From 'people's revolution' to 'democratic elections'

From ‘people's revolution’ to ‘democratic elections’:

U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt

(Od narodne revolucije do demokratskih izbora: američka

spoljna politika prema Egiptu)

Slaven Živković

The author is an undergraduate student at Faculty of Political Sciences,

University of Montenegro

([email protected])

Abstract:

Political protests and demands for changes in the region of Southwest Asia and Northeast

Africa, the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, are the biggest challenge faced by the U.S. foreign policy

during the presidential term of Barrack Obama. The Egyptian revolution from the beginning

of 2011 is the clearest example of the ‘awakening of the people’ and is one of the few that

truly arose from dissatisfaction of Egyptians. The United States seemed to be caught

completely unprepared by the revolution. In only a couple of days, the White House made a

shift from supporting President Mubarak to openly supporting the opposition parties. Even

after the fall of Mubarak, the Obama administration did not fully grasp the complexity of the

situation in Egypt. Democracy, contrary to the expectations of many in Washington DC,

could not take root overnight. The power and the influence of the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ were

underestimated. The consequences of the US policies toward Egypt, contributing to the

escalation of crisis in this country, can still be felt today. At the same time, the American

diplomacy no longer appears to have the same amount of influence in the land of the Sahara

and the Nile.

Keywords: USA, Foreign policy, Egypt, Arab spring, Barrack Obama

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Introduction

The so-called ‘awakening of the people’ throughout the Arab world, in a region called the

Middle, or Near East in the geopolitics,1 is the greatest challenge in foreign policy faced by

the administration of Barrack Obama. Arab Spring, or Jasmine revolution, issued protests,

rebellions, and important political developments in Northeast Africa, and Southwest Asia.

The people, fighting in the streets, tried to replace autocratic regimes that had up to several

decades of ‘experience’ in power. The demands were more or less the same in every country

of the Arab world; people have felt the injustice and wanted democracy, right here and now.

Regimes, hardened in their own despotism, lost touch with those they ruled. Day by day, their

policies lost trust of the people, and themselves slowly became the minority. The result, in

such circumstances, was as expected - they were faced with the inevitable revolution. That is

why the most important question was not what prompted the people to revolt, but why did it

take so long (International Crisis Group, 2011: 6)?

Although from the first moment, when he was chosen by the American people as the

president, Barack Obama insisted that the United States unconditionally support the

democratic aspirations of all peoples at any point of the world, the Arab Spring caught the

U.S. foreign policy on the wrong foot in certain moments. The results achieved during the

Arab Spring have imposed a number of issues for America. There was a need to review the

way White House promoted democratic values abroad, or accept the fact that there will be

democracies in the world that are not friendly to U.S. (Morse, 2012: 2). The 2011 revolution

in Egypt directly imposed this question, when the Mubarak’s autocratic, but friendly regime

to the United States, has been destroyed and the government has been taken, through

democratic means, by a political structure strongly colored by the Muslim ideology.

The way America had treated the crisis in Egypt from its beginning shows that many

decisions were made momentarily and that the entire policy was not well thought out and

planned for long enough. Such positioning in the first days of the revolution, made it

significantly harder for the U.S. to clearly state what they wanted in the days of a new

Egyptian turmoil, considered by many authors to be a military coup. Democratic values, as

the Holy Grail that America disseminates throughout the world, were not loud enough, in the

days when the military forced the first democratically elected President of Egypt Mohamed

Morsi to leave his rule.

1The area encompassing northeast Africa and southwest Asia.

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Since the situation in Egypt is a constantly evolving one, it is important to have in

mind that this article tends to examine the U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt from the days of

the revolution to the first elections in the post-Mubarak era. This period gives the major facts

that determined the shaky position of United States in all later Egyptian crisis moments. The

goal is not to display the situation up to nowadays.

1. From realism to idealism and back? – The basics of Barrack Obama’s foreign

policy

Among many authors, but also among the citizens of America, for a long time it was believed

that with the election of Barack Obama as the president, the U.S. foreign and security policy

had gone through a change from Bush’s realism to Obama’s idealism. Such an opinion was

dominant in the early days of Obama's term. However, the passion for idealism was quickly

replaced with the actual view of Obama's moves, and the understanding that his actions are

largely a matter of pragmatism. In fact, Obama was progressive, where it was possible, and

pragmatic, where it was necessary. Pragmatism was, after all, dominant (Indyk et al. 2012: 3).

