Gender inequalities in labour markets in Central Asia Tamar Khitarishvili
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Gender inequalities in labour markets in Central Asia
Tamar Khitarishvili
2
ThecollapseoftheSovietUnionhasinitiatedanunprecedentedsocialandeconomictransformationofthe
Central Asian economies. Their experience has demonstrated that the changes in the gender balance
triggeredbyeconomicshiftsarefarfromobvious.WhereasduringtheSovietyears,womeninCentralAsia
experiencedconsiderableadvancesineconomicandsocialwell-being,duringthepost-Sovietperiodthese
advanceswereinmanycasesreversed,inpartduetotheeconomicshiftsexperiencedbycountriesinthe
region, including private sector growth and significantmigration flows, and to some degree due to the
strengtheningof patriarchal traditions. This paper establishes the current stateof various dimensionsof
gender inequalities and their recent dynamics in the five countries of Central Asia and proposes steps
aimedatreducingthemtoadvanceinclusivegrowth,decentjobcreationandeconomicempowerment.
TamarKhitarishvili1
1ResearchScholar,LevyEconomicsInstituteofBardCollege,[email protected],18457587714;paperpreparedforthejointUNDP/ILOconferenceonEmployment,TradeandHumanDevelopmentinCentralAsia(Almaty,Kazakhstan,June23-24,2016).
Table of Contents Background ......................................................................................................................... 4
Labour markets .................................................................................................................. 5
Rural development and agriculture ................................................................................ 11
Entrepreneurship and private sector development ...................................................... 13
Industrial and occupational segregation ....................................................................... 19
Education .......................................................................................................................... 21
Pay gaps ............................................................................................................................ 24
Unpaid work and care ...................................................................................................... 26
Migration ........................................................................................................................... 32
Social Institutions, Legislative Framework and Policy-Making ................................... 35
Social protection systems ............................................................................................... 39
Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 40
References ........................................................................................................................ 43
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 49
4
BackgroundThe Central Asian countries2represent a heterogeneous group that includes energy-exporting countries
(Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan); agriculture-dependent small economies (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan); and
themore industrializedeconomyofUzbekistan.UzbekistanandKazakhstanhavethe largestpopulations,
atover30and17million,followedbyTajikistanwithovereightmillion,andTurkmenistanandKyrgyzstan
withalmostsixmillioneach.Kazakhstan is themostaffluentCentralAsiancountrywithaGrossNational
Income(GNI)percapitaof$20,867,andTajikistanthepoorestwithGNIpercapitaof$2,517(UNDP2015).
BasedontheGenderInequality Index(GII)andtheGenderDevelopmentIndex(GDI),theCentral
Asianregionischaracterizedbymoderatelevelsofgenderinequality(Figure1).AccordingtotheGII,which
gaugesreproductivehealthandgendergaps inempowermentandeconomicstatus, theregionperforms
betterthantheworldaverageonmeasuresofgenderequality(TableA1).Thisislargelydrivenbyrelatively
strong gender indicators in education and below average maternal mortality rates (even though they
remainconsiderable).
AsimilarconclusionemergesusingtheGDI,whichmeasuresgendergaps inhumandevelopment
achievements focusing on health, education and living standards and places the Central Asia countries
abovetheworldaverage(TableA2).However,inthecaseoftheGDI,thisoutcomecanbeexplainedinpart
by poor health outcomes of men, in particular, and the relatively low levels of gender-disaggregated
estimated gross national income per capita (with the exception of natural-resource-rich Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan). Turkmenistan stands out as a Central Asian country with the lowest life expectancy for
womenandmenandthelowestexpectedyearsofschooling.Ontheotherhand,Kazakhstanperformsthe
bestoutofitsfellowCentralAsiancountriesandistheonlyCentralAsiancountryclassifiedbytheUNDPas
a country with high level of human development. The other four countries of the region fall into the
mediumhumandevelopmentcategory(UNDP2015).
Kazakhstan also performsbetter than its regional neighbors basedon the Social Institutions and
Gender Index (SIGI), an OECD-produced measure of discriminatory social institutions, which assesses
formaland informal laws,attitudesandpractices that restrictwomen’sandgirls’access torights, justice
andempowermentopportunities. In fact, it is theonlyCentralAsiancountriescategorizedashaving low
degreeofdiscriminatorypractices,withtheSIGIvalueof0.1196.Tajikistan,UzbekistanandKyrgyzstanare
partofthemediumdegreegroupwiththeSIGIvaluesof0.1393,0.1475,and0.1598,respectively (OECD
SIGIdatabase).
2TheCentralAsianregionincludesKazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,andUzbekistan.
5
LabourmarketsDespite the region’spositiveperformance relative to the restof theworld, gender inequalities in
labormarketsarepervasive intheCentralAsianregion.Theyemergealreadyatthe levelof labourforce
participation(Figure2).ItisnotablethatmaleparticipationratesacrossCentralAsiancountriesaresimilar.
The gaps arepresentdue to the considerable variation in female labour forceparticipation rates,which
rangefrom46.9percentinTurkmenistanto67.7percentinKazakhstanin2013.Asaresult,thegendergap
in labour force participation in the Central Asian region varies from about 10.2 percentage points in
Kazakhstanto30percentagepointsinTurkmenistan
Overthelast20years,theoveralllabourforceparticipationratesinCentralAsiahavenotchanged
considerablyhowevertheirgenderdynamicshavevaried.InKazakhstan,thegendergapcontracted,asthe
female labour forceparticipation rate increased considerably from70.1 in 1991 to 75.1percent in 2013
6
whereasmaleratewentuponlyslightlyfrom81.9in1991to82.4in2013.3Theincreaseinthefemalerate
isparticularlynoteworthybecauseitwasthehighestintheregiontobeginwithandhasrisenevenmore.
On the other hand, the gap appears to have widened in other countries of the region. In Tajikistan,
TurkmenistanandUzbekistan,thishappened(albeitonlymarginally)duetotheslightincreaseinthemale
participation rate without the accompanying increase in the female rate. The widening of the gap was
muchmorepronouncedinKyrgyzstanbecausewomen’sratefellfrom64.5percentin1991to59.6percent
in2013whilemen’sparticipationrateincreasedfrom78.1percentto82.5percentduringthesameperiod
(theWorldBankGenderStatisticsDatabase).
Thegenderwagegapwidensaswomenenterprimechild-bearingyears.This istoa largedegree
duetotheirdomesticandcareburdens(Maltseva2007).Infact,asmanyas61percentofTajikwomennot
inthelabourforcecitedomesticresponsibilitiesasthereasonfortheirinactivity(Figure13).At11percent,
thisshareismuchlowerinKazakhstan,possiblyduetothebetterstateofsocialinfrastructureprovisioning.
Notably,theyouthfemalelabourforceparticipationratedeclinedinKazakhstanfrom48.9percentin1991
to 44.4 percent in 2013 even as it increased amongworking-age females.However, this could bepartly
attributedtomorewomengoingforhighereducation:thedecreasewasaccompaniedbyariseintheratio
offemaletomaletertiaryenrollmentfrom114.1in1999to129.5in2013.OntheotherhandinUzbekistan
theratiooffemaletomaletertiaryenrollmentfellfrom82.4in1999to64.7in2011.
3Source:WBGenderStatistics,seriesSL_TLF_ACTI_MA_ZS
7
In the environment with low labor force participation rates, low unemployment rates are
commonlyinterpretedwithcautionbecausethelowratesmaysimplybeareflectionofalargeportionof
inactivepopulation.However,intheCentralAsianregion,thisisnotthecase:countrieswithhigherlabor
force participation rates tend to have lower unemployment rates. Moreover, in these countries,
considerablegendergapsintheunemploymentratesbenefittingmenarepresent,unlikethegapsinlabor
forceparticipationrates,whicharesmallinthesecountries.ThisisthecaseinKazakhstanandKyrgyzstan
(Figure 4).On theother hand, inUzbekistan and Turkmenistan,where female labour forceparticipation
ratesareverylow,thegendergapintheunemploymentrateislessthanonepercentagepoint.Hence,in
strongerlabormarketsproportionatelyfewermenthanwomenareunemployedwhereasinweakerlabor
markets,thesharesofmenandwomenseekingjobsaresimilar.
Gendergaps inemployment largelymirror thegaps in labour forceparticipationrates (Figure5).
They are the lowest in Kazakhstan at 11.2 percentage points and the highest in Turkmenistan at 26.9
percentagepoints.Next,weshedmorelightonthefactorsthatlikelyexplainthispicturebyanalyzingthe
employmentcompositionbytypeandsectoroftheeconomy.
In particular, smaller gender gaps in the employment rate are observed in the countrieswith a
higher share of wage employment, which also tend to have higher female employment rates. This
potentially suggests thatwage employment contributes to higher female employment rates, generating
8
moregender-equaloutcomes.Henceunderstandingthefactorsthatcontributetotheexpansionofwage
employmentintheCentralAsianregionmayyieldinsightsintocontractinggendergapsintheemployment
rate.
Indeed,wageemployment is a considerablymoredominant formof employment inKazakhstan,
which has better overall gender indicators compared to other Central Asian countries, with a wage
employmentshareofover60percentamongbothmenandwomen,followedbyTajikistanwithabout53
percentandKyrgyzstanwiththesharethatvariesbetween47and48percent(Figure6).
Countrieswithhighersharesofwageemploymentalsodemonstratesmallergenderdifferencesin
thecompositionoftheirself-employment.Ontheotherhand,inTajikistanandKyrgyzstan,forexample,in
which wage employment shares are about 50 percent or lower, proportionately more women are
contributingfamilyworkersthanmen,reflectingapatterninwhichwomenaremorelikelytobeinvolved
inunpaidactivities.
9
Thesecountry-andgender-baseddifferencescanbelinkedtothesectoralstructureoftheCentral
Asianeconomies(Figure7).Morethanaquarteroftheemployedpopulationinthisregionisemployedin
agricultureand,withtheexceptionofKazakhstan,theshareofagriculturalemploymentamongwomenis
veryclosetoorhigherthanthisshareamongmen.Thegendergapisparticularlystriking inTajikistan, in
which75.1percentofwomenworkintheagriculturalsectorcomparedto41.8percentofmen.
