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NIKK Occasional paper no. 4, 1999. Reprint 2001, 2002.

Eva Magnusson

Gender Equality in

Many Different Versions Patterns in political gender equality

rhetoric in the Swedish 1990’s

Work in progress #1 in the joint Nordic research project

Nordic Gender Equalities Between Rhetorics and Practice: Studies of changes in private and public conceptions of modern gender equality politics

Eva Magnusson

Gender Equality in

Many Different Versions Patterns in political gender equality

rhetoric in the Swedish 1990’s

Work in progress #1 in the joint Nordic research project

Nordic Gender Equalities Between Rhetorics and Practice: Studies of changes in private and public conceptions of modern gender equality politics

Co-workers in the project during 1999:

Eva Magnusson, psychology, NIKK, Oslo; Malin Rönnblom, political science, Umeå;

Anne Maria Holli, political science, Helsinki; Guro Karstensen, linguistics, NIKK, Oslo.

In the nordic reference group: Beatrice Halsaa, political science, Oslo/Lillehammer;

Dorte Marie Søndergaard, psychology, Roskilde; Maud Eduards, political science,

Stockholm; Harriet Silius, sociology/women’s studies,Turku.

Gender Equality in Many Different Versions: Patterns in

political

gender equality rhetoric in the Swedish 1990’s

Eva Magnusson

NIKK, Nordic Institute for Women’s Studies and Gender Research, Oslo

Abstract

Because gender equality politics seem so advanced and uniform in the Nordic countries, it is

of some interest to study systematic variations in justification strategies and discursive

commitments in political texts arguing for gender equality. This article looks at the variety

of “versions” of gender equality that appear when one takes apart the discourses of gender

that inform political party documents on gender equality. Sweden is here chosen as the first

example, in a comparative study to cover all the Nordic countries. Consequences of different

gender equality versions for rhetoric about policy measures are also studied.

“Gender equality”1 in the Nordic countries today is characterized by the fact that

everybody is in favour of it, almost regardless of political affiliation. Few politicians

today would care to tell their constituencies that they oppose equality between

women and men. Seeing that all political parties emphasize “gender equality” as one

of their goals, there may perhaps be cause to reflect on whether they all mean the

same thing when using the concept. And if they do not, there are probably lessons to

be learned by studying the variations in how politicians are in favour of gender

equality, i.e. the different ways they speak about, write about, and argue for, their

opinion. Such studies are important, first, to map the different landscapes where

gender equality is concerned, but perhaps even more to learn more about processes

that mediate between structural levels in society, and further or hinder positive

developments. In a one-country study about to be expanded to the other Nordic

countries, I have addressed some of these issues by studying texts in which Swedish

politicians argue for gender equality. My focus has been on rhetoric, i.e. how

politicians reason and argue in favour of gender equality and what kinds of

arguments they bring forward. I have also studied the consequences – in the texts –

of different types of arguments. This study is part of a joint Nordic research project

studying changes in public and private understandings of “gender equality” during

the last three decades.

As has been shown in previous research (Bergqvist et al, 1999), and as will be

apparent in this article, arguments and rhetorical strategies vary greatly between

politicians, also when brought forward under identical headings. For individuals

encountering such rhetoric in their daily life, this kind of complexity may create real

practical and psychological complications, the manifestations of which have been

repeatedly seen in previous studies (cf. Magnusson, 1997; 1998). Here, I will try to

bring to life some of that complexity.

1 The expression “gender equality” is an English translation of the terms “jämställdhet” (Swedish), and

“likestilling/ligestilling” (Norwegian/Danish), used to designate politics and policies to further equality

between women and men.

Gender equality: a contested concept

Gender equality has not been an undisputed concept in the Nordic countries over the

last few decades. Opinions and notions about it vary enormously, and for several

reasons, many people are sceptical about using it. Feminists (myself included) are

wary about using ”gender equality” analytically, since it has often functioned as a

”neutral” and ”neutralizing” concept, built on the notion that treating women and

men ”similarly” will lead to similar results. Power then tends to evaporate from the

analysis. Also, discussing gender inequality may sometimes hide other inequalities.

Antifeminists often think ”gender equality” has gone too far now, and that it is time to

really start taking ”sex differences” seriously – as seen for example in discussions

about differences in brain hemispheres and hormones. A-feminists (those who are not

committed either way) today are generally geared more into individual freedom, and

often feel that making sex category relevant the way it is done in gender equality talk

is old-fashioned, or plainly boring.

Although the term gender equality may be seen by many as depoliticized,

uninteresting or passé, it is used frequently, and the issues around which it moves are

high on the public agendas. In Swedish mass media, for instance, discussions about

sex differences and gender equality have been quite prominent for some time, as

when Government authorities int the spring of 1999 issued a book for high school

graduates on ”living together” as grown-ups. The book strongly featured opinions on

”the differences between women and men and how to live with them”. This evoked

an intense debate in, and outside, the mass media, on the meanings of ”sex

differences”. Many critics claimed that the book, through emphasizing notions of

”natural” sex differerences, was giving credence to inequality between women and

men (Gothlin, 1999).

In the institutionalized political life in the Nordic countries the term gender

equality has a firm standing. It has been a part of the ”Nordic profile” in politics for

some decades now. Gender equality is a fairly frequent topic in party-political

rhetoric and legislation and in other kinds of political documents. There are several

institutions and other societal structures geared towards developing and

implementing gender equality policies. In these various contexts the term is often

used in ways that give it several meanings and make it serve several purposes;

sometimes seemingly contradictory ones. Such inconsistencies in meanings, uses and

consequences deserve to be interrogated, for instance by highlighting the variety of

conceptualizations that are active simultaneously on the political scene, as well as

some of the various political and other uses to which the concept is put.

Political definitions of gender equality

Political scientists in the Nordic countries divide the political arguments for gender

equality into three types, a typology that is useful as a background for my analyses of

political texts (Rönnblom, 1997). The first type of argument is based on justice

considerations, and is called the rights argument. It generally only considers the

public sphere: All citizens ought to have the same rights and duties in the political

arena. When women, being half of humanity, constitute half of those who vote, as

well as of those who are elected to political assemblies, then they have half of the

political power, and society is seen as equitable. Women have the right to be present

in representative numbers in politics, and when they have achieved this presence,

justice has been reached.

The second type is the resource argument: Women are seen as contributing

something to politics that has previously been absent, and therefore getting more

women into politics will change both the form and the substance of politics. There

will be change at all levels, since women will put new (and hitherto ”unpolitical”)

issues on the political agenda, and they will bring in new ways of dealing with old

and new issues. The focus in this argument is very much on women as different from

men.

In the third type, the interest argument, women are seen as necessary in politics,

because women and men as groups have different and sometimes contradictory

interests. Women are necessary not simply as complementary to men, but because

men as a group cannot represent women as a group. This argument is sometimes

divided in two, by arguing that women as a group have a common formal or

procedural fairness interest in wanting to take part in politics, but that this does not

mean that all women have common substance or content interests. That is, women

are not necessarily always in agreement on major political issues, since women are

diverse and different, and are to be found in all segments of society. This argument

makes gender politically relevant in ways that the other two do not; in the focus on

power that it necessitates, and the definitions of power – as interpretative prerogative,

for instance – that it invites.

As a starting point for detailed analyses of texts, this theoretical division in three

kinds of gender equality works well. When analyzing political texts containing more

detailed and specific arguments, however, the ”defining” has to take place at a

different level. I have here chosen to let practice – in this case how politicians

actually use the term ”gender equality” in their texts – provisionally outline the

boundaries of the concept.

Method: materials and analyses

This article presents results from a study of rhetorically used versions of ”gender

equality” in documents written explicitly to show political party lines on gender

equality politics. The authors are party officials; Government ministers, party

chairpersons, or members of the Swedish parliament, and leaders of the youth

organizations of the same parties. In some cases the author is anonymous, as in party

programs and some party parliamentary bills. The texts represent the seven parties in

the Swedish parliament. The documents I have studied are parliamentary bills on

gender equality by the political parties, an anthology on gender equality written by

high party representatives (Socialdemokratiska studentförbundet, 1996), journal

articles in mainstream party journals (see the list of sources). All the texts are

reasonably easy to find, and they all argue for gender equality. The main criteria for

selection have been that the texts can be seen as representing the opinions of the

author’s party, that they are contemporary, i.e. from the middle or the second half of

the 1990’s, and that they argue for, rather that just proclaim about, gender equality.

