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Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375 brill.nl/vc
VigiliaeChristianae
Galenus Christianus? Te Doctrine of Demonstrationin StromataVIII
and the Question of its Source
Maty HavrdaCentre or Patristic, Medieval and Renaissance exts,
Palack University
Olomouc, Czech Republic
AbstractTe article is a source-critical study o the doctrine o
demonstration in the so-calledeighth book oStromataby Clement o
Alexandria. Ater an overview o the doctrine,as presented in Str.
VIII 3,1-15,1, it examines parallels in philosophical
literature,especially in the writings o Galen. Tis examination
brings to light correspondences(not all o which have been
previously noted) whose number and proximity opensthe question o
the relation between Galen and the source o Stromata VIII.
Aterconsidering three explanations to account or these
similarities, the article proposes
that Galens lost writing on demonstration could be Clements
source.
KeywordsClement, Galen, demonstration, method o discovery,
embryology
1. Te problem of Stromata VIII
Te collection o texts preserved in Codex Laurentianus V,3 under
thetitle has always puzzled Clements readers. It seemsthat even in
antiquity people were not quite sure where the book ends,the
possibilities ranging rom mere sixteen paragraphs o Sthlins
editionto a version which included at least the Eclogae
propheticae.1 In the Lau-rentianus, the manuscript on whose
testimony modern editions oStro-matadepend, the end o the eighth
book is not indicated either. But inscholarly debate it is usually
placed ater a series o philosophical discus-sions regarding the
problems o proo, inquiry, sceptical , division,
1) C. the evidence collected by Teodor Zahn, Forschungen zur
Geschichte des neutesta-mentlichen Kanons, Bd. III: Supplementum
Clementinum (Erlangen 1884) 28.
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344 M. Havrda / Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375
defnition, categories and causes, beore the start o a completely
dierentsection introduced as compendia o Valentinian
doctrines.2
Te uncertainty about the scope o the book is partly due to the
actthat the text oStromataVIII is obviously a ragment or rather a
series oragments whose interconnecting link or continuity with the
precedingStromata is neither explicit nor clear. Tere have been
dierent explana-tions o the origin o the text. Out o several
solutions proposed since the17th century we will mention just two
that set the outlines o the con-temporary debate.3 In a discussion
covering all material placed ater Stro-mata VII in Codex
Laurentianus, Teodor Zahn suggests that theseragments are
abbreviations and excerpts made rom Clements fnishedwork, the
continuation o the extant Stromata.4 In the frst study ocusedon the
philosophical contents oStromataVIII, Hans von Arnim proposesa
dierent view, according to which the material consists partly o
anelaborated, but unfnished text o the eighth book, or excerpts
made romit, and partly o excerpts made by Clement himsel rom other
sources inpreparation or the planned continuation.5
2) In this sense, too, we will speak about Stromata VIII in this
paper. For a detaileddescription o Codex Laurentianus V,3 c. Otto
Sthlin in Clemens Alexandrinus, Bd. I
(GCS12, Leipzig 1905) xxxix-xlii.3) A precise overview o the
various explanations is provided by Antonio Servino, Clem-ente
Alessandrino: il problema di Stromata VIII, Quaderni del
Dipartimento di flologia,linguistica e tradizione classica Augusto
Rostagni 17 (2001) 97-104.4) Zahn, Forschungen, 104-130, esp.
117-119. Zahns hypothesis is taken up and developedby Pierre
Nautin, La fn des Stromateset les Hypotyposesde Clment dAlexandrie,
VigiliaeChristianae30 (1976) 268-302. Te main dierence o Nautins
approach is the ollowing:Whereas Zahn derives all the ragmentary
material ater StromataVII in Laurentianus romthe eighth book
oStromata, Nautin suggests that the excerpts rom the eighth book
endwith Str. VIII 24, i.e., beore the start o the section on
causes, while what ollows in Lauren-
tianus comes rom the lost Hypotyposeis. Tis part o Nautins
thesis is criticized by Alain LeBoulluec, Extraits duvres de
Clement dAlexandrie: La transmission et le sens de leurtitres,
inAlexandrie antique et chrtienne. Clment et Origne(Paris 2006)
115-117, who,apart rom presenting textual arguments, shows that
there is a thematic continuity betweenthe chapter on causes (Str.
VIII 25-33) and the preceding paragraphs 17-24, which, in turn,are
thematically linked with the rest o the book (1-16). Details o
Nautins thesis andarguments produced in its avour cannot be
discussed in this paper. For the present state othe debate c.
Bogdan G. Bucur,Angelomorphic Pneumatology. Clement o Alexandria
andOther Early Christian Witnesses (Suppl. to Vigiliae Christianae
95. Leiden/Boston: Brill,2009) 10. C. also Andrew C. Itter,
Esoteric eaching in theStromateis o Clement o Alexan-dria(Suppl. to
Vigiliae Christianae 97. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2009) 59-76.5) Hans
von Arnim, De octavo Clementis Stromateorum libro (Rostock 1894) 9,
11-12. VonArnim seems to locate the end o the fnished part o the
book at 16. Sthlin, while
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Galenus Christianus? 345
Te intricate cobweb o issues called the problem o Stromata
VIIImay be summarized by two questions: (1) What is the role o this
text in
the context o Clements extant writings? (2) What are its
philosophicalsources? Te ollowing paper is an attempt to reenter
the debate rom theperspective o the source-critical approach. It
ocuses on the discussion othe doctrine o demonstration in Str. VIII
3,1-8,3 and a closely relatedexposition o the method o inquiry in
8,4-15,1, sections that togethercomprise more than one third o the
book.6 Ater an overview o theircontents, the paper explores
parallels that might help us characterize, orpossibly determine,
the philosophical source o these sections.7
2. Str. VIII 3,1-15,1: Overview
a. Christian prooemium (ch. I, 1,1-2,5)
Clements elaboration o the theory o demonstration is preceded by
twoparagraphs in which he outlines the project o scientifc research
asinquiry o questions based on the Scriptures ().8 HereClement
describes scientifc demonstration as a method by which the
accepting von Arnims assessment about the second part o the
book, suggests that eventhe frst part consists o Clements own
excerpts (GCS 12, xli-xlii). Von Arnims distinc-tion between the
two parts is criticized by Wilhelm Ernst, De Clementis Alexandrini
Stro-matum libro VIII. qui ertur (Gttingen 1910) 52. Servino,
Clemente, 97, note 3,100-102, accepts von Arnims distinction, but
locates the breaking point between the twoparts at the end o 5,5
(GCS 17: 82,26).6) Te frst commentary on the section o
demonstration is provided by Ernst, De Clem-entis, 11-13, 15-24. C.
also Reginald E. Witt,Albinus and the History o Middle
Platonism
(Cambridge 1937) 32-35; Salvatore R.C. Lilla, Clement o
Alexandria. A Study in ChristianPlatonism and Gnosticism (Oxord:
OUP, 1971) 120-136; Friedrich Solmsen, Early Chris-tian Interest in
the Teory o Demonstration, in W. den Boer (ed.), Romanitas et
Christi-anitas(Amsterdam 1973) 281291; Silke-Petra Bergjan, Logic
and Teology in Clemento Alexandria. Te Purpose o the 8th Book o the
Stromata,Zeitschrit r Antikes Chris-tentum 12 (2008) 396-413. Str.
VIII 9,1-15,1 is discussed by Jaap Manseld, Doxographyand
Dialectic. Te Sitz im Leben o the Placita,ANRWII 36.4 (1990)
3184-3193.7) Tis paper is a partial outcome o a research conducted
at the University o Crete,Rethymno, in the Summer Semester o 2009.
I am grateul to A.S. Onassis Public BeneftFoundation or supporting
the visit and to the sta o the Department o Philosophy andSocial
Studies at UOC or their hospitality. I greatly benefted rom
comments made onearlier drats o this paper by Alain Le Boulluec,
Orna Harari and Giorgos Karamanolis.8) C. Str. VIII 2,1.
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346 M. Havrda / Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375
Christian researcher, relying on the Scriptures on the one hand
and thecommon notions on the other, may discover the truth.9 Te
discussion
is ramed by a polemic against eristic and sceptic
opponents.10
b. What is demonstration? (ch. II, 3,1III, 8,3)
Having noted that research is conducted by means o
demonstration,Clement advances to discuss the problem o
demonstration itsel. Despitethis thematic continuity, there is a
clear break between the second and thethird paragraph. Starting
with the third paragraph, Clements Christianinterests recede to the
background, only to come to the surace again
much later in the text in the orm o brie marginal
comments.11
Also, thebeginning o the third paragraph presupposes some
earlier discussion thatis missing in what precedes it in our
text.12 Clement starts by proposing a
9) Str. VIII 2,4-5. By common notions () Clement presumably
meansconsensual views o Christian community, such as beft even
simple-minded believers; c.Str. VII 95,9, where Clement compares
the distinction between simple believers and gnos-tics to that
between laymen () and specialists () who create shapes whosebeauty
surpasses the common notions ().In this comparison, the common
notions apparently correspond to the concord or con-
ession () o the believers (c. Str. VII 90,1-2; Le Boulluec, La
notion dhrsiedans la littrature grecque IIeIIIesicles, II[Paris
1985] 367-70), i.e., to a standpoint Clem-ent also describes as
common aith (); or the latter concept c. Lilla, Clem-ent, 136.; Le
Boulluec, in Clment dAlexandrie, Stromate V, ome II (commentaire),
SC279 (Paris: Cer, 1981) [henceorth SC 279], 20.10) C. Str. VIII
1,1-2; 2,5; Le Boulluec, La notion dhrsie, 382-85.11) Te only other
passages that, in my view, betray a Christian hand are ound in the
fnalchapter on causes: a theological comment in Str. VIII 29,3-6
(GCS 17: 99,1-12), a bibli-cal gloss in 30,4 (99,25), an allusion
to Gen 1:1 in 28,5 (98,14.) and arguably the peda-gogical examples
in 25,4 (96,2-5) and 30,2 (99,19.). C. also 5,5 (82,256).12)
Te abrupt beginning o the eighth book ( .) suggests to many a
reader thatClement himsel had preaced his text with an introduction
that was later lost; c. vonArnim, De octavo, 9, and Sthlins note ad
GCS 17: 80,3. Ernst, De Clementis, 53, conteststhis interpretation
by pointing out that the frst page is inscribed in themanuscript:
Since the inscription . . . is preserved, it would be strange i the
beginning o thetreatise was corrupt. Although it is undoubtedly
true that the beginning o the eighth bookis abrupt (against Zahn,
Forschungen, 115.), it could also be interpreted as an indication
thatthe text designated as chapter one in modern editions was
already composed as a ragment,perhaps a note on Clements
antisceptical source. Str. VIII 1,3-2,5 (GCS 17: 80,11-81,8)may be
described as a commentary on Matt 7:7 (quoted in 1,2 [80,9.]); c.
