Gamal Abdel Nasser: The Failure of the Pan-Arab Movement

Gamal Abdel Nasser: The Failure of the Pan-Arab Movement

32.484.1 Seminar in European/World HistoryLosers in History

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION:.............................................2

CHAPTER 1: The Region in Crisis...........................6

CHAPTER 2: Combating the Blocks of Power.................10

CHAPTER 3: The Over Extension of Nasser..................18

CONCLUSION:..............................................25

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2

INTRODUCTION:

This work explores the failures of Gamal Abdel Nasser

and his United Arab Republic in their quest to unify the

Arab peoples of the Middle East. Escalating tension

throughout the Middle East marked the era of the 1950s, as

the former colonial powers of Europe withdrew their troops

and colonial administrations; and the United States and the

Soviet Union simultaneously began vying to fill the vacuum

left in the wake. The 1950s also saw the rise of Arab

nationalism taking place throughout the Middle East. The

roots of Arab unity are far ranging, but the sudden eruption

of nationalism can be seen in two categories, one being the

formation of Israel, with the other being the reaction to

the post-World War II era, for both actions awoke the

nationalist spirit in the Middle East. The 1950s were also

an era where the newly created states under the Mandate

system each sought to consolidate power in a rapidly

changing world. These are the elements that helped to

inspire the thoughts and actions of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

3

The life and work of Gamal Abdel Nasser is often

correlated to the development of the United Arab Republic

and Nasser’s defiant stance toward the major blocks of

power. Nasser and his Free Officers at the time of the

military coup d’etat in 1952, which overthrew the reign of

King Farouk, sought to unify the Arab world by removing the

chains of imperialism, which dominated Egypt for over 70

years. While Nasser was successful in the evacuation of

British troops from Egypt, which was a major achievement,

and he created the United Arab Republic, he failed however,

in unifying the Arab world. The process of unification

often appeared to have the momentum needed to carry out this

enormous task yet, the pressures from internal and external

forces managed to prevent Nasser’s dream and so many other

Arab nationalists from ever coming to fruition. It is the

collapse of the United Arab Republic as well as the decline

in Egypt’s role as leader of pan-Arabism that is the topic

of this paper.

The success of Nasser and the United Arab Republic

(U.A.R.) would have been easy to measure, for it would have

4

been a region united both economically and politically.

Although the United Arab Republic remained an official

entity in Egypt after the withdrawal of Syria in September

1961, the momentum had collapsed around Nasser, and the

potential for a united Arab world appeared to have ended.

Explaining the rationale for Syria’s withdrawal and the

overall collapse of the pan-Arab movement will be

demonstrated in a methodological fashion. First, a brief

summary will be given to describe the situations that were

taking place in the world between the time of Egypt’s

declaration as a Republic in 1953, and the collapse of the

United Arab Republic in 1961. This will paint a picture as

to the brokering for regional influence by the two power

blocks, and the role that Egypt played in these and other

world affairs.

The second part will be a discussion of the failures of

Arab nationalism through the program that was set forth by

Gamal Abdel Nasser and the United Arab Republic. This

requires a need to place the discussion into possible

theories that can help to explain the failures of Nasser.

5

One proposed theory is that the major blocks of power, the

United States and the British were attempting to curb Soviet

expansion in the Middle East, while also attempting to

manage the growth of, and expansion of, nationalism in the

Middle East. The management of nationalism meant the need

to curb Nasser and his programs of Arab unity, as well as

Nasser’s foreign policies, which often undermined Western

agendas. This explanation as to the failure of Nasser’s

unification process is explained through the desires and

actions of the West in restricting Nasser’s various programs

as anti-imperialist, Arab-nationalist, and fervent patriot.

William Roger Louis, Kerr Professor of English History and

Culture, asserts: “the aggressive Western reaction to the

events of 1958 turned the tide against the surge of

revolution and contributed to the failure of the movement

for Arab unity.” 1

Another approach to the collapse of the United Arab

Republic and the pan-Arab movement was Nasser’s lack of

1 WM. Roger Louis, “Introduction,” in A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958, ed. WM. Roger Louis (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002), 9.

6

understanding in the area of Syrian politics. Upon

completion of the merger between Egypt and Syria in 1958,

Nasser began to import the same style of socialism and

leadership to Syria that had been successful in Egypt.

