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From Militancy to Clientelism: Labor Union Strategies and Membership Trajectories inContemporary Chile
Author(s): Indira Palacios-ValladaresSource: Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 73-102Published by: Distributed by Wiley on behalf of the Center for Latin American Studies at theUniversity of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40660525 .
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From
Militancy
o
Clientelism:
Labor
Union
Strategies
nd
Membershiprajectories
in
Contemporary
hile
IndiraPalacios-Valladares
ABSTRACT
For the
past
30
years,
Chilean unionism has been
shrinking.
Through comparison f themembershiprajectoriesf26 unions
in
two
firms
etween
1990
and
2004,
this rticle
xplains
why
some
unions defied this trend and how
their success affected verall
union
density
n
their irms.
t
argues
that
the unions that
experi-
enced
the mostfavorable
membership
utcomes
were those
that,
t
key
junctures
f
firm
estructuring,
arliest or most
aggressively
established
partnership elationship
ith
management.
However,
in a context f
great
abor
weakness,
these cases
of union accom-
modation took the
form
of exclusive
patron-client
xchanges,
which exacerbated collective action
problems
and
furtherroded
union
density.
considered
ne of the
strongest
abor movements
n Latin
America,
hilean nionism
as,
n
the
past
three
ecades,
xperi-
enced sustained
membershiphrinkage.
he
largest rop
occurred
under
military
ule,
whenunion
density
eclined
y
almost
alf om-
pared
o the
arly
970s
Angeli
972,
5;
Radrigán
999,
5).
However,
thetrend
oward eunionizationontinued fter he return
o
democ-
racy
n
1990:
between
991
nd
2007,
nion
ensity ropped
y
a third
(Dirección
el
Trabajo
.d.,
).
Although
nion
membership
eclinewas
initially
elated o the
politicalrepression
hat
accompanied
he
1973
coup,
it became
entrenchedfter he
military
egime's mplementation
f
neoliberal
structural
eforms
n
the
1980s.
Unions' nitial
eactiono these eforms
fueledmass
opposition
o the
regime
nd
helped
reorganize
he abor
movement
Campero
nd Cortázar
986).
However,
y ncreasing
nion
fragmentation
nd
ob
precariousness,
nthe
ong
un,
he
1980s
eforms
weakened nion
apacity
o recruit embers. odest
hanges uring
the democratic
osttransition
id not
substantively
lter his ituation
(Cook
2007;
Frank
004;
Haagh
2002).1
Unionmembershipecline has significantmplicationseyond
unions.
All
things eing qual,
abormovements
hat
rganize large
proportion
f
theworkforcere
ikely
o
mpose
ignificant
roduction-
©
2010
University
fMiami
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74
LATINAMERICAN OLITICS
AND SOCIETY
52:
2
stoppage ostson employers. arge abororganizationslso have a
strong otential
or lectoralmobilization.
his
xplainswhyhigh
nion
density
s
usually
ssociated
ith he
doption
f
abor-friendly
olicies,
low income
nequality,
nd the
early
xpansion
f
democracy
Rueda
and Pontusson
000;
Rueschemeyer
t al.
1992).
The
contemporary
iteraturen Chileanunionism
makes some
important
ontributionso the
topic
f union
membership
ecline,
ut
it s limited
n
two
ways.
For
one,
tfocuses
eavily
n
national
rgan-
izations
nd
dynamics
hile
devoting
ittle ttention
o thefirmevel.
This s an
importantap.
n
Chile,
irm-levelnions
rganize oughly
0
percentf all unionizedworkersDirección el Trabajon.d.).2Fewer
thanhalf f these
workers re
organized
n unions hat re
federated,
and
only
littlemore
han
quarter articipate
n unions hat
elong
to a national
onfederation
Arrieta
003,
12).
Sincethere s also
vari-
ance
in
union
membership
ecline
cross nd within ectors
Salinero
B.
2006,
8),
a
stronger
ocus
n firm-levelnionswould
yield
better
understanding
f Chilean nionism.
The second imitation
f
contemporary
esearch
n Chilean nion
decline s its
trongmphasis
n
structuralauses.A number f
studies
examine he ffectsf he egal rameworkndeconomicestructuringn
uniondecline
Barrera
998;
Espinosa
996;
González antibáñez
998,
Montero
002).
Othersook at
thebroader
oliticalxplanations
ehind
the
nability
f unions o
change
his ontext
Cook
2007;
Frank
004;
Haagh
2002).
Fewer tudies xamine
nion
trategy.
ith
he
xception
of Frank 002 and
Rojas
nd
Aravena
999,
heworks
hat o discuss
union
trategy
rovide
ich
mpirical
escription
ut
do not
study
he
roots
r
mpact
f
trategic
ecisions
n a
systematic
anner.
n
contrast,
a numberf
contemporary
tudies
bout abor lsewhere
n Latin mer-
ica
put
strong
nalytical
ocus n union
trategies
oth
t the
firmnd
suprafirmevel Anner 003;Armbruster-Sandoval003;Burgess 004;
Frundt
002;
Levitsky
nd
Way
998;
Murillo
001;
Williams
003).
This article
eeks to advance
the
study
f
contemporary
abor
unions
y
examining
he ffectsf
firm-levelnion
trategy,articularly
union-managementartnership
trategies,
n the
ability
f
organized
labor o recruit
embers.
n
doing
o it eeks o
shedmore
ight
n sub-
national
ariation
n
Chilean
nionism,
nd to contributeo
a
growing
regional
iteraturen
firm-levelnion
dynamics.
hile offers
great
opportunity
n this
egard
ecause ts
high
egree
f union
bargaining
decentralization
as made
thefirm he
primary
ocus
of union
ctivity
inthat ountry.n addition,igh evels funion ompetitionndfrag-
mentation
akeChile
n
interesting
ase
for
nalyzing
herelativeuc-
cess
of different
nion
daptations
o neoliberal eform.
The
article
nvestigates
he ausesof ntrafirmariation
n themem-
bership
rajectories
f26 Chilean
nions
n
two
arge rivate
ector erv-
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS
75
ice firms etween 990 nd2004. t answers woquestions:Whywere
someofthese nions ble to ncrease
membership?
id theirndividual
success
help
boost union
density
more
broadly
n
their irms? he
argument
his
tudy uts
forths thatdifferences
n
individual nion
strategy
ith
regard
o
management layed
a
key
role
in
shaping
intrafirmariation
n
union
membership
rajectories.
pecifically,
nions
that
grew
were those
that,
t critical
unctures
f firm
estructuring,
accommodated
management
emands arliest r most
aggressively,
effectivelystablishing
kind f
partnership
elationship.
n
doing
o,
these nions ecured
privilegedresence
n
the
irm,
monopoly
ver
firm-levelargainingrrangements,nd exclusivenputnto he lloca-
tion f
ob
lossesor other
mployment-relatedolicies.
Although
ome
outcomes ere ater xtended
o all workers
n
the
firm,
hey
everthe-
less demonstrated
heunions'
apacity
o deal
effectively
ith
manage-
ment.
his
gave
more
ccommodating
nions
recruitingdge.
In a context haracterized
y strong
irm
estructuring
nd
great
union tructural
eakness, owever,
he ame
trategies
hat
elped
ndi-
vidual nions
ain
membersended o undermineverall nion
trength
in thefirm.
solated,
moremilitantnions
ound hemselvesneffective
and thereforeulnerableo unionraiding.ortheir art,more ccom-
modating
nions,
enefiting
romhe utflowfmembers
romhemore
militant
nions,
id ittle
o reach ut o
unorganized
orkers.he result
was a decrease
n overall nion
density,long
with
reater
nion
fac-
tionalism,
hich immed he
prospects
or utureoordination.
These
findingsuggest
hat ven
in
a context f structuralnion
weakness
ike hat f
Chile,
ndividualnion
trategies ayplay
key
role
n
shaping
avorablendividual
membership
utcomes.
owever,
they
lso
suggest
hat he characternd
implications
f collaboration
with
management
re
highly ependent
n
the broader
nstitutional,
political,nd economic ontextnwhich hey ccur.
This article
will
proceed
o
discuss
he main
xplanations
ehind
union
decline
n
Chile nd to situatetsown
arguments
n therelevant
literature.
t then iscusses he
ogic
ftheresearch
esign
nd the
rep-
resentativeness
f thecases.
A narrativeccount f union
membership
trajectories
n each of hefirmsnder
tudy
s followed
y
n
analysis
f
the
variables hat nfluencedndividual nion
membership
rajectories.
The
concluding
ection iscusses hebroader
mplications
f he
indings
for
uestions
f ncome istributionnd union evitalization
n
Chile.
Theoretical Perspectives on Contemporary
Union
Membership
Decline
A
number
f scholars ave
pointed
ut that
he
elite-accommodating
characterf he
1990
Chilean emocraticransition
oosened
nions'
ies
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76
LATINAMERICAN OLITICS
AND
SOCIETY
52:
2
topolitical artiesndthe tatewhile trengtheninghepoliticalnflu-
ence of business
Frank
2004;
Garretón
994;
Moulián
1997;
Silva
1997).3
hus,
lthough
he democraticransition
pened opportunities
for
rganized
abor,
eak
aborunions ike heCentral
nitaria e Tra-
bajadores
CUT)
had
difficultyhaping
hebroader conomic nd nsti-
tutional
ontext f union
ctivity.
n
particular,
hismeant hat
ubstan-
tial abor eform
tayed
ff he
politicalgenda
Cook
2007;
Frank
004;
Haagh
2002).
