Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the Limits of Emotional Therapy

GALEN ON THE THERAPY OFDISTRESS AND THE LIMITSOF EMOTIONAL THERAPY

DAVID H. KAUFMAN

W the differentHellenistic and imperial philosophical schoolsdisagreed vehemently over the nature and the proper therapy of theemotions, they all agreed that the emotion of distress (lupē) shouldeither be avoided altogether or, if necessary in some circumstances,should be checked as quickly as possible. Accordingly, all of themajor philosophical schools contributed to the genre of consolationliterature, which offered practical advice for avoiding and consolingdistress. As a result of its predominantly practical focus, ancientconsolation literature was also perhaps the most heterodox of an-cient philosophical genres, and works of consolation often includedcompeting therapies and arguments from a variety of philosophicalschools. Galen’s recently rediscovered work On Freedom from Dis-tress (Περὶ ἀλυπίας) is no exception. As I will argue, it appeals to

© David H. Kaufman

I wish to thank audiences at FordhamUniversity and theUniversity of Pennsylvaniafor their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. I also want tothank David Armstrong, John Cooper, Brooke Holmes, Brad Inwood, Bob Kaster,and Christian Wildberg for their very helpful written comments.

For recent discussion see S. LaBarge, ‘How (and Maybe Why) to Grieve Like anAncient Philosopher’, in R. Kamtekar (ed.), Virtue and Happiness: Essays in Honourof Julia Annas (OSAP suppl.; Oxford, ), –, esp. –.

By consolation literature, I mean to include not only works of consolation in-tended to treat some (real or fictional) addressee’s distress over a particular event,but also works aimed at providing practical advice on how to avoid distress—whatJ. H. D. Scourfield aptly entitles ‘metaconsolatory’ (‘Towards a Genre of Con-solation’, in H. Baltussen (ed.), Greek and Roman Consolations: Eight Studies of aTradition and its Afterlife (Swansea, ), – at ). For a survey of ancient con-solation literature and theory see R. Kassel, Untersuchungen zur griechischen und rö-mischen Konsolationsliteratur (Munich, ).

Cf. C. Gill, Naturalistic Psychology in Galen and Stoicism [Naturalistic] (Oxford,), – and –. Representative examples are Seneca’s To Marcia: On Con-solation and Plutarch’s On Freedom from Anger. For discussion see C. E. Manning,On Seneca’s Ad Marciam (Leiden, ), –, and I. G. Kidd (intro. and comm.),Plutarch: Essays, trans. R. Waterfield (London, ), –.

The two most recent editions of this work disagree over the title. While V.

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no fewer than three prominent and, in their original contexts, op-posing methods of consolation. Nevertheless, despite their variedorigins, I will argue that Galen integrates these distinct methods oftherapy into an innovative and cogent, multi-tiered therapy of dis-tress. Beyond its considerable interest for the ancient theory of emo-tional consolation, and for the ancient theory of the emotions moregenerally, Galen’s resulting theory also illuminates several distinc-tive features of his philosophical methodology.

I

On Freedom from Distress consists of two main parts: a long ac-count of Galen’s own remarkable freedom from distress in the faceof adversity, and an explanation of the methods by which he ac-complished his freedom from distress. Galen’s account of his ownfreedom from distress aims, first and foremost, to establish his au-thority to offer advice on how to become free from distress. Galennot only asserts that he was not distressed by the loss of much of hisremarkable collection of books, medical instruments, and drugs—not to mention of gold and silverware—in the great fire of atRome, but he also contrasts his own unemotional response withthe emotional response that his addressee would have experiencedin the same situation. For instance, just before introducing a de-tailed list of the rare and significant books that he lost in the greatfire, Galen writes: ‘And these will especially distress you’ (λυπήσει

Boudon-Millot and J. Jouanna (eds.), Galien: Ne pas se chagriner [Galien] (Paris,), ad loc., read Περὶ ἀλυπησίας, P. Kotzia and P. Sotiroudis (eds.), ‘Γαληνοῦ Περὶἀλυπίας’ [‘Γαληνοῦ’], Hellenika, (), –, read Περὶ ἀλυπίας. Kotzia’s de-fence of reading Περὶ ἀλυπίας, in ‘Galen, Περὶ ἀλυπίας: Title, Genre andTwoCruces’[‘Cruces’], in D. Manetti (ed.), Studi sul De indolentia di Galeno (Pisa, ), –at –, is, in my view, decisive.

Galen also describes the great fire and the destruction of his own works inDe libris propriis, De compositione medicamentorum per genera, De antidotis, and InHippocratis Epidemiarum librum sextum commentarii. For a useful survey of theseaccounts see Boudon-Millot and Jouanna, Galien, xxii–xxiv. For a more detailedaccount of the fire and his losses in it see especially P. L. Tucci, ‘Galen’s Store-room, Rome’s Libraries, and the Fire of .. ’, Journal of Roman Archaeology, (), –.

In describing his losses, Galen provides a detailed list of his own literary cor-pus, much of which was incinerated in the fire. As he describes, his lost works in-clude commentaries, lexical treatises on, for instance, medical terms in Old Comedy,practical medical works, and philosophical treatises. Beyond simply providing an ac-


Galen on the Therapy of Distress

δέ σε καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα, Indol. B–J). By contrast, at the end ofthis list of books he reports that ‘none of these things troubled me’(τούτων οὖν οὐδὲν ἠνίασέ με, Indol. B–J). Galen’s self-control ap-pears even more remarkable as we learn more about his addressee,who shared the same privileged upbringing and education as he (In-dol. B–J) and, largely as a result, shares Galen’s view that the lossof Galen’s book collection is of greater importance than his finan-cial losses (Indol. – B–J).

After giving a detailed description of his freedom from distress,Galen turns to the education and training by which he achieved thiscondition. He begins his explanation by recounting several anec-dotes about Aristippus, the disciple of Socrates. For my purposes,the most important of these describes Aristippus as self-possessedwhen faced with the unexpected loss of one of his four fields. Ac-cording to the story, when a rather poor fellow citizen offered hiscondolences to Aristippus and claimed ‘to join in his distress’ (sul-lupeisthai) over his loss, Aristippus replied that it would be moreappropriate for him to join in his fellow citizen’s distress. For whilehe still has three fields remaining, his fellow citizen has only one(Indol. B–J).

