Social Memory Studies: From "Collective Memory" to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices Author(s): Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24 (1998), pp. 105-140 Published by: Annual Reviews Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/223476 Accessed: 08/05/2009 09:41 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=annrevs . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Annual Reviews is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annual Review of Sociology. http://www.jstor.org
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Social Memory Studies: From "Collective Memory" to the Historical Sociology of MnemonicPracticesAuthor(s): Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce RobbinsSource: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24 (1998), pp. 105-140Published by: Annual ReviewsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/223476
Accessed: 08/05/2009 09:41
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sets of practices like commemorationand monumentbuilding and generalforms like tradition,myth, or identity. They have approached t from sociol-
ogy, history, literarycriticism,anthropology,psychology, arthistory,andpo-litical science, among other disciplines. They have studied it in simple and
complex societies, from above andbelow, across the geographicalspectrum.Social memorystudies is nevertheless,or perhapsas a result, a nonparadig-matic,transdisciplinary, enterlessenterprise.While this relativedisorganiza-tion has beenproductive, t now seems possible to drawtogethersome of these
dispersed insights. Ourgoal in this essay is thereforeto (re-)constructout ofthe diversity of work addressingsocial memory a useful tradition,range of
workingdefinitions,andbasis for futurework in a field that ronicallyhas little
organizedmemoryof its own.
Lineages
Memory,of course, has been a major preoccupation or social thinkers since
the Greeks. Yet it was not untilthe late nineteenthandearlier wentieth centu-
firstexplicituse of the termcollective memorywe could find was by HugovonHofmannsthal n 1902, who referred o "the dammedup force of ourmysteri-ous ancestorswithinus"and"piled up layersof accumulatedcollective mem-
ory"(Schieder1978,p. 2). Contemporary sagesareusuallytraced o MauriceHalbwachs,who publishedhis landmarkSocial Frameworksof Memoryin
1925. Halbwachs' Strasbourgcolleague, historianMarc Bloch (1925), also
used the term collective memoryin 1925 as well as later n his book on feudal
society (Bloch 1974 [1939]). The arthistorianAby Warburgusedthe term so-
well, thoughhe never used theterms social or collective memory,analyzedthe
materialworld as accumulatedhistory, brilliantlyemphasizingnot only the
manifold traces of the past in the artifactsof commodityculture,but the rela-
tions between commoditycultureand particular orms of historicityas well(Buck-Morss1989).
Bartlett 1932) is usuallycreditedas the first modempsychologistto attendto the social dimensionsof memory,attributingdecisive importance o groupdynamicsin individualremembering.AnthropologistEvans-Pritchard1940)
developedanotionof "structural mnesia" nhis famousstudyof the Nuer.In-
teresting but largely forgottenworks in other fields include Janet's (1927)
studyof the evolution of memoryandthe concept of time, Vygotsky's 1929
claimthatmemorytakes narrative orm and is wholly shapedby cultural nflu-
ences (Bakhurst1990), and Czamowski's 1919 Durkheimiananalysisof festi-vals and ritualscelebratingSaintPatrick(Schwartz1996, pp. 275-76).In aboutthe same period,Americansociologists Cooley (1918) and Mead
(1959 [1932]) also theorizedaboutthe social context of remembering,buttheir
important deas-especially Mead's-have usually been ascribedto extraso-
ciological interests(Maines et al 1983). Among the emergingEuropeanclas-
sical theorists, Durkheim(1951 [1915]) is insightful about temporalitybutaddresses memory directly only in his brief discussion of commemorative
rituals,and thereonly as a featureof primitivesocieties. Social reproductionis perhapsthe centralcategory of Marx's thought,but the Marxist tradition
emphasizes the automaticand unconscious qualityof the process; consciousattention to the past is characterizedas an irrationalresidue of earlier socialforms: "The tradition of the dead generations,"Marx (1852) writes in The
EighteenthBrumaire,"weighs like a nightmareon the minds of the living."Simmel (1959) wrote that "All the uncertainties of change in time and the
tragedyof loss associatedwith the past find in the ruina coherentand unifiedexpression."This remark s prescientof later theoriesthatsee memorytracesas evidence of loss, but Simmel did not develop it more than aphoristically.Weber,too, had little to say aboutmemory, despite his interestin traditional
legitimation:"by its very 'progressiveness' [civilized society]... gives deaththe imprintof meaninglessness"(1946). Meaningfuldeath is elusive because
memory is inadequate o hold togetherthe diversity of our life experiences.But this is anintriguingaside rather hanthebeginningof atheoryof memory.
Shils (1981, p. 9) explainsthis sharedneglect of traditionandmemoryby
demonstratinghow Weber and his contemporarieswere the victims of theirown overdrawndichotomies. The classical theorists, Shils writes, "oversub-scribed to the naive view that modem society was on the road to traditionless-ness...." From such a perspective, an interest in how the past works on the
presentwas antiquarian, rat least useful only asa contrast o theways modemsocieties work. In his discussion of Tonnies, Terdiman 1993) notes how un-usual this lack of interest n memoryandtraditionwas in a fin de siecle culturehe describes as otherwise obsessed with memory.
Between this early period of scatteredwork on the social foundations of
memoryand the present, relativelylittle attentionwas paidto the issue. Evenmajorworks like Lloyd Warer's TheLiving and the Dead (1959) were con-sidered exotic. Since about 1980, however,both thepublicand academiahavebecome saturatedwith references to social or collective memory. Why has
public interestin memory grown so in the last two decades? Kammen(1995)explainsit in termsof the rise ofmulticulturalism, hefall of Communism,anda politics of victimization and regret,among other factors. Schwartz(1997)explains a decline in presidentialreputationsunder the rubric of postmoder-nity.Nora, Hutton,Le Goff, Matsuda,andHuyssen pursuesimilar lines of ex-
planationthroughan enterprise hey label "thehistoryof memory,"which wereview in greaterdetail below.It is a slightly different matterto trace the rise of scholarlyinterestin the
memory problematicand the associatedrediscoveryof Halbwachs;analytical
gave rise to interest n the social constructionof the past. First,multicultural-ists identify historiographyas a source of culturaldominationand challengedominanthistorical narratives n the name of repressedgroups.Second,post-modernistsattack heconceptualunderpinnings f linearhistoricity, ruth,and
identity,therebyraisinginterest n the relationslinking history,memory,and
power. Finally, hegemonytheoristsprovidea class-basedaccount of the poli-tics of memory,highlighting memorycontestation,popularmemory,and theinstrumentalization f the past.
Hutton(1993) traces the memoryproblematic o the historyof mentalities
that has dominated Frenchhistoriographysince the 1960s. Foucault's "ar-
chaeological"stanceprovidedgeneralphilosophical support or a desacraliza-tion of traditions. Historians like Aries (1974) and Agulhon (1981), Hutton
writes,beganto studythehistoryof commemorativepractices,whichtheysawas mechanismsof politicalpower,thusshiftinghistoriographicalnterest rom
ideology to imageryand from meaningto manipulation.Writers like Hobs-bawm-whose much-citedInventionof Traditionwas a hallmarkworkin thisvein-extended this desacralization, eeing traditionsas disingenuouseffortsto secure
political power. Accordingto Hutton, t was on this foundation hat
interestin Halbwachsrevived;his apparentlypresentistposition was seen as
anticipatingpostmodernism.The recent effort by Nora to document all the"realmsof memory" n Frenchsociety (discussed below), Huttonargues, s the
crowningmomentin this tradition.
Analogously, sociology has moved fromthe studyof social structuresandnormative ystemsto thatof"practice" Bourdieu1984,Ortner1984),expand-ing the functionalistdefinitionof cultureas norms,values,andattitudes o cul-
ture as the constitutive symbolic dimension of all social processes (Crane
1994).The view thatall
meaningframeworkshave histories and that
explicitlypast-orientedmeaningframeworksareprominentmodes of legitimationand
explanation eadsto increased nterest n socialmemorybecause it raisesques-tions about the transmission,preservation,and alterationof these frameworksover time. Social memorystudies also draw on the Mannheimian radition nthesociology of knowledgeand the Mertonian radition nthesociology of sci-ence as well as on Berger& Luckmann's(1966) social constructionism, orwhich many sociologists of memory seem to have a special affinity. Social
memorystudies thusfit squarelywithinthereorientation f culturalsociology,much like thatof recent
historiography,rominterestin "ideas
developed byknowledge specialists... [to] structuresof knowledge or consciousness that
shapethe thinkingof laypersons" Swidler& Arditi 1994) as well as drawingon oldersociological interests.
