Function and Functionalism, A Synthetic Perspective

Function and Functionalism: A Synthetic PerspectiveAuthor(s): Martin Mahner and Mario BungeSource: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 75-94Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3081025 .

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Function and Functionalism: A Synthetic Perspective*

Martin Mahner and Mario Bungett Center for Inquiry-Europe; Department of Philosophy, McGill University

In this paper we examine the following problems: How many concepts of function are there in biology, social science, and technology? Are they logically related and if so, how? Which of these function concepts effect a functional explanation as opposed to a mere functional account? What are the consequences of a pluralist view of functions for functionalism? We submit that there are five concepts of function in biology, which are logically related in a particular way, and six function concepts in social science and technology. Only two of them may help effect a genuine functional explanation. Finally, our synthetic approach allows us to distinguish four different varieties of functionalism in biology, psychology, social science, and technology: formalist, black boxist, adaptationist, and teleological. And only one of them is explanatory in the strong sense defended here.

1. Introduction. Philosophical analyses of the concepts of function and functional explanation are legion. It is obvious from these studies that the word 'function' does not designate a single all-purpose concept of function, but in fact a plurality of function concepts. However, it is still not clear how many function concepts there are, and whether they are logically related, and if so, how. Nor is it clear which of these many function concepts occur in which scientific disciplines: Is there one or more universal function concept which can be found in any branch of science, and are there specific notions occurring only in a particular science? Furthermore, if the word 'function' designates a plurality of concepts, what precisely is

*Received March 1999; revised October 2000.

tSend requests for reprints to Martin Mahner, Center for Inquiry-Europe, Arheilger Weg 11, D-64380 Rossdorf, Germany; email: [email protected]. tWe thank Michael Kary and Dan A. Seni, as well as an anonymous referee for useful suggestions that helped to improve the original manuscript. Philosophy of Science, 68 (March 2001) pp. 75-94. 0031-8248/2001/6801-0005$2.00 Copyright 2001 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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MARTIN MAHNER AND MARIO BUNGE

a functional explanation? And what about the term 'functionalism': does it, accordingly, designate different functionalisms too?

In this paper we shall try to answer these questions. We begin by analyzing the notions of function occurring in biology and proceed to examine whether these can also be applied to social science and technology. In so doing, our aim is not to review all the previous studies on the notion of function, but to find unity behind this diversity, which emphasizes in particular the logical relations of the various function concepts distinguished. We shall then explore the consequences of our analysis for the notion of functional explanation. Finally, we shall apply our synthesis to functionalism in biology, social science, and technology, which will allow us to distinguish as many types of functionalism as there are notions of function.

2. Functions in Biology. The concept of function has been one of the main topics in the philosophy of biology: see, e.g., Bock and von Wahlert 1965; Cummins 1975; Wright 1976; Nagel 1977; Prior 1985; Bigelow and Par- getter 1987; Millikan 1989; Brandon 1990; Neander 1991; Godfrey-Smith 1993; Griffiths 1993; Kitcher 1993; Amundson and Lauder 1994; Buller 1998; Preston 1998; as well as the largely unknown work of Berier and Pirlot (1977). These studies have proposed, for example, the notions of Cummins function, causal role function, function as survival value, system function, design function, etiological or proper function, or historical evolutionary function. However, there are only a few studies which tried to systematize some of these notions (e.g., Walsh and Ariew 1996, and, published while we were already revising this paper, Wouters 1999). And these seem not to have realized the logical relation among the various function concepts. For this reason, it will be worthwhile to try again and take another look at biological functions. In so doing, we shall improve on our earlier analysis of the notion of function in biology, Mahner and Bunge 1997.

We submit that, in biology, the term 'function' is used in at least five different, though related, senses. There are two basic concepts which help define the other three. The first basic concept is that of internal (biotic) activity. More precisely, the internal activity of some organismic system or subsystem, such as a tissue or an organ, is simply the set of all processes occurring in it. Think of the uncounted biochemical reactions occurring in the liver. Whether or not these processes are of any use to the organism, or to anything for that matter, is immaterial-at this stage of analysis. In other words, this notion has no evolutionary, adaptive, or teleological connotations whatsoever.

This concept may appear so broad as to be useless. Indeed, in principle, the internal activity of any concrete system may range from microphysical processes at the quantum level to macrophysical ones such as develop-

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FUNCTION AND FUNCTIONALISM

ment. For this reason, we will have to focus on those internal activities of biotic systems that are of interest to biology, and hence add the qualifier "biotic" or "biologically relevant" when speaking of the internal activity of some biotic system or subsystem. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude a priori any activity from being biologically relevant, so we do need this broad notion. Furthermore, the internal activity of any given system comprises both idiosyncratic and kind-specific ones. Thus, if necessary, we can form the notion of a specific internal activity, which refers to those processes that only a system of a given kind can undergo. For example, we need such a concept if we wish to speak of the normal internal activity of a system (whereby "normal" is conceived of in a purely statistical, not normative, sense). But again, the internal activity of some biotic system may, but need not be the same as its normal activity.