10
ThehighproportionsofcontributingfamilyworkersinTajikistanandKyrgyzstanappeartobetied
to the predominance of relatively small-plot based agriculture, in which women tend to participate. In
particular,16.9percentand19.1percentoffemaleworkersbutonly8.9percentand12.5percentofmale
workers inTajikistanandKyrgyzstan,respectively,arecontributingfamilyworkers.Ontheotherhand, in
Kazakhstan,despitemorethanathirdofworkersemployed inagriculture, lessthantwopercentofboth
maleand femaleworkers are contributing familyworkers. This is likelydue to the larger-scalenatureof
agriculture,especiallyinthenorthernpartofKazakhstan.Indeed,Petricketal.(2013)arguethatlarge-scale
farmingbasedonhired labourwill continue tobe themainmodeof landcultivation for the foreseeable
futureintheKazakhgrainregion.
Highsharesofown-accountworkersintheoverallemploymentarealsolinkedtonon-agricultural
private sector development although gender patterns vary by country. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
proportionatelymoremen are own-accountworkers. In contrast, in Kazakhstan, 34.7 percent of female
workers as opposed to 30.5 percent of male workers are own-account workers. Although data from
Turkmenistanislimited,ILO(2010b)indicatesthatself-employmentinTurkmenistanisfemale-dominated
with 62percent of self-employed individuals beingwomen. Further linked to gender gaps in theprivate
sector development and entrepreneurship is the higher share of employers among men compared to
women (Figure 6). For example, in Kazakhstan, proportionately twice as many men as women were
employersin2013(1.1percentofemployedwomenand2.5percentofemployedmen).Expressedinother
terms,only15percentofemployersinTajikistanand30percentofemployersinTurkmenistanarefemale
(ILO2010b;WorldBank2013).
11
Asusefulastheselabourforceclassificationsare,theymaynotaccuratelyrepresentlabourforce
participation. For example, the boundary between inactivity and unemployment reported in household
budget and in labour force surveys can be very blurry, especially for rural women. Moreover, these
classifications do not necessarily reflect the quality of the engagement in labour force. For example,
agricultural employment tends to be concentrated in low-productivity subsistence activities and, among
females inparticular, isdominatedby contributing familyworkerswhoareunpaid. Furthermore,a large
shareofagriculturalproductiontakesplaceinformally,withoutanysocialprotection,andthesameapplies
to the non-agricultural private sector. On the other hand, informal activities may provide better
remuneration and higher standards of living than employment in the formal sector. Indeed, despite its
relative stability and social benefits, public sector employment is typically poorly remunerated. These
distinctionsareimportantandweaddresssomeoftheirgenderdimensionsinCentralAsiainthecontextof
ruraldevelopment,agricultureandprivatesectordevelopment.
RuraldevelopmentandagricultureClosetohalfofthepopulationinCentralAsialivesinruralareas,asmuchas66percentofthepopulation
inKyrgyzstanand55percentofthepopulationinTurkmenistan.Thisisthecaseeventhoughoverthelast
twodecades, therural share inpopulationhasbeenconsistentlydeclining.Forexample, inUzbekistan it
dropped from64.2percent in2007 to48.8percent in2011 (Stulina2004; ILOa2010),with internal and
external migration contributing to the decline. Indeed, migration from and within Central Asia has
transformed the labour market landscape of rural areas in particular, with complex consequences for
familiesandcommunitiesleftbehind,anissuewediscussinthemigrationsectionofthepaper.
Agriculturalsectoristhemainemployerinruralareas.Femaleshareofagriculturalemploymentis
more thanhalf and standsat 54percent and53percent, inKyrgyzstanandTajikistan, respectively (FAO
GenderandLandRightsDatabase4)andat53percentinUzbekistan(Alimdjanova2009).However,women
areunderrepresentedamongworkers responsible fordecision-making, suchas specialistsandmanagers,
andtendtobeconcentrated inseasonalandunskilled jobs.Forexample,amongunskilledwageworkers
thissharevariesbetween36.7percentinKyrgyzstanand59.3percentinTajikistan(TCICWC2006).WECF
(2014b)givesanevenhigherestimateof80percentinTajikistan.Ontheotherhand,amongspecialists,the
femaleshareinTajikistanisbelow16percent(it iszeroinTurkmenistan)andamongfarmmanagers it is
only12percent.InUzbekistan,only4.2percentofmanagerialpositionsinagricultureareheldbywomen
(ADB2014).
4ThisdatabasedoesnotincludedataonKazakhstan.
12
Evidence from Tajikistan also suggests that fewer women participate in decision-making in
individualorfamilydehkanfarmsthaninlargecollectivefarms.Forexample,inKhatlonandSughdregions
ofTajikistan,TJICCAdataindicatethatwomenparticipateindecision-makingforfarmingdecisions,suchas
thechoiceofacroporthesaleofagriculturalproduce,inlessthan25percentofthehouseholdsandthisis
especially thecaseamongsmall farms.Even in large farms,womenhave littlebargainingpowerandare
trapped in low-wage, low-productivity work. It is remarkable that this picture is prevalent even among
female-headedhouseholds,indicatingthatmaleextendedfamilymemberscontinuemakingdecisionswith
respect to farming (WB 2014a). Hence, despite their considerable presence in agriculture, women in
CentralAsiaareconcentratedinlow-skilledjobswithlittledecision-makingpower.
Genderasymmetriesinagriculturalemploymentarealsolinkedtogendergapsinlandownership
and leaseholdings.Although lawsgenerallydonotdiscriminateagainstwomen, in reality,womenrarely
hold land titles, reflecting strongpatriarchal customsandattitudes.Only17.1percentof farmowners in
Tajikistan in 2007 and 12.4 percent of land holders in Kyrgyzstan in 2002 were women (FAO 2011). In
Uzbekistan,only7.2percentofleaseholdfarmswereledbywomen5(Alimdjanova2009).Infact,duringthe
implementation of the land reform and the distribution of land use rights, familieswith only daughters
receivedlesslandinUzbekistan(FAOGenderandLandDatabase).Difficultiesoftransferringownershipto
womenpresentparticularproblemsinfemale-headedhouseholdswithmigrantmalemembers,rendering
women unable to participate in critical land transactions required for sustaining the livelihood of their
households,suchasrentingormortgagingland.Moregenerally,thissituationconstrainsthedevelopment
of female-owned micro and small businesses in agriculture due to women’s inability to obtain credit
withoutcollateral.
The restrictions on land access are also translated into water access challenges because
membership in water users’ associations is commonly linked to land ownership (WB 2014a). Water
irrigation issues are particularly challenging for individual and family dehkan farms, which employ
proportionatelymorewomen(Alimdjanova2009).Thissituationcontributestotheuseoflow-productivity
agricultural practices among female-headed farms, affecting their living standards. Women-headed
householdsarealso less likely toadoptsustainable landmanagementpractices,especially insmall farms
because women tend to have relatively weak knowledge-sharing networks. Conditional on having this
knowledge,however, theyareas likely toadopt sustainable landmanagementpracticesasmale-headed
farmhouseholds(WorldBank2014a).
5Landownershiplawsvarybycountry.InTajikistanandtheKyrgyzRepublic,landcanbeprivatelyownedandistransferable.InTurkmenistan,privatefarmersgetlanduserights,butlandownershipisnottransferable.InUzbekistan,thereisnoprivatelandownership(FAOGenderandLandDatabase).
13
Anotherfactorcontributingto loweragriculturalproductivityoffemale-headedhouseholds isthe
plotsize.Similartononagriculturalenterprises,intheagriculturalsector,womentendtoownandmanage
smaller landplotsthanmen. InTajikistan, in2007theaverageplotsizewas0.22acres infemale-headed
(not necessarily female owned) farms/households and 0.37 acres in male-headed households (State
CommitteeoftheRepublicofTajikistanonStatistics2010,p.18).Thesenumbersareconsistentwithdata
based on land ownership. In Tajikistan, in 2007 the average size of female-owned land plots (based on
officialownershipdocuments)was0.27acres,asopposedto0.31acresformale-ownedplots(Kieranetal.
2015).InKyrgyzstan,theoverallfemaleshareinlandholdingsis12.4percent,butonly5.5percentoffarms
with100-1000hectaresofarablelandwerefemaleheldandwomenheldonly5.4percentofthetotalland
area (FAOGenderandLandRightsDatabase). These findingsemphasize the importanceofdisentangling
thecomplexfactorsthatunderliegendergapsinagriculturalproductivity.
This picture of gender disparities in rural areas and in agriculture reveals thatwomen aremore
likelytoengageinlow-value-addedagriculturalproductioncomparedtomen.Asinnon-agriculturalsectors,
womenoperateonasmallerscalecomparedtomen.Moreover, incountrieswithasmallshareofwage
employment in agriculture, women are more likely to work as contributing family workers. For these
countries, in particular, the challenge lies in improving income-earning opportunities of women. Impact
evaluation studies indicate that female farmers in countrieswith small-scale agriculture benefit froman
integratedsuiteofservicesthattargetsproduction,marketing,andsocialconstraintsandfromthecreation
of farmer groups and collectives to establish and strengthen networks (Buvinić et al. 2013). Providing
womenwithagricultural education services and training in theuseof seeds, fertilizers and livestockhas
also been effective in raising the productivity of female farming (Manfre et al. 2013). Finally, improving
women’saccesstocreditthroughalternativefinancingmechanismandtolandtenurethroughlegaladvice
andinformationonlandtenurearrangementscanhelpinalleviatingthebarriersencounteredbywomenin
ruralareasandinagriculture.
EntrepreneurshipandprivatesectordevelopmentFora lasting impactongender inequalities inthelabourmarketsofCentralAsianeconomies,agricultural
sector reforms have to take place in conjunction with shifts in the structure of non-agricultural private
sector employment. Private sector expansion has been viewed as key to generating robust employment
growth in the region (World Bank 2012) and its current GDP share ranges from only 25 percent in
Turkmenistanto75percentintheKyrgyzRepublic.
Due to a stronger representation of women in the public sector of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,
femaleshares inprivateemployment inthesecountriesare lowerthanmaleshares. InTajikistan,onthe
14
other hand, the female share in the private sector is higher than male share, reflecting a very high
proportionofwomenemployedinagriculture(Figure8).
