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Former Soviet Biological WeaponsFacilities in Kazakhstan:Past,
Present, and Future
Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project
Occasional Paper No. 1
CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIESINSTITUTEMONTEREYOF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Gulbarshyn BozheyevaYerlan KunakbayevDastan Yeleukenov
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NOTE FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER
The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey
Institute ofInternational Studies (MIIS) is the largest
non-governmental organization in theUnited States devoted
exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues.The
CNS has a staff of more than 45 full-time and 60 part-time
personnel, withoffices in Monterey, CA; Washington, DC; and Almaty,
Kazakhstan. The mission ofthe CNS is to combat the spread of
weapons of mass destruction by training the nextgeneration of
nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information
andanalysis.
The CNS is pleased to inaugurate, with this volume, a new series
of OccasionalPapers. Each paper will provide extensive new
information and analysis on animportant proliferation problem. The
papers will be written by leading experts,including senior scholars
and talented newcomers to the nonproliferation field.
William C. PotterDirector, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies
For more information on the projects and publications of CNS,
contact:
Center for Nonproliferation StudiesMonterey Institute of
International Studies
425 Van Buren StreetMonterey, California 93940 USA
Tel: 831-647-4154Fax: 831-647-3519
E-mail: [email protected] Web Site: http://cns.miis.edu
Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 1999
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PAPERS AVAILABLE FROM CNS:
Occasional Papers
No. 1 Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan:
Past, Present, and Future,by Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan
Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov,June 1999
Working Papers
No. 1 International Missile Trade and the Two Koreas, by Peter
Hayes, March 1993
No. 2 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations
and Regimes, compiled byRoland M. Timerbaev, Lisa Moskowitz, and
Jacques Vos, June 1993
No. 3 The Ukrainian Nuclear Arsenal: Problems of Command,
Control, and Maintenance, byMartin J. DeWing, October 1993
These publications are available for $5 each. Please
contact:
Managing EditorCenter for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies425 Van Buren
Street
Monterey, California 93940 USATel 831-647-3596Fax
831-647-6534
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CONTENTS
Foreword iiby Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D.
Brief History of the Soviet Biological Weapons (BW) Program 1The
Biopreparat Complex 2Other BW-Related Centers 3
Kazakhstani Elements of the System 4Vozrozhdeniye Island 4
Infrastructure and BW Development 5Dessication of the Aral Sea
6
Stepnogorsk Scientific Experimental and Production Base (SNOPB)
8Research and Development Work 9Infrastructure of the Facility
10
Scientific Research Agricultural Institute (NISKhI)
11Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute 12
Initial Efforts at Conversion 13AO Biomedpreparat—Heir to SNOPB
14NISKhI 17Anti-Plague Institute 17
Prospects for Conversion 17Structural and Technological
Constraints on Conversion 18Role of Foreign Assistance Programs
19
Conclusions 19
Photographs of SNOPB(1) Building 600, where research was
conducted Not Included(2) View of Buildings 600 and 241-244, from
Building 221 Not Included(4) Refrigeration units at SNOPB Not
Included(5) Buildings 251-252, used to store finished products Not
Included(6) Entrance to bunker next to helicopter landing pad Not
Included
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ii
FOREWORD
In April 1992, Russian President BorisYeltsin admitted that the
Soviet Union and thenRussia had conducted a top-secret
offensivebiological warfare (BW) program in violation ofthe 1972
Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention banning the
development,production, stockpiling, and transfer of theseweapons.
After his admission, President Yeltsinissued an edict committing
Russia to eliminateits offensive BW activities and to comply
fullywith the treaty. Nevertheless, a number offormer Soviet
microbiological research centersunder the control of the Russian
Ministry ofDefense remain shrouded in secrecy, and theUS government
has assessed that “somefacilities [in Russia], in addition to
beingengaged in legitimate activity, may bemaintaining the
capability to produce BWagents.”*
Four major BW research, production, andtesting sites also
existed in the Soviet republicof Kazakhstan, which in 1991 became
anindependent country. In contrast to Russia, theKazakhstani
government has been remarkablyopen with respect to the former
Soviet facilitieson its territory. Thus, a study focusing on
thehistory and status of the Kazakhstani sitesoffers a valuable
window into the nature andscope of the Soviet BW program.
In January 1998, the Center forNonproliferation Studies (CNS) at
theMonterey Institute of International Studiescommissioned three
Kazakhstani experts toprepare a report on the former Soviet
BWfacilities in Kazakhstan, their current status, andthe prospects
for economic conversion andenvironmental remediation. The authors
of thisreport are all superbly qualified. GulbarshynBozheyeva holds
a Candidate of Sciences(Ph.D. equivalent) degree in chemistry
fromKazakhstan State University and graduatedfrom the Program in
InternationalDevelopment Policy at Duke University in theUnited
States. She is a member of the CNSCore Group of Nonproliferation
Specialists and
* US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ThreatControl Through
Arms Control: Annual Report to Congress 1996(Washington, DC: ACDA,
1997), p. 87.
worked at CNS as a Visiting Scholar andResearch Associate.
Yerlan Kunakbayev has anM.S. in biology from Moscow State
Universityand worked at the Kazakhstan National Centerfor
Biotechnology in Stepnogorsk. DastanYeleukenov is an Advisor to the
KazakhstaniMinister of Foreign Affairs. He holds aCandidate of
Sciences (Ph.D.) degree in physicsand is a member of the CNS Core
Group ofNonproliferation Specialists. He is alsoaffiliated with the
CNS branch office in Almaty.
Commissioning local Kazakhstani expertsto conduct the data
collection and analysis notonly resulted in better quality
information thanif foreign analysts had done the work, but
itfurthered the CNS mission of buildingcommunities of
nonproliferation specialists inthe Newly Independent States of the
formerSoviet Union. The study was carried out withthe cooperation
of the Government ofKazakhstan and the United States Embassy
inAlmaty, whose assistance is much appreciated.
This report should make a significantcontribution to increasing
public understandingof what remains a dark chapter of
Soviethistory. It is also to be hoped that the RussianFederation
will follow Kazakhstan’s lead byproviding a full account of the
offensive BWactivities that took place on its territory duringand
after the Soviet era. Only by confrontingthe past will the
successor states of the formerSoviet Union be able to move forward
withother nations, in a spirit of mutual confidenceand security, to
build a more stable andprosperous future.
Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D., Director Chemical and Biological
Weapons
Nonproliferation ProjectMonterey Institute of International
Studies
June 1999
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Bozheyeva, Kunakbayev, and Yeleukenov
1
FORMER SOVIET BIOLOGICAL WEAPONSFACILITIES IN KAZAKHSTAN:PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Kazakhstani facilities involved in theresearch and development,
production, andtesting of biological weapons (BW) played a keyrole
in the former Soviet BW program.1
Although a number of open publications haveaddressed the former
Soviet program in recentyears, few have examined the
Kazakhstaniportion of the system.2 This report provides ahistory of
Kazakhstani BW facilities anddescribes their current status and
futureprospects. The example of Kazakhstan alsohighlights the
technical, economic, andfinancial problems associated with
convertingformer BW facilities to peaceful activities in
thepost-Cold War era.
The first part of this report is devoted toan overview of the
Soviet BW system. Thesecond part deals with the history and
currentstatus of the four major BW facilities inKazakhstan. The
third part examines thepotential for commercial production at
thesefacilities and the obstacles they have faced onthe road to
conversion. The final part discussesthe future prospects for
conversion andenvironmental remediation and makes somepolicy
recommendations.
1 In terms of BW capability within the former Soviet
Union,Kazakhstani BW facilities were second only to those in
Russia.Anthony Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities
inKazakhstan,” Center for Russian and East European Studies,the
University of Birmingham (UK), undated research paper;interview
with specialists from the National Center forBiotechnology (NCB;
the umbrella organization for most ofthe former Soviet military and
civilian biotechnology facilitiesin Kazakhstan), 1998. Kazakhstan
is not a signatory of theBiological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BWC) forfinancial reasons, but it participated as an observer at
theFourth Review Conference of the BWC in 1996.2 Rimmington has
prepared the most comprehensive report onKazakhstani BW facilities.
Rimmington, “Conversion of BWFacilities in Kazakhstan.” Recently,
the Kazakhstani authorSamantay Tleubergenov provided some
information on theSoviet BW program in Kazakhstan. Samantay T.
Tleubergenov,Poligony Kazakhstana (Kazakhstan’s Test Sites)
(Almaty: Gylym,1998).
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOVIETBIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM
The Soviet network of facilities involved indeveloping
biological weapons consisted of twomain groups: a system under
military controldating back to the late 1920s, and a
second,top-secret program under civilian cover thatwas created in
the 1970s.3 The Red Armyopened the first laboratories for research
onpathogenic microorganisms in 1928.4 BWfacilities under the direct
authority of the SovietMinistry of Defense (MOD) included
theScientific Research Institute of Microbiology inKirov (now
Vyatka),5 the Center for Military-Technical Problems of
Anti-BacteriologicalDefense in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg),6
and the Center of Virology in Zagorsk (now
3 Only the major elements of the Soviet BW system relevant
toKazakhstan are discussed here. Detailed material on otherSoviet
BW facilities can be found elsewhere. See, for example,Anthony
Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex?The Conversion of
Biological Weapons Facilities in theRussian Federation,”
Contemporary Security Policy 17 (April 1996),pp. 81-112.4 In 1928,
Red Army authorities decided to create a laboratoryon vaccine and
serum research at the Vlasikha estate, 30kilometers from the
village of Perkhushkovo. The youngscientist Ivan Velikanov was
appointed head of the laboratory.In 1931, a laboratory for anthrax
research was established inTobolsk, Siberia, and in 1933, a secret
bacteriologicallaboratory was opened at Pokrovskiy Monastery in the
town ofSuzdal to research highly pathogenic agents. The
famouspolitical and military official Kliment Voroshilov was one
ofthe first heads of the Soviet BW program in the 1930s.Interview
with specialists from the NCB.5 The Red Army’s Scientific Research
Institute ofMicrobiology was opened in 1933 in the village
ofPerkhushkovo near Moscow. In 1942, it was relocated toKirov, 900
kilometers from Moscow, to avoid capture by theadvancing German
Army. Rimmington, “From Military toIndustrial Complex,” p. 83.6 The
facility was previously named the Scientific ResearchInstitute of
Vaccine Preparations. It was built in 1947 andlocated within
Military Compound No.19 in the city ofSverdlovsk. Rimmington, “From
Military to IndustrialComplex,” p. 86.
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Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan
2
Sergiyev Posad).7 These facilities wereadministered by the 15th
Directorate forBiological Protection of the MOD.8 AnotherBW
facility, the Scientific Research Institute ofMilitary Medicine in
Leningrad (now St.Petersburg), reported to the
Military-MedicalDirectorate of the MOD.9 VozrozhdeniyeIsland, in
the Aral Sea, reported to the 15thDirectorate and was the main
testing groundfor biological agents developed at
MODfacilities.10
In addition to the centers developingantipersonnel BW agents,
another group offacilities worked on microbial agents harmful
tolivestock and plants. One such facility, theScientific Research
Agricultural Institute(NISKhI) in Gvardeyskiy, Kazakhstan,
wasestablished in 1958. While formallysubordinated to the USSR
Ministry ofAgriculture, the institute was probablysupervised by the
MOD. After the instituteopened, a military unit was posted there
toguard the facility and, as a rule, the director ofthe institute
held a high military rank. Facilitiesin Russia involved in the
development of anti-livestock and anti-crop agents included
theScientific Research Institute for AnimalProtection in Vladimir11
and the center in
7 The Sergiyev Posad facility is located about 70 kilometersfrom
Moscow. Rimmington, “From Military to IndustrialComplex,” p. 86.8
The 15th Directorate for Biological Protection of theGeneral Staff
was headed by General Yefim Smirnov.Interview with specialists from
the NCB; Rimmington, “FromMilitary to Industrial Complex,” p. 99.9
The Leningrad institute was created in 1969. The CentralMilitary
Medical Directorate, established in 1930, was thehighest
administrative body for medical institutions in theMinistry of
Defense. Rimmington, “From Military toIndustrial Complex,” pp.
86-87, 99, 102.10 The Kirov, Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk centers also
had theirown small testing grounds. Rimmington states incorrectly
thatthe Vozrozhdeniye site was under the authority of the Centerof
Virology in Zagorsk. In fact, the Vozrozhdeniye site wasoperated by
the Soviet MOD, which sent orders to itsZagorsk, Kirov, and
Sverdlovsk facilities to conduct certaintests at the island. The
types of agents tested at the islandincluded anthrax and plague
bacteria developed at Sverdlovskand Kirov, and viral agents
developed at Zagorsk. Interviewwith specialists from the NCB.11
“Informatsiya ob obyektakh i biologicheskoy deyatelnostiRossiyskoy
Federatsii, svyazannykh s Konventsiyey o
Sverdlovsk. Biological agents harmful tolivestock and plants
were tested at a special sitenear Novosibirsk. Munitions for the
delivery ofall types of biological agents were assembled atthe
Sverdlovsk facility.12
The Biopreparat Complex
In the early 1970s, the Soviet authoritiesbegan creating a new
network of BW facilitiesparallel to the military system. In 1972,
theUSSR signed the Biological and ToxinWeapons Convention (BWC),
under which itwas supposed to stop all offensive BW work.The new
“civilian” network of biotechnologyinstitutes conducted some
civilian research, butit also served as a cover for
military-related BWactivities. These sites were formally run
bycivilian authorities and involved a large numberof civilian
biotechnological specialists andenterprises.13 In 1972, the USSR
Council ofMinisters established a secret Interagency zapreshchenii
razrabotki, proizvodstva i nakopleniya zapasovbakteriologicheskogo
(biologicheskogo) i toksinnogo oruzhiyai ob ikh unichtozhenii”
(“Information on facilities andbiological activities of the Russian
Federation related to theBiological and Toxin Weapons Convention”),
declaration bythe Russian Federation under the
confidence-buildingmeasures for the BWC, Moscow, May 2, 1994, p.
