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demnation that characterizes the interface between free will
and disobedience as it manifests itself within the principle
of what I have elsewhere termed eschatological monism.5
These two concerns provide the reasons for Gregorys insis-
tence that Gods nal judgment is uniformly mercy, which
opposes the eschatological dualism that has come to domi-
nate Western Christian theology. This dualism has charac-
terized the Wests eschatological vision especially since the
inception of the schola augustiniana moderna, of which
Gregory of Rimini (c. 130058) was the brainchild when
he combined Augustinianism and the via moderna, and the
popularization of Luthers hyper-Augustinianism against
Johann Ecks moderatism at the 1519 Leipzig Disputation
and in his Chrysopassus (1514).6
By way of denition, therefore, Gregorys eschatological
monism opposes the belief that humanity is predestined, or
destined in any respect, to undergo a transportation to one of
two corporeal locations but rather proposes that the loca-tion, understood guratively as a great mystery,7 is actually
monadic and uniform, yet subjectively experienced multi-
fariously based on ones ontological composition in either
(passions)8 or(virtue).9 With this understanding,
the splendor of the divine emanations and mercy yield either
the painful purication of gehenna or the illuminating guid-
ance into apophatic darkness at the apex of the holy moun-
tain, which compels continued ontological, rather than mere
epistemic, participation in the divine energeiai (energies).10
In the nal analysis, Gregorys understanding and portrait of
the freedom of the human will provides a helpful framework
within which the response of divine mercy, accommodative
of an eschatology of hope as opposed to the anticipated re-
sponse of divine retribution, becomes explicable and indeed
the only viable course of divine action.
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THE FREEDOmOFTHE HUmAnWILL
The Nature of FreedomRobert Jenson alleges that Gregorys initial spiritual guid-
ance is simple. Do you want to turn from bodily things in
order to be drawn to God? Just begin to do it.11 However,
this understanding of the freedom of the will, of so-called
free choice, lends itself to accusations of culpability and re-
sponsibility which permit a retributive backlash that is for-
eign to Gregory of Nyssas explication of free will. As we
will soon discover, Gregory is more inclined to admit that
there simply is not the innate condition whereby a human
being can, properly speaking, choose attraction (i.e., desire
or pleasure). In refusing to entertain the notion that God ma-
nipulates human destiny, Gregory concurrently rejects the
notion that the freedom of the will implies a facile consent to
virtue but instead defends quite the oppositethat the free-
dom of the will implies vulnerability and inevitable failure.This circumstance renders conformity difcult, and eventu-
ally compels God to become incarnate in co-suffering soli-
darity with and love for humanity.
Further, the freedom of the will is a divinely devised anthro-
pological maneuver designed to allow for at least the prospect
of emancipation from the tyranny of death by virtue of hu-
manitys mutability and susceptibility to progress in virtue.
Gerhart Ladner summarizes this notion: One might resume
Gregorys answer to this question thus: Only if man received
mutability, which is essentially linked to his bodily constitu-
tion, and the gift of sexual propagation, would mankind as a
whole be able to reach its pre-ordained pleroma, only thus
would it have the opportunity to return to God. Without the
mutable and mortal body man would have remained fxed
in spiritual aversion from God, together with the fallen an-gels.12 While God created humanity so that it is free to unite
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ton, ortelos, the alternative, participation in evil and death,
is a very real, indeed inevitable to some degree, recourse due
to the lure of humanitys sensual setting. These disadvanta-geous circumstances are what cultivate divine mercy.
On the other hand, if the freedom of the will and appending
mutability were not part of Gods design, humanitys aver-
sion to God not only would be inevitable, as it is likewise
with the freedom of the will, but would be interminable as
well. Roman Catholic ressourcement theologian Hans Urs
von Balthasar very astutely explains this same notion as it ap-
pears in Gregorys thought, but with a consciousness toward
becoming and the immanent innite. He describes how for
Gregory, only the uncreated essence is unable to express it-
self in movement, whereas the created being of which hu-
manity is composed cannot escape movement by virtue of its
beginning to be. Therefore, within this framework, Since its
existence is, so to speak, a continuous effort to maintain itself
in being, its perfection consists of a perpetual effort towardGod13 (i.e., epektasis). Given the unenviable circumstanc-
es that humanity must endure, this is effort par excellence.
Broadly speaking, participation in some degree of both virtue
and evil is unavoidable to be sure, but the unremitting pro-
cess of supervising and governing this volatile human will
so that it can consist of a perpetual effort toward God, as
von Balthasar states, is certainly not lost on Gregory and has
profound implications for how he understands human culpa-
bility and the divine response to human transgression.
A renement of what exactly is meant byfree willis use-
ful not only because it allows insight into how Gregorys
apokatastasis necessarily implies the integral preservation
of mans free will14 but also so the aforementioned mishan-
dling of the freedom of the will can be avoided. In short,
Gregory describes free will15
in his De vita Moysis as theequidistant suspension between two prospective and latent
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Evil One.16 Gods design includes the image and likeness of
God17 implanted in each human being and which reects his
own freedom, a freedom that places emphasis on the restora-tion of this image and likeness so that compliance with the
divine will truly derives from the heart and not any violent
coercion.18 As is readily evident, therefore, the freedom of
the human will is inescapable, but in rendering disobedience
to God and participation in death inevitable, it incites a di-
vine response of mercy and restoration, the only true mani-
festation of justice when taking into account humanitys un-
desirable and enervating conditions. Gregory describes the
suspension between virtue and passion by appealing to Holy
Tradition, which suggests that God appointed an angel with
an incorporeal nature to help in the life of each person,
in addition to the corruptor [who], by an evil and male-
cent demon, aficts the life of man and contrives against
our nature.19 While this may seem to imply direct contact
and coercion, Gregory is quick to point out that the angelmerely shows the benets of virtue, while the opposing
side shows the material pleasures in which there is no hope
of future benets.20 There is therefore no direct coercion by
one side or the other; the passions tempt, while the side of
virtue offsets the seduction of evil by showing the benets of
the alternate option, but both always from a distance.