As a
result,
uring
he democratic
osttransition,
hileanunions
have continued
o
operate
n
a laborrelationsrameworkhat ends o
weaken hemCook2007;Haagh2002).For nstance,he aw allows n
unlimited umber f unionand
paraunion
rganizations
ithin ach
firm nd makes
uprafirmegotiationsxclusively
oluntary.
n addi-
tion,
mployers
an substitutend fireworkers
uring
trikesnd can
declare
ockouts,
nd workers an
drop
out of strikes.
esearch as
shown that hese nstitutions
inder nion
monopoly ower,
nvite
effective
mployerpposition,
ncrease nion
ivalry
nd
fragmentation,
and are
generally
ssociated
with
union
membership hrinkage
(Ebbinghaus
nd Visser
999, 44-45, 51-54;
cruggs
nd
Lange
002,
138;Western995, 86).
The
political
nd institutional
ontext f unionisms
important
or
understandingeneral
rends
n
labor
relationsn
Chile,
ut ince t s
relatively
onstant
t the
ubnational
evel,
tdoes not
xplain
hevari-
ation his
tudy
s concerned
with.Two other
xplanations
f union
decline an
potentiallyxplain
ubnational
ariationn unionmember-
ship:
abor
estructuring
nd union
trategy.
Chilean tudies
mphasizing
abor
restructuringighlight
he
nega-
tive
mpact
f
layoffs
nd
job
precariousness
n
union
membership.4
The
general rgument
uilds n the dea that eindustrialization
nd the
growthfthe ervice ector ave eroded nions' raditionalonstituen-
cies
while
ncreasing
he ize of
groups
with ess tradition
f unioniza-
tion
Barrera
998;
De la Maza
1999, 385-87;
Escobar
1999, 23-39;
González antibáñez
998,
1;
Radrigan
999,
1).
More
pecifically,
t
is
argued
hat
mployeresponses
o thefinancialrises fthemid- nd
late
1990s
riggered
assive
ayoffs,
hich,
y decreasing
he size of
firms,
eftworkers
morevulnerableo
employer
ntimidationr
pater-
nalism nd thereforeess
prone
to unionize
Espinosa
1996,48-49;
Montero
002, 108;
Rojas
and Aravena
999,
140-46).
With
egard
o
labor
lexibility,
he
rgument
s thatmore
typical
ormsf
mployment
have led to a loweringn thequality f employmentrrangements,
greater
abor
turnover,
nd an increase
n
subcontracting
Sehnbruch
2006).
Workers'ear f
unemployment
nd the
precariousness
f
obs
have made it moredifficultorunions o overcome ollective ction
problems
Aravena
999;
Montero
002,
103-6).
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS
77
The literatureuggestshat here s subnationalariationn firm-
level abor
restructuring.
or
nstance,
tchemendy
nd Collier
2007)
contend
hat abor ationalization
includingayoffs
nd abor
lexibility)
in
Argentina
arieswithinectors.
ccording
o these
uthors,
his
ari-
ation
artly
xplains
ifferences
n
union
trength.
n
theChilean
ase,
Herrera
1995,
90)
finds ntrasectornd intrafirmariation
n
labor
restructuring.
herefore,
ithin nd across
firms,
e should
expect
unions
organizing ccupational roups
of workerswho are more
affected
y
these rends
o
experience ighermembership
osses.
Another et of
explanations
eals withunion
strategy.ampero
(1998),Frias1998), nd Frank2002)argue, or xample,hat erious
divisions ver
trategy
nd
rigid rganizational
tructures ade t
diffi-
cult or
eak
aborunions o
pursue
n
agenda
that
was coherentnd
relevant
o
contemporary
conomic ealities.
he
implication
f this
argument
s that irm-levelnions
ad to come
up
with heir wn
ways
of
coping
with
hanges.
Given he
high
fragmentation
f the Chilean
labor
movement,
e should
xpect
ignificant
ariation
n
union trat-
egy
at
the subnationalevel. No
systematic
tudy
f firm-levelnion
strategies
as been
published,
owever.
n
contrast,
utside f
Chile
there s a wealth f tudieshat ocus n firm-levelnion trategy.his
literature
as contributed
mportant
nsights
o
our
understanding
f he
relative
uccess f
particular
nion
trategies,specially
nion
rganiz-
ing,
coalition
uilding,
nternal
estructuring,
nd
partnership
ith
management.
Studies funion
rganizing
how hat ndividualnions
hat evote
significant
esources
o
largegrassrootsampaigns
re better
ble to
reverse
r contain eclines
n
membership
Bronfenbrenner
nd
Hickey
2004;
Heery
nd Adler
004,
64).
However,
uch studies lso
suggest
that
many
ndividual
nions lack sufficientconomic and
human
resources orun arge nd sustained ffortstorganizingnorganized
workers
Heery
nd Adler
004, 4;
Milkmannd Voss
2004,
)
and
that
successful
rganizing
fnew constituencies
equiresignificant
hanges
in
decisionmaking
tructures,
hich
many
nion
eaders esist
Sharpe
2004;
Yates
2003,
236).
Therefore,
t s notuncommon
hat ndividual
union
organizing
ampaigns arget lready
nionized
workers,
phe-
nomenon
nown s union
aiding
Milkman
nd Voss
2004,
).
Other tudies
ave examined nion fforts
t
forming
ommunity
and cross-national
llianceswith ther nions
r socialmovements.
n
developed
ountries,
nions hat avedonethis
avemade nroadsnto
new constituenciesKochan t al. 2004). n theLatin mericanontext,
studies onfirm
hat oalition
uilding
llowsunions o makeconflicts
visible,
ain
short-term
oncessions,
nd increase
ffiliation,
ut
they
also indicate hat
n the
ong
run,
many
f
these
ampaigns
nd
n
fac-
tory
elocation,
ack of enforcementf
bargaining
greements,
nd
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78
LATINAMERICAN OLITICS
AND
SOCIETY
52:
2
workerayoffsAnner 003;Armbruster-Sandoval003;Frundt002;
Jessup
nd Gordon
000;
Williams
003).
A
third et of studieshas examined
nion
efforts
o restructure
union
rganization.
hree orms
f
nternal
rganizational
estructuring
seemto havea
positive
ffectn union
membership: ergers
Behrens
et al.
2004, 131),
the ntroductionf
participatory
orms f decision-
making
Saint-Pierre
993, 80;
Wells
993, 06),
nd shifts
n
theunion
agenda
to include he needs of new
constituencies
Carmichael
004;
Hébert
993,103;
Milkman
993;
Strachannd
Burgess
004).
These
studies
ndicate,however,
hat few unions
adopt
these
strategies
becausethey ntail ramatichangesnunionpower tructures.
Students
f
union
trategy
ave also
paid
attentiono the ffectsf
union
bargainingtrategies
n union
membership.
ebate has focused
on thebenefits
r
pitfalls
f
engaging
n
cooperative artnership
ela-
tionships
ith
management
t the
firm
evel.5 ome cholars iew
part-
nershiptrategies
s
positive
or nions. ckers
nd
Payne
1998)
argue,
for
xample,
hat
partnership
s a form f
accommodation
n which
unions re active
articipants
n
the
crafting
f firmnd
national
oli-
cies
affecting
hem. ichternd Greer
2004)
and
Terry
2004)
argue
hat
in a contextfdecentralizedargaining,artnership ayboostunion
membership
hen
ccompanied y
autonomous
ources f
egitimacy
in
the
workplace.
ther cholars
rgue,
n
contrast,
hat
nion-manage-
ment
artnership
mounts o union
o-optationKelly
996).
Although
abor
restructuring
ould
potentially
xplain
ariation
n
union
membership,
his
tudy
inds hat
trategic
hoicesmade
by
union
leaders t crucialmoments f firm
estructuring
erethe
major
eter-
minants f ntrafirmariationn union
membership
rajectories
n the
cases examined.
his
finding
nderscoreshe
utility
f
union-manage-
ment
artnershippproaches
or
ndividualnions.Unions hat
njoyed
themost uccess nrecruitingembersnthe amplewerethose hat,
at
certain
key
moments,
ursued
an
assertive
artnershiptrategy
toward
management.
Atthe ame
time, owever,
his
tudy ighlights
he imitationsf
partnershiptrategies
n
contextsharacterized
y high
nion
ragmen-
tation nd
weak
abor
bargaining
ower.
n
such
settings,
artnership,
even if
successful
or
ome individual
nions,
xpresses
he overall
weakness funions
ompared
o
employers
nd tends o
perpetuate
r
even
deepen
hatweakness
ydiminishing
he
fficacy
f
militancy,
et-
ting
one
union
against
nother,
nd
hampering
he
development
f
morecomprehensivend innovativetrategicpproaches o union
recruitment.
n
this
ontext,
orkers
maymigrate
rom ne unionto
another,
ut
organized
abor
s a
wholedoes not
grow tronger.
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS
79
Research Design
This
tudy dopts
most imilarases
comparative
esearch
trategy.
This
trategy
onsists f
electing
ases that
resentignificant
ariation
on the
dependent
ariable ut
similar
alues on all but one
or two
explanatory
ariables
George
nd Bennett
005,
0).