The last criterion excludes texts that simply state that a party is ”in favour of” gender

equality but does not anchor this stance in any discussion or argument. No single

political party is likely to be ”totally” represented here, since I have not addressed all

ongoing debates in mass media, etc., but concentrated the analysis to central party

material of various kinds. My ambition has been to bring out the types of arguments

active in Swedish party political rhetoric on gender equality today, and to study and

systematize the patterns of variability in its written rhetorical forms.

Diversity has been the analytical goal

When reading the texts, I have focused on statements about what the author thinks

gender equality means, why gender equality is desirable, how sex/gender is construed

by the author – for instance notions of masculinity and femininity – and finally on the

presence or absence of arguments about power connected to gender. I have aimed to

find and enhance diversity in statements and arguments, rather than to sort them in a

smaller number of overall categories. The reason for this strategy was that although

many statements could be roughly categorized according to the three classical

political arguments for gender equality (the rights argument, the resource argument,

the interest argument) many statements could not be so categorized. Also, many were

connected to the standard political arguments only at the most abstract levels of

reasoning. In arguments on more practical levels, there was much greater variety, and

I felt this to be worthy of further investigation.

Mapping a concept by studying the diversity of its uses is one way to explore its

limitations and contradictions: where does ”gender equality” in practice begin and

end? Also, variability in the sense of treating the characteristics of gender equality as

capable of varying independently might to be a way to perhaps uncouple some

logical and strategical problems with the standard arguments for it (Becker, 1998). It

may perhaps help us to new ways of seeing these problems and the versions of the

concept with which they are especially connected. A focus on actual variety in

discourses and practices may thus be useful as an analytical strategy to define

empirically a concept via the different ways in which it is being used. This may help

in the elaboration and de-homogenization of a concept such as gender equality,

which is historically new, and about which there is generally little agreement among

politicians in different parts of the political landscape, whenever they leave the

proclamatory levels (Bergqvist et al, 1999).

A multitude of versions of gender equality

The article is centered around the different aspects of gender equality that my

analytical strategies turned up as the most prominent in the texts analyzed. I have

”refined” the aspects into a number of versions of gender equality. A version of

gender equality consists of a specific view of what is important where gender

equality is concerned, and may be either a part of a larger concept of gender equality,

a particular way of apprehending the whole of the concept, or a way to stress what

one sees as the most important aspects. Often a certain part of daily life is

emphasized, or a certain way of conceptualizing femininity and masculinity,

generally connected to the political ideology of the author’s party, but not necessarily

in any direct or simple way. The analyses will show that the versions are not always

mutually exclusive, that they sometimes flow into one another, and finally, that they

are often incompatible. In other words, they would not always logically be able to co-

exist in harmony in the same text or party strategy. The fact that in practice they

sometimes do, is therefore of some interest. Rhetorical aims may sometimes override

demands for logic and stringency. Since my focus here is on highlighting variation in

versions, rather than looking closely at each party’s gender equality programme as

such, I will not put much emphasis on such inconsistencies in this article. The

descriptions of the versions are mainly meant to function as a basis for discussions

and further arguments about the purposes that the gender equality concept can and

should serve in Swedish politics.

The order of presentation of the versions is arbitrary, and should not be

understood as implying that certain versions are more central than others. Also, the

different versions of gender equality described here do not necessarily exhaust the

possible variation in meanings. The extracts I have chosen to represent are

illustrations, and not exhaustive accounts of all texts and arguments I have analyzed.

Thus, for every illustration there are several other possible examples to show. Since

my ambition has not been to make representative selections of texts, I have given no

information on numbers and proportions etc. Such information is not of prime

importance in this study, with its aim to study variability in versions. Naturally, there

is some consistent variation in versions between the political parties, but this

variation is not in focus here. The party lines are present as inevitable patterns,

though, as will be seen by the fact that the parties are unevenly distributed across the

versions.

In all, this article contains fourteen ”versions” of Swedish gender equality. I

have sorted them in subgroups after the internal affinities between their basic ways of

understanding mainly ”gender” and ”politics”. Because of the ”practical noise” in a

material such as this, where arguments on several conceptual levels are intermingled,

none of these subgroups is completely pure of overlaps and variation. I have given

the subgroups their labels depending on their main emphasis: (A) social consensus,

(B) individualism, (C) differences, (D) men’s relations to gender equality, (E)

women’s relations to gender equality, (F) gender equality’s boundaries to the

extreme.

A. Versions emphasizing social consensus and gender-neutrality

1) Gender equality is identical to the liberal-humanist ideal of general equality

The liberal-humanist version of gender equality builds on general philosophical

conceptions of the equal worth of all human beings. It harks directly back to the first

of the political definitions of gender equality above, the rights argument. This kind of

argument is basically gender-neutral and may be applied to any subdivisions of

human beings. Liberal-humanist arguments about gender equality, on an abstract and

general level, may be found more or less explicitly in practically all the texts I have

analyzed. It is seen in expressions such as: ”A moral conviction of everybody’s equal

worth” (the Social democratic party)2. ”Real gender equality means giving

everybody the same rights and possibilities. It is primarily a matter of justice

between individuals, and not between the sexes” (the Conservative party).3 ”Every

person is to be respected as a free individual and have the chance to decide about

their own life” (The Liberal party).4

The liberal-humanist version of gender equality seems to lead to rather general

and non-specific – and often decidedly gender-neutral – measures. This is seen in

expressions such as ”..we need a politics that increases liberty and gives women and

men the freedom and self-determination that is necessary for gender equality. This

means a politics where people through work, private enterprise, and increased

2 Carlsson, 1996, p. 9 (article in an anthology about gender equality). 3 The Conservative Party (Moderata samlingspartiet), 1998 (party bill about gender equality). 4 The Liberal Party (Folkpartiet), 1998 (party programme on gender equality).

(economical) plurality will make society richer and more flexible” (the Conservative

party).5 or ”We need to carry out downright indoctrination about every individual’s

inviolable worth and right to integrity” (the Christian democrats).6 Discussions of

power are generally absent.

2) Gender equality for everybody: social consensus

”It ought not to be a problem for all seven parliamentary parties to pull in the same

direction on these issues”, a female member of parliament for the Christian

democrats7 writes, when addressing general issues of gender equality such as the

equal worth and status of all individuals, democracy and power perspectives,

integration and mainstreaming efforts, and resource and quality aspects. ”Striving for

an equitable society ought to be a common issue across parties”, the Green party’s

youth organization similarly asserts.8 These arguments emphasize consensus as an

ideal, built on notions of the existence, on a general level, of foundational common

values across parties. In one sense, such consensus seems at least partly to be

achieved in Sweden: when asked, in surveys, about their attitudes, hardly anybody in

the general population today claims to be against gender equality (Flood & Gråsjö,

1997).

A somewhat different and perhaps more pragmatic or utilitarian version of

consensus-thinking was expressed when the former Swedish prime minister, social

democrat Ingvar Carlsson, gave an article on gender equality the headline

”Everybody will gain by gender equality.”9 Asserting that gender equality will be

profitable for everybody is a not uncommon way of supporting the idea of a possible

consensus about gender equality, especially when addressing men, or men’s interests.

For political action, consensus notions often tend to lead to rather general

exhortations about what people ”ought” to think and do, such as ”Gender equality

requires dialogue, consensus, and long-term work” (the Conservative party).10

Consensus notions also influence thoughts about organizing for gender equality, and

tend to lead at least some writers to negative attitudes towards separate women’s

organizations as agents of change, as in this quote from the Green party’s youth

organization: ”If the women in the various women’s organizations continue to keep

to their side and claim that issues of gender equality are only women’s issues, they

will hinder the development towards a more gender-equal society.”11 As can be

expected from the focus on agreement and consensus, discussions of power do not

figure very prominently in texts on this version of gender equality.