A large proportion of private sector activities, especially small andmediumenterprise and own-
account business activity, in Central Asian countries takes place in the informal sector, especially in
agriculture. In2006, the sizeof the informaleconomy inCentralAsian countrieswasaround40percent
(Schneideretal.2010).In2007,36percentofwageworkersand47percentofallemployedindividualsin
Tajikistanworkedintheinformalsector,withthemajoritybeingwomen(WorldBank2013).Thisindicates
theconsiderablemagnitudeofinformalactivitiesamongtheself-employedinTajikistan.InTurkmenistan,
informalsectoremploysabout14percentofworkforce,amongwhom57percentarefemale(ILO2010b).
In Kyrgyzstan the female share in informal employment in 2009was 36.2 percent, whereas it was 41.7
percent of total employment, likely reflecting the stronger position of women in formal public-sector
employment(Laboursta).
Womenemployedinformallyinagricultureareprimarilyengagedinthesaleofagriculturalproduce
grownonowngardenplots.Womenininformalnonagriculturalactivities,inturn,areengagedingarment
production,shuttletradeandlocalmarkettrade(Ishkanian2003;ADB2014;ADB2006).Forexample,ADB
(2014)reportsthatbetween70and80percentofbazaarvendorsand50percentofbazaar-basedshuttle
tradersinUzbekistanarefemale.Therealsoappearstobeagenderpatternwithrespecttothedirectionof
tradeasfemaleshuttletradersaremuchmorelikelytoshuttletoandfromKyrgyzstanandTajikistanthan
toKazakhstan(ADB2014).Thesepatternsreflecttheoftenprecariousnatureofprivatesectoremployment
intheregion.
Indeed, informal activities often represent a coping strategy to address the lack of employment
opportunities in the formal sector and its high costs due to regulations and corruption. Nevertheless,
evidence suggests that informalactivitiesareapreferredoption tomigration. Indeed,migration isoften
thelast-resortcopingstrategy–forexample,unlikeprofessionalworkers,low-skilledworkersinTajikistan
aremorelikelytomigratethantobeinformallyemployed(Abdulloevetal.2012).
Thepresenceofalargeinformaleconomyalsodoesnotnecessarilyruleoutthepresenceofstrong
entrepreneurial elements in the formal private sector. In Kazakhstan, the established formal business
ownership rate 6 is 7.4 percent and the entrepreneurial intention rate 7 is 3.9 percent (Global
EntrepreneurshipMonitorsurvey).Thecorrespondingrateswere7.3and8.1percentand16and2.4 for6Businessownershiprateisthepercentageofthepopulationaged18–64whoarecurrentlyanowner-managerofanestablishedbusiness,i.e.,owningandmanagingarunningbusinessthathaspaidsalaries,wages,oranyotherpaymentstotheownersformorethan42months.7Entrepreneurialintentionrateispercentageofthepopulationaged18–64—individualsinvolvedinanystageofentrepreneurialactivityexcluded—whoarelatententrepreneursandwhointendtostartabusinesswithinthreeyears.
15
GeorgiaandRussia,respectively,theonlyotherformerSovietcountriesinwhichthesurveywasconducted.
Bycomparison,intheUnitedKingdom,theserateswere6.5and6.3percent.Hence,theestablishedformal
businessownershiprate,inparticular,suggestscomparablelevelsofentrepreneurialactivity.Nevertheless,
during the lastdecade, about28percentof formalentrepreneurial activity inKazakhstanwasnecessity-
driven,comparedtoonly16percentintheUnitedKingdom.Thiscomparestothe2006-2014averageof30
percent in Russia and the 2014 value of 49 percent in Georgia. The key question remains whether the
entrepreneurial intentionandactivity,evenwhennecessity-driven,canbecomeaseedbedfor innovation
andjobgrowthandwhetherwomencanplayaprominentroleinthisprocess.
Indeed,womencanplaydifferentfunctionsinentrepreneurship.Asfirmowners,theirownership
participation rates in theCentralAsian countries currently standat aboutone-thirdorhigher (Figure9).
Theyhave increasedover the lastdecade.Forexample, in2005, the female sharevaried fromonly14.4
percentinTajikistanto29.4inKazakhstan.Inthesameyear,thefemaleshareinenterpriseownershipwas
11.2percentinTurkmenistan(UNDP2008).However,by2013,theratesrangedfrom28.3inKazakhstanto
ashighas49.4percentinKyrgyzstan,inlineorabovetheOECDaverageofabout30percent(WorldBank
EnterpriseSurvey).
Therewasapronouncedincreaseinthefemaleownershiprateduring2008and2009,perhapsdue
tothehighturnoveroffirmsinthesecountries.However,thesharpincreasein2008and2009acrossthe
16
board may also be due to the disproportionately strong impact of the recession on male-dominated
industries,suchasconstructionandtransport,whichreducedthenumberofmale-ownedbusinesses.
Whereas femaleownership ratesare relativelyhigh, theproportionsofbeinga topmanagerare
muchlower(Figure9),especiallyinTajikistanandUzbekistan.Topmanagersexertstronginfluenceonthe
daily operations of firms as well their long-term development. In some cases, the female share in top
managementmaybeabetterindicatoroffemaleparticipationindecision-makingthanthefemalesharein
ownership.InTajikistanin2013,32.7percentoffirmshadfemaleparticipationinownershipbutonly9.6
percenthadafemaletopmanager.Similarly,inUzbekistan,29.2percentoffirmshadfemaleparticipation
inownershipbutonly13.4percenthadafemaletopmanager.Itisnoteworthythatdespitethedecreasein
theproportionof firmswith femaleownershipafter therecession, inKyrgyzstanand, tosomeextent, in
Uzbekistan, thepercentageof firmswith female topmanagers increasedand in theKyrgyzcase reached
one-thirdofmanagersofformalSMEsin2013.Thisindicatestheincreasedinvolvementofwomeninthe
formalprivatesectorinKyrgyzstan.8
8Othersourcesconfirmtheseestimatesoffemalemanagerialengagementintheprivatesector,butalsoindicatethattheytendtobebelowthefemalesharesinthemanagementofstateandmunicipal(self-government)entities,highlightingamoreactivefemaleengagementinthepublicsector.Forexample,whereasin201123.7percentofenterprisesintheKyrgyzRepublichadfemalemanagers,thefemalesharewas23.6percentforprivateenterprises(inlinewiththeevidencefromtheWorldBankEnterpriseSurveys),21.1percentinstateentitiesandreached34.1percentinmunicipal(self-government)entities((NationalStatisticalCommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic2012),p.97).InKazakhstanin2010,25.6percentofenterpriseshadfemalemanagers,andthisproportionwas24.6percentinprivateenterprises,18.8percentinforeignenterprises,andashighas38.2percentinstateenterprises(WomenandmeninKazakhstan,2011,p.98).
17
Reflectingtypical industrialsegregationpatterns,thereareconsiderabledifferencesinthefemale
ownership share by industry. For example, in 2005, whereas the overall female share of managers in
Uzbekistanwas27.3percent, in thehealthcare,educationandculturesectors it stoodat36.1,45.7,and
44.6percent,respectively(StateCommitteeoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonStatistics2007).Womenare
alsomorethanproportionatelyrepresented inretail trade, foodandgarmentsproduction inKazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan,TajikistanandUzbekistan(WBEnterpriseSurveys).Thisisalsoconfirmedbythefindingsofthe
femaleentrepreneurshipsurveyinUzbekistan(UNECE2009)andinTurkmenistan(UNDP2008).
Thereissubstantialregionalvariationinthefemaleownershipshare.InKyrgyzstan,theproportion
of female managers varied from 24.5 percent in Batken region to 55 percent in Bishkek region (which
incidentally also has a lower gender wage gap than the average for Kyrgyzstan) (National Statistical
CommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic2012).InUzbekistan,itvariedfromonly9.7percentinAndijanregionto
37.9percentinNamanganregion(StateCommitteeoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonStatistics2007).
Female-managedfirmsdifferfrommale-managedfirmsinanumberofways.Female-ownedfirms
tend to be smaller than male-owned firms, typical of the gender differences in firm size across the
transition region. For example, in Kazakhstan the average firm size ofmale-owned firms is 50 workers,
compared to 30workers in female-owned firms. This is the case even though female-ownedbusinesses
tendtohavegreaterscaleeconomiesduetotheindustriesinwhichtheypredominate,whichimpliesthat
theywouldbenefit fromexpansionmore thanmale-managed firms.Thesmaller sizeof female-managed
firmshasbeen found tobe largely responsible for theirweaker financialperformance (Sattar2012). It is
notable that female-managed firms tend to hire proportionately more full-time female workers. For
example,in2013inUzbekistan,59.9percentpercentoffull-timeworkersinfirmswithfemaleparticipation
18
inownershipwere femalecompared to23.9percent in firmswithout femaleparticipation inownership.
Findingsof thefemaleentrepreneurshipsurvey indicatethat femaleemploymentshare in female-owned
firmsis68percentinUzbekistan(UNECE2009).SimilarrelationshipsholdinotherCentralAsiancountries.
Thesefindingsimplythatalleviatingobstaclestotheestablishmentandexpansionoffemale-ownedfirms
cancontributetotheshrinkingofgendergapintheemploymentrates.
Someofsuchobstacleshavetodowithwomen’slackofnetworksandexpertiseinnavigatingthe
“racketeerandcorruptpublicofficials”(Ishkanian2003),whichexplainswomen’sengagementininformal
andsmall-scaleactivitiesthatrequire lowinitialcapital.Femalenetworksalsotendtobelessusefulthan
malenetworksforbusinessdevelopment(Welteretal.2006).Inaddition,womenfacegreaterregulatory
barriersandlackbusinessknowledgerelativetomen(Sattar2012).
Accesstocreditisanotherfactorthatpotentiallyhinderstheestablishmentandgrowthoffemale-
owned businesses. It is in general relatively rare in Central Asian countries to borrow money to start,
operateorexpandafarmorabusiness,withfewerthan8percentofindividualsreportinghavingdoneso.