However, on the one hand, virtue is voluntarily self-sub-
dued and non-encroaching or is innately so since it is by na-
ture love, which refuses to coerce, while on the other hand,
Christ has conquered death, which has thus been rendered
impotent inasmuch as it was defeated when Christ gained
access to it via his incarnation, thereby permitting his cru-
cixion and resurrection. That God intuitively does not co-
erce humanity to embrace virtue is demonstrated expressly
in a section ofDe vita Moysis that outlines the hardening ofPharaohs heart, wherein Gregory insists that God did not
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divine will but that Pharaoh was delivered up to shame-
ful affections21 by God; in other words, God permitted, or
at most perpetuated, the sedition that was already an unaf-fected expression of Pharaohs heart, and hence does not co-
erce. Gregory is even clearer when he explains that if God
were to coerce in coincidence with the desire of his own will,
then certainly any human choice would fall into line in ev-
ery case, so that no distinction between virtue and vice in
life could be observed.22 Similarly, by invoking the plague
of darkness, Gregory explains that although the Egyptians
visibility was darkened and obscured, to the Hebrews it is
illuminated by the sun at the same time. Not only does this
seemingly anomalous circumstance, as a uniform occurrence
experienced multifariously, factor strongly into Gregorys
principle of eschatological monism and self-condemnation,
it also implies Gods refusal to coerce: It was not some con-
straining power from above that caused the one to be found
in darkness and the other in light, but we men have in our-selves, in our own nature and by our own choice, the causes
of light or darkness, since we place ourselves in whichever
sphere we wish to be.23
In this sequence, moreover, Gregory immediately before-
hand explains how when Moses stretched forth his hands
on the Egyptians behalf, the frogs were instantly destroyed.
This is, of course, a gure of the true lawgiver, Christ, who
stretched forth his hands on the cross.24 Gregory further
elaborates on the nature and function of Christs atoning
work by employing an illustration of Moses wooden staff
that parted the Red Sea as a gure of the cross also made of
wood, which destroys the Egyptian pleasuresthat is, the
passions that suffuse the soul.25 Elsewhere, Gregory claims
that the bronze serpent that Moses lifted up on the wood re-
jects passion, diluting the poison as with a medicine,26
employing medical rather than juridical language very typi-
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ribution,33 Gregorys epistemological teaching on apophasis
and ontological teaching on epektasis, for which the purity
of the soul is requisite and theoria is its ultimately unat-tainable goal (at least in its completeness),34 add new lay-
ers of skepticism about humanitys capacity for obedience
and union with Christ. The central idea that at times domi-
nates Gregorys writings so much that it is merely taken for
granted is his apophaticism.35 When Gregory discusses the
incomprehensibility and ineffability of God, it is rst and
foremost because of the innity and inapproachability of
the divine essencethat the ascendancy of the uncreated
divine essence orousia itself precludes mere epistemic ap-
prehension through social analogies36 from the created or-
der, which instead demands direct contemplation (theoria)
by way of the purity of the soul.37 Gregory is clear on this
point when he describes Moses ascent of the holy mountain,
since that which is sought transcends all knowledge, being
separated on all sides by incomprehensibility as by a kind ofdarkness,38 at which point Moses came to know that what
is divine is beyond all knowledge and comprehension.39 But
even in this description there exists the recognition that hu-
manity is itself obstructed in its ascent, since anything that
humans can measure by the senses is marked off by certain
denite boundaries,40 so that the divine is there where the
understanding cannot reach.41 Moreover, Gregorys apo-
phasis is operative in deliberations not only about the di-
vine essence but also about the ineffable teaching of God
and mystical doctrines that Moses received from God on
the mountain,42 elsewhere designating godliness itself as a
mystery.43 Indeed, as Sara Denning-Bolle claims, Gregory
is here departing company with Plato, who believes that the
realm of the intelligible is where real knowledge resides and
is therefore knowable.44
But Gregorys apophatic approachrenders ultimately unknowable, certainly in any exhaustive
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an emphasis on the elusiveness of the divine essence and the
telos of his salvic requirements, one begins to understand
why Gregory is slow to pronounce Gods wrath on thosewho reject Christ or apostatize.
But Gregory brings apophasis and the purity of the soul
leading to theoria together in a most interesting way that
nevertheless does not necessarily solve the problem more
than it describes the nature of a prospective solution, how-
ever demanding and burdensome it may be. To the extent
that one participates in the divine energeiai, ascends the holy
mountain, and unites with Christ, he places his own soul,
like a mirror, face to face with the hope of good things, with
the result that the images and impression of virtue, as it is
shown to him by God, are imprinted on the purity of his
soul.45 Therefore, the way to such knowledge is purity,46
and when he is so puried, then he assaults the mountain.47
The epistemological ramication of Gregorys apophasis on
humanitys ability to stand in virtue is clear: Religious vir-tue is divided into two parts, into that which pertains to the
Divine and that which pertains to right conduct (for purity
of life is a part of religion). Moses learns at rst the things
which must be known about God (namely, that none of those
things known by human comprehension is to be ascribed to
him). Then he is taught the other side of virtue, learning by
what pursuits the virtuous life is perfected.48
Gregory employs several images to depict this mutual reli-
ance between apophasis and theoria: the mysterious charac-
teristics of the cloud that guided the Hebrews in the wilder-
ness is an image of this apophasis that guides one into the
promised land;49 the revelation of the heavenly tabernacle
by way of a material imitation here on earth teaches that
God can be known only by analogy;50 and the incompre-
hensibleness of contemplating [] the ineffable se-crets is exhibited in the wings covering the face of God
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wings of the cherubim that cover the ark in which the pres-
ence of God rests.51 By further framing this interdependence
between apophasis and theoria with incarnational concerns,Gregory explains that when Moses sees the back of God
(apophasis), this is actually alluding to Christs demand for
followers (purity of the soul), who would of course see his
back when literally following him; this is purity of the soul
by way ofapophasis.52
But how do these central themes ofapophasis and theoria
impact Gregorys understanding of human culpability? The
rst characteristic to consider is Gregorys understanding
ofepektasis,53 which is a direct outcome of jointly applying
his teachings on both apophasis and theoria. Paul Blowers,
for instance, underscores both the strong ontological and es-
chatological character of Gregorys epektasis, within which
human beings nd their true ontological and eschatologi-
cal stability through eternal moral change for the better and
ascent toward the immutable God.54
Gregorys concept ofepektasis also declares that union with Christ and ascent of
the holy mountain toward ineffable darkness is innite in
coincidence with Gods inniteness,55 and is therefore ulti-
mately, though not pessimistically, unfeasible, so that our
statement that grasping perfection with reference to virtue
is impossible was not false.56 Not surprisingly, Gregorys
epektasis underscores the same epistemological barrier that
his apophasis also exposes: that, as Albert-Kees Geljon ob-
serves, perfection of all things that are measured by sense-
perception is marked off by denite limits.57
The epistemological limitations that result from subjuga-
tion to sense-perception characteristic of human creature-
liness give way, of course, to limitations in human progress
in virtue itself. Indeed, the gnawings of desire are fre-
quently active even in the faithful.58