Itsvalue s that t
allows heresearchero establishmore ontrols
n
situations
n
which
multiple
ariables re at work nd to isolate
ariables
f
special
heo-
reticalnterest.he
research
esign
f
this
tudy
ontrols or
national,
sectoral,
nd some
potentiallyompeting
irm-levelariables
includingskill f the
workforce,
abor
flexibility,
evel nd
type
f collective ar-
gaining,
nion
bility
o
provide
members ith ubstantive
enefits,
ize
of
the
firm,
nd,
o a certain
xtent,
abor
estructuring),
hile
llowing
variationn one
key
variable:
nion
trategy.
The
findings
re
basedon
a
total f
30
open-ended
nd
n-depth
nter-
viewswith nion eaders nd
firm
fficers,
s well s
ethnographic
ield-
work,
ll conducted
uring
004.
The research
overs
13
unions
n a
Chilean ank nd n
equal
number
n
telecommunicationsirm.ecause
the nterviewsere ecured ith
promise
f
nonymity,
his
tudy
oes
not dentifyhenames fthefirms,heunions,r the nterviewees.
In some
ways,
heunions n this
tudy
re
atypical
n Chile.
They
operate
n
firmsnwhich nion ffiliations
relativelyigh.
n
both
irms,
average
net union
density
etween
990
and
2004
almost
ripled
he
national
verage
or he
period
14.4
percent).
hey
lso
operate
n con-
texts n which
large
number f unions
ompete.6
n the
bank,
where
unions ross
ccupational
ines,
ll unions
ompete
or
he
ame
mem-
bers.
n the telecommunications
irm,
hereunions
rganize
workers
exclusivelylong ccupational
ines,
nion
ompetition
ends obe
lower
among
white-collarnions ut
very
igh mong
lue-collarnions.
The cases are nonethelessairlyypicalf the trongernionismn
Chile,
which s concentratedn
large
firms.
arge
irms
epresentnly
4.7
percent
f Chilean
usinesses,
ut
they
ccount
or
6.5
percent
f
total
mployment
Dirección
el
Trabajo
007,
7-20).
Thesefirmsend
to be muchmoreunionized han he
average
irm.n
fact,
lmost alf
of
arge
irms
aveat east ne
union,
ompared
o
3-9
percent
f mall
firms;
he
arger
he
firm,
he
arger
he
number
f
unions
n
it
Direc-
cióndel
Trabajo
007,
9).
As is often he case
among
unions n
large
firms,
he ones under
study
erehave a traditionf abor
rganization,
skilled
onstituency,
membership
enefits,
nd
professional
nion eaderswith
olitical
on-
nections
o
center-left
arties.7
imilaro other
elativelytrong
nions,
those n thefirmsovered n this
rticle
egotiated
onvenios
voluntary
but
egally indinggreements
etween orkersnd
employers),
nstead
ofthe raditionalormalollective
ontracts,
hich re more
widely
sed
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80
LATIN
AMERICAN OLITICS
AND
SOCIETY
52:
2
byunionsnChile.8urthermore,heunions nthis tudyace hallenges
that re familiar
o
many
workers
n
both
arge
nd medium-sized
irms,
such s
increasing
ob
instability;
he
mushrooming
f
parallel,
ore
re-
carious ormsf
employment;
abor
ationalization;
nd shiftso
systems
of
ob
compensation
hat
revariable nd tied o
performance.
The
sectors
nalyzed
ere re
important
nd
growing
reas of the
Chilean
conomy.
ombined,
he
financialnd telecommunications
nd
transportation
ectors
make
up
almost18
percent
f
the workforce
(Banco
Central
.d.).
Between
1990
and
2008,
employment
n the
telecommunicationsubsectoraw an ncrease f bout
8
percent,
hile
employmentnthe inancialubsectorripledBancoCentral.d.).There-
fore,
nions
n these
ubsectors
ave
future
pportunities
or
rowth.
Union
Membership
Trajectories:
The
Bank
Between
990
nd
2004,
verall nion
density
eclined
y
a littlemore
than
quarter
n this irm. ix
unions,
esignated
n
table
1 as Unions
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
and
8,
exhibited
positive
rajectory
f
growth.
ome of
these
Unions
, 3, 4,
and
5)
shared he ame
steady rowth
n
mem-
bership ince 1990;othersUnions2 and 8) experienced ramatic
growth
etween
000
and
2002.
The
remaining
nionshad
an overall
trajectory
f decline.
ome,
ike Unions and
7,
experienced
most f
theirosses
n
the
arly
nd
mid-1990s.
thers,
ikeUnions
, 10,11,12,
and
13,
experienced
major
membership
osses
after
003.
All unions
were
cross-occupationalrganizations
hat
competed
for the same
members.
In
1990
hebankhad six unions
1,
3,
4,
5, 6,
and
13).
All
of them
belonged
o one
federation,
hich ereafter
ill
be
designated
edera-
tion 1. At the
time,
hisfederation
egotiated ages
and benefits
n
behalf f all unionizedworkers.
The
1990
bargaininggenda
was driven
y
management's
ove o
make
part
f workers'
arnings ontingent
n individual
erformance.
Federation
's initial
esponse
was to
reject
management's
roposal
nd
demand
higherwage
readjustments.
egotiations
talled,
nd
the
unions
taged
massive trike
interviews
.5,
1.14).
Althoughnitially
the unions eemedto be
gaining
oncessions,
fter he sixth
ay
the
firm
ardenedts
position.
ederation
rapidly
ecided o accommo-
date
management
emands
nd calledoff
he trike.Workersxtracted
a generousashbonus nd a higher ageandbenefiteadjustmenthan
theone
originallyroposed
y
the
firm,
utthe
changes
n
the truc-
ture f
compensationroposedby management
eld. The
agreement
was
signed
or our
ears
nstead fthe raditionalwo.This ettlement
establishedhefoundationf a
partnershipelationship
n whichFed-
eration
participated
n
most
firm
ecisions
nvolving
abor
and,
in
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES:
CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS
81
Table1. LaborUnionMembershiprajectoriesn theBank,
c.
1990-2004
Workers nionized Share of the Workforce
%)
Union
1990
2004 Difference
1990a
2004
Difference
1
200
738 538
2
10
7.5
2
70
707
637
1
9.60
8.7
3
175
300
125
2
4.10
1.9
4
100
115 15
1
1.60 0.4
5
66 68
2 1
0.90 0.3
6 800 180 -620 10 2.40 -7.6
7
300
150
-150
4 2
-1.7
8
650
810 160 8
11
2.9
9
150
130
-20
2
1.80 -0.1
10
150
110 -40
2
1.50
-0.4
11
1,400
267
-1,133
17
3.70 -13.7
12
1,500
130
-1,370
19
1.80
-16.9
13
250
211
-39 3 2.90
-.02
Total
5,811 3,916
-1,895
72
53.5
-18.5
aThis olumn s calculated ver the combinedworkforcef all the banks n which
theunions
perated
t thetime.
Sources:
Membership
ata
provided y
union
eaders.
The
number f workers
er
firms
based
on
unpublished
ata
from he
Superintendencia
e Bancos e Institu-
ciones.The
figures
nclude ull-timeorkers
irectlymployed y
thefirmnd some
subcontracted orkers.
exchange,
elivered nion
estraintnd collaboration
n firm
estructur-
ing
interviews
.1,
1.5,
1.14).
Union
,
previously
he
argest
nd most
ominant
nion n Fed-
eration and theone that adbeen thevisible eader fworkermobi-
lization
uring
he
trike,
ejected
he
greement
nd eft hefederation.
Isolated,
nion found tdifficulto
extractoncessions rom
manage-
ment
nd,
during
henext hree
ears,
ost
lose to
half
tsmemberso
themore
ccommodating
nions
interview.5).
Unions and
3
cap-
turedmost fthese osses
interviews
.11,1.12,
1.13,
1.15).
In
1994
hebankunderwent
merger.
s a
result,
t nheritedwo
more nions
Unions
and
12).
Bothwere olid
organizations,
nd one
(Union12)
was
very
militant
interview.1).
n
1994,
Union
12
oined
Federation
,
whileUnion
,
whose eaders ad
somewhat istant
ela-
tionswith he eaders f Union12,chose not o do so. Union 's deci-
sion not to
join
Federation involved
igorous
nternal ebate.Out-
numbered,
orkers ho
supported
heunion's
nclusion
n
Federation
1 left or nions hatwere
part
fthat
ederation
interview.7).
The
merger
oincided
with
new
bargaining
ound.
Management's
goals
for hat
ear
wereto control
pward ressures
n thecollective
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82 LATIN
AMERICAN
OLITICS AND SOCIETY
52:
2
bargainingettlement,xtend tfor nother our ears,rimome abor
redundancies
esulting
romhe
merger,
nd
expand
ubcontracting
nd
other orms f abor
lexibility,
uch s
temporary
ontractsnd
contin-
gent
ompensation
interview
.1).
By
then,
ederation had
established close and
highly
nstitu-
tionalized
artnershipelationship
ith
management.
ince he
previous
year,
thad
actively
ollaborated ith
management
n
drafting
henew
convenio
interviews
.1,
1.15).
Moreover,
ts leaders
enjoyed
easy
access
to
the
op management,
hich llowedunions n
thefederation
to offer
uick
resolutiono their onstituents'
veryday roblems.
he
agreementinallyigned ythefederationn 1994covered our ears
and
ncluded
generous,
ne-timeash
bonus,
s well
as
some
modest
wage
increases
n
boththe fixed nd
variable
arts
f
the
wages.
n
addition,
ederation
informallyegotiated
he criteriaor
llocating
job
losses,
generous ompensation
or
workersaid off nd workers
who
accepted
ffersf
early
etirement,
nd
somekind f
ob
continu-
ation orworkersn areas
being
ubcontracted
interviews
.14,
1.15).