(Figure10;GlobalFindexsurvey,2014).Thisisespeciallythecaseamongwomen.Femaleentrepreneursin
Uzbekistan specifically cite access to credit as a key barrier to expansion, instead depending on limited
savings or the network of family and friends. Only 40 percent of the surveyed female entrepreneurs in
Samarkand and 54 percent in Tashkent sought credit from commercial banks. Out of the women who
sought credit, only 38.2 percent in Samarkand and 78 percent in Tashkent received it (UNECE 2009).
Womenalsotendtobemoreriskaversethanmen,potentiallycontributingtothegendergapinbusiness-
relatedborrowing,althoughtheevidencelinkingwomen’sriskaversiontothesmallersizeofoperationsis
inconclusive(Sattar2012).
19
Moreworkisneededtounderstandwhywomenarelesslikelytoestablishfirmswithemployees,belarger
in size, and function in the formal sector compared tomen and,more generally, how to turn necessity
entrepreneurship into opportunity entrepreneurship. Access to credit,weaker networks, and the lack of
business knowledge are some of the constraints that female-headed businesses face. Alleviating these
constraintscanincreasethepotentialforemploymentgrowthandforcontractingthegendergapsinlabor
marketsviatheexpansionoffemale-ownedbusinesses.Indeed,impactevaluationstudiessuggestastrong
positiveeffectofbusinessandfinancialliteracyprogramsontheperformanceoffemale-ownedbusinesses.
These studies also suggest the importance of utilizing multi-pronged methods. For example, providing
financial capitalalonehas impacton theperformanceof female-ownedbusinesseswhencombinedwith
income-generation training and follow-up activities (Buvinić et al. 2013).Moreover, larger sized female-
ownedbusinessesbenefitfromin-kindcapitalinjectionsbecausetheyaremorelikelytobeinvestedinthe
business (Buvinićetal.2013).Theexpansionof female-ownedbusinessesmayhaveaparticularly strong
impact on female employment because the female employment rates are higher in the firms ownedby
women,asthefindingsoftheWorldBankEnterpriseSurveysdemonstrate(Sattar2012).
IndustrialandoccupationalsegregationIndustrialandoccupationalsegregationbygenderisatypicalfeatureoflabourmarketsandCentralAsian
countries are no exception.Women’s employment tends to concentrate in health, education and social
services, a pattern established in Central Asia during the Soviet times. For example, the proportion of
women working in education and healthcare in total female employment varies from 27 percent in
Tajikistanto58percent inKyrgyzstan.Asa result,despite the lower femaleemploymentrates,women’s
presenceinthesesectorsisconsiderable.Forexample,inTajikistanwomenconstitute45percentoftotal
employment in education and 57 percent of total employment in healthcare. In Kyrgyzstan, these
proportions are even higher at 72 percent and 78 percent. Similarly, in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistanthefemalesharesineducationare69,74,and64percentandinhealthcare78,77,and70
percentofwageworkers,respectively.
Thesesectorsarepredominantlystate-financedandwomen’spresenceinthemisoftenconnected
totheprevalenceofwomeninthepublicsector.Indeed,whereastheshareofwomenintheprivatesector
employment stands at about 45 percent in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, their share in public
sector employment varies from 39 percent in Tajikistan, to 50 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 59 percent in
Kazakhstan (UNECEdatabase).However,evenwithinthepublic sector there isvariation.Forexample, in
20
stateorganizationsinTajikistanthefemaleshareis55.4percentinsocialassistanceprovisioning,butonly
19.8inthecustomsdepartment(StateCommitteeoftheRepublicofTajikistanonStatistics2010).
Despiteitsconsiderablesize,thefemaleshareinstatesectoremploymenthasdecreasedsincethe
collapse of the Soviet Union. This development has been accompanied by the increase in the female
presence amongNGOs (Ishkanian, 2003), reflecting aduality in thenatureof female involvement in the
public sector in the Central Asian countries. On the one hand, women are actively involved in the civil
society,but,ontheotherhand,thereseemstobeverylowawarenessoftheimportanceofparticipatingin
civil society, in particular in local budget processes, among women that are not in the labour force
(EsenalievandKisunko2015).
Conversely,women’spresenceintheprivatesectorhasincreasedoverthelasttwodecades.This
increasewasinpartdrivenbytheexpansionofthetradesectorandthepredominanceofwomenincertain
subcomponentsof it,suchasshuttletrading(USAID2010).Women’srolealso increasedinthehoteland
cateringsectors.Forexample,womenconstitute61and55percentofworkersintrade,hotelsandcatering
inKazakhstanandUzbekistan.ThecorrespondingfemalesharesinKyrgyzstanandTajikistanare45and34
percent(WomenandMenpublications).
Inadditiontoindustrialsegregationpatterns,verticalsegregationpatternstendtobeprevalentas
women are underrepresented in decision-making positions such as legislators, senior officials and
managers(Table3).Wehavediscussedthepresenceofverticalsegregationinagriculture.Itisalsoevident
inother sectorswith considerable femalepresence, suchaseducationandhealthcare, and in thepublic
sector.Forexample,whereas48percentofdeputydirectorsofsecondaryschoolsarewomen,thefemale
shareisonly31percentatthedirectorlevel(StateCommitteeoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonStatistics
2007). In Kyrgyzstan, in 2011, despite having higher skill level, only 29.1 percent of managers at state
institutions, organizations and enterprises were females (National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz
Republic2012,p.88).Theyarealsounderrepresentedamongplantandmachineoperatorsandassemblers
(Table1).Tosomedegree,thelatterfindingmaybeduetothelegislativeconstraintsontheengagement
ofwomenincertainoccupationsandindustries inCentralAsiancountries.Forexample, innoneofthese
countries are women allowed to work in construction, factories and mining the same way as men do
(WorldBank2015).
On the other hand, women are overrepresented among professionals and technicians in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Table 1). Reflecting their growing role in services and trade, they are also
overrepresentedamongclerksandserviceworkersandshopandmarketsalesworkers.
21
EducationThese patterns of industrial segregation are closely linked to the gender specialization ofwomen at the
tertiaryeducationlevel, itselfavestigeoftheSoviet legacy.Attheprimary level,schoolenrollmentrates
havebeengenerallyhighamongboysandgirls, according to theWorldBankdata (Figure11).However,
other sources reveal the emergence of worrisome gaps favoring boys already at the primary level. For
example, in2006, thegrossenrollment ratewas95.1percent forboysbutonly88.5percent for girls in
Kazakhstan(vanKlaverenetal.2010).Theenrollmentratesdropwithage,andmoresoamonggirlsthan
boys.InTajikistan,theboytogirlratioincreasesfrom99for10yearoldto120for16yearolds.By21years
of age, the enrollment rate of boys is 17 percent and for girls it is only 5.2 percent. The gender gap is
especiallywideinruralareas.Itisalsowideramongchildrenfromaffluentfamiliesbecauseboysfromwell-
offhouseholdsaremorelikelytostayinschoolcomparedtogirlswhereasinpoorhouseholdsenrollment
ratesdropwithageforbothboysandgirls.Evidenceindicatesthatmilitaryconflictsmayhavealsoplayeda
rolecontributingtothewideningofthegendergapinenrollmentrates.Forexample,Shemyakina(2011)
findsthattheCivilWarinTajikistanledtoadeclineintheeducationalattainmentofgirls.Re-emergenceof
traditionalnormsmaytoohavebeenafactor.Despitethesedifferencesintheeducationalattainmentand
the worsening sex ratio, however, there is no evidence that girls are discriminated against boys in
consumptionexpenditures(Pena2012).
Notably,testresultsoftheProgrammeforInternationalStudentAssessment(PISA)showthatgirls
tend to outperform boys in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,with the gap being smaller inmathematics and
22
larger in reading and science. However, the gap varies across the performance distribution: it is large
favouringgirlsatthelowerendandeitherdisappearsorfavoursboysamongthetop-performingchildren,
especiallyinmathematics.Ifitisthecasethattop-performingchildrenaremorelikelytoachievepositions
of power, the relatively stronger performance of boys at the top of the distribution can play a role in
perpetuatingmaledominanceinthepublicandprivatespheres(StoetandGeary2015).
At the tertiary level, women currently represent the majority of students in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan,similartoothercountriesoftheformerSovietUnionandthefemaletomaleenrollmentratio
has increased in recent years. This increase has been been particularly sharp in Kyrgyzstan, as the ratio
increasedfromparityat101.4percentto161.3between2000and2013.Complementingthisobservation,
Brϋck and Esenaliev (2013) find that, compared to older cohorts, youngwomen in Kyrgyzstan aremore
likelytoobtainhigherlevelsofeducationthantheirparents.
UnliketherestoftheformerSovietUnion,inTajikistan,Turkmenistan,andUzbekistan,itisyoung
menwhorepresentthemajorityofstudentsatthetertiary levelalthough inTajikistanandTurkmenistan
theratiooffemaletomaleenrollmenthasmovedclosertoparityinrecentyears.InTajikistan,itincreased
from44.8to61percentbetween2000and2014(WorldBank2013).InTurkmenistanitwentupfrom47
percent during 2000-2009 to 64 percent in 2014 (ILO 2010b). On the other hand, in Uzbekistan, it fell
sharply from 83.9 to 64.7 percent between 2000 and 2011, a worrisome development. Hence, there is
23
considerablevariationinthechangesinthefemaletomaleenrollmentratio,highlightingtheimportanceof
understandingcountry-specificcontext.
InallcountriesoftheCentralAsianregion,womenareconcentratedineducationandhealthcare
subjects, and somewhat less so in economics and social sciences. For example, in Kazakhstan, about 80
percentofgraduatesineducationandhealthcarearefemale(WomenandMenpublications).InKyrgyzstan,
these percentages are 80 and 66 (National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic 2012). In
Uzbekistan, the female shareof graduates in education is about60percent, inhealthcare it is about50
percent,andineconomicsandsocialsciencesit isonly24percent(theseshareshavebeendecreasingin
Uzbekistan).Reflectingtheoveralllowfemalesshareintertiaryeducation,inTajikistan,womenconstitute
only 39 percent of graduates in education, about 30 percent of graduates in healthcare, and only 24
percentofgraduates ineconomicsandsocial sciences9(StateCommitteeof theRepublicofTajikistanon
Statistics2010).Thesegenderpatternslargelymirrorindustrialandoccupationalsegregationpatterns.The
importanceofthisfactisunderscoredbythewell-establishedfindingthatgenderdifferencesinthefields
ofstudytranslateintogenderdifferencesinlabourmarketoutcomesintheformofindustrialsegregation
andgenderwagegaps(Flabbi2011).