Galen, in commenting on Aristippus’ response, distinguishes

count of his losses in the fire, Galen’s impressive catalogue of works is intended, Ithink, to evince his great erudition in a wide range of fields and scholarly pursuits.As Susan Mattern writes about Galen more generally, ‘His claims to authority ona wide range of subjects, including grammar, philosophy, geometry, and literature,attempt to establish his credentials as a πεπαιδευμένος—the sophistic ideal’ (Galenand the Rhetoric of Healing [Rhetoric] (Baltimore, ), ). It may be worth addingthat universal competence was already considered to be the ideal for an educatedman in the classical period: see e.g. Arist. NE . , b–a, esp. b–and a–; for a related account of ‘lack of education’ (ἀπαιδευσία), see EE . ,a–.

I will use ‘B–J’ as an abbreviation for Boudon-Millot and Jouanna, Galien; un-less otherwise indicated, I quote and translate from their Greek text throughout. Alltranslations are my own; however, I have consulted the translations of C. Rothschildand T. Thompson, ‘Galen: On the Avoidance of Grief ’, Early Christianity, (),–, and of Boudon-Millot and Jouanna, Galien.

The best collections of sources for Aristippus are G. Giannantoni, Socraticorumreliquiae, vols. (Naples, ), i. –, and E. Mannebach, Aristippi etCyrenaicorum fragmenta (Leiden, ). For a recent survey of Cyrenaic theory seeU. Zilioli, The Cyrenaics (Durham, ).

As Galen goes on to describe, one field is a considerable amount of property,sufficient to support a single household: see especially Indol. B–J, quoted belowin the main text.

Plutarch cites the same anecdote in De tranquillitate animi –.


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between appropriate and inappropriate occasions for distress. Ashe writes:

ἐὰν μὲν γάρ τις ἕνα μόνον ἔχων ἀγρὸν ἀπολέσῃ τοῦτον, ἄπορο⟨ς⟩ ἔσται παντά-πασιν, ὥστε εἰκότως ἀνιαθήσεται, ἕνα δὲ ἀπολέσας ⟨τις⟩ ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων, ἐνἴσῳ καταστήσεται τοῖς τρεῖς ἔχουσιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥστε τούτῳ μὲν μέγα οὐδὲν μὴλυπεῖσθαι τρεῖς ἀγροὺς ὑπολοίπους ἔχοντι, μέγα δὲ τὸ τὸν μηδὲ ἕνα κεκτημένονἀγρὸν ἀλύπως φέρειν πενίαν ὡς ὁ Κράτης ἔφερε, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον εἴ ⟨τις⟩μηδὲ οἰκίαν ἔχειν καθάπερ ὁ Διογένης. (Indol. B–J)

For if someone who has only one field loses this, he will be altogetherwithout resources, so that he will reasonably be distressed; but, on the otherhand, someone who has lost one out of four fields will be in the same condi-tion as someone having three from the beginning, so that for this man, whohas three fields remaining, there is nothing great in not being distressed;but it is a great thing for someone possessing not even one field to bearhis poverty without distress, like Crates. And on account of this it is evengreater if someone bears homelessness without distress, like Diogenes.

Galen distinguishes occasions on which ‘someone will reasonablybe distressed’ (εἰκότως ἀνιαθήσεται), for example extreme poverty(πενία), from inappropriate occasions for distress, such as the lossof property that does not result in extreme poverty. He also addsas a further possibility Cynic and Stoic impassivity even in theface of the most extreme poverty. This additional option raisesa puzzle for the sense in which people faced with extreme povertymay be distressed reasonably (εἰκότως). In particular, wemight won-der whether Galen thinks that their distress is reasonable only inthe sense that it is defensible, although it is, strictly speaking, un-called for by the situation; or if he rather thinks that Cynic and Stoicimpassivity in the face of extreme poverty is unreasonable, even ifmore admirable than the other extreme, unmerited distress.

As we will see, Galen’s answer to this puzzle is not altogetherstraightforward. For while he rejects the view, held by the Cynicsand Stoics, that neither moderate nor extreme poverty is worth be-ing distressed over, he thinks that the distress one experiences insuch cases can be greatly diminished by the right training. Thus,for Galen, the reasonable response to a particular distressing event

Although in this passage his examples of impassivity even in the face of ex-treme hardship are both Cynic, a few lines later Galen describes the impassivity ofthe founder of the Stoics, Zeno of Citium, in the face of utter financial ruin (Indol. B–J).

For the Stoic ideal of ἀπάθεια (‘freedom from emotions’) see e.g. Epict. Diss. .. and D.L. . . Despite what the term ἀπάθεια may seem to imply, the Stoics



has a rather wide scope, depending on other features of one’s psy-chology.

After distinguishing events that are genuinely distressing fromthose that are only conventionally so, Galen turns more directly tothe training and education responsible for his own freedom fromdistress. He attributes his freedom from distress primarily to twothings: first, to the fact that he holds the right evaluative beliefs, andso does not take merely conventional goods such as leisure, reputa-tion, or wealth to be worthy of much concern; and second, to histherapeutic practice of imaginatively anticipating potentially dis-tressing events, by which he conditions himself to be less stronglyaffected by their actual presence (Indol. B–J).

Galen asserts the importance of holding the right evaluative be-liefs at the conclusion of his idealizing account of his father and ofhis father’s influence on him. According to Galen, his father tookordinary objects of human concern, such as wealth, money, politi-cal power, and sensual pleasure to be ‘insignificant’ (μικρά, Indol. B–J). Moreover, since he considered such things to be of littlevalue, he did not place great weight on exercising moderation withrespect to them (Indol. B–J).

As a result largely of his father’s influence, Galen, too, views hu-man affairs as trivial, and so is not easily distressed or worried bythe loss of such things. As he explains:

ἐν τούτῳ τρεφόμενος ἀεὶ τῷ λογισμῷ μικρὰ πάντα εἶναι νομίζω. καὶ σχολὰς καὶἅρμενα καὶ φάρμακα καὶ βιβλία καὶ δοξὰν καὶ πλοῦτον ⟨πῶς ἄν⟩ ἄξια σπουδῆςὑπολάβοιμι; τῷ δ ᾿ ἡγουμένῳ μικρὰ πάντα εἶναι, τί ἂν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀπό τε αὐ-τῶν εἴη φροντίς; ἀκόλουθον γάρ ἐστι τῷ μὲν ὑπολαβόντι μεγαλεῖα ἐστερῆσθαι,

in fact ascribed a rich emotional life to the wise. For critical discussion see especiallyJ. M. Cooper, ‘The Emotional Life of the Wise’, Southern Journal of Philosophy,suppl. (), –, andM.Graver,Stoicism and Emotion [Emotion] (Chicago,), –. For the Cynic view, at least as it was understood in the imperial period,see M. Billerbeck, ‘Le Cynisme idéalisé d’Épictète à Julien’, in M. Goulet-Cazé andR. Goulet (eds.), Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements (Paris, ), –, andM. Schofield, ‘Epictetus on Cynicism’, in A. Mason and T. Scaltsas (eds.), The Phi-losophy of Epictetus (Oxford, ), –.