Nautin, La fndes Stromates, 268, 291. Te quotation o this verse, so
important or Clement (c. Le Boul-luec, La notion dhrsie, 385-89),
could have been prompted by a sentence or two in hissource,
possibly by the initial clauses o 1,1 and 1,2 (GCS 17:
80,3-4.6-8).
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Galenus Christianus? 347
method to arrive at the starting point o such a doctrine ( . .
.), namely to explain the proposed
word by an account so clear that all who speak the same language
will ol-low (3,1). It becomes apparent soon that the proposed word
() is the word (demonstration),13 and so the whose starting point
is looked or is presumably a doctrineconcerned with the topic
described by the proposed word, namely atheory o
demonstration.14
By making the starting point o this theory an explanation o the
wordby which its subject matter is called (i.e., the word ), the
authorollows a method o inquiry that, as he tells us, should be
applied to anyobject o investigation. It consists o three
successive stages: frst, we mustdefne what people o the same nation
and language agree to be themeaning o the name by which the problem
is called; second, havingstarted rom this point, we must inquire
whether the signifed thing, withwhich the defnition is concerned,
exists or not. And fnally, i it isshown to exist, we must precisely
investigate its nature, what it is like, andnever transgress the
given order.15
Tese guidelines have a distinctly anti-sceptic overtone. Te
possibility
o arriving at the starting point o the doctrine in question is
deended onthe grounds that the word means something, and
somethingexistent, to those who use it, be it philosophers, rhetors
or judges (3,2).Tis observation meets with a more general demand or
a possibility toconfrm () statements made about the subject matter
oinquiry. As long as a statement is merely what seems to be the
case (), an opponent can, with equal orce, show whatever he wants
tothe contrary. It is thereore necessary to confrm the statement;
but ithe judgment about it were based on something doubtul as well,
and the
13) C. von Arnim, De octavo, 9.14) For c. Str. VIII 4,1. Te
expression also appears in Str. VII95,3; c. Ernst, De Clementis,
14; Itter, Esoteric eaching, 96. However, in the latter passage,
does not reer to the doctrine o demonstration, but to the teaching
o Christwho is himsel believed to be the starting point o the
doctrine; c. e.g. Str. VII 5,1; 57,3.15) 3,3-4 (GCS 17: 81,17-24):
, . , , , , .
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348 M. Havrda / Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375
judgment about the latter again on something else that is also
doubtul,[the account] would go on infnitely and would be
unprovable. But i
conviction about that which is not agreed is derived rom that
which isagreed by all, the latter should be taken as the starting
point o the doc-trine (4,1).
Clement then presents a defnition o demonstration that
supposedlymeets the above mentioned standard: All human beings
would agree thatdemonstration is an account that provides
convincingness () tothat which is doubtul on the basis o that which
is agreed ( ).16 Tis defnition is a starting point o a
subsequentinquiry o the essence o demonstration, in the course o
which Clementurther clarifes the concept and distinguishes it rom
other scientifcmethods, such as indication () or analysis.17
Te agreed defnition is broad enough to include two kinds o
dem-onstration: (1) demonstration in the most proper sense ()and
(2) the one that is merely based on opinion ().18 Accordingto
Clement, a similar distinction holds or conviction (), andthough he
does not say it explicitly, it must also be applied to that whichis
agreed (), i.e., to the premises on which demonstra-
tion broadly speaking is based. Tat there are two kinds o agreed
prem-ises is confrmed in 6,2 where Clement makes a distinction
between aconclusion drawn rom agreed premises on the one hand, and
a conclu-sion drawn rom true premises on the other. While the ormer
procedureis called deduction, the latter is called demonstration.
In this passage,deduction and demonstration are obviously not used
as complemen-tary terms, nor are the agreed and the true premises
complementary.Rather, demonstration (in the proper sense) is
presented as a kind odeduction whose premises, apart rom being
agreed, are also true.19
16) 5,1 (GCS 17: 82,12-14): .17) For the essence o demonstration
c. Str. VIII 7,6 (). For (6,1) c. below, note 113; or analysis
(8,1), c. below, note 98.18) 5,3.19) S.-P. Bergjan, commenting on
Clements distinction between deduction and demon-stration, suggests
that Clement attempts to separate the two as ar as possible.
Accordingto Bergjan, Clements discussion is misleading at this
point, since he ails to mentionthat this distinction is in
Aristotelian terms a distinction between two subclasses o
syllo-gisms. Bergjan urther contends that in response to the
objection that both demonstra-tion and dialectical syllogism are
syllogisms Clement turns to a Stoic line o thought
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Galenus Christianus? 349
Tere seems to be an analogous relation between convincing and
evi-dent principles in Clements account. I infnite regress is to be
avoided
and the possibility o demonstration preserved, there must be,
accordingto Clement, some principles o demonstration that are
convincing bythemselves.20 Every demonstration is derived rom
undemonstrated con-viction ( . . .). However, Clementsuggests that
beyond conviction ( ) there areother principles o demonstration,
namely that which appears clearly tosense perception and
intellection ( ).21 An argument that starts rom these frst
principles,rather than rom merely reputable premises ( ), anddraws
an appropriate conclusion rom them, creates knowledge in thesouls o
the auditors, rather than mere persuasion.22
In the preceding section the method o demonstration was
appliedto the problem o demonstration itsel. In what ollows,
Clement describesthe demonstrative method as applicable to any
subject matter o inquiryand urther explains it by means o an
example o a specifc researchquestion.
where he fnds the needed distinction between two valid
conclusions, one a syllogism andthe other non-syllogistically
concludent. (Logic and Teology, 406). I fnd Bergjanscomments
unconvincing or two reasons: (1) Te act that demonstration is a
kind odeduction is clearly shown in Str. VIII 6,4 where Clement
says: By drawing an appropri-ate conclusion rom the premises we
only make a deduction. But i each o our premises is
true, we make not onlya deduction, but also a demonstration (,).
(2) I ail to see any indication in our text that Clement turnsto
the Stoic line o thought mentioned by Bergjan. She reers to the
distinction made inDiogenes Laertius, VitaeVII 78, between two
kinds o valid arguments, those that arenon-syllogistically
conclusive (also described as valid in the specifc sense) and
thosethat are called syllogistic. But Bergjan does not explain how
this passage is relevant toClements distinction between deduction
and demonstration.20) 7,1.21) 7,2-3. Again, the distinction between
convincing and evident principles does not indi-cate that the two
terms are complementary. Rather, the concept o evident principles
helpsClement to explain the dierence between two kinds o,
introduced in Str. VIII 5,2and 7,7.22) 7,7-8.
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c. Method o discovery (ch. III, 8,4V, 15,1)
Von Arnim correctly observes that the next thematic unit starts
at 8,4,rather than at 9,1, as indicated by William Lowths chapter
division.23 It isconcerned with a method by which the researcher,
basing himsel on someprevious knowledge o the problem he
investigates, proceeds to the dis-covery o something he has not
known.
o start with, the researcher must get hold o dierent premises
thatare appropriate () to the problem he investigates and he must
alsoreormulate the problem itsel by means o an account that is
agreed byall. In everything we investigate there is something we
already know,
something convincing by itsel which we believe without proo, and
thisshould become the starting point o research and the criterion o
everysupposed discovery.24 Sometimes this previous knowledge,
Clement goeson to speciy, may be the knowledge o the essence o the
thing underscrutiny, accompanied by a complete ignorance concerning
its activity,like, or example, in the case o stones, plants or
animals whose activitiesor states or aculties, or generally
speaking attributes, we ignore. Or wemay know some o these aculties
or states or other attributes, but ignoreand investigate the
essence, like in the case o the soul. Or we may have
knowledge o both the activities and the essences, but inquire to
which othe essences the activities belong. Finally, o some things
we know theiractivities and essences, but do not know their
states.25
In a lengthy and eloquent section, Clement illustrates the
method odiscovery26 by means o an elaboration o a specifc research
question,namely whether the embryo is an animal. Again, the context
o this dis-cussion is distinctly polemical. Clement introduces the
question as anexample o a orm o expression which is potentially
misleading, sinceits terms can be used in dierent ways. In order to
answer it properly, wemust recognize the problems (), and this
wecan do by a semantic analysis o its terms.27 It is done by the
method o
23) von Arnim, De octavo, 10. Chapter division o the Stromata,
proposed by WilliamLowth, was frst introduced in John Potters
edition in 1715.24) 8,4-6. Although this is the only place where
the word is mentioned in theeighth book, the concept already seems
to be implied in Str. VIII 4,2, where Clement saysthat the agreed
defnition o the proposed word shows the way to the discovery o what
issought ().25) 9,1-5.26) C. 9,6: .27) C. 9,6-10,1.