Nasser also sought to become the sole leader of Arab

nationalism, while members of the Ba’ath party in Syria also

sought to control the pan-Arab movement, resulting in

competing ideas and tension between the two states. This

theory proposes that Nasser’s failure in unifying the Arab

world was due in part to his dictatorial manner in, and

unrelenting drive to, becoming the nationalist leader of the

Arab world. This theory is built upon the work of Elie

Podeh, who is a lecturer in the department of Islam and

Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of

Jerusalem. Podeh believes that the internal politics with-

in the elite circles of both Egypt and Syria were the cause

of the UAR collapse. 2

The schools of thought that provide the framework for

this paper primarily come from the realist school as defined

2 Elie Podeh, xiii and page 2.

7

by Elie Pudeh. In “The Decline of Arab Unity”, Podeh states

that the realist school “contends that states are motivated

by the pursuit of power and expansion.” 3 This theory

suggests that expansion was the primary rationale to Egypt’s

unification with Syria as it provided Egypt with an entrance

into the Fertile Crescent, a region historically held by

Iraq. 4 In all, this theory proposes that Egypt’s desire

for unity “stemmed from its age-old desire to achieve

regional hegemony.” 5 Chapter two is rather a formulation

that purports the weaknesses of the UAR, and the primary

intentions of the West in seeing its collapse.

The theories provided are but a few of the many ideas

as to the collapse of the UAR and the decline in pan-

Arabism. In this paper though, it is the combination of the

aforementioned theories that in the end, broke Nasser’s

nationalist movement, and have left Nasser as a loser in

history. The status as a loser does not require that Nasser

was the only factor in the failure; rather, it was Nasser

3 Elie Podeh, The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), 1.

4 Elie Podeh, 2.5 Elie Podeh, 2.

8

who promoted an idea, and it was Nasser who was unable to

bring all the pieces of the puzzle together in order for the

experiment to work.

9

CHAPTER 1: The Region in Crisis

As the chapter title implies, the Middle East region

during the 1950s was in a constant state of fluctuating

crisises. “The great battleground of the Cold War had

shifted away from Europe and Korea and Formosa, where the

situation was relatively stable, to Africa, the Middle East,

and the Indian Subcontinent, where the situation was in

active ferment.” 6 The formation of Israel in 1948 can be

seen as the watershed moment in the Middle East. After this

momentous act of imperialism, parts of the Arab world joined

in revolt. For Egypt, the war in 1948 against Israel was a

catastrophic loss, although it helped to reinvigorate the

drive for nationalism, and led to an awakening for men such

as Nasser, who pledged to correct the wrongs that were

forced upon Egypt.

The 1950s and 1960s is also an era that is marked by

the cold war between the United States and the Soviets. The

Cold War brought increasing pressure upon developing

nations, especially in the Middle East, whose oil was the 6 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York:

Simon & Schuster, 1990), 436.

10

backbone of the industrialized nations. This era was also

one where the Americans and British sought to curb the

expansion of communism. To accomplish this end, the Western

powers attempted to construct alliances and military bases

throughout the region. One example of an alliance that

curbed Soviet expansion was the creation of the Baghdad Pact

in 1954 and 1955. “Participants in the Baghdad Pact were

Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and Britain, all of which

signed an interlocking series of agreements.” 7 The Pacts

primary goal was to create a shield against communist

expansion, but for Nasser, it appeared as another act of

imperialism, as well as an attempt to curb Nasser’s pan-Arab

drive. 8

While the Western powers created pacts that followed

the lines of Bismarkian theory, Nasser was scoring enormous

victories for his people by breaking the imperial hold of

the British. This is evident in 1954 when the British and

7 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East 2nd ed.

(Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 301.8 Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen,(New York: Doubleday & Company, 1973), 46.

11

Egyptian’s reached an agreement that guaranteed the

evacuation of British forces from Egypt. With the British

removed from Egypt proper, there was still a continuing

presence of the British and French in the functioning and

running of the Suez Canal. The nationalization of the Suez

Canal on July 26, 1956 further eroded the British influence

in Egypt; it also served to expand Nasser’s popularity

throughout the Middle East as an anti-imperialist and Arab

nationalist. 9 The anti-imperialist and avid Arab-

nationalism that Nasser promulgated in the Middle East

earned him the reputation in London and Washington as the

“Hitler on the Nile”. 10

The Soviet Union after World War II lost considerable

ground in regional affairs throughout the Middle East, and

Nasser with his program of nationalism and Socialism

appeared to be a nation into which the Soviets could finagle

a foothold. The one aspect that prevented Khrushchev from

fully supporting Egypt was the Egyptian ban on the communist9 WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 409.

10 Irene L. Gendzier, “Oil, Politics, and US Intervention,” in A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958, ed. WM. Roger Louis (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002), 123.