3) Gender equality, the acid test of democracy

In several of the texts I have studied, gender equality is connected explicitly to

general democracy issues, as in arguments that we will not achieve real democracy

until we have reached complete gender equality. Gender equality here is not just a

5 The Conservative Party (Moderata samlingspartiet), 1998 (party bill about gender equality). 6 Frebran, 1996, p. 17 (article in an anthology about gender equality). 7 Frebran, 1996, p. 20. 8 The Green youth (Grön Ungdom), 1996, p. 40 (article in an anthology about gender equality). 9 Carlsson, 1996, s. 9. 10 The Conservative party (Moderata samlingspartiet), 1998 (party bill about gender equality). 11 The Green youth (Grön Ungdom), 1996, p. 40 (article in an anthology about gender equality).

women’s issue, but “an issue for all who want to realize the perfect democracy,”

writes a young male social democrat.12 In a little more detail, Mona Sahlin (then

minister for gender equality) writes, “To be honest, I find it difficult to understand

why gender equality should not be considered as a political field. It is about

democracy, and so far I have heard nobody say that there are more important issues

to prioritize than developing our democracy. We simply think that democracy has a

unique value of its own. .. But for some reason it seems impossible to get gender

equality recognized as an important part of democracy.”13 She problematizes what

she sees as the “ordinary” conception of democracy in society, which has so far not

taken gender equality as a self-evident criterion of democracy. Those who assert the

foundational value of democracy are far from unanimously convinced that gender

equality should be counted as a part of democracy, according to Sahlin.

The Left party’s programme on politics for women (1997) explicitly connects

democracy to gender equality: ”In our society men have the decisive power at all

levels. Individual women may have both power and other kinds of influence, but

women as a group lack power and authority. This pattern must be broken if Sweden

is to become a democracy worth the name.” .. ”Gender quotas are necessary

demands in order to achieve democracy and justice.” .. ”A society that is free of

gender-based violence is a democratic right.”

In the Christian democratic party’s latest party bill on gender equality (1998),

gender equality is connected on an overall level to democracy issues: ”Every

democratic society must see it as a major task to remove the prejudice, structures,

legal hindrances and traditional conceptions that obstruct and prevent equality

between the sexes.”

The Center party’s party bill on gender equality for 1998/99, with a slightly

different angle brings forward democracy issues in connection to a discussion about

differences between women and men: ”Women’s and men’s knowledge,

characteristics and experiences differ from each other. These differences must be

utilized as a resource in the common work to build a good society. The point of

departure must be to value different traits in equivalent ways. Then we will achieve

gender equality and democracy.”

In the Conservative party’s latest bill on gender equality (1998/99), arguments

about democracy are also only mentioned in connection with discussions about

differences between women and men, and girls and boys: ”Schools need both

feminine and masculine knowledge and experiences. The teaching profession has

during the last few decades suffered a decline in status, with lower wages, a scarcity

of teachers, vacancies in the teacher training programmes, and other negative

effects. This is a direct threat to the development of society, since teachers are one of

the most important instruments of democracy and civilized society; they are

conveyors of knowledge and have the task to help pupils learn basic values and

critical thinking.”

In the party bills on gender equality by the Liberal party and by the Green party,

no mention is made of the word ”democracy”.

B. Versions emphasizing individualism

12 Mårtensson, 1996, p. 33 (article in an anthology about gender equality). 13 Sahlin, 1996, p. 45 (article in an anthology about gender equality).

4) Gender equality as personal characteristic: attitudes

Here, gender equality is seen as mainly inside individual persons, in the shape of

attitudes or (sometimes) opinions. Such an individualized version of gender equality

seems to be rather common, since a large majority of the authors of the texts I have

studied, regardless of political party, eventually use an ”attitude version”. This is

seen in expressions such as ”..gender equality is basically a question of attitudes”,

”in the final analysis this has to do with ourselves, as women and men in all our

relations” (both by Social democrats),14 ”..gender equality is basically shaped by

attitudes between women and men at home by the kitchen table, or between kids in

the playground” (the Center party’s youth organization),15 ”This is about attitudes of

both women and men and is at the heart of the matter” (the Green party’s youth

organization),16 ”..gender equality means tackling the degrading attitudes with which

women are often confronted” (the Christian democrats).17 The text in my selection

where ”attitudes” are most conspicuously absent in an explanatory function was

written by the chairperson of the Left party (previously the Communist party).

In the attitude version, gender equality is treated as a part of individual

psychology. ”Attitudes” is a concept that is nowadays generally used to denote

”personal attribute” or even ”individual characteristic” (Danziger, 1998). Using the

concept of attitudes to as it were put ”the real gender equality” inside people’s minds

and thereby turning it into a psychological concept, leads to its being seen as difficult

to approach by political means. And indeed, several of the authors at this point take

recourse to rather ”unpolitical” explanations of why attitudes to gender equality are

difficult to influence: ”..there is a deeper cause” and ”I am convinced that gender

equality must begin by working upon attitudes” (the Center party’s youth

organization),18 ”Already at home, the child’s opinions on male and female roles are

created. Adults are responsible for the attitudes that are carried forth to the

children” and ”Gender equality cannot be seen as only a political issue” (the

Christian democrats),19 ”..the fact that we have not come further, may be because too

many men do not see the advantages” i.e., have not yet developed the right attitudes

(the Social democrats),20 ”There are still many attitudes and habitual behavior

patterns that need to be brought into the light and ”The cause of the sex segregation

in higher education and the labour market may lie in early childhood” (the

Conservative party).21

As can be expected, this kind of argument is generally not connected to power or

discussions about power differentials. Also, the invocation of attitudes as the

foundational explanation of gender equality, will of necessity stand in a somewhat

uneasy relation to some of the other versions of gender equality described here.

14 Carlsson, 1996, p. 10. 15 Hansson, 1996, p. 22 (article in an anthology about gender equality). 16 The Green Party’s youth organization (Grön Ungdom), 1996, s. 39 (article in an anthology about

gender equality). 17 Frebran, 1996, p. 17. 18 Hansson, 1996, p. 22. 19 Frebran, 1996, p. 18. 20 Carlsson, 1996, p. 10. 21 The Conservative Party (Moderata samlingspartiet), 1998 (party bill about gender equality).

The political measures suggested after this kind of argument are generally rather

vague and often non-committal. They are expressed in words such as: ”need for

attitude change”, ”discussion of attitudes”, ”downright indoctrination”, ”more

research on sex roles and gender equality”, ”we must not force attitude change by

using political means”, ”if men are to feel comfortable in front of the kitchen range,

we need to allow them to approach it in their own way”, ”we need to increase

people’s understandings of their fellow humans as individuals and not as ’sex roles’”,

”we have to raise people’s awareness”, ”women and men must learn to listen to each

other and understand each other’s differences”, ”the task of the Government is to

work politically with the tools at our disposal, while the work to change attitudes has

to go on in parallel.”

Conceptualizing gender equality as a personal characteristic – for instance, an

attitude – seems to work a sharp discursive distinction between ”the real gender

equality” inside people’s minds and the ”shallow” political means that probably will

not touch this ”real thing”. Psychological depth/surface metaphorical thinking

flourishes in such texts: coercing people into behaving in ”gender equal” ways will

not, according to this argument, make them ”really be” gender equal. Arguments

against coercive or very specifically directed measures to increase gender equality

(such as obligatory father’s months in the parental leave scheme or quotas to increase

the number of female university professors) are often based on this version of gender

equality as basically an attitude.

5) The gender equality of new generations: personal expression

In the texts I have studied, representatives of political youth organizations sometimes

frame gender equality as a generational issue, that is, as dividing the generations. For

instance, some argue that what they call the ”traditional” focus on improving

conditions for women is too narrow. In the following quotes from an article by a

representative of the Center party’s youth organization some aspects of this argument

are communicated as she writes about young people’s opinions: ”..we can see that

the view of gender equality does not always have the traditional contents. When I

meet with young people they often tell me that the debate on gender equality is too

narrow and one-sided. I am inclined to agree with them. The notion of gender

equality needs to be changed and widened.” The author continues: ”Gender equality

must never be an end in itself. The major objective in politics ought to be efforts to

create opportunities for as good a life as possible for all people.”22

Representatives of the Green party’s youth organization also express

dissatisfaction with the ”traditional” way of arguing about gender equality: ”Today,

when we talk about gender equality, mostly women are heard, and problems are

discussed from women’s perspective. This makes the debate lopsided.” Such a one-

sided focus is redundant and counterproductive today, the authors assert: ”Today

society has changed, as well as our female and male roles; we are more even than

before; for instance, there is a big difference between young men and women and

their parents.” .. ”Then, to just go on in old ruts where women assert their rights

without cooperating with men does not further a positive development to increase

our understanding of the problems of today.” .. ”Many young feminists are not of

the same opinion as the redstockings of the sixties. There are many shades and it is

22 Hansson, 1996, p. 21.

more to do with being an individual and a woman, and not just the traditional

women’s role.” 23

This type of gender equality arguments are explicitly rhetorically contrasted

against ”oldfashioned” arguments emanating from older generations, and they are

often decidedly gender-neutral (or even ”de-gendering”). Each individual is to be

entitled to express his or her self, unfettered by ”gender chains”. Here we see strong

connections to a modern Western individualism and neo-liberalism. It is therefore,

for instance, not surprising that representatives of the Conservative party’s youth

organization express strong opinions about whether gender equality is at stake when

men fail to take an equal share in housework with their female partners. Such failure

should not be conceptualized in political terms, they assert, since ”How an individual

family chooses to organize must be up to the family itself.” On a general level the

same authors argue that ”..a freer society where ’civil society’ is given larger scope,

is the kind of society with the best chances to become gender equal in the long

perspective.”24

The distancing of one’s arguments from forerunners in the struggle for gender

equality (with the forerunners often rhetorically packaged as ”70’s feminists” or

”redstockings”) thus often joins hands with versions of gender equality as mainly an

expression of individuality, liberated from the issue of gender. This in turn functions

to de-politicize and ”de-gender” gender equality, thereby effectively moving it

outside the political arena. Issues of power do not enter into these arguments.