339.12 BW tests on military hardware were also conducted
inAfghanistan. Soviet mobile missiles equipped with BWwarheads were
stationed in the Arctic. Interview with NCBspecialists.13 The new
network of facilities increased the capability of theSoviet BW
system by attracting new human and materialresources and
supplementing military research withtechnological developments in
the civilian sector. As early asthe late 1960s, the Soviet
authorities took measures toaccelerate the development of the
biotechnology industry as awhole. In 1966, microbiological
enterprises were integratedinto one industrial branch under the
Main Directorate for theManagement of Microbiological Industry
(Glavmikrobioprom).On August 8, 1970, the Central Committee of the
CPSU andthe USSR Council of Ministers adopted the decree
“OnMeasures for the Accelerated Development of theMicrobiological
Industry,” which envisioned the creation of anumber of new
microbiological plants. Based on this decree,Glavmikrobioprom
ordered the construction of the civilianbiotechnological plant
Progress in Stepnogorsk that laterprovided a cover for the nearby
BW facility. Eduard I. Perov,“Trudnyye shagi ‘Progressa’” (“The
Difficult Steps of‘Progress’”) in Stepnogorsk: Zdes propisany nashi
serdtsa. Stranitsyistorii goroda Stepnogorska Akmolinskoy oblasti
(Stepnogorsk: Ourhearts are registered here. Pages from the history
of the city of Stepnogorsk,Akmofa Oblast) (Almaty: Atamura, 1994),
p. 107.
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Bozheyeva, Kunakbayev, and Yeleukenov
3
Science and Technology Council on MolecularBiology and Genetics,
consisting ofrepresentatives of the Ministry of Defense,
themilitary-industrial complex, the SovietAcademy of Sciences, the
Ministry of Health,and the Ministry of Agriculture. The Councilwas
chaired by the well-known virologistVladimir Zhdanov and the
members wereapproved by General Secretary of theCommunist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU)Leonid Brezhnev and Chairman of the
USSRCouncil of Ministers Aleksey Kosygin.14
The All-Union Production AssociationBiopreparat, created in 1973
by a decree of theCentral Committee of the CPSU and the USSRCouncil
of Ministers, was tasked withimplementing the programs approved by
theInteragency Council. This organizationcomprised some 40 research
and devel-opment(R&D) and production facilities. In addition
tomanaging the civilian biotechnological industryand R&D,
Biopreparat was actively involved inmilitary BW programs.15
Although formallysubordinated to the civilian MainAdministration of
the Microbiological Industry(Glavmikrobioprom), Biopreparat was
fundedby the MOD and the head of the organizationheld the rank of
lieutenant general.16
Leading Biopreparat facilities included theState Scientific
Center of Applied Microbiologyin Obolensk, the Institute of
ImmunologicalStudies in Lyubuchany, the State ScientificCenter of
Virology and Biotechnology (knownas Vector) near Novosibirsk, the
State 14 Vyacheslav Yankulin, “Sindrom chumy, ili Khozhdeniye
pomukam odnogo iz sozdateley bakteriologicheskogo oruzhiya”(“Plague
Syndrome, or A walk through the torments of one ofthe creators of
biological weapons”), Izvestiya, October 15,1997.15 Biopreparat,
known by its postal code P.O. Box A-1063,controlled the world’s
second-largest antibiotics industry andproduced a number of
biopharmaceuticals and veterinaryproducts, which were exported to
many developing countries.Western sources believe that as many as
2,000 of Biopreparat’s9,000 scientific employees were experts on
deadly pathogens.Laurie Garrett, “Inside Russia’s Germ Warfare
Labs,” Newsday,August 10, 1997, pp. A5, A38-A39; Rimmington,
“FromMilitary to Industrial Complex,” p. 87.16 Rimmington, “From
Military to Industrial Complex,” p. 87;Yankulin, “Sindrom
chumy.”
Scientific Institute of Ultrapure BiologicalPreparations in
Leningrad, and the ScientificExperimental and Production Base
inStepnogorsk, Kazakhstan.17 The 15thDirectorate of the MOD
supervised the workof the Biopreparat facilities and
coordinatedtheir activities with those of the MOD’smilitary
biotechnological centers. As theKazakhstani example will show, in
addition tobeing run by the same upper echelon of theMOD, the
military and Biopreparat BWsystems shared some technologies
andpersonnel.18
Other BW-Related Centers
In addition to the aforementioned centerswithin the offensive
part of the Soviet BWprogram, other facilities were involved
mainlyin defensive BW developments. The system ofanti-plague
research institutes and fieldmonitoring stations under the
authority of theMain Directorate of Quarantine Infections ofthe
USSR Ministry of Health included theMikrob Scientific Research
Anti-PlagueInstitute in Saratov, the Rostov Anti-PlagueInstitute,
the Volgograd Scientific ResearchAnti-Plague Institute, and the
Irkutsk Anti-Plague Institute for Siberia and the Far East.19
These institutes were mainly responsible forcivilian
epidemiological investigations and didnot have direct links with
MOD or BiopreparatBW facilities.20 As follows from the example
ofthe Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute inAlma-Ata (now
Almaty), however, the anti-plague institutes developed vaccines and
17 The center in Obolensk, about 100 kilometers fromMoscow, was
founded in 1974. The institute at Lyubuchany,near Chekhov, Moscow
Oblast, was created in 1980. Vector, inKoltsovo near Novosibirsk,
was established in 1985.Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial
Complex,” pp. 86,108.18 Rimmington indicates that Nikolay Urakov,
former deputydirector of the MOD Kirov facility, became the
director of theBiopreparat facility in Obolensk in 1986.
Rimmington, “FromMilitary to Industrial Complex,” p. 108.19
“Informatsiya ob obyektakh,” pp. 339-341.20 The network of
Anti-Plague Institutes could provideassistance to MOD conventional
forces by monitoringoutbreaks of natural endemic diseases in the
areas wheretroops were stationed.