Oneof themost pressing labourmarket challenges in theCentral Asian region lies in low youth
labourforceparticipation(Figure3)andhighyouthunemploymentrates.Inthiscontext,facilitatingschool
towork transition is seenasakeystep toaddressing thischallenge. InKyrgyzstan,youngmenaremore
likelytocompletetheschooltoworktransitionwhereasyoungwomenaremorelikelytowithdrawfrom
schoolandfromthelabourforcerightaftergraduatingtostartfamiliesandtakecareoftheirhouseholds
(Elderetal.2015).Over40percentofemployedyouthworksascontributing familyworkersprimarily in
agriculture, with higher shares among young women than young men and much higher than the 8.9
percent among working-age men and 19.1 percent among working-age women (Figure 6). In addition,
moreyoungworkersareengagedinirregularthanin“regular”work,i.e.workforpaywithacontractofat
leastoneyear inKyrgyzstanwithsharpgenderdifferences. Infact,only14.3percentofyoungwomenas
opposedto25.4percentofyoungmenareemployed inregularwork, the largestgapamongthe former
SovietUnioncountries(Elderetal.2015).Moreover,proportionatelymorewomenworkfewerhours:64.6
percentofmencomparedto50.6percentofwomenworkmorethan30hours.Finally,alargerproportion
ofyoungwomenthanmenareneitheremployednorineducationortraining(NEET):7.5percentofyoung
menand22.7percentof youngwomen, the second largest gapafterArmenia (Elderet al. 2015). These
9Referstotheproportionofcurrentlyenrolledstudents.
24
patterns present a picture of a highly underutilized young generation, in which labour-market-related
gendergapsareperpetuated.
PaygapsThe patterns of industrial segregation by gender and gender specialization in tertiary education have
contributed to the presence of gender wage gaps10in Central Asian countries. There is considerable
variation in the estimates depending on the earnings measure and the data source. For example, in
Tajikistan,theUNECEdatabaseindicatesthegapof50.9percentin2013(Table2).However,forthesame
year, itsvalue is46percentwhenusingthegenderearned incomegap(WEF2015).Accordingto Johnes
(2002),thegenderwagegapcontractedfrom55percenttoabout51percentbetween1999and2003.The
UNECE database suggests that it decreased further to 38.7 percent in 2008, before increasing to 50.9
percentby2011(UNECEdata).Wenotethatthe2003valueof51percentinJohnes(2002)issubstantially
higherthanthevalueof27.2percentreportedintheUNECEdatabase(Figure12).
AccordingtotheUNECEdataset,Kazakhstanstandsoutasacountrywithaverylowanddeclining
genderwagegapthatreached6.8percent in2012(Figure12,UNECEdata).However,anumberofother
sourcesfindthegenderwagegapinmonthlywagesisabove30percentandthatitdecreasedfrom39.3to
31.4percentbetween2003and2008 (vanKlaverenet al. 2010;MenandWomen inKazakhstan, 2011).
Using hourly wages the gap was 47.8 percent in 2003 (Staneva et al. 2010) and 19.4 percent in 2009
(Blunch2010).
10Wedefinethegenderpaygapasthedifferencebetweenmen’sandwomen’saverageearningsfromemploymentexpressedasapercentageofmen’saverageearnings.
25
On the other hand, the relatively stable gap observed in Kyrgyzstan between 2000 and 2010 is
confirmed by all available sources (National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic 2012; UNECE
database;WECF2014).Thegapincreasedfrom32.4percentin2000to36.4percentin2010,afterwhichit
sharplydropped.Morerecentevidence fromKyrgyzstan from2013points to the further loweringof the
genderearningsgap(includingself-employedworkers)toabout19percent(Andersonetal.2015).
ThereispaucityofdataonwagegapsinUzbekistanandTurkmenistan.Databasedonasurveyof
Turkmen self-employed individuals, which includes small business employers and own accountworkers,
indicatesthattheincomegapamongown-accountworkersisabout36percent(UNDP2008).Ontheother
hand,amongsmallbusinessowners,women’searningsare30percentmorethanmen’searnings.
Itisnotablethatthegenderwagegapappearstobesmalleramongyoungworkersintheregion.
For example, Baumann et al. (2013) find that the gap among young wage and salaried workers in
Kyrgyzstan is23percentandElderetal. (2015) indicate that it isnegligible.Hence,even though labour-
market-relatedgendergapsamongyoungworkersremainsubstantial,theremightbesomeindicationsof
changinggenderdynamics.
There is also variation by firm size. For example, in Kazakhstan, the gap is narrower at small
enterprisesthanatlargeenterprises,66.3percentversus89.8percent,whichismainlyexplainedbymen’s
wages in small enterprises being substantially lower than in large andmedium enterprises. In addition,
therearelargeregionaldifferencesinthemagnitudeofthegapfrom15.6percentinNorthKazakhstanto
50percentinMangistauskayaregion(MenandWomeninKazakhstan,2011).Similarly, inKyrgyzstan,the
gapvariesfrom26.6percentinBishkekto47percentinJalalAbadin2010(NationalStatisticalCommittee
oftheKyrgyzRepublic2012).
26
GenderwagegapsintheCentralAsiancountriesalsovarybyindustry.Forexample,inKazakhstan
thegaprangesfrom59percentinaccommodationandfoodservicesto91percentineducation.Moreover,
industrialsegregationhasbeenshowntocontributetothepresenceofthegenderwagegapinKazakhstan
(Van Klaveren et al. 2010). Similarly, in Turkmenistan UNDP (2008) attributes the gender gap among
entrepreneurstodifferentindustriesinwhichmenandwomenoperate.Andersonetal.(2015)findthatin
Kyrgyzstan in 2013 the higher proportion of women in wage employment contributed to widening the
genderearningsgap,likelytowomen’sstrongerpresenceinthelowerremuneratedpublicsector.
InTajikistan,notonly industrial segregationbutgenderdifferences ineducationandoccupations
alsocontributedtothegap.Ontheotherhand,inbothKazakhstanandKyrgyzstan,thegreaterproportion
ofwomenwith tertiary educationhas a contracting influenceon the gap. In fact, in Kazakhstan, gender
differences in endowments (e.g., industry, occupation, education, and experience) jointly reduce the
genderwagegap(Blunch2010)andoccupationalsegregationdoesnotcontributetoit(VanKlaverenetal.
2010).
Beyondtheanalysisofthegapatthemeanofthedistribution,thegenderwagegapisthehighest
attherighttailofthedistribution,potentiallyindicativeoftheglassceilingeffect(Andersonetal.2015).
Despiteconsiderablevariations in thegenderwagegapsandtheir trends, thecommonfinding is
thatthemajorityofthegapinCentralAsiancountriesisunexplained,arguablyduetounaccountedfactors
anddiscriminationinthelabourmarkets(Andersonetal.2015;AndersonandPomfret2003;Sattar2012).
There are several important caveats that must be taken into account when interpreting the
evidence on the gender earnings gaps. For example, gender gaps in monthly earnings are a common
measure of gender pay gap. However, thismeasure can overestimate themagnitudeof the gap to the
extent that women work fewer hours (Brainerd 1998). Moreover, gender pay gaps are commonly
measuredusingwageincomeofemployees.Assuch,theanalysisofgenderpaygapsprovideonlyapartial
pictureofthegenderearningsgaps incountries inwhichwageemployment isnotthedominantformof
employment, as is the case for most Central Asian countries (with the exception of Kazakhstan).
Furthermore, agriculture plays a sizable role in employment, employing more than a quarter of the
workforce, and its role is especially large in self-employment, for which themeasurement of income is
particularlyproblematic.
UnpaidworkandcareOne factor that has played a role in influencing women’s ability to engage in labour markets as wage
workersandentrepreneurs isunpaidworkconstraints.Similartoothercountries intheworld,womenin
27
CentralAsiacarrymostoftheburdenofdomesticandcareresponsibilities.Thisisclearlydemonstratedby
timeusesurveys,whichshedlightonthegenderdistributionofunpaidandpaidworktime.Womenspend
between 1.5 and 4 times as much time as men on unpaid work, with the gap being the lowest in
KazakhstanandhighestinUzbekistan(Table3).Ontheotherhand,menspendmoretimethanwomenon
paidworkandthegendergapinpaidworktimeissimilaracrosstheCentralAsianregion.Intotal,women
and men in Kazakhstan spend about the same amount of time working in paid and unpaid activities,
whereas in Kyrgyzstan,women spendbetween 10 and 20 percentmore timeworking thanmen, higher
thantheOECDaverageoffivepercent.
28
Perhapsnot surprisingly, ruralmenandwomenspendmore timeonunpaidworkactivities than
theirurbancounterparts(exceptforKazakhstan)butgendergapsinruralareasarelower(Table4;Meurs
and Slavchevska 2014). This finding does not necessarily imply a more equal sharing of household
responsibilitiesinruralareasbutrathermaybeareflectionofthegreaterdegreeofgenderspecialization
inunpaidworkactivities(Walkeretal.2014)aswomentendtospendmoretimeoncooking,cleaningand
carewhereasmenengageinhouseandpropertymaintenance.
Similartorural/urbandifferencesinotherdomesticresponsibilities,ruralwomeninKyrgyzstanand,
to some extent, in Uzbekistan spendmore time on childcare. However, the opposite holds in Tajikistan
(Table4).Thismaybebecausepoorinfrastructureconstrainstheirnon-carerelatedtimeuse(hencethey
spendmore timeonnon-careactivities),but, asa result, their care timesuffers (MeursandSlavchevska
2014). We note however that urban/rural comparisons in childcare have to be made with caution,
especiallywhenconsideringprimarychildcaretime.This isbecausetheshareofsecondarychildcare(i.e.,
childcare that takesplacewhileparents areprimarily involved inother activities)maybehigher in rural
areas if mothers are engaged in activities, such as tending to a garden plot, which better allow for
supervisorychildcare(Short,etal.2002).
