A positive stancetowards the representational functions of
any of the joints of the chain of signicationis, however,
precluded.
As for the critique of human thought (as what is immediately
represented by ordinary
ans,escapBerkeLock
A conclusive answer to this question cannot disregard Berkeleys
deep involvement in
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792
77the two-languages metaphysics. It is precisely this and only this
theory that calls forboth the provisional commitment to a
representational theory of language and, at thesame time, its
denunciation as a theory of what language merely appears to be. The
con-
39 Cf. Creery (1991, p. 29).40 The fact that things are signs
follows straightforwardly from the semiotic constitution of their
elements, i.e.ideas of sense. See below (Section 3.5); cf. also
Fogelin (2001, pp. 92, 100).
41 Laand rightly so, that Berkeleys own rival theory of
(ordinary) language does note the representationalism that it
otherwise denounces. How can this be? Why doesley fail to fashion
his critique of Lockean, representational linguistics into a
non-ean, non-representational theory of language?language), it is
scattered over Berkeleys writings. It pervades, for example, the
rst threeparagraphs of the introduction to the Principles (where
language is not yet his concern),but rarely accompanies, as it does
in the following quotation, his language criticism:
The impossibility of dening or discoursing clearly of most
things proceeds from thefault & scantiness of language, as
much, perhaps, as from obscurity & confusion ofThought. Hence I
may clearly & fully understand my own Soul extension, etc &
notbe able to dene them! (Phil. Comment., 178)
It is also worth noting in this context that Berkeley has been
shown to reject contem-porary representational theories of
perception in favour of a semiotic theory of percep-tion.39
Likewise, Berkeleys notorious assaults on received ideas of
material substances(e.g. Principles, 16) should, in the context of
linguistic Platonism, be read as a critiqueof represented
substances, i.e. of the common doctrine that material things are
the ultimatesignieds. For Berkeleys idealist doctrine explodes the
basis of representational theoriesof language in at least two ways:
rstly, it does away with the idea that things are utterlydistinct
from, and thus in a way behind, words and ideas (cf. Phil.
Comment., 606); sec-ondly, it postulates that things (and their
properties) are in fact signs.40 In sum, then, thekeystones of
Berkeleys metaphysics are a unity. The critique of materialist or
dualistontologies, the critique of language and the critique of
representational theories of percep-tion combine to form a critique
of representational realism the presence of which isencouraged, if
not required, by a linguistic Platonism operating from behind the
scenes.
If the above argument for at least an implicit presence of a
full critique of representa-tion in Berkeleys works is valid, the
following problem suggests itself: We have seen abovethat Berkeley
notes many important non-ideational uses of language, emphasizing
thatthese non-representational functions of language are as
important as the representationof ideas. We have also seen that
Berkeley explicitly takes to task linguistic theories
ofrepresentation including the sub-theory of ideational
representation. And, of course,Berkeleys emphasis on
non-representing uses of language has not been lost on
historiog-raphers, who have argued that Berkeley thereby
anticipates more recent, if not modern,theories of language.41 On
the other hand, it is generally agreed among the same histori-nd
(1975, 1991).
-
straints that the two-languages metaphysics places on Berkeleys
linguistic ideas are suchthat apart from denying him the
possibility of communicating the true nature of lan-guage they also
prevent him from painting his intuitions about
non-representationaluses of language into an appropriate linguistic
theory. This is inescapable to the extentthat a representational
theory forms part and parcel of the two-languages metaphysics.Thus,
the paradoxical situation that the truth-seeking philosopher nds
himself in reap-pears on the meta-level of linguistic theories: the
adherence to linguistic Platonismrequires the restoration of the
same representational model of language that it is meantto
undermine.
