THE BRITISH JOURNALOFCRIMINOLOGYVol. 36Autumn1996No.
4THELIMITSOFTHESOVEREIGNSTATEStrategiesofCrimeControl
inContemporarySocietyDAVIDGARLAND*Thearticle offers
adescriptiveanalysisofstrategiesofcrime control
incontemporaryBritainandelsewhere.Itarguesthatthenormalityofhighcrime
ratesandthelimitationsofcriminal justiceagencies have created anew
predicament for governments.Theresponseto this predicament
hasbeenarecurringambivalencethathelps explainthe volatileand
contradictorycharacterofrecent crimecon-trol
policy.Thearticleidentifiesadaptive
strategies(responsibilization,definingdeviancedown,
andredefiningorganizational success) and strategiesofdenial(the
punitivesovereignresponse), as
wellasthedifferentcriminologiesthataccompanythem.One
insightthatFriedrichNietzsche shares withEmile Durkheimperhapsthe
onlyinsight shared by these very differentthinkersis that strong
political regimes have noneedtorely uponintenselypunitive
sanctions.Punitivenessmaypose as asymbol ofstrength, but it should
be interpretedas a symptom of weak authorityandinadequatecontrols
(Nietzsche1956: 205; Durkheim1973: 199).The most visible
andstriking phenomenon of recentpenalpolicy in Britain andtheUSA is
the punitiveness whichhas come to characterizeprominentaspects of
govern-mentpolicyandpoliticalrhetoric.Inwhatfollows,Iwillseektoidentifytheweak-nesses
and limitations that motivate this display of punitiveness and to
point to some ofthe problems of power andauthority that lie behind
it.Ialsowanttodescribesomequitedifferentstrategiesofcrimecontrolthathavebeen
prompted by these same weaknesses, and that are emerging;rather
less
visiblyalongsidetherecurringrecoursetopunitivedisplay.Thissecondsetofstrategiesisquite
differentin characterfromthe punitive currentandbears a complex
relation to*Profeuor,Centre for Law and Society,University of
Edinburgh. An earlier venion of thiipaper wai delivered as the10th
AnnualLecture of the SouthamptonUnivenityInstitute of Criminal
Justice on1March1995. I am gratefulto Pro-fessor Andrew
Rutherfordand Dr Penny Green for their comments nd hospitality on
that occasion.I am also gratefultoJamaB.
Jacobs,RichardSparks,StanleyCohen,Pt CTMalley,
JoannaShapland,PaulRock,ChrisHimsworthandPeter Msung for comments
on earlier draft! of this paper.445 at Universidade do Porto on
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DAVIDGARLANDit.Iwillcharacterizethesestrategiesasadaptations
tothecurrentpredicamentof
crimecontrol,whereasthepunitivestrategywillbedescribedasasymbolicdenialofthatpredicament.Iwillgoontosuggestthatthis
dualistic,ambivalent,andoftencontra-dictorypatternof crimecontrolis
underpinnedby a similarly
dualisticandambivalentpatternofcriminologicalthinking,involvingasplitbetweenwhatIterma'crimin-ologyoftheselfanda'criminologyoftheother'.Myargumentwillbethatthisisacontradictorydualismexpressinga
conflictatthe heartof
contemporarypolicy,ratherthanarationallydifferentiatedresponseto
differentkinds of
crime.Itakeasmypointofdeparturethepredicamentofcrimecontrolinlatemodernsocietyandthereactionstothispredicamentonthepartofstateagencies.Iwanttofocusontheproblemof
crimecontrolas itis
perceivedandmanagedbytheagenciesandauthoritiesinvolved,andtotracehowtheseperceptionsandadministrativestrat-egieshavechangedovertime.Thatbroadersocialandculturalforcesplayapartinshapingthe'problem'andits'perception'istakenforgrantedandlargelyun-exploredinthepresentpaper(onthis,see
Garland1990). Myanalysiswill
bebasedupontrendswhicharediscernibleinGreatBritain,althoughthereis
evidencetosug-gestthatsimilartrendsarealsopresentintheUSA,Australiaandelsewhere(seeFeeleyandSimon1992;
O'Malley1992).HighCrimeRatesas a Normal Social FactInthecourse of
thelast30 years, highcrime rates have
becomeanormalsocialfactinBritain,justastheyhaveinmostcontemporarywesternsocieties.Ratesofpropertycrimeandviolentcrimewhicharehistoricallyunprecedentedinthemodernperiodhavebecomeanacknowledgedandcommonplacefeatureof
socialexperience.Sotoohavelinkedphenomenasuchasawidespreadfearof
crime,pervasivemediaandcul-turalrepresentationsofcrimeandthepoliticizationofcrimecontrol.Depitethefactthatcrimehasanunevensocialdistribution,andthathighriskvictimizationisverymuchapocketed,concentratedphenomenon,crimeis
widelyexperiencedas
apromi-nentfactofmodernlife.Formostpeople,crimeisnolongeranaberrationoranunexpected,abnormalevent.Instead,the
threatof crime hasbecome aroutinepart ofmodernconsciousness,
aneverydayriskto be assessedandmanagedinmuchthesamewaythatwe deal
withroadtrafficanothermodern dangerwhich has
beenroutinizedand'normalized'overtime.Highratesofcrimehavegraduallybecomeastandard,backgroundfeatureofourlivesatakenforgrantedelementoflatemodernity.Advertisementsforsecuritylockswhichtellusthat'acartheftoccurseveryminute'makethe
point quite wellcrime formspart of our daily environment,as
constantandunremittingas timeitself.Idonotintendtogo intothe causes
of this
phenomenonhere.Iammoreinterestedinthequestionofhowgovernmentsandotheragencieshaverespondedtothisnewsocialfactandtotheproblemswhichitentailsforthem.Myclaimisthatthenor-malityof
highcrimeratesinlatemodernsocietyhaspromptedaseriesoftransforma-tionsinofficialperceptionsofcrime,incriminologicaldiscourse,inmodesofgovernmentalaction,andinthestructureofcriminaljusticeorganizations.(Thesechangesare,
in turn,linkedto broaderreconfigurationsof social
andpoliticaldiscourseandpolicy,thoughIwillnothavespaceto
discusstheseconnectionshere.)Whatfol-lowsis athumbnailsketchof
theseemergingtransformations.446 at Universidade do Porto on
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THELIMITS OF THESOVEREIGN
STATEChangesinOfficialDiscourseOfficialdiscourseoncrimeandpunishmentinBritainhasundergoneamarkedchange
since the early1960s. In1964 a
governmentpolicydocumententitledTheWarAgainst
Crimeacknowledged'theupsurgeincrimeanddelinquency'whichhadcon-tinuedunabatedsincethemid-1950s,butsawnoneedtoquestiontheframeworkofactionwhichhadbeengraduallyassembledovertheprevioushalfcenturyaframe-workwhichIhave
describedelsewhereas
the'penal-welfarestrategy'(Garland1985).Likeitsimmediateforerunner,PenalPracticeinaChangingSociety(1959),theWhitePaperof1964confidentlyassertedthatthepenal-welfarestrategyformedtheappro-priateframeworkforaction,andthatvigorouspolicingandcorrectionalpenalmeas-ures,guidedbyresearchstudiesintothecauses
of crimeandtheeffectivenessof
penaltreatments,wouldbegintostemtherisingtideof
post-warcrime.Totheextentthatthesemeasuresseemedtobefailing,thiswasseenasaproblemofresourcesandknowledge,orofmethodsandimplementation,andplanswerelaidforfurtherresearch,increasedfundingandtheexpansionof
childwelfareservices.Therewasnodoubtaboutthestate'scapacitytodealwiththeproblem.Onthecontrary,theimpliedpromiseof
thestatementwasthatthestatewouldwinthewaragainstcrime,justasthewarfarestatehadvanquishedits
foreignenemiesandthewelfarestatewasnowattackingthesocialproblemsof
peacetime.Intheperiodsincethe1960s,
officialdiscoursehasgraduallymovedawayfromtheconfidentpositionsetoutinthesedocuments.Thereisnowmuchlesstalkofa'waragainstcrime".Thereisalsolesscommitmenttothepenal-welfareframework.Thestate'sclaims
in respectof crime controlhavebecome more modestandmorehesitant,at
least in certaincontexts andwhenaddressing certainaudiences.