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Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan
4
diagnostic materials for microbial pathogensmodified by the
military. Moreover, given theexchange of top-ranking specialists
between theanti-plague institutes and offensive BWfacilities, their
participation in some offensiveBW programs cannot be ruled out.
Forexample, Igor Domradskiy, the deputychairman of the Interagency
Council and afounder of Biopreparat, had previously headedthe
anti-plague institutes in Irkutsk and Rostov-on-Don.21
Finally, some institutes of the USSRAcademy of Sciences
represented in theInteragency Council may have been
indirectlyinvolved in BW developments. A commonpractice among
Soviet scientific institutes wasto seek research contracts from
well-financedmilitary-industrial organiza-tions. One
academicinstitute that may have been indirectly involvedin BW work
was the Shemyakin Institute ofBioorganic Chemistry (IBKh) in
Moscow,which was founded in 1980 and did research onadvanced
methods of genetic engineering andindustrial microbiology.22 The
first director ofIBKh, Academician Vadim Ovchinnikov, alsoserved as
head of the Biological SciencesDepartment of the USSR Academy
ofSciences. It was widely believed among Russianscientists that
Ovchinnikov actively soughtresearch funding for his institute from
militarybiotechnology programs.23 As described in thenext section,
IBKh had links with theBiopreparat center in Stepnogorsk.24
21 Yankulin, “Sindrom chumy.”22 The IBKh building was
constructed by Finnish builders andhad up-to-date foreign and
Soviet equipment not available atmany other microbiological
institutes of the Soviet Academyof Sciences. Interview with NCB
specialists.23 Ovchinnikov wanted to discover how the
three-dimensionalstructure of the protein albumin is determined by
its primaryamino acid sequence, hoping to win the Nobel Prize for
hisresearch. However, achieving this ambition proved to
beimpossible at the time. Interview with a former IBKhemployee.24
Interview with NCB specialists.
KAZAKHSTANI ELEMENTS OF THESYSTEM
Kazakhstani BW facilities belonged tovarious parts of the Soviet
BW structure andreported to different central authorities
inMoscow.25 The four main facilities were theVozrozhdeniye Island
open-air test site in theAral Sea, the Scientific Experimental
andProduction Base (SNOPB) in Stepnogorsk, theScientific Research
Agricultural Institute(NISKhI) in Gvardeyskiy, and the
Anti-PlagueScientific Research Institute in Alma-Ata.These
facilities are described in greater detailbelow.
Vozrozhdeniye Island
The Vozrozhdeniye Island test site in theAral Sea was part of
the older, military BWsystem. The island was apparently chosen
foropen-air testing of biological weapons becauseof its
geographical isolation.26 Vozrozhdeniye is
25 This study of the structural links of the Kazakhstanielements
shows how the Soviet BW system was organized.First, the system was
clearly divided into separate parts, whichwere funded and managed
by different authorities inaccordance with technological
specialization (anti-personnel vs.anti-crop and anti-livestock
agents, defensive vs. offensivedevelopments), military or civilian
participation, and the levelof involvement in the BW program
(direct or indirect). Unifiedstrategic guidance and top executive
management over the far-flung system were provided by the
Interagency Council andthe MOD. Although the system observed the
strictest secrecyrules, corporate links between facilities with
similar orcomplementary expertise and the transfer or exchange
ofhuman, technological, and material resources were common.The
expanded horizontal links and the short vertical chain ofcommand,
with little delegation of authority to intermediateelements, would
probably have been the most effectivemechanism in the event of
wartime mobilization.26 Vozrozhdeniye Island was discovered by A.
I. Butakov,Lieutenant of the Russian Fleet, on the Konstantin in
September1848. Butakov named it Nicholas Island after Tsar
Nicholasthe First. Seven miles northwest from Nicholas Island,
hefound another island, which he named Naslednik (Heir). Tothe
south of Naslednik Island was one more island, which henamed
Konstantin Island after Grand Duke KonstantinRomanov, the official
chairman of the Russian GeographicSociety. Together, the three
islands were called the Tsarskiye(Tsar) Islands. During the Soviet
era, Nicholas and NaslednikIslands were renamed Vozrozhdeniye
(Rebirth) andKomsomolskiy Islands. Due to the dessication of the
Aral Sea,the three Tsar Islands later merged into one big island.
ZhenisDarmenov, “Ostrov Vozrozhdeniya: Tayn stanovitsya
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Bozheyeva, Kunakbayev, and Yeleukenov
5
situated in the middle of the Aral Sea,surrounded by large,
sparsely populated desertsand semi-deserts that hindered
unauthorizedaccess to the secret site. The island’s
sparsevegetation, hot, dry climate, and sandy soil thatreaches
temperatures of 60° C (140° F) insummer all reduced the chances
thatpathogenic microorganisms would survive andspread.27 In
addition, the insular locationprevented the transmission of
pathogens toneighboring mainland areas by animals orinsects. The
northern part of VozrozhdeniyeIsland, which Kazakhs call Mergensay,
is onKazakhstani territory. The southern two-thirdsof the island is
in the Karakalpak autonomousregion of Uzbekistan.28
In 1936, Vozrozhdeniye Island wastransferred to the authority of
the Soviet MODfor use by the Red Army’s Scientific
MedicalInstitute.29 The first expedition of 100 people,headed by
Professor Ivan Velikanov, arrived onthe island that summer. The
researchers were menshe” (Vozrozhdeniye Island: There are fewer and
fewersecrets”), Put Lenina, Aug 14, 1990, p. 2.27 Interview with a
member of the 1990 Kazakhstanidelegation to Vozrozhdeniye Island,
November 1998.28 It appears that no clear border demarcation yet
existsbetween Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the territory
ofVozrozhdeniye Island. Whereas the northern part of the islandis
owned by Kazakhstan, the airspace over the island iscontrolled by
Uzbekistani air traffic authorities, and thesouthern part of the
island is under the authority of theUzbekistani Ministry of
Defense. Residents of Aralsk recalledthat Uzbekistani authorities
prevented the mayor of the cityfrom traveling to the island by
helicopter. A similar incidenthappened to some Kazakhstani
fishermen in 1994 when theylanded on a part of the island that
Uzbekistani authoritiesclaimed was their territory. In May 1998,
the authors of thispaper and BBC television journalists, who had
permissionfrom the Kazakhstani government to travel to the island
byhelicopter, were forbidden to approach the island byUzbekistani
authorities.29 Previously, Vozrozhdeniye Island and the city of
Aralskwere used as exile camps for kulaks (private farmers) by
the15th Special Commandant’s Office of NKVD (People’sCommissariat
of Internal Affairs, later the KGB). One suchsettlement in Aralsk
was named “New America.” GennadiyKruglyakov, “Kazakhstanskiye
‘Solovki’” ( “Kazakhstan’s‘Solovetskiye’ Islands”), Kazakhstanskaya
pravda, October 28,1998, p. 3. The Red Army’s Scientific Medical
Institute,established in 1933, was transferred to Kirov in 1942 and
isnow known as the Scientific Research Institute ofMicrobiology.
Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities,” p.2.
provided with special ships and two airplanesand reportedly
conducted experimentsinvolving the spread of tularemia and
relatedmicroorganisms. In the fall of 1937, however,the expedition
was evacuated from the islandbecause of security problems,
including thearrest of Velikanov and other specialists.30
In 1952, the Soviet government decided toresume BW testing on
islands in the Aral Sea.A biological weapons test site,
officiallyreferred to as “Aralsk-7,” was built in 1954
onVozrozhdeniye and Komsomolskiy Islands.The MOD’s Field Scientific
ResearchLaboratory (PNIL) was stationed onVozrozhdeniye Island to
conduct theexperiments.31 Military unit 25484, comprisingseveral
hundred people, was also based on theisland and reported to a
larger unit based inAralsk.32 The PNIL developed methods
ofbiological defense and decontamination forSoviet troops. Samples
of military hardware,equipment, and protective clothing
reportedlypassed field tests at the island before
beingmass-produced. During the Soviet interventionin Afghanistan,
military protective geardeveloped for Afghan conditions was tested
atthe PNIL.33
Infrastructure and BW Development
The BW test site on Vozrozhdeniye Islandwas divided into a
testing complex in thesouthern part of the island and a
militarysettlement in the northern part where officers,some with
families, and soldiers lived. Thesettlement had barracks,
residential houses, anelementary school, a nursery school, a
cafeteria, 30 Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities,” pp. 2-3.31
Interview with NCB specialists; Rimmington, “Conversionof BW
Facilities,” p. 3.32 Interview with an official from the US
Department ofDefense (DOD), May 1998. The Aralsk military base was
animportant source of jobs for local residents, who supplied
thetroops with food and other services. Civilians also workedamong
sailors on dry cargo barges and tankers. Interview withlocal
citizens in Aralsk and Kzylorda pilots, May 1998;Darmenov, “Ostrov
Vozrozhdeniya.” Rimmington indicatesthat over 1,000 people were
stationed at the island.Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial
Complex,” p. 86.33 Darmenov, “Ostrov Vozrozhdeniya.”
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Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan
6
warehouses, and a power station. Personnelwere subjected to
regular immunizations andreceived hardship benefits.34 PNIL
laboratorybuildings, located near the residential area,possessed
up-to-date equipment and aBiosafety Level 3 containment unit.35
Alsolocated in the northern part of the island wasBarkhan Airport,
which provided regular planeand helicopter transportation to the
mainland,and a seaport at Udobnaya Bay. Special fastpatrol boats
protected the island fromintruders.
The open-air test site in the southern partof the island was
used for studying thedissemination patterns of BW agent aerosolsand
methods to detect them, and the effectiverange of aerosol bomblets
with biologicalagents of different types.36 The testing groundswere
equipped with an array of telephone poleswith detectors mounted on
them, spaced atone-kilometer intervals.37 BW agents tested atthe
Vozrozhdeniye site had been developed atthe MOD facilities in
Kirov, Sverdlovsk, andZagorsk, and the Biopreparat center
inStepnogorsk, and included anthrax, tularemia,brucellosis, plague,
typhus, Q fever, smallpox,botulinum toxin, and Venezuelan
equineencephalitis. The experiments were conductedon horses,
monkeys, sheep, and donkeys, andon laboratory animals such as white
mice,guinea pigs, and hamsters.38 In addition tocommon pathogenic
strains, special strainsdeveloped for military purposes were tested
atthe island.39 Bacterial simulants were also used
34 For example, one year of service counted as two.35
Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex,” p. 86.36
Biological aerosols can be disseminated over a distance ofup to 20
kilometers. Interview with specialists from the NCB.37 Interview
with an official from the DOD, May 1998.38 Interview with NCB
specialists.39 For example, special strains may be resistant to
standardantibiotics and vaccines and may have other militarily
usefulproperties such as high virulence or greater
environmentalviability (resistance to ultraviolet rays, heat,
desiccation, andshear forces). Such strains can be developed by
simpleselection techniques or by genetic engineering methods.
Sovietscientists appear to have developed genetically modified
strainsof anthrax and plague. On BW technologies, see Office
ofTechnology Assessment, United States Congress, Technologies
to study the dissemination of aerosol particlesin the
atmosphere.
The fact that the island’s prevailing windsalways blow toward
the south, away from thenorthern settlement, was probably
animportant factor in designing the site. The BWaerosol tests were
also conducted in such a wayas to avoid contaminating the northern
militarysettlement, and a special service on the islandwas
responsible for environmental control.40
Nevertheless, the activities on the secret islandcaused serious
concerns among local residentsbecause of repeated epidemics and the
massdeaths of animals and fish in the area.41
Individual cases of infectious disease alsooccurred in people
who spent time on theisland.42
Desiccation of the Aral Sea
By the early 1990s, the desiccation of theAral Sea, which had
been taking place since the1960s because of the diversion of water
intoirrigation projects, had begun to impair theoperation of the
Vozrozhdeniye test site.
Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, Background
Paper,December 1993, pp. 71-117.40 Accidents could not be
completely avoided, however. In1960, the wind shifted during a BW
test on Konstantin Island,leading to widespread contamination and
forcing an emergencyevacuation. Thereafter, the island was never
used again.Interview with NCB specialists.41 In 1976, a mass death
of fish occurred in the Aral Sea. InJune 1986, outbreaks of plague
were noted in the region andentire flocks of sheep lost their wool.
In May 1988, over thecourse of only about an hour, approximately
half a millionsaiga antelope dropped dead in the Turgay steppes
northeastof the Aral Sea. “‘Green’ Activists Suspect Removal of
BWEquipment from Aral Sea Site,” JPRS-TAC-92-015, 8 May1992, pp.
27-28. Rimmington indicates that during the massdeath of the saiga,
the entire human population of the area wasevacuated as a
precautionary measure. Rimmington,“Conversion of BW Facilities,” p.
3. The cause of mass deathsamong animals in the area remains
unclear. It might be relatedto the unfavorable environmental
situation in the Aral regioncaused by the desiccation of the sea,
the heavy pesticidepollution of tributary rivers, or natural
endemic outbreaks ofplague.42 Dr. Aykimbayev of the Almaty
Anti-Plague Institute recalledthat once an ichthyologist was
urgently transported to an anti-plague station in Aralsk. She
appeared to have contractedsmallpox after accidentally reaching the
island. Interview withDr. Aykimbayev, October 1998.