Through his reconstructionof intellectual ineages for social memorystudies,it is possible to limn a conceptualcore for ourcontemporary fforts. Theplaceto begin is Durkheim'sresponseto philosophicalpositions, in contradistinc-
tion to which he demandeda social account of temporality.For Halbwachs,Durkheim'sstudent,this meant thatstudying memorywas not a matterof re-
flecting philosophicallyon inherentpropertiesof the subjectivemind;memoryis a matterof how minds worktogether n society, how theiroperationsarenot
simply mediated but arestructuredby social arrangements: [I]tis in societythatpeople normally acquiretheir memories. It is also in society thatthey re-
call, recognize, and localize their memories..." (Halbwachs 1992, p. 38).Nonetheless, because questionsof social memoryinvolve issues of temporal-
ity, mind, and, as we see shortly, narrativeand historicity, social studies of
memoryhave remainedclose to philosophy.Halbwachsdeveloped his concept of collective memorynot only beyond
philosophybut against psychology, thoughthe very idea of a social memoryappropriatespsychological terminology. Freud had arguedthat the individ-ual's unconscious acts as a repository for all past experiences. Forgetting,
rather hanremembering, s whattakes workin the formof repressionand thesubstitutionof "screen"memories thatblock access to more disturbingones.Halbwachsrejectsthis Freudianandotherpurelypsychological accounts. He
arguesthat it is impossible for individuals to remember n any coherent and
persistent ashion outside of theirgroupcontexts:"There s [thus]nopoint,"he
argues,"inseekingwhere... [memories]arepreserved n my brainor in somenook of my mind to which I alonehave access: for they arerecalledby me ex-
ternally,and the groupsof which I am a partat anytime give me the means toreconstruct hem..." (Halbwachs1992, p. 38).
Writersin other traditions have rejected an individual-psychologicalap-proachto memory as well: Gadamer(1979), for instance,has written,"It istime to rescuethe phenomenonof memoryfrombeing regardedas a psycho-logical facultyand to see it as anessential elementof the finite historicalbeingof man"(Hutton 1993). Contemporarypsychologists Middleton & Edwards
(1990) as well encouragetheirdisciplineto recoverBartlett'sandHalbwachs'more social insights.Neisser (1982) implicitlycalls for a more social perspec-tive on memory when he argues that the standardexperimentalmethods of
cognitive psychology have been inadequatedue to the artificialityof the ex-
perimentalsetting. Pennebaker,Paez, and Rime (1997) take an explicitly so-cial psychological perspectivein theirstudies of collective memoryof politi-cal events. Preserving more of the individualistperspective, some authorshave suggested possible benefits of linking social, neuropsychological,and
Thethird,andperhapsmost contested,boundary or social memorystudiesis its relationto historiography.Halbwachs was very decisive about his solu-tion:History s deadmemory,away of preservingpaststo which we no longerhave an "organic" xperientialrelation. On the surface,this understandingofthe distinctionnegatesthe self-image of historiographyas the moreimportantor appropriate ttitude owardthe past: History'sepistemologicalclaim is de-valued in favor of memory'smeaningfulness.At a deeperlevel, however, the
distinction is the same that traditionalhistorianswould draw betweenhistoryandmemory:Onlythe former s engagedin a searchfor truth. n thisvein, Ye-
rushalmi(1982, p. 95) drawsa sharpcontrast between Jewish memory andJewishhistoriography, rguing hatuntiltheeighteenthcentury, he formerex-
cluded the latter. On the one hand, he lamentsthis conditionbecause, as he
writes,".. collective memory... is drasticallyselective. Certainmemories live
on; the rest are winnowed out, repressed,or simply discardedby a process ofnatural election which thehistorian,uninvited,disturbsand reverses."On the
otherhand,he critiqueshistoryfor its sterilepostureof distancefrommeaningandrelevance:"...Jewish historiography an never substitute or Jewishmem-
ory.... A historiographyhat does not aspireto be memorable s in perilof be-
coming a rampantgrowth" Yerushalmi1982, p. 101).Recentapproacheswithinhistoriography,however,have critiqued his un-
derstandingof the relationsbetweenhistoryandmemory.First,as historiogra-
phyhas broadened ts focus fromthe official to the social andcultural,memoryhas become central "evidence." Theorists now recognize, moreover, that
memoryfrequentlyemployshistoryin its service: Professionalhistorianshave
often providedpolitical legitimation for nationalismand other more recon-
structiveidentity struggles.This involvement calls into questionnot only the
success of historians nbeing objective,but theverynotion of objectivity tself
(Novick 1988). Furthermore,postmoderists have challenged the "truth-claim" of professionalhistoriographyby questioningthe distinctionbetween
knowledge and interpretation, ndderivativelybetween historyandmemory(White 1973, Veyne 1984). Philosophershave arguedforcefully that histori-
Iggers 1997). History is writtenby people in the present for particularpur-
poses, and the selectionandinterpretation f"sources"arealwaysarbitrary.f
"experience,"moreover,is always embedded n and occursthroughnarrative
frames,then there is no primal,unmediatedexperiencethat canbe recovered.
The distinctionbetween history and memoryin such accounts is a matterofdisciplinary power ratherthan of epistemological privilege. Burke (1989)thereforerefers to historyas social memory,using the termas "a convenient
piece of shorthandwhich sumsuptherathercomplex processof selection and
interpretation."Hutton(1993) titles his book History as an Art of Memory.Schwartzarguesthat"Sharpoppositionbetween historyand collective mem-
oryhas been our Achilles Heel, causingus to assertunwillingly,and often de-spite ourselves, that what is not historical must be 'invented' or 'con-structed'-which transformscollective memory study into a kind of cynicalmuckraking"B Schwartz,personal communication).
Before turning o thehistoryof memoryand to the substantiveresults of so-cialmemorystudies,it is possible, on thebasis of theprecedingreconstruction,to define some of the basic concepts for such an inquiry.Halbwachsdistin-
guishedamongautobiographicalmemory,historicalmemory,history,andcol-lective memory.Autobiographicalmemoryis memoryof those events thatwe
ourselvesexperience,while historicalmemoryis memorythatreaches us onlythroughhistorical records. History is the rememberedpast to which we no
longerhave an "organic" elation-the pastthat is no longeran importantpartof ourlives-while collective memoryis the activepastthatforms ouridenti-ties. Memoryinevitably gives way to historyas we lose touch with ourpasts.Historicalmemory,however, can be eitherorganicor dead: We can celebrateeven whatwe did not directlyexperience,keepingthe given past alive forus,or it can be alive only inhistoricalrecords,so-calledgraveyardsof knowledge.
Though collective memory does seem to take on a life of its own, Halb-
wachs remindsthat it is only individualswho remember,even if they do muchof this remembering ogether.And Coser (1992) points out that,while Durk-heimwrites"Society"with a capitalS, Halbwachsemploys themore cautious
"groups."Halbwachscharacterized ollective memoryasplural;he shows thatsharedmemories can be effective markers of social differentiation(Wood1994, p. 126). Some authors,nonetheless,detect the collectivist overtones ofthe Durkheimian radition n Halbwachs'work. Fentress& Wickham(1992)worry about "a concept of collective consciousness curiously disconnectedfromthe actualthought processes of any particularperson,"which risks ren-
dering"theindividual a sort of automaton,passively obeying the interiorizedcollective will."
As aresultof theseproblems,some authorspreferothertermsto "collective
memory." Sturkin (1997) defines "culturalmemory" as "memory that issharedoutsidethe avenuesof formalhistoricaldiscourseyet is entangledwithculturalproductsand imbuedwith culturalmeaning."Fentress& Wickham
(1992) refer to "social memory"ratherthan to collective memory. Olick &
Levy (1997) refer to "imagesof the past"as partsof "politicalculturalpro-files." Assmann(1992) distinguishesamongfour modes of memoryin an ef-
fort to capturethe range of memory problematics:1. mimetic memory-thetransmissionof practicalknowledge from the past;2. materialmemory-thehistory containedin objects; 3. communicativememory-the residues of the
past in languageandcommunication, ncludingthe very abilityto communi-
cate in language;and 4. culturalmemory-the transmissionof meaningsfromthe past, thatis, explicit historicalreference and consciousness.
