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Information | Reference
Case Title: ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,petitioner, vs.
NAGMAMALASAKIT NAMGA MANANANGGOL NG MGAMANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC.,ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS,petitioner-in-intervention, WORLDWAR
II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTEDBY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
BYSENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.DRILON, REPRESENTATIVEGILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. ANDREPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.FUENTEBELLA,
respondents, JAIMEN. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR
AQUILINO Q.PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention., SEDFREY
M.CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA,JR. AND HENEDINA
RAZON-ABAD,petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO D.MACALINTAL AND PETE
QUIRINOQUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,WORLD WAR II
VETERANSLEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,THROUGH
THE SPEAKER OR ACTINGSPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,SPEAKER JOSE G.
DE VENECIA,REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVEFELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON,respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO,respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL,respondent-in-intervention., ARTUROM. DE CASTRO AND
SOLEDAD M.CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLDWAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES
OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. FRANKLIN
M.DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G.
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.*
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, vs.NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA
MANANANGGOL NG MGAMANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS
ANDMEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD WAR IIVETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner-in-intervention,
vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G.DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVEGILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE
FELIXWILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO,respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL,respondent-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 160262. November 10, 2003.*
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. ANDHENEDINA
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO D.MACALINTAL AND PETE
QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs. THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKEROR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKERJOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B.FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINM. DRILON, respondents, JAIME
N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 160263. November 10, 2003.*
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG,petitioners, WORLD
WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M.DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SENATE PRESIDENT, ANDJOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SPEAKER OF
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* EN BANC.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 415
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SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G.DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITYAS
SPEAKER OF, FRANCISCO I.CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR IIVETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M.DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY ASPRESIDENT
OF THE SENATE OF THEREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,GILBERT TEODORO,
JR., FELIXWILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIOLEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT,
KIMBERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINOLIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS
CAGAS,SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUISBERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ,
ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGARERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUELDANGWA, ALFREDO
MARAON, JR.,CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS,AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTOSEACHON,
JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON,MANUEL ORTEGA,
ULIRAN JUAQUIN,SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE
BAUTISTA, DELDE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO
BACULIO,FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON,LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERICSINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSESOLIS,
RENATO MATUBO, HERMINOTEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIOMACIAS,
ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADOESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BULUT, JR.,JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLOBONDOC, GENEROSO
TULAGAN,PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAELDUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLILAPUS,
CARLOS COJUANGCO,GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS
45
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 45
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N.SORIANO,
respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.PIMENTEL,
respondent-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 160277. November 10, 2003.*
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II
VETERANSLEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY
ASSPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OFTHE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA,JULIO
LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN,MARCELINO LIBANAN,
EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS,DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS
BERSAMIN,JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE,ISMAEL
MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON,JR., CECILIA
CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO,FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU
YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSECARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN
JUAQUIN,SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDEBAUTISTA, DEL
DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT,AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III,
AUGUSTO SYJUCO,ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG,
ERICSINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO,HERMINO
TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS,ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS
NEPOMUCENO, CONRADOESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO,
JUANPABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUOYLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT,
JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS,CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO,
FRANCISESCUDERO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIOBADELLES,
DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA,JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE
ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETASUAREZ, RODOLFO PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO
IPONG,GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUANMIGUEL
ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINAJOSON, MARK COJUANGCO,
MAURICIO DOMOGAN,RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLERBARINAGA,
JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO
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GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCISESCUDERO, RENE VELARDE, CELSOLOBREGAT,
ALIPIO BADELLES,DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAMMITRA, JOSEPH
SANTIAGO,DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO,ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLFO PLAZA,
JVBAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG,GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO,CELIA
LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI,BENASING MACARAMBON, JR.,JOSEFINA JOSON,
MARKCOJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN,RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELOMONTILLA,
ROSELLER BARINAGA,JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS,RODOLFO, HERMINIO
HARRY L.ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN,MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON
C.REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR.,ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.SERRANO AND
GARY S. MALLARI,petitioners, WORLD WAR II
VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON. SPEAKERJOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR.
ANDROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HISCAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERALOF THE
HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES,
respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR
AQUILINO Q.PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention., SALACNIB F.
BATERINAAND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAULM.GONZALES, petitioners, WORLDWAR II
VETERANS LEGIONARIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES,
THROUGH THESPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER ORPRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER
JOSEG. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVEGILBERTO G. TEODORO,
JR.,REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITSPRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
46
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 160292. November 10, 2003.*
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA.CECILIA
PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR.,ALFREDO C. LIGON,
JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.MALLARI, petitioners, WORLD WAR II
VETERANSLEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
JR.AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSECRETARY GENERAL OF
THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES,
respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO,
respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL,respondent-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 160295. November 10, 2003.*
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAULM.GONZALES,
petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANSLEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER ORPRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR.,REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THESENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO,
respondent-in-intervention, SENATORAQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
respondent-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 160310. November 10, 2003.*
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR,MELVIN MATIBAG,
RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO,EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO
SARMIENTO, EDGARDONAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH,
EMETERIOMENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS,NELSON A.
LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TO
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PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENTFRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,JAIME
N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO
Q.PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention., LEONILO R. ALFONSO,PETER
ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR,MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMONMIQUIBAS, RODOLFO
MAGSINO,EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDOSARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE,LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARDSMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA,MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMOCASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA,WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE
TO,PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC.,CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DEVENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,AND ALL
MEMBERS, PHILIPPINESENATE, respondents., ATTY.FERNANDO P.R. PERITO,
IN HISCAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THEINTEGRATED BAR OF THEPHILIPPINES,
MANILA III, ANDENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ, JR., INHIS CAPACITY AS A
TAXPAYER ANDMEMBER OF THE ENGINEERINGPROFESSION, petitioners, vs.
THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESREPRESENTED BY THE HONORABLEMEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE LED BYHON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAMFUENTEBELLA,
respondents.,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THEPHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THEHOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTINGSPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER,SPEAKER, CLARO B. FLORES,petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THESPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF
THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATEPRESIDENT, respondents., U.P.
LAWALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC.,
47
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 47
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
QUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICOPABLES, JR.,
JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P.GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO,
RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ,HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON
ARCE, JR., ELDELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ,
ALBERTOBUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNACLARISSA
LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIERQUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA,
ANTONIOLIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U.SOON,
VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAURESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER,
AND EDILBERTO GALLOR,petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES
OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE
HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKERJOSE G. DE
VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BYHON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIXFUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. 160318. November 10, 2003.*
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES,petitioners, vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALLMEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL
MEMBERS,PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
G.R. No. 160342. November 10, 2003.*
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AMEMBER OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.
MENEZ, JR., IN HISCAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF
THEENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE HONORABLEMEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVEWILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
G.R. No. 160343. November 10, 2003.*
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THEHOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKEROR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER
-
ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC.,GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILOV.
ORTIZ, GLORIA C.ESTENZORAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO,LUIS V. DIORES, SR.,
BENJAMIN S.RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO,DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA
R.DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA
G.AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FORTHEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OFOTHER CITIZENS
OF THE REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs.THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, TIIESENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINDRILON, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVESFELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTOTEODORO, BY THEMSELVES
AND ASREPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUPOF MORE THAN 80
HOUSEREPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNEDAND FILED THE IMPEACHMENTCOMPLAINT
AGAINST SUPREMECOURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.DAVIDE, JR.,
respondents., FR.RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO,petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLEPRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THEHONORABLE SPEAKER OF THEHOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents., NILO A. MALANYAON,petitioner, vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAMFUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTTEODORO, IN
REPRESENTA,VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L.HOFILEA, petitioners, vs.
THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DEVENECIA, AND
THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON,respondents., IN THE MATTER OFTHE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINTAGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.DAVIDE, JR., ATTY.
DIOSCORO U.VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.,PHILIPPINE BAR
ASSOCIATION,petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH
THESPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
48
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINESTHROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINM.
DRILON, respondents.
G.R. No. 160360. November 10, 2003.*
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES
THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THESENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE
SENATEPRESIDENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 160365. November 10, 2003.*
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.PADERANGA,
DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZORAMOS,LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V.
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS,
ELSA R.DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVAG.
AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND INBEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, TIIESENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENTFRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES
FELIXFUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVESAND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORETHAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES
WHO SIGNED ANDFILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREMECOURT
CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 160370. November 10, 2003.*
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THEHONORABLE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THEHONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 160376. November 10, 2003.*
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAMFUENTEBELLA
AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTA
-
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA,REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVEFELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THESENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.FRANKLIN DRILON,
respondents.,DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS,PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU
CITYCHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON,PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU
PROVINCE,VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIALBOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B.
SITOY,DEAN OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW,UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNGLAWYERS
ASSOCIATION OF CEBU,INC. [YLAC], REPRESENTED BY ATTY.MANUEL
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATIONOF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THEPHILIPPINES,
INC. [CAMP, INC.],REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R.POCA, MANDAUE
LAWYERSASSOCIATION, [MANLAW],REPRESENTED BY FELIPEVELASQUEZ,
FEDERACIONINTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS
Citation: 415 SCRA 44More...
Search Result1. G.R. No. 160261. November 10,
2003. [*EN BANC.] ERNESTO B.FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
vs.NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGAMANANANGGOL NG MGAMANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC.,ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS,petitioner-in-intervention, WORLDWAR
II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTEDBY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
BYSENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.DRILON, REPRESENTATIVEGILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. ANDREPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.FUENTEBELLA,
respondents, JAIME
49
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 49
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
TION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OFIMPEACHMENT AGAINST
CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
ITSSPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 160392. November 10, 2003.*
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,vs. THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGHSPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND
THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLINDRILON, respondents.
G.R. No. 160397. November 10, 2003.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINTAGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY.DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR.,
petitioner.
G.R. No. 160403. November 10, 2003.*
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSEOF
REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER ORPRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE
G. DE VENECIA,REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO,
JR.,REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THESENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATEPRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON,
respondents.
G.R. No. 160405. November 10, 2003.*
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITYCHAPTER,
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBUPROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARDMEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE
COLLEGE OFLAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERSASSOCIATION OF
CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRESENTED BYATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OFACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.[CAMP,
INC.], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA,MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
[MANLAW],REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACIONINTERNACIONAL
DE ABOGADAS
-
FUENTEBELLA, respondents, JAIMEN. SORIANO,
respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.PIMENTEL,
respondent-in-intervention. G.R. No. 160262.November 10, 2003. [*EN
BANC
2. . [*EN BANC.] ARTURO M. DECASTRO AND SOLEDAD M.CAGAMPANG,
petitioners, WORLDWAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M.DRILON, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS
SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G.DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITYAS
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, respondents,JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.PIMENTEL,
respondent-in-intervention. G.R. No. 160277.November 10, 2003.*
FRANCISCOI. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WARII VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF
THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. JOSE G.
DEVENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M.DRILON, IN HIS
3. .] SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA,CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. ANDHENEDINA
RAZON-ABAD,petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO D.MACALINTAL AND PETE
QUIRINOQUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,WORLD WAR II
VETERANSLEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs.THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES,
THROUGHTHE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKEROR PRESIDING OFFICER,
SPEAKERJOSE G. DE VENECIA,REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVEFELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
50
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
[FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G.CO, PRESIDENT
OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANDINDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.[CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND
BERNARDITOFLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OFCOMMERCE AND
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners, vs.
THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DEVENECIA, AS HOUSE
SPEAKER AND THE SENATE,REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON,
ASSENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
Supreme Court; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; Checks
andBalances; The Supreme Courts power of judicial review is
conferred on thejudicial branch of the government in Section 1,
Article VIII of theConstitution; In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the onlyconstitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the properallocation of powers between the several
departments and among theintegral or constituent units thereof.This
Courts power of judicial reviewis conferred on the judicial branch
of the government in Section 1, ArticleVIII of our present 1987
Constitution: SECTION 1. The judicial powershall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may beestablished by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justiceto settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there hasbeen a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdictionon the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasissupplied) Such power of judicial review was
early on exhaustivelyexpounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in
the definitive 1936 case ofAngara v. Electoral Commission after the
effectivity of the 1935Constitution whose provisions, unlike the
present Constitution, did notcontain the present provision in
Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on whatjudicial power includes.
Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed: x x x In times ofsocial
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
theConstitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated.In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organwhich can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powersbetween the several departments and
among the integral or constituentunits thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The executive and legislative branches
ofthe government effectively acknowledged the power of judicial
review inArticle 7 of the Civil Code.In our own jurisdiction, as
early as 1902,decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power ofjudicial review was exercised by our
courts to invalidate constitutionallyinfirm acts. And as pointed
out by noted political law professor and former
-
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON,respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO,respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL,respondent-in-intervention. G.R. No.160263. November 10,
2003
4. CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OFTHE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OFTHE
PHILIPPINES, GILBERTTEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAMFUENTEBELLA, JULIO
LEDESMA IV,HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO
LIBANAN,EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS,DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWINGATCHALIAN, LUIS
BERSAMIN, JR.,NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTONIEVA, EDGAR ERICE,
ISMAELMATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA,ALFREDO MARAON, JR.,
CECILIACARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITOAQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON,
JR.,GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSECARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA,
ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO,CLAUDE
BAUTISTA, DEL DEGUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT,AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DYIII, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANORUFINO BIAZON,
LEOVIGILDOBANAAG, ERIC SINGSON
5. insidious scheme of theminority members of the House
ofRepresentatives is successful, thisCourt found the requisites
forintervention had been complied with.Alleging that the issues
raised in thepetitions in G.R. Nos. 160261,160262, 160263, 160277,
160292,160295, and 160310 were oftranscendental importance,
WorldWar II Veterans Legionnaires of thePhilippines, Inc. filed a
Petition-in-Intervention with Leave toIntervene to raise the
additionalissue of whether or not the second
51
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 51
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the executive and
legislativebranches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power ofjudicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit: Article 7. Laws arerepealed only by subsequent ones,
and their violation or non-observanceshall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. Whenthe courts
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, theformer
shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative
orexecutive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are notcontrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial review is indeed an
integralcomponent of the delicate system of checks and balances
which, togetherwith the corollary principle of separation of
powers, forms the bedrock ofour republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers areutilized only for the benefit of
the people for which it serves.As indicatedin Angara v. Electoral
Commission, judicial review is indeed an integralcomponent of the
delicate system of checks and balances which, togetherwith the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock
ofour republican form of government and insures that its vast
powers areutilized only for the benefit of the people for which it
serves. Theseparation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of
government.It obtains not through express provision but by
actual divisionin our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusivecognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within itsown sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers areto be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to beabsolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitutionhas
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
securecoordination in the workings of the various departments of
the government.x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments
in the exercise of its power todetermine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts voidif violative of the
Constitution. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; Wherever
possible,the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaningexcept where technical terms are employed.To
determine the merits of theissues raised in the instant petitions,
this Court must necessarily turn tothe Constitution itself which
employs the well-settled principles ofconstitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible,the words used in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaningexcept where
technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,Inc.
v. Land Tenure Administration, this Court, speaking through
ChiefJustice Enrique Fernando, declared: We look to the language of
thedocument itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stopthere, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed
that the words inwhich consti-
-
issue of whether or not the secondimpeachment complaint against
theChief Justice is valid and based onany of the grounds prescribed
by theConstitution. Finding thatNagmamalasakit na mgaManananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al
6. . and World War II VeteransLegionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc.possess a legal interest in the matterin litigation the
respective motions tointervene were hereby granted.Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, on theother hand, sought to intervene forthe limited
purpose of making ofrecord and arguing a point of viewthat differs
with Senate PresidentDrilons. He alleges that submittingto this
Courts jurisdiction as theSenate President does willundermine the
independence of theSenate which will sit as animpeachment court
once the Articlesof Impeachment are transmitted toit from the House
ofRepresentatives. Clearly, SenatorPimentel possesses a legal
interest inthe matter in litigation, he
7. the 12th Congress, theconstitutionality of which
isquestioned. The questioned actshaving been carried out, i.e.,
thesecond impeachment complaint hadbeen filed with the House
ofRepresentatives and the 2001Rules have already been
alreadypromulgated and enforced, theprerequisite that the
allegedunconstitutional act should beaccomplished and performed
beforesuit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, hasbeen complied with.
8. standing. With respect to themotions for intervention, Rule
19,Section 2 of the Rules of Court
52
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
tutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained.They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical termsare employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails.As the Constitution is not primarily
a lawyers document, it being essentialfor the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the peoplesconsciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood inthe sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of
theprovision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of thecourts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the peoplemean what they say. Thus these are the cases
where the need forconstruction is reduced to a minimum. (Emphasis
and italics supplied)
Same; Same; Same; The words of the Constitution should
beinterpreted in accordance with the intent of the framersratio
legis estanimathe object is to ascertain the reason which induced
the framers ofthe Constitution to enact the particular provision
and the purpose sought tobe accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make thewords consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.Where there is ambiguity, ratio
legis est anima. The words of theConstitution should be interpreted
in accordance with the Intent of itsframers. And so did this Court
apply this principle in Civil Liberties Unionv. Executive Secretary
in this wise: A foolproof yardstick in constitutionalconstruction
is the intention underlying the provision under consideration.Thus,
it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
shouldbear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and theevils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.
A doubtful provision willbe examined in the light of the history of
the times, and the condition andcircumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is toascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enactthe particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby,in
order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to
thatreason and calculated to effect that purpose. (Emphasis and
italicssupplied)
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole
ut magis valeat quam pereat.Ut magis valeat quam pereat.
TheConstitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in
Chiongbian v. DeLeon, this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel
Moran declared: x x x[T]he members of the Constitutional Convention
could not have dedicated aprovision of our Constitution merely for
the benefit of one person withoutconsidering that it could also
affect others. When they adopted subsection 2,they permitted, if
not willed, that said provision should function to the fullextent
of its substance and its terms, not itself alone, but in con
junctionwith all other provisions of that great document. (Emphasis
and italicssupplied)
-
Section 2 of the Rules of Courtrequires an intervenor to possess
alegal interest in the matter inlitigation, or in the success of
eitherof the parties, or an interest againstboth, or is so situated
as to beadversely affected by a distributionor other disposition of
property inthe custody of the court or of anofficer thereof. While
intervention isnot a matter of right, it may bepermitted by the
courts when theapplicant shows facts which satisfythe requirements
of the lawauthorizing intervention.[92Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v.
Courtof Appeals, 313 SCRA 522, 531(1999) citing Gibson vs. Revilla,
92SCRA 219; Magsaysay
9. -Labrador v. Court of Appeals,180 SCRA 266, 271 (1989).]
InIntervenors Attorneys RomuloMacalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadrascase, they seek to join petitionersCandelaria, et al. in
G.R. No.160262. Since, save for oneadditional issue, they raise the
sameissues and the same standing, andno objection on the part
ofpetitioners Candelaria, et al. hasbeen interposed, this Court as
earlierstated, granted the Motion for Leaveof Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention. Nagmamalasakit namga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al.sought to join petitioner
Franciscoin G.R. No, 160261. Invoking theirright as citizens to
intervene,alleging that they will suffer if this
10. suffice to clothe him withstanding. Ripeness and
PrematurityIn Tan v. Macapagal, [95Supra note81.] this Court,
through Chief JusticeFernando, held that for a case to beconsidered
ripe for adjudication, it isa prerequisite that something had
bythen been accomplished orperformed by either branch before a
53
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 53
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
Same; Same; Same; If the plain meaning of the word is not found
to beclear, resort to other aids is available; The proper
interpretation of aconstitutional provision depends more on how it
was understood by thepeople adopting it than the framers
understanding thereof.If, however,the plain meaning of the word is
not found to be clear, resort to other aidsis available. In still
the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. ExecutiveSecretary, this
Court expounded: While it is permissible in this jurisdictionto
consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention inorder to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution,resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedingsare powerless to vary the terms of
the Constitution when the meaning isclear. Debates in the
constitutional convention are of value as showing theviews of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for theirvotes,
but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority
whodid not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose
votes at thepolls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it saferto construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face. The properinterpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by thepeople adopting it than in the
framers understanding thereof. (Emphasisand italics supplied)
Same; Same; Impeachment; American jurisprudence and
authoritieson impeachment, much less the American Constitution, are
of dubiousapplication for these are no longer controlling within
our jurisdiction andhave only limited persuasive merit as
Philippine constitutional law isconcerned; Although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins tothat of the United States,
their paths of development have long sincedivergedin the colorful
words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut theumbilical
cord.Respondents and intervenors reliance upon
Americanjurisprudence, the Americana Constitution and American
authoritiescannot be credited to support the proposition that the
Senates sole powerto try and decide impeachment cases, as provided
for under Art. XI, Sec.3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutionalcommitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, tothe total exclusion of the power
of judicial review to check and restrain anygrave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably supportthe
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate
theinherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident toimpeachment proceedings. Said American jurisprudence and
authorities,much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for theseare no longer controlling within our
jurisdiction and have only limitedpersuasive merit insofar as
Philippine constitutional law is concerned. Asheld in the case of
Garcia vs. COMELEC, [i]n resolving constitutionaldisputes, [this
Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence someof which
are hardly applicable because they have been dictated bydifferent
constitutional settings and needs. Indeed, although thePhilippine
Constitution can trace its
-
performed by either branch before acourt may come into the
picture.[96Id., at p. 681.] Only then maythe courts pass on the
validity ofwhat was done, if and when thelatter is challenged in an
appropriatelegal proceeding. The instantpetitions raise in the main
the issueof the validity of the filing of thesecond impeachment
complaintagainst the Chief Justice inaccordance with the
HouseImpeachment Rules adopted by
More...
54
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
origins to that of the United States, their paths of development
have longsince diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas,
[w]e have cut theumbilical cord.
Same; Same; Same; The major difference between the judicial
power ofthe Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is thatwhile the power of judicial review is only impliedly
granted to the U.S.Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,
that granted to thePhilippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as
expressly provided for inthe Constitution, is not just a power but
also a duty, and it was given anexpanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality; Thereare also glaring
distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and thePhilippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House
ofRepresentatives over impeachment proceedings.The major
differencebetween the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that ofthe U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of
judicial review is onlyimpliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court
and is discretionary innature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, asexpressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also aduty, and it was given
an expanded definition to include the power tocorrect any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any governmentbranch or
instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between
theU.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect
to thepower of the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings.While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to theHouse of Representatives without limitation, our
Constitution, thoughvesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiateimpeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of suchpower as embodied in Section
3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof.These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,and the one
year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution did not intend to leave the
matterof impeachment to the sole discretion of Congressit provided
for certainwell-defined limits, or judicially discoverable
standards for determiningthe validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicialreview.Respondents are
also of the view that judicial review ofimpeachments undermines
their finality and may also lead to conflictsbetween Congress and
the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court toexercise judicial
statesmanship on the principle that whenever possible,the Court
should defer to the judgment of the people expressedlegislatively,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness andpride.
But did not the people also express their will when they
institutedthe above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This
shows that theConstitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the solediscre-
-
55
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 55
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
tion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or inthe language of Baker v. Carr, judicially discoverable
standards fordetermining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through thepower of judicial review.
Same; Same; Same; Checks and Balances; There exists
noconstitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial reviewover impeachment proceedings would upset the system
of checks and
balances.There exists no constitutional basis for the contention
that theexercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset thesystem of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpretedas a whole and one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another. Bothare integral components of the
calibrated system of independence andinterdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond thepowers assigned to it by
the Constitution.
