Geographies of Global Internet Censorship

Geographies of global Internet censorship

Barney Warf

Published online 23 November 2010

Springer Science+Business Media BV 2010

Abstract More than one-quarter of the planetrsquos

population uses the Internet today although access to

it is highly uneven throughout the world While it is

widely celebrated for its emancipatory potential

many governments view the Internet with alarm and

have attempted to limit access or to control its

contents This project seeks to provide a comprehen-

sive theoretically informed analysis of the geogra-

phies of Internet censorship It begins by clarifying

the reasons types extent of and opposition to

government limitations of Internet access and con-

tents Invoking an index of censorship by Reporters

Without Borders it maps the severity of censorship

worldwide and assesses the numbers of people

affected and using the Freedom House index it

correlates political liberty with penetration rates

Second it explores Internet censorship at several

levels of severity to explicate the multiple means

through which censorship is implemented and

resisted The third part offers a moral critique of

Internet censorship via a Habermasian interpretation

of cyberspace as the closest real-world approximation

of an ideal speech situation The summary notes the

paradox of growing e-government and continued

fears of an expanded domain of public discourse

Keywords Internet Cyberspace Censorship Habermas

The Internet interprets censorship as damage

and routes around it

(John Gilmore in Elmer-Dewitt et al 1993

In mid-2010 more than 19 billion people used the

Internet making it a tool of communications entertain-

ment and other applications accessed by roughly 28

of the worldrsquos population (wwwInternetworldstats

comstatshtm) The distribution of these netizens was

highly uneven (Fig 1) For many users these uses

extend well beyond email to include bill payments

stock trading lsquolsquoe-tailrsquorsquo shopping digital gambling

videogames telephony (eg Voice Over Internet Pro-

tocol) hotel and airlines reservations chat rooms

downloading television programs digital music and

pornography as well as popular sites and services such

as YouTube Facebook and Google In all these ways

and more cyberspace offers profound real and potential

effects on social relations everyday life culture poli-

tics and other social activities Indeed for rapidly rising

numbers of people around the world the lsquolsquorealrsquorsquo and the

virtual have become thoroughly interpenetrated In this

light access to cyberspace is no longer a luxury but a

necessity As its applications have multiplied the

Internet is having enormous impacts across the globe

including interpersonal interactions and everyday life

B Warf (amp)

Department of Geography University of Kansas

219C Lindley Hall Lawrence KS 66045-7613 USA

e-mail bwarfkuedu

GeoJournal (2011) 761ndash23

DOI 101007s10708-010-9393-3

identity formation retail trade and commerce gover-

nance and is affecting the structure and form of cities in

the process generating round upon round of non-

Euclidean geometries in the context of a massive global

wave of timendashspace compression

A cottage industry of geographers has artfully

charted the origins and growth of cyberspace its

uneven social and spatial diffusion and its multiple

impacts ranging from cybercommunities to digital

divides to electronic commerce (Dodge and Kitchin

2000 Castells 2001 Kellerman 2002 Crampton

2003 Zook 2005a b Malecki and Moriset 2008)

Such authors typically embed the Internet within

post-Fordist capitalism and drawing on the literature

in critical cartography view it as a powerknowledge

constellation with decisive social roots and conse-

quences Zook and Graham (2007) note the Internetrsquos

lsquolsquocore and peripheryrsquorsquo structure as exemplified by the

dominant role played by search engines such as

Google and voice concerns over the privatization of

the digital commons Similarly Zook (2003) called

attention to the Internetrsquos role in the lsquolsquoonline adult

industryrsquorsquo This literature offers a valuable means for

spatializing the Internet demonstrating its rootedness

in social relations and changing geographic relations

of proximity and serves as a necessary antidote to

many prevailing utopian and technocratic interpreta-

tions such as those that proclaim the ostensible

lsquolsquodeath of distancersquorsquo (Cairncross 1997) or the lsquolsquoend of

geographyrsquorsquo (OrsquoBrien 1992)

One dimension however has received woefully

little attention from geographers concerns the

strategies and tactics deployed by states the world

over to limit access and shape the contents of what

their denizens may view on-line Brunn (2000) for

example explicates how cyberspace is closely inter-

twined with various geographies of regionalism

networks non-state actors and various transnational

processes Steinberg and McDowell (2003) delved

into the mechanics of domain name policing but not

censorship per se While the geographic literature has

delved into issues of geosurveillance and govern-

mentality virtually nothing has been said about how

governments erect obstacles to Internet access or

massage its contents to their liking Warf (2009a b)

touched upon Internet censorship in Latin America

and the states that comprised the former Soviet

Union and Warf and Vincent (2007) addressed the

marked government restrictions found in the Arab

world Nonetheless no comparative geographic anal-

ysis of Internet censorship worldwide yet exists and

regional approaches are limited in scope and ability

to detect differences in Internet censorship practices

and outcomes among the worldrsquos states Confronting

this issue directly is essential if we are to achieve a

robust understanding of the nuanced political impli-

cations of the digital domain

Of all of the innumerable myths that swarm around

cyberspace one of the most insidious is that the

Internet is an inherently emancipatory tool a device

that necessarily and inevitably promotes democracy

by giving voice to those who lack political power

and in so doing undermines authoritarian and repres-

sive governments President Ronald Reagan for

Number of Internet Users

2100 - 999999

1000000 - 3999000

4000000 - 19999000

20000000 - 99000000

100000000 - 420000000

Fig 1 Distribution of worldrsquos Internet users June 2010 Source author using data from wwwinternetworldstatscom

2 GeoJournal (2011) 761ndash23

example asserted that lsquolsquoThe Goliath of totalitarianism

will be brought down by the David of the microchiprsquorsquo

(quoted in Kalathil and Boas 2003 p 1) while the

chair of Citicorp Wriston (1997 p 174) argued that

lsquolsquothe virus of freedom hellip is spread by electronic

networks to the four corners of the earthrsquorsquo Oh that

such optimistic proclamations were true Drawing on

modernizationist theories of development in which

rising education levels and information access led

inexorably to a liberalization of the public sphere via

a well informed rationale public that asserts itself

politically prevailing discourses about the politics of

the Internet tend to be couched in an unrealistic

utopianism rooted in technological determinism and a

silence regarding the perpetuation of inequality Such

visions appeal widely to Western policy makers who

may exaggerate the extent and power of ostensibly

freedom-loving cyberdissidents Closely associated

with this idea is that the global community of

netizens is a self-governing one in which the state

has become largely irrelevant (Goldsmith and Wu

The reality unfortunately is more complex and

depressing and the necessary corrective calls for a

state-centered approach As Lake (2009) notes lsquolsquothe

Web is not nearly the implacable force for freedom

that some of its champions have portrayed The

worldrsquos authoritarians have shown just as much

aptitude for technology as their discontented citi-

zensrsquorsquo Many governments across the planet aggres-

sively limit access to the Internet and as Kalathil and

Boas (2003) demonstrate Internet opposition to

censorship and political activism is typically confined

to small groups of educated individuals often diasp-

oras and has relatively little impact among the

masses of their respective states

The goal of this paper is to explicate the

geographical nature of Internet censorship world-

wide to demonstrate that its uneven topography

reflects spatially specific constellations of state power

relations that intersect in diverse ways with the

geography of cyberspace The topic has largely been

overlooked by geographers despite its numerous

renditions in academic texts in terms of its origins

technology and applications the Internet has been

largely portrayed in insufficiently political terms A

focus on censorship assists in addressing this void

lsquolsquoCensorshiprsquorsquo of course means many things and

takes many different forms parents who restrict their

childrenrsquos access to pornography or corporations that

monitor their employees at work are examples The

focus here however is on government restrictions on

Internet access The paper begins with a discussion of

the dimensions of state restrictions on cyberspace

including the variety of forms involved a rough

conceptual model of the temporal sequence of

different types of intervention and a brief statistical

confirmation that political liberty is indeed correlated

with Internet penetration rates Second it turns to the

specifics of Internet censorship as it is practiced and

resisted within a variety of levels of severity Third

by way of moral critique it discusses these issues in

light of a Habermasian conception of the ideal speech

situation and the implications of Internet censorship

for the broader process of truth construction Finally

the conclusion notes how many governments are

caught between the rock of promoting information

technology and a hard place of fearing a widening of

the domain of public discourse a conundrum bound

to rise in intensity as many states initiate electronic

government (e-government) measures

Dimensions of Internet censorship

Internet accessibility reflects inter alia the willing-

ness of governments to allow or encourage their

populations to log into cyberspace Repressive gov-

ernments often fear the emancipatory potential of the

Internet which allows individuals to circumvent

tightly controlled media Theorizations of Internet

censorship can draw fruitfully on contemporary

geographic discussions of the state power and

discourse Foucauldian perspectives loom large in

this regard Critical analyses of cyberspace for

example point to geosurveillance invasions of

privacy and the formation of digital panopticons

(Crampton 2007 Dobson and Fisher 2007) Such

work has demonstrated that clearly the Internet can

be made to work against people as well as for them

Far from being innately emancipatory in nature

cyberspace can be used to reinforce hegemonic

powers cultivate a climate of fear and prevent or

minimize dissent

There are multiple motivations for Internet cen-

sorship and thus several forms and types including

political repression of dissidents human rights activ-

ists or comments insulting to the state (eg in China

GeoJournal (2011) 761ndash23 3

Iran BurmaMyanmar) religious controls to inhibit

the dissemination of ideas deemed heretical or

sacrilegious (as found in many Arab states) protec-

tions of intellectual property including restrictions on

illegally downloaded movies and music or cultural

restrictions that exist as part of the oppression of

ethnic minorities (eg refusal to allow government

websites in certain languages) or sexual minorities

(ie gays and lesbians) Typically governments that

seek to impose censorship do so using the excuse of

protecting public morality from ostensible sins such

as pornography or gambling although more recently

combating terrorism has emerged as a favorite

rationale Deliberately vague notions of national

security and social stability are typically invoked as

well Other proponents hold that some degree of

censorship is needed to combat lsquolsquocyberanarchyrsquorsquo

(Goldsmith 1998) or to prevent crime (Katyal 2001)

Governments face a choice in the degree of

censorship including its scope (or range of topics)

