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From Stalemate to Crisis Brinkley text Chapter 19
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Page 1: From Stalemate to Crisis Brinkley text Chapter 19.

From Stalemate to Crisis

Brinkley text Chapter 19

Page 2: From Stalemate to Crisis Brinkley text Chapter 19.

From Stalemate to Crisis

In the late 19th century, the United States seems to have had another series of mediocre leaders

They were more concerned with irrelevant issues than with the nation’s more serious problems

This was a period of stalemate in which dramatic changes were taking place, but the leadership was doing little to affect them

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From Stalemate to Crisis

The two-party system was strong Republicans and Democrats were almost

evenly matched, and there was a vigorous contest for power

The conflict between them centered more on regional, ethnic and religious sentiments than the broader political and policy issues

Party loyalty was strong on both sides

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From Stalemate to Crisis

At this point, the federal government did comparatively little

The only Cabinet departments were the original line-up in 1789

The Department of State, the Department of War (later the Department of Defense), the Department of the Treasury, and the Post Office, and . . .

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From Stalemate to Crisis

The Department of the Interior (added in 1849) The Department of Agriculture (1862) Mostly, the federal government just . . . . . . delivered the mail, . . . maintained the national military, . . . conducted foreign policy, . . . and collected tariffs and taxes

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But there were exceptions Economic development was growing in

importance

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The federal government had been involved in economic development for some time

Subsidies to railroads, land grants Intervention on the side of “capitalism”

(management) Pensions for Civil War veterans and widows Some reformers hoped to make old-age

pensions available to all Americans

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Party patronage and corruption stalled reform efforts

The most powerful organizations were the political parties (Party Bosses), not the national government

There were 100,000 presidential appointments to be made with a very small staff

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Presidents had to try to avoid offending powerful party factions

Rutherford B. Hayes (served 1877-1881)

Competition between Half-Breeds (reform) and Stalwarts (machine politics) for control of the Republican Party

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1880 Election: Republicans nominated

James A. Garfield (Half-Breed) for President

Chester A. Arthur (Stalwart) nominated for Vice-President

Democrats nominated an unknown (Winfield Hancock)

Garfield-Arthur won easily

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From Stalemate to Crisis

Four months into his term, Garfield was assassinated

Shot by Charles Guiteau, a lawyer and disgruntled office seeker

Probably mentally unbalanced

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Guiteau proclaimed, “I am a Stalwart of the Stalwarts! I did it and I

want to be arrested! Arthur is President now!” Guiteau got his wish, and was arrested He was hanged a year later.

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Garfield had advocated civil service reform Arthur had been a believer in the “Spoils

System” But Arthur supported Garfield’s civil service

reforms after Garfield’s death 1883: Pendleton Act required civil service

exams for some federal jobs Expanded over the years

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1884 Election: James G. Blaine

(R) vs. Grover Cleveland (D)

Cleveland won More about

Cleveland later

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FARMERS’ GRIEVANCES: TIGHT MONEY – the government would not

issue “greenbacks,” but insisted on “coinage at par” – printing only as much currency as gold reserves in the treasury could support.

UNFAIR BANK PRACTICES – banks gave better interest rates to the wealthy

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From Stalemate to Crisis

(Farmers’ grievances, cont’d) RAILROADS – all railroad companies agreed

to give better freight rates to industries than to farmers

The Grange contended that since the land of the United States belongs to “all of us,” companies that had laid rails on that land should be controlled by the government.

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When silver was discovered in Nevada in the 1870s the farmers’ alliances tried to convince the federal government to back currency up with silver as well as with gold (BI-METALLISM)

Congress refused.

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RACIAL GRIEVANCES: Two theories, and two styles

of black leadership, emerged during this era

BOOKER T. WASHINGTON: raised as a slave, he advocated patience in achieving social equality

“Be content with where you are,” he advised young black people.

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W.E.B. Du Bois (du BOYCE) Son of a university-educated

black family in the North He advocated that the “10%” –

the academically gifted young black people – should demand nothing less than full professional education and admission to the professions

This was the only true equality

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The White leadership tended to favor Washington’s views

The emerging black business class tended to favor Du Bois’ strategy

Black leaders were divided for the next 75 years of which tactic would be most effective

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Political parties did NOT reflect these divisions in society as much as they reflected religious and social affiliations

E.g., there was not a political party in the 1880s and 1890s that represented minorities, workers, or women

Differences in the parties were much more subtle.