6) Gender equality does not belong in politics!

Among conservatives and neo-liberals in Sweden, many gender equality issues are

defined as outside of the proper domain of politics and politicians. This makes their

texts on gender equality particularly interesting reading, since so much of the space is

taken up by telling the reader what gender equality is not. Through such ”negative

definitions”, the texts question the boundaries and scope of gender equality in useful

ways.

The Conservative party’s 1998 parliamentary bill on gender equality provides

some examples of negative definitions, and I will quote them fairly exhaustively:

”Politicians should not interfere in women’s and men’s choices of how to live their

lives, or how a family shapes its daily life. Such political interventions actively

counteract modern gender equality.” .. ”There is a huge difference between

furthering gender equality, and using quotas or punishment to force desirable ratios

in sex representation.” .. ”Political assemblies with women only, function differently

from ones with men only. In both cases important knowledge and perspectives are

often missing. However, we do not see this as something to change through

legislation or through political decisions grounded in gender equality arguments.”25

Thus, the ways families divide housework and power, and the proportions of men

and women in politics and in high positions in working life, are seen as fields where

politicians should keep their hands off.

23 The Green Youth, 1996, p. 40 (article in an anthology about gender equality). 24 Boman & Schlingmann, 1994, s. 193. A somewhat chilling vision of this freer society may be had

by reading the sentence following on the one quoted from the article: “With this insight as our basis

there is no reason to allow free reign to recently spawned feminist and socialist movements.” (p.193) 25 The Conservative party (Moderata samlingspartiet), 1998 (party bill about gender equality).

This tendency to narrow and de-politicize gender equality is even more obvious

in an article in a Conservative party journal a few years ago, where two

representatives of the youth organization wrote: ”The societal injustices which

legitimate gender equality politics can be summarized in three types. From a liberal

viewpoint26 none of these is politically valid; in other words they are not sufficient

cause for political measures.”27 The first type of injustice they mention is the sex-

segregated labour market; according to the authors this should not be subjected to

political measures, since the labour market consists of voluntary contracts between

employers and employees. This makes the distribution of the professions that women

and men choose to work in irrelevant to gender equality politics. The second type of

injustice is men’s failure to take responsibility at home and share housework. This

should not lead to political measures, the authors assert, ”..since how a family

chooses to organize must of course be up to the family itself.” Here, a sharp

distinction is made between private and public, where the public only is to be subject

to politics. The third injustice, finally, is that women lack influence in society, ”or at

least feel that they do.” This should not lead to political measures, since the reason

for women’s lack of influence in Sweden, the authors claim, is the strong public

sector in Swedish society, women’s confinement to work in the public sector

(through social democratic politics for many years), and the fact that decision making

in this sector is dominated by men. Their neo-liberal ideal is expressed later in the

same article: ”..in a free society families are given the possibility to organize in the

ways they wish. Having reached the insight that gender equality is an individual

thing is in itself a great step forward.”

This version of gender equality may at first glance seem identical to the version

”gender equality is basically about attitudes.” And indeed, ”attitudes” are often

invoked by its proponents. However, an important difference appears when one looks

at what are seen as legitimate measures to change the situation. As seen earlier in this

article, Ingvar Carlsson, writing in 1996 as the prime minister and chairman of the

Social democratic party, invokes ”attitudes” as the foundational basis for changes as

well as lack of changes in the extent of gender equal behaviour. However, he

explicitly states that he wants to use political means to support attitude changes. The

conservative politicians quoted here, on the contrary, see everything connected to the

”private” part of life, including attitudes, at totally outside of the political arena. This

is also valid for measures to influence gender equality. Their suggestions for

solutions to gender equality problems are almost without exception varieties on the

theme of ”personal responsibility”, as expressed in this example: ”When problems

are defined as societal and political instead of as attitude problems, demands are too

easily made for political solutions instead of an increase in personal responsibility.”

… ”We are honestly upset over the uneven sex distribution that we find existing, and

we will therefore take our responsibility as individuals. This means that we, to the

extent that we have the opportunity, will act so that our surroundings become more

gender equal.”28

26 As can be seen in some extracts in this article, the rhetorical uses of the term “liberal” tend to vary

somewhat depending on party allegiance. Conservatives in Sweden sometimes use “liberal” when

describing their politics, in ways that would not be condoned by the Liberal party, for instance. “Neo-

liberal” or “ultra-liberal” would probably be more apt descriptions. 27 Boman & Schlingmann, 1993, p. 188. 28 ibid, p. 188 and 189.

As can be expected, issues of power and subordination are absent from texts

arguing for this version of gender equality.

C. Versions emphasizing sex differences

7) Gender equality that takes sex differences into account

In this version, gender equality concerns the right to express individual traits whose

main features are that they differ between women and men. More or less explicit

links are made between standard political gender equity issues and traditional ideas

on the nature of man vs. the nature of woman, mainly concerning psychological sex

differences. In these texts difference arguments are used to legitimate gender equality

strivings, and the arguments are brought forward as tools to be used to achieve

gender equality. “Differences” were long used to legitimate what we today see as

unfair treatment of women, but here similar kinds of arguments are used in arguing

for gender equality. Such an inversion in the use of difference arguments creates

theoretically as well as politically complex situations and consequences, as is evident

in feminist literature on ”difference versus equality/similarity.”29 I have selected one

extract among several from the material I have studied, in order to illustrate how such

difference arguments are being used in contemporary gender equality debates in

Sweden, and what their use may do to the meanings of ”gender equality”:

The example is found under the heading ”Modern gender equality”, in the

Conservative party’s latest parliamentary bill on gender equality (written by the

Conservative party’s women’s organization, 1998). The freedom to be an individual

according to the imperatives of your sex category is here seen as the way towards

gender equality in schools: ”We are of the opinion that modern gender equality

politics should not deny or obliterate the differences that may exist between girls and

boys at certain ages; it should instead ask how school is to be enabled to take these

differences into consideration, in order to give each individual the opportunity to

develop their full potential.” .. ”Work for gender equality must be based on

knowledge about differences and similarities between the sexes and the importance

of gender at school, and become a pedagogic issue rather than a matter of morality

or attitudes”. Here, ”knowledge” is invoked as objective facts about sex differences,

differences which need to be expressed, preferably in pedagogical measures. Such

reasoning effects a rhetorical removal of gender equality from the political and moral

realm by stating as a fact that boys and girls, as well as women and men, are different

from (and similar to)30 each other in ways that need to be recognized and

emphasized.

Gender equality, then, is no longer a matter of rights or oppression, but of neutral

knowledge, and finding the pedagogic means to allow the expression of the

differences. According to this view, until we consistently treat girls and boys, and

sometimes women and men, differently, we will fail to achieve modern gender

equality. Gender equality will in this version therefore mainly be about sex

29 See for instance Wilkinson, 1997. 30 “Similarities” are also mentioned in the text of this bill; however, as in many other similar instances,

“differences” seem to be the more interesting phenomena. Differences are elaborated on; not

similarities.

differences. No discussions about power are discernible in the writings on this

version.

8) Gender equality through women’s unique contributions as women

Resource arguments for gender equality (see the political definitions in the

introduction section) sometimes appear in rather pure forms in the texts I have

studied. The notion that women will contribute something to politics that has

previously been absent, is the common basis for these arguments. If more women

enter politics, both the form and the content of politics will change. Accordingly, this

version focuses strongly on women as different from men.