Speaking of organismic subsystems, it is evident that these do not exist in isolation but are the components of some more inclusive system, in particular the organism or even the organism-environment system. Thus, the internal activities of every organismic subsystem are somehow related to the activities of other systems. We call the relations of some organismic subsystem to (or rather its interactions with) other such subsystems, or to the organism as a whole, or to the organism-in-its-environment, the external (biotic) activity or role of the given subsystem. In other words, the role of an organismic subsystem is what it does in the supersystem of which it is a part. Again, this notion comprises all the roles of a given subsystem, and it is not concerned with the usefulness of any such activity. And, as before and as needed, we can restrict this very broad concept to that of the specific external activity.

According to the preceding distinctions, one of the (specific) internal activities of the heart is the performance of rhythmic contractions (includ- ing the concomitant production of heart sounds), whereas its external activity or role is blood pumping. (In German and French these two concepts are distinguished by different words: the former is designated by Funk- tionieren andfonctionnement respectively; the latter by Fungieren [or Rolle] and fonction [or role] respectively. See Bernier and Pirlot 1977; Mahner and Bunge 2000.)

In biology, either the specific internal or the specific external activity of an organismic subsystem or both have been called 'function' (in the sense of 'functioning'). Let us distinguish these notions by means of subscripts: the two basic concepts are those offunction, (internal biotic activity) and function2 (external biotic activity or role). Since the internal and external activities of some organ are often interdependent, these concepts may be combined into the notion offunction3 (internal cum external activity). For example, when speaking of the function(ing) of the legs, we usually have in mind both the physiological activities of the muscles and the locomotion

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they bring about. Likewise, the rhythmic contractions of the heart are of interest to us only inasmuch as they allow for its role as a blood pump. Since these three notions of function entail nothing as to the value or usefulness of the corresponding activities, they are often called 'effects' rather than 'functions.' Nevertheless, they constitute the working orfunc- tioning of the system in question, hence they are indeed functions in this sense.

Obviously, the function3 of some organismic subsystem may be valuable to the organism as a whole, i.e., it may favor its survival or reproduction; or it may be indifferent, or even disvaluable. For example, while the function3 of the heart is highly valuable, that of the appendix is almost nil, and that of a tumor is disvaluable. If the function3 of the subsystem is valuable to the organism, we call it, or the subsystem in question, an aptation. (Gould and Vrba 1982; Mahner and Bunge 1997) Correspond- ingly, a disvaluable function3 is a malaptation (or malfunction or dysfunction). And if a function3 should turn out to be neutral, we might call it a nullaptation. We call any function,2,3 that is an aptation a function4. Ac- cordingly, the production of heart sounds is not a function4 of the heart, although it is clearly one of its activities (functions3). However, it is clearly an aptation of our noses to support spectacles.

As evolutionary biologists would want to point out, the aptedness of most activities is often not merely accidental: in most cases it will be the result of selection. We call an aptation that has been retained or improved on by selection an adaptation. And we designate this concept byfunctions. Accordingly, it is not a function5 of our noses to support spectacles. Note that all adaptations are aptations, but not conversely. (Gould and Le- wontin 1979; Gould and Vrba 1982) Note also that there are no such things as maladaptations (or malfunctions5), but only malaptations (or malfunctions4): By definition, there can be no features that are favored by selection for being disvaluable (see also Davies 2000).

The preceding definitions show that the concept of function5 logically presupposes (or implies) that of function4, which in turn presupposes that of either function,, function2, or function3. Thus, there is not just a plurality of function concepts, but these concepts are logically related, namely by the relation of implication (see Figure l)-a fact that so far seems not to have been appreciated sufficiently. The corresponding processes are also historically prior to each other: A new mutation may establish a new internal or external activity of some organ, which may turn out to be an aptation in a given environment-or else a malaptation. If it turns out to be an aptation, natural selection may start to spread this aptation in the population, perhaps imposing in addition a direction on the subsequent evolutionary process. In other words, our analysis is in tune with evolutionary biology.

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Internal Activity (Function ) \i (Function

1) Total Activity Aptation Adaptation

(Function3) Function4) (Function 5)

External Activity/ (Function 2)

Figure 1. Relations among the five concepts of function (function,,) in biology. The figure can be read from left to right ("is needed to define"), or else from right to left ("implies").

Note that, in principle, the ambiguous word 'function' can be elimi- nated in favor of the expressions 'internal activity', 'external activity', 'aptation', and 'adaptation.' Any one of these notions may be called 'function' in a given context, so that we need to watch out which of these different concepts is being referred to in any biological work. (See also Wouters 1999.) Thus, the search for the concept of function in biology is futile.