The difference is evident in many examples. Obama made a rather friendly handshake

with Hugo Chavez who, during the previous administration, was not allowed to be anywhere

close to the President of the United States. In addition, Obama signed with Russia a new

START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), with a very positive attitude and good faith that it

would be respected. His Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011) refused to talk with the

Chinese about human rights issues and put forward a rather surprising remark that ‘the United

States already knows China’s position on the matter’. Although Obama has put human rights

and promotion of democracy in the center of the flag which U.S. foreign policy should have

flown. To show how important democracy is for him, both at the national level, and in the

whole world community, he invested great efforts to transfer decision-making process from

G8 to G20. However, that body suffers constant criticism from other countries that it is ‘self-

appointed’ and ‘makes decisions that others cannot control’.

The framework, in which Obama places the U.S. foreign policy, was already in sight

in 2007, in his article for ‘Foreign Affairs’ at a time when he was a Senator of Illinois, and

when he fought for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination. Under the strong

influence of his famous predecessors Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman and John F.

Kennedy, Obama said that America's leading role in the world must be restored, including:

solving the crisis in Iraq, and the final U.S. withdrawal from the territory, the restructuring of

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their own army and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, a powerful struggle against

terrorism with the renewal of friendships with a number of countries around the world,

insisting on the establishment of democracy in as many countries, and restoring world

confidence in America. He recalled famous quotes of his predecessors:

’As Americans, we are not destroyers but builders’ (Roosevelt) [...] ‘If a free society

cannot help the many who are poor; it will not save the few who are rich’ (Kennedy) (Obama,

2007).

Even then it was clear, and it was confirmed in the early days of Obama's term, that

America, however, made a great shift, though hidden, in foreign and security policy with the

change of the first man. However, it is perhaps exaggerated given the fact that Obama's

foreign policy suffers from its desire to be un-Bush (Cohen, 2009: 2). He is trying to stop the

pendulum of American foreign policy, which cannot find a balance between diplomacy and

force, on the side of diplomacy. But his flirtation with ‘semi-authoritarian’, if not autocratic

regimes, as well as slightly strained relations with his old friend – Israel, has shown that

things cannot overnight become black and white. America neither in the eyes of its citizens,

nor in the rest of the world does enjoy the status of an exceptional nation anymore. Its

‘peaceful capitalism’, as the phrase that ‘won’ the Cold War, is not seen as its greatness

nowadays. ‘I believe in American excellence, as much as I doubt that the British believe in

British or Greeks in Greece’, Obama said in France. Earlier in Ghana, he denied that the

mission of America is to introduce democracy around the world: ‘Every nation should live

democracy in its own way,2 according to its own tradition’. The shift is made from democracy

to human rights. When he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama, in the most elegant

way, stood for the defense of human rights: ‘While we respect the unity and diversity of the

cultures and traditions of each country, America will always be a voice for those aspirations

that are universal’.

It is no secret that Obama realized that security must be more important than

democracy. However, the American president must be given praise for one thing; he restored

the confidence of the world in America. The media, around the world, were hurrying to

proclaim him the ‘rock star of the world of politics.’ More or less in every country he visited

he was greeted warmly. According to the survey results of the ‘Pew Research Center’ trusts in

2 Critics could not resist to connect this with Gorbachev's ‘My Way’ doctrine, which is often referred to under

the legendary Frank Sinatra's song lyrics, and created well-known results in the USSR.

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Europe that ‘America will do the right thing in world affairs, increased from 25% from the

Bush time, to the 85% at the time of Obama’ (Pew polls, July 2009). However, the question

remains - what exactly can Obama do with it? While trust has increased, a large number of

decisions and initiatives of Barack Obama have not been greeted with enthusiasm in Europe.

His promise to close the notorious Guantanamo prison contributed to his popularity, but the

Obama’s Administration is yet to find a way to do it.

Therefore, by carefully disguised rhetoric, Obama quickly returned partly to Bush's

policy that the security of the United States is most important, and does not shy to defend it

using force. In his Nobel Peace Prize speech said: ‘Whatever the mistakes made, the fact is

that the United States helped to ensure global security over the past six decades with the blood

of our citizens and the strength of our military.’ It was par excellence rhetoric of Reagan and

Bush, spoken in front of an audience that was not prone to such words (Nau, 2010: 4).