Table4.Rural/UrbanBreakdownofTimeUse,DailyHours
rural urban
Men Women FMratio Men Women FMratio
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan(2005)GWANET Paidwork,nostudy 4.6 3.9 0.85 Unpaidwork,includingcare 1.3 2.9 2.23 Care 0.2 0.95 4.75 Total 5.95 6.8 1.13 Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan(2010) Paidworkandstudy 4.2 2.8 0.7 5.7 4.1 0.7Onlypaidwork,onlyemployed(p.85) 4.6 4.0 0.9 6.1 5.8 0.95Unpaidwork,includingcare 3.0 5.5 1.8 1.6 4.3 2.7Care 0.8 1.9 2.0 0.5 1.1 2.2Total 7.2 8.3 1.2 7.3 8.4 1.2 Kyrgyzstan(2005) Paidwork,nostudy 3.3 1.52 0.46 Unpaidwork,includingcare 2.3 4.97 2.16 Care 0.1 .89 8.90 Total 5.6 6.5 1.16
29
Tajikistan Tajikistan(2003) Paid work (employment, excludingsubsistenceagriculture) 3.5
1.8
Unpaidwork(houseworkonly) 5.5 6.5 Care 4.0 5.8 Total 9 8.3 Tajikistan(2007) Unpaidwork(housework,includingcare) 4.6 4.6 Care 0.9 1.6 Tajikistan(GWANET,2005) Paidwork(nostudy) 4.8 1.9 0.40 Unpaidwork,includingcare 1.6 5.3 3.31 Care 0.01 2.0 200 Total 6.4 7.2 1.1 Turkmenistan Turkmenistan(2005)GWANET Paidwork(includingdomesticplots) 5.7 3.2 0.56 Unpaidwork,includingcare 0.8 4.9 6.15 Care 0.1 1.35 13.1 Total 6.5 8.1 1.3 Uzbekistan Uzbekistan(2006) Unpaidwork,includingcare 0.95 4.02 4.2 1.1 3.93 3.6Care 0.37 1.00 2.7 0.37 0.93 2.5
Sources: Tajikistan: Meurs and Slavchesvka (2014) for 2003, GWANET (2005) for 2005, State Committee of theRepublicofTajikistanonStatistics(2010)for2007;Kyrgyzstan:NationalStatisticalCommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic(2012), p.120; Kazakhstan: GWANET 2005; Kyrgyzstan: GWANET for 2005 and workshop presentation for 2010;Turkmenistan: GWANET survey for 2005; Uzbekistan: State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics(2007);GWANETsurveyswereconducted in selected ruralareasandarenot representativeof ruralpopulations inthesecountries.
The extent to which care and domestic responsibilities constrain women’s engagement in
employmentandentrepreneurshipinthecountriesoftheCentralAsianregionneedscarefulassessment.
TheavailableevidencefromtheCentralAsianregionrevealsthattheshareofinactivewomenwhoreport
domesticresponsibilitiesastheprimaryreasonfortheirinactivityvariesfrom11percentinKazakhstanto
60.5percent inTajikistan(Figure13).Ontheotherhand,except forTajikistan, thisshare isnegligible for
men.Evenonceemployed,womencontinuetofacedomesticandcareresponsibilities.Thisisevidencedby
theirhighernumberof lostworkingdaysduetotemporarydisability,suchastakingcareofsickchildren
(seeMaltseva2007fortheevidenceonTajikistan).
30
Some of the country-based variation is likely due to the differences in the available social
infrastructureandtheaffordabilityofmarketsubstitutes.Forexample,OECD(2012)findsthatthe“lackof
supportformotherhoodishurtingwomen’scareerprospects,despitegainsineducationandemployment”
and “[c]ountrieswith the smallest gender gap inunpaidwork are thosewhichhave thehighest female
employment rates” (OECD 2012). One way of interpreting this finding is that by alleviating women’s
responsibilitiesand reducing thegap inunpaidwork, social infrastructuremaybe contributing to raising
women’semploymentrates.Indeed,thereappearstobeapositiverelationshipbetweenthefemalelabour
forceparticipationandtheavailabilityofchildcare inCentralAsia.Forexample,asteady increase inpre-
schoolenrollmentratesforchildrenunderthreefromthelowof4.5percentduring2001-2002schoolyear
to15percentin2012-2013inKazakhstanhasbeenassociatedwithanincreaseinthefemalelabourforce
participation rate. Nevertheless, this relationship is not clear-cut. In fact, Turkmenistan stands out as a
countrywith some of the lowest labour force participation rates in the region but some of the highest
enrollmentratesforpre-schoolchildren(Figure14).
31
The coverage also varies within the countries. For example, in Kazakhstan, whereas the overall
coverageratefor1-6year-oldswas26percentin2010,itwasonly7.6percentinAlmatinskayaregionand
ashighas54.4percent inPavlodarskayaregion(AgencyoftheRepublicofKazakhstanonStatistics2011,
p.64).InKyrgyzstan,thecoverageof1-6year-oldsin2010was14.5percentandwashigherinurbanareas
at29.9percentandunder8percent inruralareas(NationalStatisticalCommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic
2012).The latter findingmayappeartocontradict the lower female labour forceparticipationofwomen
observedinurbanareas.However,thelackofsocialinfrastructureinruralareasislesslikelytonegatively
influencefemaleinvolvementinthelabourmarket.Thisisbecauseagriculturalself-employment,whichisa
dominant form of employment in rural areas, may allow women to combine work with supervisory
childcare,somethingthatmaynotbepossiblewiththemoredominantwageemploymentinurbanareas
(Short et al. 2002). Nevertheless, rural women in Central Asia feel that improvements in social care
infrastructureandthe“creationofkindergartenswouldcreatemoreopportunitiesforthem”(WECF2014a).
Indeed, a comprehensive review of policies aimed at raising women’s economic empowerment
finds that programs providing access to affordable and reliable childcare, childcare subsidies, and public
childcare provisioning are an effective approach for improving women’s labour market outcomes and
earnings indeveloping and transitioneconomies (Buvinić et al. 2013). Evidence is also supportiveof the
employment-increasing impact of publicly provided pre-school programs (Haeck et al. 2015). Such
programmeshavetheadditionalbenefitofdirectemploymentcreationandtheaccompanyingincreasein
thedemandforsupportingjobs.İlkkaracanetal.(2015)andAntonopoulosandKim(2011)investigatethe
direct and indirect effects of social care sector expansion and find that it supports decent employment
creation,generatespro-womenjoballocation,andreducespoverty.Theeffectofchildcareprovisioningis
32
positivenotonlyonpaidfemaleemployment,butalsoonfemaleentrepreneurship,asitallowswomento
expandtheirbusinessesandhenceaddressthesmallsizeconstraint,whichisoneofthemainreasonsfor
the weaker performance of female-owned businesses (Johnson 2005, cited in Kabeer 2012). Therefore,
policies supporting the development of the childcare support network can play a considerable role in
increasingfemalewageemploymentandentrepreneurship.
MigrationA crucial coping strategy for dealing with the lack of income-earning opportunities, migration has
fundamentally shifted the labour market landscape of Central Asia countries and affected its gender
balance. Initially, thecollapseof theSovietUnionwasassociatedwiththemovementofethnicRussians
out of Central Asia and forcedmigration triggered bymilitary conflicts. But over the last two decades,
labourmigrationhasbecomeitsdominantform,withtheRussianFederationthemainrecipientcountry,
followed by Kazakhstan. These flows can be explained by growing populations combined with limited
employmentopportunities inKyrgyzstan,TajikistanandUzbekistan,andcontractingpopulationstogether
with labour shortages in some sectors of the economies of Kazakhstan and Russia. Within countries,
regionswithhigherpovertytendtohavehighermigrationrates,underscoringthepushnatureofmigration.
NetmigrationfromKazakhstanisrelativelysmallbecauseoflargemigrantin-flowsfromotherCentralAsia
countries. The net migration rate in 2009 was 3.3 per 1,000 of population (55,000 out-migrating) (van
Klaveren,etal.2010).Ontheotherhand,inUzbekistan,bysomeestimates,7-8percentofthelabourforce
aremigrantsworking abroad. In Kyrgyzstan, 14 percent of households in 2007had at least onemigrant
householdmember,primarily inthesouthernpartofthecountry. InTajikistan,37percentofhouseholds
hadatleastonemigrantmember,with98percentofmigrantsworkingintheRussianFederation(Golunov,
2008). As a result, remittance flows have become a lifeline sustaining domestic economies, a fact that
becamealltoovisibleduringthe2008financialcrisis,duringwhichremittanceflowsdwindled,worsening
therecessioninthesecountries.Thecurrentvolumeofremittancesremainsconsiderable,at49percentof
GDPinTajikistan,29percentinKyrgyzstan,and13percentinTajikistan(Anichkova2012).11
Until recently, labour migration from Central Asia has been primarily viewed as a male
phenomenon,duetothenatureofdemandinhostcountriesandthedominant“malebreadwinner”family
model inCentralAsia.Forexample,about40percentofmigrantworkersinRussiawereemployedinthe
male-dominatedconstructionin2007,followedby19percent intrade,and14percent inagricultureand
foodprocessing(FederalMigrationServiceoftheRussianFederation).Asaresult,bysomeestimates,95.3
11DataforTurkmenistanisunavailable.
33
percentofmigrantsfromTajikistantoRussiaaremale(Golunov,2008;Abdulloevetal.2014).AmongTajik
migrantstoRussiaandKazakhstan,bysomeestimates,88percentaremen,oftenseasonalworkersleaving
inthespringandreturninginthewinter,andthemajorityofKyrgyzmigrantsaremen(WECF2014).
However, official estimates for 2010 indicate that 49.6 of migrants were women (National
Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic 2012, p.56). The 2008 crisis contributed to the rise in the
proportionoffemalemigrants.Inparticular,asremittanceflowstoTajikistanfellby30percent,theshare
of women among Tajik migrants almost doubled from 6.61 percent in 2007 to 13.01 percent in 2009
(Danzer and Ivaschenko 2010). This has been in part attributed to the increased household need to
diversifyincomesources.