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Galenus Christianus? 351
questions and answers ( ): We ask ouropponent what he means by
the words animal and embryo and
inquire whether the meaning he provides is doubtul or whether it
isagreed by all.28 I he reuses to answer the question, he is shown
to be aneristic person. In that case we should choose the method o
exposition( ) instead and elaborate on the problem ourselves,
whilegiving our opponent an opportunity to answer our exposition
point bypoint when it is fnished. I he attempts to interrupt our
investigation byhis questions, it becomes clear that he is not even
willing to listen. 29
Now, to reach an agreement regarding the meaning o our terms,
oneshould identiy what we have already known. We have already had a
cer-tain notion o what the embryo is and what the animal is (i.e.,
we haveknown the essence) and seek to fnd out whether the
activities and stateso the embryo are such as belong to the
animal.30 For example, i wedefne the animal as that which is
nurtured and grows, it remains to beshown that the embryo is
nurtured and grows (which is obviously thecase).31 Or, i the animal
is defned as that which perceives and sets itselto motion by an
impulse, it is also clear what the matter o investigationshould
be.32 But, as mentioned above, it is also necessary to
determine
what we mean by the embryo.33
Again, in the ace o those who are shu-ing about names, the
author makes it clear that we do not investigatethe word embryo nor
its (incorporeal) meaning, but rather the nature othe thing under
scrutiny.34 Although the semantic analysis o the terms oour
question is a necessary prerequisite o research, we can only
discoverthe answer by investigating the nature o the subject matter
itsel.
Clement then outlines the course o such investigation by
proposingthe defnition o animal as that which is capable () to
per-ceive or be moved by an impulse. Tis defnition comprises both a
pres-
ent condition (already is able) and a prospective condition
(will ever be
28) In this context the views o Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics
on the meaning o the wordanimal are compared (10,3-11,1).29)
11,3-12,1.30) C. 9,8-9.31) C. 11,2; Clement does not explain this
implication in so many words, but this is obvi-ously what he means
when he says: I our opponent says that the animal is that which
isnurtured and grows, he has an answer [to his question].32)
11,2.33) 12,2. C. below, note 73.34) 12,7-13,2.
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able). Tat the prospective condition holds or the embryo is
evident andneed not be investigated. What remains, then, is to
consider whether the
present condition holds o it as well, either potentially (as in
the case oan animal that is at rest or sleeping), or actually.35
Unortunately, the textdoes not speciy how the researcher should
proceed in order to answerthis last question, which is probably due
to the act that the main goal othe whole discussion is merely to
illustrate how to recognize the prob-lems.
Te relevance o this section to the problem o demonstration is
explic-itly shown in its last paragraph which, as von Arnim
observes, shouldinclude 15,1, a passage mistakenly placed at the
beginning o the nextchapter by Lowth.36 Ater the outline o the
method o discovery summa-rized above, demonstration is described as
a common [method] appliedto everything claimed to be discovered. It
is an argument by which weconfrm something on the basis o something
else, and that on the basiso which we confrm it must be agreed and
recognized by the student (onthe grounds o being evident to sense
perception and intellection). In thisconnection Clement recalls the
dierent types o research questions men-tioned above, e.g. when the
essence is known but activities or states
unknown, or when we all know the activities and states, but do
not knowthe essence, like in the case o a question in which part o
the body is theruling part o the soul.37
3. Te source: Preliminary observations
Te theory o demonstration developed in Stromata VIII was
hardlyinvented by the Christian writer himsel. It is true that in
his extant writ-ings Clement is interested in demonstration; the
little he tells us about it,however, is always frmly imbedded in
the context o Christian thought.38As we have seen, Clements
religious interests are still clearly present in
35) 13,3-5. Te argument is summarized in 13,6-8.36) C. von
Arnim, De octavo, 10-11.37) 14,1-4.38) C. esp. Str. II 9,6; 25,3;
48-49; VII 95,3-96,1. C. Harry A. Wolson, Te Philosophyo the Church
Fathers, Vol. I (Cambridge, Mass. 1956) 122.; Lilla, Clement, esp.
137-39;Elizabeth A. Clark, Clements Use o Aristotle (New
York/oronto 1977) 16-26; GeorgiaApostolopoulou, Die Dialektik bei
Klemens von Alexandria (Frankurt a.M. etc.: PeterLang, 1977) 87-98,
esp. 92-98; Le Boulluec, La notion dhrsie, 398.; Ugo
Schneider,Teologie als christliche Philosophie. Zur Bedeutung der
biblischen Botschat im Denken des
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Galenus Christianus? 353
the frst chapter oStromataVIII, but this line o thought is
abandoned,and what is developed instead is a scholastic
introduction to the doctrine
o demonstration that, in the way it is presented, has no obvious
relevanceto the project outlined at the beginning o the book. Tis
observationseems to suggest that, starting with chapter 2 and at
least within theextent o the material discussed above (3,1-15,1),
the text o StromataVIII draws rom a scholarly work concerned
precisely with this topic, thedoctrine o demonstration.39
Is it possible to characterize Clements source more closely? Te
historyo the theory o demonstration starts with Aristotles
Posterior Analyticsand there are indeed many allusions to this
work, as well as to other writ-ings o the Organon, in the sections
discussed above. Te most obviousexamples are the distinction
between deduction and demonstration in6,2-4 and the postulation, as
a way to avoid the infnite regress, o thefrst premises o
demonstration, characterized as convincing by them-selves and
indemonstrable in 6,7-7,2.40 Te division o the three stageso
inquiry in 3,3-4 (quoted above, note 15) could be derived rom
Poste-rior AnalyticsII 10, 93b30-33.41 erminology o the section is
largely Aris-totelian, as the author seems to recognize when he
notes that what he calls
(conclusion)an Aristotelian term, others (namely theStoics) call
(8,3). Te distinction made in 5,2-3 between the twokinds o
demonstration, one that provides the scientifc conviction andone
based on opinion, is not strictly Aristotelian, as Aristotle
reservesthe term demonstration or the scientifc deduction only.42
But itmay well correspond to Aristotles distinction between
demonstrationand the dialectical deduction based on reputable
premises.43 Otherelements reect post-Aristotelian epistemology too,
most notably the
39)
It may be regarded as a consensual view that in 3,1-15,1 (as
well as in some other partso the book) Clement draws rom one and
the same philosophical source; c. von Arnim,De octavo, 10-11, who
reers to this source as liber dialecticusor introductio
dialectica.40) Deduction and demonstration: c. An. post. I 2,
71b23-24; op. I 100a27-29; Ernst,De Clementis, 17; Bergjan, Logic
and Teology, 405.; indemonstrable premises: c.An post. I 2, 71b27
and Jonathan Barnes,Aristotles Posterior Analytics(Oxord:
ClarendonPress, 1975) 99, with other reerences; convincing by
themselves: c. op. I 100b18-21.41) C. the discussion o the latter
passage by David Charles, Aristotle on Meaning andEssence(Oxord:
OUP, 2000) 23-56 et passim.42) C. above, note 40.43) op. I
100a27-30. Alternatively, in Str. VIII 5,3 could includeAristotles
rhetorical deduction as well. C. Str. II 49,2 where both the
dialectical and therhetorical deductions are classifed as . Te
passage is quoted by
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characterization o the frst principles o demonstration as that
whichappears clearly to sense perception and intellection.44
Te Stoics were also preoccupied with demonstration, and at least
thedefnition o demonstration in 5,1 (quoted above, note 16) bears a
traceo the Stoic inuence.45 Stoic terminology is occasionally
used.46 It is clear,however, that the author sympathizes more with
the Aristotelian traditionand even distances himsel rom the Stoics
(c. 4,3; 8,3).
Tese preliminary notes create a vague picture o a source
grounded inthe Aristotelian tradition and elaborating the doctrine
o demonstrationin a syncretistic manner. But as we start looking or
terminological andmethodological parallels in post-Hellenistic
philosophy, the picturebecomes much sharper. Not surprisingly
perhaps, the most signifcantparallels are ound in the writings o
another syncretistic author o Clem-ents time who was occupied with
the doctrine o demonstration, namelyGalen. Exploring them will help
us determine the doctrinal backgroundo Clements source with more
precision.
4. Clement and Galen
Galens interest in logic in general and demonstrative method in
particu-lar is well known. His early treatise On Demonstration is
now lost, but hisviews about this matter can partly be
reconstructed on the basis o hisextant writings.47 In 1910 Wilhelm
Ernst already noted some terminolog-
44) C. Sextus, M. VII 217, reerring to Teophrastus; c. Pamela
Huby, Teophrastus oEresus: Sources or his Lie, Writings, Tought and
Inuence, Commentary, IV: Psychology(Leiden etc.: Brill, 1999)
93-95. For other Aristotelian elements c. below, notes 64 and65;
Solmsen, Early Christian Interest, 283.45)
C. Cicero,Ac. II 26; Diogenes Laertius, VitaeVII 45; Sextus,M.
VIII 314; 422. (par-allels noted by Ernst, De Clementis, 15.).46)
C. esp. Clements distinction between the (corporeal) voice, the
(incorporeal) mean-ing (also called the thing) and the nature o the
investigated matter in Str. VIII 12,7-13,2,which employs the Stoic
concept o the incorporeal , also described as the signifedthing
itsel ( . . .) by the Stoics; c. Sextus,M. VIII 12, notedby Sthlin
in his GCS edition, adp. 87,23-25. For as meaning c. Pierre
Hadot,Sur divers sens du mot pragmadans la tradition philosophique
grecque, in P. Aubenque(ed.), Concepts et catgories dans la pense
antique(Paris: Vrin, 1980) 309-319.47) C. Iwan von Mller, ber
Galens Werk vom wissenschatlichen Beweis, inAbhand-lungen der
kniglich-bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaten, phil.-philol. Kl.
20 (1897)405-478; Barnes, Galen on Logic and Terapy, in F.