Critics who chargethat "collectivememory"over-totalizesprefera prolif-erationof more specific termsto capture he ongoing contest over images ofthepast:official memory,vernacularmemory, publicmemory,popularmem-
ory, local memory, family memory,historicalmemory,culturalmemory,etc.Still othersarguethat a collective memoryconcepthasnothingto add to olderformulations ike myth, tradition,custom, andhistoricalconsciousness. Gedi&Elam(1996) hold thatoveruse of the termcollective memory s "anactof in-trusion... forcingitself like amolten rock into anearlier ormation...unavoid-
ably obliteratingfine distinctions...." If defined too broadly,as the pattern-maintenancefunction of society or as social reproductionper se, what is notsocial memory?On the otherhand,Burke(1989) arguesthat"if we refuse touse suchterms,we areindangerof failingto notice the differentways in whichthe ideas of individualsare influencedby the groupsto which they belong."Schwartzuses HerbertBlumer's classical distinctionbetweenoperationaland
sensitizing concepts,and classifies collective memoryas of the lattersort. He
argues that collective memory"is not an alternative o history (or historical
memory)but is rathershapedby it as well as by commemorativesymbolismand ritual. To conceive collective
memoryin this
waysensitizes us to
realitywhile encouragingus to recognize the many thingswe can do to realityinter-
pretively"(personalcommunication).In this review, we refer to "social memorystudies"as a generalrubricfor
inquiryinto the varieties of forms throughwhich we are shapedby the past,conscious andunconscious,public andprivate,materialandcommunicative,consensualandchallenged.We referto distinct sets of mnemonicpracticesinvarious social sites, rather hanto collective memoryas athing.Thisapproach,we argue,enables us to identify ways inwhichpastandpresentare intertwined
withoutreifyingamystical groupmindandwithout ncludingabsolutelyevery-thing in the enterprise.Methodologically,Olick (n.d.) and Schudson(1992)suggest specifyingthe different nstitutional ields thatproducememorysuchas politics and the arts;Olick (n.d.) and Reichel (1995) theorizethe varyinglinksbetween mediaandmemory;Wagner-Pacifici 1996) places special em-
phasis on memory'scultural orms.
The History of Memory
Instead of trying to fix conceptualdistinctionstheoretically, many scholars
have called for a historicalapproach o social memory,one thatsees such dis-tinctions as emergingin particular imes and locations and forparticularpur-poses. As Matsuda 1996, p. 16)putsit, "...memoryhas too often become an-other analytical category to impose on the past; the point should be to re-
Yet for Yates, Coleman,andCarruthers,memorizationremains central:Inearliercenturies,this form of rememberingwas of greatersignificancethanitis today. But even for those periods,an analysis of ars memoria reveals littleaboutpopularmemorydue to its elite focus. Inresponse, Geary(1994, p. 8) fo-cuses on ordinarymedieval people who, he argues,were actively engaged in
vised archivalrecords, iturgical exts, literarydocuments,doingso with refer-ence to physical remindersfrom previous generationsand a fluid oral tradi-tion...." Geary(1994) also breakswith Yates et al by expanding he definitionof memoryto include textual transmissionas well as oral memorization.
But while ancient arts of memorydo persistin the intersticesof later mne-monic forms(Matsuda1996, Casey 1987, Zonabend1984), it is virtuallyim-
possible to discuss collective memorywithouthighlightinghistoricaldevelop-ments in the materialmeans of memorytransmission.While new technologi-cal means of recording hepastare oftenseen as "artificial,"withtimetheyare
incorporated nto the accepted cultural constructof memory. By extension,contemporary nterest in the social bases of memory may be traced at least
partlyto a historical shift of memoryfrom the mind to externalloci; withoutextemalizationof memoryin "artificial" ites, the social locationof memory snot as clear. Even in earlier cultures, however, direct attentionto materialforms of memorycan yield importantnsights.
Assmann (1992), for instance, argues that while Babylonian, Egyptian,Greek,and Jewish cultures all developed the technical means for preservingthepast (word,text,writing,andbook), only theGreekand Jewishpersistedas
living traditions,due to the peculiaritiesof theirhistoricalexperiences.In theJewish case, where the entireweight of culturalcontinuityrested on funda-mentaltexts, everythingdependedon keeping them alive. This led to the de-
velopment of a new form of reading-commentary-and a new kind of his-
writinginantiquitywas theseed forthe rise of more abstract hinking.Becausethatcapabilityresided n thehandsof a smallelite,however,itwas not untilthevast expansionof literacyin the seventeenthandeighteenthcenturiesthat the
profoundpossibilities of written culturebecame a dominantculturalform.Inthe process, memorybecame a public affair,and a problematicone at that.
On the basis of this kind of macro-historical heory, many contemporaryscholars of memorywork with an image of oral culture as richly expressiveandof literatecultureas detachedandintrospective Goody 1986). "Memory,"as Hutton 1993, p. 16)putsit, "firstconceivedas arepetition, s eventuallyre-conceived as arecollection."WhereProustrevelledinthe"involuntary"mem-
ory evoked by the taste of a tea cookie, macro-historical heorists of memorydescribe modemmemoryas predominantly"voluntary" r active. Hobsbawm& Ranger(1983), for instance,distinguishsharplybetween custom andtradi-tion. The former is the unproblematic ense of continuitythatundergirds he
gradual, iving changes of "traditional"ocieties. Tradition, n contrast,aimsat invarianceand is the productof explicit ideologies.
In an importantsynthesis, Le Goff (1992) follows Leroi-Gourhan 1993[1964-1965]) in identifyingfive distinctperiodsin the historyof memory.
* First, peoples without writing possessed what Le Goff calls "ethnic
memory," n which memory practicesare not highly developed arts;LeGoff thereforesee societies withoutwritingas free, creative,and vital.
* Second, the move from prehistoryto Antiquity involved the develop-ment fromoralityto writing, though writingnever fully supplantedoraltransmission.This new condition enabledtwo importantnew mnemonic
practices-commemoration and documentary recording-associated
with emerging city structures.
* Third,memory in the Middle Ages involved "the Christianizationof
memoryandofmnemotechnology,thedivision of collective memorybe-
tween a circular iturgicalmemoryand a lay memorylittle influencedby
chronology, the developmentof the memoryof the dead andespecially
of dead saints..." (p. 68).
* Fourth,memoryas it developed fromthe Renaissance to the presentin-volved the gradualrevolutionin memory broughtaboutby the printingpress,which required he long developmentof a middle class readershipto complete its effect. With a "progressiveexteriorizationof individual
memory," he collective memory grewto such a degreethatthe individ-ual could no longer assimilate it in toto. In the nineteenthcentury,Ro-manticism added to a growing fervor for commemorating,andprolifer-
ated multifarious forms for doing so, including coins, medals, postagestamps, statuary, nscriptions,andsouvenirs.Inthe sameperiod,we wit-ness the birthof archives,libraries,andmuseums,reflectingtheinterestsof differentnationsseekingto buildshared dentitieswithintheir citizen-ries.
* Finally, changes in the twentieth century constituted anothergenuinerevolutionin memory,the most importantelement of which was the in-vention of electronic means of recordingand transmitting nformation,which not only changethe
waywe remember,but
providenew
waysof
conceptualizingmemory.Not only computersbut imageprocessingandthe immunesystem (Sturkin1997) now serve as basic models andmeta-
phorsfor thinkingaboutmemory.
A key pointinmanyhistories of memory s thata significanttransformationinthe experienceof timeoccurredatsome debatablepointbetween theMiddle
Ages andthe nineteenthcentury.Many authorsdescribe an existential crisis
arisingout of the increasedpossibility for abstract houghtdiscussed above,out of accelerating change resultingfrom increasedindustrializationand ur-
banization,as well as out of the resultantdecline of religiousworldviews andof traditional orms of political authority.Koselleck (1985), for instance,de-scribes a shift from a "space of experience"to a "horizon of expectation."Through he seventeenthandeighteenthcenturies,awide varietyof new expe-riences andevents producedan awarenessof the "noncontemporaneity f the
contemporaneous,"which led, in turn,to a sense of a humanfutureand of thedistinctness of history.Aries's (1974) work on attitudes oward deathanddy-ing in Westernculture,as well, attributes he risingimportanceandfrequencyof commemorativepracticesin thenineteenthcenturyto anincreased sense of
change:The pastwas no longer felt to be immediatelypresentbut was some-thingthatrequiredpreservationandrecovery.
Hobsbawm(1972) describesthe rise of linearhistoricalconsciousness as a
necessary solution to the existentialproblemsof rapidtransformation: Para-
sisting communities whose generationsform indissoluble links in a chain ofmemories and identities."
Othershave given similarinsightsa more criticalturn.Boyarin(1994), forinstance,points out that statist ideologies "involve a particularlypotentma-
nipulationof dimensionalities of space andtime, invoking rhetoricallyfixednational dentitiesto legitimatetheirmonopolyon administrative ontrol."Re-nan is remembered from the nineteenthcentury for having pointed out the
ways in which national identitiescombinerememberingand forgetting,with
greateremphasison the latter:They forgetthattheyare not inevitable and thattheir internalfissures may be as significantas theirexternalboundaries An-derson 1991). Duara(1995) writes that the relationshipbetween linearhis-
toricity and the nation-state is repressive:"Nationalhistory secures for thecontested andcontingentnation the false unityof a self-same,nationalsubjectevolving throughtime..." enabling "conquestsof Historical awarenessover
other, 'nonprogressive'modes of time."