Democracy became a rear term in Obama's speeches. Similar happened with his

administration, especially with Hillary Clinton. That is the reason why, after his visit to Cairo

in 2009, Ayman Nour, a prominent opposition politician said: ‘His [Obama's] less frequent

talk about democracy gives non-democratic regimes security that they will not deal with the

pressure. And it has a negative effect on democracy in the Arab world’. The message to

Obama was clear - you are either with them or you are with us.

The impression is that the U.S. foreign policy favored Egypt's president, Hosni

Mubarak, until 2011. The Egyptian regime was seen as friendly. Once again, the practice has

shown that when it comes to non-democratic regimes, the U.S. is ready, if necessary, to look

away. Obama administration's policy towards the Middle East largely remained unchanged

from the time of Bush Administration. Large peace conferences were replaced by special

envoys that Obama sent all over the world, but the idea remains the same. For the area of the

Middle East, George Mitchell was appointed as a special envoy.

In these circumstances, and after all the turbulences and probably not so visible but

very evident turmoil in foreign policy, America has met the ‘awakening of Arab nations’.

After the first waves of revolutions, apparently, that policy turned out to be if not defeated,

then knocked-out a few times.

2. The new Tunisia – January revolution in Egypt

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Protests are not something that is unknown to the Egyptians. Despite the fact that the

country had been ruled for several decades by a single leader, and that people had had

relatively little impact on the creation of Egyptian politics, the Egyptians knew from time to

time to express their dissatisfaction by the means of street protests. The number of protesters

would, nonetheless, always be small and, as a rule, the police forces would easily outnumber

them. The rhetoric of protest in the past was not directly aimed against the government, or the

ruler. Protesters tried to criticize what would be called in democratic societies ‘public policy’

without demanding resignations.

The 21st century broke all the taboos. As of 2000, protests against the second

Palestinian intifada, then in 2003 against war in Iraq proved that there is still smoldering

dissatisfaction with the Government's decisions. In 2005, they have even gone a step further,

for the first time Egyptians protested about election results, and they did it immediately after

the elections. The first time one could hear the open charge that the elections were rigged, and

the protesters for the first time carried signs reading ‘Down with Mubarak!’ although some of

the leaders, mainly from the 'Muslim brotherhood’, did not like it’ (CNN, 12 December 2005).

In those years there was also a notable increase in activity and impact of the labor unions.

They began to exceed the requirements of the rule and set ultimatums. That was certainly

most visible in a conflict between their followers’ and well-armed police forces during the

protests in 6 and 7 April 2008, in the city of Mahalla al-Kubra, due to rising food prices.

There were also a large number of groups in a number of social networks that have

worked on association of young people who are dissatisfied with government. The young

ones, who make 15 of the 17% of Internet users in Egypt, were the leaders of the revolution

(Khamis and Vaughn, 2011: 4). However, until the end of January 2011, their actions

primarily related to the virtual world. They also run a number of innovations in the study of

theory of the organization of the masses. Analysts concurred in the assessment that the

revolution in Egypt was 'retweeted ' (Lotan et al. 2011). Therefore, it is widely accepted that

in Tahrir Square in Cairo so many people gathered on 25 January 2011 because the

government made a mistake in the virtual world - that morning they have limited internet

access to their citizens. Twitter has officially confirmed that their site was blocked in Egypt

on 25 January. Many were furious because of this, they had nowhere else to go and they went

out into the streets.

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While the history of protests in Egypt is something that is clear and public, it is much

more difficult to answer the question of what was the ‘trigger’ of the revolution. The primary

issue from the start was not: why the revolution, but - why the revolution today? Answers can

be found in several events.

First are the parliamentary elections in Egypt in 2010. According to the official results,

National Democratic Party has once again beaten all opposition parties, and even increased

the number of votes and MPs in both houses of parliament. It was an obvious mistake that

kind of dictatorship was not capable to afford. Mubarak has tried to maintain the illusion of

democracy, among Egyptians and the rest of the world. But that is not easy, when his party

has 420 seats in parliament, which consists of 518 seats, with 53 ‘independent’ members,

many of whom were controlled by the NDP. The real opposition was virtually left with no MP

functions. Literally, they were expelled to the street, and they began to work on the street.

Mubarak's dictatorship gave the wrong answer to the question - if you can have 100% of MPs,

or 80%, what would you choose?

