Fortitudine Vol 34 No 4 - Marines.mil

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Motto of the United States Marine Corps in the 1812 eraHistorical Bulletin Vol. 34, No.4 2009

Memorandum from the Director: History Division Celebrates 90 YearsDr charles P Neimeyer 3

"At All Times Ready": Marines at John Brown's RaidDr. Charles P Neirneyer 4

Harpers Ferry: Last Action of "Henderson Era"Michael E. Krivdo 7

National Museum of the Marine Corps: Colonel Archibald Henderson'sPresentation Sword

Beth L. crumley 11

National Museum of the Marine Corps: Combat Artist: Commander PennGregoiyA. Macbeak 16

In Memoriam: Passing of Generals Cooper and Karch, Medal of HonorRecipients Pope and Wahlen, and TV Personality Ed McMahon

Robert V Aquilina 17

Celebrating 90 Years of Collecting, Preserving, and Promoting of MarineCorps History

Annette D. An2erinan 19

Book Review: In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in AfghanistanLtCol Gregoiy C. McCarthy 26

Histories Branch: Major General Bolden to Head NASADr. Thomas M. Baughn 27

About the Cover: The drawing of a younger andolder John Brown was created with fine art coloredpencils blended with a natural turpentine substitute(natural Turpenoicl) in an essentially complemen-taly color scheme of muted reds and greens. Thesupport is primed canvas inountecl on masonite.

Amy V Lindenberger, CPSA <www.civilwarfineart.com>

This bulletin of the Marine Corps historical progrini is published for Marines, at the rate of onecopy for every nine on ictive duty, to provide education and training in the use. of militaiy andMarine Corps history. Other interested readers may purchase single copies or four-issue sub—

scriptioris From the Superintendent o Documents, U.S. Government Printing Olfice. The appro-priate order tomi appears in this issue.

Fortitudine,VoI. 34, No.4, 2009

Dr. Charles P. Neiineyer

By the time of publication for thisissue of Fortitudine, History

Division should be moved into its

new home. It is a brick buildingacross the street from our modularone in which History Division hasbeen housed for the last four years.History Division will occupy the.firstfloor of the building, which includesa spacious atrium that the NationalMuseum of the Marine Corps willhelp decorate with artifacts befittingthe heritage of the Corps. HistoryDivision's ma i Ii ng address willchange from 3079 Moreell Avenue to3078 Upshur Avenue. The staff'sphone numbers and email addresseswill remain unchanged. HistoryDivision will share the building withthe Staff Non-Conmissioned OfficerAcademy and Enlisted ProfessionalMilitary Education programs, whichwill still be operating on the secondfloor of the building.

During the past few months,History Division has published sever-al occasional papers on the MarineCorps advisory effort in Vietnam,Marine Advisors with the VietnameseMarine Corps, by Charles D. Melson,Chief Historian, and Wanda J.Renfrow, and Marine Advisors withthe Vietnamese Provincial Recon-naissance Units, 1966—1970, byColonel Andrew R. Finlayson, and onclose air support during the battle forKhe Sanh, Vietnam, Close Air Supportand the Battle for Khe Sanh, byLieutenant Colonel Shawn P.

Callahan. Also, Dr. Nathan S.

Lowrey's monograph, Marines inAfghanistan, 2001—2002, has beencompleted and is scheduled for pub-lication. History Division recentlypublished a battle study on an-Nasiriyah by Colonel John R. AndrewJr. Nearing completion is an oral his-tory anthology on the "Awakening"in al-Anbar Province, Iraq, compiled

by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery,Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S.McWilliams, and Lieutenant ColonelKurtis P. Wheeler. The anthology willbe published in two volumes, withone focusing on the perspectives ofleaders in the Marine Corps and U.S.Army regarding the "Awakening,"and the other focusing on the per-spectives of Iraqis. The Field Historyunit collected this information in

record time thanks to the efforts ofMajor General John F. Kelly andColonel Bradley E. Weisz. We hopeto continue our collection efforts thisyear thanks to Major General RichardT. Tryon and his II Marine Expe-ditionary (Forward) staff.

The Marine Corps University Presshas been busy these last several

months also. Dr. Paula Holmes-Eber,Dr. Patrice M. Scanlon, and Ms.

Andrea L. Hamlen of Marine CorpsUniversity have just completed a

sequel, Applications in OperationalCulture: Perspectives from the Field,to a successful book, OperationalCulture for the Warfighter, by Dr.Barak A. Salmoni and Dr. Holmes-Eber, published by the press in 2008.Another press publication nearingcompletion is, The Iranian PuzzlePiece: Understanding Iran in theGlobal Context, by Dr. Amin Tarzi, afaculty member of Marine CorpsUniversity, who collected and editedthese papers from a symposium in2008. Finally, work is proceedingapace on the inaugural edition of theMarine Corps University Journal. Thejournal is intended as a forum forscholars of national security affairs,and in the future, we hope to high-light the work of faculty from theMarine Corps University. The firstedition will include substantive arti-cles on a wide array of topics rangingfrom the torture of prisoners to

obtain intelligence and the growth of"feral cities" and their potential futureimpact on U.S. national security. Thisedition should be hitting the streetsby late 2009.

History Division welcomes ournew Marine Corps University presi-dent, Major General Robert B. Neller.He earned his bachelors degree inhistory and speech communicationfrom the University of Virginia in

1975 and his masters degree inHuman Resource Management fromPepperdine University. Serving as aninfantry officer for his entire MarineCorps career, he attended theAdvanced Armor Officer Course atFort Knox, Kentucky. He conmand1-ed the 3d Light Armored InfantryBattalion and deployed with this unitto Somalia in 1992. After serviceoverseas at the NATO DefenseCollege in Rome, Italy, and a tour onthe staff of the Supreme Headiquar-ters Allied Powers Europe in Mons,Belgium, he transferred to the 2dMarine Division and given commandof the legendary 6th Marine Regi-ment. He later served as the divi-sion's G-3. Selected for BrigadierGeneral in March 2001, he was laterassigned as the Deputy CommandingGeneral for Operations, I MarineExpeditionary Force (Forward) dur-ing Operation Iraqi Freedom. Follow-ing his pronotion to Major General,he assumed command of the 3d

Marine Division in June 2007.

This year has been special for theMarine Corps University and

History Division because both ofthem celebrated their anniversaries.The Marine Corps University cele-brated its 20th and the HistoryDivision celebrated its 90th. Thisissue of Fortitudine includes a picto-rial essay about the 90-year story ofHistory Division. D1775D

Fortitudine, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2009 3

This year marks the sesquicentenni-al of John Brown's raid on the U.S.

arsenal in Harpers Feriy, Virginia, dur-ing two bloody clays in October 1859.Brown's raid was historically signifi-cant for several reasons: (1) it was oneof the more significant domestic ter-rorism events to have taken place onU.S. soil; (2) it was one of the firsttimes, but certainly not the last, whenMarines would he asked to quicklyrespond in a national military emer-gency; (3) it firmly established a tracli-tion in the minds of most Americans(and perhaps the Marines also) thatMarines are shock troops who can begiven tough assignments on shortnotice.

Going into harm's way for the 19thcentury Marine Corps was nothingnew. Marines had long manned thefrigates of the Navy and had previous-ly fought in regional conflicts such asthe Seminole War (1836) and theMexican War (1846—48). However, ineach instance, they had been givenmore time to equip and prepare forcombat. Even so, Marine CommandantArchibald Henderson had been ableto rapidly organize a 400-man battal-ion in just 10 clays for the SeminoleWar. But the Marines going to HarpersFeriy in 1859 were not even affordedthe luxuiy of a single clay to get ready.

By 1859, Brown already had a

national reputation. In the South, hewas reviled as a terrorist and murder-er. In northern abolitionist circles, hewas hailed as a man of righteousaction. An intensely religious man,Brown was a violent opponent ofslavery and was convinced that hehad been sent by God to do some-thing about it. Brown got his opportu-nity to strike a blow against slaveiywhen the territoiy of Kansas was inthe throes of deciding whether it

wanted to enter the Union as a slaveor free state. In October 1855, follow-ing the sacking of Lawrence, Kansas,by proslaveiy Missouri "border ruffi-ans," Brown and his men usedbroaclsworcls to hack to death fiveproslavery men. Forced to flee Kan-

by Dr. Charles P. IVeimeyerDirector

Department of Defense

Lt Israel C. Greene led the 12 Marineswho bro/'e into the engine house atHaipers Ferry and captured Broun.Greene used his sword to subdueBrown, but did not kill him. Greeneresigned from the U.S. Marine Coips atthe outset 0/the Ciuil War and joinedthe Con/derate States Marine Coips,rising to the J7k of inajoi This paint-ing shows Greene in his ConfederateStates Marine Cops uniform.

sas, he ended up for a short time inChatham, Canada, where he beganplanning yet another attack—this timeagainst the sleepy mountain town ofHarpers Feriy.

