Basic concepts
• The payoff matrix
• Nash equilibrium
• Dominant strategies
• Maximin strategies
• Mixed strategies
Game Theory And Oligopoly
• Non cooperative games the prisoner dilemma
• Cooperative games dealing with cheaters
• Sequential games the ad of being first
Introduction
Introduced by
• In 1950s , By John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
• Application –
1. political, courtship, economic issues
2. It could be used to analyze the bargaining
• process between two parties : Wage rate
• negotiation: unions and firms Peace talks:
• between 2 countries.
Assumptions
• Assumptions Finite sets of possible action
• Awareness of availability competitors strategies too Intelligent and rational
• Maximize gain and minimize loss If a’s gain is b’s loss,its 0-sum game (amt of gain=amt of loss) Players act; select their stategies simultaneously
Types of games
Cooperative
when players can negotiate a binding
contract to play joint strategies.
Non-cooperative when game is not
cooperative it is said to be non-cooperative
game.
The Payoff Matrix
It is a course of action taken by 1 of the participants in a game
Pure strategies Selects the same strategy
Mixed strategies-don’t selects the same stategy Payoff: It is the result or outcome of the strategy
Example: 2 children engaged in coin-flipping 2 competing firms whose objective is to increse their profits by price changes
Consider the competition between two department stores, each of which must what kind of clothing to promote
Payoff matrix
0,0 4,2
2,2 2,4
Store 1
Promote girl’s cloth
Promote women’s cloth
Promote girl’s cloth
Promote women’s cloth
Store 2
Profit in millions
A Nash Equilibrium is defined as a set of strategies such that none of the participants in the game can improve their payoff (profits), given the strategies of the other participants.
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Firm
Firm 2
Firm 1
Strategy
No Price Change
Price Change
No Price Change
10,10
100,-30
Price Change
-20,30
140,25
Dominant Strategy(in millions)
Dominant Strategies : Dominant Strategies The dominant strategy is the optimal choice for a player no matter what the opponent does. One firm will be in dominant position in terms of change in strategy.
Firm
Firm 2
Firm 1
Strategy
No New Product
New Product
No New Product
4,6
3,6
New Product
6,3
2,2
Max min Strategy
New Product
No New Product
No New Product
Firm 1
New Product
Strategy
Firm 2
Nas
h
Equ
ilib
riu
m
3
2 6
4 6
2
6
,
, ,
, 3
Maxmin Strategy
New Product
No New Product
No New Product
Firm 1
New Product
Strategy
Firm 2
3
2 6
4 6
2
6
,
, ,
, 3
Maxmin Strategy
Minimum
Minimum
3
2
2 6
Maximum
Maximum
6
6
6 3
Profit in millions
Nash Equilibrium & Maximin Point Isn't Same
Why So?
• Decision Criterion is not Profit-Maximisation
• Its for avoiding highly unfavourable outcome
• Its for avoidance of risks
•
Just Remember that its 2 Step Process
1.Find Minimum(Least) Profit
2.Select maximum Out of Minimum Profit
Mixed Strategy Why We Should Study This?
Game Table
• The Game of Tennis Striker chooses to serve either left or right Receiver defends either left or right
• Better chance to get a good return if you defend in the area the striker is serving to
1. For Striker:
• Best response to defend left is to Strike right
• Best response to defend right is to Strike left
2. For receiver: Just the opposite
Receiver - 70-30 Striker - 60-40
Expects Throws Receiver Striker Probability
Percent of Payoff Matrix
Chances of Success
Left Left 0.70 0.60 0.42 75% 0.315
Left Right 0.30 0.40 0.12 25% 0.030
Right Left 0.70 0.60 0.42 25% 0.105
Right Right 0.30 0.40 0.12 75% 0.090
Total Success 0.540
Receiver – 50-50 Striker - 70-30
Expects Throws Receiver Striker
Probablity
Percent of Payoff Matrix
Chances of Success
Left Left 0.50 0.70 0.35 75% 0.263
Left Right 0.50 0.30 0.15 25% 0.038
Right Left 0.50 0.70 0.35 25% 0.088
Right Right 0.50 0.30 0.15 75% 0.113
Total Success 0.500
Receiver – 50-50 Striker - 40-60
Expects Throws Receiver Striker Probablity
Percent of Payoff Matrix
Chances of Success
Left Left 0.50 0.60 0.3 75% 0.225
Left Right 0.50 0.40 0.2 25% 0.050
Right Left 0.50 0.60 0.3 25% 0.075
Right Right 0.50 0.40 0.2 75% 0.150
Total Success 0.500
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
•A mixed strategy equilibrium is a pair of mixed strategies that are mutual best responses.
• In the tennis example, this occurred when any player chose a 50-50 mixture of left and right.
Receiver’s Best Response
Suppose p is the probability of Strikers Serving towards left Clearly
•If p = 1, then the receiver should defend to the left
•If p = 0, the receiver should defend to the right.
Left
1/2
Right
P
Best Response
Suppose that the receiver goes left with probability q. Clearly,
•if q = 1, the server should serve right
•If q = 0, the server should serve left Server’s
Left
1/2
Right
q
Putting Things Together
p
1/2
q
1/2
R’s best response
S’s best response
Mutually best response
Prisoner
Prisoner 2
Prisoner 1
Strategy
Don’t Confess
Confess
Don’t Confess
0,0
15,5
Confess
5,15
5,5
Noncooperative Games A game is considered non cooperative if it not possible to negotiate with other participants and enter into some form of binding agreement.
Example : Prisoner's Dilemma
Prisoner
Prisoner 2
Prisoner 1
Strategy
Confess
Remain Silent
Confess
5,5
0,20
Remain Silent
20,0
1,1
cooperative Games A game is considered cooperative if it possible to negotiate with other participants and enter into some form of binding agreement.
Firm
Firm 2
Firm 1
Strategy
No New
Product
New Product
No New
Product
30,30
10,40
40,10
20.20
New Product
Profit in millions
Repeated Games
•A repeated game is a game that the same players play more than once In repeated games • the sequential nature of the relationship allows for the adoption of strategies that are contingent on the actions chosen in previous plays of the game
Firm
Firm 2
Firm 1
Strategy
Low-level
Advertising
High-level
Advertising
Low-level
Advertising
30,30
10,40
High-level
Advertising
40,10
20.20
Profit in millions
• Any 1 Firm breaks the agreement
• Adopts High-Level Advertising
• Temporary Loss to other firm due to cheating
• In next period, Other firm will do the same (Tit-For-Tat)
• If One Firm Cuts price-Other firm will cuts price in next period.
• If One firm Raise Price-Other firm will do so in next period.
• Tit-For-Tat is Win-Win Situation
Advantages
•Easy to understand •Never initiates cheating •Never rewards cheating cause it punish in some way •Its about forgiving because cooperation is quickly restored
Sequential Games •One Player acts First & Then other responds. •Games where players choose actions in a particular sequence are sequential move games. Examples: Chess, Bargaining/Negotiations. •Must look ahead in order to know what action to choose now
Firm
Firm 2
Firm 1
Strategy
Low-level
Advertising
High-level
Advertising
Low-level
Advertising
2,2
-5,10
High-level
Advertising
10,-5
-7,7
Benifits to the one Who acts first
Profit in millions
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