The police became increasingly brutal towards citizens. Day by day the reports say the

police clashed with the protesters, used live ammunition and killed a large number of

disgruntled citizens of Egypt (Al-Ahram, 3 June 2012). Mubarak's dictatorship is slowly

turning into a hardly bearable police state.

However, most of analysts believe that all these events ‘spilled gasoline on Egypt and

the revolution in Tunisia lit the match.’ Mohammed Bouazizi a Tunisian who set himself on

fire in protest, started a revolution in Tunisia, and a chain reaction in the Arab world, became

an icon in Egypt. Between 15 and 19 January at least seven people in Egypt attempted to

imitate Bouazizi’s act (International Crisis Group, 2011: 7). Dissatisfied people raised the

question - why couldn't the screenplay in Tunisia be transferred to Egypt?

It all started on the social networks. Facebook page launched an initiative to gather

people out to the streets on the 25 January to show displeasure. This date was not chosen

randomly. In Egypt, 25 January is celebrated as the National Police Day. One of the demands

of the protesters Facebook page, which has been removed,3 was the resignation of Habib al-

Adliyya, Minister of the Interior. In addition, they requested the termination of the

‘Emergency Law’ provisions and limitation of the presidential terms to two mandates for one

3 According to the International Crisis Group, their researchers accessed this page on 24 January 2011, and

passed the requirements of Protestants (International Crisis Group, 2011)

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person, by new constitutional reforms. In a few days, more than 80,000 people joined the

Facebook group. Very important was role of ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ organization that was

proscribed under Mubarak, but which was still known to be able to generate a large number of

people. They agreed to send its young members to protest, and rather shyly invited their

followers to join them. It was tricky, but fantastically thought out move at a time, if we take

into account what happened in the following days and months. The ‘Muslim Brotherhood”

was at the moment probably the biggest winner of the Egyptian revolution.

A lot of unhappy people appeared on the streets of Cairo on 25 January. It is difficult

to estimate their number, as the demonstrators were scattered around Cairo. On the first day of

the protest representatives of Amnesty International noted that the police used

‘disproportionate and unnecessary use of live rounds and lethal force against protesters, which

yesterday reportedly led to the death of another demonstrator’ (Amnesty International Report,

28 January 2011). First estimates show that, a few days later when the protests become a

single place for all groups, on 28 January in Tahrir Square there were over 100,000

disgruntled (Sharp, 2011: 2). Until that day, the police arrested the 1,120 protesters. Those

arrested included some of the leading men of the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, including

Mohammed Morsi. Those were probably the first protests in which the police forces were

outnumbered. In addition, police officers, realizing the extent of the protests and the number

of protesters faced by, refused to use live ammunition and to openly confront the protesters.

Therefore, President Mubarak, in the night of 28 and 29January replaced them. Army got out

on the streets in order to calm the situation. However, they also refused to fire on 31 January,

said the protesters have legitimate demands, and soon joined them (Amnesty International

Report, 1 February 2011).

On 29 January Mubarak, for the first time since the start of the revolution, addressed

the nation. He announced that he would dismantle the government, and he appointed Ahmad

Shafiq, the minister of aviation at the time, as the prime minister. Also, he appointed

intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman as his vice president.4 The protests have continued. In his

second speech, on 1 February, when the ‘March of Millions’ brought together more than 250

000 people on the streets of Cairo (Sharp, 2011: 6), Mubarak called for a ‘peaceful transfer of

power’. The crowd still continued to chant ‘Leave! Leave!’ The protests continued the next

4 According to the Article 82 of the Egyptian constitution, the Vice-president will take over the country if the

President is unable to perform his duties. In 30 years as president of Egypt, Mubarak had never, until 29 January

2011, named the vice president.

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day more intensely than ever. On these days it became clear that the army was still on the side

of the president, but not without dissenting opinions, among high, but less influential, army

officials. On 4 February mass protests continued, but the peace talks began. Mohamed

ElBaradei, Amr Moussa, Ahmed Zewaii and many others worldwide prominent Egyptians

sympathized with the protesters. Promises that Mubarak will not run again for president in

elections that were scheduled for September of that year did not satisfy the protesters neither.

The most important demand was clear - Mubarak must resign immediately! On the evening of

10 February Mubarak gave his last speech as president of Egypt. He said he would not step

down before the September elections, and added: ‘Egypt is the land of my birth, and it will be

the country of my death’. On the very next day, 11 February (18th day of the protest) Vice

President Omar Suleiman announced that President Hosni Mubarak resigned and that power,

due to Mubarak's orders, and because of the complexity of the situation in which the country

found itself, takes the Supreme/Higher Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces – SCAF.