Manywritershavepointedto theways in which nationalstatesconsciouslymanipulateand exploit professional history. Smith (1986) writes that "One
sign of the formationof the nation out of the protonation s the shiftingof thecenter of collective memoryfromthe templeand its priesthoodto the univer-
sity and its scholarly community."Breisbach(1994) shows that "Historians
were called on to mediate between the demands for change and the equallystrongdesire to see thecontinuityof past,present,and futurepreserved.... Pre-sentedby carefulscholars with greateloquence,these histories becamepopu-larpossessions rather hanscholarlycuriosa."Novick (1988) shows how, de-
shiphas alwaysbeen inextricably ied to contemporarypolitical problematics.Moregenerally,Levi-Strauss 1979) arguesthat "Inourown societies, historyhasreplacedmythologyand fulfills the samefunction...."Nevertheless,Noir-iel (1996) has arguedthat"thedegree to which commemorationof historical
origins is essential for building political consensus may be treated as a vari-able." Smith (1986) as well warns against either overgeneralizingor over-
specifying the urge toward historical commemoration:Nostalgia exists in
every society; in the eraof the nation-statenostalgiafor the "ethnicpast"has
merelybecome more acute.In a majorcontribution,Hobsbawm(1983) notes the proliferation n the
mid to latenineteenthcenturyof state-ledefforts to "invent"useful traditionsto shoreuptheirfading legitimacy.Particularly fter1870, inconjunctionwiththe emergenceof masspolitics, political leaders"rediscovered he importance
of 'irrational'elements in the maintenanceof the social fabric and the socialorder."Many thinkers thus advocatedthe constructionof a new "civil relig-ion;"successful leaderssoughtto imbueeducational nstitutionswith nation-alist content, to expand public ceremony,andto mass producepublic monu-
ments. Thisimpulsespread o nonstategroupsaswell, producinganinterest n
genealogies of all sorts, includingsocial registersfor the upperclasses. With
more emphasis on local cultures in the nation-buildingprocess, Confino(1997) shows how Germannation-building n the nineteenthcentury(andbyextension othernation-buildingprojectselsewhere) requiredassimilatingdi-
verse regionalmemoriesinto one coherentnationalidentity,which was suc-
cessful only when the nationalwas mediatedthrough ocal categories.Not all thinkersof the nineteenthcentury,however,championed hisprolif-
erationof history.Nietzsche (1983) was highly critical of his age's pervasive
productionof thepastin bothits scientific and monumentalguises. Whilerec-
ognizingthat t is thepowerto bringthepastto life that constitutes he human-
ity of humanbeings, Nietzsche also claims that an excess of historycan de-stroyourhumanity:"Thepast,"he writes,"hasto be forgotten f it is not to be-
come the gravediggerof the present."Many contemporarywriterson social
memory quoteBorges's shortstory about"Funes the Memorious,"depictingtheagonyof ayoungmanwho has lost theabilityto forget.Nietzsche sees his-
sandsof yearsago in the ambienceof the oldest formsof craftsmanship" ave
lost theirmost basic support"becausethereis no moreweaving andspinningto go on while... [stories]arebeing listenedto.""Boredom,"Benjamin(1968)writes, "is the dreambirdthat hatchesthe egg of experience.A rustlingin the
leaves driveshim away.... Withthis, the gift for listeningis lost and the com-
came the tasks of specially formed national commissions during the War.
Paradoxically, ust as the effect of warwas felt morebrutally hanever among
civilianpopulations, he tasks of consolation weremade morepublicthaneverbefore. As a result,"Thememoryof the warwas refashioned nto a sacredex-
periencewhich providedthenation with a new depthof religious feeling, put-ting at its disposal ever-presentsaints and martyrs,places of worship, and a
heritageto emulate."Additionally,Winter(1995) explores the new formsofwarmemorialthatemergedto appropriatehe devastationof totalwarforna-tionalpurposes,thoughhe emphasizestheproliferationof more introspectiveforms too. Gillis (1994) notes thatWorld War I markeda massive democrati-zation of the cult of the dead. Ina detailedstudyof warliterature hatemerged
inGreatBritain,Fussell (1975) characterizeshiscorpusas comprisingapecu-liarly"modem" orm of memory.
While theFirstWorld Warthuscreatednew attitudes owardboththepres-ent andthepast, theHolocaust is said to haveproducedaneven moredecisivecrisis of representation."We are dealing,"writes Friedlander 1992, p. 3),"withaneventwhichtests ourtraditional onceptualandrepresentationalate-
gories, an 'event atthe limits."'There is the oft-quotedremarkof Adoro thatto writelyricpoetryafterAuschwitzis barbaric.By extension,manyhavepor-trayedthe Holocaust as challengingthe validity of any totalizingview of his-
tory (Friedlander1992, p. 5). In Germanintellectual circles, this issue hasspawnedan ongoing debatebetween those who maintainthatthe Holocaustwas uniqueand thosewho call for"historicizing"t. The literatureon Germandebatesaboutthe Nazi past is too voluminousto even begin to report.Good
changes in warmemorialsafterthe Second WorldWar,notingthatthe mem-
ory of war is now understoodin a new way. Where nationalistleaders ex-ploited a cult of the wardeadafterthe FirstWorld Warto foment furtherna-
tionalist sentiment,memory after Auschwitz and Hiroshimahas often beenmoreproblematic Bosworth 1993). Whereearliermonumentsaimedto exac-erbate resentmentfor future campaigns, many later monumentsworked toerase a clearburden.Indeed,Young (1992) goes so faras to implicatetheveryformof monumentalization n the forgetting:"...once we assign monumentalform to memory,we have to some degreedivestedourselves of the obligationto remember."Adoro (1967) hadmany yearsearlierpointedoutthe associa-tion between the words "museum"and"mausoleum."
While some authorsmake the Holocaustthe decisive turningpoint, others
see in it merelyone last andmost horriblestage in a developmentalreadyun-der way-one which included recognition of horrors of colonialism, twoworld wars, racism, environmentaldamage, etc-on the road to postmoder-nity. In either case, from early intimations of postmodernism n Heidegger,
through he criticaltheoryof BenjaminandAdoro, to thepostmodernist he-
ory of the 1980s, the connectedproblemsof time andmemoryhavebeen cen-
tral issues for culturalcriticism.Postmoder writers have addressed he rup-turedsense of continuityandthemultipletemporalities hattheysee as charac-
terizingourhighlymediatedsociety. Whilemanyof these theoristshave made
important nsights,we focus verybrieflyon only two here,Huyssenand Nora.For acritiqueof thepostmodernistaccountof memoryasoverlyunilinear n its
critiqueof unilinearity,see Schwartz(1997).In TwilightMemories,AndreasHuyssen(1995) characterizes he situation
of memoryin postmoderity as paradoxical.He notes the simultaneouspopu-larityof museums and theresurgenceof the monumentand the memorialat the
sametime there is an "undisputedwaningof historyand historical conscious-ness."Novelty, he says, is now associatedwithnew versions of thepastratherthanwithvisions of the future.Thismemoryboom, however, is not to be con-fused with the historical fever to legitimatizenation-states hat Nietzsche de-
rided."Incomparison, he mnemonic convulsionsof ourcultureseem chaotic,
fragmentary,andfree-floating."His pessimism, however, is not complete, and his analysis is perceptive:
"The currentobsession with memory,"Huyssenwrites,"is not simplya func-tion of the fin de siecle syndrome,anothersymptomof postmodernpastiche.
Instead, t is a sign of the crisisof thatstructure f temporality hat marked heage of modernitywith its celebrationof the new asutopian,as radicallyandir-
sis of memoryto theforgettingat the centerof thecommodity,Huyssenrelates
the furtherdevelopmentof mediatechnologies since theirtimeto "theevident
crisis of the ideology of progress and modernizationand to the fading of awhole traditionof teleological philosophiesof history."As a result,the post-modem conditionof memoryis not wholly one of loss: "Thus the shift from
notions of historyrather hanbeing simply anti-historical, elativistic,or sub-jective." Thecontemporary risis of memory,Huyssen argues,"representshe
attempt o slow down informationprocessing,to resist the dissolution of timeinthesynchronicityof thearchive,to recovera modeof contemplationoutsidethe universeof simulationandfast-speedinformationand cable networks,to
claim some anchoringspace in a world of puzzling and often threateninghet-
much of memory,"he writes, "becausethereis so little of it left."Nora can in
thisway be seen as the trueheirto Halbwachs,who noted thepassingof mem-
ory into historyas we lose a living relation to the past, thoughNora sees thisprocess as even more dramaticandirreversible,andas moreclearlypolitical,than Halbwachs did. Where premoder societies live within the continuous
past, contemporarysocieties have separatedmemory from the continuityofsocial reproduction;memoryis now a matterof explicit signs, not of implicitmeanings.We now compartmentalizememoryas a mode of experience;our
only recourse is to representandinventwhat we can no longer spontaneously
the latter:"Ifwe were able to live withinmemory,we would not have neededto consecratelieux de memoirein its name."