Thereis a new senseof the failureof criminal justiceagencies,anda
more limitedsense of the
state'spowerstoregulateconductandprohibitdeviance.Attentionisbeingshiftedtodealingwiththeeffectsofcrimecostsandvictimsandfearfulcitizensratherthanitscauses.Aboveallthereisanexplicitacknowledgementof
theneedtorethinktheproblemofcrimeandthestrategies
formanagingit.Thefirstsigns of whatIhavedescribedelsewhereas
'thecrisisof
penalmodernism'(Garland1990:7)tookquitespecificandlocalizedforms.Officialreportsfromthe1960sonwardsbegantoregisterdoubtsabouttheefficacyofcriminal
justiceinstitu-tions.Thelimitationsofprisons,borstals,probation,individualizedsentencing,deter-rentlawsandtraditionalpolicingwereincreasinglyexposednotleastbytheHomeOffice'sowncriminologicalresearchuntilthewholepenal-welfarestrategybegantounravelinthefaceof
thescientificmonitoringwhichithaddoneso
muchtopromote(seeBrody1976;ACPS1974;HomeOffice1978;Croft1978;BurrowsandTarling1982;
Heal*/a/.1985).1 When the 1964 White Paper called for
a'fundamentalreview'and the setting up of a RoyalCommUiion on the
PenalSystem, it was notto question the penal-welfareframework,but
rather to refineitAre our existingpenalmethods pro-ducing good
enough results?. . .Are we doing enough to devise and experiment
with new methods of treatment? Are weconcentrating overmuch on
seeking to improve the traditionalmethods? To these questions there
is no simple answer, butinthepresentupsurgeof crimeand
delinquencythey oughtto beasked*(HomeOffice1964:
13).Inthesameyear,theKilbrandon Reportperhaps the
quintessentialpenal-welfare documentstated that the object of 'the
machinery for thetreatment of juvenile delinquency' must be 'to
effect,so far as can be achieved by public action,thereduction and
ideallythe elimination of delinquency*(ScottishHome andHealth
Department1964: para. 12).447 at Universidade do Porto on October
13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from
DAVIDGARLANDThe'NothingWorks' slogan, which gainedso
muchattentioninthe1970s andearly1980s, mightberegardedas
asomewhathystericalandtemporarysymptomof amoresoberandabiding sense
of thelimits of criminal justice,whichhas since becomeapartof
criminologicalcommonsense. These limitationshave become
increasinglyapparent,andhavebeguntobeopenlyacknowledgedinofficialdiscourse.Fromthemid-1980sonwards,ithasbecomecommonforBritishgovernmentpolicydocuments,ChiefConstables'reports,andevenpoliticalparty
manifestos,to
emphasizethatgovernmentagenciescannot,bythemselves,succeedincontrollingcrime(seeHomeOffice1986;CommissionerofPolicefortheMetropolis1987;ConservativeParty1987).Modestimprovementsatthemargin,thebettermanagementof
risksandresources,reductionofthefearofcrime,reductionof criminal
justiceexpenditureandgreatersupportforcrime'svictims,havebecomethelessthanheroicpolicyobjectiveswhichincreasinglyreplacetheideaof
winninga'waragainstcrime'.TheMythof
SovereignCrimeControlThisstateofaffairsisquitenew,andhasledtosomesignificantdevelopments.Inparticular,theperceivednormalityofhighcrimerates,togetherwiththewidelyacknowledgedlimitationsof
criminal
justiceagencies,havebeguntoerodeoneofthefoundationalmythsofmodernsocieties:namely,themyththatthesovereignstateiscapableofprovidingsecurity,lawandorder,andcrimecontrolwithinitsterritorialboundaries.Thischallengetothestate'slawandordermythologyisallthemoreeffective,andallthemoreundeniable,becauseitoccursatatimewhenthewidernotionof'statesovereignty'isalreadyunderattackonanumberoffronts(seeHirst1994,LashandUrry1987).Sovereigntyisofcourse,likeallhistoricallydevelopedpoliticalconcepts,acomplexandmuchcontestednotion.Strictlydefined,itrefersinBritishconstitutionallawtothecompetenceoftheQueeninParliamenttomakeorunmakelawswithoutchallengebyotherlaw-makingauthorities.Butthetermhasawidermeaningwhichrelatestothesovereign'sclaimedcapacitytoruleaterritoryinthe
faceof
competitionandresistancefromexternalandinternalenemies.Overtime,thecontrolofcrimeandtheprotectionofcitizensfromcriminaldepredationshavecometoformapartof
thepromisewhichthestateholds outto
itscitizen-subjects.2Thenation-stateswhichemergedinearlymodernEuropelaidclaimto
amonopolyoflegitimate,organizedviolencewithintheirborders,andovertimemostofthemachievedlevelsofpacificationandauthoritywhichgavesubstancetothisclaim(seeElias1982).Manyofthesestatesalsoinheritedthemythof
sovereignpowerfromtheroyalautocracieswhichprecededthemarulingself-conceptionwhichclaimedtheright,andtheability,toexerciseaplenitudeof
powerovereverysubjectandcircum-stancewithina definiteterritory(see
Hirst1994: 28; Hinsley1966). Thenotionthatasingle
sovereignpowercouldgovernallsociallife was
enhancedinthemid-nineteenthcenturybythecreationof
astrongstateapparatus,andinparticular,bythedevelop-mentofapublicpoliceforcewhichcametoberegarded,howeverinaccurately,ashavingaprofessionalmonopolyoverthefunctionofcrimecontrol.Foratime,1A
primary responsibility of any government at home ii to take action
to protect people from crime. . .tht guaronttt oflaw and
ordtr(originalemphases)is essentialto the British way of life.'
Speech bythePrimeMinister, 9 September1994(see Major 1994).448 at
Universidade do Porto on October 13,
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THESOVEREIGN
STATEparticularlyinthelastdecadesofthenineteenthcentury,thenewstateforcestogetherwiththeinstitutionsofcivilsociety,suchasfamilies,neighbourhoods,churches,tradeunionsandvoluntaryassociationssucceededinreducingcrimeandmaintainingahighdegreeof
order,asuccesswhichhelpedentrenchtheimageofaneffectivesovereignstate(seeGatrell1992andClarke1987).
Thestate'sclaiminthisregardwaslaterfortifiedbythedevelopmentofareformativepenal-welfareapparatus,whichaugmentedsovereignpowerwithanextensiveapparatusofsocialregulationandengineering.
By themid-twentiethcentury,the state was promisingnotjustto
punishlegal violations,andquell internalunrest,butactuallyto
governin wayswhichwouldcurborcurethesocialproblemof crime.Forall
its importancein guiding state formationandstrategies of rule,this
notionofstatesovereigntyprovedunsustainable(seeHirst1994),andthelimitationsofthestate'sabilitytogovernsociallifeinallits
detailshavebecomeevermoreapparentinrecenttimes.Sohavingtakenovercontrolfunctionsandresponsibilitieswhichoncebelongedtotheinstitutionsof
civil society,the state is now facedwithits
owninabilitytodelivertheexpectedlevelsofcontrolovercriminalconduct.Moreover,itnowoperatesinacontextwherethesocialcontrolfunctionsof'private'agenciesandorganizationshavebeenmuchreducedoveralongterm,partlythroughthedis-organizingprocessesassociatedwithlatemodernity,partlythroughthemonopolizingtendenciesof
thestateapparatus.4ThePredicamentofCrimeControlThepredicamentforgovernmentstoday,then,isthatthey(i.e.ministers,officials,agencyexecutives
etc.)see the needto withdrawor at least qualifytheirclaimto be
theprimaryandeffectiveproviderof
securityandcrimecontrol,buttheyalso see,
justasclearly,thatthepoliticalcostsofsuchanmovearelikelytobedisastrous.Thecon-sequenceisthatinrecentyearswehavewitnessedaremarkablyvolatileandambiva-lentpatternof
policydevelopment(see ReinerandCross1991; AshworthandGibson1994;
Faulkner1993; Windlesham1993).Ontheonehand,therehas beenanattemptto
faceuptotheproblemanddeveloppragmaticnewstrategiesthatareadaptedtoit(seebelow).Butalongsidethesediffi-cultadaptationstotherealityprinciple,therehasalsobeenarecurringtendencytowardsa
kindof hystericaldenial,andthe emphaticreassertionof the oldmythof
thesovereignstate. Thelastdecadehas seentheemergenceof a series of
carefullyplannedpolicy initiatives(mostnotablytheCriminal Justice
Actof1991
andtheprisonreformprogrammethatfollowedtheWoolfReport)whichhavebeensuddenlyundercutbyshiftsofpoliticalmood.Ithasseenthecoexistenceofquitecontradictorydiscoursesandstrategiesinrespectof'thecrimeproblem'.Andconcertedattemptstoreducethecostsofcrimecontrolexpenditurehavesuddenlybeenundercutbypunitivepro-3The
itate never succeeded in gaining control of all crime complaints.