KudlienR.J. Durling (edd),Galens Method o Healing (Leiden etc.:
Brill, 1991) 50-102; Riccardo Chiaradonna, Le
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Galenus Christianus? 355
ical correspondences between Clement and Galens works
Introduction toLogic, On the Terapeutic Methodand On the Doctrines
o Hippocrates and
Plato.48 In an important article published in 1973 Friedrich
Solmsenremarks that i we examine the ragments o Galens treatise On
Demon-stration with AristotlesAnalyticsas well as StromataVIII in
mind, we arestruck by the number o tenets they have in common.49
And in a studypublished in 1996 the list o parallels between
StromataVIII and the writ-ings o Galen is urther extended by eun
ieleman, who also considerstheir number and coherence striking.50
And striking indeed it is. Inwhat ollows I list the most important
correspondences, including manythat, to my knowledge, have not been
previously observed.
a. On the Terapeutic Method
In the frst book o On the Terapeutic Method Galen introduces
themethod by which he will proceed in the treatise. In this
connection herecalls the methodological discussion in his work On
Demonstration inwhich it was shown that the frst principles o every
demonstration arethings clearly apparent to sense perception and
intellection and withevery subject matter o inquiry we must replace
the name with an
trait de Galien Sur la dmonstration et sa postrit tardo-antique,
in R. Chiaradonna,F. rabattoni (eds.), Physics and Philosophy o
Nature in Greek Neoplatonism (Leiden/Bos-ton: Brill, 2009)
43-77.48) Ernst, De Clementis, 11-24, indicates the ollowing
parallels: (1) Str. VIII 6,1 andGalen, Inst. log. 11,1: the
defnition o; (2) Str. VIII 6,2 and Galen, Inst. log. 11,2:the
description o demonstration as a conclusion drawn rom true
premises; (3) Str. VIII7,2 and Galen, Inst. log. 1,5; 8,3; 16,6-7;
17,7: the description o the frst premises as that
which is convincing by itsel; (4) Str. VIII 7,3; 14,3 and Galen,
MM(Khn X 39,7-9);PHPIX 7,4 (CMG V 4,1,2: 586,19.): the description
o the frst premises as clear tosense preception and intellection;
(5) Str. VIII 8,2 and Galen, PHP II 3,12 (CMG V4,1,2: 112,4.):
indierence concerning names by which premises are called; (6) Str.
VIII8,4 and Galen, Inst. log. 1,2: on the necessity o having
premises appropriate to the dem-onstrated matter. Ernst quotes
these passages along with parallels rom Aristotle, Alexan-der o
Aphrodisias and other sources in order to show that the background
o Clementsdiscussion on demonstration is chiey Peripatetic.49)
Solmsen, Early Christian Interest, 285. Apart rom the
correspondences detected byErnst, Solmsen reers to verbatim
agreement between MM(Khn X 39,9.) and Clem.Str. VIII 4,2.50) C. eun
ieleman, Galen and Chrysipus on the Soul(Leiden etc.: Brill, 1996)
127. Teparallels are mentioned on pp. 20, 24., 30, 104.
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account.51 Galen then goes on to search or the starting point o
a truedoctrine ( ) concerning the therapeutic
method. As his project in this book is to discover therapies or
all diseases,it is necessary or him to distinguish dierent kinds o
disease. But onecannot fnd either dierentiae or species without a
secure knowledge othat what is divided, i.e. the genus in question.
Tereore, concludesGalen, in our case, too, we must explain by an
account what disease is( . . .), so that we may perormits division
correctly.52 But how shall we do that? How else, says Galen,than in
the manner described in On Demonstration? First, we must agreeon
the notion o the thing proposed without which it is impossible to
dis-cover its essence. And, as we said [in On Demonstration], this
notion mustbe taken as something agreed by all, or otherwise it
would not be properto call it a starting-point. What, then, is the
notion o being ill that isagreed by all human beings? And to what
underlying thing do they mostoten reer with this word to be
ill?53
Galens procedure described above is very similar to the method
Clem-ent employs in Str. VIII 3,1-4,2 in order to fnd the starting
point o thedoctrine o demonstration. According to Clement, there is
no better o
clearer method to arrive at the starting point o such doctrine (
. . .) than to explain the proposed word by anaccount () so clear
that all who speak thesame language will ollow. (3,1) Tis conorms
with a general rule weshould apply to every subject matter o
inquiry, namely that our argu-ment should not be based on any
agreed starting point other than theollowing: what people o the
same nation and language agree to be themeaning o the name by which
the problem is called. (3,3).
As we know, according to Clement, arriving at the agreed
defnition o
the proposed word is the frst stage o inquiry which should be
ollowedby a question concerning the existence o the thing signifed
and fnallyby research concerning its essence (3,4). In the passage
discussed above,
51) Galen,MM(Khn X 39,7-10).52) X 40,2-11.53) X 40,11-41,1: ; ,
, . ;
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Galenus Christianus? 357
Galen distinguishes between the frst and the third stage o this
schemewhen he asks, frst, about the notion o being ill that is
agreed by all
human beings and, second, to what underlying thing the word
usuallyreers. According to Galen, it is necessary to agree on the
notion() o the proposed thing in order to discover its essence
().54
Te similarity o methods is joined with the similarity o terms.
EvenGalens phrase we must replace the name with an account () has a
close parallel in Str. VIII 4,2 ().55 Te main di-erence between the
two descriptions is that Galen is concerned with thedoctrine o
therapeutic method and the proposed word is to be ill,whereas
Clement is concerned with the doctrine o demonstration andthe
proposed word is demonstration.
Clements question about the existence o the subject matter o
inquiry(3,4) is not addressed by Galen in the passage quoted above.
But later inthe treatise, in the context o a polemic against the
Empiricist view thatgeneral terms always reer to particulars, Galen
asks a rhetorical questionabout the meaning o the word disease and
the existence o the thingsignifed that, again, reminds us o
Clements (presumably anti-sceptic
and equally rhetorical) question concerning the meaning o the
worddemonstration and the existence o the thing it signifes. Says
Clement:Is the name demonstration o such kind as blituri, a mere
sound thatmeans nothing? (. . .) At any rate, philosophers provide
demonstration assomething existent, each party in a dierent way.56
Compare Galen: Dothe words animal and disease seem to you to signiy
nothing, but have asense similar to that o blituri and scindapsus?
Or is it the case that theysigniy, but yet there is no object
underlying the words, as is the case withScylla and centaur?57
Other conceptual and terminological correspondences between the
twotexts may be observed. Ater discussing the way people normally
use thewords health and illness, Galen suggests that throughout the
present
54)MM(Khn X 40,12-41,1).55) Galen,MM(Khn X 39,9.). C. Solmsen,
Early Christian Interest, 285; ieleman,Galen and Chrysippus, 24.
and note 69.56) Str. VIII 3,1-2.57)MMX 144,9-14, translated by
Robert J. Hankinson, Galen On the Terapeutic Method(Oxord:
Clarendon Press, 1991) 72. In the last quoted sentence Galen, like
Clement,makes a distinction between the meaning o the word and the
existence o the underlyingobject.
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358 M. Havrda / Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375
treatise we shall derive our interpretation o words rom ordinary
Greekusage (), as we have said in the treatise On
Demonstration. However, continues Galen, discoveries,
investigationsand demonstrations concerning the actual essence o
the thing will not bederived rom the opinions o the multitude ( )
but rom the scientifc premises ( ) the manner o whose discovery was
elaborated in that work.58Here Galen again makes a distinction
between what appears as the frstand the third stage o Clements
scheme and indicates that the premisesemployed in the frst phasethe
commonly accepted meanings owordsmay not yet be the scientifc ones.
A similar line o thought canbe discerned in Clement. Te premises
established in the frst stage aremeanings agreed by people o the
same nation and language (3,3).However, as we have seen above, when
discussing the nature o demon-stration Clement distinguishes
between two kinds o agreed premises,those that correspond to an
opinion and those that are true and evident(5,1-2; 6,2-4; 7,3). Tis
distinction, o course, does not mean that thepremises established
in the frst stage, apart rom being agreed by all, maynot also be
true. Indeed, according to Clement, when replacing the pro-
posed name with an account, the researchers ought to make sure
that theaccount is not merely what appears to be the case (), or
anopponent could, with equal orce, show whatever he wants to the
con-trary. Instead, they should fnd an account that is agreed and
clear tothem all () andthat will show the way to the discovery o
what is sought ().59 But it seems that (or Clement as orGalen) the
truth o the matter can only be established when the
researcherinvestigates its essence and discovers an account that is
frmly based on
that what appears clearly to sense perception and
intellection.
b. Te embryo question
In StromataV 5,3 Clement mentions the question whether the
embryois or is not an animal () in connectionwith the so-called
convertible statements (), that is tosay, statements that can
equally be proposed by those who argue or the
58)MMX 41,17-42,9.59) Str. VIII 4,1-2.
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Galenus Christianus? 359
opposite thesis ( ).60 Tis reects a view that the argumentspro
and contrathe state-
ment the embryo is an animal are equally convincing.However, in
StromataVIII Clement holds a dierent view.61 He intro-
duces the question as an example o a orm oexpression () that
conuses and disturbs our mind,so that it is not easy to discover
the dierences it involves.62 It is ques-tions like these that show
why the researcher must frst o all recognizethe problems. (9,6-7).
Te dierences that the question involves pre-sumably correspond to
the various ways in which the words animal andembryo are used.
First Clement discusses dierent meanings o animaland then o embryo
(10,1-12,2), which enables him to ormulate theresearch question in
the clearest possible manner and open the way to itssolution. No
doubt that the aim o the whole discussion is to show thatwith the
correct method o discovery even the paradigmatically conus-ing
question about the embryo can be resolved in a scientifc
manner.