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Bozheyeva, Kunakbayev, and Yeleukenov
7
Although the island was initially 200 squarekilometers in size,
it expanded to 2,000 squarekilometers by 1990.43 The shrinkage of
the AralSea increased operational expenditures at thetest site,
particularly the cost of importingnecessary items.44 The site’s
port had to berelocated several dozen kilometers away fromthe
settlement, increasing the need for groundtransportation and the
size of the labor forceneeded for loading and unloading
operations.45
Kazakhstani specialists believe that by 2010, theisland will be
connected to the mainland; thereis already a shallow zone between
the islandand the settlement of Muynak on theUzbekistani coast. The
emergence of a landbridge would eliminate the major
securitybenefits of the island.46
The Moscow authorities did not allowKazakhstani public
representatives to visitVozrozhdeniye Island until 1990.47 The
firstKazakhstani commission, headed by N. I.Ibrayev, Deputy
Chairman of the KzylordaOblast Executive Committee of the
CPSU,visited the island in August 1990. The visit washosted by
Valeriy Sinevich, the commander ofthe military unit stationed on
the island, andVictor Donchenko, deputy head of the PNIL.48
In the spring of 1992, a second Kazakhstanigovernment commission
headed by SvyatoslavMedvedev, Minister of Ecology and
43 Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities,” p. 344 Fuel, food,
and construction materials were regularlydelivered to the site.
Annually, the site required tens ofthousands of metric tons of
drinking water. Darmenov,“Ostrov Vozrozhdeniya.”45 Ibid. Initially,
transport ships used Udobnaya Bay near themilitary settlement, but
the pier had to be moved several timesas the sea shrank.46 Ibid.47
Kazakhstani public activists, particularly from the
Nevada-Semipalatinsk international anti-nuclear movement, the
non-governmental organization Tamshy in Aralsk, and the
Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan public movement, have made considerableefforts
to penetrate the veil of secrecy over VozrozhdeniyeIsland.48 The
delegation included parliamentarians, representatives ofthe Aral
and Kazalinsk regions, and journalists, making a totalof 24 people.
Defensive means against BW, equipment fordetecting air admixtures,
and some tested military hardwarewere demonstrated to the public
representatives. Darmenov,“Ostrov Vozrozhdeniya”; “‘Green’
Activists Suspect.”
Bioresources, visited the island. In August1992, an independent
expert commission ofthe Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan
non-governmentalorganization also visited.49 The Russian
militaryauthorities claimed that no offensive testing orresearch
had been conducted on the island andthat the site had tested only
defenses againstbiological weapons.50
Evacuation of Russian military personnelfrom Vozrozhdeniye
Island began in 1991,when the PNIL specialists left and
thelaboratories were mothballed.51 On January 18,1992, the Supreme
Soviet of newlyindependent Kazakhstan issued the edict “OnUrgent
Measures for Radically Improving theLiving Conditions of Aral Area
Residents,”which officially closed the Vozrozhdeniyemilitary site.
On April 11, 1992, RussianPresident Boris Yeltsin’s Edict No. 390,
“OnEnsuring the Implementation of InternationalObligations
Regarding Biological Weapons,”ordered that all offensive BW
programs be shutdown. Following this decree, the Russiangovernment
declared that the Vozrozhdeniyesite was closed, the special
structures would bedismantled, and within two to three years
theisland would be decontaminated andtransferred to Kazakhstani
control.52 In August1995, specialists from the US Department
ofDefense visited Vozrozhdeniye Island andconfirmed that the
experimental field lab hadbeen dismantled, the site’s
infrastructuredestroyed, and the military
settlementabandoned.53
After the Russian authorities leftVozrozhdeniye Island in 1992,
local residents
49 Ivan Chasnikov, Ekho yadernykh vzryvov (The Echo of
NuclearExplosions) (Almaty, 1996), p. 75.50 “‘Green’ Activists
Suspect.”51 Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex,” p.
86.52 The evacuation from Vozrozhdeniye Island continued in1992.
Local authorities and environmentalists were concerned,however, by
the lack of Kazakhstani control over thedismantlement of the site.
On March 7, 1992, Bigali Kayupov,head of the Aralsk Regional
Administration, attempted todetain a convoy from Military Unit
25484 that was removingheavy trucks, tractors, tanker trucks, and
other equipment.“‘Green’ Activists Suspect.”53 Rimmington, “From
Military to Industrial Complex,” p. 86.
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Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan
8
of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan flocked to theisland to seize
abandoned military equipmentthat the Russian forces had been unable
to takewith them. It is to be hoped that the lootingoccurred in the
safer, residential part of theisland. Kazakhstan has not yet used
the portionof the island under its jurisdiction for
economicpurposes, and specialists remain concernedabout
environmental contamination.
Stepnogorsk Scientific Experimental andProduction Base
(SNOPB)
The Scientific Experimental andProduction Base (SNOPB) at
Stepnogorsk wasunder the authority of the
Biopreparatorganization.54 Known only by its post officebox, No.
2076, this facility tested and certifiedpilot-scale and large-scale
methods ofproducing BW agents developed in thelaboratories of
Biopreparat and the MOD, andissued technical documentation
andrecommendations.55 SNOPB was also one ofsix mothballed plants in
the Biopreparat systemdesigned for the large-scale production
andweaponization of biological agents during theso-called “special
time”—mobilization for totalwar. It specialized in anthrax. Western
andRussian experts have referred to SNOPB as theSoviet Union’s main
facility for themanufacture of biological weapons and one
thelargest installations ever created for thispurpose.56 Since the
war did not materialize,the Stepnogorsk facility was never used at
fullcapacity.