12

party. 11 For Nasser, maintaining positive neutrality as a

non-aligned nation kept him from fully embracing the Soviet

Union, for a mutual assistance pact would have a resemblance

of the colonialism of the past. 12 In terms of Nasser and

his trust of foreign powers, the Soviet Union and the United

States both stood out as non-colonizing nations, but in 1957

with the introduction of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Nasser’s

suspicion of U.S. intentions changed dramatically as it

“smacked of the same kind of Western control embodied in the

Baghdad Pact.” 13 The implementation of Eisenhower Doctrine

in the Middle East can be seen as a reaction to Nasser’s

purchase of arms from the Soviets in 1955, as the doctrine’s

sole purpose was to financially support nations from

becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union. 14

For Nasser and his goals of Pan-Arab unity, the Syrian

request to create the United Arab Republic in 1958 was not

11 WM. Roger Louis, “Introduction,” in A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958, ed. WM. Roger Louis (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002), 11.

12 Mohamed Heikal, Cairo Documents, 41. “We are not ready to discuss pacts or any security measures unless we do it of our own free will.

13 William Cleveland, 307.14 Dwight D. Eisenhower. Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East. Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957, reprinted in “Essential Documents in American History” found in EBSCOhost. Part VI

13

one he sought after strongly. Rather it is suggested that

Nasser’s hand had been forced by Syria, which was faltering

on anarchy. 15 In terms of Nasser and his views of Arab

unity, this merger provided Nasser and Egypt several

distinctly advantageous opportunities. One interpretation

of the merger is promulgated from the ideological school of

thought, that “the UAR was a culmination of the long-aspired

pan-Arab dream.” 16 The merger can also be viewed from the

realist school of thought. This view holds that the merger

between Egypt and Syria “stemmed from its age-old desire to

achieve regional hegemony through expansion.” 17 This idea

also addresses that the union had the potential for Egypt to

correct the defeat incurred in the 1948 war with Israel,

although this idea does not appear to have the validity

needed to be considered strongly, it is something that

should be contemplated when looking at the formation of the

UAR.

15 WM. Roger Louis, “Britain and the Crisis of 1958,” in A RevolutionaryYear: The Middle East in 1958 ed. Wm. Roger Louis (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 20

16 Elie Podeh, 1. 17 Elie Podeh, 2.

14

As previously noted, the mid-1950s and the early 1960s,

was a time of continual change in the Middle East and the

world stage. There were the great powers seeking hegemony

over various regions, such as the Middle East, where oil was

an issue that meant economic survival or total industrial

collapse for the West. The Cold War added to the anxiety

and complexity of the Middle East, as the Western Powers

sought to curb the expansion of Communism. In terms of

Nasser, it maybe said that his actions during the period in

question, was the cause of his problems, as the West sought

to curb Nasser’s nationalist drive as well as his desire for

communist support. For the nations in question, alliances

aided programs, for the West there was the Baghdad Pact, for

Nasser and Egypt, there was an unofficial alliance with

Russia, as well as the United Arab Republic. The UAR was in

one form or another, a means of aiding Egypt, whether

militarily, or by ensuring an Arab nation.

15

When the Arab people began to fight for the realization of Arabunity, they were fully aware that the path was not an easy one.The Arabs were aware that the path to unity was beset with difficulties, because the drive towards unity was a challenge to the great powers which tried to weaken us and to usurp our rights and independence. 18

CHAPTER 2: Combating the Blocks of Power

This chapter deals with the major blocks of power and

how their attempts to gain hegemony in the Middle East often

collided with the work and goals of Nasser and the drive for

Arab unity taking place throughout the region. In fact, the

rise in nationalism was due in part to the Arab desire to

regain control over of their nations destiny. This desire

to reassert Egypt’s independence can be viewed as an

oppositional force to the American desire to encircle the

Soviets and block the spread of communism.

In 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower took office as

President, he brought with him as Secretary of State, John

Foster Dulles. Dulles was a fervent anti-communist who

proposed to Nasser that a Middle East Defense Organization

(MEDO) be created, that would simulate the NATO (North

Atlantic Treaty Organization) in Europe or the SEATO

18 Speech by President Gamal Abdel-Nasser in Aleppo. 44

16

(Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) in Southeast Asia. 19

This was the first in a series of pacts designed by the West

to contain the Soviets. Even though Dulles approached Egypt

with the idea for the MEDO, he “saw belatedly that Cold War

alliances would divide rather than unite the Arab World.” 20

The ability of Dulles to learn and understand the

intricacies between the U.S. and the Middle East can also be

seen later, during the Suez Crisis, when he and the U.S.

opted to negotiate on Egypt’s behalf. The importance of the

Middle East, according to the U.S. National Security

Council, was “having access to the regions resources and

strategic positions while denying them to the Soviet Union.”

21 In terms of the United States and Egyptian foreign

policy, the U.S. perspective was global, while the Egyptian

was regional, creating potential areas of disagreement in

future affairs. 22

19 Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, 40, and Elie Podeh, 30. The sources work in conjunction to support the idea that the U.S. was seeking alliances through various pacts.

20 WM. Roger Louis, “Britain and the Crisis of 1958,” in A RevolutionaryYear: The Middle East in 1958 ed. Wm. Roger Louis (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 18.

