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International Security

Treaty ApplicationsCase study of the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Pat Norris

HR GEO User Consultation Workshop

Frascati 14-15 April 2010

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No. 2 Logica 2010 All rights reserved

Introduction to NPT and IAEA

Phases to be Monitored

Relevant Organisations

Further information on the subject can be found in my two books:

during the Cold War: Spies in the Sky(published by Springer-Praxis, 2007) since the Cold War: Watching Earth from Space (to be published by

Springer-Praxis, autumn 2010)

Structure of the presentation

International Security Treaty Applications - Pat Norris - Frascati, 14 April 2010

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Logica 2010 All rights reserved

The NPT is the basis for countries to prevent the use of nuclearweapons.

It divides the nations of the world into three categories countries with nuclear weapons countries that commit not to have nuclear weapons

countries that are not signatories or that do not comply

The nuclear countries agree to help the non-nuclear countries usenuclear technology for peaceful purposes (electricity generation)

President Obama has strengthened this (April 6th) by promisingcompliant non-nuclear signatories immunity from nuclear attack

161 States are parties to the NPT

The NPT will be reviewed at a special 4-week long conference in NewYork starting on 3rd May.

No. 3

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)


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The United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)headquartered in Vienna has the remit to monitor the NPT.

Initially the IAEA acted as bookkeepers and accountants rather thandetectives they relied on States to report where nuclear materials were stored and

processed

in the early days of the NPT this was a reasonable approach since most of

the countries being inspected were industrial nations with professionalnuclear programs that had signed up in good faith and were not intendingto cheat

today the IAEA considers that 72 countries have significant nuclearactivities

The credibility of the IAEA was damaged in 1991 by the discovery ofa nuclear weapons program in Iraq, effectively under its nose, andclose to facilities it was inspecting

No. 4

Policing the NPT the IAEA


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Responding to the loss of IAEAcredibility:

The UN Special Commission(UNSCOM) was created reportingto the UN Security Council

The IAEA formed the Iraq ActionTeam to detect nuclear activities

not acknowledged by Iraq as wellas to monitor the destruction ofIraqs enriched uranium

The U.S. Government* provideddetailed line drawings of Iraqi

sites based on high resolutionsatellite imagery

showed all major buildings, fences,gates, and even shipping containers

No. 5

IAEA after the first Iraq War


* National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)

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The U.S. collaboration went further:

U.S. imaging systems would image Iraqi

deception activities and within a few hourssummaries of the information and drivingdirections for inspectors were with the IAEAteams in Baghdad

Most famous example:

surveillance noted in July 1991 that huge amountsof equipment had been removed before an IAEAAction Team inspection

IAEA responded to the base where the trucks couldbe seen departing from a rear exit

the Action Team stopped the convoy on thehighway, and established the first solid proof thatIraq had a secret uranium enrichment program,never declared to the IAEA as was required

No. 6

Spy Satellite Imagery


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An example where satellite imagery gave false information:

April of 1992 the Action Team directed Iraq to destroy eight

buildings at Al Atheer Iraq army demolition teams mined the columns of the largestindustrial buildings at Al Atheer with destruct charges

when the charges were fired, the buildings collapsed in an orderly pancakefashion as you would expect from a professional demolition team

a week later U.S. analysts asked whythe buildings had not been destroyed

U.S. analysts came to Vienna to look atground photos

the multi-story industrial buildings had

pancaked so neatly that the roofs stilllooked the same to the imagerysatellites

No. 7

Limits of Satellite Imagery


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In 1999 UNSCOM was dissolved and replaced by UNMOVIC which inturn was wound up in 2003 after the 2nd Iraq War.

The Action Team was merged into the IAEA Department ofSafeguards A Satellite Imagery Analysis Unit (SIAU) was set up in the

Department of Safeguards that monitors open-source information:

SIAU produces high quality site maps for inspectors to take to the field

SIAU can also be tasked to look at undeclared activities when there is asuspicion that something is wrong

it is recognised that if the area of interest is not accessible (e.g.: NorthKorea), remote sensing sensors provide one of the few methods forgathering data for nuclear monitoring

it is also recognised that satellite imagery is far from being sufficient on itsown to confirm the existence or absence of nuclear activities

No. 8

UNSCOM evolves


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The phases of nuclear activities to be monitored include:

Production of uranium

Enrichment of uranium Production & extraction of plutonium Weapons manufacturing and deployment

No. 10

Phases to be monitored


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Mining provides about 2/3 of the uranium used by the worlds nuclearpower stations

the remainder comes from stockpiles, modified uranium fromdecommissioned nuclear weapons, reprocessed nuclear powerstation fuel, etc.