3. Functions in Social Science. Given the different natures of biotic and social systems, we may ask whether the preceding analysis is of any use in the social sciences. We submit that it is. Indeed, all five concepts of function distinguished above occur in the social-science literature, if only tacitly (Fig. 1): internal social activity, role (external social activity), activity cum role, aptation (valuable social activity or role), and adaptation (an aptation that gets reproduced because of its value, perhaps being improved along the selection process). Examples: Internal activities of social systems are manufacturing, work coordination in a firm or in an orchestra, election in a polity or a club, teaching at a school, and playing in a soccer team. External activities (roles) of social systems are trade, marketing, foreign relations, spying, broadcasting, and advertising. Again, internal activities of social systems are of interest to us mostly insofar as they allow for certain roles to be played in a higher-level social system, so that we may combine the two as needed into the notion of function3.

The notion of aptation (function4) is exemplified by Radcliffe-Brown's classic definition of a social function: "the function of any recurrent activity, such as the punishment of a crime, or a funeral ceremony, is the part it plays in the social life as a whole and therefore the contribution it makes to the maintenance of the structural continuity." (1935, 396) A social function4 (or social aptation) is thus an objective feature of society that contributes to its cohesion and thereby to its continuity or "survival." The opposite of a function, in this sense, is of course a social dysfunction (or malaptation).

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Finally, sociofunctions5 (or social adaptations) are aptations that are the result of some process of natural or artificial selection, such as the continual change of product line in view of market opportunities, or cur- riculum updating.

If this were all there is to social functions, there would be no important difference between social and biotic functions. However, in contradistinction to biosystems and most animal societies, the functions_5 of human individuals and social systems often involve purposive actions. Thus, we arrive at a sixth concept of function (or rather a set of concepts) that is genuinely teleological, involving the notions of intention, purpose, or goal. We call this notion teleofunction. We do not call it function6, because it does not presuppose the notion of function5, which presupposes that of function4, which in turn presupposes that of function3. Rather, being a teleofunction is a (relational) property of some systems performing any one function,5. That is, a purpose or goal may be attributed to each of the five functions distinguished above, so that social activities, roles, activities cum roles, aptations, and adaptations that are intentional are teleofunctions (see Figure 2). This is why we obtain five corresponding teleofunctions, namely teleofunctionsl_5. For example, knowingly committing a crime is a teleofunction3 of some individual in some social system (an intentional activity and role), but it is-at least most likely- neither a function4 (an unintended socially valuable activity and role) nor a teleofunction4 (an intended socially valuable activity and role).

The distinction between teleofunctions and functions simpliciter matches Merton's (1957, 51) distinction between manifest and latent social

Teleofunction 1

Internal Activity (Function 1) \

\ Total Activity Aptation Adaptation (Function 3) (Function 4) (Function 5)

External Activity (Function 2)

Teleofunction 2 Teleofunction 3 Teleofunction 4 Teleofunction 5

Figure 2. In psychology, social science, and technology, any one function(,5), or part of it, can be attributed a purpose or goal, and thus have an intentional aspect: it can be a teleofunction.

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functions. The former are those that are recognized and intended, whereas latent functions are unrecognized and unintended. Even purposive social actions can have unanticipated consequences, some beneficial, others per- verse. For instance, a welfare program can keep the poor afloat while at the same time inducing chronic welfare-dependency. Thus, the manifest- latent distinction helps to explain the persistence of social practices that persist without having achieved their manifest purpose, or which have long ceased to serve any useful manifest purpose. (Merton 1957, 64) For example, fertility rites and other ceremonies may persist in industrial societies because they have some latent collateral function4, such as reinforcing group "identity" and thus social cohesion.

To conclude, the notions of function in social science differ from those in biology in that there is a further notion of function in the sense of intention, purpose, or goal. This teleological aspect may apply to each of the five concepts of sociofunction, turning them into teleofunctions (or teleosociofunctions).

4. Functions in Technology. Technological design may be characterized as the technique of inventing and implementing the function(s) bringing about the best value. Not surprisingly, function analysis is central to both engineering and management science (see, e.g., Snodgrass and Kasi 1986; Umeda and Tomiyama 1997). And yet, the relevant literature is marred by the absence of a clear definition of the very concept of a function. In turn, this conceptual fuzziness makes for widespread confusion. Thus, the author of a highly praised monograph on the subject describes the subject of his discipline as follows: "In function analysis, concepts are considered to be purposive actions involved in the creation of products and services." (Akiyama 1991, 3) No distinction is made between concept-an abstract entity-and action-a concrete process-nor between the different kinds of function that the designer handles.

Our preceding analysis of the various concepts of function will come in handy also in the case of artifacts. (For a philosophical analysis of the notion of an artifact see, e.g., Bunge 1985, Ch. 5.) Obviously, artifacts too carry out certain activities, perform certain roles, or both. (See also Chan- drasekaran and Josephson 1997.) For example, a computer undergoes certain processes that constitute its internal activity or function,. And its internal activities are of interest to us only inasmuch as they are relevant to some role (function2) of the computer in some supersystem, in particular the user-computer system. However, not all artifacts have a relevant function,, though all have some role or other (function2). For example, although a hammer or a screwdriver have no internal activities of interest to their users, they have a certain role-but only when they are being used.

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For this reason, the notion of function3 (internal activity cum role) may not always be applicable or useful in technology.