and depth (or degree of intervention) which ranges

from allowing completely unfettered flows of infor-

mation (eg Denmark) to prohibiting access to the

Internet altogether (eg North Korea) most opt for a

position between these two poles Thus the conflict

between Internet free speech and national territorial

laws speaks to Taylorrsquos (1994) well received notion

that the lsquolsquopower containerrsquorsquo of the nation-state has

sustained mounting lsquolsquoleakagesrsquorsquo to and from the

world-system Most frequently interventions to limit

access or shape the contents of cyberspace reflect

highly centralized power structures notably

authoritarian one-party states concerned with an

erosion of legitimacy As Villeneuve (2006) points

out states seeking sovereignty over their cyber-

territories often generate unintended consequences to

censorship (eg diminished innovation negative

publicity that may lead to pariah status reduced

tourism or offended corporations) results that policy

makers rarely anticipate or acknowledge when putt-

ing such systems into place

Essentially censorship involves control over

Internet access functionality and contents (Eriksson

and Giacomello 2009) Precise filtering is almost

impossible but there is a wide variety of methods are

used to control the flow of digital information

including requiring discriminatory ISP licenses con-

tent filtering based on keywords redirection of users

to proxy servers rerouting packets destined for a

specific IP address to a blacklist website blocking of

a list of IP addresses tapping and surveillance chat

room monitoring discriminatory or prohibitive pric-

ing policies hardware and software manipulation

hacking into opposition websites and spreading

viruses denial-of-service (DOS) attacks that overload

servers or network connections using lsquolsquobot herdersrsquorsquo

temporary just-in-time blocking at moments when

political information is critical such as elections and

harassment of bloggers (eg via libel laws or

invoking national security) Content filtering often

relies on keyword matching algorithms that evolve as

the Internetrsquos lingo changes and filtering may occur

at the levels of the ISP the domain name a particular

IP address or a specific URL Most forms of filtering

are difficult to detect technically the user may not

even know that censorship is at work Most ISPs lack

the ability to block transmission to an individual IP

address or URL so governments undertaking this

task in volume frequently purchase foreign (usually

American) software for this purpose Filtering mech-

anisms suffer the risk of overblocking or lsquolsquofalse

positivesrsquorsquo ie blocking access to sites that were not

intended to be censored and underblocking or lsquolsquofalse

negativesrsquorsquo ie allowing access to sites that were

intended to be prohibited (Murdoch and Anderson

2008) Most common and particularly important is

self censorship as the bulk of casual Internet users

well understand the boundaries of politically accept-

able use within their respective states Often culti-

vating a persuasive hegemonic view of dominant

powers is more efficient than outright force Typi-

cally both persuasion and coercion are combined as

local contexts demand Once formal censorship is

initiated no matter how benign or transparent the

temptation to enlarge its scope or what Villeneuve

(2006) calls lsquolsquomission creeprsquorsquo is always there

The institutions used to enforce such policies

which are typically outgrowths of older media

regulatory regimes concerned with newspapers

radio and television are usually government minis-

tries of information and communication The degree

of centrality in the management of Internet censor-

ship varies considerably Because the state is not a

monolithic entity but composed of diverse agencies

sometimes working at cross-purposes rather than

view censorship as the simple repression of opposi-

tional discourses it is more instructive to think of it

in terms of multiple sometimes contradictory

authorities that invoke diverse strategies of suppres-

sion of various groups and individuals for a broad

array of reasons and motivations Adding to this

complexity is the rapidity with which the Internet has

grown and changed technologically often govern-

ment censors have difficulty keeping up-to-date with

changing technologies (eg text messaging) or slang

terms used to communicate hidden meanings

The degree and type of Internet censorship obvi-

ously varies widely and reflects how democratic and

open to criticism different political systems are

Reporters Without Borders an NGO headquartered in

Paris and one of the worldrsquos preeminent judges of

censorship ranks governments across the planet in

terms of the severity of their Internet censorship

(Fig 2 see also Quirk 2006) Their index of Internet

censorship is generated from surveys of 50 questions

sent to legal experts reporters and scholars in each

country Thus countries in northern Europe the US

and Canada Australia and New Zealand and Japan

exhibit minimal or no censorship (scores less than

10) Conversely a roguersquos list of the worldrsquos worst

offenders including China Vietnam BurmaMyan-

mar Iran and Turkmenistan exhibit the planetrsquos

most severe and extensive restrictions (scores greater

than 80) In North Korea Internet access is illegal

although the government uses it to send messages to

the outside world (Hachigian 2002) In between these

extremes lies a vast array of states with modest to

moderate forms of Internet censorship that reflect

their diverse systems of governance the presence or

absence of civil liberties and the ability of various

groups to resist limitations on their ability or right to

use the Internet in whatever manner they so prefer

Using the categories of Fig 2 Table 1 summarizes

the distribution of the worldrsquos population and Internet

users according to the level of severity of censorship

Thus only 13 of the worldrsquos people but a third of

Internet users live in countries with minimal censor-

ship conversely roughly one-quarter of the worldrsquos

people and Internet users live under governments that

engage in very heavy censorship (the vast bulk of

whom are located in China)

Internet penetration ratesmdashthe proportion of

the population with regular access to cyberspace at

home school or workmdashalso shape the contours of

censorship geography (Fig 3) Rates vary from as

low as 02 (Myanmar) to 100 (Falkland Islands)

Fig 2 Reporters Without Borders Internet Censorship Ranking 2009 Source data drawn from httpwwwrsforgen-classe

ment1003-2009html

Penetration rates have important implications for

state attempts at control In impoverished states in

which penetration rates are low and users rely heavily

on cybercafes censorship is relatively easy and

resistance is futile However falling prices for

personal computers expansion of home ownership

and rising technological prowess of users generate a

population that is more difficult to monitor and

discipline Moreover rising incomes literacy rates

and technical skills often lead to modernizing elites

that actively resist censorship through organized

means Indeed unlike traditional media such as

newspapers and television whose centralized struc-

tures make them amenable to state control the

decentralized rhizomic interactive structure of the

Internet makes it much more difficult for state

authorities to manipulate Nonetheless it should be

remembered that lsquolsquoit is actually easier for a govern-

ment to computer search vast quantities of e-mail

than to open regular mail or monitor tapped tele-

phonesrsquorsquo (Dunn 2000 p 467) There is no guarantee

however that censorship measures succeed As

Hachigian (2002 p 41) points out lsquolsquoThe subtle

choices regimes make about how to treat the Internet

are designed to reinforce their broader strategies for

retaining power and those choices do not predict

regime viability in a clear wayrsquorsquo

However Internet censorship should be seen as

part of a more complex array of contested relations in

cyberspace the Web is not simply a tool a tool of

government control but an arena of conflict Thus

the Internet also serves a variety of counter-hege-

monic purposes including human rights groups and

ethnic or political movements in opposition to

governments (Warf and Grimes 1997 Kreimer

2001 Crampton 2003) Attempts at censorship are

often resisted sometimes successfully by local

cyberactivists such as through the use of anonymiz-

ing proxy servers in other countries that encrypt

usersrsquo data and cloak their identities Today numer-

ous groups in civil society use the medium to connect

isolated once-invisible populations (eg gays and

lesbians) unite and empower womenrsquos movements

give voice to human rights activists and allow

political minorities to promote their own agendas

Thus Internet usage both reflects and in turn shapes

prevailing political orders In authoritarian regimes

with relatively weak civil societies opposition to

Table 1 Global population and Internet users by severity of

Internet censorship

Population

(000s)

Internet

users (000s)

0ndash9 912137 134 629208 319

10ndash19 743610 109 320059 162

20ndash49 2826536 415 400853 203

50ndash79 732971 108 139775 71

80ndash115 1602751 235 480462 244

Total 6818006 1000 1970357 1000

a Reporters Without Borders

Source calculated by author

Fig 3 Internet penetration rates December 2009 Source calculated by author using data from wwwinternetworldstats

comstatshtm

state-control is often weak and ineffectual in more

democratic states opposition can be organized

vociferous and effectual When seen as a contested

terrain of political struggle the interactions between

government Internet censors and the various groups

that resist such impositions resembles a cat-and-

mouse game that continually evolves over time As

the context of Internet censorship changes including

rising penetration rates deregulation of telecommu-

nications providers and new geopolitical circum-

stances (eg openness to foreign investment) both

government authorities and their opponents resort to

changing tactics Overt control over cybercafes for

example may give way to government blockages of

dissident websites while opposition groups may

utilize foreign proxy servers anonymizing software

or texting by cell phones to circumvent such obsta-

cles The outcome of such contestations is inevitably

path dependent contingent and unpredictable

In this light a rough sequence of stages of Internet

censorship summarizes the major forms of state

political intervention as they vary over time Gener-

ally authoritarian governments in countries with low

Internet penetration rates resort to relatively crude

measures such as restricting public access through

licenses and monitoring of cybercafes A national

sanitized intranet may be offered as a substitute for

the global Internet Cuba Vietnam and Burma

Myanmar exemplify this approach As more people

move on-line including rising home personal com-

puter ownership rates a more complex expensive

and cumbersome set of censorship mechanisms is

called for including firewalls and blocking or filter-

ing web-site access Arrests and imprisonment of

cyberdissidents may be common China Kazakhstan

and Saudi Arabia are prime exemplars of these

tactics A third stage involves widespread Internet

access in which lsquolsquosoftrsquorsquo censorship tactics are the

norm particularly self-censorship and encouraging

ISPs to police their users Singapore and Russia

illustrate this type and degree of government inter-

vention Finally at least in the hopes of many

optimistic observers widespread Internet usage can

overwhelm the statersquos capacity to control dissent as

in northern Europe and the US and Canada

To assess the effects of authoritarianism empiri-

cally the analysis includes a brief statistical analysis

of the relations between national Internet usage rates

and political openness or lack thereof via the widely

used Freedom House index of political freedom

(wwwfreedomhouseorg) A non-governmental

organization founded by Eleanor Roosevelt Freedom

House assesses countries on the basis of electoral

freedoms political pluralism and civil liberties

including the number of political parties degree of

corruption human rights abuses autonomy of

minorities media censorship and tolerance of polit-

ical discussion This measure ranges between 1 and 7

score (1 = most open) Of course the Freedom

House measure is not without its critics who claim

the group masks a conservative political agenda

behind a facade of neutrality demonizing govern-

ments at odds with the United States and overlooking

faults of US allies Despite these objections its

measure of political openness remains highly popular

among social scientists in many different disciplines

When compared with Internet penetration rates a

scattergram indicates that political freedom is an

important driver of Internet usage (Fig 4) A corre-

lation of -62 was statistically significant at the 95

confidence level (N = 180) Thus the least demo-

cratic countries have among the lowest penetration

rates while the comparatively wealthy and demo-

cratic republics have by far the highest rates Of

course the standard objection to such an approach is

that both political freedom and Internet access are

functions of national wealth As several political

observers maintain (Tilly 2007 Inglehart and Welzel

2005) wealthier countries are far more likely to be

democratic ones Controlling for wealth (as measured

by GDP per capita in 2009) political freedom still

exerts a powerful influence over penetration rates1

testifying to the autonomy of the political In short

statistically at least there are grounds for supposing

that censorship does affect Internet penetration rates

although this analysis is admittedly preliminary

descriptive and not predictive Moreover because

censorship also occurs in countries with significant

penetration rates a more nuanced analysis is called

1 The regression equation is P frac14 18 68Feth39THORN thorn

eth41THORN

where P = internet penetration rate in 2009 F = Freedom

House index in 2009 and GDP = GDP per capita in 2009

Numbers in parentheses below the equation are t-values of

coefficients R2 = 79 (N = 180) significant at 95 confidence

Levels of severity of Internet censorship

across the globe

There is a highly uneven topography of Internet

censorship around the globe one that reflects the

geographies of the worldrsquos diverse political systems

the extent of Internet penetration rates the social

cultural and economic constitutions of various soci-

eties and the degree of political opposition Such

complexity means that patterns of Internet censorship

do not lend themselves readily to pat characterizations

but require a more detailed case-by-case analysis The

uneven landscapes of Internet censorship reflect the

complex intersections between the growth of cyber-

space and a large variety of regional national and local

political and cultural contexts Decisions of whether

and how to regulate Internet access reflect the degree of

centralization of political control cultural attitudes

toward dissent and geopolitical concerns particularly

for states seeking to attract foreign investment For

example countries seeking to promote development of

an information technology sector or international

exports of services (eg Malaysia) including tourism

are often concerned that Internet censorship can

diminish the revenues from such efforts This section

explores Internet censorship using the levels of sever-

ity denoted by Reporters Without Borders as depicted

in Table 1 and Fig 2

Worst censors (RWB scores 80ndash115)

In a country with more than 420 million Internet

users in June 2010 Chinese Internet censorship is

arguably the worldrsquos most severe (Kahn 2002) The

Communist Party of China has long exerted strict

centralized control over flows of information within

and across the nationrsquos borders largely through the

Ministry of Information Industry (MII) although

Internet policing is conducted primarily through the

Ministry of State Security The state has encouraged

Internet usage but only within an environment that it

controls and cyberspace in China remains relatively

free compared to the traditional media In the early

phases of Internet development the state did little to

regulate cyberspace but as chat rooms and blogs

pushed the boundaries of allowable dissent with a

steady stream of criticism of government officials it

began to tighten control significantly after 2000 (Bi

2001) Indeed for the first decade the Internet likely

strengthened the governmentrsquos control although as

Chinarsquos population of netizens grew explosively it

increasingly became a vehicle for challenges to the

statersquos authority (Hachigian 2001) leading to increas-

ingly harsh repression In 2005 the OpenNet Initia-

tive (2005) declared that lsquolsquoChina operates the most

extensive technologically sophisticated and broad-

reaching system of Internet filtering in the worldrsquorsquo

The Chinese government has been blunt in its

justification for censorship asserting its necessity to

maintain a lsquolsquoharmonious societyrsquorsquo

The government deploys a vast array of measures

collectively but informally known as the lsquolsquoGreat

Firewallrsquorsquo which includes publicly employed moni-

tors and citizen volunteers screens blogs and email

messages for potential threats to the established

political order There are numerous components to

the Great Firewall that operate with varying degrees

of effectiveness International Internet connections to

China are squeezed through a selected group of state-

controlled backbone networks Popular access to

many common Web services such as Google and

Yahoo is heavily restricted (MacKinnon 2008

Paltemaa and Vuori 2009) The national government

hires armies of low-paid commentators commonly

called by the derogatory term the lsquolsquofive-mao partyrsquorsquo

to monitor blogs and chat rooms inserting comments

that lsquolsquospinrsquorsquo issues in a light favorable to the Chinese

state Some municipal governments take censorship

into their own hands Beijing for example uses

10000 volunteer Internet monitors (Wines 2010)

However a large share of censorship occurs via

Internet companies themselves (MacKinnon 2009)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Freedom House Score