21 Burton I. Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the United States, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996),18.

22 Burton I. Kaufman, 21.

17

Nasser opposed Western inspired strategic pacts for a

multitude of reasons. One simple reason was the historical

context of the West and the domination of Egypt. In respect

to Egypt’s history, Egyptians had succumbed to over seventy

years of British occupation, as Nasser stated, “We fought

against foreign occupation, foreign influence, and

imperialism…and no flag other than our own is flying over

our country.” 23 Egypt had little intention of allowing any

nation to dominate over Egypt again. Nasser understood the

complex scenario of entering pacts with the West, as Nasser

pointed out “If I went and told my people that the British

status here is going to be changed from occupiers to

partners by a change of the flag, they will laugh at me.

They will lose faith in me and other people will rise from

the underground and win the confidence of the people.” 24 A

second reason in opposing the Western inspired pacts was

Nasser’s desire to assert Egypt’s role as a leading nation

23 Speeches and Press Interviews. Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1959. page 193. This source is from Vassar College.

24 Mohamed Heikal, 40 & 41.

18

in the pan-Arab movement, and for Egypt to control the

direction of the Middle East, not Western nations.

The refusal of Nasser to enter the Western led pacts

was further exacerbated when the Baghdad Pact was created in

1954 and 1955. The Baghdad Pact was seen as an approach by

the West to undermine Nasser, who in turn began a propaganda

war against the Pact. 25 Nasser’s hostility towards the Pact

was based on the Iraqi attempt to involve the remaining Arab

nations; a step that Nasser perceived would isolate Egypt in

the Arab world. 26 The British participation in the Baghdad

Pact added to Nasser’s discontent. In a speech Nasser gave

in March 1960, he addressed the British role in Arab

politics, “The Arab people cannot feel secure vis-à-vis

those who work with Britain or wish to be under British

influence because their policy is planned in London and

outside the Arab nation.” 27 The combination of British

interference in Arab politics, and the view held by Nasser 25 James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, eds., Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 160.

26 James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, eds., 160. This position was described by Ambassador Henry Byroade in March 1955.

27 Speech Delivered by President Gamal Abdel-Nasser to Officers, N.C.Os and Men of First Army at Oatana Camp. March 7, 1960. Reprinted in Speeches and Press interviews, 1960 (jan-mar) page 122.

19

that Iraq was attempting to isolate Egypt, can both be

viewed as antagonisms against Egypt and the larger pan-Arab

movement.

In response, Egypt and Syria entered into a “mutual

Arab cooperative” or military assistance treaty, which can

be scene as a prelude to the future UAR. 28 It can be

surmised that the formation of the Egyptian-Syrian alliance

after the creation of the Baghdad Pact was a means of

contesting the Western encirclement of Nasser, as well as a

attempt by Egypt and Syria to display their desire to lead

the Arab World.

The alliance between Egypt and Syria can be seen as an

event that was promoted by the ideologies and experiences

that both nations endured during the 1950s. Both nations

opposed the Baghdad Pact, as can be witnessed in the signing

of a military assistance treaty. The two nations stood

together during the Suez crisis in 1956, and both nations

were opposed to the Eisenhower Doctrine that came into

effect in 1957. The Eisenhower Doctrine in and of itself

28 Tareq Y. Ismael, The U.A.R. in Africa: Egypt’s Policy Under Nasser (Evenston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 27.

20

acted as a catalyst in furthering talks between an Egyptian

and Syrian union. 29

The alliance between Egypt and Syria also served

another major facet of the brokering for power in the Middle

East. The union between the two nations encircled Israel on

the Southern and Western flanks, as well as guarantee a

“permanent common command to execute the defense” of the

allied nation. 30 For Nasser, this appears to be a step in

the direction of correcting the wrongs Egypt encountered in

the 1948 war with Israel. At this time Egypt also undertook

the risky move of gravitating towards the Soviets, a move

Nasser knew would create a backlash from the U.S. and

British.

The decision of Nasser to seek out weapons from the

Soviets via Czechoslovakia in May 1955 meant that the

American attempts to keep the Communists out of the Middle

East had failed. The action of Nasser “to improve Egypt’s

chances in the anticipated next round with Israel, accepted

29 Elie Podeh, 33.30 Tareq Y. Ismael, 27

21

Soviet arms, [and] the Cold War moved to the foreground.” 31

This action infuriated the U.S. who issued an ultimatum that

included a stop in all U.S. aid, a stop in trade, a collapse

in diplomatic relations and a possible blockade so that

Soviet weapons could not arrive. 32 For Nasser, “he was

acquiring the image of a Pan-Arab leader who not only would

break the imperial domination of the Western powers but

would also use his country’s newfound military strength to

avenge the ‘disaster’ of 1948.” 33

31 Diane B. Kunz, “The Emergence of the United States as a Middle Eastern Power, 1956-1958,” in A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in1958, ed. Wm. Roger louis (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002), 78.