3. American foreign policy towards Egypt – pro or contra revolution?

The U.S. policy toward Egypt is a very sensitive issue in the context of the overall security

and political situation in the Middle East. Historically, the good relations between the two

countries began in 1970 when Anwar Sadat became the president of Egypt. Egypt has become

increasingly important for America especially in 1978 when the Camp David agreement

between Egypt and Israel was signed. This agreement served as the basis for the peace treaty

between the two countries, signed a year later in Washington.5 The practice of the U.S.

administration from that moment is that any Egyptian regime, while respecting provisions of

the signed agreement, will have the support of the White House. That was the case with Hosni

Mubarak.

Despite numerous contradictory statements on the issue of democratization and respect

for human rights, and occasional and very slight American insistence that Egypt must

seriously address these issues, relations between the two countries have evolved during

Mubarak's presidency. Mild criticism coming from time to time from Cairo as well, objected

that White House does not put enough pressure on Israel to work on reconciliation with

Palestine, and thus compromise the foundation on which America wants to build peace in the

region. Nevertheless, the level of assistance that the United States each year sends to Egypt

5 The Israel-Egypt 1979 Peace Treaty is available at:

http://www.icsresources.org/content/primarysourcedocs/IsraelEgyptPeaceTreaty.pdf

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remains unchanged. Between 1948 and 2011 America, on behalf of the bilateral agreement,

helped Egypt with $71.6 billion, including $1.3 billion of annual help, paid by the United

States in the name of military aid to Egypt since 1987 until today (Sharp, 2013: 9).6

The aid, that the Americans have never conditioned with reforms, focused mainly on

solving problems that worried greatly the U.S. Administration at the beginning of the

revolution in Egypt on 25 January. The issues that particularly worried the White House,

Jeremy M. Sharp (2011), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs in U.S. Congressional Research

Service, reduced to the following:

‘1. The safety and security of American citizens in Egypt and U.S. efforts to evacuate

Americans who want to leave Egypt; 2. The Egyptian government’s respect for human rights

and the security forces treatment of civilian protesters; 3. The possible misuse of U.S.-

supplied military equipment to the Egyptian army if soldiers should fire upon peaceful

demonstrators; 4. The reform of the Egyptian political system into a more democratic space

with free and fair elections for president in the fall of 2011; 5. The role of the Muslim

Brotherhood in Egyptian politics; 6. Any new Egyptian government’s respect for Egypt’s

1979 peace treaty with Israel, its commitments to securing the Suez Canal as an international

waterway, and plans for military and counterterrorism cooperation with the United States’.

Because of the fifth and sixth items on the list, an American professor of political

science Singerman Diane and Edward Walker, U.S. ambassador to Egypt (1994-1997), agree

that America will always stand for democratization. However, history has many times

witnessed cases that force with a very undemocratic agenda comes to power through

democratic means. Egypt is the lifeblood of the Arab world, and the number of events in

Egypt can easily be replicated in the entire Arab world. That is the reason why all five U.S.

presidents supported Mubarak without insisting on democratization. Obama is no exception.

First of all – stability, than – reforms, if possible.

On 25 January, the first day of protests in Egypt, the Western powers were still on the

side of Mubarak. America immediately called on all parties to refrain from using violence.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said to Reuters attitude of the White House: ‘We support

the fundamental right of expression and assembly for all people and we urge that all parties

exercise restraint and refrain from violence. Our assessment is that the Egyptian government

is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the

6 Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. aid, after Israel.

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Egyptian people’ (Reuters, 25 January 2011). Obama did not talk about the situation in Egypt

in his speech to the Congress but, instead, once again pointed out that the United States

supported democratic aspirations of all peoples.

What in the words of Hillary Clinton seemed to many like a pretty strong position, and

a clear message of support for Mubarak, overnight received a turn to the diplomatic

understanding of the situation. America slowly began to adjust to any changes. On the very

next day, 26 January, addressing the media after a meeting with Foreign Minister of Jordan

Nasser Judeh, Hillary Clinton felt the need to slightly revise her attitude towards Egypt.