Other formj of (private) crime control remainedin existence, ome of
them ancient, tome of them modern(tee Robert1989 and Shearing and
Stenning 1983,1987,
Johnion1992).Butforthematsofthepopulation,thestateusuallyintheformofthepublicpolicecametobeviewedasresponsible
for crime control,and the state's own ideology sustainedthis
situation.It is precisely becausethe punishmentof offendersis under
effectivestate controlthatitwas,for tolong,presented as
themosteffectivemeans of controllingcrime.4On
thedisorganizingprocesses of late modernity,particularly as they
relate to crime control, see Bottoms and Wiles0994).449 at
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DAVIDGARLANDnouncementsonthepartofgovernmentministersthatthrowthewholeprocessintoreverse.Likeallmyths,the
mythof thepenalsovereignandits
'lawandorder'powersistoodeeplyinscribed,andtoopoliticallypotent,tobeeasilydismantledbyrationalcritiqueandadministrativereform,andwewillcontinuetoobserveitsinvocation.Whathaschangedisthatitnolongerframesallaspectsof
policyandpracticeinthisarea.AdaptationsIndescribingthepenalstate'sresponsestothispredicament,IwillfocusuponanumberofdevelopmentswhichItaketobefairlynovel.Itshould,however,beemphasizedattheoutsetthatthesearebynomeansthemostprominentormostnumericallysignificantaspectsofpresent-daypenality.WriterssuchasMathiesen(1990)andChristie(1993)arerightto
directourattentionto the massive expansionofincarcerationwhichis
currentlytakingplacethroughoutmostof the
developedworld,sinceinpoliticalandsociologicalterms,this is of
primeimportance.Butalongsidethegrowthofimprisonmenttherearedevelopmentsoccurringwhichtendinadifferentdirectionandoperateaccordingtoadifferentkindof
rationality.Thesenewdevelop-mentsmightbest be describedas newmodes
of governing crime.
Theyeachentailnewkindsofobjectives,newcriminologicaldiscoursesandformsofpracticalknowledge,andnewtechniquesandapparatusesfortheirimplementation.As
yet,mostareatanearlystageoftheirdevelopment,existingas
reformprogrammesandproposalsratherthanfullyestablishedstrategies.However,thesenewmodesarealreadychangingthewaysinwhichcrimeisadministered,andareliabletobecomemoreimportantinthefutureasgovernmentsseektoreconfiguretheirstrategiesandadaptthemtothecon-ditionsof
latemodernity.Thenewcriminologiesof everyday
lifeThemostexplicitexpressionandtheorizationof this new stateof
affairsis tobefoundinanewgenreof criminologicaldiscourse whichhas
become increasinglyinfluentialinUKgovernmentcircles since the
mid-1970s. This genre is composedof a set of
cognatetheoreticalframeworks,including rationalchoice theory,
routineactivitytheory,crimeasopportunityandsituationalcrimepreventiontheoryasetwhichmightbecollectivelydescribedas'the
new
criminologiesofeverydaylife'(seeClarkeandCornish1986;Felson1994;HealandLaycock1986;ClarkeandMayhew1980).
Thestrikingthingaboutthese criminologiesis thatthey eachbegin
fromthe premise thatcrime is
anormal,commonplace,aspectofmodernsociety.Itisaneventorratheramassofeventswhichrequiresnospecialmotivationordisposition,no
pathologyorabnorm-ality,andwhichis writtenintotheroutinesof
contemporarysocialandeconomiclife.Incontrasttoearliercriminologies,whichbeganfromthepremisethatcrimewasadeviationfromnormalcivilizedconduct,andwasexplicableintermsofindividualpathologyorebefaultysocialization,thenewcriminologiesof
everydaylifeseecrimeascontinuouswithnormalsocialinteractionandexplicablebyreferencetostandard5Theworkofthefollowingscholar!
haiinformedmy understandingof
thedevelopmentsexaminedhere:O"Malley0992,1994, nd),fteleyand
Simon0992,1994), Simon0993), Stenson(1993; 1995), Shearing0994),
Bottoms0990), Bottomsand Wiles0994)and Peters 0986).450 at
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THESOVEREIGNSTATEmotivationalpatterns.6Crimebecomesarisktobecalculated(bothbytheoffenderandbythe
potentialvictim)or anaccidentto be avoided(Poyner1986),
ratherthanamoralaberrationwhichneedsto be
speciallyexplained.7Itisclearthatthiscriminologicalapproachemergesinacontextwherehighcrimerates
aretakenas a given, andwhere the dataof self-reportand victim
studiestestifytothenormalityofcrime.Theseperspectivesarenotincompatiblewitholdercrimino-logieswhichfocusuponthepathologicaldispositionof
theindividual,andtheyexpli-citlyacknowledgetheneedforsuchtheoriesinasmallminorityof
cases.Butwhatisinterestingistheextenttowhichthenewcriminologiesofeverydaylifehavebeentakenupby
policymakers to reorientgovernmentactionandto
createnewtechniquesforactingupontheproblemofcrime.Inparticular,itis
significantthatmanyoftheprogrammesofpracticalactionwhichflowfromthesetheoriesareaddressednottostateagenciessuchas
thepolice,thecourtsandtheprisons,butbeyond
thestateappa-ratus,totheorganizations,institutionsandindividualsofcivilsociety.Thetheoriestakeitforgrantedthatthestatehasa
limitedcapacity,andtheylooktotheeverydaylifeworldtobringaboutchange.If
these projectsare differentin the agents they intendto
empower,theyarealsodif-ferentinthetargetsthattheyaddress.
Thenewprogrammesof actionare directednottowards individual
offenders,but towards the conduct of potential victims, to
vulnerablesituations,andtothose routines of everydaylife
whichcreatecriminalopportunitiesasan unintendedbyproduct.8 This is,
in effect,'supply side criminology', aiming tomodifythe everyday
routines of social and economic life by limiting the supply of
opportunities,shiftingrisks, redistibuting costs, and creating
disincentives. It aims to embed controls
inthefabricofnormalinteraction,ratherthansuspendthemaboveitintheformofasovereigncommand(cf.ShearingandStenning1984).Insteadofrelyinguponthethreatof
deterrentsentences, or the dubious ability of the police to catch
villains, it setsaboutreplacingcash withcreditcards, building locks
intothe steering columns of
cars,employingparkinglotsupervisersandcitycentreclosecircuitTVcameras,co-ordinatingthe
closing times of rival discos, laying on late nightbuses
andspecialroutestoandfromfootballgames,advisingretailersaboutsecurity,encouraginglocalauthoritiestoco-ordinatethevariousagenciesthatdealwithcrimeand,ofcourse,encouragingcitizens
to set up NeighbourhoodWatchschemes.Incontrastto
traditionalcriminology,this approachno longertakes the state
anditsagenciesto bethe primaryor proximateactors inthe business of
crime control.Andtothe extentthatit depicts a criminal subject,this
figureis no longer the poorlysocializedmisfitinneedof assistance,
butinsteadanillicit,opportunisticconsumer,whoseaccesstosocialgoodsmustbebarred.Thiscriminalfiguresometimesdescribedas'situa-tionalman'(CornishandClark1986a:4)lacksastrongmoralcompassorany6Untilrecently,officialdiscourseabout
crimeandmostacademiccriminologyviewedthe problemof crime
fromthepointofviewofthecriminal
justicesystem,seeingcrimeasaproblemofindividualcriminals,andcriminalsastypifiedby
those in captivity. The officialendorsement of the new
criminologies of everyday life representsa shiftin per-spectiveof
major significance.Explaining how and why that shift came about is
an importanttopic for research.7"Crime maybeseenas arisk to
bemanaged1(HomeOffice1993: 2). The(forward-looking)perspectiveof
pmtntiontends to view offendingas an aggregate risk, while the
(backward-looking)perspectiveof punishment views
offendingasanindividualwrongdoingShiftingfromoneperspectivetotheotherthereforehassignificantmoralconsequences,cf.Fedey
andSimon1992 and 1994.* As Nigel Wilker puts it Thepotential
offendersare numerous and by no means always recognisable.By
contrast, wedo at least knowwhat property we want to protect,and
where it is'(Walker198& p.v\451 at Universidade do Porto on
October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from
DAVIDGARLANDeffectiveinternalcontrols,asidefromacapacityforrationalcalculationandawilltopleasure.Inthehandsofotherwriters,thismightbeintendedasaformofculturalcritiqueoracommentaryoncontemporaryconsumeristmores.
No
suchsignificanceisconveyedbythecriminologicaltexts.TheresponsibilizationstrategyThesenewcriminologiesarefarfrombeingfullytranslatedintogovernmentpolicy,butalreadyonecantracetheemergenceof
newstrategiesandtechniqueswhich
flowfromthisframework.Inparticular,therehasdevelopedanewmodeofgoverningcrimewhichIwouldcharacterizeasaresponsibilizationstategy.Thisinvolvesthecen-tralgovernmentseekingtoactuponcrimenotinadirectfashionthroughstateagencies(police,courts,prisons,socialwork,etc.)butinsteadbyactingindirectly,seekingtoactivateactiononthepartofnon-stateagenciesandorganizations.Thisisthe
essence of the new crime preventionapproachdevelopedby the
UKgovernmentinthelast10years.11Itskeyphrasesaretermssuchas'partnership','inter-agencyco-operation','themulti-agencyapproach','activatingcommunities',creating'activecitizens','helpforself-help'.Itsprimaryconcernis
todevolveresponsibilityforcrimepreventionontoagencies,organizationsandindividualswhicharequiteoutsidethestateandtopersuadethemtoactappropriately.Theresponsibilizationstrategyinvolvesanumberofnewtechniquesandmethodswherebydiestateseekstobringaboutactiononthepartof'private'agenciesandindividualseitherby
'stimulatingnew forms of behaviour'or by
'stoppingestablishedhabits'(RileyandMayhew1980:15).Thefirststepis'toidentifypeopleororgan-izationswhichhavethecompetencetoreducecriminalopportunitieseffectively,and.