32 Mohamed Heikal, 52. 33 William L. Cleveland, 302.

22

Nasser’s desire to seek out weapons from the Soviets

(via Czechoslovakia) should not be perceived as an action to

become communist, rather it is due to the resistance to seek

out the West for military aid. Seeking assistance from the

British was out of the question for Nasser, as his

perception of the Baghdad Pact was that is was a “Western

policy designed to separate her [Egypt] from the Middle

East”. 34 The U.S. was also not much of an option, but

“Soviet aid never had explicit “strings” attached to it and

was extended entirely on Egypt’s terms.” 35 1955 was also

the year that Nasser initiated his plan to build the Aswan

Dam on the Nile. The costs of construction though meant

Nasser had to approach the World Bank, an organization that

used both American and British funds. The U.S. and British

refused to help fund the Dam in 1956 after Nasser openly

recognized Communist China, and had stepped up opposition to

the Baghdad Pact. In this period of months, the boundaries

between Nasser and the West were set.

34 Michael Graham Fry, “The United Nations Confronts the United States in 1958,” in A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958, ed. WM. Roger Louis (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002), 161.

35 Tareq Y. Ismael, 81.

23

In 1958, the political situation in the Middle East

underwent tremendous changes. The formation of the UAR in

February brought Egypt into the Fertile Crescent, whereupon

the great pan-Arab experiment began. While in July, Iraq,

the former competitor for Syrian unity, underwent a coup

that brought Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim to power. 36 The

coup in Iraq had drastic effects on American and Egyptian

foreign policy, as the new regime was considered a greater

threat, with its communist leanings and the potential

challenge it posed to Nasser’s previously unquestioned

leadership in the pan-Arab movement. 37 The new Iraqi regime

altered the power politics between the U.S. and Egypt as

well, as it initiated a new era of cooperation between the

two states. Relations with the Soviets also began a

downward turn at this time, as Nasser perceived the Iraqi

coup as a Soviet inspired attempt to seize power. 38 With

the acknowledged dislocation between the Soviets and Egypt,

and the anti-communist ideology of Nasser, the American

36 William Cleveland, 318.37 Burton Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the Untied States, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 28.

38 Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, 192.

24

government began sending wheat to Egypt and in return, Egypt

ceased anti-American propaganda broadcast thru Cairo Radio.

39 The cooperation between Egypt and the United States

continued thru the Kennedy administration, as both nations

worked to prevent Soviet expansion, and to progress the

Middle East toward greater cooperation.

Prior to the development of the UAR, Nasser had to face

obstacles set up by the Western nations, such as the Baghdad

Pact, as well as the propaganda broadcasted into Egypt from

Baghdad and Israel. 40 Egypt and Syria united even though

foreign influences attempted to undermine Nasser’s

intentions, claiming Egypt’s economy “was invading the

Syrian economy,” that Nasser had become the ruler of Syria,

and that “the Syrians were suffering Egyptian imperialist

occupation.” 41 Nasser experienced the aggressive attitudes39 Burton Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the Untied States, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 28. The shipments of American grains to Egypt under the so-called PL 480 program, made food available to friendly foreign governments.

40 Adress by President Gamal Abdel-Nasser to the Members of the NationalUnion at Aleppo. February 18, 1960. Reprinted in Speeches and Press Interviews, 1960 (jan-mar), 50. In his speech Nasser stated that currently 9 foreign stations were broadcasting into Egypt, with one from France called the “Voice of Free Egypt.”

41 Address Deliviered By President Gamal Abdel-Nasser to Members of National Union Executive Committees, Northern Region. March 4, 1960. Reprinted in Speeches and Press Interviews, 1960 (jan-mar), 103, 104.

25

of the West in undermining his power, and in reaction,

Nasser sought out Soviet arms, he nationalized the Canal and

expelled the British from Egypt. Nasser stood tall through

the barrage of Western imperialism, while succeeding in

uniting Syria to Egypt. It was the collapse in relations

between the Soviets and Egypt, and the reaction of the U.S.

to the Iraqi coup that altered the relationship between

Egypt and the West.