Fig 4 Scattergram of freedom house score and Internet

penetration rates 2010 Source author

which monitor chat rooms blogs networking ser-

vices search engines and video sites for politically

sensitive material in order to conform to government

restrictions Websites that help users circumvent

censorship like anonymizercom and proxifycom

are prohibited Users who attempt to access blocked

sites are confronted by Jingjing and Chacha two

cartoon police officers who inform them that they are

being monitored Instant messaging and mobile

phone text messaging services are heavily filtered

including a program called QQ which is automati-

cally installed on usersrsquo computers to monitor

communications Blogs critical of the government

are frequently dismantled although for the most part

the government out-sources this function to blog-

hosting companies (MacKinnon 2008) In 2006 for

example Microsoftrsquos MSN Spaces blog-hosting site

agreed to conform to government lsquolsquoguidelinesrsquorsquo in

return for freedom from censorship at the ISP level

In June 2009 the government attempt to require

manufacturers to install filtering software known as

Green Dam Youth Escort on all new computers but

retreated in the face of a massive popular and

corporate outcry (LaFraniere 2009) a lawsuit from

a California firm Cybersitter alleging that China

stole its software (Crovitz 2010) and the fact that

Green Dam inadvertently jammed government com-

puters (Lake 2009) In response Falun Gong released

a program to circumvent it called Green Tsunami

The Great Firewall system began in 2006 under an

initiative known as the lsquolsquoGolden Shieldrsquorsquo a national

surveillance network that China developed with the

aid of US companies Nortel and Cisco Systems (Lake

2009) and extended beyond the Internet to include

digital identification cards with microchips contain-

ing personal data that allow the state to recognize

faces and voices of its 13 billion plus inhabitants

The envy of authoritarian governments worldwide

the Golden Shield has been exported to Cuba Iran

and Belarus Indeed many respects Chinarsquos state-led

program of Internet development serves as a model

for other authoritarian governments elsewhere

The Chinese government has periodically initiated

shutdowns of data centers housing servers for websites

and online bulletin boards disrupting use for millions

Email services like Gmail and Hotmail are frequently

jammed before the 2008 Olympics Facebook sites of

critics were blocked In 2007 the State Administration

of Radio Film and Television mandated that all video

sharing sites must be state owned Police frequently

patrol Internet cafes where users must supply personal

information in order to log on while web site

administrators are legally required to hire censors

popularly known as lsquolsquocleaning ladiesrsquorsquo or lsquolsquobig mamasrsquorsquo

(Kalathil and Boas 2003)

At times government censorship can generate

problems with foreign investors The government

for years blocked access to The New York Times until

its editors complained directly to President Jiang

Zemin but left the web site for USA Today unmo-

lested (Hachigian 2002) In the Chinese case Google

the worldrsquos largest single provider of free Internet

services famously established a separate politically

correct (by Chinarsquos government standards) website

Googlecn which censors itself to comply with

restrictions demanded by the Chinese state arguing

that the provision of incomplete censored informa-

tion was better than none at all (Dann and Haddow

2008) In early 2010 responding to the ensuing

international criticism Google announced it would

no longer cooperate with Chinese Internet authorities

and withdrew from China Untroubled the Chinese

government promotes its home-grown search engines

such as Baidu Sohu and Sinacom which present

few such difficulties

Finally the Chinese state has arrested and detained

several Internet users who ventured into politically

sensitive areas Although it cannot monitor all

websites in the countries the state pursues the

intimidation strategy popularly known as lsquolsquokilling

the chicken to scare the monkeysrsquorsquo (Harwit and Clark

2001) Reporters Without Borders reported in 2008

that China had incarcerated 49 cyberdissidents the

most in the world For example cyberjournalist Hu

Jia winner of the European Sakharov Prize for

Freedom of Thought was sentenced to 3 years in

prison in 2008 for lsquolsquoinciting subversion of state

powerrsquorsquo Human rights activist Huang Qi received a

similar sentence that same year for posting criticisms

of the Sichuan earthquake relief efforts Librarian Liu

Jin received 3 years for downloading information

about the organization Falun Gong which China

treats as terrorists Chinarsquos best known blogger Zhou

Shuguang was prohibited from traveling to Germany

to judge an international blogging competition

Others have been prosecuted for posting or down-

loading information about Tibetan independence

Taiwanese separatism or the Tiananmen Square

massacre No avenue exists to repeal censorship

decisions

Such measures have helped to limit the use of the

web by democracy and human rights advocates Tibet

separatists and religious groups such as Falun Gong

They also help proactively to sway public opinion in

favor of the state However given the polymorphous

nature of the web such restrictions eventually fail

sooner or later By accessing foreign proxy servers a

few intrepid Chinese netizens engage in fanqiang or

lsquolsquoscaling the wallrsquorsquo (Stone and Barboza 2010) Using

its programmers in the US Falun Gong has devel-

oped censorship-circumventing software called Fre-

egate which it has offered to dissidents elsewhere

particularly in Iran (Lake 2009) Chinese censorship

and its resistance thus form a continually change

front of strategies and tactics As one Chinese blogger

put it lsquolsquoIt is like a water flowmdashif you block one

direction it flows to other directions or overflowsrsquorsquo

(quoted in James 2009)

Vietnam

Vietnamrsquos Leninist state has long pursued a rigid path

of Internet censorship (Pierre 2000) The countryrsquos sole

ISP with a license for international connections

Vietnam Data Communications is a subsidiary of the

government telecommunications monopoly Domestic

content providers must obtain special licenses from the

Ministry of the Interior and lease connections from the

state-owned Vietnam Post and Telecommunications

Corporation The state uses a complex system of

firewalls access controls and strenuously encouraged

self-censorship E-mail is regularly monitored by

searches for key words Vietnam has imprisoned those

who dare to use the Internet to speak out against the

government such as Pham Hong a doctor who posted

an online article calling for democracy (International

Censorship Explorer 2006) Owners of cybercafes who

permit searches of unauthorized websites by their

clients face fines of 5 million dong roughly US$330

(Kalathil and Boas 2003) Despite the liberalization

efforts known as doi moi the Vietnamese Communist

Party keeps a firm grip on cybertraffic particularly

Internet sites considered to be lsquolsquooffensive to Vietnam-

ese culturersquorsquo (Human Rights Watch 2002) In 2003 the

government lashed out at Reporters Without Borders

after the organization listed the country as one of the

worldrsquos 15 worst censors of the Internet

BurmaMyanmar

The government of BurmaMyanmar according to

the OpenNet Initiative (2005 p 4) lsquolsquoimplements one

of the worldrsquos most restrictive regimes of Internet

controlrsquorsquo The ruling junta the State Peace and

Development Council bars 84 of sites lsquolsquowith

content known to be sensitive to the Burmese statersquorsquo

(p 4) It also excludes email sites such as Hotmail

and Yahoo because they cannot be monitored for

political criticism and pornography The 1996 Com-

puter Science Development Law requires that all

network-ready computers be registered with the

Ministry of Communications Posts and Telegraphs

BurmaMyanmar has only two Internet service pro-

viders and both outlets charge high prices for email

accounts To implement its censorship the govern-

ment purchases software from the US Company

Fortinet to block access to selected websites and

servers At times the state has resorted to blunter

instruments when it sought to silence demonstrators

in 2007 it switched off the countryrsquos Internet

network altogether for 6 weeks

One of the worldrsquos more repressive governments in

terms of Internet regulation Iran maintains strict

control over cyberspace through its state-owned

telecommunications monopoly Telecommunication

Company of Iran run through the Ministry of

Information and Communication Technology to

which all Iranian ISPs are connected Like many

countries Iran manages its censorship at the level of

ISPs which must agree to prohibit access to lsquolsquonon-

Islamicrsquorsquo web sites As the Internet has emerged as

prominent domain in which political dissent the

governmentrsquos restrictions have grown proportion-

ately In 2001 the government assumed control over

all international traffic entering or leaving the coun-

try and claims to have blocked access to five million

websites Roughly 20 official categories of prohibited

websites exist including those that insult Islam

promote national discord pornography and immoral

behavior In 2006 all websites and blogs were

required to obtain licenses from the Ministry of

Islamic Culture and Guidance or risked being

declared illegal Also in 2006 the government

outlawed Internet connections faster than 128 kbps

entailing stiff resistance from business leaders The

governmentrsquos surveillance of dissidents was abetted

by purchases of European spy technology from

Siemens and Nokia (Rhoads and Chao 2009) partic-

ularly a technique called deep packet inspection

which allows authorities not only to block email and

Internet telephony but to identify usersrsquo names

Foreign spyware have now been complemented by

domestically produced versions (OpenNet Initiative

2009a b) In 2009 in the face of massive anti-

government protestsmdashthemselves organized through

social networking channelsmdashthe Iranian regime

cracked down yet again imprisoning dozens of

dissenting bloggers under the aegis of Tehran Pros-

ecutor Saeed Mortazavi

However Iran has found Internet censorship

increasingly difficult to administer During the 2009

crackdown for example amateur videos of govern-

ment attacks on demonstrations circulated virally on

the Web In response the government slowed down

the maximum transmission rates on its Internet

backbones making traffic in videos slow and diffi-

cult Using free downloadable software to circum-

vent government filters called Freegate and Ultrasurf

which were developed by Chinarsquos Falun Gong (Lake

2009) Iranian protestors repeatedly resisted govern-

ment controls over cyberspace at critical political

moments Some observers argue that the Internet has

lsquolsquocertainly broken 30 years of state control over what

is seen and is unseen what is visible versus invisiblersquorsquo

(Stelter and Stone 2009)

Severe censors (RWB scores 50ndash79)

Russia and Belarus

The archipelago of countries consisting of Russia and

neighboring statesmdasha region long known for many

governments that resist transparency abuse human

rights and rely on state-controlled mediamdashexhibits

numerous attempts to restrict access to the Internet as

well as govern its contents In Russia where the

conventional media are already under tight govern-

ment control the Putin government gradually sought

to extend its influence over the Internet essentially

following the Chinese model of granting the secret

service extensive monitoring powers ostensibly on

the grounds of fighting corruption (Troianovski and

Finn 2007) As Russiarsquos penetration rate increased

threatening to broaden the sphere of public debate

and give rise to autonomous voices the administra-

tion responded by purchasing independent websites

promoting pro-government websites and fostering a

network of government-friendly bloggers Russiarsquos

Internet surveillance law the System for Operational-

Investigative Activities allows state security services

unfettered physical access to ISPs and requires them

to report statistics about users and has been emu-

lated to one extent or another by other countries in

this region In Ukraine where the Internet remains

relatively free the state-owned provider Ukrtelecom

is the largest ISP in the country even here however

government officials have raided the offices of on-

line newspapers such as Obkom on national security

grounds In 2003 the Ukrainian Parliament passed the

Law on Protection of Public Morals (OpenNet

Initiative 2007) Under the guise of combating

terrorism the Ukrainian state has held that censorship

is necessary to secure the lsquolsquonational information

spacersquorsquo

In Belarus whose government Reporters Without

Borders called one of the worldrsquos lsquolsquobitterest

enemies of the Internetrsquorsquo President Lukashenko

claimed that he would lsquolsquoput an end to the anarchyrsquorsquo

online and would lsquolsquonot allow humanityrsquos great

technical achievement to become a news sewerrsquorsquo

(Reporters Without Borders 2008) The point was

backed up by the presence of government troops at

Internet cafes All Belorussian ISPs are required to

connect through Belpak a subsidiary of the

state-controlled ISP Beltelecom During the 2006

presidential elections the government launched

lsquolsquojust-in-timersquorsquo cyberattacks against opposition party

websites which often mysteriously suffered fre-

quent disconnections

Pakistan

The Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA)

repeatedly filters Internet content deemed to be

irreligious antimilitary or secessionist All interna-

tional traffic to and from the country is routed

through three sites owned by Pakistan Internet

Exchange with locations in Islamabad Lahore and

Karachi The 2006 Net Cafe Regulation bill requires

Internet cafes to monitor patrons although its

enforcement has been dubious (Reporters Without

Borders 2004) The PTA has banned dozens of URLs

that published Danish cartoons ridiculing the Prophet

Mohammed indeed the Pakistani police attempt to

register all websites containing lsquolsquoblasmephous mate-

rialrsquorsquo (Ahmed 2002) Baluchi nationalist and human

rights sites are also blacklisted The Pakistani cyber-

community responded to these initiatives with a

lsquolsquoDonrsquot Block the Blogrsquorsquo campaign (httpdbtborg)

which among other things has exposed the militaryrsquos

numerous civil rights violations

Arab world severe censors

In most of the Arab world the media are closely

monitored and controlled by governments either

through laws and regulations or via direct ownership

in state monopolies (Warf and Vincent 2007)