.
.toassessbothwhetherthosehavearesponsibilitytodosoandwhetherthisresponsibilitycanbeenforced.'(Houghetal.1980:16).Anumberoftargetsandtechniquesof
persuasionare identifiedby such analyses. Thesimplestof
these,butalsothemostwide-ranging,is the
publicitycampaign,targetedatthepublicasawholeorelsespecificgroupsof
potentialvictimsoroffenders.Thesecampaigns,whichinvolveextensivemass
mediaadvertisingorelse themass leafletingof
households,aimtoraiseconsciousness,createa sense of duty,andthus
changepractices.Similarly,expertsup-portandencouragementhasbeenofferedtocitizenself-helpgroups(suchas'Neigh-ComishandClarke(1986&15)do,however,posethefollowingquestion:'Ifcriminalbehaviourisportayedasrational,normaland
commonplace,what willbethe effectupon everydaythinking and
moralizing about crime?110See Pat CMalley,unpublished paper on
'Post-KeynesianPolicing' which describes how contemporary police
policiesseekto shiftthe responsibilityfor crime prevention on to
the individual and the marketSee also CMalley1992 and
1994whichlocatesthis,and the rise of situationalcrime
preventiondiscourses,withina broader 'nco-liberaJ'
politicalforma-tion. As CMalleypoints out, similar shifts of
responsibility from the state to the private sector are occurring
in areas suchas pensions,welfareand
healthcare.Crimepreventionisnot,ofcourse,anewconcernof
government.Butwhenthegovernmentandpartypoliticalreports of
the1960s(LabourParty 1964; HomeOffice1964;
ConservativeParty1966)mentionedcrime prevention,theycalledfor
comprehensivestateaction,andfor theco-ordinationof the various
state agenciesinvolvednotforthe
acti-vationofprivateorganizationsandindividuals.Andtheircrimecontrolprogrammesweretargeteduponcriminaloffenders,not
upon criminalevents and the victims of
crime.acf.EngstadandEvans(1980): 'It ismost unlikelythatthe group
or corporatebodyto whomresponsibilityis
beingshiftedwillimmediatelyacknowledgethattheirpropertyoroperationsaregeneratingasubstantialstraininpoliceresources,acceptthat
they have a duty,up to their competence,for the control of crime,
andtake appropriateaction.Inourview,thefailureof many...crime
controleffortscan beattributedto theabsenceof somemeansof
ensuringthatmembers of the communityinvolved acceptedand
effectivelydischarged their responsibilities.1(pp. 6-7).452 at
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SOVEREIGNSTATEbourhoodWatch'),whichhavebecomeacentralplankof
governmentcrimepreven-tionpolicy,andserveasamodelformoreambitiousandmoreeffectiveformsof
co-operationbetweenthepublicandtheprivaterealms.Thegovernmenthasalsoestablishedaseriesof
organizationsandprojectssuchasCrimeConcernUKandtheSaferCitiesschemes,theremitof
whichistosetupcrimepreventionprojectsandtoestablbh local non-state
or semi-state structures which will help govern
crimeproblemsbymeansofinter-agencyco-operationandtheactivationoflocalinitiatives.Withinthestateagenciesthemselves,organizationalchangehasbeenintroducedtofurthertheseends,withthepromotionofstrategicplanning,inter-agencyco-operation,andshareddecisionmakingbetweendepartmentswhichwerepreviouslyquiteseparate.ThemostprominentoftheseistheMinisterialGrouponCrimePrevention,estab-lishedin1986topromotehighlevelco-operationbetweendepartments,butthestrategyofmovingbeyondthetraditionalcrimecontroldemarcationsisnowbeingreplicatedatall
levels of
government.Therecurringmessageofthisapproachisthatthestatealoneisnot,andcannoteffectivelybe,responsibleforpreventingandcontrollingcrime.14Propertyowners,residents,retailers,manufacturers,townplanners,schoolauthorities,transportman-agers,employers,parents,andindividualcitizensallofthesemustbemadetorecognizethattheytoohavearesponsibilityinthisregard,andmustbepersuadedtochangetheirpracticesinordertoreducecriminalopportunitiesandincreaseinformalcontrols.Ineffect,centralgovernmentis,inthisfieldofpolicyasinseveralothers,operatingupontheestablishedboundarieswhichseparatetheprivatefromthepublicrealm,
seeking to renegotiatethe question of whatis properly a state
functionandwhatis
not.Sometimesoutcomesareachievedmerelythroughgovernmentalexhortation,aswherecarmanufacturersarepersuadedtobuildingreatersecurityintheirproducts,orinsurancecompaniesareencouragedtogivediscountsinareaswhereNeighbour-hoodWatchschemesoperate.Sometimespersuasiontakestheformoftheanalysisofinterests,forexamplewhereretailersandcity-centrefirmsareshowndataonthefearofcrimeandhowthisaffectstheirtrade,inordertoencouragethemtoadoptimprovedsecuritypracticesandco-operatein
jointinitiatives.Increasinglypreventiveactiontakestheformof
establishingco-operative,inter-agencystructureswhichbringtogetherpublicandprivateorganizationsinordertoinitiatelocalprojects.Occasion-allytoo,
moreforcefulmethodsareproposed.Ithas
beensuggested,forexample,thatthe governmentmightmake retailfirmsdo
moreto
reduceshopliftingandretailcrimebythreateningtoshiftthecostsofretailtheftprosecutionsontotheretailersthem-selves(seeHoughet
al.1980:14). Thisideaofrevertingtoasystemof
privateprose-cutionshowshowtheresponsibilizationstrategymergesneadyintostrategiesofprivatizationandpublicexpenditurereductionwhichcommandedsuchsupportfromconservativegovernmentsinthe1980s
and1990s.15aTheimportanceofNeighbourhoodWatchandrelatedsurveillancescheme*suchai'cabwatch'
and'hojpitalwatch'asexemplarsofthegovernment'sprojectfor
devolvedcrimecontrolisdemonstratedbythefactthatpoliticalcommitmentto
these schemafar outruns their level of success in preventing
crime(see Jones tl al.1994).MOne might say that governmentpolicy
has begun to acknowledge what sociologistshave always known to be
truenamely, that the processes which produce order and
conformityare the mainstreamsocial processes, not the
backgroundthreat of legalsanctions,forinstance, see Croft(1980: p.
