Futures Volume 8 Issue 3 1976 [Doi 10.1016%2F0016-3287%2876%2990112-9] Martin Clark -- From Prophecy to Prediction- 12. Georges Sorel and the Ghost in the Machine

266 Frem Projhecy to Prediction

From Prophecy A serialised survey of the movement

to Prediction of ideas, developments in predictive fiction, and first attempts to forecast the future scientifically.

12. Georges Sore1 and the ghost in the machine

Martin Clark

IT is said that when Georges Sore1 had been in his grave for ten years, the ambassadors of both the Soviet Union and of fascist Italy asked if they might contribute to a more imposing memo- rial to him, as one of the ideological precursors of their regimes. If this story isn’t true, it ought to be. Sore1 was a curiously prophetic figure. A retired engineer, living modestly off his civil service pension, the epitomy of bour- geois propriety in his private life (he always wore his ribbon of the Legion d’Honneur), Sore1 steeped himself in philosophy and history, and then launched into the Parisian and Euro- pean intellectual world of the 1890s and 1900s with cheerful gusto and origin- ality. The results were extraordinary. Sore1 was incoherent, often contradicted himself, and never produced a system- atic account of anything; yet he helped demolish the comfortable intel- lectual assumptions of Edwardian Europe, and taught men to look at European society-and its future-in a radically new way. Moreover, he did it in a best-seller, his Rejections on Violence. 1

Sore1 refused to believe that men were rational creatures, ruled by pru- dence and natural law; on the con- trary, they were creatures of passion, given to violence and swayed by myths. Nor did hc believe that society was an

Martin Clark is a lecturer in the r)eparttnent of Politics at the University of Edinburgh, Edin- burgh, EH8 9YI,, Scotland. He is author of Antonio Gratnsci and the Revolution that Failed (New Haven, Coon, Yale University Press, forth- coming).

evolving organism, with its own “laws” that could be uncovered by diligent scientific enquiry. On the contrary, there were no such laws, and certainly no one could predict the future.

Nor, of course, did Sore1 hold any “mechanistic” view of society. Society was not a vast, self-regulating machine, needing only occasional repairs by skilled social engineers; it was more like a battlefield between conflicting in- terests.

Worst of all, Sore1 did not believe in progress. It was no use telling him that “You can’t put the clock back”, for he didn’t think the clock was telling the right time, and didn’t believe in clocks in any case. Neither was it any use, in Sorel’s hearing, expressing the hope that technology would solve social problems, or that it would determine the pattern of the future. Sore1 would have retorted that future society, with all its complexity, irrationality and myths, would determine what kind o* technology was invented (or, at least, applied). Nor was Sore1 impressed by bourgeois democracy. No decisions were ever taken on their mertis. Always there was “bribery”, and the parliamentary system was nothing but a national system of bribery. Deputies, and the electors, swapped votes for cash; and in the process they became corrupt. Indeed, bourgeois society was irredeemably corrupt, and its claims to represent progress were laughable.

Sorel’s greatest contempt, however, was reserved for working-class leaders. “Parliamentary socialists” like Jean

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From Prophecy to Prediction 267

Jaures betrayed their followers and secured comfortable lives for themselves. If they ever came to power they would simply corrupt the workers more than they had already.

Altogether, Sore1 was an uncomfort- able fellow to have around in polite society, the more so since his scepticism about social progress was accompanied by predictions of social conflict. He believed that society was divided into groups or classes, and these groups were and ought to be in conflict with each other. Attempts at compromise between the groups, at achieving consensus throughout society, led only to corrup- tion. “Groups” were the foundation of morality, and Sore1 was nothing if not a moralist. Men who fought, as members of a group, were heroic and noble. They would help their fellows, and perform selfless deeds without thought of remuneration; they would be upright, independent, and free. Of course, they would also be hostile to people not in the group, and society would be constantly rent by bitter conflicts and violence; but that was a small price to pay for producing heroes, and for overcoming hedonism and corruption. Society, said Sore& was divided into warring tribes. It was morally right that it should be so, and intellectually right that it should be recognised to be so.