Te section concerned with the method o discovery (Str. VIII
8,4-15,1) again contains many elements that recall the writings o
Galen.According to Clement, with every subject matter o inquiry we
must
establish dierent premises corresponding to each problem that
are appro-priate to what is proposed ( . . . ).63 Tis remindsus o a
passage in the second book o Galens treatise On the Doctrines
oHippocrates and Plato where the author censures the Stoics or
using prem-ises that are not appropriate to the question proposed (
).64 What he means by that is explained at the
60) For convertible statement c. Aulus Gellius, Noct. Attic. V
10.; IX 16,7; Le Boulluec,SC 279, 34-36.61)
C. Manseld, Doxography, 3186, note 623, who points out that in
book eight theexample derives rom another tradition than in book
fve. C. also Marie-Hlne Con-gourdeau, Lembryon et son me dans les
sources grecques (VIe sicle av. J.-C.-Ve sicle apr.J.-C.) (Paris
2007) 180. Te incompatibility o the two passages is indicated by
the actthat in the fth book (5,3) Clement includes the embryo
question among things unft orinquiry ( []).62) For c. Aristotle,
Soph. el. 165b27 et passim; ieleman, Galen andChrysippus, 17-18,
20.63) Str. VIII 8,4: , .64) PHPII 2,2 (CMG V 4,1,2: 102,20-22).
Galen adds that he dedicated a lengthy sec-tion to these premises
in his treatise On Demonstration (II 2,3 [CMG V 4,1,2:
102,25-27]).Te concept o the appropriate premises is probably based
on Aristotle, An. post. I 2,
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360 M. Havrda / Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375
beginning o book three where Galen presents a our-old
classifcation opremises, describing the frst two classes as ollows:
(1) premises taken
rom the attributes . . . according to the essence o the problem
() and (2) premises taken rom the attributes, butnot according to
the proposed matter o inquiry ( ).65 In order to establish
appropriatepremises, it is thereore necessary to have some
knowledge o the essence.Tis explains why, in Clements account, the
researcher not only ought tohave dierent premises in respect to
each problem, but he must alsochange the problem itsel into an
account, no doubt basing himsel onwhat is previously known about
its essence.66 Tis previous knowledgedoes not necessarily extend to
the essence o the problem as a whole. Buti premises are taken that
are not appropriate to the problem, saysClement, it is not well
possible [or the researcher] to discover anything,since the nature
o the problem, also called the question, remains unknownas a
whole.67
In the next paragraph Clement explains that in some cases we
actuallymay have previous knowledge o the essence o the problem as
a whole( . . . ), while being completely ignorant
71b23; c. also 72a6 and other passages quoted by ieleman, Galen
and Chrysippus, 13,note 23.65) PHPIII 1,4 (CMG V 4,1,2: 168,15-17).
C. Paul Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei denGriechen, Bd. II
(Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1984) 719. and note 151, who reers
toAristotle,An. post. I 4, 73a34-73b24.66) Str. VIII 8,4-6.67) Str.
VIII 8,5 (GCS 17: 84,27-30): ** , , . Following Eduard Schwartz,
Sthlin
indicates a lacuna between and , but the phrase is probably
correct. Compare the ollowing expressions in Galen: (Khn IX 729,2);
(Khn III 308,10; c. 700,9-10); c. also Khn X 172,14-15: . Te dative
could be linked to and reer to the researcher, last mentioned in
8,3 (GCS 17: 84,21: );hence my translation above. Te diculty o this
solution might lie in the act that thenearest possible reerent o is
placed rather ar in the text. Tis problem could beavoided by
reading [scil. ] instead o (it is not well possibleto discover
anything about it [i.e., the problem]). (My thanks are due to
Proessor AlainLe Boulluec who, in a personal communication [August
2010], agrees that the Galenicparallels listed above allow us to
avoid the supposition o a lacuna and suggests to retainthe dative
.)
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Galenus Christianus? 361
o its attributes, or example activities, aections or aculties.
In othercases, we have knowledge o some o these attributes (or
example desires
and aections o the soul), but do not know and investigate the
essence(9,1-2). He returns to this division in 14,4, where he
adduces a questionthat corresponds to the case when we all know the
activities and aec-tions () but do not know the essence, namely in
whichpart o the body is the ruling part o the soul. As noted by
ieleman, thisquestion corresponds to the subject matter o the
second book o GalensOn the Doctrines o Hippocrates and Plato.68 In
the sixth book o the sametreatise Galen dedicates a lengthy
discussion to the distinction betweenactivities and aections o the
soul (VI 1,5-27), a distinction made, ina similar context, in Str.
VIII 14,4. Moreover, the view that the essence othe soul is unknown
is characteristically Galenic.69
For the sake o completeness, we may add that the doxographic
sec-tion where Clement compares the opinions o Plato, Aristotle and
theStoics concerning the dierence between animals and plants
(10,3-11,1)contains several correspondences with Galen, PHPVI
3,7.70 In Str. VIII13,3 Clement introduces a defnition o the animal
as that which is capa-ble o perceiving and moving by impulse (
).
71
Tis recalls a ormulation in Galens treatise OnMy Own
Opinionswhere the author answers the question why animalsare
superior to plants by pointing out two things, perception and
move-ment by impulse ( . . . ).72
68) C. ieleman, Galen and Chrysippus, 30. However, as Manseld,
Doxography, 3092-3108 et passim, shows, the question is a
commonplace philosophical theme associated withthe doxographic
tradition.69)
C. Prop. Plac. 3,1 (CMGV 3,2: 60,3.) and the reerence collected
by Vivian Nuttonad loc. in Galen, On My Own Opinions(Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 1999), 60. C. also Pier-luigi Donini, in Hankinson
(ed.), Te Cambridge Companion to Galen (Cambridge: CUP,2008) 185.,
203, note 9.70) C. Strom. VIII 10,3-4 and PHPVI 3,7 (CMG V 4,1,2:
374,14-19). C. ieleman,Galen and Chrysippus, 24, note 67. Parallels
in doxographic literature are discussed byManseld, Doxography,
3187-3190.71) Te defnition is already implied in 9,8.72) Prop.
Plac. 13,7 (CMG V 3,2: 108,12-14). C. Nat. Fac. I 1 where Galen
says that thespecifc eature o the animals is to perceive and move
by choice ( ). Te latter passage is noted by ieleman, Galen
andChrysippus, 30, note 93a, as closely similar to Str. VIII 9,8.
C. also Ps.-Galen, Defnitio-nes medicae(Khn XIX 452); Congourdeau,
Lembryon et son me, 291.
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However, the most striking (and, to my knowledge, hitherto
unno-ticed) parallel is the one related to Clements didactic
example itsel,
namely to the embryo question. In Str. VIII 12,2, having
discussed thevarious meanings o the word animal, Clement proceeds
to ask his vir-tual opponent what he means by the word embryo,
literally the thingconceived or the thing in the womb ():Does he
take the expression the thing conceived or the thing in thewomb to
signiy already that which is not ormed, and even the seeddeposited
in the womb, or just that which is dierentiated and ormedalready?
(), that is, theso-called ?73 In this passage Clement indicates
that the word specifcally designates the developed oetus.74 wenty
lines laterhe says: As regards the nature o the thing we are
investigating, namely, we have clearly shown what it is like.75 Tis
sentence apparentlyreers to the description o in 12,2, or perhaps
to some moredetailed discussion not preserved in our excerpts. In
any case it shows thatin order to solve the embryo question,
Clement narrows the matter oinvestigation to the developed
oetus.
Tis observation brings us back to Galen who in his writing On
the
Utility o the Partsgives us the ollowing testimony: Tat the
thing in thewomb is already an animal, at least when all o its
members are ormed(), we said in the treatisesOn Demonstration and
On the Doctrines o Hippocrates and Plato.76 Tispassage is
interesting not only as evidence that Galen based his solutiono the
problem on the same distinction between the levels o the
develop-
73) Str. VIII 12,2 (GCS 17: 87,4-7): ,
, .74) Tis corresponds to a medical usage also attested by
Galen; c. Vronique Boudon-Millot, La naissance de la vie dans la
thorie mdicale et philosophique de Galien, inL. Brisson, M.-H.
Congourdeau, J-L. Solre (edd.), Lembryon: ormation et
animation(Paris: Vrin, 2008) 84-87. I ollow the authors suggestion
to translate asembryo and as oetus (87.).75) Str. VIII 13,2 (GCS
17: 87,26.): , .76) Galen, UPXV 5 (Helmreich II 357,24-28 = Khn IV
238,19-239,4): , , .
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Galenus Christianus? 363
ment o the embryo that we encounter in Clement.77 It is
interestingespecially because it shows that Galen was occupied with
the embryo
question in his treatise On Demonstration. Te act that this
unexpecteditem is on the list o the contents o the treatise has, to
my knowledge,never been suciently explained.78 However, the role
that this questionplays in Clements discussion o the demonstrative
method might give usa clue.
c. Four more parallels
More parallels may be added that indicate the proximity between
the sec-
tions oStromataVIII discussed above and the writings o Galen. I
willcomplete the list with the ollowing our.In Str. VIII 5,2,
having made a distinction between two kinds o dem-
onstration and conviction, Clement also distinguishes two kinds
oknowledge, but also oreknowledge, one scientifc and sure ( ), the
other merely based on expectation ().79Now it is not very clear
what Clement means by oreknowledge in thispassage. One immediately
thinks o previous knowledge in Aristotlestheory o demonstration,80
but the specifcation o the defcient kind o
as suggests that Clement uses the word oreknowl-edge in the
sense o the knowledge o uture events. Von Arnim thinks
77) C. Congourdeau, Lembryon et son me, 309. In Str. VIII 12,2
Clement describes theless developed phase o the thing in the womb
by two expressions: a) , b) . Tese expressions seem to cor-respond,
in a chronologically reverse order, to the frst two stages o
development o thething conceived, as outlined in Galens writings On
Semen and On the Formation o the Phoetus. C. esp. Sem. (Khn IV 542)
where the initial stage called , in which the
orm o the seed is dominant (), is succeed by the stage o, in
which the main organs (heart, brain and liver) are not dierentiated
andormed yet (). Next is the stage o, which ur-ther develops into
(543). C. Boudon-Millot, La naissance de la vie, 85-87.78) Von
Mller, ber Galens Werk, 465, suggests that Galen elaborated the
embryoquestion in connection with an inquiry concerning the essence
o the soul, which in turnwas intended to show the limits o the
demonstrative method (c. 460-64). However, it isunclear how the
solution o the embryo question Galen proposed in De
demonstrationewould have helped him convey his sceptical message
concerning the souls essence.79) Str. VIII 5,2 (GCS 17: 82,14-16):
, , , .80) C. Aristotle,An. post. I 1, 71a1-2; I,2, 72a34-36.