v).aFor a vivid example of howthese strategies can be combined, see
OsbomeandGaebler (1993).453 at Universidade do Porto on October 13,
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DAVIDGARLANDItshouldbe emphasizedthatthe responsibilization
strategy does not entailthe simpleoff-loadingofstatefunctions.Noris
itsimplythe'hivingoff*orthe'privatization'ofcrimecontrol,althoughoneofitsmajoreffectshascertainlybeentostimulatethemarket
for private security (see Johnson1992). Rather it is a new form of
governance-at-a-distance,which represents, in this field at least,
a new mode of exercising power. It is anewmodeof
governingcrime,withits ownformsof knowledge,its
ownobjectives,itsowntechniquesandapparatuses.16Thestatedoesnotdiminishorbecomemerelyanightwatchman.Onthecontrary,itretainsallitstraditionalfunctionsthestateagencies
haveactuallyincreasedtheirsize andoutputduringthe same
periodand,inaddition,takesonanewsetofco-ordinatingandactivatingroles,which,intime,develop
into new structures of support,funding,informationexchange
orco-operation.Where it worksand one should not underestimate the
difficultiesinvolved in making itworktheresponsibilizationstrategy
leaves the centralized state machine
morepower-fulthanbefore,withanextendedcapacityforactionandinfluence.Atthesametime,however,
this strategy serves to erode the notion of the state as the
public'srepresentativeandprimaryprotector.Itmarkswhatmaybethebeginningofanimportantre-configurationofthe'criminaljusticestate'anditsrelationtothecitizen.Otherdevelopmentssuchastheriseofthevictims'movement(seeRock1990)andtheenhancedrolenowaccordedtovictimsinthecriminalandsentencingprocess,orthedevelopmentofreparationandmediationschemesonthefringesofthesystem(seeWrightandGalaway1989)reinforcethe
viewthatsucha reconfigurationmaybe inthe process of
occurring.Theideaof aresponsibilizationstrategyimpliesthatthestate
is
takingonanambi-tiousnewrole,notmerely'passingthebuck','gettingoffthehook'or'takingabackseat'.Itisexperimentingwithwaysofactingatadistance,ofactivatingthegovern-mentalpowersof'private'agencies,of
co-ordinatinginterestsandsettingupchains
ofco-operativeaction,allofwhichpresentmanymoredifficultiesthanthetraditionalmethodofissuingcommandstostateagenciesandtheirfunctionaries.Itis
seekingtoimplement'social'and'situationaPformsofcrimepreventionwhichinvolvethere-orderingoftheconductofeverydayliferightacrossthesocialfield.Andalthoughmanyof
these projectsare modest,low-keyand localizedin theirgoals,
theprogrammeis,inprinciple,muchmorewide-rangingandambitiousthanwasthepenal-welfareprojectof
reformingoffenders.Wherethe
stateoncetargetedthedeviantforintensivetransformativeaction,it now
aims to bringaboutmarginalbut effectivechanges
inthenorms,theroutines,andtheconsciousnessof everyone.As
arecentgovernmentdocu-mentputsit,crimepreventionshouldbecome'partof
theroutinedaytodaypracticeandcultureof
allagenciesandindividuals'(HomeOffice1993:
16).Thepracticalproblemsinvolvedinthisnewrolearenowthesubjectofdozensofgovernmentresearchpublicationswhichdetailtheobstaclestomulti-agencyworking,theresistanceitisliabletoencounter,andthebestmeansofmanipulatingdiverse16
On governmentat a distance, see Rose andMiller(1992). On the
cultural and social conditions which make possiblethis newform of
governing,and give it wide extensionat every level of
authority,from central governmentto family
andworkplacerelations,seeA.deSwaan(1990).deSwaanelaboratesacontrastbetweenmanagementbycommandandmanagementby
negotiation,and describesthe recent culturalshifttowards the latter
in all spheres.17 Onsimilar developmentsin otherareas of
government-socialinteraction, seeKooiman(1993). See alsoEUmomy
andSocitiy (1993). Nikolas Rose (1993) and others use the
term'advanced liberalism' to discuss similar patterns of governance
incontemporary states. See also CMalley(1994 \For a discussion of
nineteenth century examples of action at a distance inrespect of
child welfare,seeDonxelot(1980).454 at Universidade do Porto on
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LIMITS OF THESOVEREIGN
STATEinterestsintocrimecontrolalliances(secEngstadandEvans1980;Gladstone1980;Hope1985;
HealandLaycock1986a;LiddleandGelsthope1994a,b). A need
fornewexpertsin'co-ordination'and'inter-agencyworking'hasbeendiscovered,heraldingthedevelopmentofastrangenew'specialism'whichwillbedennedbyitsintersticialroleandits
interdisciplinaryskills(Hope1985: 42; HealandLaycock1986a:132).
Atthesametime,anewformofknowledgeisbeingassembledwhichwillsupportandextendthisstrategyinthesamewaythatpositivistcriminologyoncesupportedstrategicsof
rehabilitationandindividualcorrection.And,likethatearlierknowledgeofthecriminalindividual,whichgrewupquietlyintheroutinesofinstitutionalpractice,thisnewknowledgeisdevelopinginoutofthewayreportsandresearchstudies
whichreceivelittlepublicattentionorscrutiny.Adapting to
failureForthestateagenciesof criminal justicethatis
tosay,forthepolice,thecourts,theprisons,probation,andsoonthenormalityofhighratesofcrimeincontemporarysociety
presents new problemsof legitimacyandnewproblemsof
overload.Thefailureof crimecontrolis experiencedas
afailure,aboveall,of
thepolice,thecourtsandtheprisons,andhasledtoareformulationof
objectivesandprioritiesintheseorganiza-tions.Theincreasesinrecordedcrimehavealsohadthepracticaleffectofmassivelyincreasingthe'throughput'ofthecriminaljusticeprocess,withsteepincreasesincrimes
reportedto the police, prosecutions brought,cases
triedandoffenderspunished.Oneconsequenceisthattheorganizationshavehadtoexpandandtransformtheirpractices
inordertokeeppacewiththeirnewworkload.Oneresponsetotheproblemofoverloadhasbeentodevelopnewstrategiesofsystemintegrationandsystemmonitoring,whichseektoimplementalevelof
processandinformationmanagementwhich was previously lacking(see
Morgan1985;
Moxon1985;Lygo1991).ThissystematizationofcriminaljusticewhichhasbeenlargelysponsoredbytheHomeOfficehaspermittedagreaterlevelofco-ordinationandplanningtotakeplace,andhasbeenusedtobringaboutparticularpolicyobjectives,suchas
thereductionintheuse of custodialpenaltiesfor
juvenileoffenders(seeCava-dinoandDignan1992: 211-20).Arelated
developmentisthewidespreadmovementtowardsamoremanagerialist,business-likeethos
whichemphasizeseconomy,efficiencyandeffectivenessin the use
ofcriminal
justiceresources.CentralgovernmentinitiativessuchastheFinancialMan-agementInitiativehavebeenappliedtoallpublicservices,including(belatedly)thepolice,thecourts,theprisonsandcommunitymeasures,andhaveledtothedevelop-mentofclearlyspecified'performanceindicators'againstwhichtheorganization'sactivitiescanbemeasured,as
wellasanemphasisuponstrategicplanning,lineman-agement,devolvedbudgetsandfinancialresponsibilitywithintheagencies(seeRaineandWillson1993;
Humphrey1991).Themostpublicizedaspectsof
thishavebeenthevariousmeasuresofprivatizationwhichhavetakenplace,transferringspecificcriminal
justicefunctionstocommercialconcernsinanewformof
contractprovision(Young1987;
HomeAffairsCommittee19876).Alsoimportanthowever,isthetransformationofstatedepartments(suchastheprisonservice)intosemi-autonomousagencies
whichareallocatedabudgetandapolicybrief,butaresupposedlygivenindependentcontrolofinternalissuesofman-455
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DAVIDGARLANDagementandpolicyimplementation(Jordan1992).
Theintroductionof largernum-bers of volunteergroups(e.g.
specialconstables,
volunteerprobationofficers,etc.)andthe'civilianization'of manytasks
thatwere previously undertakenby trainedpolice
orprisonofficershavealsohelpedreduceexpenditure(Joneset al. 1994:
ch. 4).Thisnewethos also entails aconcernwith whatmightbe
called'customerrelations'.Stateagenciesincreasinglyredefinetheirmissionintermsofservingparticular'con-sumers'(suchasvictimsandtheirfamilies,oreveninmates)andbeingresponsivetotheirexpressedneeds,ratherthanservingthemoreabstract,top-downnotionofthepublicgood.Hencethepracticeof
conductingsurveysoftheviewsof consumersandthedevelopmentof
objectivesandprioritieswhichseektorespondtothese(See Woz-niak1994;
ScottishPrisonService1992; Commissionerof
MetropolitanPolice1987).Defining deviancedownPerhaps the major
system adaptation to high crime rates and high case loads has been
thetendency of the criminal justice agencies to limit the level of
demand placed upon them byresort to a variety of devices which
effectively'definedeviance
down'(Moynihan1992),eitherbyfilteringitoutof
thesystemaltogether,orekeloweringthedegreetowhichcertainbehavioursarecriminalizedandpenalized.Thisprocess
occursatthe'shallow'andhencelessvisibleendofcriminaljusticeandcan,therefore,developlargelyun-announcedby
way of discretionarydecisions taken by police andprosecutors
wellawayfromthe gaze of the mediaandpoliticalactors.(The lack of
scrutinythatfacilitatesthe'definingdown' strategy also facilitates
its pathologies, such as the dilution of due processand the
production of'convictionrecords' which are not subject to legal
proof (see
Cohen1985)).Thisstrategyhasbeenmadepossiblebyaculturalcontextinwhichthecrim-inalizationof
minorviolationsis oftenviewedas
counterproductive,andbyabureau-cratic context in which such
criminalization is viewed as unnecessarily expensive.The 'defining
down' process has a number of aspects. It includes the widespread
use ofcautioninganddiversion fromprosecution,andthe developmentof
fixed
penaltiesandsummaryhearingsforoffencesthatwerepreviouslyprosecutedatmoreseriouslevels(Ditchfield1976;
HomeOffice1985; Dahrendorf1985).Itincludestheuse of
commu-nityandmonetarypenaltiesforcrimesthatwouldoncehaveattractedcustodialsen-tences,andthedecriminalizationofbehavioursthatwereonceroutinelyprosecuted(Bottoms1983).Italsoincludesdecisionsbythepolicethattheywillnolongeruseinvestigative
resources on certain offences which have a low likelihood of
detection and alow priority forthepublic, in orderto conserve
resources forthose crimes
whichcanbetargetedandinvestigatedeffectively.Thistendencyhasbeendevelopingsincethe1970s,butithasrecentlybecomemorevisible,andhencemorecontroversial.ThedevelopmenthasbeenendorsedbytheAuditCommission(1993),butithasalsometcriticismfromvictims
of the manyoffenceswhich now fallbelowthethresholdof
policeinterest.Theimpactof'definingdown'is,ineffect,theoppositeofthe'net-widening'ten-dencythatisfrequentlyattributedtocontemporarycrimecontrolpractices.Itscon-cernis
to letminoroffencesandoffendersfallbelowthethresholdof
officialnoticetoIwouldargue that this strategy of'definingdeviance
down' iiindeed a "strategy1 which upatterned, systematic
andresource-driven. The developments describedhere are not limpjy
the effectsof historically changing cultural views
aboutoffenceseriousness,though of course atttudes and practice!
tend to reinforceeach other over time.456 at Universidade do Porto
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THELIMITSOF THESOVEREIGNSTATEallow themto slip a'net'thatis in
dangerof bursting atthe seams.