And what united men in a group? Myths, rooted in fables of deeds per- formed by heroes long ago, or-even better-in apocalyptic expectations of a future triumph over the forces of darkness. The early Christians cohered as a group, because they daily awaited the Second Coming; the workers in France felt-or should feel-the same way about the revolution, or about the general strike. Groups need their myths, their imaginative rousing concepts that create political reality. Sore1 pointed to the syndicalists’ myth of the “prole- tarian general strike” as the cohesive force among French workers, the force that might enable them to topple the

decadent bourgeoisie. It is worth noting how important the “future” is in this scheme of things. In order to form groups, men need myths; pre- dictions of the future are a necessary part of most myths, and thus men’s social conflicts here and now rest on their various views of the future. The future becomes the basis of the present, perhaps even the basis of history (the past). The Second Coming has never happened (as yet), but Christianity has become a worldwide religion because of it. Social scientists hitherto had researched into the present, in order to reveal the future; Sore1 researched into the future, in order to reveal the present.

This perspective, however bizarre it may have appeared to the prosperous French bourgeoisie, enabled Sore1 to see what was going on far more clearly than they did. The importance of militant trade unions, the growth of nationalism and populist revolt in outlying regions, the rise of political anti-Semitism and racism, the idea of war as a permanent characteristic of society, the growth of guerilla warfare and urban terrorism-all this would have come as no surprise to Sorel. Nor would the current situation in Northern Ireland, Lebanon, or the Argentine. Sore1 was always impressed by the “cowardice”, the tendency to appease- ment, characteristic of the comfortable middle-class and of democratic govern- ments. Strikes and violence usually

P"Yi troops are rarely called in, except to force employers to settle; there is very rarely official retaliation against terrorism or intimidation. Hence the fragility of bourgeois society. Pro- gressives and liberals, Sore1 complained, prefer to sell out the whole country rather than stand and fight. Fortu- nately, however, if the progressives are too tolerant of violence they are soon replaced by more robust defenders of middle-class values, like Mussolini. Paradoxically, Sore1 approved of work- ing-class violence at least partly because he hoped it would arouse the middle

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268 From Prophecy to Prediction

classes from their slumbers. It would force them to become warlike, heroic, and energetic again, and thus preserve civilisation.

Faith and the revolution

Sore1 has other lessons to teach us as well. I personally agree with his view that predictions of the future are myths, and tell us only about ourselves and our societies. Sore1 was also right, I think, to stress that revolutionary political commitment is not based on intellectual arguments. Like religious commitment, it presupposes a “will to believe”, a “leap into faith”-a point well understood by chairman Mao. Arguably, too, all institutions (not just armies or trade unions) need to be sustained by moral fervour; and per- haps that is what is wrong with many of our current ones-as non-heroic men, we accept them out of prudence or inertia, not out of faith. And it is difficult not to sympathise with Sore1 when he urges that people should run their own lives, and not be fooled by intellectual charlatans or political careerists. Moreover, in his more “optimistic” moments, Sore1 argued that groups did not have to be violent “tribes”. They might also be work groups, and men might find virtue and heroism among the myths of produc- tion, as well as among those of race or war. Industrial societies might thus generate their own ethic, the ethic of the producer, craftsman or artist, working in teams and competing (not fighting) against other groups. This is certainly a more attractive myth, and has become curiously fashionable again recently. Small is beautiful; craftsmen enjoy sturdy independence; the tedium of mass civilisation may yet be staved off. Perhaps Sore1 stumbled upon the basis of ethics in our time.

On the other hand, Sore1 was often mistaken. His picture of industrial society as a conflict of warring groups is, at best, only partially true of France or other advanced societies. Perhaps

because he wrote before the mass media, mass advertising and mass education had conditioned us all, he clearly underestimated social consen- sus. The despised bureaucratic, corrupt middle class has normally had little difficulty in imposing its values through- out society; normally workers, ethnic groups, and even religious sects have proved only too anxious to sell their militant birthright for a mess of corrupt pottage. And a good job too, for Northern Ireland is not everyone’s idea of an ideal society.

Sore1 romanticised the strike, just as Marx had romanticised the Paris commune; but in practice he didn’t like violence any more than anyone else does-he did not, for example, welcome the virtual civil war in Italy in 1921-22, before the Fascist seizure of power. There may be some virtues in compromise after all; there may be some point in social reforms; there may be more social cohesion among the various groups, more society-wide myths, than Sore1 was prepared to allow (admittedly war is likely to make them more strongly felt). Perhaps there is even something to be said for Sorel’s two pet hates, economic prosperity and universal compulsory education.