Nora's projectis to catalogueall of theseplaces of memoryin Frenchsoci-
ety. He organizestheanalysesaround hreeprincipleswhich he sees as layeredon top of one another n telling ways: theRepublic,theNation,and "LesFran-
ces." For Nora, this ordering representsa historicalprogressionfrom unity,throughuncertainty,to multiplicity. The peculiar status of the second, the
memory-nation, s the linchpin. In its ascendancy,the memory-nationreliedon national historicalnarratives o providecontinuity through dentity.In the
nineteenthcentury,change was still slow enough that states could control itthroughhistoriography.But, Nora argues,the nation as a foundationof iden-
tityhas erodedas the state has cededpowerto society. Thenationitself, earliershoredup by memory, now appearsas a mere memorytrace. In contrast totheoriesof the nation discussed above, Nora thus sees the nation-stateas de-
clining in salience, the last incarnationof the unification of memoryand his-
tory, a form in which history could provide the social cohesion memoryno
longercould. Historytoo has now lost its temporaryabilityto transmitvalueswith pedagogical authority(Wood 1994). All that is left, as Hutton(1993)
characterizesNora'sproject,is to autopsythepast,at best to celebrate ts cele-brations.
Manywriters,however,notethatolderstyles of memorypersistinthe inter-
stices of modem historicalconsciousness, andthey see in this coexistence an
indictmentof cleardichotomybetweenmemoryandhistory(Zonabend1984),while othersworrythatsuch accountsareinappropriatelyeleological. Rappa-port (1990), moreover,chargesthat the dichotomybetween oral andwrittenmodes of memory serves a colonialist mentalitythat devalues non-Westernforms of remembering.These critiquesnotwithstanding, t is clear that the
situation of memoryhas changedratherdramaticallyboth over the centuriesandespecially in the last few decades. Nora's approachraises as many ques-tions as it answers:Given the scope of the cataloguingproject,what is not alieu de memoire? Isn't the attemptto catalogueeven what one recognizes as
impoverished memory traces itself a political act of recuperation Englund1992)?Nonetheless,Nora's theoryremains he mostcomprehensiveempiricaleffort to confront the contemporary ituation of memory.Where Yates sug-gests a historyof memory,Nora takes it to a programmaticevel.
Processes of Social Memory:Statics andDynamics
The historyof memoryoutlinedabove makes clearthatmemoryis not anun-
changingvessel forcarrying hepastintothepresent;memory s aprocess,nota thing,anditworksdifferentlyatdifferentpointsin time(Zelizer1995). Soci-
ologists of memoryhave thus sought to specify at a more middle level how
memoryprocessesoperatewithin
specificsocial institutions.Here the
quintes-sentialsociological issues of power,stratification, ndcontestationarecentral.One meritof Nora's project s thatit remindsus of all the differentplaces his-torical imageryandpracticesoccur. Sociologists have long studiedmany ofthese sites andpractices n anattempt o understand hestatics anddynamicsofsocial reproduction.Key terms here include identity,contestation,malleabil-
ity, andpersistence.
Identity
Erikson(1959) is usuallycreditedwith introducing he identityconceptto de-scribepsychological developmentover the life course:personalidentity,de-
spite periodic crises, is self-sameness over time. A recent narrativeturn in
they areseen as ongoing processes of construction n narrative orm (Bruner1990, Calhoun1994). As Maclntyre(1984, p. 218) puts it, "...all attempts oelucidate the notionof personal dentity[and,by extension,group dentity]in-
dependentlyof and in isolation from the notions of narrative... are bound tofail."As Hallwrites,"Identities personalorcollective] arethenameswe give
to the differentways we arepositioned by, andpositionourselvesin, the narra-tives of thepast" Huyssen 1995,p. 1). Identitiesareprojectsandpractices,not
properties.Manyrecent social theorists have extendedthe conceptto the social level,
noting, as Maclntyredoes, that "Thepossession of an historicalidentityand
thepossession of a social identitycoincide."As Hobsbawm(1972) writes,"To
be amemberof anyhumancommunity s to situateoneself withregard o one's
(its)past,if onlyby rejecting t." In amuch-quoted ormulation,Bellahand co-
authors(1985, p. 153) write that "Communities... have a history-in an im-
portant ense are constitutedby theirpast-and for this reasonwecan
speakof
a real communityas a 'communityof memory,' one that does not forget its
past. In ordernot to forget thatpast, a communityis involved in retellingits
story, its constitutive narrative.""Thetemporaldimension of pastness,"Wal-
lerstein (1991, p. 78) adds, "is central and inherent n the concept of people-hood."
A crucial inkbetweenthe literatures n identityandmemoryconcernshowwe acquireourpersonaland social identities.Halbwachspaidparticular tten-tion to the role of the family in shapinghow we construct he past;Zerubavel
(1996) generalizesthis insightby discussingwhat he calls "mnemonicsociali-zation" nto "mnemoniccommunities.""All subsequent nterpretations f our
early 'recollections,"'he writes, "areonly reinterpretations f the way theywere originallyexperiencedand rememberedwithin the context of our fam-
ily." Muchof what we "remember,"moreover,we did not experienceas indi-viduals. "Indeed,"Zerubavelwrites, "beingsocial presupposesthe ability to
experienceevents thathappenedto groupsand communitiesto which we be-long long before we joined themas if they werepartof our own past...." This
"sociobiographicalmemory"is the mechanismthroughwhich we feel pride,pain, or shame with regardto events thathappenedto our groupsbefore we
joined them.Another centralconceptualtool for analyzingthis intersectionbetween in-
dividual and collective identities as constitutedthroughsharedmemories isthatof generations.Mannheim's(1952 [1928]) seminalwork herearguesthatsocial andpoliticalevents shapegenerations hroughmajorsharedexperience
during heir formativeyears.It is notanaccidentthatthenotion of generationsfloweredinEuropeafterWorldWarI. The war createda felt communityof ex-
perienceespecially amongthe soldiers. Wohl (1979) refers to "thegenerationof 1914," whose members, following Mannheim'stheory, were in the rightplace (totalwar)at the righttime (when they were young men) to form a par-ticularly clearly demarkedgeneration.Schuman& Scott (1989) develop andtest Mannheim's theories about the connections between generationsandso-cial memoryby askingdifferentage cohortsto rankvarioushistoricaleventsinterms of theirperceived importance.Strikingresponsedifferences,theyargue,
demonstrate hatgenerationaldifferences in memoryare strong,that adoles-cence andearlyadulthoodare indeed theprimaryperiodsfor"generationalm-
printing n the sense of political memories,"and that later memories can bestbe understood n termsof earlierexperiences.Shils (1981) pointsoutthat new
generationsdefine themselves againsttheirelders andthusbeara differentre-lation to the past than previous generations.Theorists of nationalism have
pointed out (Smith 1986, Anderson 1991) thatnationalistmovements almost
always centrallyinvolve youthmovements.In the previous section, we saw thatthe nation-state,despite internaldivi-
sions along generational,regional, religious,and other ines, has often claimedto be theprimary ormof organizingsocial identity.But in thehistoryof mem-
ory,thisremainsa broadepochal generalization.Sociologists have studiedat acloser level how this aim to dominateidentitymanifestsitself throughcollec-
tive mnemonicprocesses. Collectivememorydoes not merelyreflectpastex-
periences (accurately or not); it has an orientational function (Schwartz
1996a).As Schwartzputsit, "collectivememoryis botha mirroranda lamp-a model of anda model for society"(personal communication).