Just after midnight on 17 October1859, Brown and 18 men crossed thebridge spanning the Potomac Riverthat led into town. However, it wasnot long before Brown was surprisedby the approach of an eastboundtrain. Not anticipating this turn ofevents, he stopped the train. HeywardShepherd, a free African American andrailroad employee, went Onto thebridge to investigate. Seeing armedmen on the bridge, Shepherd fledtoward the train and was mortallywounded by rifle fire. For reasonsunknown, Brown allowed the stoppedtrain to continue through HarpersFeriy, thereby sealing his own fate,for the train crew alerted local author-ities in Frederick, Maiylancl, about the

insurrection they had just encoun-terecl.

During the night, Brown sentraiders to round up local slave own-ers, including Lewis W. Washington,the great-grand nephew of GeorgeWashington, and liberated the fewslaves they could find in the area. By0400 on 17 October, Brown had herd-ed about 40 hostages into the enginehouse and a nearby outbuilding onthe arsenal grounds.

By daylight of 17 October, whileBrown and his men traded shots witharmed locals in and around the arse-nal, Secretaiy of War John B. Floydand Secretary of the Navy IsaacToucey discussed the situation atHarpers Ferry. There were no Armytroops within miles of the nationalcapital. The closest were artillerymenat Fort Monroe in the far southeastcorner of Virginia. However, Touceyknew that the Marines maintained abarracks at 8th and I Streets,Washington, D.C., and guarded thWashington Navy Yard. He immediate-ly sent a clerk over to meet withMarine Commandant John Harris, whoordered Lieutenant Israel C. Greene totake 86 Marines to Harpers Ferry.Greene had his Marines ready to gowithin two hours, and they were on atrain headed north by 1530.

Meanwhile, the governors ofVirginia and Maryland (both

slave states at the time) sent militiaunits toward Harpers Ferry. The firstof these units arrived just before 1100.Concerned that there was no seniorleadership above the rank of lieu-tenant to take charge of the situationat Harpers Ferry, Secretary Floydrequested the services of ColonelRobert E. Lee, U.S. Army, then onleave at his home in Arlington,Virginia. Secretary Floyd orderedColonel Lee to proceed with all possi-ble dispatch (Lieutenant James EwellBrown "Jeb" Stuart, U.S. Army, accom—paniecl him as his aide) to HarpersFerry, take command of the Marines,and restore order as quickly as possi-

4 Fortitudine,Vol. 34, No.4,2009

ble. As a further precautionary mea-sure, Commandant Harris detailedMarine Corps Paymaster Major WilliamW. Russell to accompany LieutenantGreene. Since he was a staff officer,Russell was ineligible to commandtroops in the field, but Harris believedRussell's more judicious temperamentmight assist Greene in the crisis.

B ecause the Marines had movedout so quickly, their train was 30

minutes ahead of the one carryingColonel Lee and Lieutenant Stuart.Secretary Floyd wired ahead andordered Greene to wait for Lee, andGreene thus halted his train at SandyPoint, Maryland, just a few miles Out-side of Harpers Ferry. By the time Leewas able to link up with Greene, itwas nearly 2300. Meanwhile, insidethe town, a day-long firefight hadtaken place between Brown, now bar-ricadeci inside the engine house, andthe local militia forces. A number ofraiders and townsmen had been killedduring the day, including the popularmayor, Fountaine Beckham. In re-sponse to Beckham's death, captured

raider William Thompson was mur-dered by an enraged mob, whichdumped his body into the Potomac.

Lee Ordered the Marines to crossthe Potomac River bridge at 2300 on17 October and relieve the militiaforces. However, what Greene foundwas chaos. Armed townspeople, somedrunk, roamed about the arsenalgrounds firing their weapons; nervousmilitiamen stood in formation just outof range of gun shots from the build-ing; and curious spectators peekedaround buildings to gawk at all theactivity. Lee told the Marines to clearthe area of the townspeople andordered the militia to pull back fromthe engine house, replacing them withthe more disciplined Marines.

s day broke on 18 October, Lee,ot exactly sure who was inside

the engine house, drafted an immedi-ate surrender demand "to the personin charge of the insurgents." Heordered Stuart to deliver the ultima-tum to the engine house door and tonot negotiate with the insurgentleader. In the meantime, Lee ordered

Greene to form a storming party totake the engine house by force, antic-ipating that his surrender demandwould be rejected. Greene formedtwo squads of 12 Marines apiece. Eachsquad member was armed with theModel 1842 musket and a socket bay-onet about 18 inches long. Greeneordered the Marines' weapons toremain unloaded out of fear of hittinghostages and decided to take theengine house in a bayonet assault.Greene selected three stout Marinesand equipped them with sledgeham-mers to batter down the heavy wood-en engine house doors.

As Lieutenant Stuart approachedthe engine house, Brown cracked thecenter door open and pointed a car-bine at Stuart's chest. Stuart deliveredthe note and immediately recognizedBrown. Stuart had previously served atFort Riley, Kansas, and was well ac-quainted with Brown's activities there.As anticipated, Brown asked Stuart toagree to surrender terms, and after ashort while, Stuart abruptly broke offthe discussion and waved his cap—the signal for the Marines to begintheir assault. Brown slammed andbolted the door. With a shout, thethree hammer-wielding Marines beganbattering the center wooden door. ToGreene's chagrin, the door provedimpervious to the repeated blows, andafter about three minutes, he orderedthe Marines to stop. Spying a heavyladder nearby, Greene instructed thefirst assault squad to use it as a batter-ing ram, and on the second blow, thelower right hand panel on the doorgave way. Greene, Russell, and sever-al armed Marines of the first squaddove through the opening. Greenecharged through the engine housearmed only with a light military saber.(Contrary to popular belief, Greene'ssword was not the mamaluke hiltdress sword that Marine officers havecarried since the time of ArchibaldHenderson.)

Inside the engine house, it was pan-demonium. Greene later reported

that due to the gun smoke, cries of thehostages, and the shrieks of thewounded and dying, he had a hardtime initially locating Brown untilhostage Lewis Washington rushed up


The picture below shows the engine house where John Brown and his compatri-ots made their last stand against the Marines under the command of Lt Greene.

Library of Congress

buried in the Catholic cemetery in

Harpers Ferry. Thirteen hostages werereleased. In all, 17 people lost theirlives during the course of the raid(two slaves, three townspeople, oneslave owner, one Marine, and ten ofBrown's insurgent party).

After securing the prisoners, around1200 on 18 October, Lee sent Stuartalong with a few Marines to theKennedy farm in Maiylancl, the placefrom which Brown and his men hadbegun their raid. There Stuart foundweapons and military supplies thatBrown had intended to give to liberat-ed slaves. Lee wrote up his officialreport on the incident and sent it backto Washington in the hands of MajorRussell. The next clay, Lee wisinformed by a local farmer of anotherinsurrection in Pleasant Valley, Mary-land, near the present-clay location ofCamp David. Lee, Stuart, Greene, and25 Marines arrived there only to find it

was a false alarm. On 20 October1859, Greene and his Marinesreturned to their barracks at 8th and I

Streets.

to him and pointed Brown out. Brownhad reloaded his carbine and had justshot and mortally wounded PrivateLuke Quinn in the abdomen. RushingBrown, Greene slashed at Brown'shead with a glancing blow that cutinto his neck. Brown fell on his side,and Greene attempted to run Brownthrough with the point of his saber.Catching the saber tip on Brown'sleather cartridge belt, the sword bentin half. Not to be stopped, Greenethen repeatedly bashed Brown's headwith the hilt of his saber, knockinghim unconscious. Greene reported

that his Marines "came rushing in liketigers. They bayoneted one manskulking under the engine, and

pinned another fellow up against therear wall, both being killed instantly."Greene also noted that once he andhis men had entered the enginehouse, only Brown showed any morefight. Once Brown was subdued,Greene ordered his Marines to "spillno more blood." Marine casualties forthe entire assault were one man killed(Private Luke Quinn) and one manslightly wounded (Private MatthewRupert). Private Quinn was later

In his report to the AdjutantGeneral's office, Colonel Lee wrote

that "I must also ask to express ... myentire commendation of the conductof the detachment of Marines, whowere at all times ready and prompt inthe execution of any duty." It was afitting tribute, and one that firmlyestablished the Marine Corps as a

national force in readiness—a missionthat the Corps continues to carry onclown to the present clay.