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364 M. Havrda / Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375
that Clement introduces a Christian element here,81 but it is
not necessar-ily so. Te ancients already knew the dierence between
layman and
expert opinion about uture events82 and Aristotle even (perhaps
hal-mockingly) describes divination as .83 Te distinc-tion gained
in importance or doctors who tried to base medicine (owhich
prognosis is an important part) on frm scientifc oundations. Inhis
Commentary on Hippocrates Prognostic, Galen distinguishes two
mean-ings o the word , comparing them with two ways in which
theword is normally used, one being sure (), as when we saythat
ater winter there will be spring, then summer and then autumn,and
the other not sure (), as when Aratus says that i the upperhorn o
the moon leans orward, we should expect a storm rom thenorth, and i
it inclines backwards, a storm rom the south (Phaen. I794.). Tough
it does usually () turn out to be so, sometimesit does not.84 A ew
lines later Galen says that people normally use theword
oreknowledge to designate both the expectation that uture
eventswill happen as usually, and the one that is certain.85 He
adds that a gooddoctor should not care about such distinctions, but
rather try to makepredictions that turn out to be correct as oten
as possible.86 Nevertheless
on another occasion he does indicate that some medical
predictions maybe regarded as sure (namely when they are concerned
with necessaryconsequences)87 and he even uses the term as
adescription o a sure prediction.88
Clements rare collocations (5,2) and (8,2) can also be ound in
Galen.89 More importantly, in the latterpassage Clement recommends
to the demonstrative man that he shouldnot worry about names by
which premises are called whether peoplewish to call them axioms or
propositions or assumptions (
81) Von Arnim, De octavo, 10.82) C. Plato, Tt. 178c-179a;
Aristotle,Met. IV 1010b11-14.83) De mem. 449b12. I owe this
reerence to Miroslav edina.84) Galen, Hipp. Prog. (Khn XVIIIb
12,14-13,13).85) Galen, Hipp. Prog. (Khn XVIIIb 14,10.): .86) Khn
XVIIIb 14,12-15,5.87) C. CAM(Khn I 289,15-293,17).88) Hipp. O. Med.
(Khn XVIIIb 636,14.).89) : Galen, Ut. Resp. (Khn IV 492,11); c. SM
(Khn XI636,12-16); : Galen, Sem. (Khn IV 649,7); c. PHPII 3,17 (CMG
V4,1,2: 112,30).
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Galenus Christianus? 365
); this recommendation notonly corresponds to Galens
sel-proessed tendency o using philosophical
terms he regards as synonyms interchangeably,90 but specifcally
recalls theollowing passage in PHP II 3,12: Te ancients wrote about
all thesekinds [o premises], whether you want to call them
propositions or axi-oms or statements (), it makes no dierence or
our present purpose . . .91
d. Dierences?
Can we detect any specifc dierences between the concept o
demonstra-
tion recorded by Clement and Galens views? ieleman proposes two
suchpoints o dispute, but on closer examination one proves
disappointingand the other inconclusive.
When discussing Clements distinction, in Str. VIII 7,7-8,
between twokinds o demonstration (the one based on evident premises
and the otheron reputable ones), ieleman notes that in this context
Clement alsoreers to the requirement that premises should be
appropriate (),but quite unlike Galen presents this as a
prerequisite or syllogistic(including endoxic) reasoningtout
court.92 However, this supposed dier-
ence is based on mere oversight. It is true that in the passage
concernedClement uses the word in relation to both kinds o
deduction.But unlike in 8,4, where the word reers to the
appropriate premises(precisely in the Galenic sense), in the
passage discussed by ieleman theword reers to an appropriately
drawn conclusion ( ).93 Clements point is that both kinds o
deduction are stilldeductions (valid arguments), provided that
their conclusions are appro-priate to their premises.94 In this
sense the word is also used byAlexander o Aphrodisias and, indeed,
by Galen.95
90) C. Ben Morison, in Cambridge Companion to Galen, 148.91) C.
Ernst, 23, note 1; ieleman, Galen and Chrysippus, 24-25 and note
69.92) ieleman, Galen and Chrysippus, 20.93) Str. VIII 7,8 (GCS 17:
84,2-8): , , , , , , , ,
,
,
.94) Te point is already made in 6,4. C. Bergjan, Logic and
Teology, 405.
95) C. Alexander, In op. (CAG II.2: 14,2); Galen, Hipp. Elem.
(Khn I 445,14.); Ven.
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366 M. Havrda / Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375
ielemans second observation is more interesting. In a chapter
dedi-cated to Galens scientifc method ieleman recalls a passage in
Galens
treatise On the Diagnosis and Cure o the Errors o the Soul where
theauthor argues or the utility o mathematical methods
(particularly analy-sis) or healthy lie. In this context Galen
elaborates his point by means oan example o the way these methods
are used in architecture, namely inthe construction o a sundial.96
Having indicated how the logical methodso analysis and synthesis
are employed in this case, Galen proceeds to dis-cuss ways by which
the accuracy o the sundial can be tested empirically.97According to
ieleman, this example illustrates a more general pointabout Galens
demonstrative method, namely that the logical method oinquiry
should be tested by experience: Te addition o empirical testingto
the logical method (i.e. analysis/synthesis) reects a amiliar
Galenicscheme, viz. the duo reason/experience. In this respect
Galen diers romthe Platonist account o philosophical method oered
in Clement, Str.VIII, which is closely similar to this and other
Galenic passages in allother respects. ieleman notes that Clement
agrees with Galen insoar asanalysis in concerned.98 Unlike Galen,
however, Clement identifes dem-onstration with the downward route
rom the axioms, which coincides
with what Galen calls synthesis.99
In Galens view as presented by iele-man, analysis and synthesis
lead to some amount o clarifcation o thesubject matter o inquiry.
Nevertheless, defnitive and clear confrmationthat what is looked or
has indeed been ound is only provided by thesubsequent empirical
test. Only when the later stage has been added dowe have proo or
demonstration in its proper sense.100
But is Clements description o proo (when we reach what we
arelooking or rom the frst premises through all the middle terms)
really a
96) Galen, Pecc. Dig. 4-5,16 (CMGV 4,1,1: 53,9-59,8).97) C.
ieleman, Galen and Chrysippus, 34.98) C. Str. VIII 8,1 where
Clement describes analysis as a procedure by which we ascend
rom demonstrable premises to that which is evident to sense
perception and intellection.C. Galen,MM(Khn X 33,14-18), where the
author provides a description o the proce-dure which is closely
similar to Str. VIII 8,1. On Galens concept o analysis c.
Barnes,Galen on Logic and Terapy, 67; ieleman, Galen and
Chrysippus, 33.99) ieleman reers to Str. VIII 8,1: Demonstration
takes place when we reach what we
are looking or rom the frst premises through all the middle
terms (, ).
100) ieleman, Galen and Chrysippus, 35. On the importance o
empirical verifcation orGalen c. Hankinson, in Cambridge Companion
to Galen, 169-178.
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Galenus Christianus? 367
point o a specifc dierence rom Galens theory? In his opusculumOn
the Best Method o eachingGalen reers us to his treatise On
Demon-
stration where it is written how, by starting rom the elements
and prin-ciples in each case, a man may best demonstrate whatever
can bedemonstrated.101 Tus the demonstrative method is described as
the axi-omatic method,102 and the need or empirical testing is not
a part o itsdefnition. It is true that in the writing discussed by
ieleman Galen alsosays: When we fnd a demonstrative method that
leads us to what we arelooking or and is clearly confrmed by the
thing itsel, we have an excel-lent test o its truth.103 Here, as in
Clement, the demonstrative methodleads us to what we are looking
or. Te confrmation o the methodcomes rom the thing itsel, no doubt
provided that the premises o theinquiry are appropriate to the
things essence. But i our method is to beconfrmed by the thing
itsel, such confrmation must necessarily bebased on something more
evident than the premises on which we havebased our investigation
so ar. What ieleman calls the addition oempirical testing seems to
be an example o such confrmation. It pro-vides the researcher with
new, more evident premises or his argumentabout the subject
matter.104
Now as we know, Clement derives the frst premises rom that
whichappears clearly to sense perception and intellection. Tis
ormulationallows or the possibility that when it comes to matters
that can only bedemonstrated on the basis o sensory evidence,
Clements demonstrativeman will seek the same kind o empirical data
as Galens. Tere is nodirect indication o that in StromataVIII.
Nevertheless the whole discus-sion about the embryo culminates in
the insight that in order to fnd outwhether the embryo is an
animal, we must inquire whether it is actuallyable to move and
perceive. But this question can hardly be dealt with by a
method other than empirical research.
101) Opt. Doct. 5,3 (CMG V 1,1: 106,19-108,1 = Khn I 52,12-14);
I ollow the transla-tion o Barnes, Galen on Logic and Terapy,
66.102) C. Barnes, Galen on Logic and Terapy, 66.103) Galen, Pecc.
Dig. 3,5 (CMGV 4,1,1: 47,4-7 = Khn V 68,4-7). Te passage is
quotedby ieleman, 35, note 116. C. also Hankinson, in Cambridge
Companion to Galen, 169.104)
A good example is the amous argument rom dissection described in
Galen, PHPII3,4-8 (CMG V 4,1,2: 110,1-14). C. Donini, in Cambridge
Companion to Galen, 190.