National and other dentitiesare establishedandmaintained hrougha vari-
ety of mnemonic sites, practices, and forms. Spillman(1997), for instance,
compares he role of centennialand bicentennialcelebrations n Australiaandthe United States, demonstrating he differentways each of these countriesused commemorations o addressdiverse issues. Hunt(1984) explores cloth-
ing, medals, language,and othersymbolic formsas well, as markersof mem-
ory and identity.Cerulo(1995) examinesnationalanthems,thoughshe does
not make the connectionto social memoryexplicit. Schwartz 1990, 1991) andGoode(1978), not to mentiontheclassical work of ThomasCarlyle(1901), ex-amine the role of heroes in national dentity.Coontz(1992) documentsnostal-
gia for earlier"golden ages,"as does Smith(1986), who notes the importanceof origin myths in creatingandmaintaining dentities. Zerubavel(1995) dis-cusses nationalmythologies,andassociatedphysical places, as orderingprin-ciples for articulationsof nationalmemory. Ferguson(1994), Boyer (1994),andHaydon(1995) examinethewaysurban orm embodiesa vision of identityby inscribingthe past. Muensterberger1994) explores collecting as a mne-
monic practice,while Bennett(1995) undertakesa historyof the museumandof the world'sfairas sites forarticulatingnational dentities.Rochberg-Halton(1986) studies the role of household objects in establishingthe relations be-tween memoryandidentity.Olick (1993, 1997) examinespolitical speech asmnemonicpractice.Dayan & Katz (1992) see the mass media as producingelectronic monuments hatcompetewithhistorywritingto frame social mem-
ory; Lang & Lang (1989) examinethe role of the news in forging collective
memory.The literatureon film andnationalmemoryis enormous.Therearemany important ase studiesof the connectionsbetweenmemory
andparticularnationalidentities,emphasizingbothpositive andnegative as-pects of those historical formations. Rousso (1991) and Maier (1988) studyhow France and Germanyrespectively confront their difficult legacies ofWorld WarII. Roniger(1997) andNino (1996) look at how various countriesin the SouthernCone, includingChile, Uruguay,andArgentina,confrontthe
memoryof humanrightsviolations.Aguilar(1997) discusses the problematiclegacy of the SpanishCivil War forsubsequentregimes.Trouillot(1995) ana-
lyzes the complex memories of colonialismandcontemporary trugglesoverhistorical dentityin Haiti. Sturkin 1997) examines memories of Vietnamand
of the AIDS epidemic in the United States as sites for working out nationalidentity.Buruma 1994) comparesJapaneseand Germanmemoriesof the Sec-ond WorldWar.Gluck(1993) examines differentepochsinJapanesememory.A special issue of thejournal Representationseditedby Greenblatt,Rev, and
Starn(1995) studies struggles in EasternEuropewith memory of pre-1989events; a volume editedby Watson(1994) examines memoryunder state so-
cialism; Tumarkin 1994) has written on the cult of World War II in Russia.Borneman(1997) analyzes how various central and easternEuropeancoun-
trieshave settledaccounts after1989 with theirCommunistpasts,as does Ro-
senberg(1995).Herzfeld(1991) uses ethnography o analyzethe complex negotiationsbe-
tween local and nationalmemories in a Greektown, as does Confino (1997)for WilhelmineGermany.Kammen(1991, 1978) is the preeminentanalystofAmericanmemory, documenting he changingforms of historicalconscious-
ness in Americanhistory;Thelen (1989) has edited an importantvolume on
Americanidentity.Segev (1993) and Zerubavel 1995) presentrichstudies of
memoryin Israeli collective identity.Darian-Smith& Hamilton(1994) have
edited a volume on Australianmemory. A massive tome sponsoredby the
HolocaustMemorial Center(Wyman 1996) containsmonographson how 24
differentnationsreactedto theHolocaust,exploringhow thateventshapedna-tional identities and vice versa.Rapaport 1997) and Irwin-Zarecka1989) re-searchhow Jews in contemporaryGermanyandPoland,respectively, live in
the lands of their formeroppressors.Oneparticularlyvibrantarea of debateconcerningthe connection between
memory and identity has been scholarshipconcerning heritage. The classicwork in this field is Lowenthal's (1985) monumental The Past Is a ForeignCountry,which documents heways in which nationalpasts, particularlyheirbuilt and geographicalremains,are reshapedaccordingto present interests.
Heritagesites appear o be especially useful for dramatizing he historicityofthe nation,particularly n GreatBritain.Indeed,the heritagedebate has beenmost heated in Britain, which possesses an elaboratephysical legacy and
which has a substantialhistory of propagating t. Barthel (1996) comparessuch debatesin Great Britain and the United States, findingmore democraticand inclusive versions in the United States and more elitist programs n theUnited Kingdom; Koshar (1994) studies such processes in West Germany.Wright(1985) has provideda detailed account of British debatesand, alongwith Hewison (1987), criticizes the nostalgia "industry"or producingmind-
less, pacifying, andpolitically conservative commodificationsof the national
past.Samuel(1994), on the otherhand,sees aredemptivepotential n theheri-
tage industry; o argueotherwise is to denigratepopularconsciousness in the
name of the people. Manyothers have documentedthe commercializationofnostalgia,particularly n the form of reconstructedvillages, Disneylandver-sions of the Americanpast,andsouvenirs(Davis 1979).Foraninformativere-view of the literatureon nostalgia, see Vromen(1993).
National identities, of course, are not the only ones available, but he-
gemonicforces withinthenation-statehave workedhard o appropriate ndsi-
lence otheridentitydiscourses. As Alonso (1988) explains,"Historicalchro-nologies solder a multiplicityof personal,local, andregionalhistoricities andtransform hem into a unitary,nationaltime." Almost all of the studiesjustmentioned,however, highlightnot the simplicity or unity of national narra-
tives, but the fact thatthey areessentiallycontested:Memorysites and mem-
ory practicesare centralloci for ongoing strugglesover identity.As Sturkin
(1997) puts it, "Culturalmemory is a field of culturalnegotiation throughwhich different storiesvie for a place in history."This soundsalmost too be-
nignandpassive;peopleandgroupsfighthard ortheirstories. Contestation s
clearlyat the center of bothmemoryandidentity.
Contestation
Memorycontestation akesplace from above andbelow, fromboth centerand
periphery.The critical theoristsof nationalism discussed above noticed thatnation-statesnot only use historyfor theirpurposes,but makehistoriographyinto a nationalistenterprise.Indeed,Wilson et al (1996) document how na-tional governmentsseek to controlthe very "sources"of professionalhistori-
ography by limitingaccess to state archives. "The
hegemonyof moder
nation-states,"Alonso writes(1988), "and he legitimacywhichaccruesto the
groupsandclasses that control theirapparatuses,arecriticallyconstitutedbyrepresentationsof a nationalpast."This is accomplishedthroughthe related
strategiesof naturalization,departicularization, nd idealization. This meansthathistoryas a tool has until recentlynot been easily available to competingidentities;as a result,otherclaimants often have not been very good competi-tors. As Foucault(1977) put it, "Since memory is actuallya very importantfactor in struggle... if one controlspeople'smemory,one controls theirdyna-mism."
In order o resist the disciplinarypowerof nationalisthistoriography,Fou-caultarticulated notionof"counter-memory," eferring o memories thatdif-fer from, and often challenge, dominantdiscourses. In a similarvein, manyscholarsin the past several decades have soughtto redirecthistoricalinquiry
awayfrom the nation-stateas aunitof analysisin favorof groupsandperspec-tives excluded from traditional accounts. Feminist historians, for instance,have soughtto recover therepressedhistoryof women thathas been left outof
"official"histories.Oralhistorians(Thompson1988) see theirenterpriseas a
way of giving "historyback to the people in their own words:"It claimsto bemore democraticthan otherhistoriographicalmethodologiesbecause it pro-vides an alternativeviewpoint from below, a viewpoint that conventional
methodologydisenfranchises.Feministsandoralhistorians, n fact,have often
combinedtheirefforts to recover the lost voices of ordinarywomen's experi-ence (Leydesdorffet al 1996).
The dominanceof nationalmemoryover othermemoriesthusnot only ex-cludesothercontestants orcontrol over the national dentitybutmaintains he
primacyof nationalover otherkinds of identityforprimaryallegiance.On theotherhand,counter-memoryapproachesoften employa ratheressentialistno-tion of authenticity:Counter-memorys sometimesseen asprotectedandsepa-ratefromhegemonic forms.To resistthis, the Popular MemoryGroup(John-son et al 1982) andothersemployingthe conceptof popularmemory(Lipsitz1990, Wallace 1996) have sought to understandpopularmemoryin terms of
ongoing processes of contestation and resistance, a relatively free space of
readingandreaction n whichofficial andunofficial,publicandprivate, nter-penetrate.Dominantmemoryis notmonolithic,noris popularmemorypurelyauthentic.Some historians of gender arguethat"focusing exclusively on thedominatedmakesa full understanding ven of the originsandmaintenanceoftheirsubordinationmpossible" Leydesdorffet al 1996). "The ntertwiningof
power and memory,"these authorswrite, "is very subtle... when we as oralhistorians try to rescue and interpretthese memories... we also inevitablytransform heirstandingandcharacteras memories."
Achieving mnemonic consensus is thus rarely easy, chargedas it is with
transcending he infinityof differencesthatconstituteandareconstitutedby it.As Thelen (1989) puts it, "Thestruggle for possession and interpretation f
memoryis rooted in the conflict andinterplayamongsocial, political,and cul-turalinterests..." "It is a product,"Irwin-Zarecka 1994) writes, "of a greatdeal of work by large numbersof people." Many empiricalstudies have fo-cusedon these struggles,especiallyover the mostpublicrepresentations f the
past to be found in monumentsand museums. Wagner-Pacifici& Schwartz
(1991), for instance, introducea notion of culturalentrepreneurshipn their
studyof the strugglefor theVietnamVeteransMemorial.Theessays inLinen-
thal & Engelhardt(1996) documentso-called history wars over a proposedSmithsonianexhibit on the bombingof Hiroshima.Savage (1994) character-izes AmericanCivil Warmemorials as involving "systematicculturalrepres-sion, carriedout in the guise of reconciliationandharmony."But as much asmonumental ormstrives forpermanence,Savageargues,"theculturalcontestthatmonumentsseem to settle neednot endonce theyare builtanddedicated":Even the most concretepresentationsof the past arepolysemic. Along theselines, Sandage (1993) showed how African-Americancivil rightsgroups ap-propriated he LincolnMemorial as a site for articulating heirclaims.