Inthisdevelopmenttheradicalforceatworkis
notthecriticalcriminologyof
writerslikeStanCohenandNilsChristie,whoarguethatcriminalizationisoftenanevilinitself,butinsteadtheAuditCommissionandthegovernment'sFinancialManagementInitiatives,whoseconcernistofindwaysofreducingpublicexpenditureandimprovinggovernmentperformance.ThusinarecentReport(1989),
theAuditCommissionwarnedthattheProbationServiceshouldguardagainst'net-widening',asitcalledit,notbecauseitpullsmorepeopleintothesystemandincreasesthenetofpenalcontrol,butsimplybecauseit
is deemedto befinanciallywasteful.Inthe lightof these
developmentsandin view of thetendencytothinkof thestateas
foreverseekingtoextendthetentaclesof
controlweshouldremindourselvesthatCohen'stheoryof
net-widening(seeCohen1985: ch.2)is
originallyastorynotaboutexpansionism,butratheraboutafailedrcductionism.Net-wideningisgenerallytheunplannedcorollaryofattemptstoscaledownorinformalizepenaltystructures.Whereitoccurs,
itis usuallyunderstoodas thecovertachievementof the
variouspro-fessionalgroupswhohaveastakeinthesocialcontrolbusiness(Cohen1985:
ch.5).Whatis tooeasily
forgottenisthattherearealsootherinterestsatworksuchastheinterestsof
theTreasuryandlocalauthoritybudgetholdersthatareopposedtotheunplannedextensionof
controlmeasuresonthegroundsof cost(nottomentionthosecriminal
justiceprofessionals,whoareopposedonprincipletotheovercriminalizatdonoftheirclients)andwhichcanbeeffectiveinavertingsuchoutcomesbythecarefulmonitoringofpolicyimplementation.Ifthereisatendencyto'net-widening'intheBritishpenalsystem,itseemsprobablethatthisisamarginalandcontradictoryaspectthoughonewhichisimportantforthoseinvolvedofamorefundamentaltendencytowardstherelaxationof
penalcontrolsinrespectof
minorviolationsofthecriminallaw.19Despitethesewell-documentedtendenciestodefinedeviancedown,thenumbersprocessedthroughthestatesystemhavecontinuedtoexpand,inpartbecauseofthegrowing
levels of crime, in partbecause the tendencies describedso farhave
beenoffsetbyapunitivecounter-tendencywhichIwilldescribeinamoment.20Wearethusexperiencingasituationrathermorecomplexthan'net-widening'oneinwhichthestateagencies
of criminal justicehave been steadily increasingin size,
in'productivity',andin the numbers of cases processed,atthe same
time as they have beenreducingtheextentto
whichtheyprocessandpenalizeminoroffencebehaviour.19AJ farasI
amawaretherehaibeennoresearchwhichcompare!overtimethesizeof
thecriminal justice'net' in theUKin a waywhichis sensitiveto
thechangingratesof
criminalcases.(Andofcourse,thefactthatmanyoffencesdo notnowresultin
officialactionmakessuchcomparisonshighlyproblematic).Thetimeperiodschosenwould,of
course,becrucialto theanalysisforexample,the'net1 of
penal-weliarecontrolover juvenilesinEnglandand
Walesseemstohaveexpandedduringthe1970s,beforecontractingagaininthe1980s(seeGelsthorpeandMorris1994).For
somediscussion ofthemethodologyrequiredforempiricalstudiesof
'net-widening" seeMacMahon(1992).20The'WaragainstDrugs'andthe
escalationof penalizationthatthishas involvedin the UK and the
USAare acentralelementin
thispunitivecounter-tendency.Heredeviancehascertainlybeendefinedup(thoughpossessionofsoftdrugshasbeendifactodecriminalizedin
someregions),as it has beenin respectof
somesexualandsomeviolentoffenceswherethethresholdsof
tolerancehaveundergonechange(seeKrauthammer1993).FeeleyandSimon(1992)andSimon(1993)haveoutlinedkeyaspectsof
changingpolicyandorganizationaladaptationsastheyhaveoccurredintheUSA.
SeealsoCMal l e y(1992).457 at Universidade do Porto on October 13,
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DAVIDGARLANDRedefining successand
failureAmajorwayinwhichstateagencieshavereactedtocriticismisbyscalingdownexpectations,redefiningtheiraims,
andseekingto changethecriteriaby
whichfailureandsuccessarejudged.Tosomeextent,thisaccordswiththeresponsibilizationstrategydescribedearlier,so
thatnowadays
policeandprisonauthoritiesarequicktopointtothelimitationsof
theircontributiontothecontrolof crime.Thepolice still claimsuccess
in detecting serious crime,
andinapprehendingseriouscriminals,buttheyholdoutlow
expectationsforthecontrolof whattheynowrefertoas'
random'or'opportunistic'offending.Similarly,theprisonauthoritiesfocusmoreandmoreupontheirabilitytoholdoffenderssecurelyincustody(andthus'incapaci-tate'them2),andnolongerholdoutmuchprospectofproducingrehabilitativeeffects.Atthesametime,thediscourseoftheseagenciesshiftstheresponsibilityforoutcomesontothe'customers'withwhomthey
deal, so thattheinmateis now
saidtoberesponsibleformakinguseofanyrefomativcopportunitiesthattheprisonmightoffer,while
the police emphasizethatit is the victim's responsibilityto
protectpropertyandavoiddangeroussituations.22Increasinglytheseorganizationsseekto
beevaluatedbyreferencetointernalgoals,over whichtheyhave neartotal
control,ratherthanby referenceto social goals such
asreducingcrimerates,catchingcriminals or reforminginmates,allof
whichinvolvetoomanycontingenciesanduncertainties.Thenewperformanceindicatorstendtomeas-ure'outputs'ratherthan'outcomes',23whattheorganizationdoes,ratherthanwhat,ifanything,itachieves.Prisonregimesareassessedinterms
of thenumberof
hourswhichinmatesspendin'purposefulactivity',notintermsofwhethertheseprogrammesreducesubsequentoffending(ScottishPrisonService1993).24Policeforcesasktobejudgedinterms
of the numberof officerson the beat,orthenumberof
emergencycallsprocessed,or othermeasures
of'economyandefficiency',notbythe
effecttheseactionshavehaduponrates of
crimeorcriminalconvictions(Commissionerof
theMetropolis1987).Inmuchthesameway,theshiftof
sentencingpolicytowardsa'justdeserts'model,whateverthe other
dynamics which have brought it about(see Duff
andGarland1994),involvesamoveawayfromautilitarianframeworkinwhichsentencersseektobringaboutasocialoutcomenamelythereductionof
crimethroughdeterrentorreforma-tive sentencingto one where the key
objective(fittingthe punishmentto the
offence)isBThenotionof'incapadtation'ortheuseofcuitodyto
preventreofTendingby high-rateordangerousoffender!ii
nimportantaspectof the new concerntomanagebothrikand
resourcesincoit-effectivewayi(tee Z imring
andHawkins1995).Apolicyofselectiveincapadtationaimstokeepconfinedforlongperiodsthoseoffenderswhoareregardedas
aseriouscrimerisk,andto uselessexpensivecommunitypunishmentsfor
thosewhoare judgedto be lesserrisks. Thereis,of course,a
usefulambiguityin themeaningof
longsentencesofimprisonment,whichcanberegarded
asinstrumentalformsof incapadtationas wellas expressiveformsof
punitiveness.Thatlong-termimprisonment'incapac-itates' in
otherwaysreducingthesocialandpersonalcapacitiesof
theprisoner,andtheabilityto resumenormalsodallifeon releaseisa
barelysuppressedpunitiveaspectof
thispolicy.acthedevelopmentof'contract'-basedrelationshipsin
probation,communi
tyservice,andmostrecently,inprisonregimes,whichexplidUyholdtheoffenderorinmateresponsiblefor
a courseof prescribedconduct.OnthisseeD.Nelken(1989)andA. E.