Brown and a few of his survivingraiders were indicted on charges oftreason and murder and hanged on 2December 1859. Virginia Military Insti-tute cadets under the command ofMajor Thonas J. Jackson witnessed hisexecution. It would not he long beforeLee, Stuart, Jackson, and even theredoubtable Greene were fightingagainst the very federal governmentthey had so recently sought to defendagainst the wrath of Brown. WhileJohn Brown remains a figure of con-troversy, it is clear that his raid at

Harpers Ferry was part of the tinderthat set off the most destructive warever experienced on the continent ofNorth America. 1775


Libriiy ol Congress Photo

The above collage shows events surrounding John Brown's execution by hangingin Charlestown, Virginia (now West Virginia). The governor of Virginia hadaccepted the ofir of cissistcince from the superintendent; of the Virginia MilitaiyInstitute, who provided a contingent of approximately 85 upperclassmen cadetsfor security. One of the ofjicem present at the execution was Maf Thomas j.Jackson, later known. as "Stonewall" Jackson of Civil War ftnne.

by Michael E. Krivdo

The Marines that stormed theengine house and killed or cap-

tured John Brown's raiders on themorning of 18 October 1859 werecompetent, well-trained, and disci-plined, and they displayed a level ofprofessionalism that had takendecades to achieve. When directed toprovide forces to counter Brown'sthreat, the Marines quickly and effi-ciently organized and equipped adetachment and dispatched it withinhours of notification. The detach-ment's commander, First LieutenantIsrael C. Greene, analyzed the incom-plete intelligence on the threat anddeveloped plans. For example,Greene brought two three-inch how-itzers with his unit in the event that theenemy force proved larger than thesketchy information indicated.Greene also functioned well with the

overall commander of the operation,Army Brevet Colonel Robert E. Lee.Greene organized his men for the mis-sion, detailing specific tasks for themand supervising their preparations andrehearsals, and then led the assaultinto the engine house. As for theMarines, the fact that the assault ele-ment unflinchingly obeyed the orderto breach Brown's "fort" withoutammunition (to keep from hittinghostages) is proof enough of theircourage, professionalism, and confi-dence in their leaders. These qualitiesdid not come about overnight, butwere the product of several decades ofreforms and initiatives that slowly, yetfirmly, shaped the Marine Corps intoan organization that could capablymeet challenges such as HarpersFerry; and that Corps was very muchthe product of Archibald Henderson.

Although Archibald Henderson,fifth Commandant of the MarineCorps, had died in office nine monthsbefore the Harpers Feriy incident, hehad laid the foundation for theMarines' involvement through initia-tives first instituted by him over thepreceding three decades. WithoutHenderson's insistent and tirelessefforts to seek a larger, expanded rolefor the Marine Corps within the mili-tary establishment, it is unlikely thatthe Secretary of War or other com-mand authority would have ever con-sidered the Marines for such a com-plex and sensitive assignment. In theMarine Corps that Henderson inherit-ed in 1821, such a mission would havebeen inconceivable.

Within days of assuming commandover what many described as a weak,disorganized, and somewhat clemoral-


John Brown, at the bottom right of painting, regained con-sciousness after a head wound inflicted by Lt Israel Greene,

during the battle at the federal armoiy at Harpers Ferry,Virginia, in October 1859.

National Museum of the Marine Corps

izeci organization, Henderson placedinto action reforms designed tocounter critics and to reshape theMarine Corps into a valued militaryorganization. Previous commandantshad exercised limited control overtheir Marines; the clay-to-clay decision-making resided either in the hands ofthe secretaty of the navy or rested in

the authority of ships' captains andnavy yard commanders. Rarely didMarine commandants dare to "rock theboat" by challenging that arrangement.Henderson countered this trend, firstby daring to select his own officers tofill critical staff billets that gave himthe means to exert tighter control overthe organization. Second, he issuedorders and guidance to the comman-clers of Marine detachments and bar-racks to report directly to him and todiscontinue the previous practice ofreporting to the secretary or throughthe Navy chain-of-command. Third,Henderson reached out to Navy com-manders and solicited their adviceregarding the importance ol Marineswithin the Navy mission. Fourth, heenhanced training for new Marinesand instituted reforms to improve theirquality of life. Through each of theseactions Henderson gained the ammu-nition to diploniatically and intelligent-ly fight opponents of the Corps andnew insights to increase the overalleffectiveness of the organization.

National Museum of the Marine Corps

Brevet BGen Archibald Henderson,fifth commandant of the Marinecoips.

opportunities to serve with the Armyin operations ashore, something thatno previous commandant had envi-sionecl or desired. Henderson's intentwas twofold: to make the Corps morevaluable as a force in readiness forbudget-conscious political leaders andto expand opportunities for both train-ing and employing Marines outside oftheir traditional naval roles.Henderson succeeded in this effortand gained a great dividend by mak-ing the Marine Corps more relevantand valuable to the nation.Importantly, Henderson's volunteering

the Marine Corps to serve with theArmy during the Creek and SecondSeminole Wars helped to convertPresident Andrew Jackson, the formerArmy general who in 1829 arguedbefore Congress to merge the Corpswith tle Army, into a supporter of theMarines. Moreover, Henderson's vol-unteering a Marine battalion in 1836for service with the Army, lightingIndians in the South, yielded anotherbenefit that has not frequently beendiscussed. Faced with an acute short-age of officers, many Marine officersgained the rare opportunity to eithercommand regular Army units in com-bat or serve as high-level staff officers.As a consequence, the Marine officercorps gained invaluable experienceand skills that would not have beenpossible without the service with theArmy of the South. Henderson himselfserved as a commander ol an Armybrigade in what historian John Mahonhas called "the most active zone olcombat" in the war. These operationsalso yielded an important second ben-efit: They formed the lounciation for arich and colorful common histoiy thathelped promote a sense of espril decoips in the ranks.

The Marine Corps' timely and suc-cessful service in the Second

Seminole War opened the door forsimilar operations in the future. It also

Henclerson understood that theroles and missions of the Marine

Corps extended beyond the basictasks of helping impose order and clis-cipline on board ships and guardingNavy yards. A devout believer that theMarine Corps served as the "militaryarm of the Navy," he remained keenlyinterested in increasing the value andrelevance of Marines in what weretermed "landing party operations,"which became increasingly importanta nd more Irequently executed ci uring

his tenure. Henderson seized everyopportunity to strengthen the MarineCorps' position in these early amphibi-ous operations, eventually gaining anorganic artillety capability that clrasti-cally increased the shore-based fire-power of Marines fighting as part of anaval operation.

Henderson sought out increased

Marines, patrolling the swamps of Florida, sought Seminole Indians who wereresisting relocation to the west of the Mississibpi River by fighting a guerrilla war.

National Museum oF the Marine Corps


justified Henderson's long-standing(and frequently criticized) practice ofmaintaining a few officers and enlistedmen in Washington, D.C., to serve asheadquarters staff for forming a battal-ion in contingencies. This staff pro-duced other important benefits byeducating and evaluating all newMarine officers in the military artsbefore shipping them off to their dis-tant posts. The headquarters staffserved two functions: It trained offi-cers for the rigors of duty at sea andafforded Henderson and his trustedofficers the opportunity to get to knoweach and every officer in the MarineCorps despite its decentralizedemployment scheme. Through thiscommon training, the headquartersstaff managed to instill commonMarine Corps' customs and traditionsinto new officers who only monthsbefore had been civilians with littleknowledge of military life.

During the Mexican War,Henderson gained a significant

increase in the manpower of theCorps and again formed a battalion forservice in the invasion of Mexico.Because the Mexican navy was weakand the possibility of engagements atsea unlikely, Henderson reallocatedMarines from shore duty to fill thenew battalion. Unfortunately, the bat-talion did not arrive in Mexico untilthree months following the Army'samphibious landing at Veracruz, butthe battalion subsequently participatedwith General Winfield Scott's forces asit fought into "the Halls ofMontezuma" in Mexico City. In thePacific, Marines, serving as the nucle-us of landing parties, seized severalmajor cities up and down the coast,helping to gain control of Californiafor the United States. Significantly,Marines, from ships stationed off SanDiego, participated in the rescue ofArmy Brigadier General Stephen W.Kearny's overland force and laterformed another ad hoc battalionunder Lieutenant Jacob A. Zeilin (thefuture seventh commandant) thatseized Los Angeles. Henderson'sMarines were proving themselves a-dept at operating amphibiously.

Although peacetime meant shrink-ing to its prewar manpower limits, the

Marine Corps now possessed a wealthof institutional knowledge and experi-ence in both landing party operationsand in fighting ashore as part of largercombat formations. And in the 1850s,the Marines were called on more fre-quently to put their new skills to thetest. In addition to being tasked on atleast five occasions to quell domesticcivil disturbances (another new mis-sion not undertaken until Henderson'stenure), Marines also exercised theirnew skills and weaponry in a dozeninstances that involved the employ-ment of landing parties on foreignshores. Although some of the situa-tions required nothing more than ashow of force to resolve the situation,others required combat action. Inaddition to at least nine armed land-ings throughout Central or SouthAmerican countries, Marines also par-ticipated in two punitive landings inFiji and two more prolonged engage-ments in China (1854 and 1856).

The 1856 operation in China is

indicative of just how far Marine par-ticipation in landing operations hadadvanced in the "Henderson Era." Aspart of the escalation of violence inCanton that accompanied what cameto be known as the Taiping Rebellion,the American consul requested securi-ty support from the Navy's East IndiaSquadron. On 14 November, MarineBrevet Captain John D. Simms com-manded a landing party of approxi-

mately 60 Marines and 60 sailors, thefirst recorded instance of a Marinebeing placed in charge of such an unit.After landing, the Chinese granted acease-fire, but soon violated it by fir-ing several times on U.S. naval shipsfrom a series of forts that guarded theapproach to Canton. Angered by thecease-fire violations, the commodoreof the squadron, Captain James F.