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REPUBLICANS: Predominantly Northerners, white and black Remained loyal to the ideals of Lincoln, though

they were not active in racial equality Industrialist Protestant, tended to appeal to native-born

WASP Anti-immigration Pro-temperance

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DEMOCRATS: Generally Southerners Many invoked “The Lost Cause” of states’

rights and old-world Southern gentility Largely Catholic and immigrant Segregationist

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Republican presidents dominated from 1880-1912 During this period, Republicans generally controlled the Senate Democrats controlled the House This arrangement was stable and predictable,

generally accepted by each party. That generalized acceptance of the status quo

mitigated against any dramatic social change

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One notable exception: Grover Cleveland A Democrat who earned a reputation as a

reformer Won in 1884 after his Republican opponent

rashly characterized Democrats as Catholics, rebels, and drunkards

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As president, Cleveland worked to lower protective tariffs

He felt that protective tariffs were unfair to ordinary people and helped industrialists too much.

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Cleveland’s re-election campaign in 1888 was fought over the tariff

He lost a close (and probably dishonest) election in ’88 to Benjamin Harrison

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Benjamin Harrison was a completely unremarkable leader

During his term many new sources of anger among ordinary Americans appeared.

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Benjamin Harrison

Grandson of President William Henry Harrison (who had served for four weeks in 1841)

Benjamin Harrison was the last President with a beard

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Congress passed the first Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890

It was not intended to do much other than quiet the criticism of big businessmen and their monopolies

It was little-used for about ten years, and was never very successful.

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Republicans under Harrison acted quickly to re-instate the protective tariffs that Cleveland had fought against

The McKinley Tariff of 1890 benefited the industrial tycoons greatly

It was introduced by then-Representative (later President) William McKinley

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The McKinley tariff was was the highest tariff ever

It raised the average duty (tariff) to an average of almost fifty percent (50%)

It was very unpopular among ordinary people It helped the Republicans lose their

Congressional majority in 1892 It also helped McKinley lose his Congressional

seat

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Grover Cleveland returned to prominence after this mid-term Republican defeat, in an “I-told-you-so” frame of mind

Even though he had lost a presidential election for a second term in 1888, the Democrats nominated him again in 1892

He won, becoming the only president to serve two non-consecutive terms

So he was the 22nd and the 24th President

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Under Cleveland’s second term Congress lowered the protective tariff somewhat

Passed the Wilson-Gorman tariff over the president’s weak objections.

But Cleveland was by no means a general reformer

He did not believe that changing social policies was any affair of the government

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Farmers were often victimized by industrialists as well

Striking, union formation and other forms of collective action was more difficult for them

The Grange and other Farmers’ Alliances sprang up in the 1880s

Farmers could state their grievances and use politics to force government aid

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The Grange: Oliver Hudson Kelley of

the U.S. Department of Agriculture made an official trip through the South

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He was astounded by the lack of sound agricultural practices he encountered

Helped form the National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry in 1867

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The Grange began as a fraternal organization, complete with its own secret rituals.

Local affiliates were known as "granges" and the members as "grangers.“

In its early years, the Grange was devoted to educational events and social gatherings

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The Grange grew slowly in the early years But the attraction of social events was

considerable Farm life in the 19th century was marked by a

tedium and isolation It usually was relieved only by church functions

and the weekly trips to town for supplies

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Following the Panic of 1873, the Grange spread rapidly throughout the farm belt

Farmers in all areas were plagued by low prices for their products, growing indebtedness and discriminatory treatment by the railroads

These concerns helped to transform the Grange into a political force

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During the 1870s, the Grangers advocated Cooperative purchasing to obtain lower prices

on farm equipment and supplies Pooling of savings to reduce dependence on

corrupt banks Cooperative grain elevators to hold non-

perishable crops until the optimal times to sell

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Mary Elizabeth Lease of Kansas, one of the nation's first female attorneys, traveled to Grange halls

She urged the farmers to "raise less corn and more hell.”

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Such pleas went largely unheeded Most farmers preferred to blame the politicians,

judges and bankers for their plight As a result, the various groups who advocated

real reform (or who were consistently abused by America’s majorities) had no hope of assistance under the programs of either the Democrat or the Republican parties

But those problems did not go away.

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The Grange and the various Farmers’ Alliances became more and more militant in demanding government action to assist farmers

They demanded laws to assist farmers in getting bank loans, and to lower the rates charged by railroad companies

Farmers called these high freight rates “thievery, legalized.”