Bottoms(1994).23I amgratefulto mycolleagueDavid
J.Smithforbringingthiswayofphrasingthedistinctionto
myattention.24Therapeuti
candrehabilitativeprogrammeshavecontinuedtooperatein
Britishprisonsduringthe1980sand1990s.Buttheyare nowseenas
"specialistservices'ratherthanthe vanguardof agenera]policyof
rehabilitation,and theseatypicalregimecharacteristicsnolongerpropup
the systemsgeneralideology.Thi schangeheraldsanew
realismofrepresentation,butit alsosignalsthewayin whichcriminal
justicehasbecomedisconnectedfromideologiesofsolidarity.458 at
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THESOVEREIGN STATEwell withinthe capacity of the courts, and thus
much less likely to 'fail'. The same
mightbesaidaboutimprisonment,whichisincreasinglyrepresentedasmerelyameansofincapacitationandpunishment,andalsoaboutcommunitysupervision,whichisincreasinglyrepresentedas
an economical formof'punishmentin
thecommunity'.Criminaljusticeorganizationsareseekingtobecomemoreself-contained,more'autopoietic'(Teubner1993)
and less committedto externally denned social
purposesandtosomeextenttheyareachievingthisdefensivenewstatus.Butwhilethecentralgovernmenthasencouragedandcolludedinthesereducedandmorerealisticmissionstatements,partof
thecostof failureis thatthese agenciesareno
longerpermittedtheprofessionalautonomy and discretion with which
they were once
entrusted.Increasinglyagencieslikethepolice,probationandprisons,whichwereoncegivenamission,abudgetandadegreeof
freedomtogetonwithit,arenow subjecttodetailednationalstandardsset
by central government,andare closely monitoredand inspectedto
ensurethat practice and resource-use complies with these
instructions. The central state may bewideningits rangeof
actionandinfluencethroughthe indirectmeans describedabove,butit has
also tightenedits grip upon its own agencies
andemployees.25Bythesevariousmeans,thecrimecontrolagenciesofthestatehavebeguntorep-resentthemselves
in ways which suggesta more modest, andmore
self-containedremit.Thepromisetodeliver'lawandorder1andsecurity
forallcitizensis
nowincreasinglyreplacedbyapromisetoprocesscomplaintsorapplypunishmentsina
just,efficientandcost-effectiveway.Thereisanemergingdistinctionbetweenthepunishmentofcrime,
whichremainsthe business of the state(andas we will see, becomes
onceagain,asignificantsymbolofstatepower)andthecontrolofcrime,whichisincreasinglydeemedtobe'beyondthestate'insignificantrespects.DenialasaReactiontothePredicamentUptothispointIhavebeendescribingaseriesofgovernmentalandorganizationalresponsestowhatItermedthepredicamentofcrimecontrolinlatemodernsociety.Whateveronethinksof
them,thesestrategiesarecertainlymarkedbyahighlevelofadministrativerationality,andadegreeoforganizationalcreativity.However,theyformonlyoneaspectofaverycontradictoryresponse.Atthesametimethattheadministrativemachineof
thestatehasbeendevisingstrategiestoadapttoitslimita-tionsinrespectofcrimecontrol,andthuscometotermswiththeuncomfortablerealities,
the politicalarmof the statehas frequentlyengagedin a formof
denialwhichappearsincreasinglyhystericalintheclinicalsense of
thatterm.33This teenuto throw some doubt on the claimmade by
Bottoms and Wiles(1984)that a 'hollowing out of the state'
isoccurring in respect of crime control.28In Reudianterms, 'denial'
is a psychic defencemechanismby means of whichsome
painfulexperienceorreality isrefusedaccessto consciousness.
'Hysterical' behaviouris conductentailing 'conversion-symptoms'
which disguisethe psy-chicproblem whichlieattheirroot
Theimplicationisthatthe observedphenomenashouldnot
betakenattheirfacevalue and that they are intended to draw or
distractattention(Rycroft1968). The distinctionsuggestedhere
between thepoliticalandthe administrativeaspects of the state is
clearlyundertheorized.Idealtypically,it seeks to capture the
dis-tinctionbetweenthe conductand discourseof elected
politicians,directedtowardspopularpoliticalaudiences, andtheconduct
of state officials,directed towards the rational and
efficientpursuit of policy goals. Politics and administration do,of
course,intersectand interact,but to
specifythismorepreciselywouldrequiremore empiricaldetailthan can be
pre-sented here.See for instance the account of victim policy
formationin theHome Officein Rock(1990).459 at Universidade do
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from
DAVIDGARLANDInthefaceofevidencethatcrimedoesnotreadilyrespondtoseveresentences,ornewpolicepowers,oragreateruseofimprisonment,theBritishgovernment(likeotherselsewhere)has
frequentlyadopteda punitive'lawand order'stancethat seeks
todenyconditionswhichareelsewhere acknowledgedandto reassertthe
state'spowertogovernbyforceof
command.Sometimesthepunitivepronouncementsofgovernmentministersarebarelyconsideredattemptstoexpresspopularfeelingsof
rageandfrus-trationinthewakeofparticularlydisturbingcrimes,suchasthenewpowersofimprisonmentwhichfollowedtheconvictionof
youthsforthemurderof
JamesBulgerin1993.Usuallypunitivepoliciescanalsoclaimaninstrumentalrationale(asinpoliciesofcustodialincapacitation,theprisonbuildingprogramme,andthenewpowerstopassverylongsentencesoncertainoffenders)whichlinks
punitivenesswitheffectivecrimecontrol,howevercontroversialthismaybe.Buttogetherwiththeirexpressiveorreductionistobjectives,these
'lawandorder'policies
frequentlyinvolveaknowingandcynicalmanipulationof the symbols of
state powerandof the emotions
offearandinsecuritywhichgivethesesymbolstheirpotency.Suchpoliciesbecomeparticularlysalientwhereamoregeneralinsecurityderivingfromtenuousemploy-mentandfragilesocialrelationsiswidelyexperiencedandwherethestateis
deemedtohavefailedinits effortsto delivereconomicsecurityto key
socialgroups.MichelFoucault(1977),inhisdescriptionoftheexecutionofRobertDamiens,showedingraphic
detailhow harshpunishmentshave beenusedas public displays of
aruler'spower,designedtoreaffirmtheforceofthelawandreactivatethemythofsovereignty.Andthough
JohnMajoris hardlyLouis XV,wheneverhe orhisministersadopttheposture
of being 'toughon
criminals','condemningmoreandunderstandingless',andensuring'
thatcriminalsarefrightened,notthelaw-abidingpublic'(see,forexample,Howard1993,
Major1994),andwheneverthey flourish new
powerstosendoffenderstobootcamps,ortosupermaxprisons,ortolifeimprisonment,theyaredeliberatelydeployingthesamearchaicstrategy.Ashowofpunitiveforceagainstindividualsisusedtorepressanyacknowledgementofthestate'sinabilitytocontrolcrimetoacceptablelevels.Awillingnesstodeliverharshpunishmentstoconvictedoffendersmagicallycompensatesa
failureto deliver security to the
populationatlarge.Thispunitivenesshascomplexroots.Itisbynowadeep-rootedaspectofourculture,embeddedinthecommon-senseofthepublic,thepoliceandthejudiciary(Garland1990).Deliberateattemptsbygovernmenttomodifythiscultureforinstanceinthestrategyof'punishmentinthecommunity'inthelate1980shaveshowntheresilience
of the demandforharsh, custodialpenalties. There is
alsopressureupongovernmenttorespondtocriticismsoftheadaptivestrategiesdiscussedabove,particularlywhentheadministrativetendencytodefinedeviancedownproducesresults
whichsections of the public andthe media find
unacceptable.(Recentexamplesincludeprisonsecuritybreaches;'bailbandits',violentoffenderswhoareparoledandthenreoffend;young
repeatoffenderswho appearto have
immunityfrompunishment,andsoon.)Buttheessentialattractivenessof
thepunitiveresponseis
thatitcanberepresentedasanauthoritativeinterventiontodealwithaserious,anxiety-riddenproblem.Such17The
Home Secrettry announced in October1993 that he would introduce
legislation to set up secure centra" for 12-14 year olds, and would
double themaximum lentence for persistent juvenileoffenders(Howard
1993).See Wrong(1994)on fear of violence and insecurity as a
motivating factor in political action.460 at Universidade do Porto
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THELIMITS OF
THESOVEREIGNSTATEactiongivestheappearancethat'somethingisbeingdone'here,now,swiftlyanddecisively.Likethedecisiontowagewar,thedecisiontoinflictharshpunishmentexemplifiesthesovereignmodeof
stateaction.Noneedforco-operation,nonegotia-tion,noquestionof
whetherornotitmight'work'.Punishmentis anactof
sovereignmight,aperformativeactionwhichexemplifieswhatabsolutepowerisallabout.Moreover,itis
asovereignactwhichtendstocommandwidespreadpopularsupport,andhereatleastStuartHall's
suggestionof'authoritarianpopulism'tendsto ringtrue(Hall1988).Noris
itmerelyagesturewithoutbroadereffects.Inasociety
whichmanifestsdeepsocialandracialdivisions,whichexperienceshighcrimeratesandlevels
ofinsecurity,wherewelfaresolutionshavebeenpoliticallydiscredited,andinwhichadevelopingcommercialsectorencouragesandfacilitatestheexpansionof
imprisonmentinotherwordsinsocietiessuchastheUSAortheUKapunitivepoliticalandlegalculturesoongives
rise tomass incarceration,withallof its
socialandfinancialconsequences.Criminologies of the
Other/Criminologiesof theSelfAccompanyingthese punitive policies is
a certaincriminologythat looks
quitedifferentfromthecriminologiesofeverydaylifethatinformthepreventiveandde-escalatingmeasuresdescribedabove.