The West was unable to undermine Nasser’s appeal to the

Arab masses, but the effect of the West in controlling and

subverting other Arab governments did occur. For instance,

the U.S. Marines landed in Lebanon and British paratroopers

landed in Jordan in 1958. 42 The intervention in Lebanon by

American Marines was “in short, a show of force-and a most

impressive one,” designed to “bring about a change in

Nasser’s attitude.” 43 Nasser understood the designs of the

West and the fear of a communist takeover in Syria. It can

be surmised that at some level of thinking both Eisenhower

and Nasser wanted to intervene in Syria before the nation

42 Stephen Ambrose, 468.43 Stephen Ambrose, 468.

26

became communist, thus having detrimental effects on both

the U.S. and Egypt. While the above chapter focused on the

brokering for power in the Middle East, it should be noted

that Nasser was able to secure the objectives he set out

for. Therefore, the collapse of the UAR is not due to

Western desires and manipulation of Nasser, but rather the

Western influence in the greater Middle Eastern region and

especially Syria.

Mohamed Heikal, a key figure in Nasser’s life, both

personally and professionally, describes the Syrian coup

d’etat in 1961 that led to the eventual breakup of the UAR.

Heikal states that King Saud of Saudi Arabia and King

Hussein of Jordan worked together to bribe Syrian officials

in the government as well as members of the military, to

overthrow the government. 44 A sum of twelve million pounds

was paid by the Saudi Crown Prince to orchestrate the coup,

but it was when the new Syrian government collapsed and

members were put on trial, that evidence of CIA involvement

came to light. 45 During the trial of Dandeshi, a Syrian

44 Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, 204.45 Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, 204.

27

politician tried for treason “documents came to light

proving that he and a number of other Syrian politicians

were in contact with CIA agents who were preparing for a

coup d’etat in Syria, in collaboration with and under the

direction of the Special Security Committee of the Baghdad

Pact.” 46 While Heikal does not state the reason for the

CIA’s desire to overthrow Syria or the UAR, he does describe

the confusion of Nasser in understanding the multi-faceted

policies of the American government. The effect of the coup

on Nasser and the UAR was devastating, but it should not be

taken without considering that many Syrian elites were

beginning to oppose the UAR in 1961. This growing

opposition in Syria to the manner in which Nasser governed

Syria can be seen as the prelude to the coup and will be

discussed further in Chapter 3.

46 Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, 205.

28

CHAPTER 3: Negotiating the Politics of the Union

While the UAR was a product of the growing nationalist

movement, it was not an event that occurred overnight, or

for that matter, occurred without due reservations on the

part of both the Egyptians and the Syrians. In order to

demonstrate that Nasser was a loser in history, there is a

need to address another potential reason for the collapse of

the UAR, and thus, the greater pan-Arab movement. In the

years preceding the creation of the UAR, Egypt and Syria

cooperated in order to repel the imperial powers, as can be

seen with the mutual assistance pact. Both countries were

also centers of Arab nationalism, although the ideologies of

nationalism differed greatly. While Nasser created his own

form of nationalism often called “Nasserism” and political

parties were banned in Egypt, the Syrian government was

multi-faceted, with several political parties vying for

power. 47 In the previous chapter, the policy of Nasser and

Egypt was explained in relation to the Western powers, and

47 Ibrahim Khalil Abu-Rish. United Arab Republic, 1958-1961. M.A. diss., The American University, 1972. MAI, 11, no. 02, 1972. 0137, 17.

29

their desire to gain hegemony over the Middle East. While

this explanation demonstrates the continuous struggle that

Nasser underwent in uniting the Arab Middle East, there is

also need to also explain the struggle that Nasser underwent

in relation to Syria. This course of study will demonstrate

that while Nasser did not break-up the UAR, his actions and

misunderstanding of Syrian political circles alienated the

very people in Syria who advocated for the UAR merger.

As mentioned earlier, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War can be

seen as the watershed moment in Middle Eastern history. The

effect of the war on Nasser was effectually, a desire to

correct the wrongs, and a desire to oust King Farouk for his

ineffectual leadership during the war. In the case of

Syria, the defeat initiated a series of coups, which left

Syrian politics in a state of disarray. After the Arab-

Israeli war, the Syrian army, led by Colonel Husni Zaim,

overthrew the civilian style government. This was the first

in a series of coups that demonstrated the fragmentation

between the Syrian army and the Syrian elites who had

30

supported the ousted President Quwwatli. 48 In the second

coup of the year, Colonel Adib Shishakli’s entered power.

In 1954, a faction of the military ousted Shishakli, and a

civilian parliamentary government resumed control. The

political climate in Syria remained in a constant state of

turmoil until the merger with Egypt occurred in 1958,

largely due to the military’s consistent involvement with

political affairs. 49

Events transpired with-in Syria immediately before the

creation of the UAR that allowed Nasser to dictate a series

of demands before endorsing any merger. Syria, in the eyes

of many nations, appeared to be “slipping into anarchy with

the Ba’ath party, the Communists, and rival nationalist

officers all fighting for power.” 50 Due to the political

instability in Syria, the Ba’ath party sent Salah el Bitar

and Army nationalist leaders to Egypt to address Nasser and

the desperate need for a union between the two nations. 51

48 William Cleveland, 315.49 William Cleveland, 315.50 Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, 123.51 Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, 123.