By contrast, Galen portrays his mother as thoroughly unpleasant and vicious.Indeed, according to him, her only contribution to his education was as a negativeparadigm to contrast with his father (Aff. dig. v. – Kühn).

Galen also comments on several occasions that his own freedom from distressover the destruction of his property is not, in fact, an especially impressive achieve-ment (Indol. , , B–J; Aff. dig. v. Kühn). Likewise, in On Diagnosis, afterdescribing several of his more remarkable successes as a doctor, he denies that theywere in fact ‘remarkable’ (Praen. . – Nutton).


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λυπεῖσθαι τε καὶ φροντίζειν ἀεί, τῷ δὲ σμικρῶν ἀεὶ διὰ τέλους καταφρονοῦντι,⟨μηδέποτε λυπεῖσθαι⟩. (Indol. – B–J)

And since I have always been raised in this way of thinking, I consider allthese things to be insignificant. And how could I suppose that leisure acti-vities [σχολὰς] and surgical instruments and potions and books and repu-tation and wealth are worthy of concern? And for someone who considersall these things to be trivial, what anxiety would there be for the presence orabsence of them? For it follows that someone who believes that he has beendeprived of great things [μεγαλεῖα] will always be distressed and worried[λυπεῖσθαι τε καὶ φροντίζειν ἀεί]; but someone who always and completelylooks down on such things as insignificant will never be distressed.

According to this passage, if someone believes that, for instance, hisown ground-breakingmedical, philosophical, or lexical treatises aresignificant, hewill necessarily be distressed if he loses them.Galen’sown freedom from distress in the face of his significant losses inthe great fire of Rome thus reflects his contempt (καταφρόνησις) forhuman affairs. Inculcating evaluative beliefs that accurately de-pict such things as insignificant (μικρά) is, therefore, a fundamentalpart of Galen’s therapy of distress. Galen insists, however, thatin order to have the right practical outlook, it is not sufficient thatone simply be persuaded that ordinary objects of human concernare insignificant by, say, the argument in On Freedom from Distress.Rather, one must also become habituated to acting on these beliefs:for instance, he attributes his own correct practical outlook to thefact that he ‘has always been raised in this way of thinking’, largelyon account of his father’s influence (Indol. B–J).

I follow the manuscripts in printing σχολὰς rather than σχολὰν with B–J. For other uses of the term ‘contempt’ (καταφρόνησις) see e.g. Indol. , , ,

b B–J. καταφρόνησις for human affairs is closely linked in Galen’s account to thevirtue that he mentions most often in his account, ‘greatness of soul’ (μεγαλοψυχία).According toGalen’s broadly Stoic use of the term, μεγαλοψυχία may even be definedas the state of having ‘contempt’ (καταφρόνησις) for conventionally significant humanaffairs. The Stoics defined μεγαλοψυχία as ‘knowledge making one superior to thethings that happen by nature both to the virtuous and the base’ (ἐπιστήμην ὑπεράνωποιοῦσαν τῶν πεφυκότων ἐν σπουδαίοις τε γίνεσθαι καὶ φαύλοις, Stob. Ecl. . . b. ,p. Wachsmuth=SVF iii. ). For Galen’s use of the term see e.g. Indol. b, B–J. For a brief, but helpful, discussion of Galen’s use of μεγαλοψυχία here seeGill, Naturalistic, .

Galen also claims to have given a more detailed argument for the insignificanceof human affairs in other works, which are now lost. For an attempt to identify theworks that he has in mind see Boudon-Millot and Jouanna, Galien, .

Galen explores this idea at greater length in On the Diagnosis and Cure of theEmotions of the Soul of Each Person. See especially Aff. dig. v. , – Kühn.



In explaining his own freedom from distress, Galen also empha-sizes his therapeutic practice (ἄσκησις) of imagining potentially dis-tressing events in advance. He describes this method of therapyby referring to the following passage of Euripides:

ἐγὼ δὲ ⟨ταύτα⟩ παρὰ σοφοῦ τινος μαθὼνεἰς φροντίδας νοῦν συμφοράς τ ᾿ ἐβαλλόμην,φυγάς τ ᾿ ἐμαυτῷ προστιθεὶς πάτρας ἐμῆςθανάτους τ ᾿ ἀώρους καὶ κακῶν ἄλλας ὁδούς,ἵν’, εἴ τι πάσχοιμ ᾿ ὧν ἐδόξαζόν ποτε,μή μοι νεῶρες προσπεσὸν ψυχὴν δάκοι.(Indol. and, again, B–J=Euripides, fr. Nauck)

Having learnt these things from a certain sageI was casting concerns and misfortunes into my mind

adding to myself exiles from my country,untimely deaths, and other kinds of evils,in order that, if I should ever suffer any of the things

that I was imagining,it would not, by coming upon me freshly, bite my soul.

This same passage is also quoted and endorsed by Plutarch,Posidonius, and Seneca, among others. The method of emotionaltherapy that it describes is based on the principle that emotionallysalient things strike or ‘bite’ one more intensely when they arenovel and unexpected than when one has become familiar withthem. Thus, Galen urges his addressee ‘to exercise the impressionsof your soul for nearly every event’ (Indol. B–J), so that they willaffect him less vehemently if they occur. It is worth noting that, ingeneral, this method of therapy does not affect one’s beliefs aboutthe things one imagines. On the contrary, Euripides’ examples areof the imaginative anticipation of exile, violent death, and other

For Galen’s description of this method of emotional therapy as a ‘practice’(ἄσκησις), as opposed, say, to an ‘argument’ (λόγος), see Indol. , – B–J. Healso distinguishes these two sorts of therapy in the programmatic first sentence ofOn Freedom from Distress and, again, in the first sentence of his parallel discussion ofhis freedom from distress in On the Diagnosis and Cure of the Affections of the Soul(see Indol. B–J and Aff. dig. v. Kühn).

I follow Nauck in supplying ταῦτα, which, as he comments, is supported byCicero’s translation of this passage at Tusc. . .

I again follow Nauck in printing εἰς φροντίδας νοῦν rather than εἰς φροντίδ ᾿ ἀεὶ,which is printed in B–J.

See e.g. Cic. Tusc. . ; Sen. Ep. . –, esp. ; Cons. ad Polyb. ; Plut.Cons. ad Apoll. ; and Galen, PHP . . De Lacy.

ἀσκεῖν παρακελεύομαι τὰς φαντασίας σου τῆς ψυχῆς μόνον οὐ καθ ᾿ ἑκάστην καιροῦῥοπήν.