In addition, recent trends show the increased feminization of migrant flows due to the rising
demandforservice-sectorjobsandtherecession-induceddropinconstructionemployment.Inparticular,
thedemandfordomesticandcareworkersincreasedwithwomenbeingtheiroverwhelmingmajority–90
percent in Russia and 74 percent in Kazakhstan (Karachurina et al. 2014), including both internal and
foreignmigrants. A large proportion ofmigrant domesticworkers are undocumented. For example, the
shareofmigrantdomesticworkerswithvalidmigrationcardswas61percentinRussiaandonly42percent
inKazakhstan.
In part for this reason, female shares in total stock ofmigrants are believed to be substantially
underestimated.Forexample,officialestimatessuggestthatwomencomprise14percentofmigrantflows
inRussia(FederalMigrationServiceoftheRussianFederation),butothersourcesputthefigurecloserto
30 percent (Tyuryukanova 2011). Women are more likely to be employed informally without official
contractsnotonlyindomesticworkbutinalloccupations.EvidencesuggeststhatwhereasmigrantTajik
womeninRussiaaremorelikelytoregisterthanmen(83.3percentversus74.7percent),theyarelesslikely
to engage in employment with a written contract (73.3 percent of females do not have a contract,
compared to 25.6 percent of men) (ILO 2010a). Women are also more likely to be victims of human
trafficking,remaininglargelyinvisibleinofficialstatistics.Therefore,differentanalyticaltoolsareneededto
bettercapturetheirsituation(UNIFEM2009).
Migrants from Central Asia tend to be engaged in unskilled occupations. This can be in part
explainedbythenatureoflabourdemandintherecipientcountriesand,increasinglyso,bythelowerskills
compositionofmigrants.Inrecentyears,theproportionofmigrantswithtertiaryeducationdroppedfrom
21 percent in 2002 to only 12 percent in 2011 (EDB andUNDP 2015) Indeed, studies demonstrate that
migrationisthemorelikelyoutcomeforlow-skilledworkersinTajikistanwhereasprofessionalworkersare
more likely to engage in informal activities (Abdulloev et al. 2012). However, the characteristics of the
34
labourdemandinrecipientcountriesplayacrucialrole.Forexample,eventhoughmanyfemalemigrants
have higher or vocational education, they are employed in low-skilled occupations in domestic work
(UNIFEM,2009). Indeed,domesticworkers are among themost educated labourmigrants inRussia and
Kyrgyzstan(Karachurinaetal.2014).Atthesametime,thereappeartobeparticularnichesinhigh-skilled
occupationsthatmigrantshavesuccessfullyentered.Forexample, labourmigrantsfromKazakhstantend
to be high-skilledworkers,many ofwhomwork in themanufacturing sector in Siberia (Golunov, 2008).
Kyrgyz doctors have increasingly migrated to Russia in search of better earnings opportunities
(Mambetalieva,2007).
Althoughmigrationhasbeenacopingresponsetopoorlabourmarketenvironment,ithasinturn
profoundly affected labour markets in Central Asian countries and their gender balance. For example,
migrantremittances inTajikistanhavebeenshowmto increasetheprobabilityofmaleself-employment,
withoutanyimpactonfemaleemployment.Thispotentiallyimpliesthatmenarebetterabletocapitalize
on remittances than women (Piracha et al. 2013). At the same time, however, male labour force
participation rates and work hours in Tajikistan decrease due to migration more so than their female
counterparts(Abdulloevetal.2014;JustinoandShemyakina2012).
Migrationhasalsohadimplicationsforhouseholddynamics.Forexample,womenhavepickedupa
greater shareof thehousehold responsibilitiespreviously carriedoutby themigranthouseholdmember
(asevidencefromMoldovasuggests,Görlichetal.2007).Duetomigration,womeninCentralAsiatakeon
tasks such as “fieldworks, animal care, children upbringing, and household chores” (WECF 2014a) and
women in households abandoned by migrants are more involved in unpaid work activities than other
women(OSCE2012).
The impact ofmigration on individual and householdwell-being has beenmulti-faceted.On the
one hand, it has played a substantial role in reducing poverty. For example, migrant remittances have
reducedpovertyratesintheKyrgyzRepublicby6-7percentagepoints(UNDP2015)andplayedapositive
roleinchildgrowthinTajikistanbyimprovingthenutritionalintakeofhouseholds(AzzariandZezza2011).
InTajikistanwomeninhouseholdswithmigrantshaveachievedhigherlevelsofeducation(Abdulloevetal.
2014).
However,migrationhasalsohaddisruptiveeffectsonfamily life,withasymmetricgender impact
onmigrantsandfamilymemberswhostaybehind.Between230,000and288,000householdsinTajikistan
can be considered economically abandoned and live at or below the poverty line, and more than 70
percentofthemconsistofmarriedwomenwithchildren(OSCE2012).Upto30percentofmarriedmigrant
men from Tajikistan do not return home (IOM 2009). Themajority of abandonedwomen report being
35
worseoff as a resultof their spouses’migrationandare twiceas financially vulnerableasotherwomen
(OSCE2012).Even inhouseholds thateconomicallybenefit frommigration,children’spsychologicalwell-
beinghasbeenaffectedbytheabsenceofaparent(UNICEF2011).
Thisevidencehighlights the complexity in theway inwhichmigrationhas influenced thegender
dynamicsoflabormarketsandhouseholdwell-beinginCentralAsiancountries.
SocialInstitutions,LegislativeFrameworkandPolicy-MakingUnderlyingthegenderinequalitiesinlabourmarketsaresocialnormsandcustoms.Normsonfemalerole
in the household and male role as breadwinners affect women and men’s labour market participation
choices, thetypesof jobs theyseek,andtheirability toestablishandrun firms.Forexample,morethan
halfofmenandmorethanathirdofwomeninCentralAsiancountriesbelievethatwhenjobsarescarce,
menshouldhavemorerighttoajobthanwomen(Figure15).Closetoathirdormoreofmenandwomen
believethatifawomanearnsmorethanherhusbandthismaycausemaritalstrife;closetohalformoreof
men andwomen believe thatmenmake better business executives. Notably, women tend to hold less
conservativeviewsthanmen.TheseproportionsaresubstantiallyhigherinUzbekistanthaninKazakhstan
andKyrgyzstan,indicativeofitsmoretraditionalnorms.Suchattitudestowardsgenderrolesinsocietyare
bound to influencemen andwomen’s labourmarket choices asworkers and entrepreneurs, potentially
reinforcinggenderinequalitiesdemonstratedinthisanalysis.
36
Addressing these inequalitieswill require strong politicalwill and greater female involvement in
public life.Asalready indicated,womenhavebeenactiveparticipants in thenon-governmentalsectorof
CentralAsiansocieties,takingoncausessuchasmaternalhealthcare,businesstraining,andclimatechange
(Ishkanian, 2003). But implementing these changes will necessitate greater female participation in the
political process,whichwomenhaveeschewed inpart due to social norms, aspolitics are viewed tobe
“men’s work” and corrupt (Ishkanian, 2003). Most people also believe that men make better political
leadersthanwomen–forexample,about70percentofmenand58percentofwomenholdthisviewin
KazakhstanandKyrgyzstan.InUzbekistan,consistentwithotherobservedpatterns,theseproportionsare
evenhigher,82percentofmenand72percentofwomensubscribingtothisview(Figure16).
Asaresult,althoughno legal restrictionsexist,during2000-2014theproportionofseatsheldby
women in parliaments was below the average for the Europe and Central Asia region (Figure 17).
Nevertheless,thisfigureincreasedand,by2014itwasatorabovetheECAaverageintwooutofthefive
countries. At the ministerial level, the proportion of women is considerably below the ECA average.
However, similar to female parliamentarians, the proportion of female ministers has increased in all
countriesofCentralAsia(Figure18).Thesearepositivedevelopmentalthoughitremainstobeseenhow
sustainabletheywillbe.
37
Instatestructures,thetypesofpositionsthatmenandwomenholdvary.Forexample,in2011,in
Kyrgyzstan,thefemaleshareofcivilservantsinthestatesectorwasarespectable39.8percent.But40.6
percent of thesewomenwere in administrative positions and only 25.5 percent in political and special
positions(NationalStatisticalCommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic2012).Atthemunicipal level, thefemale
shareis33.1percent–withonly4.2percentofwomeninpoliticalmunicipalpositionsand34.8percentin
administrativemunicipal positions.Out of 48ministries and agencies, 26hadnowomen in political and
specialpositions(NationalStatisticalCommitteeoftheKyrgyzRepublic2012,p.105).InTajikistan,in2008,
outof23ministriesandagencies, the femaleshare insupervisory/managerialpositionswas less than10
percentin11ofthemandfivehadnowomenatall.
38
FurtherreinforcinggenderinequalitiesinCentralAsiaisgender-relateddiscriminatorylegislationin
the labourmarket,which itself canbe shapedbyperceptionsaboutgender rolesand in somecases isa
remnantoftheSovietpast(Tables5and6).UzbekistanistheonlyCentralAsiancountry,whichhasthelaw
that mandates equal remuneration for work of equal value and nondiscrimination based on gender in
hiring (Table5).Furthermore,all countriesof the regioncontain legislation thatplace restrictionson the
typeofjobsinwhichwomenworkinallCentralAsiancountriesaswomencannotdothesamejobsasmen
ordothesamejob-relatedtasksasmen.TheserestrictionsarelinkedtotheSoviet-eralabourregulations
preventingwomenfromengagingin“unsuitable”andhazardousoccupations.WorldBank(2016)findsthat
theyhavecontributedtoloweringwomen’searningspotentialintheregionand,asaresult,tothegender
wagegapinearnings.
Finally,incorporatingamorenuancedandevidence-basedunderstandingofgenderdynamicsinto
policy-making can be crucial in more effectively reducing gender inequalities. For example, household-
based analyses of poverty often overlook gender asymmetries in resource allocationwithin households.
