FRANCOIS RECANATI RIGIDITY AND DIRECT REFERENCE (Received in revised form 18 November, 1986) What is it for a singular term, or for a use of a singular term, to be referential in the strong sense, i.e. purely or directly referential? This is the question I will try to answer in this paper. The intuitive (and largely metaphorical) notion of referentiality that is current in the philosophical literature emerges fr om the following set o f statements: A referential term is a term that serves simply to refer. It is devoid of descriptive content, in the sense at least that what it contributes to the proposition expressed by the sentence where it occurs is not a concept, but an object. Such a sentence is used to assert of the object referred to that it falls under the concept expressed by the predicate expression in the sentence. Proper names and demonstrative expressions are supposed to be referential in this sense; and although definite descriptions are not intrinsically referential, they have a referential use. That such a notion exists in contemporary philosophy is beyond question. But many philosophers do not like it. I suspect that there are two reasons why this is so. First, it is thought that the intuitive notion of referentiality is too vague and metaphorical to be of any use; and second, assuming that a definite view does emerge from the set of statements above, it is thought that there are serious objections to this view. I do not share this pessimism. I think that the notion of referen- tiality can be satisfactorily defined, and that the objections raised to the referentiality theory can be met. In this paper, however, I will be mainly concerned with defining referentiality. Limitations of space will not allow me to pr esent a thorough defense of the doctrine of referentiality. My starting point will be the related but less disreputable notion of rigidity, introduced by Saul Kripke in the philosophical literature. It is show that there are, under that name, three different notions on the market, all stemming fro m Kripke's characterization of a rigid designator as a designator that denotes the same object in all possible worlds, The PhilosophicalStudies 53 (1988) 103--117. 9 1988 by D Reidel Publishing Company
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8/11/2019 François Recanati (1988) Rigidity and Direct Reference.pdf
R I G I D I T Y AN D D I R E C T R E F E R E N C E
( R e c e iv e d in r e v is e d f o r m 1 8 N o v e m b e r , 1 9 8 6 )
What is it for a singular term, or for a use of a singular term, to be
referential in the strong sense, i.e. purely or directly referential?
This is the question I will try to answer in this paper. The intuitive (and
largely metaphorical) notion of referentiality that is current in the
philosophical literature emerges from the following set of statements:
A r e f e r e n t i a l t e r m i s a t e r m t h a t s e r v e s s i m p l y t o r e f e r . I t i s d e v o i d o f d e s c r i p t i v e
c o n t e n t , i n t h e s e n s e a t l e a s t t h a t w h a t i t c o n t r i b u t e s to t h e p r o p o s i t i o n e x p r e s s e d b y t h e
s e n t e n c e w h e r e i t o c c u r s i s n o t a c o n c e p t , b u t a n o b j e c t . S u c h a s e n t e n c e i s u s e d t o
a s s e r t of the o b j e c t r e f e r r e d t o t h a t i t f a ll s u n d e r t h e c o n c e p t e x p r e s s e d b y t h e p r e d i c a t e
e x p r e s s io n i n t h e s e n t e n ce . P r o p e r n a m e s a n d d e m o n s t r a t iv e e x p r e s si o n s a r e s u p p o s e d
t o b e r e f e r e n t i a l i n t h i s s e n s e ; a n d a l t h o u g h d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e n o t i n t r i n s i c a l l y
r e f e r e n t i a l , t h e y h a v e a r e f e r e n t i a l u s e.
That such a notion exists in contemporary philosophy is beyond
question. But many philosophers do not like it. I suspect that there are
two reasons why this is so. First, it is thought that the intuitive notion of
referentiality is too vague and metaphorical to be of any use; and
second, assuming that a definite view does emerge from the set of
statements above, it is thought that there are serious objections to this
view. I do not share this pessimism. I think that the notion of referen-
tiality can be satisfactorily defined, and that the objections raised to the
referentiality theory can be met. In this paper, however, I will be mainly
concerned with defining referentiality. Limitations of space will not
allow me to present a thorough defense of the doctrine of referentiality.