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such things, which are appropriate objects of distress in Galen’sview. Indeed, a few sections later, Galen affirms that although hefirmly believes that grave physical injury or exile to a deserted is-land really are distressing, ‘he trains his impressions [phantasiai] inevery terrible thing, so that he may bear them moderately’ (Indol. B–J). This method of therapy thus conditions the impressions(phantasiai) one will form of such things, as well as the affectiveresponse one will have to those impressions, so that they will affectone less vehemently even if one believes that such events really aredistressing.

Galen’s account in On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates ofthe Stoic philosopher Posidonius’ (second century ) very simi-lar method of emotional therapy is helpful for filling in the detailsof this procedure. According to Galen, Posidonius recommended‘dwelling in advance’ (προενδημεῖν) on emotionally salient things sothat one will be less strongly affected by them. Galen explains thatby ‘dwelling in advance’ onmerely conventional good or bad things,Posidoniusmeans that people should ‘fashion andmodel in advance[προαναπλάττειν τε καὶ προτυποῦν] that the thing will be present tothem’ (PHP . . DeLacy). Thus, as the expression ‘fashion andmodel in advance’ suggests, Posidonius recommends that peopleimagine merely apparent good or bad events in vivid detail, ‘as ifthey were present’ (οἷον παροῦσι, PHP . . De Lacy), ratherthan, say, merely grasping the possibility that such things mightsome day be present to them.

ἀσκεῖν ⟨δ’⟩ ἀξιώσας τὰς φαντασίας εἰς ἅπαν δεινόν, ὡς μετρίως ἐνεγκεῖν αὐτό. Cf.Indol. – B–J.

Galen’s account in books and of the PHP of Posidonius’ method of pre-ventative emotional therapy and of his more general theory of the emotions is byfar our best evidence for Posidonius’ theory. His extensive use of Posidonius in thePHP, as well as the affinity of his own account in On Freedom from Distress withhis account of Posidonius’ theory, strongly suggests that his account here is largelyindebted to Posidonius; so too Boudon-Millot and Jouanna, Galien, –. For theextensive influence of Posidonius on Galen’s On Moral Character (De moribus) seeR. Walzer, ‘New Light on Galen’s Moral Philosophy’, in id., Greek into Arabic: Es-says on Islamic Philosophy (Oxford, ), –. For Posidonius’ philosophy of theemotions see especially J. M. Cooper, ‘Posidonius on the Emotions’, in T. Engberg-Pedersen and J. Sihvolan (eds.), The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy (Dordrecht,), –.

βούλεται δὲ τὸ προενδημεῖν ῥῆμα τῷ Ποσειδωνίῳ τὸ οἷον προαναπλάττειν τε καὶ προ-τυποῦν τὸ πρᾶγμα παρ ᾿ ἑαυτῷ τὸ μέλλον γενήσεσθαι.

For salient uses of ἀναπλάττειν see Ar. Nu. and Plato, Alc. I –; forτυποῦν see Plato, Prot. –.

Posidonius makes this distinction more forcefully in another passage, quoted in



For Galen, too, the premeditation of potentially distressing af-fairs differs from merely grasping the possibility that such affairsmight befall one. For example, after commenting on the unpar-alleled cruelty of Commodus’ reign, he writes: ‘therefore, by see-ing each of these things every day, I trained my impressions for thedestruction of all of my possessions’. Presumably, Galen trainedhis impressions (phantasiai), as opposed to his beliefs, not by con-sidering the evils presented by Commodus’ brutal rule, many ofwhich are, in his view, actually worth being distressed over, but byobserving (θεώμενος) potentially distressing events around him andimagining that they were happening to him.

Galen’s own method of emotional training thus involves both abelief-based and a non-rational component, corresponding to hisview that the adult human soul consists of both a rational and anon-rational aspect. These two lines of emotional training are,I think, based on two distinct kinds of Stoic emotional therapy:the belief-based methods associated especially with the early Stoicsand the method proposed by Posidonius, who advocated (in addi-tion to belief-based training) the imaginative anticipation of poten-tially distressing events. However, while both the early Stoics andPosidonius take all instances of distress to be unwarranted, Galen,as we have seen, allows the possibility of appropriate as well as inap-propriate instances of distress. For instance, he takes distress to be

PHP . . – De Lacy: ‘For I suppose that you all have long since observed howthose who have been persuaded through argument that something bad is present orimpending to them are not frightened or distressed, but those receiving impressionsof those very things are. For how would someone move the non-rational unless hepresents some representation similar to a perceptible one? Some people thus fall intoappetite through a narrative, and when one vividly urges them to flee an impendinglion they are frightened, even though they do not see it.’

ὥστε καθ ᾿ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν κἀγὼ θεώμενος ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐγύμνασά μου τὰς φαντα-σίας πρὸς ἀπώλειαν πάντων ὧν ἔχω (Indol. B–J).

For Galen’s tripartite theory of soul see especially PHP . . – De Lacy,where he claims that there are ‘scientific proofs’ (ἀποδείξεις ἐπιστημονικαί) showingthat the soul has three parts, each located in a different part of the body. For fur-ther discussion of Galen’s psychology see P. Donini, ‘Psychology’, in R. J. Hankin-son (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Galen (Cambridge, ), –, and T.Tieleman, ‘Galen’s Psychology’, in J. Barnes and J. Jouanna (eds.),Galien et la philo-sophie (Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique, ; Geneva, ), –.

For the early Stoic views see Cic. Tusc. . – and Origen, Cels. . =SVFiii. , together with the discussion of Graver, Emotion, –, and R. Sorabji,Emotion and Peace of Mind [Peace] (Oxford, ), –. For Posidonian premedi-tation see Gal. PHP . . – De Lacy, with especially H. Lorenz, ‘Posidonius onthe Emotions’, OSAP (), – at –.


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an appropriate response tomaterial losses that do not leave one withsufficient funds even for basic necessities (Indol. , b–a B–J;Aff. dig. v. – Kühn).

Towards the end of On Freedom from Distress, in a section thathe explicitly labels as a sort of appendix to his account of how toachieve ‘freedom from distress’ (alupia), Galen expands on his dis-tinction between appropriate and inappropriate occasions for dis-tress and also introduces yet anothermethod of emotional therapy.