Therefore, while thefreedom of the will ideally places humanity in a position to
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humanity is requested to perform the impossible. This is the
case because there exists a conict in us, for man is set
before competitors as the prize of their contest,60
while ul-timately free will [has an] inclination to evil61 so that it
was only to be expectedthat some would be lled with
lust.62 Progression in virtue is arduous because humanity is
at times enslaved by trickery,63 while Gregory describes
the passions as a erce and raging master to the servile
reasoning, tormenting it with pleasures as though they were
scourges.64 So much does Gregory sympathize with the un-
enviable situation within which humanity nds itself that the
only time he uses the word (blame) is in reference
to the devil, whom the history [for] producing evil
in men [which] leads them to the subsequent sin.65 Indeed,
as Alan Dunstone observes, Gregory stresses the culpabil-
ity of death.66 Another factor that Gregory introduces is the
inherent immaturity of humanity, a common anthropogenic
concept of the Greek fathers, especially Irenaeus of Lyons.67
The circumstances created by this immaturity and attenua-
tion of the human ability to ascend the mountain is further
strained by the many conditions Gregory places on human-
itys capacity for obedience, not the least of which is being
somehow favorably disposed to what is presented,68 while
someone who does not know the way cannot complete his
journey safely.69
III. VICInAL CULPAbILITy
Proximity to the Offense versus Dispassionate Choice
Gregory of Nyssa maintains a delicate balance between
the very real and immediate prospect of falling into sin and
humanitys inherent and created goodness. This tension cali-
brates any possibility of falling into an emphasis on the totaldepravity of humanity that is inconsistent with Gregorys an-
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manity and its vulnerability to passions in balance, Gregory
readily acknowledges the inevitability of sin70 and Gods
commensurate refusal to enact retribution on humanity dueto that which cannot be avoided. If free will implies the nec-
essary rejection of God, at least for a time and to some de-
gree, how then is retribution a just response?
I wish, therefore, to advance the principle of vicinal cul-
pability to describe Gregorys explanation of the nature and
function of human blameworthiness, wherein culpability
is determined not by guilt or a neutral, dispassionate, and
preventable attraction to disobedience but instead by ones
proximity to the offensethat is, who is connected to or
in the vicinity of the offense. The purpose of culpability, if
so understood, is not to project guilt to elicit divine retri-
bution but merely to identify the offender, or perhaps more
appropriate for Gregory, the inrmed in need of healing and
convalescence. Gregory describes how a person is found in
proximity to the offense by following a succession from (1) (desire) to (2) (pleasure) and nally to the(3) (passions), variously described as that which in-duces desire as well as the offenses against God themselves.
By recalling these conduits between the person and the of-
fense, the offender can be identied not for divine retribution
or any punitive reaction but in order that this person might
be restored, healed, and reconciled to God. This is Gods
desire and is the solution to how God is indeed love, yet
simultaneously refuses to let humanity escape responsibility
for its transgressionsand, more important, is disinterested
in permitting anything that he created to remain dissimilar to
that which he ultimately desires it to be.
Using this same terminology to describe the dire circum-
stances that humanity must overcome, Gregory declares,
now having learned what great power for evil the diseaseof pleasure possesses, we should conduct our lives as far
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some opening against us, like re whoseproximity causes an
evil ame.71 The trajectory through pleasure and eventually
ending in the passions is initiated by desire: i.e., temptation,or the beckoning of passion. Gregory discusses the role of
desire in leading astray those who are normally faithful to
God in the nal passages ofDe vita Moysis. Here, he de-
scribes desire as the very root of evil, while this desire
arises through sight,72 and is thus stimulated by temptation
and an attraction to that which is external, sensible, and eas-
ily perceptible. Desire is that attraction which arises when
one is placed within an environment hostile to virtue that
develops as a result of sins suffusing the fabric of the cos-
mos. While human beings as Gods creation remain good
and capable of cooperating with divine grace, their environs
have also decayed so that it enfolds humanity in an indis-
criminate blanket of seduction toward evil. Gregory portrays
this surrounding context as patently volatile, its capricious-
ness replicated in the actions of anyone (i.e., everyone)who comes into contact with it. Hence, Gregory observes,
Everyone knows that anything placed in a world of change
never remains the same but is always passing from one thing
to another, the alteration always bringing about something
better or worse.73 Elsewhere, Gregory relates how the rest-
less and heaving motion of life thrusts from itself those who
do not totally submerge themselves in the deceits of human
affairs and it reckons as a useless burden those whose virtue
is annoying.74
The desire and lure of disobedient behavior cultivates plea-
sure in the one who inevitably indulges. Gregory describes
this pleasure as evils bait, since it draws gluttonous souls
to the sh hook of destruction.75 While desire beckons,
pleasure is the attraction itself and assent to the temptation
that one realistically cannot refuse if it is an expression ofthe true nature of ones heart. In a way that is very consistent
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es pleasure as a disease76 and even admits that pleasure is
an enemy of ours that is hard to ght and difcult to over-
come.77
We are beginning to see, therefore, that althoughhumanity possesses a free will, this does not imply that it
can consistently and continually choose virtue over passion;
rather, human beings make choices in compliance with the
complexion of their hearts, something that cannot be chosen
in any strict sense but can be sedulously molded through co-
operation with divine grace.
One gets the picture that human beings are analogous to a
feather blowing capriciously in the air this way and that by the
arbitrary thrusts of the wind, which is the decaying environ-
ment that engulfs humanity and is the outlying beckoning of
either evil or virtue. The feather responds in keeping with its
nature, being light and acquiescent. The feather is therefore
free, sometimes too free, but its choice (this word admittedly
being perhaps too imprecise and loaded) is always an expres-
sion of its own nature: lightness. St. Silouan the Athoniteoffers a similar analogy: Not all souls are equally strong.
Some are sturdy as stone, others frail as smoke. Those like
smoke are the proud souls. As the wind bears smoke hither
and thither, so does the enemy sway them whichever way he
will, for either they have no patience or else are easily de-
ceived. But the humble soul keeps the Lords commandments
and stands rm in them like a rock buffeted by the waves.78
There is a certain reciprocity between pleasure and the
passions wherein the passions can be inamed by some ex-
ternal force which can bring out the nature of the illness,
earlier identied as pleasure, whereas this pleasure itself by
way of the senses allows the passions to pour in upon the
soul from the dishonorable things which are seen.79 True
to form, Gregory is quick to point out that human nature
is especially drawn to this passion, being led to the diseasealong thousands of ways.80 But it must be recognized, as we
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passions or away from the passions but rather delivers up
to passion him whom he does not protect because he is not
acknowledged by him.81
Therefore, desire, pleasure, and thepassions are, according to Gregory, inevitable obstacles that
combine to regulate the divine operations that address the
sedition and disobedience of humanity. As a disease infuses
a human being involuntarily, Gregory suggests eschatologi-
cal restoration rather than retribution, and this rst by way of
the co-suffering love of the incarnate Christ.