Armstrong, launched an attack on theforts. On 20 November, with navalgunfire from the USS Portsmouth andUSS Levant firing over their heads, asizeable landing party of about 300sailors and Marines rowed ashore andattacked each fort sequentially fromthe relatively unprotected landwardside. Simms led an assault party ofapproximately 50 Marines and sailorsand overran the Chinese on the firstfort, forcing some to swim their way tosafety. When the Chinese regroupedand tried to retake the fort by massedcounterattack, their human waveswere scattered by the combination ofa determined defense by the Marinesand the firepower of two howitzersthat the landing parry had broughtfrom the ships for just that purpose.Henderson's long push for artillerytraining for Marines and organicartillery pieces for landing parties hadborne fruit.

Simms successfully repeated theprocedure the next day on the secondfort and then seized the third by that

Fortitudine, Vol. 34, No.4, 2009 9

National Museum of the Marine Coips

On 6 December 1846, Capt Gillespie, with 39 men and a four-pounder cannon,joined Gen Kearny's forces to engage the Calfornians. Gillespie, Kearny, and 18men were wounded and nine were killed before the 6'alifornians withdrew.

same evening. On the morning of 22November, the Amecicans placed all ofthe captured enemy cannon and thetwo howitzers into action, firingagainst the last Chinese fort whileSimms' assault party moved to take it.On arriving at the fort, the Americansfound the position booby-trapped hutabandoned. In three clays of action,the naval force had seized four granitefortresses and killed over 500 Chinesetroops and suffered 10 killed and 32wounded. After the Marines andsailors demolished the forts withexplosives, the Chinese governmentissued an apology for provoking theincident in the first place.

The 1856 operation va liclateciHenderson's earlier insistence on pro-vicling Marines with adequate trainingin artillery tactics and acquisition oforganic artillery to support the landingparty ashore. Furthermore, contra iy toMillett's assertion that "CommandantHenderson made no great issue of the[1856 Barrier Fort operationi,"Henderson specifically cited the oper-ation as a rationale to support hisargument for the authority to sendMarine officers to the U.S. MilitaryAcademy's course of instruction forlight and heavy artilleiy. His argumentproved persuasive because in 1857,Lieutenant Israel Greene, the sameofficer who would soon command theHarpers Ferry response force, becamethe first Marine to attend that course.

Ithough the actual number ofarines involved in the battalion

deployments was relatively small, theirperformance and achievementshelped capture the inagination of thepublic and military alike, and someleaders began to honestly consider thepotential for the future of the Corps.Slowly, but with increasing frequency,senior Navy leaders became morereceptive to Henderson's concepts andideas, and some even began corre-sponding with hin regarding theirthoughts on the place of Marines innodern naval warfare. For example,Navy Captain David G. Farragut wroteHenderson in 1852, stating thatMarines were needed afloat not onlyto maintain discipline on ship, but "forthe important duty of landing to actagainst the eneny, when they become

the nucleus and in fact, the chiefreliance of the Commanding Officerfor the formation of landing forces."In a remarkable turnaround, the Boardof Navy Commissioners, a groupwhose majority argued in 1830 "thatMarines are not a necessary compo-nent part of the crews of our vessels-of-war," by 1842 would help arguebefore Congress that "on board shipthey [Marines] are absolutely indis-pensable." Such a sea change in theopinion of the naval establishment isremarkable, and the credit properlyrested on Henderson's shoulders.

In light of this growing support forHenderson's ideas on deploying unitsof Marines trained for combat ashore,it is not surprising that when PresidentJames Buchanan dispatched a force toParaguay in 1858 to demand a "redressfor an insult to our flag and for injuriesto our citizens," a Marine battaliontrained in "drill both for the use of themusket and of light and heavyartillery" accompanied the naval force.Being composed of "19 vessels, carly-ing 200 guns and 2,500 men, well sup-plied with ammunition, small arms,and whatever was necessaiy to its suc-cess," the naval force represented thelargest deployment of American mili-tary power since the Mexican War andwas truly expeditionaiy in every senseof the word. On its arrival in Paraguay,the force simply overwhelmed thenation and brought about a quick res-olution to the crisis, a testament to theprinciple of naval presence. Unfortu-nately, Archibald Henderson did notlive to see the fruits of that labor; the"grand old man of the Marine Corps"died while taking his afternoon nap onhis sofa in the commandant's quartersin Washington.

Nonetheless, "Henderson's Era"continued for some time past his

death, sustained through the spirit andactions of the men he had helpedtrain. The Marines, who fought JohnBrown's raiders nine months aftertheir commandant's death, owed theirtraining, discipline, traditions, and pro-ficiency to the systems, procedures,and infrastructure placed in service byHenderson. The fifth commandantwas also responsible for establishingthe early precedents for working

alongside the Army, and this cooper-ation fostered the atmosphere of pro-fessionalism and mutual respect thatgave Colonel Robert E. Lee, as seniorcommander, the confidence to employthe Marines in that difficult and politi-cally sensitive operation. Tellingly,militia units from both Virginia andMaiylancl, although first on the sceneat Harpers Feriy, deferred to theMarines the complex tasks of recover-ing the hostages and capturingBrown's raiders. Equally important,Greene personally expressed greatconfidence in his men's ability to suc-cessfully accomplish the mission andwas not disappointed.

At the highest levels of the Corps,though, some indicators arose that

suggested the new Commandant,Colonel John Harris, did not embracethese nontraditional operations asenthusiastically as Henderson did.Although outwardly Henderson's ini-tiatives remained in effect, Harris hadalready begun to relax command pres-sure to maintain the momentum thatHenderson had established. As AllanR. Millett describes the situation,"Henderson's death removed animportant force for efficiency in theofficer corps." Harris proved to betimid in his dealings with both higherand subordinate commanders, and heexpressed interest in returning tomore traditional roles for Marinesdespite growing evidence thatchanges in naval technologies and tac-tics made some of those duties obso-lete. When the call came clown fromthe War Department for Marines torespond to the Harpers Ferry situation,Harris' contribution was minor.

Harris' own official correspondenceprovides the nost convincing cvi-clence that he was not keen about pur-suing some of Henderson's initiatives.Interestingly, in his first annual reportto the Navy secretary, written onlythree weeks after the successful con-clusion of the events of Harpers Ferry,Harris includes not one word about theaction at Harpers Ferry. WhereHenderson would have used the suc-cess as a springboard to gain someimprovement or initiative to better theCorps, Harris instead moves on toanother point that gives insight into

10 Fortitucline,Vol. 34, No.4,2009

his concerns. After a discussion on thestate of the various barracks, he statesthat "from want of accommodationsand of numbers we find it impossibleto instruct the men as infantry and aslight and heavy artillery." Hendersonhad consistently placed his centralizedtraining effort above everything else,even if it meant temporarily shortingdetachments on board ship. Harris, itseemed, had different priorities for hisMarine Corps.

These differences continued togrow and became even more apparentwith the outbreak of the Civil War.Whereas previous examples suggestedthat Henderson would have relishedthe chance to pursue the opportunitiesbrought about by the war, Harrisseemed to shrink from the challenges.Rather than seek chances to increaseMarine Corps participation in theamphibious operations undertakenduring the war, Harris instead feltmore comfortable with fielding smalldetachments for service on board the

new ships of the Navy, seeminglyignoring the fact that steam-poweredironclad ships, armed with long-rangenaval artillery, had little use (Or room)for Marine marksmen in the rigging.Finally, in the wake of the MarineCorps' disappointing experiences atthe First Battle of Bull Run in July1861, Harris asked the secretary of theNavy to see if he could help divorcethe Marine Corps from further servicewith the Army altogether. The "Hen-derson Era" was truly over.

In any event, the evidence supportsthe hypothesis that the Marines atHarpers Ferry in October 1859 owedtheir training, weaponry, armaments,equipment, and proficiency to theefforts of Commandant Henderson.Under his tutelage, Greene becamethe first Marine officer to attend a for-mal course of instruction at WestPoint, and he also becameHenderson's Instructor of Artillery atHeadquarters, responsible for thetraining of new officers and men in

tactics and skills they needed forduties both afloat and as members oflanding parties. Through that experi-ence, Greene and his noncommis-sioned officers had been infused notonly with the skills to fight, but alsowith a sense of esprit de corps and ashared history of tradition and customsborn in the "Henderson Era." Greeneand his men also understood that thecontinued good reputation of theirCorps, a standing that had been metic-ulously built up over the years underthe careful tutelage of their long-stand-ing commandant, rested in theirhands. Finally, the Harpers Ferry mis-sion itself seems lifted from theHenderson playbook; it involved anontraditional, high-profile assignmentwith the Army, yet the Marine Corpswould bear the brunt of the fight.Henderson had long seized on everyopportunity to showcase the capabili-ties of his Marines, and he would cer-tainly have been proud of their per-formance in this action. 1775

by Beth L. CrumleyAssistant Ordnance Curator

Q ne of the most intriguing items,held in the edged weapons col-

lection of the National Museum of theMarine Corps, is a presentation swordmade by the Ames Sword Companyand given by the State of Virginia toColonel Archibald Henderson in 1841.While Henderson's legacy as Com-mandant of the Marine Corps, a posi-tion he held for 38 years (1820—1859),is well known, details of his early ser-vice are sometimes forgotten. As acaptain of Marines aboard the USSConstitution, Henderson distinguishedhimself during the battle with HMSCyane and HMS Levant and receivedthe sword for his actions.