Cyber-journalists editors and bloggers may face

penalties for lsquolsquoslighting the Islamic faithrsquorsquo blas-

pheming government officials promoting political

change or advocating lsquolsquoimmoral behaviorrsquorsquo Arab

governments typically excuse their censorship on the

grounds that they are protecting Islamic values and

morality Sometimes this justification is linked to an

alleged onslaught of Western decadence against

Islamic values (Fandy 1999) Offensive sites gener-

ally are held to include pornography homosexuality

drugs gambling and atheism However like auto-

cratic regimes the world over many Arab govern-

ments are afraid of their citizens having access to

any substantive political information about the

outside world Censorship may also generate profits

for the government including limited potential

access of customers to rivals of state-owned tele-

communications companies Nonetheless despite

these restrictions the Internet has opened myriad

spaces of Arab political debate that transcend

national boundaries (Ghareeb 2000 McLaughlin

2005 MacFarquhar 2006)

Censorship in the Arab world is most acute in Saudi

Arabia Public access to the Internet in the kingdom

was made possible only when the state deemed that it

could effectively control it the entire Internet back-

bone network is state-owned Thus while the kingdom

has sought to garner the economic benefits of the web

it has also strenuously tried to prevent it from

challenging the highly conservative basis of its rule

(Teitelbaum 2002) The Saudi state has erected exten-

sive firewalls to control the flow of digital information

Saudi Internet cafes are required to record the names of

the customers and the times they arrive and depart

information that must be delivered to state security

upon request persons under 18 are forbidden unless

accompanied by an adult By royal decree the King

Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology

(KACST) a government-owned research center is

the only portal through which ISPs can make interna-

tional connections (wwwunescoorgwebworld) This

mechanism operates using commercial software pro-

duced in the United States Secure Computingrsquos

SmartFilter (Lee 2001) which has also been sold to and

utilized by the governments of Iran Yemen Tunisia

the UAE and Sudan (Villeneuve 2006) Requests

from Saudi ISPs to access the outside world must pass

through state-controlled servers According to the

OpenNet Initiative (2004) in 2004 more than 400000

web pages were banned by the Saudi regime (about

22 of all sites tested in a sample) the vast bulk of

which pertained to adult material but also including

some games recreational sites on-line shopping

Yahoo America On-Line and even medical websites

that use words like lsquolsquobreastrsquorsquo if only in a medical

context Access attempts to banned sites are logged by

the state which understandably encourages wide-

spread self-censorship

Many Arab states follow the Saudi model to

different degrees In 2006 Bahrain and Jordan

blocked access to Google Earth and Skype respec-

tively citing national security concerns (BBC News

Online 2002) In Syria the government blocks access

to Kurdish-language news websites overseas and any

domain ending in lsquolsquoilrsquorsquo ie Israel In Tunisia the

government forbids access to services such as

Hotmail and human rights websites in addition

every ISP must submit a monthly list of subscribers to

the state censorship agency In 2002 a Tunisian court

sentenced cyber-activist Zohair Ben Said al Yehiawy

to 2 years in jail for criticizing the judiciary and

corrupt police practices (wwwhrinfonetenreports

net2004tunisshtml) Tunisiarsquos suppression of free-

dom of speech led Reporters without Borders to

criticize the United Nationsrsquo 2005 World Summit on

the Information Society in Tunis as a joke In Iraq

under the regime of Saddam Hussein Internet access

was strictly limited (Ghattas 2002) In 1997 the Iraq

government newspaper al-Jamhuriyya denounced the

Internet as lsquolsquoan American means to enter every house

in the worldrsquorsquo (Anderson 1997)

Moderate censors (RWB scores 20ndash49)

Thailand Malaysia Singapore and Indonesia

Many countries in Southeast Asia exhibit multiple

forms of Internet censorship Many governments in

the region often justify such intervention on the

grounds that they share lsquolsquoAsian valuesrsquorsquo ostensibly at

odds with Western notions of democratic access

(Hachigian 2002) In Thailand the number of

blocked websites jumped markedly after the military

coup of January 2006 When YouTube posted a silly

44-s video ridiculing King Bhumibol Adulyadej in

2007 the government temporarily banned the website

entirely throughout the country and deported the

producer a Swiss national back to his country

Seeking to encourage growth of his countryrsquos

information technology sector Malaysian Prime

Minister Mahatir Mohamad declared publicly in

1996 that there would be no censorship of the Internet

in part to give his country an edge over neighboring

rival Singapore As a result lsquolsquopro-reform websites have

matured from a cacophony of accusatory and insulting

diatribes into an alternative independent mediarsquorsquo

(Abbott 2001 p 105) However in 2002 the Malay-

sian government signaled its intent to require website

operators to obtain licenses precisely for the purpose of

monitoring content and has tried to restrict Muslim

fundamentalists from publishing on the web The

countryrsquos famed Multimedia Corridor however

designed to attract foreign investors remains a

censorship-free zone revealing that the geographies

of censorship vary not only among countries but within

them as well

The authoritarian government of Singapore one of

the worldrsquos best-connected and technologically

dynamic countries also censors the Internet regularly

(Rodan 2000) Its primary vehicle in this regard is the

Singapore Media Development Authority (MDA)

which has regulated Internet content under the guise

of monitoring a broadcasting service since 1996 All

ISPs are automatically licensed by the Singapore

Broadcasting Authority which routes all Internet con-

nections through government proxy servers Licensees

are required to comply with the 1996 Internet Code of

Practice which includes a definition of lsquolsquoprohibited

materialrsquorsquo ie content that it deems lsquolsquoobjectionable on

the grounds of public interest public morality public

order public security national harmony or is otherwise

prohibited by applicable Singapore lawsrsquorsquo (OpenNet

Initiative 2006 p 3) Moreover lsquolsquothe government has at

times taken unannounced strolls through several thou-

sand personal computers with Internet connections

subsequently explaining such actions as sweeping for

viruses or pornographyrsquorsquo (Kalathil and Boas 2003

p 78) Self-censorship is also encouraged as a means to

stifle political expression The use of lawsuits under

stringent defamation laws is also common and can

reach well beyond the islandrsquos perimeter For example

Jiahoa Chen a Singaporean student at the University of

Illinois was forced to shut down his causticsoda blog

under threat from the government-run Agency for

Science Technology and Research (OpenNet Initiative

2006) As a result of these measures Singaporersquos

government has achieved near-total control over its

Internet environment with minimal loss of political

legitimacy Zittrain and Palfrey (2008) however argue

that Singaporersquos censorship has been exaggerated and is

largely confined to a handful of pornographic websites

India despite its generally democratic practice of

governance has nonetheless also engaged in moderate

Internet censorship In 2000 the Indian Parliament

approved the Information Technology Act to crack

down on cybercrime allowing cybercafes and Internet

usersrsquo homes to be searched without warrants as part of

criminal investigations It also allowed the government

to block access to sites considered pornographic or that

lsquolsquoendanger public order the integrity and security of

the nation and relations with other countriesrsquorsquo Those

setting up lsquolsquoanti-Indianrsquorsquo websites can be jailed for up to

5 years (Reporters Without Borders 2004 p 1) In

2002 India enacted the Prevention of Terrorism

Ordinance Act authorizing the government to monitor

electronic communications including personal email

The Indian cybercafe association the Association of

Public Internet Access Providers strenuously pro-

tested against the measures which it said would lead to

the closure of most of the countryrsquos 3000 or so

cybercafes

Central Asia

Central Asia exhibits a pronounced tendency toward

heavy Internet censorship For example the same

lsquolsquoevent-based filteringrsquorsquo practiced by the Belarussian

government occurred in Kyrgystan during the 2005

parliamentary elections there In Uzbekistan ISP

providers must operate under government control the

governmentrsquos web filter Uzpak enjoys a monopoly

over international connections monitors all Internet

traffic in the country and the government often shuts

down uzbekistanerkorg and birliknet the Web sites

belonging to the largest opposition parties (Privacy

International 2003) In Kazakhstan a journalist from

the news website kubkz Kazis Toguzbayev was

given a 2 year prison sentence in 2008 for posting an

article accusing the regime of protecting the killers of

opposition leader Altynbek Sarsenbayev Invoking an

older Soviet tradition Uzbek Internet journalists who

publish criticisms of the government are occasionally

forced into psychiatric hospitals The dictator of

Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov another of

Reporters Without Bordersrsquos ardent lsquolsquoenemies of the

Internetrsquorsquo strove to keep that country hermetically

sealed from the outside world via a national intranet

although his successor Gurbanguly Berdymukhamm-

edov vowed to open it up to the global Internet This

promise was belied however by the presence of

government soldiers at the doors of Internet cafes

(Eurasianetorg 2007) Cybercafes in which custom-

ers attempt to access banned websites are routinely

closed

Azerbaijan seems to have to have taken electronic

governance to heart (Hajiyev 2006) While Azeri

Internet provision is highly centralized via two state-

owned ISPs the Azeri web remains relatively free

from government filtering Nonetheless when two

Azeri bloggers posted a video ridiculing the govern-

mentrsquos purchase of high-priced donkeys they were

arrested (Barry 2004)

The Internet has also been used against the state in

several such countries Between 2003 and 2005

Ukraine Georgia and Kyrgyzstan all experienced

lsquolsquocolor revolutionsrsquorsquo in which opposition parties

utilized the web as an integral part of their strategy

and suffered just-in-time blocking by their govern-

ments (Warf 2009b) A growing community of

Eurasian cyberactivists resists Internet censorship

(see Eurasianetorg) The Uzbek lsquolsquoFor a Free Inter-

netrsquorsquo campaign for example has monitored bills in

the lower house of parliament the Mazhlis which

attempt to extend the governmentrsquos censorship The

Tajik governmentrsquos attempts to criminalize some

forms of cyber-speech as libel against the state were

met with heated opposition led by Nuriddin Qa-

rshiboev head of the National Association for

Independent Media in Tajikistan Moreover Tajik

cyber-journalists petitioned the government to abol-

ish the requirement that the president be called

lsquolsquoworthyrsquorsquo and lsquolsquoreliablersquorsquo every time he was men-

tioned More recently those seeking to avoid gov-

ernment censorship can download software designed

to help them do so such as the Canadian lsquolsquocensorship

circumventionrsquorsquo program Psiphon

Arab world moderate censors

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is often heralded as

the Internet star of the Middle East with relatively a

high penetration rate and a government eager to

diversify the economy However here too censorship

is the norm All telecommunications passes through

the government monopoly Etisalat which operates

the countryrsquos only ISP Filtering of Internet content at

cybercafes blocks sites that are blacklisted by the

state although leased lines in businesses and homes

are exempt The UAE Minister of Transportation

Ahmed Hameed Al-Taier claimed that his govern-

mentrsquos filtering system lsquolsquowas the main reason behind

the spread of the Internet in the country Many people

allowed access to the Internet inside their homes

upon the condition that there be some sort of

censorship to protect their families from websites

offensive to their moralityrsquorsquo (Arabic Network for

Human Rights Information 2004)

Some Arab countries such as Egypt Jordan and

Lebanon are relatively lenient with regards to

Internet regulation Typically such states are oriented

toward the West and at least grudgingly accept the

need for democratic access to the Internet (Anderson

2003) such as in Jordan (Cunningham 2002)