The Incarnate Christ and Co-suffering Love
The incarnate Christ gures prominently inDe vita Moysis,
particularly in portrayals of Moses as a type of Christ.82 The
inclusion of the incarnation as a subject closely related to the
ascent of the holy mountain is telling for at least two reasons.
First, Gregory describes the incarnation as a mechanism by
which God experiences the unfavorable circumstances with-
in which humanity unfortunately nds itself, and therewithis given cause to advance a pronouncement of mercy and,
by extension, a program of restoration. Second, it supple-
ments the historical account of Moses by underscoring its
spiritual and allegorical implications that Gregory routinely
introduces, which is very characteristic of his ultimate con-
cern: humanitys ascent of the mountain into the darkness of
knowing without knowing after the full revelation of God
in Christ, his incarnation, life, death, and resurrection.
Within a revealing exposition on the theophany of the burn-
ing bush, Gregory makes mention of the incarnation for the
rst time: For if truth is God and truth is light [of the burn-
ing bush]the Gospel testies by these sublime and divine
names to the God who made himself visible to us in the esh
such guidance of virtue leads us to know that light which has
reached down even to human nature.83
It is especially impor-tant to note with what high degree of clarity Gregory explains
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ity for which he cannot but show irrepressible compassion.
Very soon after introducing the incarnation, Gregory claims,
although the divine nature is contemplated in its immuta-bility, by condescension to the weakness of human nature it
was changed to our shape and form.84 So much does God
kenotically identify with his creation that Christ became a
serpent, as too did the rod of Moses, that he might devour
and consume the Egyptian serpents produced by the sorcer-
ers,85 which Gregory earlier claimed is an image of wiping
away our inrmities before he again returned to his own
bosom the hand which had been among us and had received
our complexion.86 Therefore, while the father of sin is called
a serpent by Holy Scripture and what is born of the serpent is
certainly a serpent the Lord was made into sin for our sake
by being invested with our sinful nature.87 Eventually the ser-
pent is transformed back into the rod of faith supporting [sin-
ners] through their hopes and man, then, is freed from sin
through him who assumed the form of sin and became like uswho had turned into the form of the serpent.88
One image Gregory employs to demonstrate this sup-
port and co-suffering love is the manna that was sent from
heaven when the Hebrews were wandereding in the wilder-
ness. Again, with an acute awareness of the wildernessthe
unfavorable external conditions that disclose the inevitabil-
ity of human sin and disobedienceChrist again kenotically
descends to the level of humanity as manna. This corporeal
insertion into humanitys dire affairs compels the sinner to
purify himself of Egypt and the foreign life so that he emp-
ties the sack of his soul of all evil nourishment prepared by
the Egyptians.89 And purication is followed by restoration:
Neither ploughing nor sowing produced the body of this
bread, but the earth which remained unchanged was found
full of this divine food, of which the hungry partake. Thismiracle teaches in anticipation the mystery of the Virgin,90
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ble divinity, which nullied any anticipation of retribution
on account of humanitys careless disobedience by instead
pitching his own tabernacle among us that we might behealed and have the image and likeness of God restored.
Gregory insightfully outlines the role of the incarnate Christ
to minister to the condition of those who had become ill
when he enlists Moses, as a type of Christ, to co-suffer with
humanity as one who even besought God for mercy on their
behalf.95 While the revelation of humanitys ill-conceived
priorities and indiscretions in the Old Testament is reected
in Gods presumed violent reaction to their apostasy, the full
revelation of God is understood as residing instead in the
person of Christ, of whom Moses is a type and who implores
God to be merciful and compassionate on account of his
identication with humanitys plight. In a brilliant maneu-
ver where Moses is at once both the pregured Christ who
desires mercy and intercedes on behalf of humanity and is
the humanity that has been transgured and restored by thismercy, Gregory observes, [Moses] did not rush to defend
himself against those who caused him sorrow; although they
had been condemned by impartial judgment and he knew
what was the naturally right thing to do, he nevertheless in-
terceded with God for his brethren. He would not have done
this if he had not been behind God, who had shown him his
back as a safe guide to virtue.96
Therefore, Moses is a gure of both Christ (intercessor)
and Christs followers (one who sees the back of God), for
which the restoration of humanity by means of Christs
mercy and compassion is a prerequisite.97 As Dunstone as-
serts, Humanity is thus pitiable, rather than culpable. There
seems to be little sense of deliberate disobedience to the di-
vine imperative and the resulting offence to the holy majesty
of God. There is thus an ambiguity in Gregorys referencesto sin and evil, which must colour his doctrine about the ex-
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The Divine Response: Remedial Justice versus Juridical
RetributionSuch an emphasis on divine mercy should come as no sur-
prise. De vita Moysis, as with Gregorys other writings, is
replete with images of restoration, correction, purication,
and healing. What goes largely unacknowledged, however,
is the epistemological rationale that we thus far have been
exploring and for which restoration is preferred over retribu-
tion. The inevitability of sin is also an admission of the ubiq-
uity of sin, which is why Gregory famously teaches the nal
restoration ofallhumanity. Appropriately enough, Gregory
discusses this eschatological hope in a section on the harden-
ing of Pharaohs heart and, perhaps even more telling, in the
only passage on gehenna in which also appears the sole use
of the term apokatastasis in the entire treatise.99
Hope for the nal restoration of all humanity accommo-
dates images of purication and healing and is antitheticalto juridical measures that generate the reverse outcome.
Gregory describes purication as a means for accommodat-
ing guidance in virtue and a necessary step for permitting an
excess of virtue to take evils place.100 Elsewhere, Gregory
explains that purication is the obligation of the one who
wishes to approach the holy mountain,101 and is a prerequisite
for embarking on the apophatic ascent to the place where
his intelligence lets him slip in where God is. This, Gregory
continues, is called darkness by the Scripture, which signi-
es the unknown and unseen.102 The use of medical or re-
medial terminology is also very characteristic of Gregorys
soteriological and, by extension, eschatological reections.