Groupscan also use images of the past andstrugglesover historyas vehi-cles for establishingtheirpower or, perversely, lack of power. Baker(1985)demonstrateshow revolutionaries n eighteenth-centuryFranceused memoryto achieve their movement aims. Bodnar (1992) shows how various ethnic
groups in the 1920s used national holidays to articulate their versions ofAmerican identity and to claim a unique place in the cultural landscape.
Takezawa 1995) documents heJapanese-AmericanmovementforredressinginternmentduringWorldWarII. De Oliver(1996) analyzesthe struggleover
containingalternativevoices at the Alamo historic site. There are numerousother such studies of contestationandsocial movementsdemandingan inver-sion of some past or a new monumental nterpretation.
Malleability and Persistence
Noticing theways in which imagesof thepastare theproductsof contestationhas led varietiesof both constructionistsanddeconstructionists o
emphasizethatthepastis produced n thepresentandis thus malleable.A powerfulline ofso-called "presentism" unsthroughmuch of the sociological work on mem-
ory,workwhich documents heways in which imagesof thepastchangeover
time, how groupsuse the past for presentpurposes,and that the past is a par-ticularlyuseful resourceforexpressing nterests.Withinpresentism,however,it is possible to emphasizeeither nstrumental rmeaningdimensions of mem-
ory:The formersee memoryentrepreneurships amanipulation f thepastfor
particular urposeswherethe lattersee selective memoryas an inevitable con-
sequenceof the fact that we
interprethe world-including the
past-onthe
basis of our own experience and within cultural frameworks.Hobsbawm&
Ranger (1983) areparadigmaticexamples of instrumentalpresentism,whileMead (1959 [1932]) and Mannheim (1956) manifest the latter variety;Halbwachs(1992) combineselements of both.
In response to the perceived ascendancyof presentismin social memorystudies, a number of authorshighlight limits on the malleabilityof the past.Schudson(1989, 1992), forinstance,arguesthat "Thepastis in somerespects,and under some conditions,highly resistant o effortsto makeit over." Three
factors, accordingto
Schudson,limit our abilities to
changethe
past:The
structure f availablepasts presentsonly somepastsandposes limitsto thede-
gree to which they can be changed,while placingotherpasts beyond ourper-ceptualreach; he structure f individualchoicemakes somepastsunavoidable
and othersimpossibleto face; andthe structureof social conflict overthepastmeans thatwe arenot always the ones decidingwhich pasts to rememberand
which to forget. In his important tudyof Watergate n Americanmemoryas
well, Schudson(1992) respondsto the instrumentalist laim of infinitemalle-
abilityby takingthe limits on such manipulabilitynto account.In
contrast,Schwartz
(1991, 1996) respondsto the culturalclaim of malle-
ability: Certainpasts, while somewhatmalleable, are remarkablypersistentovertime. Schuman& Scott (1989) and Middleton& Edwards 1990) empha-size individual-levelprocesseslikegenerational xperienceandpersonal den-
tities, while Schwartz andothers look at institutional actors. Schwartzdocu-mentshow certainmeaningsremainrelevantover long periodsof time despite
superficialchangesin thereadingof those meaningsas well as in their institu-tionalcontexts;certainpastsare constitutiveelements of politicalcultures,andthese endureas long as thepoliticalculture s notcompletelysuperseded.Evenwhen radically new pasts emerge, they often superimposethemselves overolder versions withouteliminatingthem. As Shils (1981) sumsup a moreex-treme version of this argument,"traditionalpatternsof belief and conduct...arevery insistent;they will not wholly release theirgripon those who would
suspendorabolishthem."Shils also emphasizesthatthepersistenceof thepastcan be an explicit goal, as in self-conscious orthodoxies,thus mixing instru-
ertial." Halbwachs discusses how memories become generalized over timeinto an "imago,"a generalized memorytrace. Conservatives see this kind of
change in memoryas decay and seek ways to recuperate he lost past. Shils
(1981) and Assmann(1992), amongothers,discusspaststhatremainthe same
simply out of the force of habit. Connerton's 1989) focus on memory"incor-
porated" n bodily practices(as opposed to that"inscribed"n print, encyclo-pedias, indexes, etc) suggests this sortof inertia.Drawingon Elias's civilizing
process andBourdieu'swork on consumption,he arguesfora "mnemonicsofthe body."
Table 1 summarizesthis discussion by identifyingsix ideal types of mne-monic malleabilityor persistence: 1. instrumentalpersistence-actors inten-
tionally seek to maintaina particularversion of the past, as in orthodoxyormovementsto maintainor recovera past;2. culturalpersistence-a particularpastperseveresbecause it remainsrelevantfor latercultural ormations moregeneral images are more likely to adaptto new contexts than more specificones); 3. inertialpersistence-a particularpast occurs when we reproducea
version of the past by sheer force of habit;4. instrumental hange-we inten-tionally change an image of the past for particularreasons in the present(though we cannot always predict the results of our efforts); 5. cultural
ticularimages die, our mnemoniccapabilities decay, or we simply forget.Oneproblemwith instrumentalist nd inertialaccountsof changeorpersis-
tence is that they locate the statics and dynamics of memoryoutside of thememories themselves. Even culturalapproaches,while emphasizingmean-
ings, seem to locatethe source of changeinpoliticalcultures,not in thetextual
dynamics of memory itself. To remedy this exogenous bias, Olick & Levy(1997) arguethatwhethera particularpast persists or not depends partlyonhow it is constituted:Mythic logics producetaboos and duties while rational
logics produceprohibitionsandrequirements;he formerrequirebold acts of
transgression o changethemwhile the lattercan be changed hroughargumentand refutation.Olick (1997) also refinesculturalist heories of mnemonicdy-namicsby pointingoutthatculturalpersistenceorchangeis notmerelya mat-ter of fit or lack of fit with context,norof whethera particularmemoryis de-fensible as accurateor authentic:Memories formgenresthatunfold over time
by referringnot only to their contexts and to the "original" vent, but to theirown histories and memories as texts.
Reputations and Knowledge
Two empiricalareasthat have seen a greatdeal of work on the staticsanddy-namics of memory are reputationstudies and the sociology of knowledge.While the sociology of reputation s not an entirelynew field-biographieshave always dealt with image-it concentrates n an unprecedentedway onhow individualsare remembered ather han how they lived. Often these stud-ies begin by recognizingthatreputationsareonly loosely correlatedwith life-time achievements;not only talent,but social factorsplay a role in securingandmaintaining he outstandingreputationsof individuals.
Various authors, including especially Lang & Lang (1988) and Taylor
(1996), appear o haveconvergedon explanations ntermsof fourbasic factorsin reputationaldynamics.First,personalstrategizingandpoliticalmaneuver-
ing by the figureor his or herrepresentativescan controlthe figure's image.Strategies include seclusion, autobiography, lamboyance, forging relationswith patrons,etc. Lang& Lang (1988) note thatin orderto catchthe eyes of
dealers,collectors, curators,and arthistorians,artistshave toproducea criticalmass of work,keep adequaterecords o guaranteeproperattribution, ndmake
arrangements or custodianship.Institutionalpractices like record-keepingalso favor some kindsof reputation orpreservationover others.
Second,imageis influencedby those with a stakein aparticular eputation.Latour 1988), for instance,arguesthat Pasteur'sreputation preadas doctorsandhygienists alignedthemselves with the scientist's cause to promotetheirown professional interests.De Nora (1995) shows how Beethoven benefited
from admirationby an aristocraticmusicalpublic that was pivotal in shapingthe narrativeof his genius. Schudson (1990) reveals how Ronald Reagan's
popularitywas constructedby an oral political culturein Washington,DC.Donoghue (1996) arguesthat in the eighteenth-century iterarymarket, t was
reviewers, and not the authorsthemselves, who were chiefly responsiblefor
creatingnarrativesof literarycareers.
Third,the impactof culturalfactors on reputation s theorizedin two dis-tinctways. Forthose who view culturalpatternsas distinct fromtalent,cultureworks to boost somereputationsat theexpense of othersas amatterof happen-stance.Lang& Lang(1990), forinstance,discuss the influence of ideology on
abilityas a symbolic form for a varietyof sentiments hatmayhavenothingtodo directly with art." In a different approach,culturaltheorists (Bourdieu1984) who focus on the constructednatureof taste show how reputationsde-
pendon strugglesforprestigeandpositionthatemploycultureas a tool andasmarkers.De Nora (1995, p. 180), for instance,details how Beethoven's pro-motion of a sturdierpianohelpedcreatenew aestheticcategorieswithinwhichhis music "couldmake sense andbe positively evaluated."Reviews of Beetho-ven's work became more favorable as personal idiosyncrasiesand creativitycame to be valued inthe music-criticaldiscourse as a "higher" ormof music.