Just as in the case of biosystems, an artifact's activity or role may be valuable to some artifactual supersystem of which it is a part. For example, a fuel injection device is necessary for the cylinders in an internal combustion engine to work. Its specific function is then an aptation or func- tion4. If, on the other hand, a certain activity is disvaluable to the system as whole, it is a malaptation or dysfunction. Think of all the "bugs" that may plague a computer system. And if an artifact with any given function4 gets reproduced because of that function, perhaps being improved on in the course of this process, it is in addition a technofunction5.

However, technofunctions,_5 simpliciter are only such if they are latent or unintended. Although technology must take such side-effects into account, technological design involves the intentions, purposes, or goals of rational agents. Therefore, artifacts may be said to have a purpose, in the sense that they have been designed according to some goal of some person. Thus, it is correct to speak of the proper function of an artifact, or even of its purpose, provided one adds that this is a function or purpose by proxy. For example, a car does not work for its own sake nor, in particular, does it seek to survive. Involving both intention and value to somebody, technological functions,, are teleofunctions,,. And most of them are also teleofunctions5, since they are the result of artificial (both technical and economic) selection (Fig. 2).

To conclude, in technology, just as in social science, we find five concepts of function as well as the teleological notion of a teleofunction. Like- wise, each function_5 may be associated with a teleofunction (or teleo- technofunction).

5. Functional Account vs. Functional Explanation. When we ascribe a function to a system, what does this explain? In particular, do the various concepts of function distinguished above have the same or different explanatory power? Let us see.

The first step in trying to understand some fact is to describe it. The second consists in subsuming the particular described under some universal, or general pattern. Finally, in a third step we may unveil the mechanism or modus operandi of the fact to be understood. More on this in a moment. Let us first take a look at the second step, which is known as the classical account of scientific explanation, the so-called covering law model. It consists in a deductive argument of the form:

Law & Circumstances .'. Proposition describing the fact to be explained.

For example, when wishing to explain why Jones died, we may point out that he was given (a certain dose of) arsenic. Thus, the law statement

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"All people who take (a certain dose of) arsenic are bound to die", and the circumstance that Jones had indeed taken (a certain dose of) arsenic, are said to jointly explain why Jones died.

In some sense this does explain why Jones died. But is this explanation satisfactory? We think that it is not, because it fails to tell us why people who take arsenic are doomed. We will have explained this fact only if we succeed in uncovering the biochemical mechanism that mediates between the intake of arsenic and death. Thus, we claim that genuine explanations point to the mechanism-causal, probabilistic, or mixed-by virtue of which the facts to be explained occur. Therefore, we distinguish mechanismic explanations (or explanations proper) from mere subsumptions (see Bunge 1967, 1983, 1997; Mahner and Bunge 1997; see also Wimsatt 1976; Salmon 1984). Thus, the covering-law model describes subsumption, not genuine explanation.

Let us apply these distinctions to our six concepts of function. Since the notion of internal activity is defined as the set of processes or mechanisms occurring in a system, reference to functions, may provide a mechanismic explanation. Not so with the second concept of function, i.e., that of role. The problem is that one and the same role (function2) may result from alternative (internal) mechanisms (functionsl). For example, a certain part of a plant may grow either by the swelling of its cells or by their multi- plication; the output of a factory may grow either by recruiting more workers or by introducing a more advanced technology; and a message can be sent in several different ways. It is in this sense that the concept of functional equivalence is often defined: Two systems are functionally equivalent if, and only if, their functions2 are the same, i.e., iff they have (roughly) the same outputs regardless of their differences in inputs or in mechanisms. Not referring to any mechanism, a function ascription in this sense can provide only a description or at most a subsumption, but not a genuine explanation. For this reason, we speak of a functional account instead of a functional explanation proper. Indeed, scientists are not sat- isfied with subsumptions unless they hit on a plausible mechanism "re- sponsible for" the fact or the function2 in question. For example, Wege- ner's hypothesis of continental drift was not accepted until plate tectonics provided the underlying mechanism. And the conjecture that mood and emotion affect health did not gain currency until some of the corresponding neuro-endocrine-immune mechanisms were unveiled. Thus, knowledge of function2 or role is only preliminary knowledge.

The same holds for the concept of aptation or function4. To show that a certain internal or external activity of some subsystem is valuable to the system of which it is a part, or even that its presence is required by the overall design of the system in question, is a description or perhaps even a subsumption, but not a mechanismic explanation. (See also Wouters

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1999, although he calls this an "explanation without a cause.") By contrast, what is mechanismic is an explanation of how and why a certain function4 has come into being; in particular, showing that an aptation is also an adaptation (function5) is a mechanismic explanation, because in so doing the biologist, for instance, will make use of the theory of selection, which involves reference to a mechanism of evolution.

Finally, what about the explanatory power of the concept of teleofunction? To say that any one functionl5 occurs because it is intended may be called a teleological account. But it is not an explanation proper, because neither is it an argument nor does it point to a mechanism. Rather, it is intentions that call for explanation, e.g., in terms of brain processes or mechanisms.