Firstly she said that parties must refrain from the use of force. She also pointed out the

following:

‘We support the universal rights of the Egyptian people, including the rights to

freedom of expression, association, and assembly. And we urge the Egyptian authorities not

to prevent peaceful protests or block communications, including social media sites. We

believe strongly that the Egyptian Government has an important opportunity at this moment in

time to implement political, economic, and social reforms to respond to the legitimate needs

and interests of the Egyptian people. The United States is committed to working with Egypt

and with the Egyptian people to advance such goals’ (Clinton remarks, 26 January 2011).

Since Mubarak announced on 28 January that he will take certain steps, to partially

meet the demands of protesters, Obama talked to him on the phone. In his observations on the

situation in Egypt (Obama remarks, 28 January 2011) the day after Mubarak speech, the U.S.

president said that his Egyptian counterpart, has an obligation to give his promises an actual

meaning. America has cooperated with Egypt on a number of issues, especially those related

to the stability of the Arab world, but that does not mean that America will insist that Egypt

meets the demands of its citizens for economic, social and political reforms. He pointed out

that ‘ultimately the future of Egypt will be determined by the Egyptian people’ and that he

believed that ‘the Egyptian people want the same things that we all want - a better life for

ourselves and our children, and a government that is fair and just and responsive’ (Ibid). He

did not miss, however, to emphasize that on the resolution of these issues America will work

together with the Egyptian government, and the Egyptian people. Once again, he left open

possibilities for all scenarios.

Between the two Obama's speeches on the situation in Egypt, in only a few days,

Hillary Clinton, in an interview with ABC News, on 30 January avoided to answer the

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question on stability in Egypt. She said the friendship between America and Egypt lasts for

more than 30 years, but that Mubarak's government reform and the appointment of the first

vice-president during his presidency are not sufficient, and that the government must take

decisive steps to peaceful transition to a society towards democracy (ABC News, 30th

January

2011).7 Although carefully disguised, no one missed to note that this is the first time since the

protests began in Egypt the highest American officials use these kind of formulations. And

Obama in his speech on 1st

February, after another phone-meeting with Mubarak finally

resolutely called for the democratization of Egypt. He said that the truth is in the communion

of the people in the streets, and that transformation must begin immediately. ‘Through

thousands of years, Egypt has known many moments of transformation. The voices of the

Egyptian people tell us that this is one of those moments; this is one of those times’, Obama

said (Obama remarks, 1st February 2011).

And after almost a week since the beginning of the revolution, it seemed that America

with those Obama’s words, finally took a clear position - sided with the protesters. Frank

Wisner, the special U.S. envoy to Egypt, whom Obama appointed to the position on 31st

January, stirs the passions on 5th

February, when he said that Mubarak should stay in power to

carry out a constitutional reform (Politico, 6th

February 2011). The White House immediately

distanced itself from Wisner's words. Already on 10th

February, Obama said that the changes

in Egypt must be irreversible and once again called on the authorities to find a way to

peacefully resolve the crisis and implement reforms. When Egyptian vice-president Omar

Suleiman informed the public that Mubarak resigned, Obama in his speech pointed out that

this is ‘one of those moments in which we witness the making of history‘, and with apparent

pleasure emphasized that ‘the Egyptian people spoke, his voice is heard and Egypt will never

be the same’ (Obama remarks, 11 February 2011).8

The first impression was that Egypt had triumphed. Mubarak quickly replaced its

presidential chair with the trial one. However, no one, not even the United States was certain

about how the situation would develop in the coming months, as important as the 18 days of

the Egyptian revolution. The fight for a place in the new conditions of Egyptian political life

remained to be fought for the heterogeneous mass of protesters.

7 See Clinton’s interview at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QXGVZeW8ZL0.

8 Obama’s full speech after Mubarak step down is available at: www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-

video/video/2011/02/11/president-obama-historic-day-egypt.

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Although never explicitly expressed, it was clear that in America there was fear that

the new ruling power could be much less friendly to the U.S. than Mubarak. Democracy was

not really worth sacrificing four decades of building good relations with Egypt.

4. Elections – the birth of democracy?

Reactions in most parts of the world were very positive after Mubarak's resignation.

Congratulations to the Egyptian people were coming from a number of addresses, even from

those that by the last day favored Mubarak. Concern that the country, from the hands of a

dictator, in what was estimated as very vulnerable state, goes into the hands of the army and

generals who have earned the rank under Mubarak, did not abate.