Same; Same; Requisites for Judicial Review.As clearly stated
inAngara v. Electoral Commission, the courts power of judicial
review, likealmost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is
subject to severallimitations, namely: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for theexercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must havestanding to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interestin the case such that he
has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as aresult of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must beraised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue
ofconstitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; The gist to
thequestion of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in theoutcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness whichsharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends forillumination of difficult constitutional
questions.Locus standi or legalstanding has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in thecase such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as aresult of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of thequestion
of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in
theoutcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness whichsharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends forillumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Real-Party-in-Interest; The rule
onreal-party-in-interest is a concept of civil procedure while the
rule onstanding has constitutional underpinningsthe question as to
real partyin interest is whether he is the party who would be
benefited or injured bythe judgment, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit while thequestion of standing is whether such
party have alleged such a personal
-
56
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concreteadverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the courtso largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutionalissues.There is, however, a difference between the
rule on real party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the
former is a concept of civilprocedure while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings. In view of thearguments set forth
regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiteratethe ruling in
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato to clarify what is meant by locusstandi
and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest. The
differencebetween the rule on standing and real party in interest
has been noted byauthorities thus: It is important to note . . .
that standing because of itsconstitutional and public policy
underpinnings, is very different fromquestions relating to whether
a particular plaintiff is the real party ininterest or has capacity
to sue. Although all three requirements aredirected towards
ensuring that only certain parties can maintain anaction, standing
restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits,as well
as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of
thejudiciary in certain areas. Standing is a special concern in
constitutionallaw because in some cases suits are brought not by
parties who have beenpersonally injured by the operation of a law
or by official action taken, butby concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the publicinterest. Hence the question
in standing is whether such parties havealleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
ofissues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficultconstitutional questions. x x x On the other hand, the
question as to realparty in interest is whether he is the party who
would be benefited orinjured by the judgment, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. (Citations omitted)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizens Suits; When suing as a citizen,
theinterest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must bedirect and personal.When suing as a citizen, the
interest of thepetitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct andpersonal. He must be able to show, not
only that the law or anygovernment act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminentdanger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, andnot merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appearthat the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some rightor
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to
besubjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
or actcomplained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of apublic right, the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement ofpersonal interest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Taxpayers Suits; In the case of a
taxpayer,he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegallydisbursed, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper
-
57
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 57
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcementof an invalid or unconstitutional law; Courts are vested
with discretion asto whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.In the case of ataxpayer, he is allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds areillegally disbursed, or that
public money is being deflected to any improperpurpose, or that
there is a wastage of public funds through theenforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke thepower of
judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he
hassufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised bytaxation and that he would sustain a direct injury
as a result of theenforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient thathe has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public. Atall events, courts are
vested with discretion as to whether or not ataxpayers suit should
be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing tomost of the
petitioners, given their allegation that any impendingtransmittal
to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuingtrial
of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of
publicfunds.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislators Suits; For a legislator, he
isallowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claimsinfringes his prerogatives as a legislator.As for a
legislator, he is allowedto sue to question the validity of any
official action which he claimsinfringes his prerogatives as a
legislator. Indeed, a member of the House ofRepresentatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Associations Suits; While an
associationhas legal personality to represent its members,
especially when it iscomposed of substantial taxpayers and the
outcome will affect their vitalinterests, the mere invocation by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines orany member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of lawand nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe itwith
standing.While an association has legal personality to represent
itsmembers, especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers
and theoutcome will affect their vital interests, the mere
invocation by theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of
the legal profession of
the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
althoughundoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with
standing. Its interest istoo general. It is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. However,a reading of the petitions shows
that it has advanced constitutional issueswhich deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,novelty and
weight as precedents. It, therefore, behooves this Court torelax
the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by
it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Class Suits; When dealing with class
suitsfiled in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be
sufficiently nu-
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58
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
merous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable
the court todeal properly with all interests involved in the suit,
and where it clearlyappears that not all interests can be
sufficiently represented as shown bythe divergent issues raised, a
class suit ought to fail.In the same vein,when dealing with class
suits filed in behalf of all citizens, personsintervening must be
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests ofall
concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all
interestsinvolved in the suit, for a judgment in a class suit,
whether favorable orunfavorable to the class, is, under the res
judicata principle, binding on allmembers of the class whether or
not they were before the court. Where itclearly appears that not
all interests can be sufficiently represented asshown by the
divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before thisCourt,
G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitionersadditionally allege standing ascitizens and taxpayers,
however, theirpetition will stand.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;
TranscendentalImportance, Explained; There being no doctrinal
definition oftranscendental importance, the following instructive
determinants areinstructive(1) the character of the funds or other
assets involved in thecase, (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional orstatutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality ofthe government, and, (3) the
lack of any other party with a more direct andspecific interest in
raising the questions being raised; In not a few cases, theSupreme
Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on locus standi of
apetitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendentalsignificance to the people, as when the issues raised
are of paramountimportance to the public.There being no doctrinal
definition oftranscendental importance, the following instructive
determinantsformulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano areinstructive: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in thecase; (2) the presence of a clear case
of disregard of a constitutional orstatutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentalityof the government; and,
(3) the lack of any other party with a more directand specific
interest in raising the questions being raised. Applying
thesedeterminants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised
herein areindeed of transcendental importance. In not a few cases,
this Court has infact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where thepetitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to thepeople, as when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to thepublic. Such
liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement thata party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A
partymust, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it notbeing one of which courts can take judicial notice.
In petitioner Vallejoscase, he failed to allege any interest in the
case. He does not thus havestanding.