A native of Dumfries, Virginia,Hendetson was appointed a secondlieutenant on 4 June 1806. In less thana year, he commanded the Marinedetachment aboard USS Wasp. ByDecember 1807, he had transferred tothe USS Constitution. Assignmentsashore followed, including billets at

the Marine Barracks, New York, andCharleston, South Carolina, where hisMarines were assigned to gunboatsthen engaging pirates along the U.S.coast. Appointed to the rank of cap-tain in 1811, Henderson spent the firstfifteen months of the War of 1812ashore, commanding the Marine Bar-racks at Charlestown, Massachusetts.

Henderson's frustration at not beingmore directly in the fight was mount-ing. He had already approached theArmy regarding an interservice trans-fer, an effort for which he had beenrebuked by Paul Hamilton, Secretaryof the Navy. A letter, written in May1813 to his brother John, clearlyshowed Henderson's dissatisfactionwith his assigniTnent and his intent toresign his commission at the end ofthe war if he was not promoted. InJune, fate intervened and Hendersonwas ordered to return to sea and com-mand the Marine detachment aboardConstitution.

By the time Henderson reported forduty on 9 September 1813, the ex-ploits of the Constitution were al-ready the stuff of legend. In August1812, in a 30-minute engagement, thecrew of the Constitution shatteredHMS Guerriere and was given aheroes' welcome upon their return toBoston. Four months later, the frigateHMS Java was captured and burnedoff the coast of Brazil. Hendersonfeared he had already missed much ofthe action.

The eighteenth of December 1813dawned fair and clear. The

Constitution, under the able commandof Captain Charles Stewart, sailed fromBoston Harbor for the West Inches.There she preyed on British vessels,capturing the Lovely Ann, Phoenix,and catherine and burned theschooner HMS Pictou. In March 1814,a cracked mainmast and an appear-ance of scurvy among the crew forced

Fortitucline, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2009 11

Stewart to sail for Boston. Spotted andpursued by the British frigates HMSJunon and Tenedos, Stewart managedto evade the British ships by orderingstores and provisions thrown over-board. On 17 April, the Constitutionanchored in Boston Harbor to thecheers of thousands. Although orderswere issued in May for Stewart to sail,a British blockade prevented Consti-tution 's departure until 17 December1814. Once again, Henderson fearedthat in his time ashore he had missedthe action.

Q n 20 Februaiy 1815, Constitutionsailed near the Portuguese island

of Madeira in the mid-Atlantic, steeringsouthwest with a light breeze. It was aquiet morning until shortly after noonwhen the lookout atop the frigate'smain masthead spotted a sail off the

starboard how. Another sail was re-ported off the port bow. The first shipchanged course and was headingdirectly toward Constitution. Theship's log recorded the event:

At 1 discovered a sail two pointson the larboard bow—hauled upand macic sail in chice-at ½ past1 macic the sail to he a ship's at¾ past 1 discovered another sailahead-macIc them out at 2 p.m.to be both ships, standing close-hauled, with their starboardtacks on board.

The vessel approaching from thestarboard flew signal flags, whichcould not he answereci. RealizingConstitution was not friendly, theunknown ship turned westward, sail-ing away.

The chaplain on board the USS

Constitution, Assheon Y. Humph-reys, wrote the following passage inhis journal: "As we were now in directtrack for craft bound from theMeciiterranean to Macleira and felt

assured that none but men of warwould manoeuver in this way andwere not mistaken." The ships were,indeed, men of war: the HMS Cyaneand HMS Levant.

Stewart orcieredl all sails hoisted andthe bow guns to fire, hoping to

bnng the ships to battle. With thechase on, the main royal mast ofConstitution snapped, forcing Stewartto slow his pursuit and make repairs.Within an hour, the mast was repaired,a testament to the skill of the men onboarci the Constitution. Stewart's after-action report stated that as the dis-tance closed between Constitution

Capt Henderson s Marines provided "lively and well-directed tire" during Constitution's battle with Cyane and Levant.Navy Art Collection


and the enemy ships, his crew "com-menced firing on the chase from ourtwo larboard bow guns; our shotfalling short, ceased firing."

Still about four miles from theBritish vessels, Stewart cleared

Constitution for action, determined toengage the enemy. The 34-gun Cyaneand 21-gun Levant "passed within hailof each other, and hauled by the windon the starboard tack, hauled up there[sic] courses and prepared to receiveus." Shortly before six, the two shipswent to fighting sails and formed up,sailing westward, 100 yards apart,with Cyane astern of Levant.

Stewart ordered the Stars andStripes raised, and both British shipsalso hoisted their flags. From Stewart'sreport on the action, Constitution con-tinued to close and

ranged up on the starboard sideof the sternmo,st ship, about 300yards distant, and commencedthe action by broadsides, bothships returning our fire with thegreatest of spirit for about 15minutes, then the fire of theenemy beginning to slacken,and the great amount of smokeunder our lee, induced us tocease our fire to ascertain theirpositions and conditions.

Captain Henderson, commandingthe Marine detachment, later testifiedthat the range was "so close that theMarines were engaged almost fromthe beginning of the action." Even atthis early date, Marine marksmen wereknown to be among the best in theworld. Posted high in the ships' rig-ging, their mission was to fire uponthe enemy's officers and gunners.Their fire was deadly, and in this par-ticular battle, was key to victory.

Constitution had drawn parallelwith Levant. Cyane had moved star-board to close the range and was inposition to rake Constitution's sternwith her carronades. In a brilliantexample of seamanship and naval tac-tics, Stewart ensured victory over bothvessels. He ordered a full broadsideinto the smoke and toward the Levant,then "braced aback our main andmizen and topsails, and backed asternunder the cover of smoke abreast the

sternmost ship, when action was con-tinued with spirit and considerableeffect." Cyane was heavily damaged.Levant reappeared through the smokeand turned to starboard in an attemptto gain a raking position across('onstitution's bow. Stewart ordredthe ship hard to port and delivered araking broadside to Levant's stern.Heavily damaged, Levant disappearedinto the darkness. Constitution contin-ued its turn to port to come underCyane's port quarter and stern.Cyane's log documented the damage:

Tried to get the Cyane before thewind to close her but could not,owing to the state of the riggingand situation of the sails, theylying flat aback and driven soentangled in the wreck of themizen mast . . . totally unman-ageable with most of the stand-ing and all the running riggingshot away, sails much shot andtorn down. . . A number of shotin the hull and nine or tenbetween wind and water. Sixguns disabled by the enemy'sshot.

Outgunned, outmaneuvered, andunable to flee, HMS Cyane, under thecommand of Captain Gordon ThomasFalcon, struck her colors, fired one ofher carronades leeward, and yielded.

Stewart quickly ordered a crew of15 Marines, under the command ofFirst Lieutenant Beekman Hoffman totake control of the vanquished vessel.With Cyane's officers on board, theAmerican ship went in search ofLevant. The smaller ship had made asweeping turn to port and was return-ing to fight. As Levant sailed out of thedarkness, the two ships passed within50 yards and exchanged broadsides.The Levant began to flee. Constitutionfollowed, firing her bow guns. Unableto return fire and the ship's deck look-ing like "a perfect slaughterhouse,"Captain George Douglas struck hiscolors in defeat. The battle was over.

Captain Stewart reported Americanlosses during the battle as 3 killed, 12wounded. A muster roll signed byCaptain Henderson reported PrivatesWilliam Horrell and Antonio Farrow"killed in action with his BritannicMajesty's Ships Cyane and Levant, 20

February 1815." Four of the woundedwere Marines.

In a general order, dated 23February 1815, Captain Stewartoffered "his thanks to the officers, sea-men, ordinary seaman, and Marines"for "their gallantry, order, and disci-pline displayed." To Captain Hender-son and First Lieutenant William H.Freeman, Stewart specifically notedthat he owed "his grateful thanks forthe lively and well-directed fire keptup by the detachment under theircommand."

This single engagement by theConstitution benefitted Henderson

greatly. He was awarded $400 in prizemoney and a silver medal, ordered byCongress, to commemorate the battle.(That medal is currently housed at theCommandant's House, Marine Bar-racks, 8th and I Streets, Washington,D.C.) Of greater importance toHenderson, however, was his brevetpromotion to major, dated August1814. Six years later, Navy SecretarySmith Thompson appointed ArchibaldHenderson "Lieutenant Colonel Com-manding and Commandant, UnitedStates Marine Corps."