Morocco is often included in this category although

it assiduously blocks access to web sites promoting

independence for the Western Sahara Egypt is often

celebrated for its relative lack of overt censorship

reflective of a regime eager to encourage tourism and

court foreign investors Even so the Egyptian state

created an agency in 2004 the Department to Combat

Crimes of Computers and Internet to censor

lsquolsquosubversiversquorsquo Internet sites and has arrested pro-

grammers journalists and human rights activists for

violating censorship standards In 2001 Shuhdi

Surour the webmaster for al-Ahram Weekly

newspaper was arrested for posting a poem online

critical of the state (Bahgat 2004) Despite the

governmentrsquos attempts to halt the publication of

several books many authors found alternative outlets

on the Web (Gauch 2001) One of the most important

political uses of the Internet in Egypt involves the

Muslim Brotherhood which while technically illegal

engaged in cybercampaigns but whose activities are

closely monitored

Oman and Yemen offer contrasting models of

Internet censorship In Oman the government-owned

OmanTel is the monopoly provider of fixed and

mobile telephony services and facilitated the pur-

chase of PCs through instalment payments In

contrast Yemenrsquos government ordered all Internet

cafes to remove barriers between computers to ensure

users lacked privacy when on-line (OpenNet Initia-

tive 2006) leading to a decline in the number of such

establishments Almost all Yemenrsquos efforts imple-

mented through a product called Websense are

directed against pornography although some anti-

Islamic sites are also blocked

Israelrsquos enduring confrontation with the Palestin-

ians has also taken the form of Internet censorship

Before the Oslo Accord of 1995 the Israeli militaryrsquos

Order 1279 forbid Palestinians from using electronic

transmissions for political purposes including leased

telephone lines (Parry 1997) In response Palestin-

ians in the West Bank created a wireless network

PalNet using microwave transmitters which has

been subject to occasional disruptions by the Israeli

army In 2000 the Israeli government attempted to

shut down several Hezbollah websites (Diker 2003)

leading to retaliation by Palestinian hackers against

the Israeli Foreign Ministryrsquos website flooding it

with spam messages The Palestinian Authority

launched a Hebrew-language version of its Wafa

news agency website to circumvent what it called

Israel censorship of cyberinformation The Israeli

government has also actively recruited bloggers to

combat anti-Zionist websites including those that

deny the Holocaust Finally it should be noted that

the ultraorthodox community within Israel has

attempted to impose Internet censorship as well

efforts directed primarily at preventing access to

adult material on-line

Turkey briefly blocked a YouTube site that insulted

the founder of the modern Turkish state Kemal

Ataturk In 2000 the Ministry of the Interior barred

Internet cafes from allowing access to websites that

espoused anti-secularist (ie Islamicist) or Kurdish

nationalist views (Economist 2007) In 2007 after the

Turkish parliament passed legislation regulating

Internet access there in less than 1 h of debate the

number of websites blocked in the country immedi-

ately jumped from zero to 2600 (Anderson 2009)

Subsaharan Africa

In Subsaharan Africa minuscule Internet penetration

rates and an enfeebled civil opposition have done little

to curtail censorship efforts Resisting the global tide

of neoliberal deregulation and privatization that has

washed over telecommunications markets worldwide

many African governments have retained state

monopolies over information services Levels of

censorship vary widely across the continent of

course At one extreme is Sudan where Internet

usage is almost entirely concentrated in Khartoum the

government openly boasts of censorship the govern-

mentrsquos telecommunications monopoly Sudatel was

blacklisted by the United States as part of a broader

strategy to resolve the violence in Darfur (OpenNet

Initiative 2009b) The other end of this censorship

spectrum is South Africa which has negligible

government interference in cyberspace Most African

states fall in between these poles In Kenya the

administration used several censorship strategies

such as restricting bandwidth offered to ISPs through

the state-owned Internet backbone and demanding

that ISPs turn over their subscriber lists (Africa ICT

Policy Monitor 2006) In 2000 the Communications

Commission of Kenya ordered the closure of the

month-old Kenya Internet Exchange Point ostensibly

on the grounds of preventing its use by lsquoterroristsrsquo but

more likely because it infringed upon Telkom

Kenyarsquos monopoly Zimbabwersquos government issued

numerous laws to limit freedom of expression of

the media including the Broadcasting Services

Act the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Com-

mercialisation Act and the Public Order and Security

Act (POSA) Its Monitoring and Interception of

Communications Centre may compel ISPs to install

software to intercept information deemed necessary

by the state (Burnett 2005) The government also

blocks certain websites using legislation such as

POSA For example the website of the Movement for

Democratic Change (wwwmdczimbabwecom) has

been shut down a number of times (httpwww

privacyinternationalorg)

Latin American moderate censors

Latin American Internet censorship is typically less

egregious than that found other parts of the world The

regionrsquos most restrictive policies are found in Cuba

where Internet and e-mail access is jealously guarded

by the government which controls the countryrsquos only

Internet gateway and four national ISPs (Kalathil and

Boas 2001) In 1996 the Cuban Executive Council of

Ministers initiated Decree Law 209 which governed

Internet access in that country With six competing

ministries vying for control however it proved to be

bureaucratically unfeasible and in 2000 censorship

authority was passed to the Ministry of Computing and

Communications Faced with high prices of computer

equipment partly due to the long standing US trade

embargo Cuba has rejected a market-led model of

Internet development in favor of a collective govern-

ment-led one that emphasizes institutions not indi-

viduals As a result lsquolsquoindividual access to the Internet

has been essentially prohibitedrsquorsquo (Kalathil and Boas

2003 p 55) Commercial ISPs are allowed to pro-

vide individual accounts only to people who have

obtained sponsorship from government agencies

Until recently all Internet accounts had to be regis-

tered through the National Center for Automated Data

Exchange at the cost of $260 a month (the average

Cuban makes $240 per year) Relaxation of this

restriction in 2006 helped to fuel the boom in Cuban

Internet access Nonetheless differential pricing

ensures that access to the nationrsquos intranet remains

considerably cheaper than international networks

Access to Internet cafes with international connections

must be paid for in US dollars which are scarce among

Cubans Nonetheless a growing network of informat-

icos or technologically savvy individuals has con-

tested these restrictions and in the US conservative

groups such as the Cuban American National Foun-

dation maintain web sites criticizing the regime

Light Internet censors (RWB scores 5 10ndash19)

Latin American light censors

Many governments with unsavory human rights

records in the past such as Brazil now are

remarkably open with regard to the Internet although

Brazilian courts have ordered ISPs to block access to

certain blogs and YouTube videos that carry material

lsquolsquodefamatoryrsquorsquo to the state Similarly Argentina

passed an anti-censorship decree for the Internet In

some countries including Costa Rica which is

known for its democratic governance journalists

have been harassed by the state when exposing

corruption in ruling circles on the Internet (Privacy

International 2003)

Less draconian is the attempt of the Chilean

Chamber of Deputies which passed a bill allowing

judges to punish Internet users who are lsquolsquooffensive to

moralsrsquorsquo or the lsquolsquopublic orderrsquorsquo (Cortes 2000) The

order was aimed at websites located within Chile ie

with thecl domain name and was utterly ineffective

against sites located outside the country An attempt

to prohibit access to Alejandra Matusrsquos The Black

Book of Chilean Justice an expose of the ineffec-

tiveness of the judiciary led to its publication on the

web and even wider readership

In contrast with Chile the Peruvian government

passed the Transparency and Access to the Public

Information Act which created public access Internet

terminals and established the Telecommunications

Investment Fund which is responsible for promoting

universal Internet access Perursquos Transparency and

Access to the Public Information Act includes the

creation of public information portals and considers

governmental information as accessible to citizens

Southern and Eastern Europe

Southern European countries generally exhibit less

tolerance for Internet dissent than do their northern

counterparts In Italy the Vatican called for restric-

tions on the Internetrsquos lsquolsquoradical libertarianismrsquorsquo and

the Italian government has shut down websites

critical of Catholicism The government has also

attempted to force ISPs from allowing websites that

defend or instigate crimes or portray the Mafia in a

positive light Following the assassination of a town

councilor in northern Spain a website for the Basque

separatist electronic journal Euskal Herria based in

San Francisco was shut down by email bombs

believed to be initiated by the Spanish government

(Conway 2007)

In Eastern Europe with a long history of censor-

ship under Soviet occupation attempts to control the

Internet have been more explicit and widespread In

Bulgaria for example the governmentrsquos attempt to

license ISPs that included the collection of user

names and passwords was defeated by the Internet

Society of Bulgaria on the grounds that it served

political rather than economic purposes Moldovan

Internet cafe owners formed the Internet Club

Association to lobby against restrictions to access

In the former Yugoslavia Internet censorship was

widespread under the government of Slobodan

Milosovic in the 1990s Cyber-repression included

the arrest and persecution of the journalist Miroslav

Filipovic who wrote about military human rights

abuses politically motivated tampering with websites

during the 2000 presidential elections filtering of

academic networks and ordering some ISPs to close

politically lsquolsquounsuitablersquorsquo websites The overthrow of

the Milosovic regime in 2000 greatly improved that

countryrsquos affairs in this regard

Uncensored (RWB scores 0ndash9)

Western Europe

While European countries are generally relatively

open in terms of Internet access there too several

governments attempt to restrict what is said in

cyberspace Generally however censorship in eco-

nomically developed countries focuses more on

social concerns such as pornography or intellectual

property than overt attempts to stifle political dissent

Often moves to restrict access are strenuously

opposed by privacy advocates and some ISPs Indeed

most attempts to censor the government in Europe

have backfired In addition to large mobilized

constituencies that advocate Internet liberties eco-

nomic integration has reduced European statesrsquo room

to maneuver on this issue for example in 2008 the

European Parliament passed a proposal that treats

Internet censorship as a free trade barrier While

aimed at EU trade relations with countries such as

China the measure also limits domestic censorship

Despite these obstacles to censorship some Euro-

pean countries do engage in mild forms of Internet

censorship to widely varying degrees Northern

Europe tends to be especially mild with Reporters

Without Borders reporting zero interference in Scan-

dinavia However in Finland a nation widely

celebrated as a bastion of high tech democracy when

hacker Matti Nikkirsquos website criticized government

efforts to regulate the Internet the government added

it to its list of proscribed child pornography sites

blocking access by ISPs A Finnish government

attempt to censor Internet message boards in 2003

was met with stiff resistance from telecommunica-

tions and media companies In the United Kingdom it

is illegal to look at any of a list of websites kept by the

Internet Watch Foundation (Anderson 2009) Starting

in the mid-1990s the German government attempted

to shut down foreign sites that promoted racial hatred

more recent efforts led by the Minister of Family

Affairs have focused on child pornography Simi-

larly in France the government in 2000 banned

Yahoo from allowing access to websites that promote

racial hatred or sell Nazi memorabilia or those

portraying child sexual abuse In both France and

Germany it is impossible to search for Nazi materials

on-line using Google (Conway 2007) More recently

government officials have tracked down bloggers who

insulted them and filed intimidating legal challenges

(Sayare 2009) With some of the worldrsquos toughest

antipiracy laws the government now fines persons

who repeatedly download illegal material

United States

Although it often trumpets itself as a paragon of

democracy and although Internet censorship in the

US is minimal there too the state has intervened

occasionally in attempts to shape Internet access

Whereas the first attempts to regulate cyberspace

were caught up in culture wars between liberals and

conservatives more recent attempts have been more

explicitly corporatist in nature

The most egregious case of American Internet

censorship involved the Communications Decency

Act (CDA) passed by Congress in 1996 in an attempt

to limit childrenrsquos access to pornography (however

loosely defined) on the Internet by facilitating

government censorship particularly the distribution

of lsquolsquopatently offensiversquorsquo materials to minors essen-

tially catering to the political agenda of the Christian

Right Resistance to the CDA was ferocious includ-

ing lawsuits by a coalition of ISPs leading to the

Supreme Court to overturn the law in 1997

More recent government Internet censorship

efforts in the US involve private sector proxy actors

(Kreimer 2006) Thus Congress has mandated that

public schools and libraries install filtering software

and holds ISPs responsible for providing access to

child pornography In this reading censorship is a

means of controlling lsquolsquonegative externalitiesrsquorsquo such as

Internet crime and pornography that the market left

to its own devices would fail to control Congress has

also initiated incentives for ISPs to block access to

websites that infringe on intellectual property rights

Under the USA PATRIOT Act the Federal Bureau of

Investigation has a lsquolsquogood corporate citizenrsquorsquo program

that encourages ISPs to censor websites that are not

consonant with the public interest and to turn over

information about users whose email reveals suspi-

cious intent (Gellman 2005) The administration of

George B Bush enacted legislation encouraging

telecommunications companies to engage in data

mining on anti-terrorist grounds indeed lsquolsquowith

respect to online surveillance the United States

may be among the most aggressive states in the world

in terms of monitoring online conversationsrsquorsquo

(Deibert et al 2008 p 232) Whereas issues of

copyright infringement or child pornography consti-

tute legitimate concerns in this regard other applica-

tions particularly restrictions on political

information lie at the end of the slippery slope that

such measures entail

Discussion a Habermasian critique

Many groups in closed societies can view digital

information in a manner unavailable in censored print

or broadcast media undermining state monopolies

over the media and enhancing if slowly and contin-

gently moves toward democratic governance (Slane

2007) Precisely because cyberspace facilitates rela-

tively easy unfettered access to information it has

been viewed with alarm by numerous governments In

and of itself of course the Internet does not simply

produce positive or negative effects for its informa-

tion is always filtered through national and local

cultures biases and predispositions However as ever

larger numbers of people are brought into contact with

one another on-line cyberspace may expand oppor-

tunities for engaging in political activity some of

which challenges or delegitimizes prevailing models

of authority by undermining the monopoly of tradi-

tional elites over the means of communication The

Internet is relatively low in cost and easy to use and

thus reduces a major obstacle to the participation in

public debate by the poor Because it allows access to

multiple sources of information including films and

images the Internet has facilitated a generalized

growth in awareness of foreign ideas products and

political norms Indeed as Yang (2003) suggests

given how widespread digital communications have

become the Internet and civil society have increas-

ingly come to co-evolve energizing and shaping one

another in time and space

In this way cyberspace closely resembles Haber-

masrsquos (1979) famous lsquolsquoideal speech situationrsquorsquo in

which unfettered discourse is central to the lsquolsquopublic

spherersquorsquo and in which discursive truth is constructed

in the absence of barriers to communication (Poster

1997) One of the twentieth centuryrsquos leading social

philosophers Habermas has long maintained that

unconstrained communications are mandatory to

broader processes of consensus construction in

which people of all backgrounds partake in public

positive and normative interpretations of their worlds

In what is essentially a pragmatist defense of

Enlightenment ideals his notion of communicative

rationality which is central to his critical theory

refers to the procedures of open debate and criticism

which he holds became increasingly widespread with

the growth of modern bourgeois society The lsquolsquoideal

speech situationrsquorsquo is vital to the operation of civil

society in which social life is successfully reproduced

and transformed The ideal speech situation never

exists in reality but functions as a Weberian ideal

type a counterfactual yardstick by which to judge

real-life contexts and the obstacles that generate

distorted communication In a situation in which all

power relations constraining debate have been

removed all participants are free to provide input

into the norms of truth production As Luhmann

(1996 p 885) notes

Habermas does not locate the problem at the

level of actually occurring communications hellipInstead he employs a theory of how the