39
UsingthecaseofTajikistan,FalkinghamandBaschieri(2009)demonstratethat, iftraditionsallowmento
retainevenaportionoftheirwageincome,gendergapsinpovertyrateswiden:a20percentretentionof
men’swageincomeresultsinwomenexperiencingapovertyrate10percentagepointshigherthanthatof
men.Hence,poverty-reductionstrategieswouldneedtobroadentheirtargetpopulationtoincreasetheir
effectiveness.Moreover,changinggenderdynamicswillrequireacomprehensiveapproachthataccounts
forhouseholddynamicsindecision-making.Forexample,MeursandGiddings(2012)highlightthatisfairly
common in Central Asia for the eldestwoman in the household to be influential in choosing healthcare
servicesthatexpectantmothersreceive.Therefore,policiesaimedatimprovingmaternalhealthoutcomes
musttargetnotonlypregnantwomenbuttheirhouseholdsaswell.
SocialprotectionsystemsGenderinequalities in labourmarketsareintegrallyconnectedwithgenderdifferencesinaccesstosocial
protectionsystems.LargeinformalsharesoftheeconomiesofCentralAsiacoupledwithstrongmigration
outflowshaveputconsiderablestrainoncontributorypensionschemesandhaveledtolargepartsofthe
populationnotbeingcoveredbysocialprotectionschemes. In fact, thecoverageofsocialassistanceand
social insuranceprogrammes inCentralAsiahasbeen limitedcomparedtoothercountriesoftheformer
SovietUnion. It is thehighest in Kazakhstan,with 31percentof population coveredby social assistance
programmes and 28 percent covered by social insurance programmes (e.g. pensions). However, in
Kyrgyzstan,theseproportionsareonly8.5percentand30.5percent,andinTajikistan,theyare10percent
and34percent,respectively. Inadditiontothe largesizeofthe informalsector,the lowcoverage isalso
duetoagriculturalworkersindehkansbeingoutsideofthesocialprotectionsystem(Mikkonen-Jeanneret
et al. 2016). Furthermore, the poverty and inequality-reducing impact of social assistance and social
insurance programmes in Kazakhstan and especially in Tajikistan has been small. The small impact in
Tajikistanhasbeenattributed toboth inadequate resourcesandpoor targeting (WorldBank2014b).On
theotherhand,Kyrgyzstanachievedamodest41percentreduction inthepovertyheadcountratiofrom
socialinsuranceschemes(WorldBankAspiredatabase).
Migration remittances have buffered the poor state of social protection infrastructure, as have
traditional informal safety nets, such as mahalla. However, these arrangements must not serve as a
substitute for a formal social protection system whose mandate is to ensure effective and targeted
coverage.
WomenandmeninCentralAsiafacedifferentconstraintsinaccessingandutilizingresourcesand
in participating in labourmarkets. In particular, their pensions are affected by their lower labour force
40
participationrates,involvementinlow-remuneratedserviceindustries,andhighratesofself-employment
inagricultureascontributing familyworkers.Furthermore, limitedchildcareprovisioning inCentralAsian
countries may be another contributing factor, preventing women from participating in formal wage
employment and further limitingwomen’s access to social protection (FAO2015). Therefore, thedesign
andimplementationofsocialprotectionprogrammesshouldacknowledgetheseconstraints.
ConclusionsThis paper has demonstrated that gender inequalities in labourmarkets remain pervasive and, in some
cases, have worsened in Central Asian economies. Proportionately fewer women participate in labour
marketsandtheyaremore likely toengage inprecarious formsofemployment. Incountrieswithahigh
shareofagriculturalemployment,womenareover-representedascontributing familyworkers.Theyare
also substantially less likely to be entrepreneurs and to hold land titles. They face greater barriers in
accessingcreditandhaveweakernetworks.Migration inCentralAsiahasbeenamalephenomenon,but
recentevidencepointstowardsitsincreasedfeminization.
Reducingthesegenderinequalitiesmustbecomeapriorityforallcountriesintheregioniftheyare
toachieveinclusivegrowth,humandevelopmentandprogresstowardstheSustainableDevelopmentGoals.
Theachievementofthesegoalswillrequireacomprehensiveevidence-basedstrategythatexpandshuman
choicesandcapabilitiesbycomplementingsupply-sideinterventionswithdemand-sidemeasuresaimedat
creating equitable and gainful employment opportunities. Indeed, activemeasures to enhancewomen’s
economicempowermentshouldbeofcentralconcerntothepolicydialogueaimedatinclusivegrowthand
povertyandinequalityreduction(Çagatay1998).Suchastrategyshouldincludethefollowingelements:
1. Improve theproductivity andworking conditionsof agriculture and rural economy:a large
proportion of the workforce in Central Asia is employed in agriculture and in rural areas,
working long and unpredictable hours, in unsafe conditions of typically low wages and
productivity.Womeninruralareasareproportionatelymorelikelytobe[unpaid]contributing
familyworkers. They are also less likely to hold land titles and have limited decision-making
power. Improving the agricultural productivity,wages andworking conditions, andwomen’s
accessto landwillbeakeytochangingthegendergaps inemploymentcomposition inrural
areas(SDG2).
2. Address gender gaps in education at primary, secondary and tertiary levels and high
specializationbysubjectsintertiaryeducation:Investmentsingirls’educationandnurturinga
41
gender-balancedsystemoftertiaryeducationwillbevitalforreducinggender-basedindustrial
andoccupationalsegregation(SDG4;SDG8).
3. Improve women’s access and skills for entrepreneurship: all countries of Central Asia will
benefit from efforts that promote women’s access to networking opportunities; facilitate
women’saccesstocreditthroughinnovativefinancingandtomarketinformationandtraining
innewanddigitaltechnologies;andimprovewomen’sskillsandcapacitiestostartanddevelop
theirbusinesses(SDG8).
4. Remove legal and regulatory barriers to women’s economic empowerment: although
substantialprogresshasbeenmade,pervasivegender-basedoccupationalrestrictionsremain,
preventingwomenfromengaginginemploymentandentrepreneurship(SDG10).
5. Implement policies to address women’s care and domestic responsibilities to promote
decent employment opportunities, increase productivity and earnings: reducing women’s
burden of unpaid care to promote their participation in the labour market and in
entrepreneurshiphastobeanintegralpartofastrategytoreducegenderinequality(SDGs5,
8).
6. Placelabourmigrationandremittances,andtheirgenderedimplicationsatthecenterofthe
nationalpolicymakingagenda(SDGs5,8,10,and17).
7. Rebuild social protection systems able to play a transformative role in accompanying
women’sparticipationtotheformaleconomy.
8. Support efforts to ensure that an equitable proportion of women are elected and/or
appointedtogovernment leadershippositions throughout theregion.Ensuringthatwomen
participate proportionately in the political process and in leadership positions is essential to
addressing genderdisparities in the region. In addition, efforts shouldbemade to invite the
participation of women in elected and/or appointed positions who reflect the demographic
compositionoftheconstituenciestheyserve.
9. Strengthen national capacities to generate and use sex- and age-disaggregated data for
gender analysis: this is necessary to design gender-responsive macro-economic and social
policyandprogrammes. It isparticularly important toaddress thegapsondataon timeuse.
National statistical agencies must improve data collection to allow full mainstreaming of
genderinmacroeconomicpoliciesandmakethedataaccessible(SDGs5,17).
42
10. Includeastrongimpactevaluationelementinproposedpolicies:impactevaluationelements
(environmental, social and gender) need to be incorporated into policy design. Impact
evaluationsarekeytoprovidingnewevidence-basedpolicyframeworksforgenderequality.
11. Addressandcombatgenderstereotypes:fosteringtrustinwomen’scapabilitiesandbuilding
their confidence is key to gender-transformative social change. It is important to support
culturalcampaignsagainstsexiststereotypesofwomenaswellasmentogeneratebehavioural
patternsthattranscendtraditionalgenderrolesandresult inamoreequitabledistributionof
responsibilities and leadership between the sexes in the workplace, at home and in the
community. Promotingwomen in visible positions of seniority and decision-making in public
andprivatespheres,aswellasencouragingmenintraditionallyfemaleprofessions,arekeyto
changingsocialnormsandeliminatinggenderbiasesinsocial,economicandpoliticalspheres.
43
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49
AppendixTableA1.GenderInequalityIndexanditscomponents,2014
Gender InequalityIndex
Maternalmortalityratio
Adolescentbirthrate
Share ofseats inparliament
Population with atleast some secondaryeducation(%ages25andolder)
Labour force participationrate(%ages15andolder)
Value Rank
(deathsper100,000livebirths)
(births per1,000women ages15–19)
(% held bywomen) Female Male Female Male
Country 2014 2014 2013 2010/2015 20142005–2014
2005–2014 2013 2013
Kazakhstan 0.267 52 26 29.9 20.1 95.3 98.8 67.7 77.9
Uzbekistan .. .. 36 38.8 16.4 .. .. 48.1 75.6
Kyrgyzstan 0.353 67 75 29.3 23.3 94.5 96.8 56.0 79.5
Tajikistan 0.357 69 44 42.8 15.2 95.1 91.2 58.9 77.1
Turkmenistan .. .. 61 18.0 25.8 .. .. 46.9 76.9
World 0.449 — 210 47.4 21.8 54.5 65.4 50.3 76.7
Source:UNDP(2015)
TableA2.GenderDevelopmentIndex(GDI)anditscomponents,2014.
GenderDevelopmentIndex
HumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)
Life expectancy atbirth(years)
Expected years ofschooling(years)
Mean years ofschooling(years)
Estimated grossnational income percapita(2011PPP$)
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Kazakhstan 1.0015 0.7865 0.7853 74.1 64.6 15.4029 14.6539 11.3300 11.5400 15408.17 26746.30
Kyrgyzstan 0.9614 0.6379 0.6635 74.6 66.6 12.6894 12.3371 10.4802 10.5500 2122.02 3991.84
Uzbekistan 0.9451 0.6404 0.6777 71.8 65 11.2728 11.7433 9.5000 9.9000 3810.68 7341.85
Tajikistan 0.9260 0.6000 0.6479 73.2 66.2 10.4981 11.9683 9.5650 11.1904 2014.24 3016.66
Turkmenistan .. .. .. 69.9 61.5 10.5543 11.0472 .. .. 8725.06 17551.53
World 0.9236 0.6697 0.7250 73.66637 69.45568 12.1858 12.3960 6.2084 7.8544 10296.19 18372.57
Source:UNDP(2015)
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