In the 1830s, South Carolina andNew York began honoring their nativesons who had distinguished them-selves in the War of 1812. Virginia fol-lowed suit and authorized the pur-chase of a number of presentationswords. The Army-Navy Chronicle,Vol. VIII of 1839, made the followingnotation:


On Friday last, Mr. Ratcliffeoffered a joint resolution in theHouse, voting a sword to Col.Henderson, the gallant comman-cler of the Marine Corps of theUnited States, who so clistin-guishecl himself in the late warwith Great Britain at sea. Theresolution was unanimouslyadopted in the House, and OnSaturday, the following clay,passed unanimously in theSenate. Col. Henderson particu-larly distinguished himself onboard the frigate Constitution, asCaptain of Marines, when thatvessel engaged and captured theBritish sloops of war Cyane andLevant.

The Ames Sword Company ofMassachusetts had gained a sterlingreputation for the craftsmanship ofmagnificent presentation sword s,which were used as tokens of esteem,given by a grateful nation, a state leg-islature, or local citizens. Crafted of

gold and silver, they were ornate,beautifully engraved, andl often bejew-eleci. When the State of Virginia autho-rizeci the purchase of presentationswords to be given to its native Sons,Nathan Peabody Ames hopedl toobtain that commission. In Januaiy1839, Ames travelledl to Washington,D.C., and met several Army and Navyofficers who examinedl a number ofdlifferent presentation swords. Exhibi-tion of a sword craftedl by the AmesSword Company in honor of Lieuten-ant David Turner, USN, proved instru-mental in obtaining the contract.Virginia commissioned seven swordsat a cost of $600 each. In May, twoadldlitional swords were adidledl to thecontract. Of the nine recipients,Henderson was the only Marine to behonored.

The swords were dlesignedl byCaptain Washington Hood of the U.S.Topographical Engineers. Each swordfeatures a solid goldl hilt with a fouledanchor in a medallion on the grip. Thelarge langet, an extension of the cross

Kathy Reesey

The solid gold hilt of the sword, depict-ing Virtue's victory over Tyranny.

Presented by the State of Virginiato Col. Archibald Henderson ofthe Marine Corps of the U.S. intestimony of the high senseentertained by his native state ofhis gallantry & good conduct inthe capture of the Cyane &Levant by the frigate Constitu-tion on the 20th Feb. 1815 & ofhis patriotic service generallydluring the late war with GreatBritain.

A presentation sword demandedclose attention to the details of work-manship. In the 1830s, swords of thefinest quality might feature two orthree etched panels, featuring floralpatterns, alternating with patrioticmotifs. These designs were carefullysketchedl and entrusted to the Amesengravers. The svorcl designed forHenderson was ornately engraved. Aclose examinition of the front of the

14 Fortitudine,VoI. 34, No.4,2009

The reverse of the sword with inscription.

guard, carries the State Seal ofVirginia: Virtue, with sword in hand,her foot on the prostrate figure ofTyranny, whose cl-own lies nearby.The wordls Sic Seinper Tyrannis (thus

Kathy Reeseyalways to tyrants) is inscribed above.

The sword designed for Hendersonhad the same features as describedabove for all nine swords but also hadthe following inscribed on the langetof the reverse sidle:

The sword and scabbard presented to Col Henderson.Kathy Reesey

blade reveals the name of the sword'sdesigner, "Captain Washington Hood,U.S. Topographical Engineers." A fed-eral style eagle, typical of the AmesSword Company, carries a banner inits beak upon which the motto EPluri bus Unum is inscribed. Above theeagle is a sunburst pattern. Also on thefront of the blade is an array of arms:two snakes intertwined with a shieldand an eagle-pommeled sword.Engraved on the reverse of the bladeis another eagle with its wings invert-ed. A second collection of weapons isdepicted, including a helmet, aneagle-pommeled sword, and twocrossed naval cannon. The name "N.E. Ames, Springfield" is clearly visible.

The swords were completed by1841. Virginia Governor ThomasWalker Gilmore of Virginia set 22February, George Washington's birth-day, as the date for presentation. Thecity of Richmond hosted the event.Newspapers of the day carried wordof the festivities, even remarking onthe "heavy traffic" seen in the city. TheSouthern Literary Messenger devotedseveral columns to the event anddescribed the festivities in great detail:

With the exception of the wel-come given to the goodLafayette, it is probable that theMetropolis of Virginia was nevergraced with a more imposingassemblage, nor the scene ofmore interesting ceremonies,than occurred on 22ndFebruary, 1841, the birthday ofthe father of this Country . . . As

it happened, General Harrison,the President-elect of the UnitedStates, and John Tyler, the vice-president elect were both pre-sent on the occasion. The mili-tary of the city, in their best andmost brilliant array, addedsplendor to the spectacle; andthe Metropolitan fair, by theirpresence and their charms, werenot backward in giving life andanimation to the scene . . . Col.Henderson, the present com-mander of the United StatesMarine Corps, is the last in orderon the roll of honor, but by nomeans last in the considerationof those who know him, andknow how to appreciate thesterling qualities for which his is

distinguished . . . it is no idlecompliment to say, that Col.Henderson richly deserved thechaplet, which the gratitude ofhis native state has entwinedaround his brow.

Though Henderson was not inattendance at this grand event (hisbrother John had recently died), hekept the sword throughout theremainder of his tenure as Comman-dant of the Marine Corps.

G eneral Archibald Henderson diedon 6 January 1859. Four days

later, The Evening Sun describedHenderson's funeral:

The deceased was laid out at theGeneral's quarters in a mahog-any coffin . . . Arranged uponthe coffin were the cap, coat andequipments worn by the de-ceased during his life; the swordbeing a magnificent weaponpresented to the General while acolonel by the State of Virginia.

Since 1954, the sword presented toColonel Archibald Henderson hasbeen part of the edged weapons col-lection of the National Museum of the

Kathy Reesey Marine Corps,generously donated byhis great-great-granddaughter, Mrs.Kenneth T. Gordon. Following con-servation, this rare and beautifulsword is scheduled to go on displayin 2010, when the museum opensthree new galleries covering 1775through the end of World War I,

another fitting tribute to "The GrandOld Man of the Marine Corps."

117751

Fortitucline, Vol. 34, No.4,2009 15

The tablet on the scabbard depicts the three ships in battle.

by Gregory A. MacbeakEditor/or Foi-tituciine

This month Fortitucline features combat artist, Commander Monica Allen Penn, USNR, whowas one of the four combat artists whose works were shown at the Navy Art Gallery fromSeptember 2008 until February 2009.

From an early age, Penn liked to do art: "I can't remember a time that I didn't like to draw orpaint, or just plain work with my hands." She was trained at the California College of Arts andCrafts and illustrated a book of poetry as her first professional work. She continued with her artis-tic training at Texas A&M University and the Fashion Institute of Technology, State University ofNew York where she received a masters degree in decorative arts in 1993.

During her time as a combat artist, Penn has been to far away places including Crete, Italy,Sarajevo, and Zagreb. While at Zagreb in 1995 she entered! the Navy Combat Art Program. Herrecent work for the program has included "documenting sailors returning from Iraq, which took Crndr Penn

me to Bethesda Naval Hospital as well as Walter Reed Army Hospital in D.C."Penn's favorite picture is called Priority Mciii (shown below). Penn stated that "I draw in pencil and paint in transpar-

ent watercolor on at least 300 gram paper up to 600 grams which resembles old fashioned egg cartons ... less chanceof buckling."

Penn lives in the south of France, and besides teaching watercolor classes in Italy, she also paints frescos throughoutEurope and the United! States. D1775D

Priority Mail

16 Fortitucline,Vol. 34, No.4, 2009

by Robert V. AquilinaReference Historian

Lieutenant General Charles G.