Management
hen
pened negotiations
ith
Unions
and
7.
Both
had been excludedfrom he
earlydrafting
f
collective
argaining
agreementsndhadhad ittleo noinputn the llocation f ob osses.
Leaders
f thesetwo unions
hought,
owever, hat,
iven
he firm's
strong
conomic
erformance
n
recent
ears
nd the
mprovement
f
relations etween eadersof Union 6 and
management,hey
ould
negotiate higher age
readjustment
han heone achieved
y
Feder-
ation
1
(interviews
.5,
1.7).
The
two
unions
negotiatedogether
ut
were oo small o offer
ny
real
challenge
o
management.hey
nded
up signing
he same
agreement egotiated y
Federation .
The
firm
subsequently
xtended he ame conditionso all
workers,
utFedera-
tion1
amply
ublicized
he
point
hat t had
been
a
key
player
ehind
the greement.imilarynamicsccurredn1998 nd 2000.
Unable o
shape
the
bargainingynamics,
nions and
7
focused
their ffortsn
recruiting
embers
interviews
.5,
1.7).
This
yielded
some
positive
esults:oth nions
were ble to recoverome
prior
mem-
bers.
Organizing
riveswere modest nd
short, owever,
nd did not
systematicallyarget norganized
orkers.
herefore,
either
f
these
unionswas able to recover
revious
membership
evels. he twounions
also
undertook
alks bout
merging
o boostunion
membership,
ut t
least s of 2004 his dea had notbecome
reality
interviews
.5,
1.7).
In
2000thebank
began
a
new
merger,
hich ulminated
n
2002.
Thenewly ncorporatedankhad been one of the hreeargestnthe
country.
t had a
strong
raditionf unionism nd an
amalgamated
union
Union 1)
that
n
1997
had
ed an
aggressive,
ilitant
ampaign
and had achieved ne
of the best collective
ontracts
n
the
ndustry
during
he
1990s.
Although
ess
militant,
heother
our nions
Unions
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES:HILE'S
LABOR
UNIONS
83
2, 8, 9, and10)were also strong. ntil heirrrivaln thebankunder
study,
hese ive
nions hared
general
rajectory
f
membership
ta-
bility
interviews
.2,1.8,1.9,
1.10).
Most fthe
ncoming
nion eaderswere
riticalfFederation
In
initial
onversations,
eaders
f
Federation came
across s
defending
personal
ositions
f
privilege
nd
offering
nclusion
n thefederation
under onditionsf subordinationather
han
ooperation
interviews
1.2,1.8,
1.9).
As a
result,
ll theunions
xcept
Union
(at
the ime ne
ofthe mallest nions
n
the
firm)
efused
o
oin.9
Union
sought
ut
Federation
as
an
opportunity
o
grow
interview.16).
Between 000 nd2002,Federationwas a conspicuous resence
in thefirm.ts eaders
requentlyppeared
n
the
ompany
f
manage-
ment,
romoting
he
firm's
olicies
nd
motivating
orkerso
oin
with
management
n
making
he
firmuccessful.
y
then he
ogo,
website,
and overall
mage
f Federation
closely
esembled hefirm's
orpo-
rate
mage.
During
his
period,
he
big
debate
between nions nd
manage-
ment oncernedhe
rimming
f
merger-induced
edundancies.
n
2000
Federation
secured n informal
greement
hat
pared
ts
members
fromayoffsfthey howedgoodperformancendnegotiated new
convenio
interview
.14).
These
agreements,
imilaro the
1994
gree-
ment,
ereextended o therest f the
workers,
hether
nionized r
not.Newcomers ere more
ikely
o have ower
valuationsmmedi-
ately
fter he
merger
nd thereforeo be morevulnerable
o
ob
loss.
However,
ecausethefirstvaluation
as
supposed
o take
place
after
two
years,many
ew workers ound
ccommodationn thefirm. nce
again,
ederation
amply ublicized
ow ts
negotiations
ad benefited
even
unaffiliatedorkers.
In
2003,
ederationsucceeded
n
negotiatingage
nd
benefit
ead-
justmentslightlybovethe ndustryverageinterview.15).The collec-
tive
bargainingrocess
ollowed he
pattern
f the
previous
nes since
1990.
ederation
was thefirsto
sign
collective
argaining
ettlement,
which,
or he
previous
ix
months,
thad been
ointly
rafting
ithman-
agement.
onfederatednions ried o
negotiate igher age
readjust-
ments,
utwere
argely
nsuccessful.s a union eader
ecounted,
We
Unions
, 9,
and
10]
didnotwant o
sign
n
agreement
e had
not
negotiated,
ut he
firm
ust gnored
s.
They
oldus to
present
our
proposal,
hichwe
actually
id.Butwhenwe went o discuss
it hey ad thedocumentfFederation there or s tosign. hey
added a few lauseswe
wanted,
utwe did not ikehow the
firm
proceeded,
interview.10)
All
the nonfederated
nion eaders
nitially
esisted
management's
pressures
o
sign
hedocument
lready igned y
Federation
,
but
hey
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84
LATINAMERICAN OLITICS
AND SOCIETY
52:
2
faced ignificantressuresrom heir wn rank ndfile o accept he
conditionsffered
y management
interviews
.9,
1.10).10
ccording
o
union
eaders,
his
was theresult
f
two
factors. ne was that
members
of the
ncoming
nions
had a hard ime
dapting
o the
firm
ecause
newwork emands
nd
pressures
ere
perceived
s
significantly
reater
than
nthe
riginal
anks
interviews
.2,1.8,
1.9).
Theother
eason,
ne
that ffectedew
and old
unions,
as that he
greement
egotiatedy
Federation
was attractive
y
contemporary
hilean
tandards.
Most
unions
gave
in to rank-and-file
ressures
s soon as
they
started
o
experience
membership
osses or even
threats f massive
membershipefectioninterviews.8,1.9).Union11,at the time he
largest
f henonfederated
nions,
fferedhe
ongest pposition,
hree
months.
ccording
o
its
eaders,
uring
hat
eriod
heunion ost
five
hundredmembers
nd
experienced
ainful
nternal
ivisions
inter-
views
1.2,
1.8).
Roughly
alf fthese
membership
osseswere
aptured
by
unions
n Federation
.
According
o one ofthe
federation's
eaders,
their nions id
not need to
actively
ecruithose
potential
members:
We
leaders
f Federation
]
are
managers
f
success,
otconflict.
e
don't
needto seek
people
out.Our
president
as a lotof nfluence
ith
the dministrationinterview.14).
The other alf
fthe osseswere
captured
y
Union
,
a nonfeder-
ated
union
interviews
.2,
1.8).
Union8's
success,
n
turn,
was the
result f
twofactors.t
was
among
he
firstf thenonfederatednions
to
sign
he
2003
convenio.
n
doing
o,
twas able
to add some
modest
specific
enefits
o
ts ersion f he ollective
ontract,
hich
were ater
expanded
o
Unions and 10.
In
addition,
s a result f nternal
ivi-
sions
a
couple
of months
efore he
collective
argaining
rocess,
senior
nion eader
had
organized
recruitingampaign
o boost
his
power
within
heunion
interview.8).
This
yielded nly
modest
mem-
bership ainsbutmadetheunionbetter nownwithin hefirm. nion
8,
moreover,
ad a
unique pportunity
o seek
prior
members
fUnion
11 because
t offered
imilarlyenerous
enefits.11
Following
he
2003
collective
argaining
rocess
nd a series
of
internal
eadership isputes
n Federation
,
Unions
2
and
13
eft
ed-
eration and
oined
he
ncoming
nion
1
These
hree nions reated
a new and more
militantederation.
uring
004,
he
new federation
sued the
firm or nfairabor
practices,
sked
for unds
llegedly
wed
to
workers,
icketed
he
orporate
uilding,
nd tried o
nullify
he
on-
venio
hey
ad
agreed
n
previously
s
part
f Federation
Thisbehaviorwas not well received y managementinterviews
1.3,1.4,
1.6).
As unions
n
thenew federation
ardened
heir
ositions,
they
met ncreased
esistance rom
he firm.
Management
irculated
internal
emos
enouncing
eaders
n
this ederation
s
treasonous,
nd
Federation
did the ame.
Althoughnhappy
ith
management,
on-
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES:
CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS
85
federatednions lsorejectedhebehaviorfthenewfederation.any
argued
hat
iven
he successof Federation
,
militancy
as suicidal
(interviews
.5,
1.8).
Some
also felt hat
he awsuits
resented
y
the
new federation
id
nothave a solidbasis
interviews
.9,
1.10).
Joining
the new federation
ost Union
12
close to
a third f its
membership
(interview
.3).
The hardest
it
nion,
owever,
as stillUnion
11,
the
most ocal
oftheunions
n Federation
(interviews
.3, 1.5,
1.17).
The
Telecommunications
Firm
Between
990
nd
2004,
verall
nion
ensity
eclined
y
lmost
fifth
in this
firm. wo
unions,
Unions
1
and
5,
experienced
rowth.
ntil
2002,
hese
unions hared
with he
other nions
he ame
membership
trajectory:
tability
ntil
999,
ollowed
y
decline.
After
002,however,
theseunionsbroke
with
he
typical rajectory
nd
grew
dramatically.