Whereasthelatterdepicttheoffenderas
arationaloppor-tunist,littledifferentfromhisorhervictim,thecriminologyinvokedbythepunitivestrategyis
oneofessentializeddifference.Itisacriminologyofthealienotherwhichrepresentscriminalsasdangerousmembersofdistinctracialandsocialgroupswhichbearlittleresemblanceto'us'.Itis,
moreover,a'criminology'whichtradesinimages,archetypesandanxieties,ratherthanincarefulanalysesandresearchfindingsmoreapoliticizeddiscourse
of the unconsciousthana
detailedformofknowledge-for-powcr.Punitivepoliciesarepremiseduponcharacterizationsofoffendersas'yobs','pred-ators','careercriminals','sexbeasts',as'evil','wicked',ormemberof
an'underclass'(Coward1994)eachofthesebeing'suitableenemies'(Christie1986)forarulingculturestressingfamilyvalues,
individualenterprise,andthelimitsof welfarism,eachofthemexamplesof
whatMaryDouglasterms'thepoliticaluses of
danger'(Douglas1992).Inthisrhetoric,andinitspolicyeffects,offendersaretreatedasadifferentspeciesof
threatening,violentindividualsforwhomwe canhaveno
sympathyandforwhomthereis no effectivehelp. The
onlypracticalandrationalresponseto suchtypesistohavethem'takenoutof
circulation'fortheprotectionofthepublic,whetherbylong-termimprisonment,as
intheUK,orelse by judicialkilling,as is increasinglythecase in the
USA.So, atthe same time thatshallow-enddeviance is
defineddown,moreseriousoffencesaredealtwithinamuchmorepunitivemanner,withincreasesintheproportionateuseofcustodyforadultoffencesandintheaveragelengthofprisonsentencesduringthe1980s(see
ReinerandCross1991:
2-3).Wethushaveanofficialcriminologywhichisincreasinglydualistic,increasinglypolarized,andincreasinglyambivalent.Thereisacriminologyofthe
self,thatchar-acterizesoffendersasrationalconsumers,
justlikeus;andthereisacriminologyof
theother,ofthethreateningoutcast,thefearsomestranger,theexcludedandtheembit-tered.One
is invokedto routinize crime, to allay
disproportionatefearsandtopromotepreventiveaction.Theotheris
concernedto
demonizethecriminal,toexcitepopularfearsandhostilities,andtopromotesupportforstatepunishment.Theexcluded461
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DAVIDGARLANDmiddle-groundhere,ispreciselytheonce-dominantwelfaristcriminologywhichdepictedtheoffenderasdisadvantagedorpoorlysocializedandmadeitthestate'sresponsibilityinsocialaswellaspenalpolicytotakepositivestepsofaremedialkind.Onemightsaythatweare
developinganofficialcriminologythatfitsoursocialandculturalconfigurationoneinwhichamorality,generalizedinsecurityandenforcedexclusionarecomingtoprevailoverthetraditionsofwelfarismandsocialcitizenship.Inthelightof
theopeningcommentsof thisarticle,itis
worthnotingthatpunitiveoutburstsanddemonizingrhetoricshavefeaturedmuchmoreprominentlyinweakpoliticalregimesthaninstrongones.Significantly,itwasthepowerfulandconfidentthird-termgovernmentofMrsThatcherwhichintroducedradicallegislationtocutcrimecontrolcostsandtode-escalatepenalties.Withinayearoftakingoffice,MrMajor'sgovernmenthadreversedthesepoliciesandreaffirmedacommitmenttothepunitiveuseofimprisonment.Similarly,itwastheClintonadministrationwidelyperceivedatthattimeasweakandfalteringwhichmadeitaprioritytointroducetheUSCrimeActof1994,withitsextendedpowersofcapitalpunishmentandnewmandatorylifesentencesforrepeatfelons.Overthelasttwodecades,punitivepoliciessuchasthesehaveaccompaniedandcontradictedthestrategiesofnormalizingcrime,responsibilizingothersanddefiningdeviancedown.Whereasforonesetofgovernmentalcalculations,highratesofimprisonmentrepresentamajorproblemofcostandineffectivenessthatmustbetackledbyreductionistmeasures(see
HomeOffice1988), foranother,theyrepresentapositivesymbolof
thestate'swillingnessto use forceagainstits
enemiesandtoprotectitsloyalsubjectsbywhatevermeansare'necessary'.Statesovereigntyovercrimehasthusbeensimultaneouslydeniedandsymbolicallyreasserted.Thelimitsof
policeandpunishmentarerecognizedinonepolicyonlytobe
ignoredinanother.Andalthoughthiscontradictionis
sometimesrationalizedasa'policyof
bifurcation',30itsrealrootslieinthepoliticalambivalencewhichresultsfromastateconfrontedbyitsownlimit-ations.Inconsequence,thereis
nowarecurringgapbetweenresearch-basedpolicyadviceandthepoliticalactionwhichensues.Forexample,thetwomostradicalBritishdevelopmentsof
the1980sand1990stheprisonbuildingprogrammeandthepolicyofprisonprivatizationwereinitiatedintheabsenceof
anysubstantialsupportfrompenalexpertsorpractitioners(HomeAffairsCommittee1987a,b).Whereasthe'pre-ventive'strategies
describedabove are premisedupon consolidatedresearch
resultsandclearadministrativerationalities,the'punitive'strategyisdrivenbyapoliticaldynamicratherthanapenologicalone.Onestrategyadaptsitselftotherealityprin-ciplewhiletheotherstrivestodenyit.(Inrespectoftheprison-buildingandprivat-29ThereisatheoreticalpointtobemadehereinrespectoftheworkofMichelFbucaultandhisfollowers.Thedis-cussionshowsthattheanalysisof
strategiesandtechnologiesofpowermustalwaysbeaccompaniedbyananalysisofthepoliticsoftheirexercise,andofthecountervailingforcesrangedagainstthem.Theexerciseofsovereignpenalpowertendstointerrupttheoperationofgovernmentalstrategies,oftenforshort-termpoliticalpurposes.Thisexacerbatesthetensionbetween"thepassionate,morallytoneddesiretopunishandtheadministrative,rationalistic.
. .concerntomanage'(Garland1990:180).3 0'Bifurcation' isapolicy
optionwhichdifferentiatespenalresponseonthe basisof risk
andresourceassessments,assetoutforexampleinthe1991Criminal
JusticeActandthepolicypapersleadinguptoit.Bifurcationasarationallydiffer-entiatedpolicyresponseshouldnotbeconiusedwiththecontradictoryandconflictedpoliciesbeingdescribedhere.Onbifurcationasapolicy,seeBottoms(1983).462
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THESOVEREIGN
STATEizationexamplesgiven,oneshouldaddthattheywerealsodrivenbywhatonemightcall'thepenal-industrialcomplex'thenetworkof
commercialandcapitalistinterestswhichsurroundsandfeedsoffthecontemporarypenalsystem,
justasthearmamentsindustryfeedsoffwarfare(seeChristie1993).Norarcthesetwodivergingstrategiessimplythetwinprongsof
aconcertedpolicyforthe controlof serious crime on the one
hand,andminor crime onthe
other.Foronething,theyoperateonquitecontradictoryassumptionsaboutthecharacterofoffendingandthepossibilitiesforcriminaljusticeinterventions.Foranother,therhetoric,perceptionsandemotionsinvokedbythepunitivestrategyhavetheeffectofunderminingthepreventive,responsibilizingstrategy,andmakingitmore
difficultforthosecommittedtothe latterto
carrytheirpoliciesthrough.TheEclipseof the
SolidarityProjectThedevelopmentswhichIhavedescribedabovebothpreventiveandpunitivehavecalledintoexistenceanaccompanyingcriticaldiscoursewhichhasbeguntoidentifytheproblemsentailedinthisnewschemeofthoughtandaction.Asfortheobjectionstoarevivedpunitiveness,thesehardlyneedtoberecountedasthesehaveformedthebasisofliberalpenologyforthebestpartofacentury.Butthecriticalcommentaryregardingthenewermodesofgoverningcrimeisimportantsinceitidentifiesdangerswhichmightnotbesotransparent(seeBlagget
al.1986;Bottoms1990;Kinsey