reasonable coordination of actions can take

place if assured of the freely rendered agree-

ment of all involved

Thus in this conception reason truth logic and

self-reflexivity are not located in some abstract

transcendental realm but are grounded in praxis

The only criterion that remains for resolving contest-

ing claims is their truth-value which rests on the

lsquolsquoforce of a better argumentrsquorsquo leading to a consensus

theory of truth that rejects absolute foundations for

knowledge in favor of procedural ones Importantly

lsquolsquothe participants in an ideal speech situation [must]

be motivated solely by the desire to reach a consensus

about the truth of statements and the validity of

normsrsquorsquo (Bernstein 1995 p 50) Later in The

Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere

(Habermas 1989) he argued that civil society

located between the state and everyday life and with

origins in the rise of industrial capitalism and the

Enlightenment had become thoroughly dominated by

large corporations reducing citizens to spectators and

consumers of goods (see Kellner 1979 1990)

Habermasrsquos critics have argued that his view

exaggerates the power of reason to obtain consensus

and that he obfuscates inequalities in access to public

discourse such as class gender and ethnicity Thus

Habermas holds up an ideal that can never be realized

in practice (Hohendahl 1979 Calhoun 1992) Despite

these objections it is worth noting that the ideal free

speech situation remains the prevailing normative

standard against most contemporary conceptions of

the political economy of unfettered access to and

production of knowledge are compared particularly

with regard to the legitimacy of legal institutions

(Froomkin 2003)

Cyberspace in all its diverse formsmdashchat rooms

blogs and email as well as neogeographic practices

such as wiki-websmdasharguably exemplifies the Hab-

ermasian vision of diverse groups engaging in

practical discourse more than any other realm today

Enhanced access to information empowers citizens

facilitates debate and may alter political outcomes

In particular the Internet allows communities of

shared interests to form around common discourses

that express identities and foment mutual understand-

ings within a broader heterogeneous differentiated

civil society Of course the reality of unequal digital

access is never a perfect reflection of the idealized

norm the digital divide at multiple spatial scales

signifies that social and spatial inequalities are

reproduced inside of cyberspace That said at

minimal cost and easy to use the Internet allows

for the construction of a negotiated consensus that

lies at the heart of legitimate political rule As

Froomkin (2003 p 856) puts it lsquolsquoIn Habermasian

terms the Internet draws power back into the public

sphere away from other systemsrsquorsquo More generally

by shifting the production of meaning from the few to

the many unfettered electronic communication

allows truth to be uncoupled from power

Given this ideal Internet censorship represents a

particularly egregious infringement not only upon

democratic norms of liberty equality and informed

dissent but upon the discursive capacity of citizens to

construct their worlds Far from challenging existing

power relations censorship of cyberspace thus

amplifies them At risk when and where censorship

succeeds is the production of reason itself if

following Habermas truth is the consensual outcome

of reasoned debate then government limitations on

Internet access and attempts to shape the contents of

cyberspace fly in the face of peaceful resolutions of

differences Ever since Foucault social science has

concerned itself greatly with the ways in which power

and knowledge are hopelessly entwined with one

another Censorship of whatever type is thus an

affirmation that rational consensus and thus truth is

impossible in the face of force

Concluding thoughts

As the Internet grows by leaps and boundsmdashthe vast

bulk of users worldwide began after 2000mdashits social

applications and implications have risen proportion-

ately Despite the hyperbole exaggerating the Inter-

netrsquos capacity to effect social change the global

diffusion of the Internet has created a growing

challenge for many authoritarian regimes and greatly

enabled the growth and effectiveness of global civil

society Email petitions cyberprotests calls for

action advocacy of various marginalized political

causes and the blogosphere have become an integral

part of political action allowing local social move-

ments to lsquolsquojump scalersquorsquo by reaching national and

global audiences (Adams 1996) In response gov-

ernment censorship ranging from relatively mild

steps such as anti-pornography measures to the arrest

and execution of cyberdissidents has become an

inescapable dimension of the geographies of cyber-

space One-quarter of the worldrsquos netizens live under

the harshest forms of censorship and in most

countries self-censorship accomplishes what govern-

ments have not

The information technology revolution however

has also brought with it promise of economic growth

and improved productivity Many governments

therefore are caught in a conundrum wishing to

encourage the growth of information technology

sectors on the one hand but fearful of its political

repercussions on the other In attempting to manage

Internet access and content states must take care not

to alienate investors tourists entrepreneurs and

software developers For some states such as Myan-

mar or North Korea such concerns are irrelevant But

most governments seek to appropriate the economic

benefits of information technology without paying the

political costs of enhanced democracy The strategies

used to negotiate this predicament are contingent and

reflective of a wide constellation of political eco-

nomic and cultural circumstances thus censorship

and its resistance are geographically specific Con-

trary to early utopian predictions the growth of the

much vaulted global lsquolsquoinformation societyrsquorsquo will not

necessarily lead to greater democracy worldwide but

in a more sober view to enhanced avenues for civil

discourse The Habermasian critique addresses the

moral dimensions of this issue from the standpoint of

contemporary social philosophy

A last point concerns electronic governance or

e-government which takes a variety of forms ranging

from simple broadcasting of information to integration

(ie allowing user input) in which network integra-

tion minimizes duplication of efforts E-government

allows for example for the digital collection of taxes

electronic voting payment of utility bills applications

for permits passports and driverrsquos licenses on-line

registration of companies and automobiles access to

census data and reductions in waiting times in

government bureaucracies While such measures are

relatively common in economically advanced coun-

tries even many countries in the developing world

have moved in this direction (Wagner et al 2003) As

ever larger domains of social life move on-line the

future is likely to see steady growth in e-government

across the planet leading to greater transparency and

accountability in state actions Clearly strict censor-

ship and enhanced e-government are incompatible

goals How different political regimes strive to imple-

ment such measures yet still retain control over

discourses they perceive to be threatening will play

out in fascinating and unexpected ways in the future

References

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to the emancipatory potential of the net Lessons from

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99ndash114

Adams P (1996) Protest and the scale politics of telecom-

munications Political Geography 15(5) 19ndash441

Africa ICT Policy Monitor (2006) httpafricarightsapcorg

Ahmed A (2002) Pakistanrsquos blasphemy laws Words fail me

The Washington Post May 19

Anderson J (1997) Globalizing politics and religion in the

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pressumichedujeparchiveAndersonhtml

Anderson J (2003) New media new publics Reconfiguring

the public sphere of Islam Social Research 70(3)

887ndash906

Anderson K (2009) Net surveillance and filters are a reality

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guardiancouktechnology2009jun24kevin-anderson-

internet-filtering

Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (2004) The

Internet in the Arab world A new space of repression

httpwwwhrinfonetenreportsnet2004

Bahgat H (2004) Egyptrsquos virtual protection of morality

Middle East Report 230 22ndash25

Barry E (2004) In Azerbaijan a donkey suit leads to laughs

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websites March 26 httpnewsbbccouk1lowworld

middle_east1895005stm

Bernstein J (1995) Recovering ethical life Jurgen Habermasand the future of critical theory New York NY Routledge

Bi J (2001) The internet revolution in China The significance

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Brunn S (2000) Towards an understanding of the geopolitics

of cyberspace Learning re-learning and un-learning

Geopolitics 5(3) 144ndash149

Burnett P (2005) Internet censorship on the rise in Africa

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Cairncross F (1997) The death of distance Boston MA

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Calhoun C (1992) Habermas and the public sphere Cam-

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Castells M (2001) The internet galaxy Oxford Oxford

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Conway M (2007) Terrorism and internet governance Core

issues httpwwwunidirchpdfarticlespdf-art2644pdf

Cortes M (2000) Internet censorship around the world

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Crampton J (2003) The political mapping of cyberspace

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Crampton J (2007) The biopolitical justification for geosur-

veillance Geographical Review 97(3) 389ndash493

Crovitz G (2010) Chinarsquos web crackdown continues Wall StreetJournal January 11 httponlinewsjcomarticleSB1000

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

Cunningham K (2002) Factors influencing Jordanrsquos infor-

mation revolution Implications for democracy MiddleEast Journal 56(2) 240ndash256

Dann D amp Haddow N (2008) Just doing business or doing

just business Google Microsoft Yahoo and the business

of censoring Chinarsquos Internet Journal of Business Ethics79(3) 219ndash234

Deibert R Palfrey J Rohozinski R amp Zittrain J (Eds)

(2008) Access denied The practice and policy of globalinternet filtering Cambridge MA MIT Press

Diker D (2003) Should Israel now send a new message to the

Arab world Jerusalem Letter May 1 httpwwwjcpa

orgjlvp497htm

Dobson J amp Fisher P (2007) The panopticonrsquos changing

geography Geographical Review 97(3) 307ndash323

Dodge M amp Kitchin R (2000) Mapping cyberspace

London Routledge

Dunn M (2000) The information revolution and the Middle

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Elmer-Dewitt P Jackson D amp King M (1993) First nation

in cyberspace Time December 6 pp 62ndash64

Eriksson J amp Giacomello G (2009) Who controls what and

under what conditions International Studies Review11(1) 206ndash210

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with soldiers httpwwweurasianetorgdepartmentsinsight

articleseav030807shtml

Fandy M (1999) Cyberresistance Saudi opposition between

globalization and localization Comparative Studies inSociety and History 41 124ndash147

Froomkin A (2003) HabermasDiscoursenet Toward a

critical theory of cyberspace Harvard Law Review 116(3)

740ndash873

Gauch S (2001) Effects of Arab censorship blunted by the

Internet Christian Science Monitor January 29 p 1

Gellman B (2005) The FBIrsquos secret scrutiny In Hunt forterrorists bureau examines records of ordinary Ameri-cans Washington Post November 6 p A1

Ghareeb E (2000) New media and the information revolution

in the Arab world An assessment Middle East Journal54(3) 395ndash418

Ghattas K (2002) Surfing the net in Iraq BBC News May 1

httpnewsbbccouk1hiworldmiddle_east1959481stm

Goldsmith J (1998) Against cyberanarchy University ofChicago Law Review 1199(fall) 1217ndash1222

Goldsmith J amp Wu T (2006) Who controls the internetIllusion of a borderless world New York NY Oxford

University Press

Habermas J (1979) Communication and the evolution ofsociety Boston MA Beacon Press

Habermas J (1989) The structural transformation of thepublic sphere An inquiry into a category of bourgeoissociety Oxford Blackwell

Hachigian N (2001) Chinarsquos cyber-strategy Foreign Affairs80(2) 118ndash133

Hachigian N (2002) The internet and power in one-party East

Asian states Washington Quarterly 25(3) 41ndash58

Hajiyev Y (2006) Azerbaijan httpeceuropaeuinformation_

societyactivitiesinternationalreldocs

pi_study_rus_ukr_arm_azerb_bel_geor_kaz_mold5_azerb

aijanpdf

Harwit E amp Clark D (2001) Shaping the internet in China

Evolution of political control over network infrastructure

and political content Asian Survey 41(3) 377ndash408

Hohendahl P (1979) Critical theory public sphere and cul-

ture Habermas and his critics New German Critique16(winter) 89ndash118

Human Rights Watch (2002) Human Rights Watch World

report 2001 Vietnam httpwwwhrworgwr2kasia

Vietnamhtml

Inglehart R amp Welzel C (2005) Modernization culturalchange and democracy The human developmentsequence Cambridge Cambridge University Press