In particular, after noting the view, associated especially with theCynics and Stoics, that the wiseman (σοφός) will never be distressed(Indol. – B–J), Galen describes the limits of his own freedomfrom distress:

οὐ μὴν ὑπεράνω πασῶν [sc. τῶν ἀνιαρῶν περιστάσεων] εἰμι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖςσυνήθεσιν ἑκάστοτε λέγειν πειρώμενος, ὡς οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε ἐπαγγειλάμενος ἱκανὸςεἶναι ποιεῖν ὃ καὶ μὴ διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἐπεδειξάμην, ὅτι χρημάτων μὲν ἀπωλείαςἁπάσης καταφρονῶ μέχρις ἂν ὑπολείπηται τοσαύτη κτῆσις αὐτῶν ὡς μήτε πεινῆνμήτε ῥιγοῦν ⟨μήτε διψῆν⟩, ἀλγημάτων δὲ μέχρις ἂν ἐπιτρέπηταί μοι καὶ τουτὸδύνασθαι διαλεχθῆναι φίλῳ καί τινος ἀναγινώσκοντός μοι βιβλίον ἕπεσθαι τοῖςλεγομένοις. (Indol. b B–J)

But I am not above all these things [sc. unpleasant circumstances], andsince I never promise that I am capable of doing anything that I have notalso exhibited through my deeds, for this reason on each occasion I try totell my friends that I dismiss the whole loss of possessions only so long asso much of these remains that I am not hungry or cold or thirsty; and Idismiss physical pain only so long as it allows me to have a philosophicalconversation with a friend and if someone reads a book to me, to be ableto follow the things being said.

Galen reports that he can endure physical pain and severe materialdeprivation only so long as he remains capable either of engagingin a philosophical conversation with his friends or of attending in afocused and sustained way to a book being read to him. Once physi-

Thus, he writes: ‘Now then, I think that I have fully answered your questionregarding freedom from distress [ἀλυπίας], but I consider it best to add a certain dis-tinction’ (Indol. ). For a defence of reading ἀλυπίας rather than ἀλυπησίας here seeagain Kotzia, ‘Cruces’, –.

This translation of διαλέγεσθαι is suggested by the allusion here to Epicurus,who in his Letter to Idomeneus claimed to distract himself from the terrible pain ofhis fatal illness by recalling his philosophical conversations with his friends (ἐπὶ τῇτῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ, D.L. . =fr. Usener). The use of δια-λέγεσθαι to refer specifically to more recondite conversations has a long pedigree inclassical Greek. In addition to its use by Epicurus in his Letter to Idomeneus, see e.g.Xen. Oec. . .



cal pain or material deprivation has rendered him incapable of pay-ing attention to such things, he can no longer endure it and willbe distressed, thus suggesting that Stoic and Cynic claims of totalimpassivity (ἀπάθεια) are, at least in his experience, unrealistic.

Indeed, since Galen, in his words, only promises that he is cap-able of doing what he has actually exhibited through his deeds, thispassage also implies that he endures serious but non-crippling in-stances of pain andmaterial deprivation by discussing philosophywithhis friends and reading philosophical treatises, and thereby diverting hisattention from the source of his distress.

I think that Galen appropriates this method of therapy, as well asits emphasis on philosophical conversation, from the Epicureans.

The Epicureans recommended consoling people experiencingdistress by redirecting their attention from the source of theirdistress—say, their impending exile—to other more pleasant sub-jects, such as, especially, the memory of their past philosophicalconversations (Cic. Tusc. . –). Moreover, according to Epi-curean theory, this sort of therapy is available in all instances ofdistress, however intense. For instance, the Epicureans argue thatthe wise man can redirect his attention and so avoid distress, evenif he is being roasted alive in the Bull of Phalaris or is in the finalstages of strangury.

Although, as we have seen, Galen rejects the Epicurean view that

Galen’s distinction between bearable and crippling instances of pain is notwithout precedent in the ancient philosophical tradition. For instance, the Epicur-eans also distinguished sharply between more and less intense instances of pain: seee.g. Epic. ΚΔ , Ep. Men. . –, and Sen. Ep. . . However, as we will see, forthe Epicureans, unlike Galen, even the most intense pain can be treated by redirect-ing one’s attention to other more pleasant objects.

Galen’s familiarity with Epicurean ethics is attested by his composition of se-veral, no longer extant, treatises on the topic, for which see Lib. prop. xix. Kühn.Indeed, in Indol. B–J he refers to a treatise of his entitled ‘According to Epicurus’(Κατὰ ᾿Επίκουρον) that apparently discussed Epicurean ethics in detail. For a defenceof reading Κατὰ ᾿Επίκουρον (which may be an abbreviation of a longer title) ratherthan Κατὰ ᾿Επικούρου, see Boudon-Millot and Jouanna, Galien, .

Although Cicero’s discussion in the Tusculan Disputations is our only directsource for Epicurus’ therapy of occurrent distress, Cicero’s report fits very well withour other evidence bearing on Epicurus’ theory. See especially D.L. . =fr. Usener and Plut. Non posse =fr. Usener; cf. Cic. Fin. . , . –,Tusc. . , and Philod. De musica, . , col. . – Delattre. For discussion seeM. Graver, Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations and (Chicago, ),–.

See e.g. Cic. Tusc. . and Sen. Ep. . , as well as the other passages col-lected in fr. Usener.


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this sort of therapy is available in especially intense instances ofdistress, it nevertheless plays an important role in his therapy ofdistress. For while the belief-based therapy he recommends is es-sential in the case of inappropriate objects of distress, and the ima-ginative pre-rehearsal of potentially distressing events is useful aspreventative therapy in the case of appropriate objects of distress,of the methods of emotional therapy Galen discusses only Epicur-ean therapy is useful for consoling people experiencing occurrentdistress over an appropriate object, such as extreme poverty or ex-treme physical pain.

Galen’s own complex theory of emotional consolation thus com-bines three distinct and, in their original contexts, competingmeth-ods of emotional therapy. Nevertheless, I hope to have shown thatfar from simply stitching together incongruous methods of therapy,he integrates these methods into a sophisticated and cogent theoryof his own.

II

I wish next to consider the implications that Galen’s multi-tieredtherapy of distress has for his philosophical methodology. In se-veral works Galen professes his willingness to learn from all of themajor philosophical schools, and to select the aspects of their the-ories that seem best to him. For instance, in On the Diagnosis andCure of the Emotions of the Soul of Each Person Galen, after describ-ing his education, which included a period of study with philoso-phers from each of the major philosophical schools, writes: ‘I donot declare allegiance to any sect, rather I make a thorough exa-mination of them.’ Galen thus presents himself as a person whohas at least a working knowledge of all of the major philosophicalschools, but is an adherent of none of them. Moreover, he claimsthat this is the right stance for a philosopher. For example, at thebeginning of the same text he criticizes Antonius, an otherwise un-known Epicurean, for failing to engage sufficiently with the works

Presumably, then, Galen includes this additional method of therapy in an ap-pendix to hismain discussion because it does not contribute directly to producing thelong-lasting, character state (ἕξις) constituting freedom from distress, but is rather amethod of consoling occurrent episodes of distress.