Construction of SNOPB began in 1982 onthe desolate, windy
Kazakhstani steppes, 14 54 SNOPB stands for Stepnogorskaya
nauchnaya opytno-promyshlennaya baza (Stepnogorsk Scientific
Experimental andProduction Base). The facility had other names:
theKazakhstani Branch of the Biokhimmashproyekt Institute,
theStepnogorsk Scientific Research Institute for Biotechnology,and
the Biopreparat Kazakhstani Scientific Research Complex.Since 1993,
it has been called the Biomedpreparat Joint StockCompany, or AO
Biomedpreparat.55 Interview with an official from the DOD, May
1998;Gennadiy Lepyoshkin, “Flagmanu farmindustrii byt” (“To bethe
flagship of the pharmaceutical industry”), in Stepnogorsk:Zdes
propisany nashi serdtsa, p. 126.56 Rimmington, “Conversion of BW
Facilities,” p. 2.
kilometers from the city of Stepnogorsk, amilitary-industrial
town under the authority ofthe Ministry for Medium
Machine-Building(Minsredmash) and Glavmikrobioprom.57
SNOPB was built in the backyard of a civilianbiotechnological
plant called Progress.58
Documents concerning the construction of thefacility show that
the design incorporated themost advanced developments in
industrialbiotechnology at the time, including the use ofspecial
materials. The availability of power andheat-generating facilities,
as well as qualifiedbiotechnological and construction
specialistsfrom Progress and the city of Stepnogorsk,facilitated
the building of SNOPB.59 EduardPerov, the former deputy director of
Progress,headed SNOPB during its construction.60 Atthe end of 1983,
Kanatjan Alibekov, who hadpreviously headed the Biopreparat
facility inOmutninsk, was appointed director ofSNOPB.61 His deputy
was Gennadiy 57 Other names of Stepnogorsk were Makinsk-2,
Tselinograd-25, and Aksu. It is located about 200 kilometers north
ofAstana (formerly Tselinograd), the new Kazakhstani capital.Aksu
is situated nine kilometers from the city of Stepnogorsk.Dual-use
enterprises in Stepnogorsk included the TselinnyyUranium Mining and
Chemical Combine (TsGKhK) and the16th State Ball-Bearing Plant,
which produced ball bearings fortractors as well as for tanks. The
area has a number of uraniumdeposits, which was why Minsredmash,
the USSR nuclearindustry ministry, decided to create a city there.
Lepyoshkin,“Flagmanu farmindustrii byt,” p. 126; Perov, “Trudnyye
shagi‘Progressa’,” pp. 107-109; M. S. Koyshibayev, “Na
krutompovorote vremeni” (“At a sharp turn in time”), in
Stepnogorsk:Zdes propisany nashi serdtsa, pp. 5-6.58 The
construction of the Progress plant started in 1970 bythe order of
Glavmikrobioprom. It was done to implement theAugust 8, 1970 Decree
of the Central Committee of the CPSUand the USSR Council of
Ministers “On Measures for theAccelerated Development of the
Microbiological Industry.”The plant, worth 170-180 billion rubles,
was the largest andmost technologically advanced in the Soviet
microbiologicalindustry. Perov, “Trudnyye shagi ‘Progressa’,” pp.
107-108.59 The Progress plant produced herbicides, supplements
foranimal feeds (amino acids, vitamins, antibiotics), and
ethanol.It occupies an area of 300,000 square meters and
employs2,000 workers, including 800 engineers. The plant has
hugestainless-steel fermentation tanks. Interview with
NCBspecialists.60 In 1983, Perov became director general of
Progress. YuriyDavydkin headed SNOPB for a short time until he
wasreplaced by Kanatjan Alibekov at the end of 1983.
Lepyoshkin,“Flagmanu farmindustrii byt,” p. 127.61 In 1988,
Alibekov, an ethnic Kazakh, became the firstdeputy director for
research and production at Biopreparat, the
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Bozheyeva, Kunakbayev, and Yeleukenov
9
Lepyoshkin, who came to SNOPB from theMOD facility in Kirov in
1984.62
Research and Development Work
At Stepnogorsk, Alibekov directed theresearch team that in 1988
developed theSoviet Union’s most deadly weapons-gradeanthrax
agent.63 SNOPB continued researchand development work on anthrax
thatpreviously had been conducted at the MODinstitute in
Sverdlovsk, but that had to becurtailed in 1979 after an accidental
release ofanthrax spores from the facility killed some 70people.
The accident in Sverdlovsk increasedWestern suspicions of the
existence of aclandestine Soviet BW program in violation ofthe 1972
Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention. From 1984 to 1987,
corespecialists and equipment from Sverdlovskwere transferred to
SNOPB.64 In addition toanthrax, the Stepnogorsk facility produced
second-in-command of this organization. His formercolleagues in
Stepnogorsk describe him as an impressive,highly energetic person
and a man of great erudition. In 1992Alibekov (now Ken Alibek)
became the highest-rankingdefector from Biopreparat to the United
States. He wrote acomprehensive classified study on the Soviet BW
program thatplayed a key role in revealing and subsequently halting
thisformidable program. Rimmington, “Conversion of BWFacilities,”
p. 6; Richard Preston, “The Bioweaponeers,” TheNew Yorker, March 9,
1998, p. 52; Tim Weiner, “SovietDefector Warns on Biological
Weapons,” New York Times,February 25, 1998, pp. A1, A8.62
Lepyoshkin, having previously worked at the MOD facilityin Kirov,
brought to Stepnogorsk his expertise from the MODBW system.
Currently, he is Director General of the NationalCenter for
Biotechnology (NCB), which includes theBiomedpreparat Joint Stock
Company (formerly SNOPB),NISKhI in Gvardeyskiy, and several
Kazakhstani academicmicrobiological institutes. Rimmington provides
a detailedbiography of Lepyoshkin in “Conversion of BW Facilities,”
p.15.63 Alibekov’s anthrax was ready in 1989. The anthrax
agentdeveloped at SNOPB was reportedly four times more
effectivethan the standard product and was resistant to a
widespectrum of antibiotics and vaccines. Preston,
“TheBioweaponeers”; Garrett, “Inside Russia’s Germ WarfareLabs,” p.
A39; Rimmington, “Conversion of BW facilities,” p.2.64 In
particular, the Sverdlovsk facility had weaponizationequipment
necessary for loading biological agents into bombsand missile
warheads. Sergey Volkov, “U Yekaterinburga bylsvoy Chernobyl”
(“Yekaterinburg had its own Chernobyl”),Uralskiy rabochiy, April
11, 1998, p. 3.
staphylococcus toxin.65 SNOPB also conducteddevelopment and
experimental production ofseveral civilian products, including
vaccines,diagnostic tools, herbicides, and medicines.66
The best biotechnologists and talentedyoung scientists from
Russia were invited towork at SNOPB, and specialized courses
atleading Russian research institutions wereorganized for new
personnel.67 The facilityemployed 350 people in 1984. By 1991,
thestaff had grown to about 800 people, amongthem 17 scientists
with doctoral degrees and100 researchers.68 Some SNOPB
specialistsheld military rank. Although subordinate toBiopreparat,
SNOPB exchanged technologicalexpertise with MOD facilities involved
insimilar research. In addition to staff fromSverdlovsk,
specialists from the MOD researchcenter in Kirov worked at SNOPB.