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368 M. Havrda / Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375
5. Te question of source
Te number and coherence o similarities with extant writings o
Galenand especially the close correspondences with passages that
reer to hislost treatise On Demonstration allow us, I believe, to
identiy the source oStromataVIII, at least as ar as the passages
discussed above are concerned,as a writing specifcally dedicated to
the doctrine o demonstration whosephilosophical background, method
and vocabulary is extremely close tothose o Galen. But then
obviously the question arises whether theremight be any genetic
relation between Clements source and the writingso Galen, and i so,
o what kind. Here, equipped with the evidence rom
the previous section, we are entering the realm o the plausible.
Withinthis realm, we may distinguish three lines o
interpretation.
(1) Tere is no direct relation between Clements source and the
writ-ings o Galen, but both draw rom the same scholastic
traditionwhere the parallels noted above are common.
(2) Clements source is a source o Galen.(3) Clements source is
Galen.
Te frst line o interpretation is chosen by Solmsen who thinks
that thedoctrines common to Clement and Galen reect the
philosophical syn-cretism (alias eclecticism) which prevailed in
logic as much as elsewhereand describes Galen as representative o a
trend.105 In a similar vein,ieleman regards StromataVIII as a
document o the Platonist scholastictradition and as an indicator o
traditional elements in Galens concepto demonstration.106 ieleman
agrees with Jaap Manseld, according towhom the source or sources o
Stromata VIII belong with the tradi-tions o the Middle Platonist
scholastic literature.107 Manseld bases thisassessment mainly on
his elaboration oStr. VIII 17-21, a chapter dedi-cated to the
problem o division and defnition that contains parallelswith the
Middle Platonist sources, especially the fth chapter o
AlcinousDidascalicus.108 Some o these parallels were already noted
by R.E. Witt
105) Solmsen, Early Christian Interest, 286. As a possible
source o the trend representedby both Galen and StromataVIII
Solmsen suggests Gaius (290, note 36).106) C. ieleman, Galen and
Chrysippus, 20, note 47; 24; 104.107) Manseld, Doxography, 3184. C.
also Manseld, Heresiography in Context(Leidenetc.: Brill, 1992)
62.108) C. Manseld, Heresiography, 78-109, esp. 80-84.
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Galenus Christianus? 369
who traces them, as all the philosophical material in Stromata
VIII, toAntiochus o Ascalon, or rather to some Peripatetic
authority inuenced
by Antiochus, or example Aristocles o Messene.109However, these
explanations underestimate the act that the source (or
one o the sources) o Stromata VIII is specifcally concerned with
theproblem o demonstration. Moreover, neither Witt nor Manseld
takeinto consideration the Galenic parallels noted above. According
to Mans-eld, Clements possible sources are a manual or more than
one and pos-sibly (. . .) include the logico-epistemological
section o a substantial workdealing with systematic philosophy in
the manner o Alcinous.110 But wehave seen that the
logico-epistemological section discussed above can becharacterized
more precisely as an introduction to the doctrine o demon-stration.
We may add that the chapter on division and defnition (Str.VIII
17-21) neatly coheres with this theme. It is impossible to analyze
thischapter in detail within the ramework o the present study. Suce
to saythat the text abounds with allusions to the
Organon,especially the Poste-rior Analytics, which apart rom its
critique o division also includes chap-ters where division is
presented as a useul scientifc method, notably as atool or fnding
defnitions.111 Another point o convergence with the two
earlier sections oStromataVIII is the act that the chapter on
divisionand defnition covers topics that are oten discussed by
Galen and werecertainly elaborated in his treatise On
Demonstration.112 Tus the sourceo the logico-epistemological
material in StromataVIII may be more ade-quately characterized (to
paraphrase Manseld) as a substantial workdealing with the
demonstrative method in the manner o Galen.
Having described the topic and style o our source more narrowly
wecan ocus our inquiry on the ollowing question. Is it possible
that the
109)
Witt,Albinus, 31-41.110) Doxography, 3184.111)An. post. II
13-14. By emphasizing the Aristotelian content I do not mean to
denythat the ramework o the discussion is probably Platonist; c.
Witt,Albinus36-38; Mans-eld, Heresiography, 80-84. C. also J.
ManseldD.. Runia, Atiana. Te Method andIntellectual Context o a
Doxographer, Vol. III (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010) 63.112) C.
Barnes, Galen on Logic and Terapy, 68; 72-76; Chiaradonna, Le trait
deGalien, 45. For Galens interest in division and defnition c. also
ieleman, in CambridgeCompanion to Galen, 59.; Hankinson, ibid.,
167. C. also Manseld, Heresiography, 330,who quotes Galen, PHPIX
9,43-46 (CMG V 4,1,2: 608), as another parallel to Alcinous,Did. 5.
Te passage recalls Clements distinction o three kinds o division in
Str. VIII19,3-8. However, in this instance Galen is closer to
Alcinous than to Clement, as he intro-duces not three, but fve
kinds o division. C. Manseld, Heresiography, 81.
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370 M. Havrda / Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375
parallels we have detected in the method and vocabulary
oStromataVIIIon the one hand and Galens treatise On the Terapeutic
Methodon the
other reect a scholastic tradition where this particular method
andvocabulary was common? Possible it is. Ater all, the topic and
much othe vocabulary is Aristotelian, though elaborated in a
distinctly eclecticmanner, and many isolated motis can be ound
elsewhere. But as ar as Iam aware, we have no indication o a
similar treatment o the demonstra-tive method, any testimony or
ragment to support this explanation. Tiscould still be ascribed to
an optical illusion created by the exceptionalnumber o Galens
writings that have been preserved in contrast to thenumber o
philosophical documents o the same period that have beenlost. But
the curious detail that both Clement and Galen employ thesame
research question, whether the embryo is an animal, in the contexto
an exposition o the demonstrative method, and solve it in a
similarashion, using similar words, supports a dierent view, namely
that therelation between the two texts is somehow more
exclusive.
Tis view is urther supported by the ollowing consideration. I
ourinterpretation o the word prognosis(5,2) is correct, we have a
reason tobelieve that the context o Clements discussion o the
theory o demon-
stration is specifcally medical. Tere is another medical term
used in thesame section, namely (6,1).113 It is worth mentioning in
this con-nection that the source rom which Clement draws in the
last chapter on
113) was a technical term in the Methodical school o medicine;
c. MichaelFrede, Te Method o the So-Called Methodical School o
Medicine, in Essays in AncientPhilosophy(Minneapolis 1987) 263-66.
It was extensively used by Galen in both medicaland logical
contexts; c. Barnes, Galen on Logic and Terapy, 98-100; Fridol
Kudlien, Endeixis as a Scientifc erm, in F. KudlienR.J. Durling
(edd), Galens Method o
Healing(Leiden etc.: Brill, 1991) 103-111; Hankinson, Galen On
the Terapeutic Method,202-206; Philip J. van der Eijk, in Cambridge
Companion to Galen, 292. Galens use o is oten compared with the
concept o an indicative sign ()known to Sextus (PHII 99-101; M.
VIII 151-6), a concept that is probably o medicalorigin itsel; c.
David Sedley, On Signs, in J. Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M. Burnyeat,M.
Schofeld (edd.), Science and Speculation (Cambridge: CUP, 1982)
241. and note 8;James Allen, Inerence rom Signs(Oxord: OUP, 2001)
87-146, esp. 106-122. Tere doesnot seem to be any evidence o a
similar use o outside the medical literature. Is itnoteworthy that
in Inst. log. 11,1 Galen makes a distinction between and on the
grounds that the ormer does not proceed by the rules o syllogism
(c.Phillip de Lacy, Galen on Te Doctrines o Hippocrates and Plato
[CMG V,4,1,2, Berlin:Akademie Verlag, 1984, 3 vols.] 658).
Eectively the same distinction is made by Clem-ent in Str. VIII
6,1.
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Galenus Christianus? 371
causes (25-33) is most probably medical.114 It does not seem
unthinkablethat a substantial work dedicated to the problem o
demonstration would
include a section on causes.115 Considering how much attention
Galenpays to the problem o causes in his extant writings, we might
entertainthe possibility that he discussed it also in his treatise
On Demonstration.Be it as it may, the indications mentioned above
suggest that the doctrinalramework o Clements source could be
specifcally medical. But i this isa sound conclusion, the
hypothesis o a scholastic tradition so narrowlyspecifed, o which
there is no trace in our sources, would seem ratherarbitrary.
I we reject the idea o a scholastic tradition in which the
similaritiesbetween StromataVIII and the writings o Galen were
common, we arelet with two options. Either Galen draws his theory o
demonstrationrom a non-Galenic source which is also the source o
Clement, or Clem-ent draws his theory o demonstration rom a lost
writing o Galen.Again, the problem with the frst explanation is
that it posits somethingo which we have no evidence. As or Galen,
he does not appeal to any
114) C. Jean-Jol Duhot, La conception stoicienne de la causalit
(Paris: Vrin, 1989) 211-
235, who argues that the character o some passages in this
amalgam o Stoic and Aristo-telian elements is indisputably medical.
C. Str. VIII 28,7; 30,1; 31,4-5; 32,7; 33,1-9;Duhot, La conception
stoicienne, 221, 224, 226, 232-4, 235. We may add two
observa-tions: (1) In Str. VIII 25,2, having explained that
procatarctic causes provide the occasionor something to happen,
Clement adduces the ollowing example: beauty, when seen byan
incontinent person, creates in him the erotic condition () butdoes
not necessitate its ulflment. Tis is oten explained as a Stoic
description. However,the word is not used in the sense attested or
the Stoics, namely as an enduringstate which additionally does not
admit o degrees (Anthony Long, David Sedley, TeHellenistic
Philosophers, vol. I [Cambridge: CUP, 1987] 376), but rather
describes a tran-
sient inner condition. Tis usage might be labelled as
Aristotelian, but the description othe procatarctic cause as an
external actor that provides or some has closer par-allels in
medical literature, particularly Galen; c.MMX 242-9; Caus. Puls. IX
2-3; Hank-inson, Galens Teory o Causation,ANRWII 37.2 (1994), 1766.