He designates both pleasure and passions as an illness or a
disease103 and Christ, the lawgiver, as the physician [who]
accommodated the remedy to what the evil had produced.104
More graphically, Gregory illustrates how the physician
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168 GOTR 55:1-4 2010
Moses is a type of Christ, perhaps the most vivid use of med-
ical language to describe Gods response to humanitys dis-
obedience is in Gregorys discussion of the brazen serpent.The entire passage is worth quoting: As a physician by his
treatment prevents a disease from prevailing, so Moses does
not permit the disease to cause death. Their unruly desires
produce serpents which inject deadly poison into those they
bit. The great lawgiver, however, rendered the real serpents
powerless by the image of a serpent. There is one antidote
for these passions: the purication of our souls which takes
place through the mystery of godliness. The chief act of faith
in the mystery is to look to him who suffered the passion
for us. The cross is the passion, so that whoever looks to it,
as the text relates, is not harmed by the poison of desire. To
look to the cross means to render ones whole life dead and
crucied to the world, unmoved by evil.106
The use of medical terminology, both purifying and heal-
ing, leads to an inquiry into what exactly is the target forretribution, for the act of purication implies the elimina-
tion of something undesirable and the act of healing insinu-
ates the recreation of that which God desires to persist and
survive. Dunstone suggests that both Gregory and St. Paul
are more concerned with the culpability of the disease and
with the misfortune of those who suffer from it.107 It must
be admitted, however, that Gregorys discussion of the nature
and function of punishment is indeed quite complex, espe-
cially if presuppositions have not been adequately addressed.
Notwithstanding this convolution, it is worth investigating to
the extent that it allows further insight into Gregorys empha-
sis on divine mercy and eschatological hope.
To this end, it is of signicant advantage to evaluate the
one instance Gregory uses the Greek word , which
denotes vengeance particularly on behalf of anothers honor.Forms of this word appear in the New Testament only three
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169Klager: Free Will and Vicinal Culpability
his conversion (Acts 22:5; 26:11) and once more in Hebrews
10:29 to describe what the worst apostates deserve. Gregory
uses the word only once inDe vita Moysisin therst book, which describes the literal, rather than allegorical
and thus pedagogical, history of the life of Mosesto illus-
trate Moses reaction of breaking the tablets written with the
law in response to the idolatry of the Hebrews. It is a tting
word considering that Moses is reacting this way specically
to restore Gods honor in the face of an idolatrous substitute,
and is reasonably the only word Gregory could have used.
Notwithstanding this sole example, Gregory provides much
clarity in his allegorical rendering of this same episode,108
wherein he calibrates the literal interpretation much like
the author of the epistle to the Hebrews claries the one in-
stance in which he uses to describe what the worstapostates seemingly deserve by stating soon after that our
discipline is for a short time and for our good, that we
may share his holiness.109
Thus, in similar fashion, Gregoryproclaims, it is tting that one perceive the correction as
administered through love for mankind. While not all are
struck, the blows upon some chastise all to turn them from
evil.110 Consequently, Gregory, following St. Paul in his
second epistle to the Corinthians, calls the tablets of stone
human hearts111 that Christ through his incarnation assists
in regaining its unbroken character, becoming immortal
through the letters written by his nger.112 Moreover, in the
preceding section, Gregory cites the same passage from the
epistle to the Hebrews that its authorSt. Paul, according to
Gregoryuses to clarify and calibrate the one of three uses
of the word in the New Testament, as mentionedabove.113
Apart from this occasion, Gregory almost exclusively oper-
ates under the Greek term and its variants.114
While on its own delivers satisfaction for the inictor
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170 GOTR 55:1-4 2010
itself, denotes a denite accent on correction for
the ultimate benet of the recipient, and etymologically sug-
gests the act of pruning or restraining. In this way, performs the function of purication that characterizes
Gregorys restorative emphasis. John Sachs concurs: [F]or
Gregory, as for Origen, divine punishment is not punitive
but pedagogical. God cleanses human nature and restores
it to its natural goodness as an image of God, according to
which it is naturally attracted to the innite goodness of God
and is capable of choosing and clinging to God. Finally puri-
ed in the eschatological ame and no longer impeded by
the sin and mutability of earthly existence, human beings
will persist in the good of Gods love eternally.115
Consequently, Gregorys understanding of punishment
replaces humanity as a target for divine vengeance with evil
instead as the intended victimthat is, the desire, pleasure,
and passions whose vicinal qualities permit identication
of the one in need of purication or.
Therefore,Gregorys use of the term when describing divine
punishment as purication and his extensive use of medi-
cal terminology bet the principle of vicinal culpability: to
prune and purify is to separate the offender from the offense
after the identication of the offender has been veried, and
is therefore the only appropriate response within a vicinal
paradigm that seeks to specify proximity to the offense.
To illustrate the altruistic character of Gods punishment,
von Balthasar observes, Sex and the passions, Gregory
tells us, are apunishmentinicted by God for the sin arising
from our freedom. On the other hand, he continues, it is
undeniable that, in the perspective of real becoming, these
passions, sexuality itself, are an undeniablefavorbestowed
on the spirit.116 This is the seemingly contradictory nature of
noneschatological ,
whether sex, the passions, evenfreedom itself, that in order to be receptive to restoration,
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172 GOTR 55:1-4 2010
in Gregory of NyssasDe vita Moysis is seamlessly integrat-
ed into an anthropological and soteriological framework of
free will, creaturely limitations, divine mercy, compassion,co-suffering, forbearance, love, and the restoration of the im-
age and likeness of God. Gregorys apokatastasis demands
an eschatological response of universal restoration and heal-
ing, Gods propitiation being realized when all things are
subjected to him and when God may be everything to ev-
eryone,130 a matter for which Gregory devotes an entire trea-
tise.131 But Gregory could envisage the restoration of all God
had created because his understanding of human culpability
was not hostile to mercys precedence over retribution. The
inevitability of sin, of disobedience and sedition against God,
renders suspect and inconsistent any principle or ideology
that encourages divine retribution and does not adequately
account for the ineluctability of human disobedience and the
inexpediency of avenging that which cannot be avoided.