Cooper, a distinguished combatveteran of two wars, died 26 April2009 in Bethesda, Maryland, at theage of 81. The Clarksdale, Mississippi,native was commissioned a Marinesecond lieutenant upon graduation inJune 1950 from the U.S. Naval Acade-my, where he earned a bachelor ofscience degree in electrical engineer-ing. During the Korean War, heserved as a rifle platoon commanderwith the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,was seriously wounded in June 1951,and hospitalized until November1951. For his service in Korea, hewas awarded the Silver Star Medaland two Purple Heart Medals. Uponhis return to full duty in 1953, he wasassigned duty as inspector-instructorof a Marine Corps Reserve rifle com-pany in Columbia, South Carolina.He subsequently served in a varietyof duty assignments with the 4thMarines at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii,including rifle company commander,weapons company commander, anti-tank company commander, and asregimental assistant operations offi-cer. During the early 1960s he com-pleted several courses at the MarineCorps Amphibious Warfare School atQuantico before being ordered toOkinawa for service with the 9thMarines. He returned in 1963 to theUnited States and was assigned dutyas Marine aide to the Chief of NavalOperations, Washington, D.C. Heassumed command of the 2dBattalion, 8th Marines, in December1965 and subsequently became thelanding force commander for LandingForce CARIB 4-66. After attendingthe U.S. Army War College, CarlisleBarracks, Pennsylvania, he deployedto the Republic of Vietnam and wasinitially assigned as secretary to thegeneral staff, III Marine Amphibious

Force. He later served in Vietnam ascommanding officer of the 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, and participat-ed in a series of combat operationssouth of Da Nang. For this service hewas awarded the Legion of Merit withCombat "V" and the Vietnam Cross ofGallantry with Silver Star. He returnedto the United States in August 1970and was assigned from 1973—75 ascommanding officer of the MarineBarracks at 8th and I Streets Wash-ington, D.C. He was promoted tobrigadier general in June 1975 andbecame the legislative assistant to thecommandant of the Marine Corps.Promoted to major general in July1977, he was assigned as the com-manding general, 1st Marine Division,at Camp Pendleton. Simultaneously,he commanded I Marine AmphibiousForce, one of the Corps' largest air-ground task forces. In August 1979,General Cooper assumed commandof the Marine Corps Recruit Depot,San Diego. He subsequently assumedduty as the commanding general,Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, inJune 1981 and served in this capacityuntil July 1982. He was promoted tolieutenant general in August 1982 andassigned duty as deputy chief of stafffor manpower, Headquarters MarineCorps, Washington, D.C. His last dutyassignment was as commanding gen-eral, Fleet Marine Force Pacific/Corn-mander, Marine Corps Bases, CampH. M. Smith, Hawaii. He served inthis capacity from June 1983 until hisretirement from the Marine Corps on1 August 1985.

Brigadier General Frederick J.Karch, who led the 9th MarineExpeditionary Brigade in the March1965 landing in Vietnam and was aveteran of the Roi-Namur, Saipan,Tinian, and Iwo Jima campaigns inWorld War II, died 23 May 2009 in

Arlington, Virginia, at the age of 91.The Carmi, Illinois, native was com-missioned a Marine second lieutenantupon graduation from the U.S. NavalAcademy in June 1940. He was serv-ing in Iceland at the time of the 7December 1941 Japanese attack dnPearl Harbor. In July 1942, he joinedthe 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division,serving as a battalion executive officeruntil February 1943. From Februaryuntil September 1943, he served ascommanding officer, 1st Battalion,14th Marines, 4th Marine Division.During the remainder of World War II,he served as operations officer of theregiment and took part in the Roi-Namur, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jimacampaigns. For meritorious serviceduring these campaigns, he wasawarded the Legion of Merit andBronze Star Medal, both with Combat"V." A variety of post-war assign-ments included duty as chairman ofthe board of review, Discharges andDismissals in Washington, D.C.; in-structor at the Artillery Section,Marine Corps Schools, Quantico,Virginia; and from 1949—51, as a

member of the directing staff of theCanadian Army Staff College. Duringthe Korean War, he served as com-manding officer of the 4th Battalion,10th Marines, 2d Marine Division, andlater became regimental executiveofficer and assistant G-1 (personnel)of the division. He later served assecretary to the Joint Landing ForceBoard at Camp Lejeune and in 1955was transferred to the UnitedNations/Far East Command, Tokyo,Japan. He served there until 1957 aschief of the intelligence plans sectionand was awarded the ArmyCommendation Medal and promotedto colonel. He completed the SeniorCourse at Marine Corps Schools,Quantico, in June 1958 and then


served consecutively until July 1961as commanding officer of the 10thMarines and assistant chief of staff (G-3) of the 2ct Marine Division. Upongraduation from the Army WarCollege in June 1962, he was assignedto Headquarters Marine Corps andwas promoted to brigadier general inJuly 1964. General Karch was servingas assistant division commander ofthe 3d Marine Division on Okinawa,when he was ordered to Vietnam inFebruary 1965 as commanding gener-211, 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.He was awarded a Gold Star in lieu ofhis second Legion of Merit withCombat "V' for exceptionally merito-rious service in preparing for anddirecting the landing of the first majorU.S. combat unit in the Republic ofVietnam. In May 1965, he resumed hisduties on Okinawa as assistant clivi-sion commander of the 3d MarineDivision. His last duty assignmentwas as director, Command and StaffCollege, Marine Corps Schools,Quantico, from December 1965 toJune 1967. General Karch retiredfrom the Marine Corps on 30 June1967.

Major Everett P Pope, who wasawarded the Medal of Honor for con-spicuous gallantry on Peleliu inSeptember 1944, died 16 July 2009 atthe age of 90. A native of Milton,Massachusetts, Pope was a June 1941graduate of Bowdoin College,Brunswick, Maine, grad uated magnacum laude with honors in French,and was designated a Phi BetaKappa. He was commissioned a sec-oncl lieutenant in the Marine CorpsReserve on 1 November 1941. Hetrained at Quantico, Virginia, andNew River, North Carolina, prior todeploying overseas in June 1942 withthe 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. On 7August 1942, he participated as theleader of a machine gun platoon inthe landing and subsequent cam-paign on Guactalcanal. In 1943, hisunit was transferred to Melbourne,Australia. He again participated in

combat with the 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, from December 1943 toApril 1944 in the New Britain cam-paign. From 12—30 September 1944,he took part in the assault and cap-ture of Peleliu during which he

earned the Medal of Honor anct thePurple Heart. While serving as thecommanding officer of Company C,1st Battalion, 1st Marines, CaptainPope and his company set out on 20September to storm a steep, barrencoral hill protruding from the face ofSuicide Ridge. Although successful,the Marines suffered grievous casual-ties and were forced to hold the hillthroughout the night. By sunrise, theMarines were beating off the enemywith bare fists and hurling ammuni-tion boxes. When daylight brought arenewal of deadly enemy fire,Captain Pope and the surviving eightriflemen were ordered to withdraw.In the words of his Medal of Honorcitation, his valiant leadership againstdevastating odds during the bitterfighting on Hill 154 reflected the"highest credit upon Captain Popeand the United States Naval Service."Following the war, Major Popereturned home to Massachusetts andlater commanded the 2cl InfantryBattalion, USMCR, in Hingham,Massachusetts. He was recalled toactive duty in August 1950 during theKorean War and served untilSeptember 1951 as executive officerof the 3d Battalion, 2cl Marines, atCamp Lejeune, North Carolina. Hewas then released to inactive duty,and shortly thereafter, resigned hiscommission in the Marine Corps.

For many years, he served as pres-ident and CEO of the Workmen's Co-Operative Bank in Boston and wasan active member on governingboards at his alma mater, BowdoinCollege.

Major George E. Wahien, U.S.Army, who received the Mectal ofHonor while serving as a navy hospi-tal corpsman with the 5th MarineDivision during World War II, died SJune 2009 in Salt Lake City, Utah, atthe age of 84. Born 8 August 1924 inOgden, Utah, Wahien enlisted in theNaval Reserve as an apprentice sea-man on 11 june 1943 at the NavyRecruiting Station, Salt Lake City,Utah. He subsequently attendedtraining at the Naval Hospital CorpsSchool, San Diego, and wasactvanced to hospital apprentice firstclass on 1 November 1943. Afteractvancement to pharmacist's mate

third class on 1 December 1943, hewas assigned to the Field MedicalSchool Battalion, Fleet Marine Force,Camp Elliott, San Diego. He joinedthe 2c1 Battalion, 26th Marines, 5thMarine Division, at Camp Penctleton,California, in February 1944 andlanded with the unit on 19 February1945 at Iwo Jima. Seven clays later hewas seriouly wounded during a bit-ter firefight but remained on the bat—tlefielcl, continuing to assist hiswounded comrades. On 2 March, hewas wounded once more but refusedevacuation and continued u nhesitat-ingly to aid wounded Marines on thebattlefield. He was finally evacuatedand ultimately sent back to theUnited States for treatment of hiswounds. On 5 October 1945, he waspresented the Medal of Honor byPresident Harry S. Truman. Pharma-cist's Mate Second Class Wahlen washonorably discharged on 19

December 1945 from the NavalReserve in San Pedro, California.Three years later, he was commis-sionecl an officer in the MedicalService Corps, U.S. Army. He servedtours in both Korea and Vietnambefore his retirement from the Armyon 11 August 1969.

Ed McMahon, who was perhapsbest known for his role as JohnnyCarson's sidekick on The ToneghtShow, ctiecl 23 June 2009 in LosAngeles, California, at the age of 86.The Detroit, Michigan, native grew upin Lowell, Massachusetts, and enrolledat Boston College. He enterect theNavy's V-S training program and wascommissioned in the Marine Corps,earning his pilot's wings in 1944.During World War TI, he was stationedat Lee Field, in Green Cove Springs,Florida, where he served as a test pilotand instructor. He was recalled toactive duty during the Korean War andreceived six Air Medals for flying 85missions over North Korea inunarmed observation planes. Heremained active in the Marine CorpsReserve and eventually retired as acolonel in 1966. In 1982, he wasnamed a brigadier general in theCalifornia Air National Guard. In1985, he hostect a Public Broactcastingdocumentary, Return to Iwo li/na, pro-duced by Arnold Shapiro. 177S

18 Fortitudine,VoI. 34, No.4, 2009

by LtCol Grego'y C. McCarthy

Seth G. Jones. In The Graveyard ofEmpires. America's War in Afghan-istan. W.W. Norton, 2009.

