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FOS LTE IMSI CATCHER DOMI
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fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

May 26, 2020

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Page 1: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

FOSLTEIMSICATCHERDOMI

Page 2: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

WARNING!ThistalkwillbeaboutclassicIMSIcatchers– do

notexpectMITMcalls,dataetc.

Page 3: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

GSMIMSIcatcher- recap• CreateafakeBTSwith• highreselectionvalue(C1,C2)• randomlocationareacode

• PhoneswillconnectandinitiateLocationUpdate• ReplywithIdentityRequest(requestIMSI)• AftergettingtheIMSIsendLUReject– cause13oranyotherdependingonyourintention

Page 4: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

Whycouldwedothis?Nomutualauthentication,thenetworkisalwaystrusted

Rejectmessagesneedtobeunencrypted

(Sh*tty ornullcryptoalsoleadtoMITMetc.)

Page 5: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

LTEArchitecture

EUTRANArchitecturebyCrati underCCBY-SA3.0

INTERNETPSTNPLMN

Page 6: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

ChangesinLTE•Mutualauthentication

• Integrityprotection

• Bettercrypto

Page 7: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

Procedureimprovements•MostproceduresrequireASsecurityenabled(integrityprotection)• UEsdropnon-protectedmessagesoncetheyhaveestablishedsecuritycontext

•Shouldbefine,right?

Page 8: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •
Page 9: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

Tinylittleprotocolproblem…

Page 10: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

TrackingAreaUpdateReject• UEsendsaTrackingAreaUpdateRequest• RogueeNodeB rejectsitwithcause9

3GPPTS24.301-5.5.3.2.5

Page 11: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

CatchingtheIMSI• Nomorekey/securitycontextinUE

• UEwillinitiateattach

• ItisallowedtoaskforitsIMSIinanIDENTITYREQUEST

• AftergettingitwesendanATTACHREJECTwithcause#12(TrackingAreanotallowed)

Page 12: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

HWandSW• USRPandlaptop•ManyopensourceLTEprojects(thisisAWESOMEbtw):•openLTE•OpenAirInterface• srsLTE andsrsUE• OwnimplementationofMME/corenetwork(pendingrequesttoopensourceit)

Page 13: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

RogueeNodeB• Needtosomehow‘lure’UEs• InGSMyoujustneededaneighborcell’sfrequency+highreselectionvalue• InLTEalistoffrequenciesarebroadcastedwiththeirpriorities–>youneedtodecodethelist,andselectthefrequencywiththehighestpriority

Page 14: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •
Page 15: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

ThesePeoplearegreat!*APPLAUSE*• Ravishankar Borgaonkar andAltaf ShaikfordiscoveringtheTAURejectvuln (andmanyotherproblems)inLTE• BenoitMichau forthelibrarymycorenetworkisbasedon• PhilippeLanglois andElvisPfützenreuter forpysctp

•MymentorsduringmyinternshipatQualcomm:KevinRedonandNicoGolde

Page 16: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

Q&A

Page 17: fos lte imsi catchers - H.A.C.K.Catching the IMSI • No more key/security context in UE • UE will initiate attach • It is allowed to ask for its IMSI in an IDENTITY REQUEST •

Thankyou!Key-ID:E2712651

Fingerprint:811C3FC3CFCB16E4BAEBF5FB7440DF59E2712651