Similarly,Tuchman& Fortin(1984) show how women were "edgedout" ofthe literary ield:As menentered hefield, thenovel roseto high-culture tatuswhile the themes andstyles of women's writingwere demoted to popularcul-ture. Zelizer (1992) shows how professional ournalistsused the Kennedyas-sassinationandtheireulogies of himto advancetheirown authoritative tatus.
A fourth line of work on reputationshows how reputationsrespond tobroadernarrativeand cultural orms. We have a tendency,theorists of reputa-tion argue,to exaggeratebothgreatnessand evil. One of the earliestreputationstudies (Connelly 1977), for instance,demonstrateshow the figure of Robert
E. Lee was invested withextraordinarymportbecause,acrossmany years,hisimageacted as apalimpseston which contemporary oncernscould be writtenandrewritten.Schwartz 1990) documentshow Lincoln's imagechangedfromone of simple accessibility to that of a "remote and dignified personage."Schwartz (1991) also shows how Washington'sreputationalmalleability istiedupwiththechangingneeds of differentperiodsinAmericanhistory,while
maintaininga common core of continuity.In his now classic study, Pelikan
(1985) shows how thevarying representation f Jesus reflectedparticularpre-occupationsof differentsocieties in differentperiods.
Fromthe otherside, Ducharme& Fine (1995) show how villains-in theircase, BenedictArnold-are remembered n muchworse lightthantheirdeeds
mightwarrant;Johnson(1995) discusses the rehabilitationof RichardNixon.
Additionally, Taylor(1996, p. 261) notes that"we areparticularlyproneto re-
memberstimuli associatedwithmajorchangesin a niche."Ithelpsone's repu-tation,Latour 1988) argues,to be associated with the dawn of a new erain a
particular ield. Othershavecarried his line of argument ven further,arguingthat the very possibility of distinctivereputations s tied up with the careerofthe genius notionin the cultureat large.Heinich(1996), for instance,inquiresinto thehistoryof thecategoryof talentinherstudyof TheGloryof VanGogh,as does Gamson(1994) in his study of the categoryof celebrityin Americanculture.
Anotherempiricalfield where sociologists have studied the dynamics of
memory is the sociology of science and knowledge. Research on scientific
knowledge is concerned argelywith the problemof forgetting,while investi-
"sociological amnesia"andattributes t to institutional actorsincludingaca-
demia's rewardstructure,mythsof scientificprogress,and the lack of mecha-
nisms for punishing unintentional borrowers. Gans is aware that Sorokin
(1956) hadalreadymade the samepoint.Merton 1973) also documentedhowscientists tend to forgetthe originsof their ideas: Scientists arecommittedto
anideology of originaldiscovery,"which s embedded n all the formsof insti-
tutionallife, along with prizes andnamingof plants,animals,measurements,and even diseases after scientists." Good ideas, moreover,arethe productsof
climates of opinion; t is thus oftenpointlessto askwho saidsomethingfirst,as
Mertondemonstrates n his study of the expression,"onthe shouldersof gi-ants"(1985 [1965]).
Some works, figures, and ideas, however, tend to be singled out andpre-
served as particularlymportant.Justas forreputation,one important actorishow closely associatedwith amajorrupture work orideais, in Kuhn'sterms,how close to a paradigmshift. As Levine (1995) notes, moreover,disciplineshave collective memoriesthat establishand maintain heir identities.Douglas
(1986) arguesthat a theoryis more likely to be remembered f it sharesbasic
formulae,equations,and rules of thumbwith theoriesin other fields: "Onthe
principleof cognitive coherence, a theory that is going to gain a permanent
place inthepublicrepertoireof what is knownwill needto interlockwithother
kinds of theories."Tuchman& Fortin 1984), as alreadynoted,showthatthese
processes can be political:Ideaspropagatedby powerfulgroupsandfor
pow-erfulpurposesare more likely to be remembered han others.Taylor(1996),
Efforts to revise establishedknowledge orthodoxies can be tied up withovertpoliticalconstellationsandpurposesas well. Inthepastdecade,therehas
been a proliferationof "historians'disputes," public debates aboutboth thecontentandmeaningof historyin severalnations,includingGermany Maier1988), France(Kaplan 1995), and Israel (Ram 1995). The rise of interestin
memory, the challenges to the distinctionbetween history and memory, andthe status of memoryin postmodernsociety reviewed in this essay arepartofthe explanationfor these debates. It is interestingto note thatthe term"revi-sionism" is of relatively recent vintage (Novick 1988); revisionism now istaken to refer to those who denytaken-for-grantedruths-like the occurrenceof a Germangenocide of Jews inthe 1940s-though it originallymeantanyat-
temptto challenge commonlyheld beliefs about the past, includingthe "nor-mal"growthof scientific knowledge. Studies of more extremerevisionisms
(Lipstadt1993, Vidal-Naquet1992) documentboth thathistorycan serve as a
surrogate n more generalpolitical strugglesas well as thatparticularmagesof thepasthavesymbolicimport hatextendsbeyondquestionsof theirtruth.
Future Directions
The field of social memorystudies is clearlyvast, the forms of memoryworkdiverse. It should be clear,however,thatsimilarthemesoccurin differentdis-
ciplinary,substantive,and geographicareas. Given the epochal characterofmemorydemonstrated y thehistoryof memory,this shouldnot be surprising.As Valeryput it in ourepigraph, he time is past in which time did not matter;we experiencethis condition as a problemof memory.Inrecenttimes, the so-lution hasbeen to designatesites to stand n for lost authenticity, o proliferatenew narrativeswhen the old ones no longer satisfy, and to abbreviate-ashere-in face of insurmountableaccumulation.Social memory studies arethereforepartof thephenomenon heyseekto explain.But theexplanation,wehave tried to show, need not be relentlessly particular:The enterprisedoes
have clearlineagesjust as thephenomenonhasgeneralcontours,andexplana-tions of thevariousprocessesaretransposableacrosscases (e.g. Germanyand-the United States)and across issues (e.g. reputation,monuments,and knowl-
edge).We concludeby pointingto fourareasthatemergein social memorystudies
as possible futuredirections.First, social memorystudies clearly fit with the
widespread interest in identity in recent social and sociological discourse.
Memory is a central,if not the central,mediumthroughwhich identities areconstituted. Inquiriesinto identity and memory are being related;these re-search
programs,we hope, will illuminatefurtherhow, when, andwhy indi-viduals andgroupsturntowardtheirpasts.Interestingly,both fields have attackedthe tendencyto reify theirfounda-
tional concepts; both identity and memory, we now recognize, are ongoing
processes, not possessions or properties.This leads directly to our second
point: Many sociologists (McDonald1996)haverecently argued hatthe basic
categoriesof sociological analysisreify temporality.Thesecritiquescall for a"processual"or "narrative" pproach o social processes, arguingthat socio-
logical strategiesfor approaching he past have heretofore been ahistorical.
Appreciating he changinghistoryof mnemonicpracticesas well as the waysin which these changingpracticesare the media of temporal experience canandshouldplayaroleinthis search oramoregenuinelyhistoricalsociology.
A thirdpoint is morepractical.As the belief thathistoryandmemoryare
epistemologically and ontologically distinct has eroded and as competingpasts and historical legitimacy claims have proliferated, he ability to settle
conflicts over how to represent hepasthasalso diminished.We havecertainlygottenbetteratdeconstructingdentitarianmythology,butthishas left us witha not-always-productive acophonyof claimsvying for dominance.While therecentperiodof inquiry nto thehistoryanddynamicsof social memoryseemsto havefed this deconstructivemood (andvice versa),we hopethatfurther e-
searchwill helpus resolve someof the conflicts oratleastmanagethembetter.Our fourthpoint is connectedto this: Until now, it seems thatmacrosocio-
logical theoriesof modernityandpostmoderity have donewell at explainingmemoryas a dependentvariable.But social memory s largelyabsentfrom our
grandest heories. The diversememorypracticesreviewed here are not merelysymptoms of modernityand postmodernity-they are modernityand post-
modernity. Sociological theorists,we argue, thus have a great deal to learn
from theorists like Nora, Huyssen, and Koselleck. Recent work by Giddens
(1990, 1994) has moved in this direction. More studies of the way memorypracticesare central eaturesof moder andpostmodern ife and more theories
of these epochal formswith memoryat their heart should follow. In sum, all
four of these points demonstrate hat social memory studies is not a narrow
subfield;it provides powerful lessons for sociology as a whole, is consonantwith the reformationof historicalsociology now occurring,andprovides im-
portant nsights for theoryat the broadest evel. Sociology, we argue,cannotaffordto forgetmemory.
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