The rest f
heunions
ad an overall
rajectory
f oss
see
table
).
Two
of these
Unions
2
and
10)
appear
to have
expanded
heir hareof
unionized
workers,
ut
thisreflects
he
sharp
hrinkage
n the firm's
workforce
atherhan
eal
growth.
nions
were
organized
long
occu-
pational ines.Unions4 and 5, whichorganized rofessionals,om-
peted
for
he ame
members.
ikewise,
nions
, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11,
12,
and
13,
which
rganized
killed lue-collar
orkers nd
technicians,
competed
mong
hemselves.
Between
990
nd
1998,
he elecom
irm
ursued gradual djust-
ment f
theworkforce
o
technological
hanges
nd marketiberaliza-
tion.
Afterhe
1980s,
decade marked
y
adversarial
elations,
an-
agement
nd
workers
ought
hese
changes hrough
ccommodation
(interviews
.8,
2.11,
2.12).
Unions
exchangedwage
restraint
or
involvement
n
managerialecisions,ayoffompensations,
llocation
of
ob
losses,
nd
negotiation
f areasto be subcontracted.ll unions
were
present
t the
bargaining
able,
ut he
argest
Union
)
wielded
more
nfluence
interviews
.3,
2.10,
2.11).
In
general,
nion eaders
perceived
his ituations
a
system
f
cogovernance
interviews
.9,
2.11,
2.12).
Although
ndividual
nions ontinued
he radition
f
negotiating
n
small
locs f wo
rthree
nions,
he
participation
f ll unions
ogether
in
drafting
he
bargaining
ocument
reated ne
blueprint
f
theconve-
nio
interview
.4).
Although
hey
ooperated,
ndividual
nions
taged
routinemall toppagesonegotiatearticularssues rto acceleratepe-
cific
negotiations
egarding
he
blueprint's
ppendixes.
hese strikes
tended
obe
very
hortnd
mall,
ut
elatively
uccessful
interviews
.3,
2.8).
As a result f
this
dynamic,
etween
990
and
1999,
unions
uc-
ceeded
n
negotiating
etter ollective
onditions
orworkersnd
man-
aged
to establish
hort-termnstrumental
nterunion
oordination.
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86 LATINAMERICAN OLITICS AND SOCIETY
52:
2
Table 2. LaborUnionMembershiprajectoriesnthe
Telecommunications
irm,
990-2004
WorkersUnionized Share of
the Workforce
%)
Union
1990
2004 Difference
1990
2004
Difference
1
700
1,473
773
7.0
39.3 31.8
2
190
186
-21
2.0
5
2.8
3
600
219 -381
6.5 5.8
-0.7
4
1,100
190 -910
11.9
5.1
-6.9
5
40
111
71
0.4
3
2.5
6 130 2 -128 7.6 0.1 -1.4
7
85
7 -78
0.9
0.2
-0.7
8
1,700
24
-1,676
18.4 0.6
-17.8
9 300
3
-297
33
0.1
-3.2
10
25
16
-9 0.3
0.4 0.2
11
585
23
-562
6.3
.6
-5.7
12
500
31 -469
5.4
.8 -4.6
13
600
50 -550 6.5
1.3
-5.2
Total
6,555
2,335
-4,220
76.5
62.3
-14.2
Source:
Membership
ata
provided y
union eaders. he workforceor ach
year
s
based on thefirm'snnual
reports,
hich nclude
nly
full-time
mployees
irectly
hired
y
thefirm.
The
union-managementartnership
stablishedn the
1990s,
ow-
ever,
was not without ensions. n
particular,ignificant
ntraunion
debatetook
place
about how far ccommodationhould
go.
Several
union eaders ecame
ncreasinglyary. hey rgued
hat
abor
unions
were
giving p
job
security
ithout
fight
ecausethe
ystem
llowed
formere consultationather han
cogovernance
nd the
preference
given
o some eaderswas a
managerial
trategy
o
co-opt
nions
inter-
view
2.3).
As a
result,
ome
prominent
eaders eft heir nions o form
new
ones
Unions
, 5,
10,
and
12).
This
fragmented
heunion truc-
ture nd reduced he
unions'
verage
ize.
Despite
their
hetoric,
n
practice
heseunions id not
dopt
moremilitanttance.
These
problems otwithstanding,uring
he
collective
argaining
process
f
1998,
workersmade
mportantains.
The
agreementigned
that
ear
aised
many
enefitsnd eveled
wages,
o that ll
workers
n
the ame
occupationalategory
hared he ame
alary.
n
top
of
this,
unionsnegotiatedpecific enefitso be appended o their ndividual
collective ontracts.
his
negotiation
as,
according
o union
eaders,
the best since
1986
interviews
.7,
2.10,
2.11,
2.12).
n
regard
o the
allocation f
ob
losses,
this
greement
ed
management
o continue
gradual
ob
shedding
cross he
company, sually enerouslyompen-
sated
nd
voluntary.
oth
he
more
ccommodating
nd the
more rit-
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS
87
ical unionsparticipatedntheprocess nd signed he sameblueprint
agreement.
Between
990
and
1998,
unions hared similar
membership
ra-
jectory,
haracterized
y
some osses but
overall
tability
n
regard
o
each union's
hare f heworkforce.
he
exceptions
ereUnions
and
7,
which
rganized
mostly
orkers hose functionsad been
elimi-
nated
n
the
1980s.
Theseunionshad
negotiated
t that ime
gradual
shedding
f hose
obs,
o be
finalized
y
1991;
during
he
period
f his
study,
hey
aw
very
ittle
ctivity.
The
year
1999
marked heend of the
honeymoon
etween nions
and management.t also marked hebeginningf a trend oward
increasing
ifferentiationf
union
trategy.
The
firm
as
in a
precarious
conomic
ituation,
nd the
op
man-
agement
hanged.
he new teamhad a mandate
adically
o downsize
thefirm.
ts
pproach
was
quite
ggressive
nd
was
perceived
s
highly
authoritarian
y
union
eaders, ho,
until
hen,
ad been
used to
giving
input
n such
mportant
ecisions
interviews
.7,
2.8, 2.11,
2.12).
The
incoming anagement
eam
gnored
heunions
ltogether
nd offered
no concessions.
ore
mportant,
etween
999
nd
2002,
management
delayedpaymentfmany f the benefitsn the1998convenio nd
undertook
hreemassive
ounds
f
layoffs,ffering
o
compensation
beyond
he
egal
minimum.ach
department
as
requested
o downsize
its nternal
ccupationalroups
y
the
ame
percentage.
hus,
no union
escaped
painful
membership
osses.As
in
the
previous
eriod,
etween
1999
nd
2002,
membership
rajectory
id not
vary
ignificantly.
During
he waves of
layoffs,
orkers
would
be
called
by
their
supervisor
very
riday
nd informed hether r not
they
would be
fired.
any
eft he
premises
n
tears
interview.10).
Relationsetween
workers nd
supervisors
eteriorateds
many
upervisors
dopted
taket or eave t ttitudehat reated natmospheref fear nddis-
engagement
n
the
firm
interview.10).
n
thewords f
a firm
fficer,
Thefirmas hifted
way
romculture
here hat he
irm
ave
to he
worker atteredhemost oone
nwhich orkers'
ttitudes,
collaborationith
he
firm,
nd trust ake hedifference.
his
means
ransforming
hemindset
fworkers. e re hus
nforming
workersnd
new recruitsbout he hift rom enured
ob
to
employ
bility.
e stress
hat
wages
willbe basedon internal
equity
nd
firm
ompetitiveness.
Interview.4)
Not
surprisingly,
he conflictscalatedn
2002,
he
year
he
1998
convenio
xpired.
Managementpproached
he
negotiation
roposing
further
age
and benefituts.
All
unions nited
o
reject
his
roposal
and founded he
argest
nioncoordinationommittee
n
the
history
of
the
company,
alling
massive trike hat asted28
days
and
cap-
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88
LATINAMERICAN
OLITICS AND SOCIETY
52:
2
tured hemedia's ttentioninterviews.11,2.14).Of theunions ov-
ered
here,
nly
Unions
, 5,
and
6,
whichhad
negotiated
arlier,
id
not
participate.
Although
lmost ll
unionizedworkers
oined
t,
he strike as a
failure. orkers ereunable o
stop
he
firm
rom
unctioningormally
(interview
.2).
By
2002 thefirm ad
completely
utsourcednd sub-
contractedunctionselated o the
maintenancef infrastructurend
provision
f
customerervices nd had also
automatedts
plants.
hus,
most fthe
daily rovision
f
ervices as
already erformedemotely.
The
firm
lso hired ubstitute
orkers,
nd
offeredustomers
xperi-
encing ifficultiesith heir hone ervice ew cellphones nd other
forms f
compensation.uring
he
trike,
oreover,
eaders fUnion
were
questioned y
the
police
under
llegations
f
abotaging
he
firm,
which s a crime hat alls
nder hile's ntiterroristaw
interview.14).
As the
days
of the strike
assed,
he firm
emainednflexiblend
seemed
willing
o
absorb
ny
oss o avoid
giving
n
toworkers'emands.
According
o union
eaders,
his ntimidated
orkers
interviews
.7,2.10,
2.12).
Halfwayhrough
he
trike,
any
eturned
o their
obs.