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Out of the demands of farmers, workers, and other ordinary folk came a new political movement

The People’s Party, commonly called The Populists.

Populist leaders included farm advocate Mary E. Lease and Congressman Tom Watson of Georgia.

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Populism appealed to small town people, to farmers, and to some among the working class

They didn’t offer much for black citizens, though many blacks followed them because neither of the major parties offered them anything, either

The AFL stayed away from populism, claiming it was “too radical” for them.

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Populism was a political force that was able to connect small town people both in the North and the South

This was a geographic line neither of the major two parties had ever been able to bridge

Democrats in particular began to listen to the Populist message, and to realize that many voters were drawn to it.

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A continuing Populist call was for “free coinage of silver,” as a means of ending the currency problems of the country.

Farmers at that time generally took out bank loans at the start of the planting season, planning to pay them back once the crop sold

A farmer was thus “land poor” – his wealth was in his crops, not in his pockets. Cash was always short.

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Farmers and Populists saw printing more paper dollars, or making silver one of the economy’s official metals, as the answer to their problems

This showed a slight understanding of how paper money works, but was still an appealing idea to the Populists.

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The Republican Party scoffed at this new “bi-metallist” theory. Silver was far too plentiful, they argued; backing currency with silver would ultimately water down the dollar’s worth

Republicans and their industrialist constituents favored what they called “hard money” – paper money backed dollar-for-dollar with gold only.

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The “money question” became the big divide in American politics during the 1890s

Populists, for all the flaws in their economic thinking, seemed to be the only political home for small-town, rural Americans.

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Democrats realized the appeal of their ideas, even though they were simplistic

Democrat strategy began to envision a different Democrat party that widened its appeal to now include small town people in North and South

By mid-1890s, the Democrat party began to resemble the Populist party in many ways.

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An economic panic in 1893 soon widened into the worst depression the country had even known at that point

Several major companies went bankrupt, laid off many workers, and sent the stock market into a skid.

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Workers blamed the industrialists for the problem, and also for taking out their losses on the backs of their employees by laying them off when times got tough.

Industrialists blamed the “low tariff” policies of the Cleveland administration, for not being attentive enough to foreign competition and its effect on domestic sales.

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Banks began to call in loans and were reluctant to grant new ones, trying to safeguard their assets in case the economy really did fail completely.

Over 8000 businesses failed, including a few of the industrial giants

Farm prices fell, as demand fell (because workers could not afford to buy groceries.)

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Unemployment was over 20%. An Ohio Populist named Jacob Coxey led a

march of farmers and the unemployed on Washington DC, to force Congress to come to their aid

“Coxey’s Army” Congress ignored them A revolt was brewing

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Jacob Coxey

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Many Populists believed (incorrectly) that the root of the Depression was a little-noticed government action in 1873, by which Congress agreed never to accept silver as any more than 1/16 of the treasury’s specie

“Specie” = hard money, precious metal During the economic crisis of 1893, this 1873

action began to seem like a crime.

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Populists proclaimed that if only the government had accepted silver on a par with gold in ’73, the ’93 depression would not have happened.

A Populist leader named William Jennings Bryan seized on this one fact, and hammered if often in his speeches

Populists loved him for it, and the Democrat Party took note as well.

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Bryan was a Scripture scholar and part-time preacher

He had a heart for small town America

And he had a sharp sense of injustice.

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He said that industrialists’ insistence on “the gold standard” – backing money only with gold – resulted in the “crucifixion of America’s heartland” upon a “cross of gold.”

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Populists nominated Bryan as their presidential candidate in 1896

They assumed that both of the major parties would nominate “business-as-usual” candidates

They assumed that the Populist Bryan could win an upset victory

They saw him as the only candidate with appeal to the mass of “ordinary people” voters.

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But the Democrats, seeing Bryan’s wild popularity in 1896, nominated him as well

Bryan accepted the nominations of both parties

Neither the Populists nor the Democrats were entirely comfortable with the people this dual-nomination brought into their parties

Some of the party faithful refused to accept Bryan.

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And as a result, Bryan lost a very hard-fought campaign in 1896 to William McKinley, who advocated laissez-faire economic policies and a high protective tariff

The popular vote was fairly close (51.1% McKinley - 47.7% Bryan)

4% difference between the candidates But McKinley won the wealthy, large states and

their high electoral vote counts.