One example is to be found in an article by a female member of parliament for

the Center party, where she describes the foundation for the gender equality

arguments used by the party’s women’s organization in the following manner: ”The

early insight into women’s language, women’s culture and its value, and the

feminine life perspective, have all been important foundations..”; and ”..a natural

tradition and development of ideas to support women’s self-esteem, the respect for

women’s lives and work…”; and ”Gender equality and equal sharing means that

women’s and men’s different experiences are valued and made useful in all areas of

society.” Here, the uniqueness of women’s characteristics and experiences as a group

is in focus, more than individual traits or ways of learning, as was the case in the

previous version. Experiences and values are also prominent in statements about the

future: ”Women’s possibilities and experiences will become even more necessary,

and contain an enormous power of furthering progress.” In specific political fields

women’s unique contributions are also emphasized, as for instance: ”Housing,

communications, and transport are examples of areas which will have to be greatly

restructured and where the absence of women’s experiences is clearly seen.” 31

Similar arguments about women’s unique contributions may be found in texts by

other authors, however not as detailed. For example, in an article by a female

member of parliament for the Christian democrats, there are expressions such as the

following: ”An even sex ratio at the managerial level is also a question of resources

and quality”, and ”In order to achieve a well-balanced development of society that

takes both women’s and men’s values into account, it is important that both sexes are

represented within all areas of society and at all hierarchical levels.”32 In the latest

gender equality programme by the Liberal party, the same type of argument is

summarized in the section heading ”Liberate the feminine creative force!”

The way to organize political activity is also influenced by the thinking about

women’s unique contributions, according to the first author above: ”The women in

the women’s organization and the women who work directly in the Center party are

using two different means of influencing the Center party with female abilities. This

is a strength. It is our opinion that we need mixed meeting-places as well as separate

meeting-places for women.”33 Women’s unique contributions, named by the author

”the female abilities”, will in this way directly influence the ”ordinary” political work

done in tandem with the men, as well as influence it indirectly via the considerations

and strategies of the women’s organization.

31 Ekengard, 1996, p. 12-13 (article in an anthology about gender equality). 32 Frebran, 1996, p. 19. 33 Ekengard, 1996, p. 15.

This way of highlighting ”the feminine” may at first glance resemble the

previous version of gender equality that was based on expressing objectively

established differences between women and men. Both versions build on

emphasizing differences between women and men, but they do this with strikingly

different aims and foci. The ”expressive” version invokes ”objective knowledge”

about differences between women and men, arguing that such knowledge makes

values and moral issues superfluous in gender equality discussions. In the accounts

by the Center party’s women above, values and morality are in contrast brought into

the foreground, in conjunction with women’s unique contributions. Their texts are

saturated with expressions such as ”..women’s culture as a means of struggle”, and

”..how society’s problems may be attacked from a feminine perspective.”34 Here, the

”differences” are not merely something to ”take into consideration” with

compensatory purposes, but rather something to make use of in political work to

achieve changes. Though not many explicit arguments about power connected to

gender equality appear, they are sometimes close to the surface, as seen by the use of

words such as ”struggle” and ”attack”.

34 Ekengard, 1996, p. 13.

9) ”If only there were more men here!” - men’s contributions as men to gender

equality

In debates on gender equality, but perhaps even more prominently in debates on child

rearing, masculinity, juvenile delinquency etc., the scarcity of men in certain parts of

societal life (such as caring for small children at home or in day care, teaching in

primary schools, and in the nursing professions) is often lamented. Men’s absence

from these areas is seen as one of the important reasons for problems within these

same areas, apart from being a sign of existing deficiencies in gender equality. The

fact that only about five percent of employees in municipal day care and in primary

schools are men, for instance, is often mentioned as a serious threat, depriving young

boys of male role models and jeopardizing their development into mature men.

Fathers’ low share of parental leave is sometimes mentioned as a risk to children’s

development. The scarcity of men in caring professions such as nursing, is also

brought up as a risk factor, in this instance often based on notions such as that single-

sex workplaces are particularly conflict-ridden.

By increasing the proportion of men, hopefully many problems will be solved in

all these areas; i.e. it is argued that men as men will be the solution to certain

problems. The arguments for increasing the proportion of women in certain

professions are also sometimes symmetrically based on “women’s unique

contributions” to the workplace and the contents of work. However, they generally

lack the sense of impending doom sometimes present in writings on men’s absence

from caring for children and from some teaching professions (see the version

“Women’s unique contributions” above). Thus, there is an asymmetry in some of the

arguments for achieving equal numerical proportions between men and women in all

spheres of society, that justifies the labelling of one version of gender equality, “If

only there were more men here…”

The reasons given for the value of men as men in these particular circumstances,

generally only appear in full in polemical articles and debates on specific topics such

as child custody.35 In writings on gender equality such as party programmes and

parliamentary bills, most of these arguments for men’s value as men tend to be

implied, rather than expressed openly. This may make this version somewhat

difficult to discern, unless one is familiar with the concomitant debates on topics in

the neighbourhood of gender equality. The illustrations from party publications

shown here, should therefore be read against the backdrop of intense debates the last

few years on ”men as men”, the value of men as men, and expectations of their

salutary contributions as men, in areas such as childcare, teaching and nursing.36 A

second backdrop, even more implicit, yet logically deductible as a basis for the

35 See for instance Silverstein and Auerbach (1999) for a very lucid account of the corresponding

debates about the value of men (fathers) as men in the USA. Many of the arguments discussed in their

article are immediately translateable to the Swedish scene. 36 This debate has been influenced for instance by the different recent publications on masculinity.

Perhaps the debate has been most intense around the issue of shared custody after divorce. There is a

strong will among legislators to increase fathers’ involvement in their children both in marriage and

after divorce, and this manifests itself in legislation to make shared custody the rule as long as no very

strong reasons can be given against such sharing. Some feminists have questioned the basis for such

legislation, arguing that it in fact secures men, because they are men, access to their children, under

the implied notion that the child always needs a male present, regardless of the adequacy or motivation

of each individual man. It will increase the risks of giving very unsuitable men regular access to their

children, they claim (Nordborg, 1997).

arguments, is the (today usually unexpressed) old notion that women as women are

incomplete and fallible. In this version of gender equality therefore, women only are

never enough, and men’s presence as men is what is needed. This can also be

deduced from the fact that it is in the context of this version quite unusual to find

arguments for the good that women as women might bring to, for instance, children’s

development (although such contributions are often mentioned in other versions).

A few examples will illustrate how the arguments about men as men are usually

constructed in the context of explicit gender equality issues: generally in a rather

quantitative and ”neutral” form, and without explicit references to men’s or women’s

relative worth. In a typical wording, and under the headline ”More men in childcare

and schools”, the Liberal party, in a recent summary of their party programme on

gender equality, wrote: ”In order to give boys and girls a childhood that will build a

secure foundation for their masculine and feminine identities, it is important that

men as well as women are part of their daily surroundings.”37 The text then goes on

to suggest measures to increase the proportion of men; however nothing is added

about the expected contributions of the men. A recent Government publication on

men and gender equality contains almost identical expressions concerning gender

equality in child care and primary schools: ”An increase in the number of men in

these areas is important, in order to give children and teenagers the options of

encountering both female and male role models in their daily lives.”38 One may get

the impression that increasing the number of men is in itself seen as a problem

solution. Or the reverse: that having only (or almost only) women in these contexts

may be actually be harmful for children.

The Green party’s youth organization is more outspoken than the above: ”The

problem today is that mainly women are day care, nursery and primary school

teachers, and this creates problems for the children as well as for the teachers. It is

at this stage that the foundation is laid for social relations, consideration, and

empathy. Above all, roles and attitudes are rubbed in. How will children be able to

learn how men and women relate to each other, if most of the time they are seeing

only women?”39 Here, it is openly stated that women are a problem; or at least that

the sheer number of women is a problem. And this makes it far from obvious where

the border is to be drawn between ”women as a problem” and ”the scarcity of men as

a problem”. Perhaps such muddying of the arguments contributes to the ideas of the

sheer presence of men as a solution.

It may perhaps be necessary at this point to state that I, the present author, do not

object to increasing the number of men in childcare and primary schools. That is not

the issue here; the issue is what kind of rhetoric is used when we argue for such

increases in the context of gender equality, and what the consequences of it may be.