My starting point will be the related but less disreputable notion of
rigidity, introduced by Saul Kripke in the philosophical literature. It is
perhaps a bit misleading to speak of the notion of rigidity, since I will
show that there are, under that name, three different notions on the
market, all stemming from Kripke's characterization of a rigid designator
as a designator that denotes the same object in all possible worlds, The
PhilosophicalStudies
5 3 ( 1 9 8 8 ) 1 0 3 - - 1 1 7 .
9 1 9 8 8
by D Reidel Publishing Com pany
8/11/2019 François Recanati (1988) Rigidity and Direct Reference.pdf
r i g id i ty r e f l e c t e d i n m e a n i n g . A r e f e r e n t i a l t e r m
i nd icates
t h a t t h e
t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n o f t h e u t t e r a n c e i s s i n g u l a r ; i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e i s a n
o b j e c t x s u c h t h a t t h e u t t e r a n c e S t ) w h e r e i t o c c u r s i s t r u e i f f x
s a t i s fi e s th e p r e d i c a t e S ) . A r e f e r e n t i a l t e r m , t h e r e f o r e , i s a d e s i g n a t o r
th at s ig n i f i e s i t s ow n r ig id ity .11
N O T E S
I say : " i n some
other
p o s s i b l e w o r l d " , b e c a u s e I a m a s s u m i n g t h a t u t t e r a n c e s o f t h e
t y p e " I t m i g h t h a v e b e e n t h e c a s e t h a t P " a r e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l a n d e n t a i l t h a t it is n o t t h e
c a s e t h a t P . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s , o f c o u r s e , c o n t r o v e r s i a l , b u t i t is n o t a t i s s u e h e r e , a n d
m y a r g u m e n t d o e s n o t r e s t u p o n it.
2 T h i s m a y s e e m r e m i n i s c e n t o f L e w i s ' I n d e x ic a l T h e o r y o f A c t u a li ty a n d t h e r e f o r e n o t
v e r y K r ip k e a n . B u t i n f a c t t h e c la i m I a m m a k i n g a m o u n t s t o n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n w h a t
P e t e r v a n I n w a g e n , i n h is p a p e r o n t h e I n d e x i c a l T h e o r y o f A c t u a l i ty , ca l ls t h e " W e a k
T h e o r y " , w h i c h h e s a y s i s t r iv i a ll y t r u e ( I n w a g e n 1 9 8 0 : 4 1 0 - - 4 1 2 ) . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , I
t h i n k o n e c a n n o t r e j e c t t h e c l a i m a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h e v e n w i d e s c o p e d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e
n o n - r i g i d , w i t h o u t a c c e p t i n g t h e t h e s is t h a t a w o r l d i s a c i r c u m s t a n c e o f u t t e r a n c e , a n d
t h e r e f o r e w i t h o u t a c c e p t i n g s o m e t h i n g l ik e L e w i s ' C o u n t e r p a r t T h e o r y ( s e e In w a g e n
1 9 8 0 : 4 1 6 - - 4 1 7 ) . I c a n n o t e l ab O r a te th i s p o i n t h e r e .
3 S t e p h e n S c h i f fe r ( 1 9 7 7 : 3 1 ) m a k e s a s i m i l a r p o i n t . H e i n t r o d u c e s a n o p e r a t o r " * "
t h a t t r a n s f o r m s a d e f i n i te d e s c r i p t i o n i n t o o n e t h a t h a s m a x i m a l s c o p e i n e v e r y s e n t e n c e
i n w h i c h it o c cu r s , a n d n o t e s t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n e x p r e s s e d b y " I t m i g h t h a v e b e e n t h e
c a s e t h a t t h e * P r e s i d e n t o f t h e U S i n 1 9 7 6 w a s a l a p s e d Q u a k e r " i s t r u e i n a p o s s i b l e
w o r l d i f a n d o n l y i f
whoever in that world is President of the US in 1976
i s s u c h t h a t h e
o r s h e m i g h t h a v e b e e n a la p s e d Q u a k e r .