International Censorship Explorer (2006) Vietnam strikes

back httpicecitizenlaborgp=150

James R (2009) A brief history of Chinese internet censor-

ship Time March 18 httpwwwtimecomtimeworld

article08599188596100html

Kahn J (2002) China has worldrsquos tightest internet censorship

study finds New York Times December 4 p 1

Kalathil S amp Boas T (2001) The Internet and state control

in authoritarian regimes China Cuba and the counter-

revolution Carnegie Endowment global policy programwork paper no 21 Washington DC Carnegie Endow-

ment for International Peace

Kalathil S amp Boas T (2003) Open networks closed regimesThe impact of the internet on authoritarian rule Wash-

ington DC Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Katyal N (2001) Criminal law in cyberspace University ofPennsylvania Law Review 1003 1100

Kellerman A (2002) The internet on Earth A geography ofinformation Hoboken NJ Wiley

Kellner D (1979) TV ideology and emancipatory popular

culture Socialist Review 45(MayndashJune) 13ndash53

Kellner D (1990) Television and the crisis of democracy

Boulder CO Westview Press

Kreimer S (2001) Technologies of protest Insurgent social

movements and the First Amendment in the era of the

Internet University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150(1)

119ndash171

Kreimer S (2006) Censorship by proxy The First Amend-

ment internet intermediaries and the problem of the

weakest link University of Pennsylvania Law Review155(11) 11ndash101

LaFraniere S (2009) Censors put tighter grip on internet in

China New York Times December 18 p A 14

Lake E (2009) Hacking the regime The New Republic

September 3 httpwwwtnrcomarticlepoliticshacking-

the-regime

Lee J (2001) Companies compete to provide Saudi internet

veil New York Times November 19 p A1

Luhmann N (1996) Quod omnes tangit Remarks on Jurgen

Habermasrsquos legal theory Cardoso Law Review 17(4ndash5)

883ndash900

MacFarquhar M (2006) In tiny Arab state Internet is tool to

fight rulers New York Times January 15 p A1 11

MacKinnon R (2008) Flatter world and thicker walls Blogs

censorship and civic discourse in China Public Choice134 31ndash46

MacKinnon R (2009) Chinarsquos censorship 20 How companies

censor bloggers First Monday 14(2) httpfirstmonday

orghtbincgiwrapbinojsindexphpfmarticleview2378

Malecki E amp Moriset B (2008) The digital economyBusiness organisation production processes and regio-nal developments London Routledge

McLaughlin W (2005) The use of the Internet for political action

by non-state dissident actors in the Middle East FirstMonday

httpwwwfirstmondayorgissuesissue8_11mclaughlin

Murdoch S amp Anderson R (2008) Tools and technology of

internet filtering In R Deibert J Palfrey R Rohozinksi

amp J Zittrain (Eds) Access denied The practice andpolicy of global internet filtering (pp 57ndash72) Cambridge

MA MIT Press

OrsquoBrien R (1992) Global financial integration The end ofgeography New York NY Council on Foreign Relations

OpenNet Initiative (2004) Internet filtering in Saudi Arabia in

2004 httpopennetnetstudiessaudi Accessed 18 Nov 2010

OpenNet Initiative (2005) Internet filtering in China

2004ndash2005 httpopennetinitiativenetstudieschina

OpenNet Initiative (2006) Singapore httpopennetnet

researchprofilesSingapore

OpenNet Initiative (2007) Commonwealth of Independent

States httpopennetnetresearchregionscis

OpenNet Initiative (2009a) Internet filtering in Iran http

opennetnetsitesopennetnetfilesONI_Iran_2009pdf

OpenNet Initiative (2009b) Internet filtering in Sudan http

opennetnetsitesopennetnetfilesONI_Sudan_2009pdf

Paltemaa V amp Vuori J (2009) Regime transition and the

Chinese politics of technology From mass science to the

controlled internet Asian Journal of Political Science17(1) 1ndash23

Parry N (1997) The past and future of information technol-

ogy in Palestine wwwnigelparrycommideastinternet

unitednationspaperhtml

Pierre A (2000) Vietnamrsquos contradictions Foreign Affairs79(6) 69ndash86

Poster M (1997) Cyberdemocracy Internet and the public

sphere In D Porter (Ed) Internet culture (pp 202ndash214)

London Routledge

Privacy International (2003) SilencedmdashCosta Rica http

wwwprivacyinternationalorgarticleshtmlcmd[347]=x-

347-103752

Quirk M (2006) The web police Atlantic Monthly May

httpwwwtheatlanticcommagazinearchive2006

05the-web-police4818

Reporters Without Borders (2004) Pakistan annual report2004 httpwwwrsforgarticlephp3id_article=10794

Reporters Without Borders (2008) Belarus httpwwwrsf

orgarticlephp3id_article=25496 2008

Reporters Without Borders (2009) Internet enemies httpwww

rsforgen-ennemi26106-Turkmenistanhtml

Rhoads C amp Chao L (2009) Iranrsquos web spying aided by

Western technology The Wall Street Journal June 22httponlinewsjcomarticleSB124562668777335653html

Rodan G (2000) Singapore information lockdown Business

as usual In L Williams amp R Rich (Eds) Losing controlFreedom of the press in Asia (pp 66ndash81) Canberra Asia

Pacific Press

Sayare S (2009) As web challenges French leaders they push

back New York Times December 13 p 26

Slane A (2007) Democracy social space and the internet

University of Toronto Law Journal 57(1) 81ndash104

Steinberg P amp McDowell S (2003) Mutiny on the band-

width the semiotics of statehood in the internet domain

name registries of Pitcairn Island and Niue New Media ampSociety 5(1) 47ndash67

Stelter B amp Stone B (2009) Web pries lid of Iranian

censorship New York Times June 22 p A1 http

wwwnytimescom20090623worldmiddleeast23cen

sorhtml

Stone B amp Barboza D (2010) Scaling the digital wall in

China New York Times January 16 p B1

Taylor P (1994) The state as container Territoriality in the

modern world-system Progress in Human Geography18(2) 151ndash162

Teitelbaum J (2002) Dueling for lsquoDarsquoWarsquo State vs society

on the Saudi internet Middle East Journal 56(2)

222ndash239

Tilly C (2007) Democracy Cambridge MA Cambridge

University Press

Troianovski A amp Finn P (2007) Kremlin seeks to extend its

reach in cyberspace The Washington Post October 28 p 1

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Villeneuve N (2006) The filtering matrix Integrated mech-

anisms of information control and the demarcation of

borders in cyberspace First Monday 11(1ndash2) http

firstmondayorghtbincgiwrapbinojsindexphpfmarticle

Wagner C Cheung K Lee F amp Ip R (2003) Enhancing

e-government in developing countries Managing knowl-

edge through virtual communities Electronic Journal onInformation Systems in Developing Countries 14(4)

1ndash20 httpwwwejisdcorg

Warf B (2009a) Diverse spatialities of the Latin American

and Caribbean internet Journal of Latin AmericanGeography 8(2) 125ndash146

Warf B (2009b) The rapidly evolving geographies of the

Eurasian internet Eurasian Geography and Economics50(5) 564ndash580

Warf B amp Grimes J (1997) Counterhegemonic dis-

courses and the internet Geographical Review 87(2)

259ndash274

Warf B amp Vincent P (2007) Multiple geographies of the

Arab internet Area 39(1) 83ndash96

Wines M (2010) Chinarsquos censors tackle and trip over the

Internet New York Times April 8 p 1 4

Wriston W (1997) Bits bytes and diplomacy ForeignAffairs 76(5) 172ndash182

Yang G (2003) The co-evolution of the internet and civil

society in China Asian Survey 43(3) 405ndash422Zittrain J amp Palfrey J (2008) Internet filtering The politics

and mechanisms of control In R Deibert J Palfrey R

Rohozinksi amp J Zittrain (Eds) Access deniedThe practice and policy of global internet filtering(pp 29ndash56) Cambridge MA MIT Press

Zook M (2003) Underground globalization Mapping the

space of flows of the Internet adult industry Environmentand Planning A 35(7) 1261ndash1286

Zook M (2005a) The geography of the Internet industry

Oxford Wiley-Blackwell

Zook M (2005b) The geography of the internet Annual Reviewof Information Science and Technology 40(1) 53ndash78

Zook M amp Graham M (2007) The creative reconstruction

of the Internet Google and the privatization of cyberspace

and DigiPlace Geoforum 38(6) 1322ndash1343

Abstract


Levels of severity of Internet censorship across the globe

Worst censors (RWB scores 80--115)

China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran

Severe censors (RWB scores 50--79)

Russia and Belarus

Pakistan


Moderate censors (RWB scores 20--49)


India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa


Light Internet censors (RWB scores = 10--19)



Uncensored (RWB scores 0--9)

Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References

ltlt ASCII85EncodePages false AllowTransparency false AutoPositionEPSFiles true AutoRotatePages None Binding Left CalGrayProfile (Gray Gamma 22) CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-21) CalCMYKProfile (ISO Coated v2 300 050ECI051) sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-21) CannotEmbedFontPolicy Error CompatibilityLevel 13 CompressObjects Off CompressPages true ConvertImagesToIndexed true PassThroughJPEGImages true CreateJobTicket false DefaultRenderingIntent Perceptual DetectBlends true DetectCurves 01000 ColorConversionStrategy sRGB DoThumbnails true EmbedAllFonts true EmbedOpenType false ParseICCProfilesInComments true EmbedJobOptions true DSCReportingLevel 0 EmitDSCWarnings false EndPage -1 ImageMemory 1048576 LockDistillerParams true MaxSubsetPct 100 Optimize true OPM 1 ParseDSCComments true ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true PreserveCopyPage true PreserveDICMYKValues true PreserveEPSInfo true PreserveFlatness true PreserveHalftoneInfo false PreserveOPIComments false PreserveOverprintSettings true StartPage 1 SubsetFonts false TransferFunctionInfo Apply UCRandBGInfo Preserve UsePrologue false ColorSettingsFile () AlwaysEmbed [ true ] NeverEmbed [ true ] AntiAliasColorImages false CropColorImages true ColorImageMinResolution 149 ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy Warning DownsampleColorImages true ColorImageDownsampleType Bicubic ColorImageResolution 150 ColorImageDepth -1 ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1 ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 150000 EncodeColorImages true ColorImageFilter DCTEncode AutoFilterColorImages true ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy JPEG ColorACSImageDict ltlt QFactor 040 HSamples [1 1 1 1] VSamples [1 1 1 1] gtgt ColorImageDict ltlt QFactor 015 HSamples [1 1 1 1] VSamples [1 1 1 1] gtgt JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict ltlt TileWidth 256 TileHeight 256 Quality 30 gtgt JPEG2000ColorImageDict ltlt TileWidth 256 TileHeight 256 Quality 30 gtgt AntiAliasGrayImages false CropGrayImages true GrayImageMinResolution 149 GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy Warning DownsampleGrayImages true GrayImageDownsampleType Bicubic GrayImageResolution 150 GrayImageDepth -1 GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2 GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 150000 EncodeGrayImages true GrayImageFilter DCTEncode AutoFilterGrayImages true GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy JPEG GrayACSImageDict ltlt QFactor 040 HSamples [1 1 1 1] VSamples [1 1 1 1] gtgt GrayImageDict ltlt QFactor 015 HSamples [1 1 1 1] VSamples [1 1 1 1] gtgt JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict ltlt TileWidth 256 TileHeight 256 Quality 30 gtgt JPEG2000GrayImageDict ltlt TileWidth 256 TileHeight 256 Quality 30 gtgt AntiAliasMonoImages false CropMonoImages true MonoImageMinResolution 599 MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy Warning DownsampleMonoImages true MonoImageDownsampleType Bicubic MonoImageResolution 600 MonoImageDepth -1 MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 150000 EncodeMonoImages true MonoImageFilter CCITTFaxEncode MonoImageDict ltlt K -1 gtgt AllowPSXObjects false CheckCompliance [ None ] PDFX1aCheck false PDFX3Check false PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false PDFXNoTrimBoxError true PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 000000 000000 000000 000000 ] PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 000000 000000 000000 000000 ] PDFXOutputIntentProfile (None) PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () PDFXOutputCondition () PDFXRegistryName () PDFXTrapped False CreateJDFFile false Description ltlt ARA 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 BGR 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 CHS ltFEFF4f7f75288fd94e9b8bbe5b9a521b5efa7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065876863900275284e8e9ad88d2891cf76845370524d53705237300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c676562535f00521b5efa768400200050004400460020658768633002gt CHT ltFEFF4f7f752890194e9b8a2d7f6e5efa7acb7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065874ef69069752865bc9ad854c18cea76845370524d5370523786557406300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c4f86958b555f5df25efa7acb76840020005000440046002065874ef63002gt CZE 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 DAN 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 ESP 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 ETI 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 FRA 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 GRE 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 HEB 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 HRV (Za stvaranje Adobe PDF dokumenata najpogodnijih za visokokvalitetni ispis prije tiskanja koristite ove postavke Stvoreni PDF dokumenti mogu se otvoriti Acrobat i Adobe Reader 50 i kasnijim verzijama) HUN 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 ITA ltFEFF005500740069006c0069007a007a006100720065002000710075006500730074006500200069006d0070006f007300740061007a0069006f006e00690020007000650072002000630072006500610072006500200064006f00630075006d0065006e00740069002000410064006f00620065002000500044004600200070006900f900200061006400610074007400690020006100200075006e00610020007000720065007300740061006d0070006100200064006900200061006c007400610020007100750061006c0069007400e0002e0020004900200064006f00630075006d0065006e007400690020005000440046002000630072006500610074006900200070006f00730073006f006e006f0020006500730073006500720065002000610070006500720074006900200063006f006e0020004100630072006f00620061007400200065002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000200065002000760065007200730069006f006e006900200073007500630063006500730073006900760065002egt JPN ltFEFF9ad854c18cea306a30d730ea30d730ec30b951fa529b7528002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020658766f8306e4f5c6210306b4f7f75283057307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a30674f5c62103055308c305f0020005000440046002030d530a130a430eb306f3001004100630072006f0062006100740020304a30883073002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee5964d3067958b304f30533068304c3067304d307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a306b306f30d530a930f330c8306e57cb30818fbc307f304c5fc59808306730593002gt KOR ltFEFFc7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c5ec0020ace0d488c9c80020c2dcd5d80020c778c1c4c5d00020ac00c7a50020c801d569d55c002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020bb38c11cb97c0020c791c131d569b2c8b2e4002e0020c774b807ac8c0020c791c131b41c00200050004400460020bb38c11cb2940020004100630072006f0062006100740020bc0f002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020c774c0c1c5d0c11c0020c5f40020c2180020c788c2b5b2c8b2e4002egt LTH 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 LVI 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 NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken die zijn geoptimaliseerd voor prepress-afdrukken van hoge kwaliteit De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 50 en hoger) NOR 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 POL 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 PTB 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 RUM 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 RUS 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 SKY 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 SLV 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 SUO 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 SVE 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 TUR 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 UKR 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 ENU (Use these settings to create Adobe PDF documents best suited for high-quality prepress printing Created PDF documents can be opened with Acrobat and Adobe Reader 50 and later) DEU ltFEFF004a006f0062006f007000740069006f006e007300200066006f00720020004100630072006f006200610074002000440069007300740069006c006c0065007200200038002000280038002e0032002e00310029000d00500072006f006400750063006500730020005000440046002000660069006c0065007300200077006800690063006800200061007200650020007500730065006400200066006f00720020006f006e006c0069006e0065002e000d0028006300290020003200300031003000200053007000720069006e006700650072002d005600650072006c0061006700200047006d006200480020000d000d0054006800650020006c00610074006500730074002000760065007200730069006f006e002000630061006e00200062006500200064006f0077006e006c006f0061006400650064002000610074002000680074007400700073003a002f002f0070006f007200740061006c002d0064006f0072006400720065006300680074002e0073007000720069006e006700650072002d00730062006d002e0063006f006d002f00500072006f00640075006300740069006f006e002f0046006c006f0077002f00740065006300680064006f0063002f00640065006600610075006c0074002e0061007300700078000d0054006800650072006500200079006f0075002000630061006e00200061006c0073006f002000660069006e0064002000610020007300750069007400610062006c006500200045006e0066006f0063007500730020005000440046002000500072006f00660069006c006500200066006f0072002000500069007400530074006f0070002000500072006f00660065007300730069006f006e0061006c00200030003800200061006e0064002000500069007400530074006f0070002000530065007200760065007200200030003800200066006f007200200070007200650066006c00690067006800740069006e006700200079006f007500720020005000440046002000660069006c006500730020006200650066006f007200650020006a006f00620020007300750062006d0069007300730069006f006e002e000dgt gtgt Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (10) ] OtherNamespaces [ ltlt AsReaderSpreads false CropImagesToFrames true ErrorControl WarnAndContinue FlattenerIgnoreSpreadOverrides false IncludeGuidesGrids false IncludeNonPrinting false IncludeSlug false Namespace [ (Adobe) (InDesign) (40) ] OmitPlacedBitmaps false OmitPlacedEPS false OmitPlacedPDF false SimulateOverprint Legacy gtgt ltlt AddBleedMarks false AddColorBars false AddCropMarks false AddPageInfo false AddRegMarks false ConvertColors ConvertToCMYK DestinationProfileName () DestinationProfileSelector DocumentCMYK Downsample16BitImages true FlattenerPreset ltlt PresetSelector MediumResolution gtgt FormElements false GenerateStructure false IncludeBookmarks false IncludeHyperlinks false IncludeInteractive false IncludeLayers false IncludeProfiles false MultimediaHandling UseObjectSettings Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (20) ] PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector DocumentCMYK PreserveEditing true UntaggedCMYKHandling LeaveUntagged UntaggedRGBHandling UseDocumentProfile UseDocumentBleed false gtgt ]gtgt setdistillerparamsltlt HWResolution [2400 2400] PageSize [595276 841890]gtgt setpagedevice

identity formation retail trade and commerce gover-

nance and is affecting the structure and form of cities in

the process generating round upon round of non-

Euclidean geometries in the context of a massive global

wave of timendashspace compression

A cottage industry of geographers has artfully

charted the origins and growth of cyberspace its

uneven social and spatial diffusion and its multiple

impacts ranging from cybercommunities to digital

divides to electronic commerce (Dodge and Kitchin

2000 Castells 2001 Kellerman 2002 Crampton

2003 Zook 2005a b Malecki and Moriset 2008)

Such authors typically embed the Internet within

post-Fordist capitalism and drawing on the literature

in critical cartography view it as a powerknowledge

constellation with decisive social roots and conse-

quences Zook and Graham (2007) note the Internetrsquos

lsquolsquocore and peripheryrsquorsquo structure as exemplified by the

dominant role played by search engines such as

Google and voice concerns over the privatization of

the digital commons Similarly Zook (2003) called

attention to the Internetrsquos role in the lsquolsquoonline adult

industryrsquorsquo This literature offers a valuable means for

spatializing the Internet demonstrating its rootedness

in social relations and changing geographic relations

of proximity and serves as a necessary antidote to

many prevailing utopian and technocratic interpreta-

tions such as those that proclaim the ostensible

lsquolsquodeath of distancersquorsquo (Cairncross 1997) or the lsquolsquoend of

geographyrsquorsquo (OrsquoBrien 1992)

One dimension however has received woefully

little attention from geographers concerns the

strategies and tactics deployed by states the world

over to limit access and shape the contents of what

their denizens may view on-line Brunn (2000) for

example explicates how cyberspace is closely inter-

twined with various geographies of regionalism

networks non-state actors and various transnational

processes Steinberg and McDowell (2003) delved

into the mechanics of domain name policing but not

censorship per se While the geographic literature has

delved into issues of geosurveillance and govern-

mentality virtually nothing has been said about how

governments erect obstacles to Internet access or

massage its contents to their liking Warf (2009a b)

touched upon Internet censorship in Latin America

and the states that comprised the former Soviet

Union and Warf and Vincent (2007) addressed the

marked government restrictions found in the Arab

world Nonetheless no comparative geographic anal-

ysis of Internet censorship worldwide yet exists and

regional approaches are limited in scope and ability

to detect differences in Internet censorship practices

and outcomes among the worldrsquos states Confronting

this issue directly is essential if we are to achieve a

robust understanding of the nuanced political impli-

cations of the digital domain

Of all of the innumerable myths that swarm around

cyberspace one of the most insidious is that the

Internet is an inherently emancipatory tool a device

that necessarily and inevitably promotes democracy

by giving voice to those who lack political power

and in so doing undermines authoritarian and repres-

sive governments President Ronald Reagan for

Number of Internet Users

2100 - 999999

1000000 - 3999000

4000000 - 19999000

20000000 - 99000000

100000000 - 420000000

Fig 1 Distribution of worldrsquos Internet users June 2010 Source author using data from wwwinternetworldstatscom

minimize dissent

ment1003-2009html

Internet censorship

Population

(000s)

Internet

users (000s)

0ndash9 912137 134 629208 319

10ndash19 743610 109 320059 162

20ndash49 2826536 415 400853 203

50ndash79 732971 108 139775 71

80ndash115 1602751 235 480462 244

Total 6818006 1000 1970357 1000

comstatshtm

eth41THORN

across the globe

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Freedom House Score

decisions

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Russia and Belarus

spacersquorsquo

Pakistan

them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


minimize dissent

ment1003-2009html

Internet censorship

Population

(000s)

Internet

users (000s)

0ndash9 912137 134 629208 319

10ndash19 743610 109 320059 162

20ndash49 2826536 415 400853 203

50ndash79 732971 108 139775 71

80ndash115 1602751 235 480462 244

Total 6818006 1000 1970357 1000

comstatshtm

eth41THORN

across the globe

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Freedom House Score

decisions

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Russia and Belarus

spacersquorsquo

Pakistan

them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


ment1003-2009html

Internet censorship

Population

(000s)

Internet

users (000s)

0ndash9 912137 134 629208 319

10ndash19 743610 109 320059 162

20ndash49 2826536 415 400853 203

50ndash79 732971 108 139775 71

80ndash115 1602751 235 480462 244

Total 6818006 1000 1970357 1000

comstatshtm

eth41THORN

across the globe

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Freedom House Score

decisions

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Russia and Belarus

spacersquorsquo

Pakistan

them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


ment1003-2009html

Internet censorship

Population

(000s)

Internet

users (000s)

0ndash9 912137 134 629208 319

10ndash19 743610 109 320059 162

20ndash49 2826536 415 400853 203

50ndash79 732971 108 139775 71

80ndash115 1602751 235 480462 244

Total 6818006 1000 1970357 1000

comstatshtm

eth41THORN

across the globe

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Freedom House Score

decisions

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Russia and Belarus

spacersquorsquo

Pakistan

them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


Internet censorship

Population

(000s)

Internet

users (000s)

0ndash9 912137 134 629208 319

10ndash19 743610 109 320059 162

20ndash49 2826536 415 400853 203

50ndash79 732971 108 139775 71

80ndash115 1602751 235 480462 244

Total 6818006 1000 1970357 1000

comstatshtm

eth41THORN

across the globe

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Freedom House Score

decisions

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Russia and Belarus

spacersquorsquo

Pakistan

them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


eth41THORN

across the globe

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Freedom House Score

decisions

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Russia and Belarus

spacersquorsquo

Pakistan

them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


across the globe

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Freedom House Score

decisions

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Russia and Belarus

spacersquorsquo

Pakistan

them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


decisions

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Russia and Belarus

spacersquorsquo

Pakistan

them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


decisions

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Russia and Belarus

spacersquorsquo

Pakistan

them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


Russia and Belarus

spacersquorsquo

Pakistan

them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


them as well

cybercafes

Central Asia

closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


closed

closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


closely monitored

Subsaharan Africa

International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


International 2003)

(Conway 2007)

Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


Western Europe

United States

(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


(1996 p 885) notes

(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


(Froomkin 2003)

Concluding thoughts

ments have not

References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


References

99ndash114

887ndash906

internet-filtering

2009 p A4

bridge MA MIT Press

University Press

1424052748703948504574649021577882240html

orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


orgjlvp497htm

London Routledge

740ndash873

University Press

aijanpdf

Vietnamhtml

119ndash171

the-regime

883ndash900

MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


MA MIT Press

London Routledge

347-103752

Pacific Press

sorhtml

222ndash239

University Press

20071027AR2007102701384_pfhtml

259ndash274

Abstract




China

Vietnam

BurmaMyanmar

Iran


Russia and Belarus

Pakistan




India

Central Asia


Subsaharan Africa






Western Europe

United States


Concluding thoughts

References


Geographies of Global Internet Censorship

Documents