Seth Jones of RAND is an academicobserver of and frequent visitor to

Afghanistan. His new book, In theGraveyard qf Empires: America Warin Afghanistan is an in-depth historicalnarrative cou pled with contemporaryquotes from his many interviews andobservations from time there. Thebook makes the case that the UnitedStates got more than it bargained for inits 2001 invasion of Afghanistan andthat the many difficulties of the U.S.since have followed a long tradition offutility in this landlocked South Asiancountry.

The title is slightly misleading. If

Afghanistan has been ungovernablesince 330 BCE, then our national lead-ers are less culpable for failing to pulloff such a Herculean task in the lastdecade. Despite discussions of 19thcentury British troubles and Alexanderthe Great's difficulties in that region,the author's real objection is to U.S.operations in Afghanistan since 2005.Jones cites missed opportunities andan unnecessaly war in Iraq preoccupy-ing the Bush administration in the crit-ical early days of occupation. But hisown narrative indicates that Afghan-istan was relatively placid from2002—05. Remarkably, there werefewer than 10 total suicide bombingsfrom 2001 to the end of 2004. He ablyretells the story of a slowly unfoldinginsurgency (in contrast to Iraq's), butan even slower response.

The author persuasively argues thatthe U.S. failed to establish capable gov-erning institutions following the hastycollapse of the Talihan government inlate 2001. After 9/11, U.S. forces quick-ly raced through the major cities, butonly about one-fourth of Afghanistanlives in urban areas. If the RumsfelclDoctrine (deploy with a "light foot-print") failed, the author indirectly

nakes the case that it failed first in

Afghanistan, then in Iraq. At the time,Pentagon planners anticipated a rapidcollapse of the central government fol-lowed by a quick hancloff in bothcountries. The planners were halfright—had strategy but not bad faith.

Similarly, Jones highlights the ironyof President George W. Bush gettingelected on a promise to eschew nationbuilding and then embarking on thetwo biggest such projects since thepostwar Marshall Plan. What the Bushadninistration belatedly discovered is

that sone nation building is in the

national interest. But American abilityat this activity is still a work in

progress, and no single governmentagency has anything close to a monop-oly on planning or directing thisendeavor.

Jones posits that Afghanistan wasonly governed well in the last manyyears by the former king, Zahir Shah,who niled from 1933 until being over-thrown by a coup in 1973. Since then,Afghanistan has been buffeted by bothSoviet occupation (1979—89) and

Taliban rule (most of the 1990s). Sinceboth forces were mortal enemies of theU.S., Afghanistan became an interna-tional battleground.

The author discusses the clecentral-ized nature of the tribes and suspicionof the central government that is a

strong contributor to the challenge ofgovernance in Afghanistan, but Islamis the unifying force that drives theinsurgency. Perhaps surprisingly, theauthor finds that ethnicity is not thatstrong a factor.

The counterinsurgency mantra of"clear, hold, build" has failed miserablyin America's eight years in Afghanistan.While U.S. forces can clear with blind-ing speed, subsequent steps involvegreat difficulty. Jones quotes anunnamed Western ambassador whostates that "we can clear territory butwe can't hold it." (p. 254)

Perhaps his most significant contri-bution, which Jones quickly dispenseswith, is his study of insurgencies. 1-Tis

data indicate that successful insurgen-cies last 11 years, successful counterin-surgencies last 14 years. If this patternis applied to Afghanistan, the U.S. mustprevail in the critical period between2012 and 2015, which will be unwel-comeci news to impatient decision-makers and probably the Americanpublic.

Jones strongly criticizes Pakistan'sInter-Services Intelligence agency forcontinuing to covertly assist al-Qaedlaand n fomenting instability in

Afghanistan. The author correctlyfa ii Its Afgh anist an for a ccc Pt in g

endemic corruption, incompetence,and narcotics trafficking. Overall, how-ever, the book mostly lets Afghans offthe hook. President Hamicl Karzai hasled from virtually the beginning andbears more blame than Jones (andmany others) assign. Finding suitableAfghans to turn the country over toremains as daunting in 2009 as eightyears ago. Jones argues that well-trained police are the key to this

26 Fortitucline,Vol. 34, No.4,2009

process, but this is impossible withouta permissive environment which is stillelusive.

He also seems to flinch from whathis study tacitly suggests: a dramaticincrease in troop strength. Near thebook's conclusion (p. 320), he cites theArmy's 2006 counterinsurgency manu-al that recommends 20 troops for 1000inhabitants, which would require650,000 troops, roughly ten timesgreater than what is currently present.Nominal troop strength is not thewhole stojy, either. The author tellsthe story of numerous North AtlanticTreaty Organization partners' madden-ing caveats, i.e., self-imposed limits onuse of force. France, Germany, Italy,

and Spain are so risk-averse that theirforces are never engaged in the waythat American, British, Canadian, andDutch forces regularly are. The size ofthe troops and the continuing fightingthere will likely continue to be ham-strung by political fatigue in Westerncapitals. The book strongly suggeststhat just such a massive display offorce is what would be required tohold and build in Afghanistan.

An unsatisfying situation remains,and difficult questions persist. GeneralStanley A. McChrystal, who took com-mand in June 2009, abruptly describedthe situation as a "stalemate." How tomeasure success, how quickly to turnover security functions, how much

force to use, how far to pursue terror-ists, and similar questions are raised byJones and continue to vex senior lead-ers. From the beginning, the missionhas been plagued by ill-defined victo-ry—no end state that is both achiev-able and desirable.

Jones covers ground familiar tomost followers of the conflict, includ-ing great detail on specific battles andcontroversies of the last several years.Unfortunately, he leaves only tenpages for his proposed solutions. Thisbook will be useful to readers whowant greater depth and background onthe Afghan conundrum. It is a stronghistorical study with a less compellingprescriptive conclusion. U1775D

p resident Obama selected MajorGeneral Charles F. Bolden Jr. to be

the new administrator of NationalAeronautics and Space Administration(NASA). That achievement is remark-able since his life progressed in a

decidedly different direction than hisgoals. During an interview with Dr.Fred Allison of the Marine CorpsHistory Division, Bolden summarizedthat contrast: "So I was not going to bea Marine. I was not going to fly air-planes. I was going to go to gradschool, become an electrical engineerand make money. I wanted to be afrogman . . . [but] I had no intention ofstaying in the Navy longer than therequired five years." Bolden wanted "togo back to graduate school, get adegree in electrical engineering andmake money." He achieved that onegoal of earning money, but otherwise,he failed to avoid the things he said hehad no intention of doing.

Bolden voiced some of the samesentiments in a 6 January 2004 inter-view at NASA in which he described hisearly perceptions: I "fell in love withthe [military] uniform; fell in love withthe fact that they seemed to get all thegood-looking girls." He continued tosay that "I was not going to be aMarine, because I thought they were alittle different, and I was not going to

by Dr. Thomas M. BaughnHistorian

fly airplanes, because that was inher-ently dangerous. And my mom hadalways—I tell people, 'My mother didnot raise a fool." He in fact made acareer of flying airplanes and pilotedtwo different space shuttles into space(Columbia and Discovery) and com-manded two other Shuttle missions.

Bolden stayed in the Marine Corps,flying an Northrop-Grumman A-6 dur-ing the Vietnam conflict with MarineAttack Squadron 533, stationed in NamPhong, Thailand. He became a testpilot in 1979. Only a few test pilotshave ever become astronauts, and trueto his character, Bolden proved to havewhat it took to become an astronaut.In addition to piloting and command-ing shuttle missions, he accepted the

unenviable task of safety officer afterthe Challenger disaster. After his dis-tinguished service to NASA (14 years),he took an opportunity to return to theMarine Corps. He served as the deputycommanding general of the 1st MarineExpeditionary Forces in the Pacific andthe forward commanding general ofthat unit in Operation Desert Thunderin Kuwait. He felt his last assignmentbefore retirement was "the mostrewarding thing I'd ever done in mylife." He was the commanding generalof the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing atMarine Corps Air Station in Miramar,California, and is credited with honingthe unit for the Iraq War.

In one last twist of fate, Bolden isthe first African-American administratorof NASA. Recognizing the irony ofbecoming an astronaut, Bolden remem-bered what he had thought back in the1970s: "I knew who astronauts were, Iknew what they did, but not in mywildest imagination could somebodylike me become an astronaut, becausethey were all white, Anglo-Saxon,Protestant, all test pilots, all about five-feet-ten. They all looked alike. And Iwas none of those." Though Boldendidn't fit the profile of an astronaut inthe 1970s, the times changed to wherea black Marine became an astronautand an administrator of NASA. D1775D


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