1 Can the strict search- and-isolate strategy for controlling the spread of highly-resistant bacteria be mitigated? G Birgand a , I Lolom a , E Ruppe b , L Armand-Lefèvre b , S Belorgey a , A Andremont b , JC Lucet a a Infection control unit, Bichat-Claude Bernard Hospital, Paris, France b Bacteriology laboratory, Bichat-Claude Bernard Hospital, Paris, France ICPIC Geneva 2013
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G Birgand a , I Lolom a , E Ruppe b , L Armand-Lefèvre b ,
Can the strict search-and-isolate strategy for controlling the spread of highly-resistant bacteria be mitigated?. G Birgand a , I Lolom a , E Ruppe b , L Armand-Lefèvre b , S Belorgey a , A Andremont b , JC Lucet a - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Can the strict search-and-isolate strategy for controlling the spread
of highly-resistant bacteria be mitigated?
G Birgand a, I Lolom a, E Ruppe b, L Armand-Lefèvre b, S Belorgey a, A Andremont b , JC Lucet a
a Infection control unit, Bichat-Claude Bernard Hospital, Paris, Franceb Bacteriology laboratory, Bichat-Claude Bernard Hospital, Paris, France
ICPIC Geneva 2013
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IntroductionEpidemiological Context in France
GRE CPE
E.Faecium VR
EARSS 2011
Kp Carba-R
EARSS 2011
ICPIC Geneva 2013
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Introduction French National Recommandations, 2006-2010
Patients detected colonised with GRE or CPE:
1. Single room + contact precautions for case patients along their entire hospital stay
2. Single room + contact precautions for contact patients, until three negative weekly rectal screening (D0, D7, D15)
3. Screening of contact patients already transferred, alert at readmission
4. Cohorting of cases and contact patients in 2 different dedicated areas with dedicated staff 24/7
5. Interruption of transfers of carriers and contact patients + interruption of new admissions, pending results of screening
ICPIC Geneva 2013
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Introduction Potential consequences
• Medical impact:‒ Unintended deleterious adverse effects for patients ?
‒ Disruption for the ward‒ Loss of chance for patient due to inappropriate care
• Economical impact:‒ Lost income due to interruption of transfers and
admissions‒ Cost of lab techniques and contact precautions‒ Cost of additional staff for cohorting
ICPIC Geneva 2013
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1. To describe the episodes of HRB during a 4-year period in a 1000-bed University Hospital
2. To describe adapted control measures according to the epidemiological risk analysis
Objectives
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MethodsDescription of the Episodes
30 episodes from January 2009 to December 2012: • 14 Glycopeptide-resistant Enterococcus faecium (GRE)
• Ward associated factors:– Workload – Previous experience of the ward with HRBs– Ward organisation and management– Compliance with hand hygiene: Alcoholic handrub consumption– Geographical distribution of the ward– Number of contact patients
• Cross disciplinary factors:– Expertise and impact of the Infection control team– Reactivity of the bacteriology lab– Expertise of the lab to identify HRB (PCR, enrichment)– Involvement and support of the hospital administration
MethodsEpidemiological Risk Analysis
http://www.sf2h.net/
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• Factors associated to exposure:– Time from admission to HRB identification
• Factors associated the amount of HRB:– Type of positive sample: infection > colonisation– Positive screening : direct plating or after enrichment– Antibiotic treatment bacterial burden
• Factors associated with workload:– Nurse-to-patient ratio– Dependence in nursing care of case patients– Presence of invasive devices
MethodsEpidemiological Risk Analysis
http://www.sf2h.net/
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MethodsTailored Control Measures
Epidemiological Situation Control Measures
Admission of a case previously known or identified <48h
• Single room, Contact Precautions• Weekly cross-sectional screening, but no
contact patients
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MethodsTailored Control Measures
Epidemiological Situation Control Measures
Admission of a case previously known or identified <48h
• Single room, Contact Precautions• Weekly cross-sectional screening, but no
contact patients Case identification>48h after admission
• Interruption of transfers and admissions• Reinforcement of nursing staff• Screening of contact patients at D0, D7
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MethodsTailored Control Measures
Epidemiological Situation Control Measures
Admission of a case previously known or identified <48h
• Single room, Contact Precautions• Weekly cross-sectional screening, but no
contact patients Case identification>48h after admission
• Interruption of transfers and admissions• Reinforcement of nursing staff• Screening of contact patients at D0, D7
One secondary case • One unit for colonised and contact patients with dedicated staff
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MethodsTailored Control Measures
Epidemiological Situation Control Measures
Admission of a case previously known or identified <48h
• Single room, Contact Precautions• Weekly cross-sectional screening, but no
contact patients Case identification>48h after admission
• Interruption of transfers and admissions• Reinforcement of nursing staff• Screening of contact patients at D0, D7
One secondary case • One unit for colonised and contact patients with dedicated staff
Outbreak situation • Two distinct dedicated units for colonised and contact patients with dedicated nursing staff
Additional interruption of transfers and admissions (4/5)
Colonised patientsContact precautions (n= 19)
« Contact » patientsContact precautions (n= 19)
Weekly screening (n= 19)
Interruption of transfers and admissions (n= 10)Reinforced staff (n= 10)
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Discussion• French national guidelines are costly and difficult to
implement• Local experience suggests the possibility to adapt control
measures according to the epidemiological risk• However … several prerequisites:
o Involvement of the infection control team‒ Frequent presence of the ICT in the affected ward‒ Education of nursing staff day/night‒ Alert system for colonised and contact patients (admission and transfer)
o Involvement of the bacteriology labo Involvement of the hospital administration
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Discussion - Conclusion
• Which lessons from epidemic situations?– Delay in the identification of HRB– Higher risk of GRE transmission than CPE– Prolonged length of stay with staff weariness
• Obstacles:– Difficulties to transfer colonised patients to
downstream units (very high LOS)
• More flexible national recommendations coming soon (September 2013)