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William McKinley

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William Jennings Bryan

Bryan later argued for the prosecution in the 1925 “Scopes Monkey Trial” against the famed defense attorney Clarence Darrow

He won the case, but the trial put great strain on him

He died five days later

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But while economic conservatism prevailed in that election, the Populists did succeed in changing the Democrat party forever in 1896

Democrats continued to widen their appeal to farmers and ordinary working class voters, and eased very slowly into a growing comfort level with the idea of social reform.

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But don’t assume that the voices for reform were totally ineffective

Supreme Court decisions during this time show that the efforts toward equality for ordinary people were having some effect, however small.

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Bradwell v. Illinois (1872)

Myra Bradwell graduated from law school but was denied the right to practice law in Illinois

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The Illinois state supreme court had ruled that men and women traditionally operated in differing “spheres of influence”

The practice of law was not in the woman’s “traditional sphere”

Bradwell appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court

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Bradwell’s attorney argued that Illinois’ action violated her rights under the 14th amendment

Illinois counter-argued that the 14th amendment did not specifically include a state’s privilege under the Constitution to grant (or not grant) law licenses

A law license was not a “civil right.”

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The Court agreed with Bradwell by a 4-3 vote 3 Supreme Court justices agreed with the that

of Illinois that God did not want women to practice law

Bradwell was admitted to the Illinois bar She eventually won a federal license in 1892 to

practice in the Supreme Court.

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Back to the Grange . . . Grange influence was particularly strong in

Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin and Illinois Political pressure yielded a series of "Granger

laws" designed to give legislative assistance to the farmers

Initially, they were successful

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Munn v. Illinois (1877) Munn was one of the so-called Grange cases,

resulting from Grange activism regarding the railroads.

The State of Illinois, acting under pressure from reform groups, had regulated the amount a grain storage facility could charge farmers to store their grain while awaiting shipment via railroad.

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Grain storage facilities (called “grain elevators” in those days) were generally owned and operated by railroads

Because railroads didn’t want to do business with farmers because of the high risk of spoilage to this kind of freight, the railroads charged farmers a premium price to store grain until shipment.

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Illinois was a farm state where many Populist-minded legislators served in the state legislature

The Illinois legislature in 1876 mandated a maximum storage rate

Munn, who operated a grain elevator, sued the state for “depriving him of his property [potential profit] without due process” – a 14th amendment violation.

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The Supreme Court ruled against Munn, and in favor of the Illinois price controls

Grain elevators, said the Court, are widely used by the public and because of that the legislature has a right to regulate them.

Munn was one of the first cases approving government regulation of railroads

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Munn is considered a watershed “Watershed” = a turning point, a point after

which everything was different But a counteroffensive by the railroads brought

the Wabash case, which wiped out some of the gains

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Wabash, St. Louis, and Pacific Railroads v. Illinois (1886)

This powerful combination of railroad interests in Illinois sued the state in 1886 to protest state regulation of shipping rates on railroads

It might have been expected that the Court would revert to the position it had taken with Munn v. Illinois.

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But the Court did not It didn’t overturn Munn, either But it did state that the Wabash case was not

like Munn Munn applied only to grain elevators inside of

the state (intrastate commerce) In Wabash, the shipping rate regulations were

applied to interstate commerce

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In other words, the Supreme Court said that Illinois’ regulation of interstate commerce was unconstitutional

Reason: only the Congress could regulate interstate commerce (traffic between states)

You may even remember Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) from Chapter 7

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The Wabash decision discouraged any further state attempts to regulate railroads, at least for a while

But the suits that came before the Supreme Court during the Populist era showed that large numbers of people were beginning to demand relief from unfair corporate practices.

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Congress responded in 1887 with the Interstate Commerce Act

It created an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)

The ICC had oversight authority over railroads, canals, etc.

And any other public conveyance that was involved in interstate commerce.

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ICC rules were somewhat vague: Shipping rates had to be “reasonable and just,”

but were not specific about just exactly what that meant.

Rates had to be made public Secret kickbacks called rebates were outlawed Prices could not be structured in a way that

discriminated against “small markets.”

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The ICC was given authority to investigate and prosecute suspected abuses and violations

However, Congress did not appropriate enough money for the ICC to do an effective job

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President McKinley further weakened the Commission by appointing pro-railroad men to it

Still, the precedent favoring some kind of regulation had begun.