3.5. Some problems
The two last sections have provided ample evidence for the claim
that underlying the
78 M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008)
5792design of Berkeleys philosophy is a version of linguistic
Platonism. By and large, thehypothesis appears to rest on a basis
solid enough to require no further conrmation. Evenso, one must not
ignore those features that seem to tell a dierent story. With
Berkeleyslinguistic Platonism being brought to the fore, however, I
am condent that many of theaforementioned alien elements can now be
accounted for in a satisfactory way. Thus, forinstance, the fact
that Berkeley attributes to the universal language of vision a
communi-cative function merely shows that in an eort to convince
the reader of the linguistic natureof vision he is willing to
ascribe to it whatever features are characteristic of ordinary
lan-guage. Still, there can be no no doubt that the sole function
of Gods own idiom is that ofinstruction.42 There are, nonetheless,
at least two pieces of counter-evidence to my generalclaim that
cannot easily be dismissed as either impostors or minor modications
to theprototypical two-languages metaphysics as illustrated in part
I, Fig. 7. And it is to thesemore intricate issues that I now
turn.
The rst prominent divergence from the Renaissance model of a
presentational the-ory of language emerges from Berkeleys
discussion of the nature of the sign-signiedrelationship. Recall
that Berkeley takes pains to argue that the semiotic link
betweenideas of vision and ideas of touch is arbitrary. Now in
terms of the history of ideas,the attribution of arbitrariness to
the divine language, far from being puzzling or novel,is part of
the gradual secularization of linguistic ideas at the dawn of the
modern era.43
With regard to a presentational theory of language, however,
ascribing arbitrariness to
42 It should be noted, however, that Berkeleys language of
nature no longer informs us about the nature oressence of things.
Following Locke, Berkeley views things as collections of qualities
in precisely the same way thatwritten words are collections of
letters (see below, Section 3.5). As a consequence, the identity of
words now restsexclusively on the particular combination of
letters. But while Berkeley drew the natural conclusion that
thenotions of substance, essence and accidents are vacuous (see
below, Section 4), Locke stopped short of taking thislast step,
assuming besides all these simple Ideas they [ideas of substances]
are made up of [. . .] the confused Ideaof something to which they
belong (Essay, II.23.3). Cf. Three Dialogues, Works II, p. 249.
What Berkeleyslanguage of nature teaches us about nature herself
is, accordingly, of a more practical and less esoteric character:By
this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning
what we are to expect from such andsuch actions, and what methods
are proper to be taken, for the exciting such and such ideas: which
in eect is allthat I conceive to be distinctly meant, when it is
said that by discerning the gure, texture, and mechanism of
theinward part of bodies [. . .] we may attain to know [. . .] the
nature of the thing (Principles, 65). The same
practicalunderstanding of the nature of things determines the
functionally oriented discussion of the language of naturein
Alciphron, VII.
43 Cf. Grazia (1980). See e.g. Locke (1975[1690], III.6.51).
-
the divine language of nature is as irritating as it is
unprecedented. It inevitably raisesthe question of whether a
presentational theory of language can accommodate theintrulangu
Letally,
imatetwo-lmay
M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008) 5792 79by
the arbitrary appointment of mankind, the other by that of God
Himself. A con-nexion established by the Author of nature [. . .]