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59
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 59
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intervention; An intervenor must possess
alegal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of theparties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adverselyaffected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody ofthe court or of an officer
thereof.With respect to the motions forintervention, Rule 19,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires anintervenor to possess a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in thesuccess of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situatedas to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of propertyin the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof. While intervention is nota matter of right, it may be
permitted by the courts when the applicantshows facts which satisfy
the requirements of the law authorizingintervention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A Senator possesses a legal
interestin the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress
against whichthe petitions are directed.Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
on the other hand,sought to intervene for the limited purpose of
making of record andarguing a point of view that differs with
Senate President Drilons. Healleges that submitting to this Courts
jurisdiction as the Senate Presidentdoes will undermine the
independence of the Senate which will sit as animpeachment court
once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to itfrom the
House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses
alegal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of
Congressagainst which the herein petitions are directed. For this
reason, and tofully ventilate all substantial issues relating to
the matter at hand, hisMotion to Intervene was granted and he was,
as earlier stated, allowed toargue.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; A motion to intervene
as ataxpayer will be denied where such party fails to allege that
there willresult an illegal disbursement of public funds or in
public money beingdeflected to any improper purpose; A lawyers mere
interest as a member ofthe Bar does not suffice to clothe him with
standing.As to Jaime N.Sorianos motion to intervene, the same must
be denied for, while heasserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed
to meet the standingrequirement for bringing taxpayers suits as set
forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, to wit: x x x While, concededly, the
elections to be held involve theexpenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitionersallege that their tax
money is being extracted and spent in violation ofspecific
constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power,
orthat there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent
COMELEC, orthat public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither dopetitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds throughthe enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. (Citations omitted)In praying for the
dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allegethat
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60
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of
public funds orin public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, hismere interest as a member of the Bar does
not suffice to clothe him withstanding.
Same; Same; Same; Ripeness and Prematurity; For a case to
beconsidered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something had bythen been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court maycome into the picture.In Tan v. Macapagal,
this Court, through ChiefJustice Fernando, held that for a case to
be considered ripe foradjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something had by then beenaccomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come intothe picture. Only then may the
courts pass on the validity of what wasdone, if and when the latter
is challenged in an appropriate legalproceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Justiciability; Political Questions;
Separation ofPowers; Words and Phrases; The term political question
connotes, in legalparlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policyit refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to bedecided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which fulldiscretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executivebranch
of the Government.In the leading case of Taada v. Cuenco,Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term political
question,viz.: [T]he term political question connotes, in legal
parlance, what itmeans in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words,in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it
refers to those questionswhich, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in theirsovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority hasbeen delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government.It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of aparticular
measure. (Italics in the original)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prior to the 1973
Constitution,without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or
reason, theSupreme Court vacillated on its stance of taking
cognizance of cases whichinvolved political questions; The
frequency with which the Court invokedthe political question
doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certaincases during
the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, whenhe became
a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify the Courts power
ofjudicial review and its application on issues involving political
questions.Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and
seeminglywithout any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its
stance of takingcognizance of cases which involved political
questions. In some cases, thisCourt hid behind the cover of the
political question doctrine and refused toexercise its power of
judicial review. In other cases, however, despite theseeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court
assumed
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61
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 61
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits
on powers orfunctions conferred upon political bodies. Even in the
landmark 1988 caseof Javellana v. Executive Secretary which raised
the issue of whether the1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in
force, this Court shunted thepolitical question doctrine and took
cognizance thereof. Ratification by thepeople of a Constitution is
a political question, it being a question decidedby the people in
their sovereign capacity. The frequency with which thisCourt
invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take
jurisdictionover certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated
Chief JusticeConcepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarifythis Courts power of judicial review and
its application on issues involvingpolitical questions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; From the record of
theproceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicialpower is not only a powerit is also a duty, a duty
which cannot beabdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political questiondoctrine.From the foregoing record of
the proceedings of the 1986Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only apower; it is also a duty, a duty
which cannot be abdicated by the merespecter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief JusticeConcepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII wasnot
intended to do away with truly political questions. From
thisclarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions:
(1) truly political questions and (2) those which are not truly
politicalquestions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Truly political questions
arebeyond judicial review while courts can review questions which
are nottruly political in nature.Truly political questions are thus
beyond judicialreview, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to bemaintained. On the other hand, by virtue
of Section 1, Article VIII of theConstitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political innature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Standards for
DeterminingPolitical Questions; Section 1, Article VIII, of the
Constitution does notdefine what are justiciable political
questions and non justiciable politicalquestions, and
identification of these two species of political questions maybe
problematic.Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution does not
definewhat are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable
politicalquestions, however. Identification of these two species of
politicalquestions may be problematic. There has been no clear
standard. TheAmerican case of Baker v. Carrattempts to provide
some: x x x Prominenton the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found atextually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to acoordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable andmanageable standards
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62
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policydetermination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or theimpossibility of a courts undertaking independent
resolution withoutexpressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or anunusual, need for questioning
adherence to a political decision alreadymade; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifariouspronouncements by various
departments on one question. (Italics supplied)Of these standards,
the more reliable have been the first three: (1) atextually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to acoordinate
political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable
andmanageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility
of decidingwithout an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicialdiscretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but areinterrelated to each in that
the presence of one strengthens the conclusionthat the others are
also present.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The problem inapplying
the standards provided in Baker v. Carr, 227 U.S. 100 (1993),
isthat the American concept of judicial review is radically
different from thecurrent Philippine concept, for the Constitution
provides our courts with farless discretion in determining whether
they should pass upon aconstitutional issue; In our jurisdiction,
the determination of a trulypolitical question from a
non-justiciable political question lies in theanswer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limitson
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.The problem
inapplying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of
judicialreview is radically different from our current concept, for
Section 1, ArticleVIII of the Constitution provides our courts with
far less discretion indetermining whether they should pass upon a
constitutional issue. In ourjurisdiction, the determination of a
truly political question from a non-justiciable political question
lies in the answer to the question of whetherthere are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferredupon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are
duty-bound toexamine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
governmentproperly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus
now apply thisstandard to the present controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Impeachment; Words and
Phrases; A determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense is apurely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sounddiscretion of the legislatureit is beyond the
scope of the Supreme Courtsjudicial power; Although Section 2 of
Article XI of the Constitutionenumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of theseother high crimesand betrayal of public
trustelude a precise definition.It is a well-settledmaxim of
adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of
agovernmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the
case
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VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 63
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
of Sotto v. Commission on Elections, this Court held: x x x It
is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutionalquestion and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless suchquestion is raised by the parties and that when
it is raised, if the recordalso presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest itsjudgment, that course will be adopted
and the constitutional question willbe left for consideration until
a case arises in which a decision upon suchquestion will be
unavoidable. [Emphasis and italics supplied] Succinctlyput, courts
will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is
trulyunavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Lis Mota; It is a well-settled maxim
ofadjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
governmentalact should be avoided whenever possible.The first issue
goes into themerits of the second impeachment complaint over which
this Court has nojurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of
this issue would requirethis Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachableoffense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which theConstitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such anintent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.Although Section 2
of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates sixgrounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes andbetrayal of
public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examinationof
the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that
theframers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries
ofbetrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding
to bothpositive and negative examples of both, without arriving at
their clear cutdefinition or even a standard therefor. Clearly, the
issue calls upon thiscourt to decide a non-justiciable political
question which is beyond thescope of its judicial power under
Section 1, Article VIII.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is guided by the
relatedcanon of adjudication that it should not form a rule of
constitutional lawbroader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is applied.Notedearlier, the instant consolidated
petitions, while all seeking the invalidityof the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise severalconstitutional
issues upon which the outcome of this controversy couldpossibly be
made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of
theremaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court
is guidedby the related canon of adjudication that the court should
not form a ruleof constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to whichit is applied.