Just as it would be imprudent to exact vengeance on some-one suffering under an illness, the Great Physician effectuates
healing, which at times includes the pain of purication but
always entails, eventually, restoration and reconciliation with
the triune God. By keeping in sight the summit of the holy
mountain which lies ahead, Gregory spends the entirety ofDe
vita Moysis underscoring the arduousness of the escape from
slavery in Egypt, overcoming seemingly inviolable obstacles
such as the Red Sea; the monotony, insecurity, and uncertain-
ty of wandering in the wilderness; and the ascent of the holy
mountain itself. In doing so, Gregory enlightens the recipi-
ent of his treatise by underscoring the empathy and solicitude
that God learned when he himself kenotically descended to
our burdensome and disadvantageous circumstances by tak-
ing on esh and co-suffering with his creation, at that time
pronouncing the hope of a life in Christ to all humanity.
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173Klager: Free Will and Vicinal Culpability
nOTEs
1
See, for instance, Andreas Andreopoulos, Eschatology and Final Res-toration (apokatastasis) in Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and Maximos the
Confessor, Theandros 1, no. 3 (Spring 2004): www.theandros.com/res-
toration.html; Georges Barrois, The Alleged Origenism of St. Gregory
of Nyssa, St. Vladimirs Theological Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1986): 716,
esp. 1416; Brian Daley, Hope of the Early Church (New York: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 1991), 8589; Jean Danilou, S.J., Lapocatastase
chez Saint Grgoire de Nyssa, Recherches de Science Religieuse 30
(1940): 32847; Morwenna Ludlow, Universal Salvation: Eschatology
in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner(New York: OxfordUniv. Press, 2000); John R. Sachs, Apocatastasis in Patristic Theology,
Theological Studies 54, no. 4 (December 1993): 61740, esp. 63238;
Michael J. Tori, Apokatastasis in Gregory of Nyssa: From Origen to Or-
thodoxy,Patristic and Byzantine Review 15, nos. 13 (1997): 87100;
and Constantine N. Tsirpanlis, The Concept of Universal Salvation in
Saint Gregory of Nyssa, in Greek Patristic Theology: Basic Doctrines
in Eastern Church Fathers, vol. 1 (New York: Eastern Orthodox Press,
1979), 4156.2
Sachs, Apocatastasis in Patristic Theology, 633.3 This refers to the fourteenth anathema against Origen (cf. NPNF2
14:318). This is a complicated issue, however, with scholarly opinions
that vary too much to explore in this essay. Sergius Bulgakov observed,
It has hitherto been thought that the doctrine of Origen was condemned
at the fth ecumenical council, but recent historical studies do not per-
mit us to afrm this, later mentioning that the doctrines of Gregory of
Nyssa have never been condemned and can be discussed in the very
least as theologoumena, or theological opinions (Sergius Bulgakov, The
Orthodox Church [Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimirs Seminary Press,1988], 185). Brian Daley believes that what was anathematized at Con-
stantinople II is actually an exaggerated misinterpretation of Origens
eschatological hope, that it was a radicalized Evagrian Christology
and cosmology, and a doctrine of apokatastasis that went far beyond
the hopes of Origen or Gregory of Nyssa (Daley, Hope of the Early
Church, 190). Elsewhere, Daley asserts that Gregory offers a cautious,
undogmatic support of the Origenist position (84). Georges Barrois also
defends an Orthodox interpretation where Origen perhaps goes too far,
or at least speculates beyond what is possible to know with any certainty:The canons condemning the errors of Origen ought not to be read as
t di ti iti t t t f O th d d t i (B i Al
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174 GOTR 55:1-4 2010
leged Origenism of St. Gregory, 8). See also Henri Crouzel, Origen(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989), 178; G. Mller, Origenes unddie Apokatastasis, Theologische Zeitschrift14 (1958): 189; and Sachs,Apocatastasis in Patristic Theology, 639f.4 All English references are to Everett Ferguson and Abraham J. Mal-
hebre, trans., Gregory of Nyssa: The Life of Moses, Classics of Western
Spirituality, vol. 31 (New York: Paulist, 1978), hereafterVit. Moys. Allreferences to the original Greek will not be to the usual Gregorii Nysseni
Opera, on which the English translation is based, but will instead be to
the more accessible J-P. Migne,Patrologiae Graeca: S. Gregorius Nys-
senus, vol. 44 (Paris: Migne, 1863), hereafterPG. For the most part, Iwill simply use the divisions of Jean Danilous French translation Greg-
ory of Nyssa: The Life of Moses, ed. Jean Danilou, Sources chrtiennes,
vol. 1 (Paris: ditions du Cerf, 1968), which were also adopted by CWS.5 See Andrew P. Klager, Orthodox Eschatology and St. Gregory of
Nyssas De vita Moysis: Transguration, Cosmic Unity, and Compas-sion, in Compassionate Eschatology: Apocalypse or New Beginning?
(Eugene, Ore.: Wipf and Stock, 2011).6 See Anthony Levi, Renaissance and Reformation: The Intellectual
Genesis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2002), 62; Alister E. Mc-Grath,Reformation Thought: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Black-
well, 1999), 8287; Walter L. Moore Jr., Protean Man: Did JohnEck Contradict Himself at Leipzig? Harvard Theological Review 72,
nos. 34 (July 1979): 246, 250f., 256f., 263; Heiko A. Oberman, Four-teenth-Century Religious Thought: A Premature Prole, Speculum 53,no. 1 (January 1978): 86, 88f.7Vit. Moys. 2.242:PG 405B.8See J. Warren Smith,Passion and Paradise: Human and Divine Emo-
tion in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa (New York: Herder and Herder,
2004), 62f., 6872, 2046. On or the suspension of passion, seeJean Danilou, S.J., Platonisme et theologie mystique: Doctrine spiri-tuelle de Saint Gregorie de Nysse (Aubier: Editions Montaigne, 1944),63ff., 92103.9Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox Way (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimirs
Seminary Press, 1995), 105f., 11119.10See Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church
(Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimirs Seminary Press, 1957), 6790.11Robert W. Jenson, Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, Theology
Today 62, no. 4 (January 2006): 536. See also Ernest Vernon McClear,The Fall of Man and Original Sin in the Theology of Gregory of Nys-
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175Klager: Free Will and Vicinal Culpability
12Gerhart B. Ladner, The Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory
of Nyssa, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 12 (1958): 84. This notion is ex-
plicated most thoroughly inDe natura hominis 1,PG XL:521B524A.13Hans Urs von Balthasar,Presence and Thought: An Essay on the Re-
ligious Philosophy of Gregory of Nyssa (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1995),
37.14Barrois, Alleged Origenism of St. Gregory, 12.15The freedom of the will is a dominant motif in GregorysDe vita Moy-
sis and occupies much of his thought on human culpability as well as
his anthropology. See, for instance, Vit. Moys. 1.12; 2.3; 2.74:PG 301D;
328B; 348AB.