4 B e l i e f - co n t e x t s c o n s t i t u t e a n o b v i o u s o b j e c t i o n t o c r i t e r ia s u c h a s ( R ) o r ( R R ) b e l o w .
S i n c e I c a n n o t d i s c u s s t h e s p e c i a l p r o b l e m s r a i s e d b y b e l i e f - c o n t e x t s i n t h i s p a p e r , I
s h a l l s e t th i s o b j e c t i o n a s i d e a n d c o n s i d e r o n l y n o n - i n t e n s i o n a l c o n t e x ts .
s T h e d i s t i n c ti o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o s o r t s - - o r t h e t w o s o u r c e s - - o f r i g id i ty c a n b e
f o u n d i n v a r i o u s p l a c e s i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e , t h e locus classicus b e i n g K a p l a n 1 9 7 7 ; t h e
t e r m i n o l o g y
de facto
v s
de lure
i s K r i p k e ' s : se e K r i p k e 1 9 8 0 , f o o t n o t e 2 1 .
6 O n L o c k w o o d ' s c r i te r i o n , s e e L o c k w o o d 1 9 7 5 : 4 8 5 . A s i m i l a r v i e w i s p u t f o r w a r d i n
R e c a n a t i 1 9 8 1 : 6 2 7 - - 6 2 8 .
7 T h e d e f i n it i o n , o f c o u r s e , m u s t a l s o b e m o d i f i e d s o a s t o t a k e i n d e x i c a li ty in t o
a c c o u n t . ( T R ) b e l o w , c o n t r a r y t o ( R ) a n d ( R R ) , w o r k s f o r i n d e x i c a l a s w e l l a s f o r
n o n - i n d e x i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s .
s W h e n a n o n - r e f e r e n t i a l e x p r e s s o n ( e.g . a d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n ) is u s e d r e f e r e n t i a l l y ,
t h e c o n t e x t , n o t t h e s e n t e n c e , i n d i c h t e s th a t t h e ( i n t e n d e d ) s a t i s f a c t i o n - c o n d i t i o n o f t h e
u t t e r a n c e i s s i n g u l a r . W e m a y s p e a k , i n t h i s c a se , o f " to k e n - r e f e r e n t i a l i ty " .
9 T h e q u e s t i o n a r is e s w h e t h e r a ll r e f e r e n t i a l t e r m s h a v e a n a s s o c i a t e d m o d e o f p r e s e n -
t a t i o n , o r w h e t h e r s o m e o f t h e m , n a m e l y p r o p e r n a m e s , d o n ' t . I t h i n k t h a t p r o p e r
n a m e s , l i k e o r d i n a r y i n d e x i c a l s , h a v e a n a s s o c i a t e d m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t i o n , b y v i r t u e o f
w h i c h a s e n t e n c e S (N N ) , w h e r e " N N " i s a p r o p e r n a m e , i n d i ca t e s t h a t
t h e r e i s a n o b j e c t
x, called NN ,
s u c h t h a t t h e u t t e r a n c e i s t r u e i f f x
s a t is f i e s S ( ) .
T h i s t h e o r y o f t h e m e a n i n g o f p r o p e r n a m e s h a s b e e n a t t a c k e d b y S a u l K r i p k e , w h o s e
a r g u m e n t s I d o n ' t f in d c o n v i n c i n g ; b u t I c a n n o t d e v e l o p m y v i e w s h e r e .