31

Within Syria, there was widespread support for some

form of union, although various groups within Syria

entertained varying degrees of union. The Syrian elites and

the business community prompted for the union, as both

“gradually became convinced that Egypt offered the best hope

for avoiding a communist or Ba’ath takeover, which would

probably entail socialist measures against private

enterprise.” 52 Several groups with-in the Syrian military

also favored a union with Egypt, although there was

disagreement between supporting a federation (the

Independent officers), a complete merger (pro-Ba’ath

members) and there were undecided officers who favored “some

sort of association with Egypt” as a “remedy to the

country’s political predicament.” 53 It is rather

interesting to note that while Syrian politics was in a

constant state of turmoil, there was a overwhelming majority

of the populace who favored some form of union between Egypt

and Syria. Nasser’s inability to understand the factious

political situation in Syria would later come to haunt him.

52 Elie Podeh, 38.53 Elie Podeh, 39.

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Nasser’s apprehension towards the union was alleviated

when Syrian Foreign Minister Bitar arrived in Egypt with

authorization to discuss a federation (partial union)

between the two nations. 54 With discussions taking place

between Nasser and Foreign Minister Bitar on the union, the

Communist party who was opposed to Nasser and a union,

learned of the negotiations. Due to the belief that Nasser

would not accept a complete merger, the communists, who were

opposed to Nasser’s anti-communist attitude, advocated for

full membership, going further then the Ba’athist in

integrating the two states. 55 This placed Nasser in the

position of either denying the union, or, he could do

exactly what he did, agree to the merger on very specific

conditions, placing the pressure back onto the Syrians if

the union failed to come thru. 56 Nasser’s demands included

a guarantee from the Syrian military of their support for

the merger, a ban on all political parties in Syria,

including the Ba’athist who sought the merger originally,

54 Elie Podeh, 44.55 Ibrahim Khalil Abu-Rish, 59.56 Ibrahim Khalil Abu-Rish, 59.

33

and a popular plebiscite to ratify the union. 57 Foreign

Minister Bitar accepted the conditions, as well as the army

nationalists that participated in the negotiations. The

Union was completed, thus beginning the great experiment in

Arab unity.

The union arrived on February 1st, among widespread

support. The popular plebiscite was held on February 22nd

and the UAR was unanimously approved (99.99 percent in

Egypt, 99.98 per cent in Syria). 58 While the masses

overwhelmingly approved of the merger, the actual merging of

the two governments was more complicated. For the Ba’ath

party in Syria, there was an expectation that since they

went to Nasser to create the UAR that they would be given

priority in the new government, but Nasser disappointed the

party. 59 Under the authority of Nasser, Syrian leaders

were forced to live in Cairo, where they were unable to have

an influence on domestic issues. 60 In essence, Nasser

57 James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, 165.58 Elie Podeh, 50.59 Elie Podeh, 52.60 William Cleveland, 306.

34

“simply imposed on Syria the single party military regime

that worked so well in Egypt.” 61

In the months after the merger, while the two states

reorganized to become one, Nasser made demands that created

divisions between those that originally supported the idea

of unity. Three major constituents that originally

supported the merger eventually were displaced from power.

The members of the Ba’athists grew despondent as they

expected a prominent role in the new government. The Syrian

military became frustrated when Nasser replaced Syrian

officers with Egyptians. The Egyptian officers also incited

anger as one Syrian general stated “every Egyptian officer

in Syria during the union acted as if he were Gamal Abdel

Nasser.” 62 The third group to experience disdain for the

union were the Syrian businessmen and elites. The program

of reforms Nasser initiated in the agricultural and economic

realms severely diminished the incomes and status of the

elite. For instance, land ownership was reduced to 250

61 William Cleveland, 306.62 Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 51.

35

acres. This had the effect of severely diminishing elite

land ownership, but it served to give land to the roughly

seventy per cent of Syrians who had previously existed as

sharecroppers. 63 The Syrian economic elite “had begun to

realize that the economic disadvantages of the union might

outweigh the political advantages.” 64 Here we can see that

three major participants in seeking the union with Egypt

were growing resentful of the manners in which Nasser was

governing the UAR. As we will see in 1961 when the UAR

dissolved, these same factions were not prepared to defend

the great pan-Arab experiment.