That is why Obama said to the military that ‘nothing less than genuine democracy will

carry the day’ (Obama remarks, 11 February 2011). While Hillary Clinton, a few days later,

said to Al Jazeera that she ‘hopes Egypt will be a model in the region when it comes to

democracy’ (Al Jazeera, 15 February 2011).

Yet, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was in full charge of the affairs in

Egypt. Passions subsided in Tahrir Square, but people knew why they fought and did not want

to just leave the achievements of the revolution to the military leaders. Dissatisfaction in the

first moments of the protests, although not expressed, was still visibly smoldering in Cairo

and other cities. Demonstrators have failed to remain unique after the revolution, and many

have continued to work in different directions. Prominent Egyptians Amr Moussa, Mohamed

El Baradei and others have announced that they will run in the upcoming presidential election.

The Muslim Brotherhood has already announced on 15 February that they are working on the

establishing of a political party ‘Freedom and Justice Party’. After the Revolution all

conditions for this - many years banned but in life very present - organization to start

operating legally were met. This news certainly could not have delighted United States

(Sharp, 2011: 20). Party was declared legal, and began real engagement already in June 2011.

Its top officials immediately said the party would not be as theocratic as has been speculated,

but also that it will have its candidate in the presidential elections. Obama had previously said

that the Muslim Brotherhood is ‘one of the factions in Egypt, but not the one that has the

support of the majority’ (The Telegraph, 7 February 2011). The situation seems to be quickly

changing, and the White House had to meet the challenges. It was becoming apparent that the

Muslim Brotherhood will be a part of the post - Mubarak government in Egypt. As much as

‘Islamophobia’ was represented in American society, it was clear that Islamist forces have to

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play, probably a key role in the transition to democracy in Arab societies (Fathy, 2011). On 1

July, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that Obama administration ‘is ready for

dialogue with all the peaceful forces that are committed to resolving the problems in Egypt,

by non-violent means, including the Muslim Brotherhood’ (CNN, 1 July 2011).

The general opinion was that, a few months after Mubarak's resignation, transition

does not run as planned. The people demanded the withdrawal of Mohamed Hussein Tantawi,

which was the ‘commander in chief’ of the SCAF, and thereby the most powerful person in

Egypt those days. They believed that he is still an emblem of the Mubarak regime, and is

responsible for the slow transition. Yet the army was successful. SCAF has remained at large,

unique, while a group of young leaders from the Muslim Brotherhood set aside and formed

their own political party - the Egyptian Current Party. They were looking for a new

revolution. But, they only succeeded to dissolve and further destabilize the opposition.

In such conditions with deep divisions and mild constitutional changes, parliamentary

elections in Egypt were ahead. On the eve of the election on 21 July, SCAF announced that it

will not allow foreign observers to monitor the elections, they said - it would be a violation of

Egyptian sovereignty and interference in internal affairs.

Protests have continued up to the election. Political parties were not satisfied with the

pace of reform. Everybody wanted SCAF to hand over the government to the civilians, or to

the lower house of Parliament established in April. Divisions in the opposition, however, were

present. While the bourgeois parties sought more time until the next parliamentary and

presidential elections, religious structures demanded immediate elections. The reason is

obvious - at that point, and in such vulnerable Egypt, religious parties have had a better

chance to take the victory.

However the situation in Egypt was such that public confidence that the elections

would be regular, and a true reflection of the will of the Egyptian people, was too low. ‘I

cannot see how a legitimate election can take place when you have such state-sponsored

brutality happening in the heart of the capital city of the country,’ Democracy Now!’s

correspondent Sharif Abdel Kouddous stated (Democracy Now!, 22 November 2011).

Elections for the lower house of Parliament were still held from 28 November 2011 to

11 January 2012. Islamist forces had won 360 seats out of 498. ‘Freedom and Justice Party’

political structure of the Muslim Brotherhood won by far the most votes, and alone had 235

15

seats in the newly elected parliament. About 50 million of Egypt's 85 million people had the

right to vote on a turnout of 54%. Although the number of analysts raced in the assessment

that the first free, democratic elections were held in the Egypt, the reality however, was

different. Notwithstanding the dominance of the election it was clear that the Muslim forces

will not be allowed to govern Egypt. The army deliberately let them have their convincing

victory. As a last example of this behavior parliamentary elections in 2005 are cited. U.S.