Same; Same; Legislative Inquiries; Standard of Conduct for
theConduct of Legislative Inquiries.En passant, this Court notes
that astandard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already
beenenunciated
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64
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
viz.: The1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses ofCongress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus,
Section 21,Article VI thereof provides: The Senate or the House of
Representatives orany of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislationin accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights ofpersons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Thepower of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislationis
not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed
by theaforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided
therein, theinvestigation must be in aid of legislation in
accordance with its dulypublished rules of procedure and that the
rights of persons appearing inor affected by such inquiries shall
be respected. It follows then that therights of persons under the
Bill of Rights must be respected, including theright to due process
and the right not to be compelled to testify againstones self.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Political Questions;
JudicialRestraint; The exercise of judicial restraint over
justiciable issues is not anoption before the Supreme Court,
otherwise the Court would be shirkingfrom its duty vested under
Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the ConstitutionTheexercise of judicial
restraint over justiciable issues is not an option beforethis
Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is
notlegally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there
is no othertribunal to which the controversy may be referred.
Otherwise, this Courtwould be shirking from its duty vested under
Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of theConstitution. More than being clothed
with authority thus, this Court isduty-bound to take cognizance of
the instant petitions. In the augustwords of amicus curiae Father
Bernas, jurisdiction is not just a power; itis a solemn duty which
may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it isvexatious, would
be a dereliction of duty.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even in cases where it is
aninterested party, the Court under our system of government cannot
inhibititself and must rule upon the challenge because no other
office has theauthority to do so.Even in cases where it is an
interested party, theCourt under our system of government cannot
inhibit itself and must ruleupon the challenge because no other
office has the authority to do so. Onthe occasion that this Court
had been an interested party to thecontroversy before it, it has
acted upon the matter not with officiousnessbut in the discharge of
an unavoidable duty and, as always, withdetachment and fairness.
After all, by [his] appointment to the office, thepublic has laid
on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he]
ismentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their
variedcontentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be
fearless in [his]pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to
displease any person, interestor power and to be equipped
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65
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 65
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his]office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Seven Pillars of Limitations of
thePower of Judicial Review.In Demetria v. Alba, this Court,
throughJustice Marcelo Fernan cited the seven pillars of
limitations of the powerof judicial review, enunciated by US
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis inAshwander v. TVA as follows: 1.
The Court will not pass upon theconstitutionality of legislation in
a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,declining because to decide
such questions is legitimate only in the last
resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest
and vitalcontroversy between individuals. It never was the thought
that, by meansof a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature
could transfer to thecourts an inquiry as to the constitutionality
of the legislative act. 2. TheCourt will not anticipate a question
of constitutional law in advance of thenecessity of deciding it. .
. . It is not the habit of the Court to decidequestions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to adecision of
the case. 3. The Court will not formulate a rule ofconstitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which itis to
be applied. 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional
questionalthough properly presented by the record, if there is also
present someother ground upon which the case may be disposed of.
This rule has foundmost varied application. Thus, if a case can be
decided on either of twogrounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question ofstatutory construction or general
law, the Court will decide only the latter.Appeals from the highest
court of a state challenging its decision of aquestion under the
Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed becausethe judgment
can be sustained on an independent state ground. 5. TheCourt will
not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of onewho
fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the
manyapplications of this rule, none is more striking than the
denial of the rightof challenge to one who lacks a personal or
property right. Thus, thechallenge by a public official interested
only in the performance of hisofficial duty will not be entertained
. . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Courtaffirmed the dismissal of a
suit brought by a citizen who sought to havethe Nineteenth
Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v.Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertainedalthough
made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens. 6. TheCourt
will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instanceof one who has availed himself of its benefits. 7. When the
validity of anact of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if
a serious doubt ofconstitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court willfirst ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible bywhich the question
may be avoided (citations omitted).
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66
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The possibility of the occurrence
of aconstitutional crisis is not a reason for the Supreme Court to
refrain fromupholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases.RespondentsSpeaker de Venecia, et al. raise another argument
for judicial restraint thepossibility that judicial review of
impeachments might also lead toembarrassing conflicts between the
Congress and the [J]udiciary. Theystress the need to avoid the
appearance of impropriety or conflicts ofinterest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusingand
humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and
abroad ifthe judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove
animpeachable official. Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by
allegingthat failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution
against Congress wouldresult in the diminution of its judicial
authority and erode publicconfidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, isspecious, to say the least. As
correctly stated by the Solicitor General, thepossibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason forthis Court
to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachmentcases.
Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just
becausetheir action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Impeachment; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; Initiate
ofcourse is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do,
to begin,to commence, or set going.The resolution of this issue
thus hinges on theinterpretation of the term initiate. Resort to
statutory construction is,therefore, in order. That the sponsor of
the provision of Section 3(5) of theConstitution, Commissioner
Florenz Regalado, who eventually became anAssociate Justice of this
Court, agreed on the meaning of initiate as tofile, as proffered
and explained by Constitutional CommissionerMaambong during the
Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he(Commissioner
Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oralarguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which headded that
the act of initiating included the act of taking initial action
onthe complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word initiate
as ittwice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution
means to file thecomplaint and take initial action on it. Initiate
of course is understood byordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do,
to begin, to commence, or setgoing. As Websters Third New
International Dictionary of the EnglishLanguage concisely puts it,
it means to perform or facilitate the firstaction, which jibes with
Justice Regalados position, and that of FatherBernas, who
elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitionson
November 5, 2003.