μήτ ᾿ ἀφ ᾿ αἱρέσεώς τινος ἐμαυτὸν ἀναγορεύσας, ὧν σπουδῇ πάσῃ ἀκριβῆ τὴν ἐξέτασινἔχω (Aff. dig. v. Kühn).



of earlier, non-Epicurean philosophers in his book On Controllingthe Individual Emotions:

γέγραπται μὲν οὖν καὶ Χρυσίππῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων θεραπευ-τικὰ γράμματα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν, εἴρηται δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλους ⟨περὶτούτων⟩ καὶ τῶν ἑταίρων αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸ τούτων ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος· καὶ ἦν μὲν βέλ-τιον ἐξ ἐκείνων μανθάνειν αὐτά, ὥσπερ κἀγώ. (Aff. dig. v. Kühn)

Now then, Chrysippus and many other philosophers have written workson the therapy of the emotions of the soul; and even Aristotle and his fol-lowers, and before them Plato, are said to have written about this. It wouldhave been better to learn these things from these people, as I did.

As Galen is well aware, Chrysippus’ therapy of the emotions differsradically from that of Plato or Aristotle. Thus, by arguing that,like himself, Antonius should have used diverse and even contradic-tory earlier philosophical accounts of the emotions, Galen impliesthat a wide-ranging and independent-minded review of earlier phi-losophical discussion is an essential starting place for subsequentphilosophical work.

Of course, there are many ways in which one might use earlierphilosophical discussions as a basis for philosophical enquiry. Forinstance, one might use them either as a basis for proposing theore-tical innovations of one’s own, as Aristotle perhaps does in the firstbook of the Metaphysics, or one might compare the merits of thevarious existing positions and simply select whichever one seemsmost convincing. However, as we have seen, in On Freedom fromDistress Galen uses his philosophical predecessors in a quite spe-cific way: he incorporates more or less unadapted aspects of theirtheories into a quite different theory of his own. For example,

In the PHP Galen raises an analogous objection against Chrysippus’ theory ofthe emotions, which he criticizes for failing to engage sufficiently with earlier theor-ies of the emotions. As he writes: ‘But it is not surprising if Chrysippus says thingsthat contradict many other authors, just as it is not surprising that he has missed thetruth, for there is forgiveness for him being a man and erring; but it is surprisingthat he did not attempt at all to refute [διαλύσασθαι] the things said by the ancients’(PHP . . De Lacy).

ForGalen’s acknowledgement that Chrysippus’ theory and therapy of the emo-tions differs from that of Plato and Aristotle see e.g. PHP . . –, . . –De Lacy.

For discussion of Aristotle’s approach to the history of philosophy in Metaph.Α see M. Frede, ‘Aristotle’s Account of the Origins of Philosophy’, Rhizai, (),–.

Along similar lines, R. J. Hankinson argues that Galen develops his accountof the soul ‘by judicious selection from a variety of sources’ (‘Actions and Passions:


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while he appropriates both the belief-based therapy of the earlyStoics and Posidonius’ imaginative pre-rehearsal of potentially dis-tressing things, unlike either the early Stoics or Posidonius, Galenallows that there are appropriate occasions for distress. Again, heappropriates the Epicurean therapy of distress, but he takes it tobe effective in a far more restricted range of cases than the Epi-cureans.

While, as previous scholarly work has shown, there are close par-allels in other aspects of Galen’s philosophy to his eclectic use ofrival philosophical schools in his therapy of distress (for example, inhis theory of causation and epistemology), his positive appropri-ation of Epicurean therapy in his therapy of distress ismore surpris-ing. At any rate, the communis opinio in scholarship both on Galenand, indeed, on eclecticism of the imperial period more generallyholds that Galen and most other eclectic philosophers largely ex-cluded Epicureanism from their theories. For example, MichaelFrede, in an influential account of Galen’s eclecticism, writes: ‘likemost of his contemporaries he [sc. Galen] has no sympathy what-soever for Epicureanism’. Again, Pierluigi Donini, in describingancient eclecticism quite generally, writes: ‘it [sc. Epicureanism]did not influence in an eclectic manner any important thinker (withthe exception of Seneca, who was a completely peculiar and iso-

Affection, Emotion, and Moral Self-Management in Galen’s Philosophical Psycho-logy’ [‘Actions’], in J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum (eds.), Passions and Perceptions(Cambridge, ), – at –; cf., T. Tieleman, Galen and Chrysippus on theSoul: Argument and Refutation in the De placitis Books II–III [Soul] (Brill, ),xvii–xxii.

For an overview see especially R. J. Hankinson, ‘Galen’s Philosophical Ec-lecticism’, in ANRW II.. (), –. For more specialized discussion ofGalen’s use of the different philosophical schools in his epistemology see M. Frede,‘On Galen’s Epistemology’ [‘Epistemology’], in id., Essays in Ancient Philosophy(Oxford, ), –, and, for his theory of causation, see R. J. Hankinson, ‘Ga-len’s Theory of Causation’, in ANRW II.. (), –.

In addition to the works cited in the main text below, see e.g., for Galen, Tiele-man, Soul, xxi; for the Middle Platonists, J. M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: AStudy of Platonism, .. to .. (Cornell, ; repr. ), ; and for ec-lectic philosophers of the imperial period more generally see J. M. Dillon and A. A.Long, ‘Introduction’, in Dillon and Long (eds.), The Question of ‘Eclecticism’: Stu-dies in Later Greek Philosophy [Eclecticism] (Berkeley, ), – at . For a partialexception see Hankinson, ‘Actions’, n. , who allows that Galen’s ideal of theextirpation of many emotions may be indebted not only to the Stoics, but ‘perhapsto the Epicureans as well, although he himself would of course be loth to acknow-ledge such a debt’; cf. .

Frede, ‘Epistemology’, (emphasis added).



lated instance)’. To be sure, Galen is generally more sympatheticto Plato and Aristotle than to Epicurus, and he consistently andstrongly rejects atomism throughout his corpus; but his therapyof distress provides evidence both that he had a detailed knowledgeof Epicurean ethics and, pace Donini and Frede, that he activelyappropriated aspects of Epicureanism. Moreover, in so far as hispositive engagement with the Epicurean therapy of distress is un-usual in the context of imperial philosophy, it provides further evi-dence of his independent-minded approach to rival philosophicalschools.