Union
,
which
rganized
hite-collar
rofessionals,
as
thefirsto
defect,
nd
was followedyUnion ,a blue-collarnioninterview.10).Defections
continued,
o that
y
the
28th
ay
of
the
trike,
nion eaders
ecided
o
call t off.
y
then,
nion
,
representingop professionals
nd
supervi-
sors,
had
openednegotiations
ith hefirm.t
ended
up accepting
he
cuts
interview.10).
Thismade tclear o the ther nions hat hefirm
was determinedot o
give
n
to
any
of their
emands,
making
ccept-
ance of the cuts
precondition
or urther
egotiation.
he
remaining
unions
ejected
anagement's
emands
nd
usedArticle
69
of heLabor
Lawto extend heir
revious
ollective
greement
or
nother 8 months.
Article
69
protects
orkers hen
abor
negotiations
tall nd
manage-
ment sseekinguts othe ollectivegreement.
In
2003,
ivemore nions
1,
4, 5, 6,
and
7)
also
accepted
he uts.
Althoughegotiations
ere
ndividual,
n
practice
hese nions nded
up
with ne common ollectiveontracttructure
interview.6).
According
to the main eaderof Union
1,
they
decidedto
abandonArticle
69
because
People
weredisillusionedfter he
trike,
nd we were fraid
that ur
people
were
going
o
oin
paraunionargainingroups.
he
firm
also seemed
more
pen
to
talk
interview.9).
n
contrast,
nions
, 9,
10,11,12,
nd
13
decided obide heirime
y xtendinggain
heir
998
collectiveontractnderArticle
69
interviews
.3,2.5,
2.8).
Althoughll theunions hat egotiatedfter002stoppedmassive
defectionnd
recaptured
ome
members,
nly
Unions
1
and
5
grew.
These wounions idnotundertake
rganizing
ampaigns;
nstead,
hey
benefitedrom
unique
tatus:
hey
were
he
only
nions
n
this
roup
that
ompeted
ith ther
nions.Union
1
competed
ith ll the
blue-
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS
89
collar unionsand Union 5 competedwith Union4, a more combative
professional
nion.
Although hey,
ike all the other
unions that
negoti-
ated,
ost
many
benefits
nd were unable to
stop
ob
losses,
they
were
granted
few
privileges:
heir
eaders had more access to
management
for
resolving everyday problems, participated
with
management
n
developing
raining
eminars nd career
development
rograms,
nd had
modest
uccess
reaching
nformal
greements
o
delay
or slow
job
losses
(interviews
.9,
2.13).
The
remaining
ccommodating
unions,
which
mostly
rganized professionals,
ever
sought
this
kind of
relationship,
instead
focusing xclusively
n
finding
ormulas o
compensate
wage
and benefit osses for heirmembersinterviews .10,2.11).
Firm
fficers
ere
very utspoken
n their
upport
orUnions
1
and
5.
They appeared
publicly upportive
specially
of Union
1,
the
larger
of the two
and the
only
accommodating
blue-collar
union. Between
2003
and
2004,
management
howcased
Union
1 in
the
firm s a
good
example
of
partnership
ith workers.
According
o
the firm's uman
resources
manager,
Unions hat o
bettern this
irm
re
those hat ave eaders
hat
understand
hebusiness.
or
xample,
e
hear he eader fUnion
1speakingbout he probabilityf mploymentnstead f enure.
Thatmakes
lot f ensebecause he
ontracts
ill
get
treamlined
and
more lexible we
will
liminate
ll fixed osts. he others
ust
don't
et
t.
Interview.4)
In
contrast,
management
circulated a series of internal
memos
against
unions
underArticle
69 (Unions
8, 9, 10,
11, 12,
and
13).
Alien-
ated
and
facing
ncreased
management
hostility,
hese unions
had
to
settle each
of theirdemands
through
he courts
interviews
.3,
2.8,
2.10,
2.11).
Despite
some
legal
victories,
management ostility
ed
many
workers o leave these unions. Since by 2003 most of these workers
were blue-collar
nd Union
1
was the
only
blue-collarunion on
good
terms
with
management,
he latter
apitalized
on most of these
losses
(interviews
.1, 2.7, 2.8,
2.9).
Explaining
Variation in Union
Membership
Trajectories
This
study
has
sought
to understand
why,
between
1990
and
2004
in
two large private ectorfirms,ome unions experiencedmembership
growth
while othersdid
not,
and whether ndividual uccess
translated
into overall ncreases
n firm-levelnion
density.
With
regard
o
the first f these
questions,
the literaturedentifies
two
possible explanations:
abor
restructuring
nd union
strategy.
n
principle,
ariation
n
labor
restructuring
ould have
influenced he rei-
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90
LATIN
AMERICAN OLITICS
AND
SOCIETY
52:
2
ative uccess fdifferentnionsnmaintainingr ncreasingheirmem-
berships.
he
evidencemarshaled
ere,however,
ndicates hat
n the
two
cases,
no
significant
nterunion
ariationccurred
n the
exposure
ofunions o abor
estructuring.
In the
bank,
he
cross-occupational
nd
cross-departmental
harac-
terof
unions,
he merit-basedharacter
f
ob
losses,
nd the relative
evenness f abor
lexibility
cross he
firm
eant hat nionswere
im-
ilarly
ffected
y
labor
restructuring.
here
was, however,
ignificant
variation
n
union
trategy.
hisvariation
rguably
xplains
nterunion
variation
n
membershiprajectory.
Between 990 nd2004, aborrestructuringn the elecommunica-
tions irm lso had a
comparable
mpact
crossunions. rom
990
to
2002,
nion
trategies
nd union
membership
utcomes ere lso rela-
tively omogeneous.
n
contrast,
etween 002
nd
2004,
herewas
sig-
nificantnterunionariation
n union
strategy
nd
membership
ut-
comes,
while abor
estructuring
ecamemore ntense ut
ontinuedo
be
relatively
ven across
unions.Thus the
evidence
uggests
hat he
main actor
xplaining
ariation
n
membership
rajectory
etween
990
and 2004
was variation
n
union
trategies
n
regard
o
management.
As the iteraturendicates,nions esorto a varietyfstrategieso
boost
membership,
he most common
of which nvolve
recruiting
drives,
oalition
uilding,
mergers,
nd
partnership
argaining
trate-
gies.Although
he ase studies
uggest
ittle
ctivity
n the rea ofunion
organizingampaigns
nd no
activity
n the reasof coalition
uilding
or nternal
estructuring,
hey
ndicate hat nions hat
rew
were hose
that,
t critical
unctures
f
firm
estructuring,
ccommodated
anage-
ment's
emands arliest r
most
ggressively,
ater
stablishingpart-
nership
elationship
ith
management.
n
a situation
f
great
mbalance
in the
power
of unions relative
o
management,
his
partnership
involved nionrestraintndcooperationnexchange ormodest ar-
ticularisticenefits
hat
gave
these unions
a
competitivedge
over
others.The
logic
of such
strategic
hoice resembled
prisoner's
dilemma,
n which hose nions
hat efected irst
ot
hebestresults.
In
the
bank,
unions hat
xperienced
rowth
n
membership
ere
those
belonging
o Federation
,
along
withUnion 8.
Federation
accommodatednd
supported
management'slans
to
restructurehe
compensation
ystem
nd increase
abor
flexibility
n
1990
after he
strike,
nd
in
1994
and 2002 after
mportant ergers.
t also delivered
wage
restraint
uring
ll thecollective
argainingrocesses,
eginning
in1990. nexchange,managementfferedederation's leaders xclu-
sive
informal
enefits,
uch
as a voice
in
layoffs
nd
subcontracting
decisions,
monopoly
ver
the collective
argainingrocess,
nd
easy
access o
top
corporate
fficers.
n
general,
nions
n this ederationad
a
steady pward
membership
rajectory.
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS
91
Union ,whichwas notpart f Federation,experienced ost f
its
growth
fter
003.
Although
ot
cooperative
o the
degree
hat ed-
eration
was,
n
2003
Union was thefirstf henewunions o accom-
modate
management,ignaling
ther imilar nions to follow uit.
Although
his id not
bring
heunion ll the nformal
enefits
njoyed
by
Federation
,
Union was able to
negotiate
ome modest enefits
for
ts
members,
nd ts eaders
ained asy
ccess o
higher
xecutives,
something
hat imilar nionshad more
ifficultyoing.
Thismadethe
union ttractiveo
potential
members
ecently
rrived
n
the
firm,
nd
at the same time
represented
middle-of-the-roadlternativeo the
accommodatingederationandthemilitantederation.
In
the ase of he elecommunications
irm,
wounions
xperienced
growth
fter
002,
Unions
and
5.
They
were
among
hefirst nions
that ccommodated
anagement
emands
n
2002 and were the
only
accommodating
nions
hat
ompeted
ith thers or
members.
hese
unions
xperienced
anagementostility
t a
very
ifficult
uncture
f
worker-management
elations
nd
subsequently
ecame
management's
partner
n
trainingolicies.
Unlike he
bank,
whichhad seen variation
in union
trategies
nd individual nion
membership
rajectories
ince
1990, his ariationecame ignificantnthefirmnly fter 002.How-
ever,
despite
he shorter
eriod
nvolved,
he
relationship
etween
union
trategic
hoice
and
membership
utcome
s
even clearer:
he
two
most
ccommodating
nions
njoyed
mportant embershipains
at thedirect
xpense
f their
ompetitors.
In a context f
significant
ob
losses,
rising
work
demands,
nd
weak
nstitutionalnd
political upport
or
nions,
rivileged
anage-
ment
ecognitionielded ractical
esources
hat
nhanced
he
apacity
of
these
unions o deliver enefitso their onstituentsnd
gave
more
accommodating
nions
competitivedge
over ther nions.