Uranium is currentlymined in 20 countries

Canada & Australiasupply nearly half

6 countries supplymost of the rest

No. 11

Uranium production


Distribution of the 42,500tons of Uranium Mined in 2007

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Iraq produced a great deal of uranium by extracting it from phosphatefertilizer at the Al Qaim superphosphate plant near the Syrian borderin the western desert

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) set up a researchproject to characterize the hyperspectral signatures of the phosphatefertilizers from Al Qaim and the mine at Akashat

CNSC used the Hyperion sensor on NASAs EO-1

showed that it was possible to identify the characteristics of a plume ofwhite dust around a phosphate fertilizer plant

needs further research to establish the operational utility of the method

No. 12

Phosphate & uranium


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In the uranium production phase:

Survey suspect mines and related sites with multi- or hyper-spectralsensing every few months

each monitoring episode requires a sample every ~30 minutes for about aweek

Monitor a sample of uranium mines to check the reported productionis accurate

this involves very frequent monitoring (~10 minutes) on a continuous basisfor about a week

GEO would allow this, whereas a LEO constellation would not

includes night-time monitoring, hence the need for thermal infra-red

2 m resolution proved adequate during the Cold War research needed to clarify if that can be relaxed~10-20 km square field of view

No. 13

Potential added value of HR GEO


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Industrial processes to enrich uranium 235 to about 90% for nuclearweapons are very energy intensive.

The plants are generally fairly large, consume a lot of electricity, andreject a lot of waste heat

the gaseous diffusion process and the aerodynamic processes used in theU.S. and South Africa consume thousands of megawatts and are targets forthermal imagery

the more modern gas centrifuge process also consumes large amounts ofelectricity but can be housed in smaller buildings and made to look likeordinary industrial buildings

There is no substitute for trained image analysts with knowledge ofthe application, e.g.:

U.S. inspectors missed the two enormous high voltage power lines crossingfarmers fields to the Tarmiya uranium enrichment plant near Baghdad

amateurs tend to request the highest resolution and tend to look closelyat their target

No. 14

Uranium enrichment


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In the uranium enrichment phase:

Monitor the construction of suspect facilities to quantify the facilitiesfor waste handling, raw material input, electricity usage

this implies occasional monitoring over a period of a year or more (could bedone by LEO)

During operation of the facilities monitor the amount of raw materialincoming and the output of heat, product and radioactive waste

this requires near-continuous monitoring (every few minutes) for periods ofabout a day as a check

fast reaction (minutes) in response to IAEA request

GEO would allow this whereas a LEO constellation would not

night-time imaging needed

infra-red channels to monitor heat waste

2 m resolution proved adequate during the Cold War research needed to clarify if that can be relaxed

~5 km square field of viewNo. 15



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Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium, somany of the same steps needed to enrich uranium are required,followed by a whole additional set of difficult industrial practices

Nuclear reactors generate a great deal of waste heat and have manycharacteristics that will be obvious to trained imagery analysts

they are among the easiest (relatively speaking) nuclear facilities toidentify

there were 438 nuclear power reactors in the world at the end of 2008 andanother 44 under construction.

10 of the 44 were started in 2008 of which 6 were in China

Uranium fuel rods from the reactor are processed to extractplutonium 239 - an extremely dangerous process because of very

high radiation levels the extraction plants generate a great deal of hazardous waste

In general, the extraction process is one that can be identified bysatellite imagery, especially during the construction stage

No. 16

Plutonium production & extraction


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In the plutonium production & extraction phase:

Monitor the construction of suspect facilities to quantify the facilitiesespecially for waste handling

this implies occasional monitoring over a period of a year or more (could bedone by LEO)

During operation of the facilities monitor the amount of radioactivewaste being produced

this requires near-continuous monitoring (every few minutes) for periods ofabout a day as a check

fast reaction (minutes) in response to IAEA request

GEO would allow this but a LEO constellation would not

night-time imaging needed

infra-red channels to monitor waste heat

2 m resolution proved adequate during the Cold War research needed to clarify if that can be relaxed

~5 km square field of viewNo. 17



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It is beyond the remit of the IAEA to monitor the manufacturing ordeployment of nuclear weapons.

Several countries with an interest in this topic have their own,generally well developed, satellite inspection systems

They look for signs of radioactive waste storage and disposal(production)

Deployment essentially means monitoring missiles, other delivery

platforms and their carriers (e.g.: submarines, aircraft) or bases

No. 18

Weapon manufacturing & deployment


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In addition to individual countries, especially the five official nuclearpowers, the following take an interest in NPT monitoring:

Nuclear Suppliers Group (www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org) and theZangger Committee (www.zanggercommittee.org) govern trade innuclear materials:

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR, www.mtcr.info) controlstrade in ballistic missile materials

Australia Group (www.australiagroup.net): an informal group thatseeks to prevent trade in materials for chemical & biological weapons

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, EuropeanCommission (observer), Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,

Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania,Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, USA

No. 20

Other interested organisations


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Logica is a business and technology service company, employing 39,000 people. It provides business consulting, systems integration and outsourcing toclients around the world, including many of Europe's largest businesses. Logica creates value for clients by successfully integrating people, business andtechnology. It is committed to long term collaboration, applying insight to create innovative answers to clients business needs. Logica is listed on both theLondon Stock Exchange and Euronext (Amsterdam) (LSE: LOG; Euronext: LOG). More information is available at www.logica.com

Thank youPat Norris

Logica Office Park, Springfield Dr., Leatherhead, Surrey KT22 7LP, UK www.logica.com

Contact: Pat Norris Space & Defence Strategy Manager T: +44 1372 759056 M: +44 7785 908253 E: [email protected]

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