The therapy of distress that Galen proposes thus reflects his ap-propriative and catholic approach to the rival philosophical schools.Indeed, his own theory may be described as a selective adaptationof competing philosophical theories of consolation. While his re-sulting theory may perhaps be viewed as eclectic, it is, as I hope tohave shown, perfectly cogent and represents a significant contribu-tion to the ancient therapy of the emotions.

III

Another aspect of On Freedom from Emotions that is significant forGalen’s broader philosophical methodology is his use of his owntrained experience as his primary criterion for arbitrating betweendistinct philosophical theories. As we have seen, Galen presents thetherapeutic section ofOnFreedom fromDistress as an autobiograph-ical account of how he accomplished his own remarkable freedomfrom distress. It is fitting, then, that his primary evidence for each

P. Donini, ‘The History of the Concept of Eclecticism’, in Dillon and Long(eds.), Eclecticism, – at (emphasis added). For discussion of Seneca’s use ofEpicurus see I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung(Berlin, ), –, and, for Seneca’s innovative use of Epicurean emotional ther-apy, D. H. Kaufman, ‘Seneca on the Therapy of Occurrent Emotions’, in M. Colishand J. Wildberger (eds.), Trends in Classics: Seneca Philosophus (Berlin, forthcom-ing), – at –.

For an excellent discussion of Galen’s critique of atomism see D. Leith, ‘Ga-len’s Refutation of Atomism’, in P. Adamson and J. Wilberding (eds.), PhilosophicalThemes in Galen (London, ), –. I wish to thank David Leith for his gene-rosity in sending me a copy of his article prior to publication.

For Galen’s familiarity with Epicurean ethics see also n. above. For scholarly discussion of ancient eclecticism see the essays collected in Dillon

and Long (eds.), Eclecticism, and M. Hatzimichali, Potamo of Alexandria and theEmergence of Eclecticism in Late Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge, ), esp. –.

For a discussion of Galen’s use of autobiography elsewhere in his corpus see


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of the therapeutic methods he proposes is his own positive experi-ence of them. For example, when recommending the imaginativepre-rehearsal of emotionally salient things, he writes:

ἐγὼ τοίνυν πεπειραμένος τῶν ἄλλων ἀληθέστατον εἶναι τὸν Εὐριπίδου λόγον,ἀσκεῖν παρακελεύομαι τὰς φαντασίας σου τῆς ψυχῆς μόνον οὐ καθ ᾿ ἑκάστην και-ροῦ ῥοπήν. (Indol. B–J)

Therefore, I have found Euripides’ account to be the most true comparedto the others, and I urge you to exercise your soul’s impressions in nearlyeach event.

Galen does not offer a theoretical argument for this method of emo-tional therapy, but instead appeals to his own experience as evidencefor it. Again, when describing the therapeutic value of taking hu-man affairs to be insignificant, he appeals to the fact that he takessuch things to be insignificant and is not distressed by them (Indol. B–J).

Galen’s account of the Epicurean therapy of distress gives a some-what more general description of his empiricism (Indol. b B–J).While, in introducing this account, Galen, as we have seen, writesthat he promises to do (ἐπαγγειλάμενος . . . ποιεῖν) only what he is cap-able of actually doing, the context suggests that he also recommendsonly methods of emotional therapy whose positive effect he can ex-hibit through his own behaviour. His own experience of each kindof therapy, and his ability to exhibit its results through his deeds, isthus his primary criterion for approving and recommending differ-ent kinds of therapy. But why should Galen’s addressee, let alone

especially V. Nutton, ‘Galen and Medical Autobiography’, Proceedings of the Cam-bridge Philosophical Society, (), –.

That Galen means to call attention to his own experience and his own remark-able freedom from distress is confirmed by the rather idiosyncratic list of apparentlygood objects that he takes to be of little significance: surgical instruments, medicine,books, reputation, and wealth. Of course, medicine and books refer directly to themost significant of his losses in the great fire of Rome, described in great detail inthe first half of On Freedom from Distress.

For a translation of this passage see p. above. Similarly, in On Affections and Errors Galen claims both that he is simply

presenting the method of emotional and ethical training that has worked for him(Aff. dig. v. Kühn) and, later on, that his method is the only effective one (Aff.dig. v. Kühn). As in On Freedom from Distress, Galen’s experience is assumed tobe authoritative.

By contrast, the philosophical schools to which Galen appeals developed quitedetailed philosophical theories in support of their methods of emotional therapy. For



his wider audience, trust his experience or take it to be representa-tive of their own?

Galen pays a great deal of attention in On Freedom from Distressto answering this question. As we have seen, he devotes nearly halfof the work to describing his freedom from distress when faced withthe loss of a remarkable variety of expensive and conventionally sig-nificant things, such as a great many of his slaves, a great amount ofmoney, rare medicine, innovative medical devices, his remarkablelibrary of rare and important books, and his own ground-breakingscholarly work. Moreover, in his positive account of how to avoiddistress, Galen emphasizes his distinguished pedigree and educa-tion. His portrayal of his father is especially apposite:

οὐ γὰρ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων τις ⟨οὕτως⟩ ἀκριβῶς ὡς καὶ οὗτος ἐτίμησε δικαιοσύνηντε καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δι ᾿ αὐτὰς κἀκείνας ἔσχε φύσει τοῦτο χωρὶς τῶν ἐκ φιλο-σοφίας λόγων. (Indol. B–J)

For no other man both honoured justice and temperance so exactingly asthis man and was disposed in this way by nature, independently of philo-sophical argument, for the sake of the virtues themselves.

Not only was his father allegedly a remarkably virtuous person,but he was so by nature, independently of philosophical training.

After claiming that his grandfather and great-grandfather were asvirtuous as his father (Indol. B–J), Galen urges his addressee toview him in a similar light:

νόμιζε δὴ οὖν κὰμὲ καὶ φύσει μὲν ὅμοιον τοῖς προγόνοις ὄντα γενέσθαι τοιοῦτονκαὶ μέντοι καὶ παιδευθέντα τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτοῖς παιδείαν ὁμοίαν ἐκείνοις σχεῖν διά-θεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς. (Indol. B–J)

Therefore, consider me to be like my ancestors both by nature [φύσει] and,especially since I have been educated in the same way as them, to have asimilar condition of soul.

Galen’s emphasis on his own natural disposition to virtue is strik-ing. His experience is authoritative not only because he has been

instance, the belief-based therapy of the early Stoics depends on their sophisticated,cognitivist analysis of the emotions. For discussion see Graver, Emotion, –,and Sorabji, Peace, –.