In short, we submit that references to functions, and functions5 may provide functional explanations, whereas references to functions2, func- tions4, and teleofunctions provide at most functional accounts.

6. From Function to Functionalism. With the help of the preceding eluci- dations, we can now take a look at functionalism. Having distinguished six concepts of function, we may in principle form six corresponding notions of functionalism. Whether there actually are six such notions will be examined in the following sections.

Functionalism is usually understood as the (ontological) thesis that function is all-important and stuff (or composition) nothing; more care- fully stated, stuff is relevant at most as the material carrier of functions, but, inasmuch as two things perform the same function1,2, their material or compositional differences do not matter. Witness Putnam's classic dic- tum: "We could be made out of Swiss cheese and it wouldn't matter." (1975, 291) If functionalism claims that the internal activities (or functions,) of two compositionally different things can be essentially the same, we call it, for reasons to be given in the next section,formalistfunctionalism (or functionalism,). If functionalism claims that two compositionally different things can perform the same external activities or roles (or func- tions2), we call it black box functionalism (or functionalism2), because it disregards the inner workings of the things in question. The same name will be given to its epistemological counterpart, namely the claim that all we need to know about things is what they do or what roles they perform (functions2), regardless of substance and mechanism.

The term 'functionalism' also designates the thesis that every item of certain kinds (biological, social, or technical) serves some function ("purpose"). In this case 'function' may refer to an aptation, an adaptation, or even an intention or teleofunction. We call the former two adaptationist functionalism (functionalism4), and the latter teleologicalfunctionalism (or teleofunctionalism). Teleological functionalism proper would hold that all

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socio- and technofunctions, whether or not they are aptations or adaptations, are in any case teleofunctions, in being useful to somebody or at least in being intended to be useful to somebody.

In the following we shall examine which functionalisms discussed in the philosophical literature do match the above distinctions. We shall also assess these functionalisms with respect to their explanatory power.

7. Functionalism in Biology and Psychology. The best-known functionalism is the one discussed in the philosophy of mind and in Artificial Intelligence (AI) (see, e.g., Putnam 1975; Dennett 1978; Block 1980; Fodor 1981). The latter's counterpart in biology is the Artificial Life (AL) project (see Lang- ton 1989; Langton et al. 1991). In both cases, two versions of functionalism are commonly distinguished: weak (or moderate) and strong (or radical). Weak functionalism claims only that some biological (or psychological) functions can be successfully imitated by artificial systems or machines. By contrast, strong functionalism claims that mind as a whole- or life as a whole, as the case may be-can be replicated (not just mim- icked) by machines, and perhaps by other things as well.

Obviously, certain artifacts can imitate the net effect or outcome of certain biological functions,. That is, they can perform certain roles (func- tions2) even though they differ from the corresponding living thing in both composition and structure; in other words, they are functionally equivalent as defined in Section 5. For example, when adequately programmed, a computer can perform certain computations, such as calculating the value of an atomic energy level. But it does so through processes (functions,) widely different from the corresponding processes in the living brain; moreover, the computer does not know what an energy level is. Therefore, any such imitation is partial. Thus, weak functionalism is a functionalism2: it claims only that certain functions2 are substrate-neutral in the sense that different mechanisms can perform the same role. In dis- regarding the mechanisms underlying the roles in question, functionalism2 is a black box functionalism: it may provide functional accounts, but no functional explanations.

The strong functionalism that rules in both AI and AL is quite another matter. The former is the thesis that computers (or computer programs) are equivalent to thinking brains (or minds), in that they can replicate in toto whatever the original things do. This equivalence is said to be functional (or structural), in being substrate-neutral, i.e., independent of the stuff that "embodies" the ideas concerned. What matters are computations or algorithms, not material mechanisms. Similarly, AL holds that life is a property of the organization of matter, not so much a property of the matter itself that is so organized. Thus, AL is concerned with the "formal basis" of life, which would allow us to replicate or synthesize

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genuine life processes in computers and perhaps other artificial things. (Langton 1989)

In both cases, the functions in question are not certain roles (functions2) that might be performed with different underlying mechanisms (functions,): The mechanisms or processes themselves (functions,) are said to be replicable in different "substrates". Thus, in contradistinction to weak functionalism, strong functionalism is an instance of functionalism,. How- ever, to a materialist, this position should be unacceptable. The point of materialism is that only matter matters and, in particular, that the functions, of any thing depend critically upon the kind of stuff the thing consists of. Change it, and the organization and mechanism of the thing will change accordingly. Functionalisml, in contrast, assumes that processes (mechanisms, functionsl) are not changes in concrete things but instead stuff-free algorithms, which are purely formal objects. For this reason, we call it formalist functionalism.

Although strong functionalism is a functionalism, for referring to mechanisms, these mechanisms are, as we have just seen, formal, not material, mechanisms. Unless we share the idealist belief that formal objects can steer material processes, or be embodied in material objects, we cannot admit that formalist functionalism has explanatory power. (Further criticisms are made in Boden 1999.)