Same; Same; Same; It is clear that the framers intended
initiation tostart with the filing of the complaint.It is thus
clear that the framersintended initiation to start with the filing
of the complaint. In his amicuscuriae brief, Commissioner Maambong
explained that the obvious reason
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67
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 67
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
in deleting the phrase to initiate impeachment proceedings as
containedin the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to
settle and make itunderstood once and for all that the initiation
of impeachment proceedingsstarts with the filing of the complaint,
and the vote of one-third of theHouse in a resolution of
impeachment does not initiate the impeachmentproceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a verifiedcomplaint under
Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution.Amicus
curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same viewas
is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986
ConstitutionalCommission, that the word initiate as used in Article
XI, Section 3(5)means to file, both adding, however, that the
filing must be accompaniedby an action to set the complaint
moving.
Same; Same; Same; Reddendo Singula Singulis; The term cases
mustbe distinguished from the term proceedingsan impeachment case
is thelegal controversy that must be decided by the Senate but
before a decision ismade to initiate a case in the Senate, a
proceeding must be followed toarrive at a conclusion, and such
proceeding must be initiated in theHouse of Representatives.Father
Bernas explains that in these twoprovisions, the common verb is to
initiate. The object in the first sentenceis impeachment case. The
object in the second sentence is impeachmentproceeding. Following
the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the termcases must be
distinguished from the term proceedings. Animpeachment case is the
legal controversy that must be decided by theSenate. Above-quoted
first provision provides that the House, by a vote ofone-third of
all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in thatsense
that the House has exclusive power to initiate all cases
ofimpeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision
is madeto initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be
followed to arriveat a conclusion. A proceeding must be initiated.
To initiate, which comesfrom the Latin word initium, means to
begin. On the other hand,proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end.It takes place not in the Senate
but in the House and consists of severalsteps: (1) there is the
filing of a verified complaint either by a Member ofthe House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Memberof the
House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of
thiscomplaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the
complaintor uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee
rejects orupholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded
to the House forfurther processing; and (4) there is the processing
of the same complaintby the House of Representatives which either
affirms a favorable
resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution
by a vote ofone-third of all the members. If at least one third of
all the Membersupholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared andtransmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the
House initiates animpeachment case. It is at this point that an
impeachable public official issuccessfully impeached.
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68
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment
casebefore the Senate impeachment court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution
understoodinitiation in its ordinary meaning.The framers of the
Constitution alsounderstood initiation in its ordinary meaning.
Thus when a proposalreached the floor proposing that A vote of at
least one-third of all theMembers of the House shall be necessary .
. . to initiate impeachmentproceedings, this was met by a proposal
to delete the line on the groundthat the vote of the House does not
initiate impeachment proceeding butrather the filing of a complaint
does. Thus the line was deleted and is notfound in the present
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; From the records of the
ConstitutionalCommission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
ConstitutionalCommissioners, it is without a doubt that the term to
initiate refers to thefiling of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress taking initialaction of said complaint; Once an
impeachment complaint has beeninitiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against thesame official within a one
year period.To the argument that only theHouse of Representatives
as a body can initiate impeachment proceedingsbecause Section 3 (1)
says The House of Representatives shall have theexclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment, This is a misreadingof said
provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo
singulasingulis by equating impeachment cases with impeachment
proceeding.From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to
the amicus curiaebriefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners,
it is without a doubtthat the term to initiate refers to the filing
of the impeachmentcomplaint coupled with Congress taking initial
action of said complaint.Having concluded that the initiation takes
place by the act of filing andreferral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the HouseCommittee on Justice or, by the
filing by at least one-third of the membersof the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once animpeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachmentcomplaint may not
be filed against the same official within a one yearperiod.
Same; Separation of Powers; The power of Congress to promulgate
itsrules on impeachment is limited by the phrase to effectively
carry out thepurpose of this section.the rules cannot contravene
the very purpose ofthe Constitution; If Congress had absolute
rule-making power, then itwould by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend themeaning of the Constitution without need
of referendum.RespondentHouse of Representatives counters that
under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, itis clear and unequivocal that
it and only it has the power to make andinterpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is premised onthe assump-
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VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 69
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
tion that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules.
Thisassumption, however, is misplaced. Section 3 (8) of Article XI
provides thatThe Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment
to effectivelycarry out the purpose of this section. Clearly, its
power to promulgate itsrules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase to effectively carry out thepurpose of this section. Hence,
these rules cannot contravene the verypurpose of the Constitution
which said rules were intended to effectivelycarry out. Moreover,
Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for otherspecific
limitations on its power to make rules, viz.: It is basic that all
rulesmust not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If asalleged Congress had absolute rule-making power, then it
would bynecessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of theConstitution without need of referendum.
Same; Same; Where the construction to be given to a rule
affectspersons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomesjudicial in nature.In Osmea v. Pendatun, this Court held
that it iswithin the province of either House of Congress to
interpret its rules andthat it was the best judge of what
constituted disorderly behavior of itsmembers. However, in Paceta
v. Secretary of the Commission onAppointments, Justice (later Chief
Justice) Enrique Fernando, speakingfor this Court and quoting
Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,declared that where the
construction to be given to a rule affects personsother than
members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial innature.
In Arroyo v. De Venecia, quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph
&Co., Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held
that while theConstitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings, itmay not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamentalrights, and further that there
should be a reasonable relation between themode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result whichis sought to
be attained. It is only within these limitations that all mattersof
method are open to the determination of the Legislature.
Same; Same; The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of
theHouse Impeachment Rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI asthey give the term initiate a meaning different from
filing.Theprovisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
ImpeachmentRules which state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1)if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verifiedcomplaint and/or resolution is sufficient
in substance, or (2) once theHouse itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justicethat the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substanceor (3) by the
filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of theHouse of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution
ofimpeachment by at least 1/3 of the members