may surely be called natural; as thatmade by men will be named
articial. And yet this doth not hinder but the one maybe as
arbitrary as the other. (Vision Vindicated, 40)44 Cf.ly cross the
border that separates the two estranged linguistic theories united
in aanguages metaphysics. Being stripped of their conventional
dress, arbitrary signsprincipally gure as natural signs in the
divine language of nature:
A great number of arbitrary signs, various and apposite, do
constitute a language. Ifsuch arbitrary connexion be instituted by
men, it is an articial language; if by theAuthor of nature, it is a
natural language. Innitely various are the modicationsof light and
sound, whence they are each capable of supplying an endless
varietyof signs, and, accordingly, have been each employed to form
languages; the oneour minds the idea of small or great, or no size
at all of outward objects; just as thewords of any language are in
their own nature indierent to signify this or that thingor nothing
at all. (New Theory of Vision, 64)
It is apparent from this and other passages that Berkeley
narrows down the meaning ofthe notion of arbitrariness in an almost
Saussurean or Peircean manner, restricting it tothe logical
contingency of the sign-signied connection. Signs are tied to their
signiedsfor no other reason than barely because they have been
observed to accompany them(New Theory of Vision, 65). While the
Western linguistic tradition prior to Berkeley hadagreed with much
of contemporary linguistic discourse in treating arbitrariness as
weddedto, if not virtually identical with, convention (with
arbitrariness being usually inferredfrom the conventional plurality
of languages), Berkeley demonstrates that arbitrarinessdoes not
contrast with naturalness, but with similitude or necessary
connexion (Alciph-ron, IV. 7). Accordingly, signs classify along
two dierent dimensions that cut across eachother. One is the
arbitrary vs. non-arbitrary dimension focusing on the nature of the
sign-signied relationship, the other is the natural vs.
articial/conventional dimension placingthe provenance of signs in
the foreground (cf. Vision Vindicated, 40). Thus, his rened
clas-sication admits of both conventional, but non-arbitrary and
natural, but arbitrarysigns.44
It is precisely this conceptual clarication that allows the
notion of arbitrariness to legit-sion of what we have seen to be an
essential feature of the contrary theory ofage.t me therefore take
a closer look at Berkeleys notion of arbitrariness, which,
inciden-appears to be remarkably modern:
Those ideas that now suggest unto us the various magnitudes of
external objectsbefore we touch them, might possibly have suggested
no such thing: Or they mighthave signied them in a direct contrary
manner: so that the very same ideas, on theperception whereof we
judge an object to be small, might as well have served to makeus
conclude it great. Those ideas being in their own nature equally
tted to bring intoMeier-Oeser (1997, p. 380).
-
Ththe plingutinctiissue
Th
80 M.M. Isermann / Language & Communication 28 (2008)
5792and needs to be dealt with in somewhat more detail. Considering
that it concerns what Ihave identied as the semiotic principle of a
presentational theory, it is no doubt alsomore irritating. In part
I, I have claimed that the merging of sign and signied in
anessential identity is at the heart of a presentational theory of
language, because mostof the remaining features can be more or less
directly inferred from it. Berkeley, how-ever, not only keeps sign
and signied strictly apart. He even complains about our
care-lessness in hesitating to follow him. Moreover, ideas of sight
and ideas of touch beingentirely heterogeneous and distinct, it
seems to follow that the tactile signied cannotbe conceived as part
of the visual sign. The make-up of the divine signs, in other
words,appears to be simple and not complex. One is thus faced with
at least the following setof questions: Is it possible for a theory
of language to be based on the principal axiomof the contrary
theory of language? Or is it more reasonable to assume that instead
ofbeing the principle of a presentational theory of language it is
simply an ordinary featurethe exchange of which the theory could
easily accommodate? If so, what is the real prin-ciple of a
presentational theory of language? Does the incorporation of the
alterity ofsign and signied in a presentational context result in
an incoherent theory of language?Is there a way of eliminating this
hostile element in Berkeleys account of the divine lan-guage of
vision?
Any attempt to provide a basis for an informed answer to these
questions should takethe following observation into account.
Compared with the Renaissance occult tradition,the starting point
of Berkeleys version of a presentational theory of language is
funda-mentally reversed. The default situation for the occult
scientist or mystic was a generalunawareness of the language of
nature, or the signatures of things. Accordingly, the fun-damental
problem was how to overcome the obstacles that denied insight into
the true nat-ure of things. Once the veil of words was removed,
admittance could be gained into thetrue language of nature. Instead
of being granted to everybody, access to the secret divineidiom was
characteristically limited to some chosen few, such as initiated
adepts, learnedalchemists, magi or other privileged representatives
of esoteric knowledge. And even forthe