One possible consequence is at least sometimes apparent: the downplaying of

women’s actual contributions to work in childcare and schools, in favour of the

longed-for and seemingly unreacheable men who, it is hoped, by their presence will

bring the solutions. Discussions about power and subordination are generally absent

in the arguments for this version of gender equality.

37 Jämställdhet (Gender Equality) (1998), presented by the Liberal Party on their Internet web-site. 38 ”Men and gender equality” (1999) 39 The Green youth (Grön Ungdom), 1996, p. 39 (article in an anthology about gender equality).

D. Versions emphasizing how men relate to gender equality

10) Gender equality that men will gain by

In Sweden, men’s possible roles in furthering gender equality has for several years

had high political priority as well as visibility. In 1983 the first committee on ”issues

of men’s roles” (later succeeded by a committee on fatherhood) was set down by the

Government. Several projects, activities, reports, and suggestions of legal changes

have emanated through the years from this kind of work.40 Some of the issues that

have been brought forward by (among others) these committees will be in focus in

this and the following version of gender equality.

Although gender equality measures are most often seen as furthering women’s

interests, it is not uncommon today to emphasize that men also will gain by improved

gender equality. This is done in several party programmes and parliamentary bills. I

will focus on one example here: in the article headline by Ingvar Carlsson that I

mentioned in the version “gender equality for everybody”, he claimed that everybody

(i.e. men too) would gain by gender equality. Therefore it is particularly interesting to

see what Carlsson writes specifically about men and gender equality, and how he

then positions ”men” in relation to work for gender equality: ”..I am convinced that

everybody really will gain by gender equality. Women’s gains I think many see as

self-evident. But the fact that we have not yet come further may be due to too many

men not seeing the advantages. But there are many.”41 The gains he then enumerates

are: the increased freedom of choice men get when they no longer need to be sole

providers, the increased participation and sharing of family life and children a man

achieves when he takes equal responsibility for family work, and the positive effects

for men of actions taken against men’s violence against women.

In Carlsson’s text men are seen as the major remaining obstacles to gender

equality; it is men’s opposition that keeps gender equality from progressing faster.

This opposition is seen as irrational, that is, based in men’s lack of knowledge about

the advantages they would gain by gender equality. Implicit here seems to be a notion

that men will go on resisting gender equality only as long as they have not been told

what it would mean for them; i.e. as long as they are not given rational arguments. If

these arguments could be brought across, men would change their stance. This way

of reasoning, however, may legitimate men’s lack of interest in gender equality until

its proponents have found efficient ways of making men realize the good that is in it

for them. Thus, until gender equality activists become good enough educators, they

will need to be tolerant of men’s lukewarm interest in gender equality. It is

interesting to see how the allocation of responsibility for the gender equality status

may shift from men to activists with this kind of argument.

Arguments about what men will gain by gender equality seem to be rather

difficult to use for building practical gender equality policies, perhaps because it may

be difficult to find tangible and immediate advantages to show individual sceptical

men. Therefore this kind of argument may work better on a general level of arguing –

when speaking in abstract terms such as ”men’s life-circumstances” – than when

trying to convince individual men. One example is the rather moderate success in

Sweden of reforms such as the opening of parental leave schemes to fathers as well

40 ”Men and gender equality” (1999) 41 Carlsson, 1996, s. 9-10.

as mothers. Such reforms have been argued to a great extent (although not solely) on

the basis of the good that would be in them for fathers42. These arguments were

stepped up a few years ago, when it was clear that the low number of fathers who

took any substantial part in their families’ parental leave showed an embarrassingly

low rate of increase. As a result, a bill was passed in parliament, legislating about one

obligatory ”father-month” as part of the parental leave scheme. This month could not

be used by the mother.43 One main argument for this was that men will gain much –

as parents, and as persons – by spending at least one month at home full-time with

their baby. Until now this argument and this reform, although perhaps valid on an

aggregate level, and as seen across generations, seems to have caused only small

changes in the parenting patterns for individual men with young children.

Interestingly, this reform, which was supposedly in the interests of men, gave rise to

a seemingly endless debate about state coercion and encroachment on the rights of

individual families to organize their child care as fits them best. Thus, this gender

equality measure explicitly meant to benefit one sex, clashed with other, more

general liberal notions of equality.

Power does not appear as a major issue in discussions about what men may gain

by gender equality.

11) The new man helps women become equal

In Sweden today many men are in favour of improvements in gender equality. Some

of them strive actively to contribute, particularly by sharing family work; others are

what Swedish feminists call ”in-principle” men (Jalmert, 1983). These men often

express their favourable opinions of gender equality, but in practice they seldom

seem to find the time or opportunity to contribute actively, neither at home nor at

work. When talking about their own contributions to gender equality, both kinds of

men use various rhetorical strategies to justify and explain their own behaviour.

Sometimes such speech contains a ”helper” discourse with patriarchal overtones. I

have chosen to illustrate such a discourse with extracts from an article by a young

male social democrat, a member of the board of their national student organization,

where he argues for ”the new man” who helps women to achieve gender equality.44

The author begins the article by declaring that he is sometimes ashamed of being

a man; too many ’macho’ attributes are connected with the word, and a new kind of

man is needed in order to achieve gender equality. The first characteristic of this new

man that he describes is helpfulness: ”The new man helps women to come forward

in order to get fellow travellers on his journey who are his equals.” In this statement

there is no question about whose journey is on the agenda; the new man wants a

companion on his journey. This is a strikingly androcentric way of expressing oneself

when the explicit topic is gender equality. Also, the statement may be understood to

imply that women would not be able to become his equals without his help to pull us

forward. This impression is strengthened by the final words of the article: ”I hope we

will meet out on the road. Then it is the task of the new man to pull women forward.

42 The other major arguments have been the good it would do to the child in question, and the justice

argument about sharing responsibility between the mother and father. 43 Actually, the bill reserves one month for each of the parents, thus not singling fathers out for the one

month. In practice, however, the discussion has been about the father’s month, since mothers always

take more than their one month share. 44 Mårtensson, 1996, p. 33-36 (article in an anthology about gender equality).

When both sexes are of equal worth, the new man must stand as a guarantee for the

fair sharing of the common resources.” In this extract, there seems to be more than a

little touch of the ”Knight in shining armour”, coming to save the helpless damsel.

For feminists, such promises of help tend to evoke somewhat ambivalent feelings,

since for women to get help from others has tended to increase their low status and

sense of helplessness, rather than to be actually empowering (Unger & Crawford,

1996).

If we look closer at how the author describes the new man, we find that the new

man admits to having a lot to learn from women, but this does not mean that he is

afraid of them: ”It is high time now for men to stop their contemptuous rejection of

these [capable and successful] women as ’men with breasts.’ The new man is not

fearful of woman, but has plenty to learn from her”. Such expressions suggest that

for ”the old man” having something to learn from somebody may be connected to

fear, since such strong connections are made to the new man’s capacity to learn from

somebody without fearing the person. This evokes associations to experiences of

hierarchies and pecking orders.

To continue the description of the new man: he is a proponent of equality, but

this does not make him see women as similar to himself: ”In acts, thoughts and

words, the new man must see women as his equals, but different.” It is probably

understood here that the author means ”different from him”, i.e. from men in general,

once more an androcentric positioning. The differences mentioned are mainly

biological differences having to do with bearing and giving birth to children, but also

mentioned are notions that women are better than men at changing. While women

have been struggling to enter traditionally male domains, the author writes, ”It will

be more difficult to get men to break the brittle outer cover of masculinity that they

proudly show to the external world.” The new man is capable of such changes, as

seen in these characterizations: ”The new man knows his own shortcomings and

limitations”; and ”The new man values other things than his own visibility and

thinks twice before grabbing all the common resources.” To a feminist reader, these

descriptions come across as a mixture of humility and entitlement (entitlement to

”grab all the common resouces” if one wants to) that suggests that these statements

are made from a position of power that the writer may not be fully conscious of.

The above descriptions of the new man may probably best be understood as

directed to an audience of women, and more especially feminist women, in order to

show them that there is still hope that men will come around to help them. When the

author in the conclusion of the article seems to appeal more directly to men, other

arguments come to the fore, connecting to the gender equality version I have termed

”gender equality that men will gain by.” Here the author tells his readers what men

will gain by becoming new men: ”What the new man stands to gain is himself. His

gains will consist in the riches that will fill one’s life when one no longer fears

successful women, and when one may give expression to all aspects of one’s mental

life, without being seen as a lesser man.” The gains are thus mainly connected to

expected personality changes in the man himself, rather than to changes for, or in, the

female fellow travellers that he has helped along the road.