N o t i c e t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f " m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t i o n " t h a t i s u s e d h e r e i s l i n g u i s t i c a n d
n o t e p i s t e m i c . T h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g o f a r e f e r e n t i a l t e r m c o n v e y s a c e r t a i n m o d e o f
8/11/2019 François Recanati (1988) Rigidity and Direct Reference.pdf
R I G I D I T Y A N D D I R E C T R E F E R E N C E
7
p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e r e f e r e n c e , b u t t h i s m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t i o n i s n o t n e c e s s a ri l y i d e n ti c a l
w i th t h e m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e o b je c t r e f e r r e d t o i n th e thought e x p r e s s e d b y t h e
u t t e ra n c e . (By t h o u g h t , I d o n o t m e a n th e p r o p o s i t i o n e x p r e s s e d - - s o o n t o b e
d e f in e d - - b u t t h e o b j e c t o f th e s o - c a l l ed p r o p o s i t i o n a l a tt i tu d e s . I n a n y t h e o r y o f
D i r e c t Re f e r e n c e , t h e p r o p o s i t i o n e x p r e s s e d m u s t b e c a r e f u l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m th e
o b j e c t o f th e a t t i tu d e s - - h e r e c a l l e d t h e th o u g h t .) T h e r e a r e , fo r e x a m p le , tw o m o d e s o f
p r e s e n t a t i o n a s s o c i a te d w i th t h e p r o n o u n I ' : f r o m a l in g u i st ic p o in t o f vi e w , t h e
re fe ren ce is p rese n ted as the speak er (o r som eth ing like tha t) , bu t the con cep t tha t i s
re levan t to the though t be ing expresse d i s the con cep t o f se l f (o r someth ing l ike tha t) .
K a p l a n a n d P e r r y a r e b o th g u i lt y o f c o n fu s in g t h e tw o s o r t s o f m o d e o f p re s e n t a ti o n .
~0 In th is v~ay , we can d is t ingu ish be tw een the p rop os i t ions expressed by Th e cube
r o o t o f 2 7 i s
F
a n d b y 3 is F ' : b o th s e n t e n c e s h a v e t h e s a m e t r u th - c o n d i t i o n - - b o th
a re t rue i f f 3 i s F - - b u t o n ly the secon d p resen ts i t se l f a s t rue i f f 3 is F . On ly the
second sen tence conveys the ind ica t ion tha t the re i s an x such tha t the sen tence i s t rue
i f f x i s F . Th is i s the bas is fo r the d is t inc t ion be twe en the cube roo t o f 27 , wh ich i s
r ig id , and 3 , wh ich is re fe ren t ia l .
~ A n a n c e s to r o f th i s p a p e r w a s r e a d a t t h e fi r st m e e t i n g o f t h e P ar i s F r id a y G r o u p
( fa ll 1982) , the con fe ren ce 'Rece n t trends in sem ant ics ' (Urb ino , Ju ly 1983) , and
e l s e w h e r e . I w o u ld l i k e t o t h a n k Be n o i t d e Co r n u l i e r , P i e r r e J a c o b , D a n S p e r b e r ,
Ch a r l e s T r a v i s , a n d e s p e c i a l l y M ik e H a r n i s h , P a u l H o r w ic h a n d P a u l K a y , f o r t h e i r
c o m m e n t s o n t h e p e n u l t im a te v e r s io n o f t h e p a p e r .
R E F E R E N C E S
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v a n I n w a g e n , P .: 1 9 8 0 , ' I n d e x ic a l i ty a n d a c tu al i ty ' , T h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l Re v i e w 8 9 : 4 0 3 - -
4 2 6 .
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t io n , N e w Y o r k : N Y U P , 1 3 5 - - 16 4 .
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S e m a n t i c s o f N a tu r a l L a n g u a g e , D o r d r e c h t : D . Re id e l , 2 5 3 - - 3 5 5 .
K r ip k e , S . A . : 1 9 8 0 , P r e f a c e t o N a m in g a n d N e c e s s it y , O x f o r d : B la c k w e l l, 1 - - 2 1 .
L o c k w o o d , M . : 1 9 7 5 , ' O n p r e d i c a t i n g p r o p e r n a m e s ' , T h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l Re v i e w 8 4 :
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Re c a n a t i , F .: 1 9 8 1 , ' O n K r ip k e o n D o n n e l l a n ' , i n H . P a r re t , M . S b i s a a n d J . V e r s c h u e r e n
(eds. ), P oss ib i l i ti e s and L im i ta t ions o f P ragmat ics , Am ste rd am : Joh n Ben jamins ,
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Centre Na t ional de la Rec herch e Scienti fique,