16See, for instance, Paul M. Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, Greg-ory of Nyssa, and the Concept of Perpetual Progress, Vigiliae Chris-
tianae 46, no. 2 (1992): 156; Albert-Kees Geljon, Divine Innity in
Gregory of Nyssa and Philo of Alexandria, Vigiliae Christianae 59,
no. 2 (2005): 162; Anthony Meredith, S.J., Gregory of Nyssa (New York:
Routledge, 1999), 24.17Vit. Moys. 2.318:PG 429A.18See Michel Ren Barnes, Divine Unity and the Divided Self: Gregory
of Nyssas Trinitarian Theology in Its Psychological Context, ModernTheology 18, no. 4 (October 2002): 481f.; David B. Hart, The Mirror
and the Innite: Gregory of Nyssa on the Vestigia Trinitatis, Modern
Theology 18, no. 4 (October 2002): 549.19Vit. Moys. 2.45:PG 337D340A. Cf. Sara J. Denning-Bolle, Gregory
of Nyssa: The Soul in Mystical Flight, Greek Orthodox Theological
Review 34, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 10811; Jenson, Gregory of Nyssa,
Life of Moses, 536.20Vit. Moys. 2.46:PG 340A (emphases mine). Cf. Vit. Moys. 2.56; 2.65;
2.216:PG 341BC; 344CD; 397BC.21Vit. Moys. 2.75:PG 348B. Cf. C. W. Macleod, The Preface to Greg-
ory of Nyssas Life of Moses,Journal of Theological Studies 33, no. 1
(April 1982): 187f.22Vit. Moys. 2.74:PG 348AB.23Vit. Moys. 2.80:PG 349AB.24Vit. Moys. 2.78:PG 348D.25Vit. Moys. 2.132:PG 365B.
26Vit. Moys. 2.277:PG 416AB.27Patrick F OConnell The Double Journey in Saint Gregory of Nys-
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176 GOTR 55:1-4 2010
(Winter 1983): 309.28Cf. Vit. Moys. 2.2726:PG 413C416A.29
Vit. Moys. 2.125:PG 361D364B. See also Vit. Moys. 2.22:PG 333A.30See Jean Danilou, S.J., Introduction, inFrom Glory to Glory: Texts
from Gregory of Nyssas Mystical Writings, ed. and trans. Herbert Musu-
rillo, S.J. (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimirs Seminary Press, 2001), 58f.
Cf. Vit. Moys. 2.187:PG 385C388A. For more on Gods grace and con-
tribution to salvation, see 2.34; 2.44; 2.138; 2.215:PG 336C; 337CD;
368BC; 397AB. For more on synergism and human cooperation in
salvation, see 2.118; 2.148; 2.17980; 2.241: PG 360D361A; 369D
372A; 384AC; 405AB.
31Cf. Vit. Moys. 1.18; 2.6566; 2.7476; 2.80; 2.89; 2.24344:PG 305A;344C345A; 348AC; 349AB; 352BC; 405BD.32Vit. Moys. 2.110111:PG 357BD.33See Sachs, Apocatastasis in Patristic Theology, 632.34 Theoria is the perception or vision of the intellect through which
one attains spiritual knowledge. The intellect, however, is not equated
with the rational faculties or reason (dianoia) but is instead the high-
est faculty in man, through whichprovided it is puriedhe knows
God or the inner essences or principles of created things by means ofdirect apprehension or spiritual perception. Theoria, then, is the direct
experience of God via the purity of ones soul and lifei.e., the purity
of heart, which, far from being the mere physical organ, Gregory calls
the foremost part of the soul (G. E. H. Palmer, et al., eds. and trans.,
The Philokalia, vol. 1 (London: Faber and Faber, 1979), 358f., 361f.;
Vit. Moys. 2.215. Cf. Vit. Moys. 2.43; 2.48; 2.136; 2.150; 2.153; 2.154;
2.156; 2.162; 2.169; 2.178; 2.180; 2.181; 2.200; 2.208; 2.219.35From the Greek word apophatike, meaning away from speech (Deir-
dre Carabine, The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tra-dition; Plato to Eriugena (Louvain: Peeters, 1995), 2. See also Robert S.
Brightman, Apophatic Theology and Divine Innity in St. Gregory of
Nyssa, Greek Orthodox Theological Review 18 (1973): 97114, esp. 111.36 Lewis Ayres, On Not Three People: The Fundamental Themes of
Gregory of Nyssas Trinitarian Theology as Seen in To Ablabius: On
Not Three Gods, inRe-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa, ed. Sarah Coakley
(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003), 17.37Gregory maintains that the sequence of intellectual contemplation
(theoria) includes the images and impressions of virtue, as it is shown
to him by God, [which] are imprinted on the purity of the soul. Vit.
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177Klager: Free Will and Vicinal Culpability
38Vit. Moys. 2.163:PG 376D377A.39Vit. Moys. 2.164:PG 377AB. Cf. 2.16269; 2.176; 2.234:PG 376C;
381C; 404AB.40Vit. Moys. 1.5:PG 300CD.41Vit. Moys. 1.46:PG 317AB. Cf. 2.119. [T]he way that one is capable
of receiving (PG 361AB).42Vit. Moys. 1.56:PG 320D321A.43Vit. Moys. 2.273:PG 413CD.44Denning-Bolle, Mystical Flight, 1089.45Vit. Moys. 2.47:PG 340AB. Cf. 2.152; 2.163; 2.169; 2.189; 2.234:
PG 372CD; 376D377A; 380A; 388B; 404AB.46Vit. Moys. 2.154:PG 373BC.47Vit. Moys. 2.157:PG 373D. See also Martin Laird, By Faith Alone:
A Technical Term in Gregory of Nyssa, Vigiliae Christianae 54, no. 1
(2000): 71. Lairds study, however, is less applicable toDe vita Moysis.48Vit. Moys. 2.166:PG 377CD.49 Vit. Moys. 1.30:PG 309C.50 Vit. Moys. 2.17273:PG 380C381A.51 Vit. Moys. 2.181:PG 384C.
52 Vit. Moys. 2.251: PG 408D. Cf. Jenson, Gregory of Nyssa, Life ofMoses, 535.53 Cf. Blowers, Perpetual Progress, 15171; Danilou,Platonisme et
theologie mystique, 30926; Danilou, Introduction, 5169; Geljon,
Divine Innity in Gregory of Nyssa, 15277, esp. 162f.; Macleod,
Preface to Gregory of Nyssas Life of Moses, 18890; Meredith,
Gregory of Nyssa, 13f., 22; OConnell, Double Journey in Saint Greg-
ory of Nyssa, 318f.; Smith,Passion and Paradise, 11f., 18f.; Balthasar,
Presence and Thought, 37f.