Although
someofthese ainswere ubsequentlyxtended o otherworkers,hey
demonstrated
hat he unions
were
on
good
termswith
management,
which ould
potentially
ean ndividual
rotection
rom
ob
losses or
fasterolutionso
workplace roblems.
ield nterviews
uggest
hat
n
most
cases,
workers hemselves
ought
ut unionsthatwould offer
them
more
practical uarantees
nd
identify
hem s
good
team
lay-
ers,
ncreasing
heir
opportunities
or
ong-termmployment
nd
career dvancement.12
n
contrast,
orkers
bandoned
nions hat ad
adversarialelations ith
management.
he fact hat
nly
handful f
unions
Unions
and
7
in
the
bank)
devoted esources o
organizingcampaigns, ithmodest esults,ndicates hestrongmpacthatman-
agement upport
ad on worker
isposition
o
join
particular
nions
over thers.
Moremilitant
nions
e.g.,
Unions
1
and
12 n
thebank nd Union
8
in
thetelecommunications
irm)
r unions hat ccommodated an-
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92
LATIN
AMERICAN OLITICS
AND SOCIETY
52:
2
agementemands ater n (e.g.,Unions and7 in thebank nd Union
4 in
thetelecommunications
irm)
xperiencedmarginalization
nd,
n
some
cases,
managementersecution.
hisfostered
esentmentoward
management
nd the more
ccommodating
nions nd decreased he
possibilities
funion
oordination,
eaving
moremilitantnions solated
and ineffectivend therefore orevulnerable o union
raiding.
he
iconic
xamples
fthiswereUnions and
11 n
the
bank,
which ost
significant
umber fmembers
n
the
arly
990s
nd
dramatically
fter
2003,
espectively,
nd Union
in
the elecommunications
irm,
hich
lostmassive umbers f membersfter 002.
Whydid some unionsrefuse o accommodateespite he harsh
consequences?
he field nterviews
uggest
hree
easons. ne was that
the
dynamics
f dversarialelations urtured
igh
evels fmutual ni-
mosity
nd distrustetween nions nd
management
hatwere
difficult
to
overcome nce established.
s
adversarial elations
volved,
he
divide
ecame
ncreasinglyersonal
nd had
mportant
motionalver-
tones
or
nion eaders
interviews
.3,
2.8).
The secondreasonhad to
do with
he
objective
onditions f certain nions.For small
unions
organizing
lder
constituencies,
he costs of
accommodation ut-
weighed hecosts fmilitancy,ecausetheconcessions emanded y
management
nvolved maller etirementunds
interview.10).
A
third easonwas that omeunion eaders alculatedhat hefirm's
long-term
uccess
ultimatelyepended
on the collaborationf labor
and
that
hey
ad
enough
esources
o resist
management
ntimidation
for few
years
interview
.12).
During
hat
eriod, hey hought,
he
management
eamwouldhaveto
change, iving ay
to one better is-
posed
toward nions.
n
the absence of
management ostility,
heir
unionswould
have an
advantage
n
luring
members ack
precisely
because
they
had
kept
he
older,
more
generous
ollective ontracts.
Thus, imilaro the eaders f more ccommodatingnions,manymil-
itanteaders'main oncern
was institutionalurvival.13
Differences
n
strategic
alculation
etween
ccommodating
nd
militantnion eaders o not
ppear
o
havebeen rooted
n
age, parti-
san
affiliation,
r
any
other
bjective
ondition. he nterviews
uggest
instead hat
hey
reflectedhe most nfluentialnion eaders' areer
experiences
nd the
varying
essons
hey
derived rom hose
experi-
ences. As a union eader
tated,
We've earned hatwe cannot
ight
windmills ecause workers
re not
nterested.
es,
I am
promanage-
ment,
ecause
f hefirm oes
well,
we do well.We'vedecided o be
management'shield. f omebodyttacksheiroliciest's s if heyre
attacking
s,
becausewe've
helped
hape
them
interview.14).
As this rticle's
indingsuggest,mployers
ctively
ought
o
shape
their elations ith ndividual nions
n
ways
that ontributed
o their
own
objective
f
maximizingrofits,
nd forced nion eaders o make
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS
93
strategicecisions. mployersidnot,however,elect prioriwhich
unionswouldreceivemore
avorablereatmentnd become
privileged
negotiatingartners.
heir hoices
regarding
elations ith ndividual
unionswere
hapedby
the
trategies
dopted
y
union eaders t criti-
cal momentsf
firm
estructuring.
omeunion eaders hoseto accom-
modate
management's
emandsfor
change,
while
others owed to
resist. hese
choices,
n
turn,
haped
management's
wn
bargaining
strategies
owardndividual
nions.
With
egard
o the second
question,
whetherndividual uccess
translatednto verall ncreases
n firm-levelnion
ensity,
he
findings
of this tudyndicate hatdespitebringingome relative uccess for
individual
nions,
he
strategy
f
partnership
ccommodationid
not
translatento nion
ensity ains
t thefirmevel.Moremilitantnions
found
hemselveslienated rom he normal
rameworkf aborrela-
tions,
which ncreased
nter- nd intraunionactionalism.
eanwhile,
the more successful nions
expanded
their
membershipy
raiding
other
nions,
nd thereforead little
ncentiveo
organize
he unor-
ganized.
Thus,
although
ome
unions
experienced
bsolute
growth
overall,
nion
density
eclined.
Scholars iffern their valuations f the effectsf partnership
strategies
n
union
trength.
he conventional isdom
mong
Chilean
government
fficials,
enter-left
arties,
nd some
employers
n
this
regard
as been that
nion-managementartnership
nsures
combi-
nation
f stable
firm
erformance
nd
organized
aborvoice
on
key
issues.
Although
his
erspective ay
e
roughly
ccurate here nions
are
egally trong
nd
organizationally
nified,
his
tudy uggests
very
different
eality
n
theChilean ontext.
Where nions re
nstitutionally
weak,
ack a
strong olitical
oice,
and face
ncreasingmployment
instability,artnership
trategies ay
well
represent
fforts
y
unions o
advance heir wn narrow nterestshrougherticalatron-clienties
that
perate
t the
expense
f other nions nd undermineabor oli-
darity.14
n the
ong
run,
uchtiescould also
potentially
eakenmore
accommodating
nions
by making
hem
ncreasingly
ependent
n
management's
avor s a source of
legitimacy.
his
dependency,
s
some of
the
more
ccommodating
nion eaders
openly
recognized,
made them
ulnerableo
changes
n
management
isposition
oward
unions own
heroad
interview.14).
Beyond Union Decline
This
tudy
as
emphasized
owthe tructuraleakness f abor
n
con-
temporary
hile
hapes
the kinds f
strategies
hat
ringmembership
recruitment
uccess o ndividualnions nd how those
trategies
ffect
union
density.
wo broader ssues are tied to
the
question
f union
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94
LATINAMERICAN OLITICS AND SOCIETY
52:
2
weakness. ne is therelationshipetween niondecline nd theper-
sistence f
high nequality
n
Chile;
he thers the onditionshat ould
potentiallyring
revitalization
f Chilean
rganized
abor
n
thefore-
seeable
future.
Since
tsredemocratization
n
1990,
Chile
has
been
applauded
or
makingignificant
dvances
n
poverty
eduction
Haggard
nd
Kaufman
2008;
Mesa-Lago
008b;
Weyland
997).
At he
ame
ime,
henation as
exhibitedne ofthemost kewed ncome
istributionsn Latin
merica,
with Ginicoefficient
veraging
round
.55
ECLAC
001,71, 2006,
90).
5
This situationtems rom
wage
inequality
Ffrench-Davis
002,
198;Larrañaga009, 2) and thefact hat ealwageshavegrownmuch
more
lowly
han as national
ncome
Banco
Central
.d.).
These rends
in
wages,
n
turn,
re
probably
t east
partly
functionf
the
tructural
weakness f
unions,
ince research lsewhere
as
demonstrated
hat
unionshave an
important
ole
n
pushing p
and
compressing
ages
(Freeman
nd Medoff
984;
Rueda nd Pontusson
000).
High
evels
of income
nequality ay
have
significant
acroeco-
nomic
nd
political mplications.
ith
egard
o the
economy,
ome
scholars
rgue
hat
high
evelsof
inequality
re associated
with
poor
long-termrowtherformanceEasterly002, 66).With egardopol-
itics,
he iterature
uggests
hat
igh
evels f
nequality
re associated
with
ower-quality
nd more nstable
emocracy
Kauffman
007;
Wey-
land
1996,
).
Although
hile
does notface hese
problems ight
ow,
failure o deal
with
his ituation
n the
presentmay
make he
country
vulnerable
o
them
n thefuture.
Given the current
ituation f union weakness
nd its
negative
implications,
t s
worth
sking
what onditions
ouldmake t
possible
to foresee
strengthening
f the labor movement
n
Chile.Besides
engagingmanagement
n
training
nd worker
rotection
nitiatives,
ll
ofwhichmaymake unions moreappealing o potentialmembers,
unions
must
make nroads ntonew constituencies.
lthough
ormal
employment
as becomemore
precarious
han n the
past
Sehnbruch
2OO6),
hile
till as the
argest
ormalector
n the
region Mesa-Lago
2008a,
).