The anthropological viewpoint

It seems to me that Sorel’s real con- tribution is that he looked at industrial society with new eyes-those of an anthropologist. He was groping towards a new perspective on Western society, trying to see it from the outside, urging himself painfully away from the familiar, educated middle-class view of the world. It was a desperately difficult task, requiring great imagination and intellectual rigour. No wonder that many of his conclusions were tentative, or that he seemed “irrational” to his contemporaries (and even to us). What is going on in this place? What do these rituals, these symbols, signify? What are the values of this community? How are they formed ? These were the

FUTURES June 1976

In a British fantasy of 1891 (above) war begins with an assassination of a prince in the Balkans

And in an American fantasy of 1885 (below), dirigible aircraft (“Dynamite ballon”) would lead to air warfare

A favourite fear before 1914 was a proletarian uprising . . .

. . * in which the mob shoot the most eminent citizens. Here the Bishop of Chichester dies oppo- site his cathedral

From Prophecy to Prediction/Publications Received 271

questions Sore1 asked himself. They are anthropologists’ questions, and his answers were anthropological too.

Why, for example, did strikes occur? Not, said Sore& so that workers could win higher wages, or even so that they could “seize power” (much less so that they could entrust power to others). Such notions were contemptible bour- geois ones, quite foreign to the world view of real workers. Strikes were ritual affirmations of manly independence, heroic acts creating ties of social solidarity and mutual esteem; divisive acts, that established clearly who belonged in which group. They were the class struggle, which was pure and simple, indeed simplifying. Such rituals were very necessary in impersonal industrial societies, and Sore1 assumed that they would become more, not less, important as bourgeois prosperity and comfort increased. The same argument applied to wars, and to many kinds of group terrorism.

Yet Sore1 did not conclude that industrial society was doomed. Cer- tainly it was threatened by decadence: the bourgeoisie were soft and corrupt, the parliamentary socialists were power seeking and even more corrupt. Even so, it could be redeemed by violence; even the bourgeoisie would become “heroic” when they had to confront the workers. This is a familiar idea in anthropology. Violence, said Sore& was a purifying ritual. It was not irrelevant, not even a threat, but a necessary emotional affirmation, which alone makes industrial society tolerable and may enable it to survive. We need our occasional psychodramas. They do not have to be bloody to be effective, world wars and revolutions are not really “necessary”, the events of May 1968 in Paris will do just as well. Ritual heroism is all; even “violence” can be recycled back into the industrial system.

Sorel’s message is thus rather subtle, and interesting. It is that wise rulers (or wise capitalists) should not worry too much about spontaneous disaffection;

FUTURES June 1976

nor should they try to exert too much social control (although some is ob- viously needed, in order to satisfy the other side’s thirst for self-expression) ; nor-least of all-should they try to buy off, or absorb, disaffection. Trade unions should not be “brought into the system”; there is no need for all the panoply of consultation and social planning. Society isn’t like that. Let people have their fling. They’ll be the better for it, and so will industrial society. Few rulers are prepared to follow Sorel’s advice; but then, few rulers see their societies through anthro- pological spectacles. It takes an engi- neer to do that.

Reference

1. Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence

(Paris and London, Dunod, 1894).

Publications received

Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capital- ism (London, Heinemann Educational Books, 1978), 301 pages, L5.75 cloth.

Cabinet Office. Future World Trends (London. HMSO, 1976), 27 pages, 60~. ’ ’

C. West Churchman, Systems and Managemmt Annual 1975 (New York, Petrocelli/Charter Books, 1975), 620 pages, $25 cloth.

Nigel Cross and Robin Roy, Design Methods Manual (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 19?5), 131 pagks, i2.95.

David Elliott and Ruth Elliott. The Control of Technology (London, Wykeham Publications, 1976), xvi + 244 pages, Lg.80 cloth.

C. Gearing, W. Swart, and T. Var, Planning for Tourism and Development (London, Martin Robertson, 1976), 221 pages, Lg.80 cloth.

Daniel Harrison, Social Forecasting Methodology : Suggestions for Research (Ruse1 Sage Founda- tion, 230 Park Avenue, NY 10017, 1976), 94 pages, single copies free.

Robert Heilbroner; Business Civilization in Decline (London. Marion Bovars. 1976). 127 pages, i3.95 cloih, El.95 paper. ”

Interdisciplinary Science Reviews (London, Heyden, 1976), quarterly iournal, $44, gl7 perannum.

Draper’ L: Kauffx&n, Jr, -‘Teaching the Future: A Guide to Future-Oriented Education (Palm Springs. ETC Publications, 1976), 298’ pages,* $5.95 paper, $12.95 cloth.

John Naughton and Lyn Jones, World Models: Sense or Nonsense? (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1975), 50 pages.