54 Blowers, Perpetual Progress, 156.55 See Geljon, Divine Innity in Gregory of Nyssa, 162.56 Vit. Moys. 1.6: PG 301A. Cf. 1.58; 2.220; 2.22426; 2.230; 2.235;
2.23839; 2.242: PG 300CD301B; 400AB; 400D401B; 401CD;
404B; 404C405A; 405B.57 Geljon, Divine Innity in Gregory of Nyssa, 162.58 Vit. Moys. 2.277:PG 416AB.59 Vit. Moys. 2.56. Cf. Everett Ferguson, Gods Innity and Mans Mu-
tability: Perpetual Progress according to Gregory of Nyssa, Greek Or-
thodox Theological Review 18, nos. 12 (Spring/Fall 1973): 71.60 Vit. Moys. 2.14:PG 329D332A. Cf. 2.276:PG 416A.
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178 GOTR 55:1-4 2010
62 Vit. Moys. 2.299:PG 424A.63 Vit. Moys. 2.63:PG 344BC. Cf. 2.122; 2.297; 2.301:PG 361C; 421D;
424BC.64 Vit. Moys. 2.129:PG 364D.65 Vit. Moys. 2.279:PG 416BC.66A. S. Dunstone, The Atonement in Gregory of Nyssa (London: Tyndale,
1964), 11.67 Vit. Moys. 1.10; 2.1011; 2.5758; 2.81; 2.9192; 2.148; 2.260; 2.308.
PG 301BC; 329B; 341CD; 349B; 352C353A; 369D372A; 412A;
425B. See Andrew P. Klager, Retaining and Reclaiming the Divine:
Identication and the Recapitulation of Peace in St. Irenaeus of Lyons
Atonement Narrative, in Stricken by God? Nonviolent Identifcation
and the Victory of Christ, ed. Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin (Grand
Rapids Mich.: Eerdmans, 2007), 427f.68 Vit. Moys. 2.65PG 344CD. Cf. 1.13; 1.20:PG 301D304A; 305CD.69 Vit. Moys. 2.252:PG 408D409A.70 Vit. Moys. 2.299:PG 424A.71 Vit. Moys. 2.303 (emphases mine): PG 424C. Cf. 2.304; 2.318: PG
424D; 429A.72 Vit. Moys. 2.304:PG 424D.73 Vit. Moys. 2.2:PG 326AB.74 Vit. Moys. 2.9:PG 329B. Cf. 2.57; 2.243:PG 341CD; 405BC.75 Vit. Moys. 2.297:PG 421D.76 Vit. Moys. 2.301; 2.303:PG 424BC; 424C.77 Vit. Moys. 2.301:PG 424BC.78 St. Silouan the Athonite, St. Silouan the Athonite, ed. Archimandrite
Sophrony (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimirs Seminary Press, 1991), 438.79 Vit. Moys. 2.71:PG 345CD. Cf. 2.122:PG 361C.80 Vit. Moys. 2.271:PG 413BC.81 Vit. Moys. 2.75:PG 348B.82 Cf. OConnell, Double Journey in Saint Gregory of Nyssa, 306f.83 Vit. Moys. 2.20:PG 332CD.84 Vit. Moys. 2.28:PG 333D336A.85 Vit. Moys. 2.33:PG 336BC.86 Vit. Moys. 2.30:PG 336A.87 Vit. Moys. 2.32:PG 336B. Cf. 2.275:PG 413D416A.88 Vit. Moys. 2.276:PG 416A.89 Vit. Moys. 2.138:PG 368BC.90 Vit. Moys. 2.139:PG 368C.91 Vit. Moys. 2.216:PG 397BC.92 Vit. Moys. 2.217:PG 397CD.
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179Klager: Free Will and Vicinal Culpability
94 Vit. Moys. 2.175:PG 381BC.95 Vit. Moys. 2.261:PG 412AB.96 Vit. Moys. 2.263:PG 412BC. Cf. 2.251:PG 408D.97 Cf. Vit. Moys. 1.48; 2.182:PG 317C; 384CD.98 Dunstone,Atonement in Gregory of Nyssa, 10.99 Vit. Moys. 2.82:PG 349BC. Cf. 2.58; 2.78; 2.193; 2.206; 2.26970:
PG 341D; 348D; 389BC; 393CD; 413AB.100 Vit. Moys. 2.2878:PG 417D420B.101 Vit. Moys. 1.42:PG 316A.102 Vit. Moys. 2.169:PG 380A.103 Vit. Moys. 2.7071; 2.79; 2.303:PG 345BD; 348D349A; 424C.104 Vit. Moys. 2.278:PG 416B. Cf. 2.87; 2.172:PG 352AB; 380CD.105 Vit. Moys. 2.87:PG 352AB. Cf. 2.277:PG 416AB.106 Vit. Moys. 2.2724:PG 413CD.107 Dunstone,Atonement in Gregory of Nyssa, 16.108 Vit. Moys. 2.20218:PG 392D397D.109 Heb 12:10 RSV.110 Vit. Moys. 2.206:PG 393CD.111Vit. Moys. 2.215:PG 397AB.112 Vit. Moys. 2.216:PG 397BC.113 Vit. Moys. 2.193:PG 389BC.114 Vit. Moys. 1.25; 1.62; 2.91; 2.205; 2.308:PG 308C; 321C; 352CD;
393C; 425B.115 Sachs, Apocatastasis in Patristic Theology, 637.116 Balthasar,Presence and Thought, 78.117 Cf. Smith,Passion and Paradise, 80; Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 21f.118 Vit. Moys. 2.92:PG 352D353A. Cf. 2.93101:PG 353A356B.119 Vit. Moys. 1.62:PG 321C.120 Ibid.121 Vit. Moys. 2.15:PG 332A.122 Ibid.123 Ibid.124 Vit. Moys. 2.78:PG 348D.125 Vit. Moys. 2.276:PG 416A.126 Vit. Moys. 2.315:PG 428BC.127 Vit. Moys. 2.275:PG 413D416A.128 See Balthasar,Presence and Thought, 27.129 Vit. Moys. 2.193; 2.206:PG 389BC; 393CD.130 1 Cor 15:28 RSV.131 Gregory of Nyssa, When (the Father) Will Subject All Things to (the
Son): A Treatise on 1 Corinthians 15:28, trans. Brother Casimir, Greek
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