When writing about this gender equality version, perhaps more than the others, a

self-reflective note may be in order: Reading the text I have analyzed here was

provoking to me, since the author seemed to have written a new version of the old

tale that women are incomplete and fallible and that ”women without men” will

never succeed in whatever they set out to do. The article also contains a number of

linguistic and rhetorical turns that give a condescending and even patriarchal tone to

the text as a whole, as understood in the Swedish gender-political context (which is

difficult to convey directly in another language). This makes a feminist particularly

sceptical, since it resembles the kind of ”superior” rhetoric often used by anti-

feminists. However, at the same time the author seems to be well-meaning in his

intentions to promote women; ought the seasoned feminist perhaps to be careful not

to throw the baby out with the bath-water in her scepticism and ungratefulness?

In an informal attempt to see if my reactions were due to personal

hypersensitivity, I asked my seventeen-year old son to tell me his reactions to the

article. He would probably not have the same ”sensitivities” that his mother may

have. His main comment was that the author must be lacking in self-knowledge,

since he could write such transparently patriarchal arguments without seeing what he

was actually conveying to his readers. This reaction gave at least one kind of test of

the generalizability of my interpretations, as well as telling me that the way of being a

”new man” that transpired in the text was not what my son seemed to be striving for.

E. Versions emphasizing women’s relations to gender equality

12) Gender equality is a women’s issue and therefore women’s responsibility

Many of the issues that are today labelled “gender equality”, were at least up till the

1960’s called “women’s rights”, ”women’s issues” or “women’s liberation.” Most

people saw it as self-evident that the responsibility for these issues rested on the

women themselves. The change of terms in Sweden, into “gender equality”

(“jämställdhet”), was (among other things) supposed to show that these issues

concerned the relations between, and relative positions of, women and men, and

thereby was of importance also for men. In political practice, however, the process to

as it were bring gender equality out of the “women’s reservation” has been slow. For

instance, the tradition has long been that the women’s organizations in political

parties do most of the detailed writing on gender equality issues; parliamentary bills

on gender equality have generally been written by members of the women’s

organizations. A change in this pattern has taken place in the last few years, however,

such that in 1998 only the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats had party bills

on gender equality which were not signed by the party chairmen, but by the women’s

organizations (who signs a bill is an indication of responsibility taken; they may still

be actually written by the women’s organizations).

When one looks at the messages conveyed in political texts on gender equality,

the old pattern often prevails: though it is very seldom made explicit, gender equality

is often described as concerning mainly women, rather than the relative positions of

women and men. One also often gets the impression that gender equality is mainly

(or only) the responsibility of women, not of men. I will illustrate both these

tendencies with extracts from the texts I have studied:

A conception of gender equality as really only an issue for women, comes across

in some quotes from the Conservative party’s bill on gender equality in 1998: ”..the

[labour] government has opposed every liberalization of taxes for buying household

services. .. Women who are being weighted down by double shifts have been shut out

from the option of getting relief and extra help, while simultaneously one field of

women’s enterprise has been blocked.”45 Here, only women are seen as likely to be

working ”double shifts”, and men do not figure as possible helpmates in handling

and organizing everyday housework. This is instead to be done by other women, by

paying them for taking care of household services for the women with double shifts.

In the following extract the theme continues: ”The previous government had a

minister of environmental issues, who saw as his primary task the taxing of car-

drivers. In this way the government made life more difficult for thousands of women

who need the car to make their daily life function smoothly. In the stressful life

juggling between the workplace, the supermarket, picking up children at school and

at the day care centre, at home, at the stable and the soccer training, the car is

indispensable.” Here, too, we see that only women seem to be candidates for the

work of getting daily life to function. This impression is strengthened by the third

quote from the bill: ”If women are to become fully able to compete on the labour

market, both individual working hours and flexible day-care schedules are

necessary. A woman who must always rush from work in time for the closing hours

of the day-care centre, will have difficulties getting promoted at work.” Women

only are in need of flexible work and day-care schedules, according to this bill. There

is nothing here hinting that men might be able to contribute by leaving work to pick

up the children, for instance. In this quote, no more than in the first two, do the

authors seem to see the option of the woman and the man in the family actually

sharing the daily housework. Gender equality issues are thus in this text indirectly,

but very clearly, portrayed as only concerning women. This is neither problematized

openly, nor described as something that the party wishes to change. Apart from

construing gender equality as an issue for women only, this version also avoids all

references to power relations and responsibility in the family. This is in line with the

Conservative party’s stance that ”Politicians should not interfere in women’s and

men’s choices of how to live their lives, or how a family shapes its daily life” (see the

version on gender equality as outside of politics).

The other tendency here, of seeing work to improve gender equality as mainly

women’s responsibility, is illustrated in the next extract, taken from an article by the

then chairperson of the Center party’s youth organization.46 In it she comments on

the difficulties that women may have when trying to enter ”male” organizational

contexts with hierarchical work patterns etc.: ”When we try to alter the pattern, the

men often become irritated. But then we women must not give up.” The exhortation

to not ”give up” might be understood as giving women the main responsibility for

finding ways into the organizational jungle. The text then goes directly on to gender

equality in the family. This is an area where the situation may appear to be the

opposite of that in the organizational context: here, it is men who are supposed to try

to enter. But in this article, the responsibility for ”entering” into the family is not seen

to rest with the men, as one might perhaps have expected in the name of symmetry.

Instead, women have the responsibility here, too: ”If men are to be attracted by a

life in front of the kitchen range, they will have to be allowed to do things their own

way. Perhaps kitchens and homes may have to be rearranged for men to feel at ease

in them? Sometimes I have the feeling that we women are less willing to change

45 This text concerns a debate in Sweden about the level of employer taxes for hiring people to do

housework and childcare. The fact that these taxes are as high as taxes on employment in other sectors,

is the target here. 46 Hansson, 1996, p. 23 (article in an anthology about gender equality).

habitual patterns in our kitchens, than men are to change their patterns on the shop-

floor. Now, girls, we must show that we are serious!” Thus, in order for gender

equality in the family to improve, women again will have to change and really

facilitate things for men. In both cases one person is expected to ”let in” another

person, but the responsibility for the success of this seems to rest mainly with

women, regardless of which of the positions they are in. That this should be the case,

is not difficult to see if one looks at the status and power issues at stake. The

examples concern situations where one person (the woman) either herself wants to

get access to more power and status, or make the other person (the man) consent to

engage in a less prestigious activity. In such a situation, she has more interest in

achieving changes than he has. However, such analyses or arguments in power terms

do not occur in the texts in this material that portray gender equality as a ”women’s

issue.”

13) Gender equality is in the interest of women as a group, and therefore in

opposition to men’s interests as a group

“Of course one of the reasons why society is such as it is, is that the major decisions

have almost always been made by men”, writes Mona Sahlin, a social democrat and

at the time of writing minister for gender equality in the Swedish government.47

Here, men as a group are put in direct opposition to women as a group: it is in men’s

interest that society is designed in certain ways, and this is in conflict with women’s

interests, in terms of procedural fairness as well as substance (see the introductory

section about political arguments for gender equality). The argument continues: “I

think power is in many ways a constant. This means that one person cannot have

more power without somebody else giving way. When someone gets more power, it

always happens at the cost of other groups. And instead of power, they then

experience powerlessness.” It is therefore logical, according to Sahlin, that when

men in high positions notice that women are beginning to encroach on their

territories, the men realize that their own share will have to decrease, and this they

will oppose: “This is the reason why they only want to talk about gender equality,

but never do anything to create the real conditions to promote it.” In this view, it is

at least in some men’s interests to prevent the improvement of gender equality.