Two years into the experiment, four leading members of

the Syrian Ba’ath party resigned from government. 65 The

decision to withdraw from the government can be explained in

relation to the desires of the former Ba’ath members in

leading or at the minimum collaborating in the UAR

government. Nasser governed Syria in a fashion that

resembled a colony; he exported policies to Syria that

63 Ibrahim Khalil Abu-Rish, 80.64 Elie Podeh, 69. 65 Elie Podeh, 101.

36

worked in Egypt without considering the different economy

and society, and Nasser failed to heed the requests of the

Syrian leaders in key decisions, such as the Agrarian Land

Reform Law in September 1958. 66 The resignation of the

Ba’ath ministers had drastic effects on Nasser’s ability to

govern Syria, as the ministers were the advocators of the

merger, and they understood the complicated Syrian society

better then Nasser. This step by the Ba’ath party ministers

was also a foreshadowing of events that were to arise in

1961.

In 1961, Nasser attempted to complete the unification

of Syria and Egypt thru the July decrees. The decrees meant

to nationalize large portions of the Syrian and Egyptian

industrial and commercial sectors, such as cotton production

and maritime transportation. 67 The July decrees served to

further alienate the elites and business owners in Syria.

There is a Syrian proverb that says: “Though you are my

brother and friend, don’t get close to my pocket!” 68 The

66 Elie Podeh, 76.67 Elie Podeh, 141.68 Elie Podeh, 143.

37

July decrees did just that; they went after the elite and

business owners, a powerful group with-in Syria. Thus far,

Nasser alienated the elites, the military, and members of

the Ba’ath, the largest supporter of the union. With these

factions resenting the manner in which Nasser governed

Syria, it should come as no surprise that on September 28,

1961, a group of Syrian military officers in Damascus

rebelled against their Egyptian commanders, initiating a

coup. 69 The original desires of the officers leading the

coup was not the disintegration of the UAR; rather they

sought to overturn and/or amend several laws. The coup

organizers “were reportedly willing to accept a settlement

if the following demands were met: abolition of the July

1961 decrees; amendment of the Agrarian Reform Law” and a

restructuring of the UAR to a federation instead of the full

union where “the Syrian region would enjoy an equal status

to that of the Egyptian region.” 70 As mentioned earlier,

Nasser could become uncompromising in his style of

leadership; the Syrian coup officer’s demands became one

69 Burton Kaufman, 33.70 Elie Podeh, 150.

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more facet where Nasser was unwilling to broker a deal.

Elie Podeh suggests that if Nasser had been willing to

compromise the UAR would not have ended, but Nasser believed

that he had the support of the Syrian populace and he

therefore believed that the coup would end, with the UAR

intact. 71 Nevertheless, the populace was convinced that

Nasser no longer had their best interests in mind, and they

supported the coup. The great experiment in Arab unity

ended, and Nasser’s prestige and pan-Arab ambitions ended

with it, Nasser would spend the remainder of his time in

office protecting his authority in Egypt. 72

71 Elie Podeh, 150.72 Burton Kaufman, 33.

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CONCLUSION:

This work was an attempt to prove that Gamal Abdel

Nasser was a loser in history. His status as a loser is not

necessitated on his actions or inactions in the quest for

Arab unity, rather the status as a loser is determined by

his inability to hold the pieces of the puzzle together.

The UAR was a “self-conscious experiment in Arab unity”, and

although Syria withdrew from the UAR, the idea of Arab unity

has never died completely. 73

Chapter Two, Combating the Blocks of Power,

demonstrated Nasser’s ability to circumnavigate the complex

workings of global politics. The effect of the Cold War

between the U.S. and the Soviets allowed, “Egypt, with

golden opportunities for manipulation, and Nasser’s great

skill lay in his ability to steer between the two rival

power blocs to Egypt’s maximum advantage.” 74 Nasser in many

ways was truly a champion of international politics as he

was able to work the field in order to progress Egypt into a

73 William Cleveland, 306.74 Peter Sluglett, “The Pan-Arab Movement, Moscow and Cairo” in A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958 , 218.

40

new millennium. The failure of the UAR as discussed in this

chapter was not due to Nasser’s inadequacies as a leader,

rather it was due to the actions of the Western nations in

attempting to control the Middle Eastern region. The coup

in Syria as described by Mohamed Heikal reflects the

intentions of the West in disrupting the nationalist

movement in the Middle East, and this is a more appropriate

way of describing the failure of Nasser and the UAR

experiment. For the pan-Arab experiment was not a failure

due to Nasser’s actions, it was due to the actions of the

West. Although, the withdrawal of Syria from the UAR still

coincides with the thesis of the chapter.

In Chapter 3, Negotiating the Politics of the Union,

the failure of the pan-Arab experiment was explained in

relation to Nasser’s inability to govern Syria in a manner

that demonstrated his understanding and respect for the

distinct political and economic climate. This chapter

demonstrated Nasser’s dictatorial manner in directing Syrian

politics. Had Nasser been willing to negotiate with the

various leaders of the Ba’ath party and especially the

41

leaders of the coup, there is a great chance that the UAR

would have survived, and the experiment would not have

failed.