8. Adaptationist Functionalism. Traditional teleological functionalism, viewing everything as being purposive or goal-seeking, is no longer tena- ble. Its scientifically respectable, but not necessarily truer, descendant is adaptationist functionalism. In biology, this is the thesis that all traits are ultimately adaptive (or functional5), i.e., the product of natural selection. In teleological parlance, it asserts that "selection acts for the benefit" of something, be it the individual (organism or gene) or-nowadays less fash- ionably-the species. Thus, if observation shows that A does B, the adaptationist will say that A has been designed to do B, or that B is the proper function or purpose of A, or that B has evolved for being beneficial to its bearer, or at least to the latter's genes (see, e.g., Williams 1966). Thus, it maintains that the concept of function is that of function5 (or proper function or adaptation), also known as the etiological concept of function.

Some adaptationists regard even disease as a means for survival and reproduction-though admittedly one that can occasionally turn on its bearer. (Nesse and Williams 1994) These authors refrain from asking whether every disease has an evolutionary origin: instead, they assume this to explain all diseases in such terms. Indeed, they assert that "we must discover the evolutionary causes for each disease." (6) We submit that this way of approaching biological features is precisely the main methodological flaw of adaptationism in general.

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Nevertheless, if an aptation can be shown to be also an adaptation, this may provide a genuine explanation, for it will refer to evolutionary mechanisms such as natural selection.

9. Pan-Functionalism in Evolutionary Biology and Psychology. Daniel Den- nett, who has long espoused functionalism in the matter of mind (1978), has recently extended it to evolution (1995). In so doing, he combines formalist with adaptationist functionalism. Dennett's formalist thesis is that evolution is a substrate-neutral algorithmic process. However, if bio- evolution were indeed substrate-neutral, it would be the only process of this kind. The thesis that evolution is an algorithmic process is equally dubious, for it assumes that evolution reduces to selection. But selection is a sorting process, not a source of qualitative novelty. (Sober 1984; Mah- ner and Bunge 1997; Buller 1998; Walsh 1998) And to account for the emergence of qualitative novelty (not just its subsequent distribution in organismal populations) is what we expect from a satisfactory theory of evolution. In any event, Dennett's thesis is just hand-waving, for he ex- hibits no evolutionary algorithm that we could feed into a computer to check whether, indeed, "it" correctly predicts speciation and extinction.

The assumption that some kind of algorithmic-selectionist formalism is the driving force of everything evolutionary leads Dennett straight to adaptationist functionalism: Since everything biological is the result of selection, all features are adaptive-if not prima facie, then at least ultimately. Thus, panselectionism is paired off to panfunctionalism. (Ahouse 1998) No wonder, then, that Dennett devotes a considerable portion of his book to attacking Gould's and Lewontin's (1979) classic critique of adaptationism (see also Gould 1997a, 1997b; Mahner and Bunge 1997; Ahouse 1998; Godfrey-Smith 1998).

Combining the adaptationist and formalist approaches to biological evolution with the view that the mind is a sort of computer program, or information processor, yields the latest version of evolutionary psychology and its foray into social science. According to its parents (Cosmides and Tooby 1987), the main theses of evolutionary psychology are the following. First, psychology deals with function or purpose, not organ, and every function can be "instantiated" in a variety of systems. "Just as different kinds of hardware can run the same computer program, different physiological mechanisms can accomplish the same adaptive function." (283) Hence, psychology needs no neuroscience. Second, "natural selection theory is a theory of function." (284) Third, there are innate psychological mechanisms, all of which are information-processing programs that "ex- tract information from the environment" and process it: they "map in- formational input onto behavioral output." Fourth, the psychological mechanisms in charge of learning special tasks are "Darwinian algo-

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rithms" that "organize experience into adaptively meaningful schemas or frames." (286) Chomsky's mysterious "language acquisition device" would be one of them.

As will be obvious from the preceding sections, these views are open to serious objections. To begin with, functions5, are not substrate- independent. If in doubt, try to build a computer chip with air or iron rather than silicon. For this reason, no two organs will be able to perform the same functions,, although some may indeed perform the same func- tions2 (or roles). Hence, again, the retreat to formal mechanisms, i.e., algorithms. Moreover, function presupposes organ, but the converse is false. Hence, natural selection does not only select "for" external activities of organs-which is what the selection-sees-only-function thesis asserts-but indirectly also "for" internal activities.

Furthermore, in our view, a mechanism is a process in a concrete thing; hence there are brain mechanisms but not psychological ones. Besides, contrary to what the defunct "ecological psychology" held, the environment contains no cognitive information. But even if it did, there is no evidence for the algorithmic nature of all cognitive processes, from face recognition to concept formation. Rather, our tentative and often unsuc- cessful performance at such tasks is in sharp contrast with the certainty inherent in any algorithm-steered process. Finally, the claim that "learning is accomplished through psychological mechanisms (whose nature is not yet understood)" (Cosmides and Tooby 1987, 292) reminds one of Mo- liere's doctor, who solemnly declared that opium makes one sleepy because it possesses the "dormitive virtue."