The chairwoman for the Left Party, Gudrun Schyman, argues in similar ways

about the interests of women and men as groups, when she writes ”For a long time,

feminists in the Left movement have seen it as self-evident to emphasize the

similarities between women from all social classes, and to see that men together, and

across class boundaries, are oppressing women as a group.”48 This has facilitated

political cooperation between women across many different political boundaries, she

underlines. She adds a warning, though, that this view simultaneously contains some

dangers of a weakening of the forces of change; that is, if it were to be carried

uncritically across all party boundaries: ”..I don’t think such cooperation is enough

to make patriarchy crumble, since the definition of feminism which is the least

common denominator, in my opinion is far too watered-down.” It is not enough to

talk in a general way about women’s and men’s interests as groups; instead one must

look in detail at how these interests play themselves out for women in different social

47 Sahlin, 1996, p. 45 (article in an anthology about gender equality). 48 Schyman, 1996, p. 56 (article in an anthology about gender equality).

classes. Otherwise there is the risk that gender equality policies will be only about

political representation and percentages, and ”stagnate to become an issue only for

women of the upper and middle classes.”49 Women’s interests as a group will not in

the long run be furthered by this, the author asserts; on the contrary, it will strengthen

patriarchy by increasing class differences. What is needed is ”..a change of

perspective in gender equality work. To find strategies for achieving real influence

on decision-making in economical matters is an important task for us feminists

today.” Women’s interests are best seen to and guarded by applying a ”women’s

perspective” on all types of economical decisions, to become aware of their

consequences for women.

In both the above arguments, there are procedural fairness as well as substance

versions of the argument about women’s interests, i.e. the authors claim that

women’s interests are in opposition to men’s, both in terms of getting access to

politics, and in terms of the substance of politics. None of the authors, however,

imply that all women have the same substance interests (although Sahlin’s arguments

on this are not part of the extracts here). Both emphasize in their texts that class

differences are prohibiting us from seeing ”women” as a homogenous group.

An example of a more homogenizing version is seen in the party programme of

the Green party (1997), in the section on gender equality: ”However, gender equality

politics must not stop at an equal number of women and men in parliaments etc. It is

important that also the very form and contents of politics are changed, such that

women’s interests and concerns acquire a much higher priority on the political

agenda.”50 Here, there are also arguments about women’s interests, but no clear

distinction is made between the consequences of form vs. substance interests; thus

”women” may be understood as more of a homogenous group in society in their

version.

F. Gender equality’s boundaries to the extreme

When analyzing texts about gender equality it is as interesting and important to study

what is not incorporated under the umbrella “gender equality”, as what is. It gives a

definition of the concept from the reverse side, by pointing out where it is no longer

made relevant. The version “gender equality outside of politics” above, is one

example of boundaries for the relevance of a concept being made explicit by the

version’s proponents. It is rather more difficult to find out the boundary-drawings

that are not made explicit in the texts, but taken for granted and therefore not seen as

necessary to point out. They force us to look closer at the silences and empty spaces

in texts about gender equality. To go about this in a systematic way is a bigger

project than this space permits, but some indications may be seen in the following:

One ”silence” seems to concern things connected to violence and abuse. In

certain party programs and party parliamentary bills about gender equality, it appears

that ”gender equality” is a concept that some reserve for arguments about rather

”normal” or ”usual” situations. In the latest gender equality programme for the

Liberal party, for instance, words like violence, abuse, harassment, etc., do not

occur.51 In the Liberal party’s parliamentary bill on ”women’s politics” from the

49 ibid, p. 57. 50 The Green party, 1997 (party programme). 51 The Liberal party (Folkpartiet), 1998/99 (parliamentary bill on gender equality).

same period., however, the word ”violence” is mentioned 45 times in conjunction

with the word ”women”.52 In the Conservative party’s latest party bill on gender

equality, there is no text concerning men’s violence against women.53 There is thus a

sharp discursive distinction made here between gender equality and politics for

women. The heading ”gender equality” does not seem to actualize the more extreme

forms of men’s oppression of women. In corresponding documents by the other five

parties men’s violence against women is mentioned in conjunction with gender

equality, though often rather briefly.

Concluding remarks: what is gender equality?

In this article I have explored some of the meanings of the political concept ”gender

equality”, for the people and organizations who use it for their various political

purposes. I have tried to follow Howard Becker’s advice (1998; p. 145) to

temporarily disregard the conventional and theoretical contents of the concept in

order to achieve a sense of its meaning-range as a form of collective action. This

means studying how a concept is being used in practice, and what varying purposes it

is then made to serve. Doing this should enlarge the reach of the concept as well as of

our knowledge about society. The closest to ”conventional contents” in the case of

gender equality would probably be the definitions of gender equality found in legal

texts. ”Collective action” I have here defined, rather narrowly, as public texts written

by representatives of political parties. Another definition would produce another

content.

One major ”sense of its meaning” that has been conveyed by my analyses of

texts by politicians, is that there probably is no common meaning of gender equality.

The distribution and variety in versions ought perhaps to make us reflect on whether

we ever know what the other person is talking about when we are discussing gender

equality as gender equality, without qualifications.

A second ”sense of its meaning” conveyed by the analyses is that some of the

different meanings given to gender equality are incompatible with each other. To

create one clear-cut concept, we would have to leave out certain versions. We would

have to consider how far out in different directions one can go before ”gender

equality” stops being relevant as a description of what one is discussing.

A third ”sense of its meaning” conveyed here about the concept of gender

equality, though it is perhaps more implicit, is that discussions about

difference/similarity/equality etc., are seldom as clearcut in political practice as when

held on philosphical and meta-theoretical levels. This is in one sense so self-evident

as to be almost banal, but still it needs to be taken into account. The amount of

”practical noise” introduced by everyday life and practical political decision-making

is so large that it causes contradictions and incompatibilities to remain unnamed – or

passed by for rhetorical purposes – in ways they could not have been in a theoretical

or philosophical discussion.

To conclude; does this approach to gender equality as a practical concept actually

enlarge its reach, and our knowledge? Perhaps in a sense it really does, by mapping

the political as well as conceptual terrain to show where the ”gender-equality

52 The Liberal party (Folkpartiet), 1998/99 (parliamentary bill on politics for women). 53 The Conservative party (Moderata samlingspartiet), 1998 (party bill about gender equality).

political” territory seems to begin and end in practice. Perhaps we may then even

more clearly see what we agree about on the map, what we disagree about, and where

we want to change the map? And if all the various versions really are to be taken into

account as gender equality (and there are sure to be more than the ones here), then

politicians and others may have to think in new ways about such things as what

”being in favour of” gender equality means.

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(Gender Equality in our Time: An anthology by the Social Democrat student

organization). Socialdemokratiska Studentförbundet. ISBN 91-630-4029-8. I have cited

articles by Ingvar Carlsson (S), Inger Ekengard (C), Ros-Marie Frebran (Kd), Kristina

Hansson (CUF), Johan Mårtensson (S), Grön Ungdom (Mp), Mona Sahlin (S), Gudrun

Schyman (V).

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Men and Gender Equality (Män och jämställdhet) (February 1999) Fact sheet from the

Gender Equality Unit of the Swedish Government. Stockholm: Department of Industry,

Gender Equality Unit, 10333 Sthlm, Sweden.

- Parliamentary party bills about gender equality. (The Swedish word for bill is ”motion”)

1) Motion till riksdagen 1998/99:c016 by Lennart Daléus et al. (Center party): Jämställdhet

(Gender equality).

2) Motion till riksdagen 1998/99:fp013 by Lars Leijonborg et al. (Liberal party): Liberal

jämställdhetspolitik (Liberal gender equality politics).

3) Motion till riksdagen 1998/99:A810 by Maria Larsson et al. (Christian democratic

party): Jämställdhetsfrågor (Gender equality issues).

4) Motion till riksdagen 1998/99:m506 by Beatrice Ask and Christel Anderberg

(Conservatives): Modern jämställdhet (Modern gender equality).

5) Motion till riksdagen 1998/99:A807 by Birger Schlaug et al. (Green party) :

Jämställdhet (Gender equality)

6) Motion till riksdagen 1998/99:v025 by Gudrun Schyman et al (Left party): Med

anledning av skrivelse nr 1998/99:103 Kommittéberättelse 1999 (jämställdhet i

kommittéer bl.a.) Concerning bill no. 1998/99: 103, Gender equality in committees etc.)

- Other parliamentary bills

Motion till riksdagen 1998/99:So462 by Helena Bargholtz et al. (Liberal party):

Kvinnopolitiken (Women’s politics).

Motion till riksdagen 1998/99:So380 by Gudrun Schyman et al. (Left party):

Familjepolitiken (Family politics).

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The Liberal party, 1998 (Gender equality programme).

Jämställdhet (Gender Equality) (1998), summary of party programme presented by the Liberal Party on their Internet web-site.

The Left party, 1997 (Party programme on politics for women).

The Green pary, 1997 (General party programme, section 3 on gender equality).