By contrast, in other works Galen stresses his father’s remarkable philosophicalachievements: see e.g. Bon. mal. suc. vi. Kühn. While there is, strictly speaking,no contradiction between these two different portrayals of his father (after all, hisfather may have been both virtuous by nature and a sophisticated moral philoso-pher), in the present context Galen is, at the least, far more interested in his father’snatural proclivity to virtue than in his father’s philosophical achievements.


David H. Kaufman

trained and educated in certain ways, but also because of his verynature, inherited from his father’s family.

While Galen’s rather hyperbolic praise of his own ancestry mayseem to risk calling the representative quality of his experience intoquestion, he is careful to attribute a similar nature and upbringingto his addressee. For instance, he comments that his addressee grewup with him and had a very similar education (Indol. , B–J);again, he notes his addressee’s own temperance vis-à-vis vulgargoods and bads, such as sex, money, and reputation, which he at-tributes to his addressee’s ‘nature and education’ (φύσει καὶ παιδείᾳ,Indol. b B–J). Moreover, at the very beginning of On Freedomfrom Distress Galen emphasizes that his addressee will be more im-pressed by his freedom from distress in the face of the loss of muchof his library than by his significant financial losses, implying thathis addressee values books and learning more highly than crass ma-terial goods (Indol. B–J).

Galen’s construction of his own authoritative experience, there-fore, plays an important argumentative role in On Freedom fromDistress. In particular, it both validates his therapeutic advice andalso demarcates the intended audience of his treatise as people withthe right nature and education, who are already persuaded thatmerely conventional goods and bads are, in fact, ‘insignificant’ (μι-κρά) and not worth much anxiety or anticipation. Such people arenot only in a position to benefit from high-level emotional therapy,but they may also reasonably accept Galen’s own experience as re-presentative, since they, like him, have both good natural disposi-tions and the proper educational background.

Galen thus takes his therapy of distress to be most effective forpeople who share his superior nature and education. Indeed, ac-cording to him, having the right natural disposition and education

‘You were amazed not that I was seen to bear without distress the loss of silver,gold, silver plate, and many contracts, but that I bore without distress the loss of themajority of my writings, many drugs of all sorts (some simple and some compound),and many instruments’ (Indol. B–J).

For Galen’s anxiety elsewhere in his corpus that his works encounter the ap-propriate audience see e.g. Nat. fac. . Helmreich and PHP . De Lacy. Fordiscussion see Mattern, Rhetoric, . Aristotle expresses a similar concern that hisNicomachean Ethics find a suitable audience, NE . , a–.

For further discussion of Galen’s view that a successful student of philosophyor medicine must have the right nature and education, and for its affinities with con-temporary philosophical and medical texts, see J. Mansfeld, Prolegomena: Questionsto be Settled before the Study of an Author, or a Text (Leiden, ), –.



is even a necessary condition for benefiting fully from his therapy ofdistress, and so achieving freedom from distress (Indol. B–J; cf.Aff. dig. v. – Kühn). To be sure, the different sorts of ther-apy that he recommends may perhaps prove helpful for anyone,but unless his patient has the appropriate nature and education Ga-len’s therapy will not lead him to the stable state of freedom fromdistress. This marks a significant difference between Galen’s ther-apy of distress and the therapies proposed by his Stoic and Epi-curean sources. For while both Epicurean and Stoic therapy willoften prove more efficacious in the treatment of relatively decentpeople, they are, at least in principle, fully applicable to anyoneat all, whatever their nature and upbringing. The intended audi-ence of Galen’s therapy of distress thus indicates an additional, andrather significant, difference between his therapy and that of his im-mediate philosophical sources. Indeed, in this respect his therapyof distress has more in common with the Platonic and Peripatetictraditions than with the Epicureans or Stoics.

IV

In this article I have argued that Galen’s On Freedom from Distresscombines several important and, in their original contexts, compet-ing methods of emotional therapy into a sophisticated, multi-tiered

For Galen’s view that people may be naturally and ineliminably prone to differ-ent emotions as a result of their physical constitution see Ars med. i. – Kühn andQAM iv. – Kühn, esp. –; cf. Galen, PHP . . – De Lacy. For an ex-cellent discussion of Galen’s physiological explanation of different human ‘natures’see H. von Staden, ‘The Physiology and Therapy of Anger: Galen on Medicine, theSoul, and Nature’, in F. Owen and D. Reisman (eds.), Islamic Philosophy, Science,Culture, and Religion (Leiden, ), –.

I want to thank Brad Inwood for calling this point to my attention. For example, Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus, which gives a brief and access-

ible outline of his ethical philosophy, begins with the following exhortation: ‘Let noyoung man delay philosophizing nor any old man become tired of engaging in phi-losophy. For no one is either too young or too old to heal his soul’ (Ep. Men. =D.L. . ). For discussion of the egalitarian nature of Hellenistic ethical theorysee M. C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Eth-ics (Princeton, ), esp. – and –.

For the moral significance that Plato ascribes to a person’s having the rightnature and upbringing see Rep. – and passim. For Aristotle, see theexcellent discussion of M. Leunissen, ‘“Becoming good starts with nature”: Aris-totle on the Moral Advantages and the Heritability of Good Natural Character’,OSAP (), –.


David H. Kaufman

method of consoling distress. Moreover, as we have seen, his ex-position of this method of emotional therapy helps to illuminateseveral aspects of his philosophical methodology, most notably hisopen-minded and appropriative stance towards other philosophi-cal schools, the role of his own trained experience as a criterion forhis philosophical views, and the significance that he places on thenature and upbringing of the audience of his philosophical works. Ihave also argued that Galen’s limitation of his therapy of distress toa rather select audience indicates a significant difference betweenhis conception of the limits of emotional therapy and that of hisStoic and Epicurean sources. For while the Epicureans and Stoicstake differences in their patients’ natural characteristics and edu-cation to affect how they should most effectively lead them to thestable character state of freedom from distress, Galen holds thatonly a minority of people, with the right natures and education, arecapable of attaining even his more deflationary conception of thiscondition. Thus, not only does Galen set limits to the effectivenessof emotional therapy even in the best-case scenario, but he takeseven these more modest goals to be attainable only by a select groupof people. Galen’s therapy of distress thus differs from its most im-mediate philosophical sources not only in its particular synthesis oftherapeutic methods, but also in its conception of the limitationsof emotional therapy. In sum, although scholarly work on On Free-dom from Distress has for the most part focused on its implicationsfor reconstructing Galen’s biography and literary corpus, I hopeto have shown that this work both makes an important and originalcontribution to ancient emotional therapy and also has significantimplications for Galen’s philosophical methodology.

Transylvania University

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Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the Limits of Emotional Therapy

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