To conclude, the currently fashionable version of evolutionary psychology is purely speculative: it thrives on concocting adaptationist just- so stories, which may be plausible but are as yet untested-and it is not obvious how they could be tested unambiguously. We submit that it may become a field of scientific research, but only once the adaptationist, formalist, and computationalist dogmas have been jettisoned in favor of the psychobiological approach to mind. (For further and different criticisms see Lloyd 1999.)

10. Functionalism in Social Science. In social studies, a first variety of functionalism is the rational-choice approach. If one postulates that all choices maximize the expected utility (gain), then one must assume that those with unforeseen negative consequences correspond to wrong eval- uations and mistaken probability estimates. This renders the "rationality postulate" unfalsifiable. In other words, if the choice is successful, the action is deemed to have been objectively rational; if not, the action is said to have been only subjectively rational. In either case, the formalism is saved at the expense of substance or, rather, mechanism, namely social

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interaction. For this reason, we regard the rational-choice approach as an instance of formalist functionalism in social science.

Not referring to social mechanisms, the rational-choice approach fails miserably to explain the very existence of social systems, from the family to the transnational corporation. This failure is a necessary consequence of its explicit adoption of ontological and methodological individualism. (Bunge 1996, Ch. 14) Still, when used in moderation, this approach may have some heuristic value. Indeed, it suggests looking for the reasons, good or bad, that motivate decisions. (Boudon 1999) It also suggests explaining some failed actions as results of miscalculations. (By contrast, success may be explained either by correct calculation or by favorable circumstances.)

What is known as socialfunctionalism is a version of adaptationist functionalism. It focuses on social systems and their specific functions3 or activities. It also studies both the cohesive or system-preserving ("func- tional4") and the divisive or system-interfering ("dysfunctional") consequences of a system's activities3. In other words, it investigates whether social functions3 are aptations (functions4) or even adaptations (func- tions5). Social functionalism is an alternative to both Marxist economicism and the traditional or culture-historical approach centered on statesmen and battles. (Trigger 1989) Though fathered by E. Durkheim at the turn of the century, functionalism flourished particularly in the UK and the US between ca. 1920 and ca. 1960, particularly in the works of B. Mali- nowski and E. R. Radcliffe-Brown in anthropology, G. Childe in archae- ology, and T. Parsons in sociology.

The social functionalists postulated that all the social items (mechanisms, roles, norms, patterns, institutions, etc.) come into being and persist because they are useful to the social system concerned, or even to society at large. Put negatively: the social items that have ceased to discharge any useful function eventually disappear. Hence, the pattern of functional explanation would be this:

For all x: If x is a useful social item, then x is a standard social item. b is a useful social item. .*. b is a standard social item.

Obviously, this is not an explanation proper, but only a subsumption, or inclusion of a particular into a universal. Hence, it is at most a functional account, not a functional explanation. Moreover, it is not even satisfactory as a functional account, because it has a doubtful presupposition. This is the assumption that the social system is homogeneous, so that what is useful for its cohesion or preservation is good for every member of it. This presupposition is not even true for primitive societies, all of which retain negative items such as crippling kinship conventions and counter- productive superstitions. Thus, it is an instance of the fallacy of division.

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Having said this, we grant that, although adaptationist-functionalist accounts may be shallow or even wrong, some functionalist questions may be rewarding. The reason is that many social functions are indeed aptations, or even adaptations. And the existence of such functions,, poses the problem of their origin and persistence. Now, every such problem can be analyzed non-teleologically as the sequence of questions: What is the internal activity in question? What is its role? Are the activities and roles valuable to the group (or the society) as a whole? If in fact they are aptations, are they also adaptations?

For instance, the persistence of religion in what is said to be the Age of Science and Technology raises the problem of the latent or collateral function(s) of some churches. Again, the corruption of political democracy by an economic elite invites looking at the way political campaigns are funded and candidates are selected. Both are empirical problems, not questions that can be solved a priori.

On the other hand, a moderate version of social functionalism requires an account of the distinction and inter-relation between microsocial units (individuals) and their subjective dispositions and activities on the one hand, and macrosocial features (which are now constraints, now stimuli to individual action) on the other. (Bunge 1998) Thus, in contrast to radical functionalism, its moderate counterpart does not proscribe the search for mechanism. On the contrary:

Functionalist analysis in sociology, as in other disciplines like physi- ology and psychology, calls for a 'concrete and detailed' account of the mechanisms which operate to perform a designated function. This refers, not to psychological, but to social, mechanisms (e.g., role- segmentation, insulation of institutional demands, hierarchic ordering of values, social division of labor, ritual and ceremonial enactments, etc.) (Merton 1957, 52)

To conclude, social functionalism can be barren or fruitful. It will be barren if it only restates Doctor Pangloss's thesis that we live in the best of all possible worlds: that in which everyone maximizes his or her expected utilities. But it will be fruitful if it analyzes social systems and attempts to discover what makes them tick-that is, their mechanisms.