(2) In Str. VIII 32,4,Clement makes a distinction between
pre-evident and non-evident causes and adds thatwhile the ormer are
grasped , the latter are grasped . Again, thedistinction between
and , and the way it is applied here, closelycorresponds to the
medical usage attested by Galen; c. esp. SI11 (Khn I 77,14-78,6);or
the context c. Fredes introduction to Galen, Tree reatises on the
Nature o Science(Indianapolis 1985) ix-xxxiv. For the history o the
concept o epilogismos c. MalcolmSchofeld, Epilogismos: An
Appraisal, in M. Frede, G. Striker (edd.), Rationality inGreek
Tought(Oxord: OUP, 1996) 221-237.115) C. Aristotle, An. post. II
11; Clem. Str. VIII 18,1. C. Le Boulluec, Extraits, 116.
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372 M. Havrda / Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375
authority on the demonstrative method later than Aristotle and
Teo-phrastus. He regards their Posterior Analyticsas the best
accounts written
about this topic so ar, and claims to have clarifed some o their
ratherunclear and brie statements in his work.116 It is true, he
tell us that romhis young age he was interested in what
philosophers, all the amous Sto-ics and Peripatetics o his time,
had to say that could be used or demon-strations. But he claims to
have ound very little (), and eventhis was controversial, i not
downright absurd.117 He gives credit to hisather or introducing him
to geometry, mathematic and arithmetic.Tese disciplines saved him
rom scepticism by providing the geometricalmethod o proo. He
presents his own workOn Demonstration as a devel-opment o this
method, to be used by those already trained in the linearproos o
geometry.118 Galen might have exaggerated his achievement. ButI
wonder i he could have claimed so much originality or his work
ondemonstration i there were in circulation an earlier treatise on
the samesubject, elaborated, at least to some extent, in a similar
manner, and pos-sibly written by a doctor, a work wide-spread
enough to reach Clement oAlexandria sometime around the turn o the
2nd and 3rd century. At anyrate, neither Galen nor anyone else
indicates that such treatise ever
existed.
6. Te Galen hypothesis
It remains to explore the possibility that Galen himsel is the
source o thepassages in StromataVIII discussed above. Surprising as
it may sound, thisexplanation should not be dismissed too
lightly.119 Chronologically it is
116)
C. PHPII 2,4; II 3,1 (CMG V 4,1,2: 104,3-5; 108,22-25).117) Lib.
Prop. (Khn XIX 39,17-40,4).118) Khn XIX 40,5-41,12. On geometrical
(linear) proos in Galen c. Barnes, Proosand Syllogisms in Galen, in
Galien et la philosophie (Genve: Fondation Hardt, 2003)1-24.119)
Solmsen, the only scholar known to me who considers the possibility
that Galenmight be Clements source, quickly dismisses it as
dramatization, preerring to lookupon Galen as representative o a
trend. According to Solmsen, to think o Clement asworking his way
through 15 technical books about [demonstration] puts a strain on
theimagination. (Early Christian Interest, 286). However, Solmsen
is not aware o the ullscale o parallels, including some
characteristic details that render the hypothesis o atrend
unlikely. O course, the explanation that Galen is Clements source
does not nec-essarily imply that Clement worked his way through all
the fteen books o Galens trea-
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Galenus Christianus? 373
possible. It is true that there are not many dates in Clements
career thatcan be fxed with certainty. But we know that he wrote
the frst book o
Stromata ater the death o Commodus (192)120 and it is reasonable
tosuppose that the terminus post quem or the text known as
StromataVIII isnot earlier than that.121 As ar as Galen is
concerned, his voluminous workOn Demonstration was written beore
162.122 We know that he later com-posed numerous treatises in which
he elaborated various aspects o histheory o demonstration and two o
themOn the Demonstrative Discov-eryand Summary o the Teory o
Demonstrationseem to have been occu-pied with the theory o
demonstration in general.123 Te dates o theselater writings are
unknown, but the date oOn Demonstration suces toallow or the
chronological possibility o Clements acquaintance withGalens method
o demonstration.
Do we have any evidence that Clement was acquainted with
Galen?Not to my knowledge. But there are reasons to believe (1)
that Clementcouldhave heard about Galen, and (2) that he couldhave
been interestedto acquire Galens work on the demonstrative method.
Tat Galen wasamous among his contemporaries is attested by
Alexander o Aphrodisiaswho ourished in approximately the same time
as Clement. In an ot-
quoted passage Alexander mentions Galen as an example o a man
orepute (endoxos) alongside with Plato and Aristotle.124 An
important pas-sage in Eusebius, quoting an anonymous heresiological
source, indicatesthat sometime at the beginning o the 3rd century
there were Christiansin Rome who held Galen in such high esteem
that, according to Eusebius
120) C. Str. I 144,3-5.121) In order to date StromataVIII more
precisely, we must examine the question o its
chronological relation to other books o Stromata(especially
those where parallel motisare ound), as well as the role o
StromataVIII in Clements overall project. Both thesequestions are
controversial and cannot be addressed here. Modern discussion o the
dateso Clements writings is well summarized by Carl P. Cosaert, Te
ext o the Gospels inClement o Alexandria(Atlanta 2008) 15-18.122)
C. von Mller, ber Galens Werk, 411-14.123) Lib. Prop. (Khn XIX
44,17; 45,4). For the list o Galens books useul or demonstra-tions
c. Morison, in Cambridge Companion to Galen, 66.124) Alexander, In
op. 8,5 (CAG II.2: 549,24). For Alexanders acquaintance with
Galenc. Nutton, Galen in the Eyes o His Contemporaries, in From
Democedes to Harvey(London: Variorum, 1988) III, esp. 318-320.
Alexanders date is determined on the basis oa dedication to the
emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla in the frst lines o his De
ato(CAG suppl. II.2: 164,3); the dedication must have been written
sometime between 198
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374 M. Havrda / Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011) 343-375
source, some o them perhaps even worshipped him.125
Eusebiusdescribes them as the ollowers o Teodotus the Shoemaker who
was
excommunicated by the Roman church in the last decade o the 2nd
cen-tury.126 One o the main errors o this group, as perceived by
the churchauthorities, was their tendency to interpret the divine
Scriptures by meanso syllogistic fgures. In order to improve their
exegetical abilities theystudied geometry, especially Euclid, and
the writings o Aristotle, Teo-phrastus and Galen.127 As Nutton
observes, modern scholars are agreedthat what these Christians were
doing was erecting a deence o Christi-anity (. . .) by the use o
scientifc, demonstrative logic.128 We can saelyassume that Galen
was popular among them because o his logical writ-ings, especially
the writings on the demonstrative method. Teir choice oGalen may
have been motivated by the act that he wrote the most well-known,
most elaborate and most accessible account o the topic that
wasavailable at that time. In addition, it may also have been
provoked by theamous doctors interest in Christianity and his
criticism o its demonstra-tive impotence.129 We have seen that
Clement, too, tried to employ thedemonstrative method as a tool o
biblical exegesis.130 And he responds tosimilar objections against
Christian aith as were those ormulated by
Galen.131
Had Clement ever heard o Galens works on demonstration, hewould
have been intrigued to read them or precisely the same reason asthe
Teodotians were. But i around Clements time Galens reputation
125) Eusebius, Eccl. hist. V 28,14 (Bardy).126) 28,9.127)
28,13.128) Nutton, Galen in the Eyes o His Contemporaries, 316.129)
C. Hermann Schne, Ein Einbruch der antiken Logik und extkritik in
die altchrist-
liche Teologie, in . KlauserA. Rcker (edd.), Pisciculi: FS F. J.
Dlger(Mnster 1939),262: Die Achtung des Galenos vor der im Leben
bewhrten berzeugungstreue der Chri-sten au der einen Seite und au
der anderen Seite seine missbilligende Verwunderungber ihre
Unzugnglichkeit r Deduktionen machen es begreiich, dass gebildete
Chri-sten im Anang des 3. Jh. die Mngel auszugleichen versucht
haben, die der berhmteLogiker an ihnen empunden hatte. For Galens
attitude to Christianity, c. the classicstudy by Richard Walzer,
Galen on Jews and Christians(London 1949).130) Str. VIII 2,1.4. C.
Apostolopoulou, Dialektik, 93: So ist der Beweis, wie ihn Kle-mens
versteht, die Methode der Interpretation der Bibel. At least on one
occasion (Str. VI121,2) Clement detects a demonstrative syllogism
in the Bible itsel; c. Apostolopoulou,Dialektik, 87.131) C. e.g.
Str. II 8,4-9,6, where Clement tries to explain to the Greeks in
their terms whyaith cannot be proved. C. also II 24,2-3; V 18,3,
and reerences listed above, note 38.
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Galenus Christianus? 375
was already o such good standing as to be compared with that o
Platoand Aristotle, we have a reason to think that Clement could
have heard
about him too.Tese considerations, I believe, allow us to
propose the ollowing the-
sis: the parallels between Clements account on demonstration and
thewritings o Galen are due to the act that StromataVIII 3,1-15,1
drawrom a lost writing o Galen about the doctrine o demonstration.
I leaveopen the question whether this lost writing is a part
(presumably the frstbook or more) o Galens treatise On
Demonstration, or whether it is somelater compendium concerned with
the same topic. Its solution partlydepends on another question,
which I leave open too, namely whetherand to what extent the
remaining chapters o Stromata VIII could bealigned to the same
source. Tis as well as other problems, with which thepuzzling
bequest o the Alexandrian teacher conronts us, must bereserved or
another inquiry.
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