President Bush before the election insisted on a greater degree of democracy, Mubarak ‘gave’

to the members of the Muslim brotherhood 88 MPs in the elections, and Bush quickly realized

that America would prefer to see Mubarak's autocratic regime in Egypt, than democracy in

the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood. ‘In this spirit, Anwar El- Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and

now Mohamed Tantawi tactically empowered Islamists as a foil to gain Western support,

arms, and money’ (National Review, 6 December 2011). Thus, even before the election

rumors and even some serious evidence that SCAF secretly funded its ‘enemy’ party Muslim

Brotherhood and other Islamist forces appeared (Huffington Post, 23 November 2011).

Immediately after the elections, the new evidence had surfaced on a number of electoral

frauds’. One of the candidates, a Wafd Party candidate named Ibrahim Kamel, explained how

he acquired government documents indicating that fewer than 40 million Egyptians were

eligible to vote, while the current elections included 52 million voters, implying 12 million

fraudulent ballots. This increase was achieved, he said, by taking the names and identification

numbers of legitimate voters and duplicating them between two and 32 times in other

electoral precincts’ (National Review, 24 January 2012).

Is Obama thinking as his predecessor?

Concluding remarks

Regardless of the election results SCAF has remained the most important factor in the post-

revolutionary Egypt, and its leader Mohammed Hussein Tantawi head of the country. That is

the reason in which Egyptians saw the defeat of the revolution, from which had already been

more than a year, and there were no major reforms. Mubarak was in jail, but a revolution was

not just about him. Although the majority of Egyptians believe that democracy is something

worth fighting for - 67%, the percentage is still lower than it was in a revolutionary 2011 -

71%. In contrast, the number of those who believe that Islam must have a significant role in

Egyptian political life increased - 66 % in 2012, compared to 47 % in 2010, and

approximately 60 % of the population believes that the ruling term structure must strictly

16

follow the Quran. For the first time after 25 January 2011 the advantage on the side of those

who believe that a strong economy is more important than a good democracy is mild - 49%

versus 48%. Only 37% of Egyptians stated that the United States wants democracy in the

Middle East (Pew polls, July 2012). Are people tired?

Although the fighting continued, unabated at times, it was noticeable that

demonstrators were not so numerous. Tahrir Square was no longer able to gather so many

people. Even the Muslim Brotherhood could not gather more than a few thousand protesters.

At the time, apparently most seem to be committed to waiting for presidential elections, and

to see whether the army will keep its promise and make the transfer of power in the hands of

the person who wins the free presidential election.

The revolution in Egypt, and all the events that followed showed that Egypt is not a

typical example of Arab spring rebellion. Although people managed to overthrow Hosni

Mubarak, they are yet to achieve any of the greater revolutionary goals. Still one can say

Egypt is at least on halfway to reaching revolutionary dream. Although the first post-Mubarak

Parliament was dissolved just a few weeks after the election, they managed to elect

Constitutional Assembly, the body that has drafted a rather controversial constitution. Battle

for the more democratic constitutions is in the hearth of the Arab spring revolts, so the Egypt

example proves all the weakness of the strongly divided masses through the Arab world

regarding the long term reforms. No matter how far revolution went, Arab world is still a

shaky area, where new dictators can insensibly arise every day: as a political party, religious

movement, army leaders or a single person.

America is no longer able to ‘bring’ the constitution to the new democracies. In fact,

their foreign policy towards Egypt proved that people no longer believe in United States as

world hegemonic leader, good cop that will bring democracy by no means, throughout the

world. Revolution in Egypt and other numerous revolts in Arab world once again showed the

pragmatism of Barrack Obama and his Administration. This kind of crisis management is in

accordance with ‘foreign policy doctrine’ – first peace, than democracy.

23 May 2012 is a historic day for Egypt on its path to democracy. Regardless of all

that followed. On that day the polls in the first presidential election were opened. The first

elections in which up to the closing of the polling stations and the counting of ballots was not

clear who will win. In the days of voting, Egypt looked like Turkey and Pakistan, countries

that are de facto democratic, but in which the influence of the military is so strong that people

17

believe that military leaders can do what they want. Despite minor incidents and conflicts, the

general opinion is that the election days in Egypt went very well.

Elections are democracy in practice. But the months that followed and the events that

happened in Egypt; unequivocally demonstrate once again that ‘genuine democracy’ takes a

lot more. A word of the United States is not so loud. American foreign policy has paid the

price of their slow-match.

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