This
presents
n
opportunity
or
ecruiting
ut
requires
more
will, nnovation,
nd
energy
n
mobilizing
orkers ho
may
have dif-
ferent eeds
from hose f traditional
onstituencies.
The
findings
f his
tudy uggest,
owever,
hat uch
trategies
ill
have imited ffects
n the absenceof a labor
reformhat ackles he
multiple
ncentivesor nion
ragmentation.
herefore,
stronger
nion
movementrobably illrequire broad hangen the egalframework
in
whichworkers
egotiate
ith
management.
his annot e achieved
whileunions ontinue
o hold ittle
oliticaleverage.
The
sharp
ncrease
n
union
militancy
nderPresident
ichelle
Bachelet
2006-10)
howsthat ven under
xisting
onditions,
nions
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S
LABOR UNIONS
95
canfind ommon oliticalroundnd relativeuccess nseizing olit-
ical
opportunities.
owever,
hese ffortsavebeen
imitedo workers
in the
public
ector,
nd have
not
yet
ranslated
nto
ignificant
eforms
to the collective
spects
f the LaborCode.
This ndicates hat
more
pressure
s
needed,
not
only
rom nions ut lso
fromncumbent
ar-
ties hat ad
historicalies
o
unions,
specially
heSocialist
arty
nd
theChristian
emocrats.
For
the ast 18
years,
while
eading
he
government,
hese
parties
have embraced
elatively
rthodox
market
rinciples
n
regard
o the
labor
market,
aking
t
difficulto rebuild
he
trong
ut autonomous
relationsetween enter-left
arties
nd unions hat xisted eforehe
1973
militaryoup.
This ituation
as
been
theresult
f the
negotiated
character
fthedemocratic
ransition,
hefear nd
distrustf abor
mil-
itancy esulting
rom
he
1973
breakdown
f Salvador
llende's
ocial-
ist
egime,
nd the
ubsequent
all
f real ocialism
n Eastern
urope.
Divisions
n the abormovement
nd
strong ressure
rom
mployers
have not
helped.
n
this
ontext,
abor
eformeems
lusive.
Ironically,hange
ould
potentially
ome
as a result
f electoral
shifts
hat
romote
lternation
n
power.16
he success f
he
right
n the
2009-10 residentiallection illprobablymean hatn the horterm,
progress
n
labor
ssues
will
be
delayed.
n
the
ong
run,
owever,
his
situation
ouldcreate
more ncentives
or enter-left
arties
o
develop
a labor
genda
hatwould
llow hem
o
activelyompete
or
working-
classvotes
while
reeing
oth
nion nd center-left
arty
eaders o
crit-
icize the
government
nd the current
evelopment
odel.While
he
greater
olitical olarization
his
cenario
mplies
might
worry
ome
observers
ho
fear
repetition
f the
country's
raumatic
ast,
t
may
be
the
nly
way
o
substantively
lter he abor elations
tructure
nher-
itedfrom
he
militaryegime.
Interviews
All nterviews
ere conducted
n
Santiago,
hile
n
2004.
Translations
of nterview
uotations
y
the uthor.
Bank
1.1
Corporate
anager,
f Labor
Relations,
ugust
1.2
Member,
oard
f
Directors,
nion
11,
May
10
1.3Member,oard fDirectors,nion12,May5
1.4
Member,
oard f
Directors,
nion
13,
May
5
1.5
Member,
oard f
Directors,
nion
,
April
6
1.6
Member,
oard
f
Directors,
nion
12,
May
13
1.7
Member,
oard
of
Directors,
nion
,
May
3
1.8
Member,
oard
f
Directors,
nion
,
May
12
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96
LATIN
AMERICAN OLITICS
AND
SOCIETY
52:
2
1.9Member, oard ofDirectors, nion9,July 9
1.10
Member,
oard of
Directors,
nion
10,
July
4
1.11
Member,
oard of
Directors,
nion
3,
June
1
1.12
Member,
oard of
Directors,
nion
4,
July
7
1.13
Member,
oard
of
Directors,
nion
5,
August
11
1.14
Member,
oard of
Directors,
nion
1,
April
29
1.15
Member,
oard
of
Directors,
nion
1,
June
1
1.16
Member,
oard
of
Directors,
nion
2,
June
4
1.17
Member,
oard
of
Directors,
nion
11,
May
12
Telecommunications Firm
2.1
Member,
oard of
Directors,
nion
9,
August
30
2.2
Member,
oard
of
Directors,
nion
6,
September
7
2.3
Member,
oard
of
Directors,
nion
12,
August
26
2.4
Corporate
Manager
of
Labor
Relations,
eptember
0
2.5
Member,
oard of
Directors,
nion
10,
September
7
2.6
Member,
oard of
Directors,
nion
7,
September
2.7
Member,
oard of
Directors,
nion
13,
August
31
2.8
Member,
oard
of
Directors,
nion
11,
August
23
2.9 Member, oard ofDirectors, nion 1,August12
2.10
Member,
oard
of
Directors,
nion
2,
August
19
2.11
Member,
oard
of
Directors,
nion
4,
August
25
2.12
Member,
oard
of
Directors,
nion
8,
July
2
2.13
Member,
oard of
Directors,
nion
5,
September
8
2.14
Member,
oard of
Directors,
nion
3,
August
27
Notes
I
would
iketo thank
velyne
uber,
uan
ablo
Luna,
Jana
Morgan,
he
editor fLAPS, ndfour nonymouseviewers or heirnsightfulomments
on differentersions
f
the
paper.
also would
iketo
thankGabriel
ndetti
for
his
encouragement
nd
his
relentless,
ut
n theend
always
onstructive,
criticism.
1.
Unfortunately,
ross-national
ata
eries n
union
ensity
n Latin
mer-
ica between
990
and 2004
are
problematic.
he International
abour
Office
(ILO)
database,
or
xample,
as
comparability
roblems
ue to
considerable
cross-national
ariation
n themethods
sed to
collect he
data,
he
overage
f
the
figures
n
trade nion
membership,
hedefinitions
sed,
nd
the
pproach
to
calculating
rade
nion
density
ates.
ountry-specific
tudies
ndicate,
ow-
ever,hat nionsnMexico, eru, ndUruguay,hich harewith hile long-
standing
radition,
ave
experienced
imilar
hrinkage
Cassoni
000, ;
Fairris
and
Levine
004;
aavedra-Chanduví
nd Torero
002,
1-13).
2. The
other
2
percent
f
unionized
orkersre
organized
n unions f
independent
nd
temporary
orkers,
wo
types
f
unions hat
avea different
legal
tatus.
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PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS
97
3. The connection etweenunion-partyolitical lliances nd union
strength
as been well documented
n
both he
LatinAmericannd
European
contexts
Burgess
004;
Cook
2007;
Levitsky
nd
Way
998;
Murillo
001;
West-
ern
1995,
87-88).
4. Studies
funion
ensity
n
more
eveloped
ountriesind imilarinks
(Ebbinghaus
nd
Visser
999;
Visser
992;
Lee
2005).
5.
Partnership
eremeans
strategy
f
firm-levelnion ccommodation
characterized
y
permanent
nd
highlyooperative
nteractionsetween nions
and
management
ntended
o
produce
mutual
ains.Militancy
efers
o union
strategies
haracterized
y
ittle
ccommodation,
ainly
rientedoward btain-
inggains
orworkers.
6. Mostunionized irms ave one or twounionsDirección el
Trabajo
2007,
9).
7.
Although
n
2004
roughly
0
percent
r all theworkers
aboring
or
both
irms ere
ubcontracted,
heunions nder
tudy
ere
rganized
ery
ew,
if
ny,
ftheseworkers.
8.
UnderChilean abor
aw,
the
employer
annotrefuse
o
negotiate
formal ollective
ontracts.his
procedure
lso
requires
igher uorums
f
union
epresentation
han heconvenio
nd follows
rigid
et of
procedures.
On
average,
0
percent
f
unions
mploy
his
ype
f nstrument
Dirección
el
Trabajo
.d.,
).
9. Union soughtutFederationas an opportunityogrowinterview
1.16).
10.
According
o a
firm
fficer,
Inthe ast
bargaining
ound
was author-
ized to
ncrease he ostof the ollective
greement
y
2
percent
o
4
percent.
I succeeded
n
negotiating
n increase f
only
.8
percent
interview.1).
11.
In
addition,
ostworkersmaintained
trong
motionalttachment
o
their ank
f
origin.
nionswere
nformally
amed n referenceo those anks.
12. This ttitude
s consistent ith hat ound
y
earlier,
lassicworks
n
labor elations
n
Chile
e.g.,
Landsberger
967).
13.
Golden
1997)
argues
hat
nion
eaders
may
undertake
trikes
hey
know
will
ailwhen
hey erceive
hat he riteriaor
llocatingayoffs
hreaten
union urvival.
14. Kauffman
1974,
285)
defines
patron-client
elationship
s one char-
acterized
y
a
particularistic
nformal
xchange
elationship
etween ctors
f
unequalpower
nd status
n
which ach
party xpects
eturns
y rendering
goods
and services
o theother.
15.
One recent
nalysis
ndicateshat
nequality
eclined etween 000
nd
2006
Larrañaga
009).
However,
venwith he ecent
all n
nequality,
he ver-
age
Gini
oefficientor he
post-
990
period
s above
0.55
Larrañaga
009,
).
16. It could
lso come about s a result f an electoral
eformhatwould
give
more
epresentation
o
political
inoritieshan he urrent
inominal
ystem.
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