11. Functionilism in Technology. Recall from Section 5 that there is an asymmetry between function2 and mechanism (function): one and the same function2 can often be implemented by different mechanisms (functions,). In other words, the functions2 - mechanisms (functions,) relation is one-many. For example, the manager of a factory poses functional questions to the engineer, such as "Can you design a better mousetrap?" The technologist attempts to solve this problem by figuring out a novel mech-

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anism, one that may involve stuff other than the traditional steel spring- such as electric shock, poison, infertility drug, or what have you. In short, technological problems may be posed in functional2 terms, but they can only be solved in mechanismic terms. Thus, black box functionalism does not help the technologist.

However, the users of artifacts can be forgiven for adopting a black box functionalist stand. For example, the function2 of a car's catalytic converter is to transform the toxic carbon monoxide and nitric oxide, resulting from incomplete combustion, into inoffensive gases. The converter's mechanism, which the driver and the car mechanic need not know, consists of two chemical reactions that are made possible by platinum and rhodium particles acting as catalyzers. By contrast, the designer of the converter must know its mechanism. Indeed, every technological func- tion3, be it symbol-processing, transportation, or social control, must be "realized" in concrete artifacts. Hence, the designers must master such mechanisms; in particular, they must know the behavior of the "stuff' in question-physical, social, or what have you.

Another example is this: Accountants are uninterested in such features of a firm as the precise nature of its operations, organization, personnel morale, or public image; they focus on the company's net inputs and outputs. The firm's managers and consultants, on the other hand, will ignore those aspects only at their own risk: They must identify the underlying mechanisms if they wish to control them and, a fortiori, to improve their performance. So much for black box functionalism in technology.

All technology is presumed to be adaptationist-functionalist because its practitioners are expected to design artifacts that perform pre-assigned functions4 (which are at the same time teleofunctions4), such as grinding, symbol-processing, or conflict-solving. However, technological design can be construed in either of two ways: as subordinating everything to a key function, or as combining the key function with collateral functions. For example, whereas some cars are only efficient vehicles, others are also elegant toys or status-symbols. Houses, TV sets, business firms, pieces of legislation, public-health programs, and other technological items are par- allel. Therefore, one may speak of two kinds of adaptationist functionalism in technology: radical and moderate. Whereas the former sacrifices everything to short-term efficiency, the latter makes room for other factors and wider temporal and social horizons. It is the answer to such critics of performance-centered and context-free design as Vanderburg (2000).

In architecture and industrial design, radical adaptationist functionalism was born in the 1920s. The Bauhaus is the best-known functionalist school. Its mottos were "Form follows function" (actually first stated by Louis Sullivan) and "Less is more." That is, it shunned the convolutions typical of the Renaissance and Baroque plastic arts which served no (key)

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functional purpose. In other words, technological functionalism is utili- tarian and cuts the ties with tradition. Post-modem architecture is-or rather was-a reaction against this cold functionalism. Like all reactions, it failed.

Examples of radical adaptationist functionalism in sociotechnology are the fashionable methods for containing inflation and cutting costs, namely monetarism and downsizing, respectively. Monetarist policies are occasionally effective in reducing inflation; but they are inefficient in that they cause enormous social costs, such as unemployment and the accompa- nying increase in social expenditures. Likewise, downsizing effectively cuts the payroll; but it rips the firm's social fabric and is thus inefficient in the long run. Like almost any other single goal, that of increasing profits can be attained in alternative ways. What matters in a firm is not just how much profit it makes, but also the technological and social means it em- ploys to make it, as well as aiming at such additional goals as quality enhancing and increased market share.

Successful technology is only moderately functionalist: it admits values other than efficiency, and it balances the latter with social service. More- over, it is mechanismic throughout, since it involves the design or control of mechanisms. For example, medical therapy-a biotechnology-consists increasingly in tampering with disease mechanisms; and management science-a sociotechnology-relies increasingly on knowledge of the social mechanisms that operate in the firm. In contradistinction to the traditional arts and crafts, all modem technology is characterized by the utilization or design of the mechanisms that mediate between input and output, and that maximize the output/input ratio. Hence, both formalist and black- box functionalism are out of the question in technology.

12. Concluding Remarks. If we acknowledge that, in science and technology, there is no single all-purpose concept of function, we should try to re-analyze and systematize the various notions of function proposed in the literature. This is what we have attempted to do in this paper by dis- tinguishing amongst five non-teleological concepts and their teleological counterparts, as well as by analyzing the logical relations amongst them. Moreover, this systematization has allowed us to propose a classification of those views that come under the label functionalism, showing that the term 'functionalism' inherits the ambiguities of the term 'function.' Whether or not our systematic attempt is deemed to be completely satisfactory, it should at least show that a synthetic perspective on functions, functional explanation, and functionalism in science and technology is a worthwhile goal.

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FUNCTION AND FUNCTIONALISM 93

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Function and Functionalism, A Synthetic Perspective

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