The facilityalso appears to have had links with the Instituteof
Bioorganic Chemistry (IBKh) in Moscow.In 1989, IBKh specialists
prepared technicaldocumentation for the civilian production ofhuman
insulin at SNOPB, documentation thatrequired detailed knowledge of
the facility’sproduction equipment.69
Although civilian access to the facility wasstrictly limited,
SNOPB had technological linkswith and received specialists from
Progress, theneighboring commercial biotechnologicalplant.70 In
addition to its role as a civilian cover
65 The Sverdlovsk facility, which supplied personnel
andtechnology to SNOPB, appeared to have expertise instaphylococcus
organisms. Under conversion programs, theRussian Center of
Military-Technical Problems of Anti-Bacteriological Defense in
Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg)has worked on anti-staphylococcus
preparations. Rimmington,“From Military to Industrial Complex,” p.
95.66 Commercial products produced at SNOPB were profesim,ginseng
biomass, and BCG vaccine. Perov, “Trudnyye shagi‘Progressa’,” in
Stepnogorsk: Zdes propisany nashi serdtsa, p. 118.67 Lepyoshkin,
“Flagmanu farmindustrii byt,” p. 127.68 I. Fatkuldinova, “Neskolko
tayn sekretnogo Progressa” (“Afew secrets of the classified
Progress”), Leninskaya smena, April4, 1992.69 The documents bear
the signature of Ivanov, who replacedOvchinnikov as director of
IBKh. Interview with NCBspecialists.70 While both Progress and
SNOPB were formallysubordinated to the civilian ministry
Glavmikrobioprom,
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Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan
10
for the military-controlled SNOPB, Progresssupplied electricity
and heat to the facility.SNOPB also implemented its
civiliantechnological developments at Progress, suchas an improved
process for ethanolproduction.71 The two facilities began
tocooperate more openly in 1989, when Sovietauthorities decided to
convert some ofSNOPB’s production lines to manufacturecivilian
preparations such as human insulin andto mothball the rest of the
equipment.72 Theseplans were never implemented, however,because of
the breakup of the USSR and thesubsequent cessation of funding from
Moscow.
Infrastructure of the Facility
Occupying an area of about two squarekilometers, SNOPB consisted
of 25 buildings atwhich more than 700 people worked in 1991.73
Building 211 held production equipment forthe preparation of
nutrient media and a storagecomplex for receiving and storing dry
andliquid raw materials. Building 221 was the mainproduction
facility for the large-scalefermentation of microorganisms, and it
alsohoused a genetics research laboratory. Buildings241 to 244 were
designed for theweaponization of the biological agentsproduced in
Building 221. Building 231 wasused for drying and milling of
microbiologicalproducts, Buildings 251 and 252 for storingthese
products, Building 600 for conductingresearch and laboratory tests
on biologicalagents, and Building 277 for waste treatment.Besides
the numbered buildings, SNOPB had anumber of support facilities,
including an
SNOPB was a separate, military-run BW organizationreporting to
the Biopreparat authorities.71 Interview with NCB specialists.72
Ibid. Note that in 1989, Vladimir Pasechnik, amicrobiologist from
Biopreparat, defected to Great Britain. Inaddition, US President
George Bush and British PrimeMinister Margaret Thatcher were
putting pressure on Sovietleader Mikhail Gorbachev to open up BW
facilities in theUSSR to international inspection. Preston,
“TheBioweaponeers,” p. 58.73 The following description of SNOPB is
based on theauthors’ visit to the Stepnogorsk facility in August
1998 andinterviews with NCB specialists.
animal house, an administrative building, and amedical unit.
The SNOPB research laboratoriesemployed highly qualified
specialists and hadthe most modern equipment. From 1984 to1990,
research and development on technologyfor producing special
microbial formulationswas conducted in Buildings 221 and
600.Building 600 had a high-containment systemand a specialized
chamber for testing BWmunitions. Made of stainless steel, the
chamberwas about 200 cubic meters in volume and hadwalls 1.6
centimeters thick. It was mounted onan octagonal cement platform,
with a wastetrap below. Monkeys, rabbits, and otheranimals kept in
cages in the facility’s vivariumwere used for tests in the aerosol
chamber.74
The numbered SNOPB buildings werecomponents of an integrated
technologicalchain. In Building 211, 17 different types ofnutrient
media could be prepared, with aproduction capacity of about 30,000
metrictons per year. Building 211 was linked by asystem of pipes to
Building 221, the six-storycentral production plant where cultures
ofmicroorganisms were grown in giantfermentors. Selected strains of
biological agentsfrom the bacterial culture collection
weretransferred to a high-containment (BiosafetyLevel 3) laboratory
on an upper floor of thebuilding. This laboratory was equipped
withsubmarine doors, a shower, and a medicalroom where employees
were examined beforeentering the laboratory and changing
intodisposable suits. After cultivation in small, one-cubic-meter
fermentors, the bacterial massdescended by gravity into giant,
20-cubic-meterproduction fermentors located on the lowerfloors. Ten
such production fermentorsoccupied four floors of Building 221.
Thesolution of bacteria grown in the fermentorswas then transferred
to seven centrifugalseparators on the lower floor. Spinning at
5,000revolutions per minute, these centrifugesseparated the
bacterial cells from the nutrient
74 Interview with a DOD official, May 1998.
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Bozheyeva, Kunakbayev, and Yeleukenov
11
media and other waste products. In a singlethree-day production
cycle, 1.5 metric tons ofconcentrated bacterial slurry could
beproduced.75
Buildings 241-244 and 251-271 wereunderground bunkers with
reinforced-concretewalls two meters thick, reportedly capable
ofsurviving a nuclear attack.76 From the outsidethey resembled
small hills covered by soil andgrass. Bunkers 241-244
containedweaponization lines where special machinesfilled the
concentrated slurry of pathogenicmicroorganisms into bomblets and
then sealedthem. Weaponization could be completed byinstalling
explosive bursters in the bomblets.77
The bomblets would then be installed in a largeweapon, such as
an aerial bomb or a missilewarhead.78 Bunkers 251-271
containedrefrigerated rooms for storing biological agents,capable
of maintaining temperatures down to -40° C in a volume of 800 cubic
meters.Buildings 251-271 were connected by a railwayspur with
loading equipment, and had a smallhelicopter landing site
nearby.
Buildings 221, 241-244, and 231 wereequipped with biocontainment
systems for theprotection of plant personnel and thesurrounding
environment. These buildings hadhigh efficiency air filters,79 fans
for maintainingnegative air pressure, individual air
supplies,sterilization autoclaves, and submarine doors.All wastes
from the production process werehandled in the waste-treatment
building.
According to estimates by Westernexperts, the SNOPB facility,
once mobilized,could produce 300 metric tons of weapons-grade
anthrax over a ten-month period. 80 Full-scale production never
took place, however.Financing for construction was reduced in 1990
75 Ibid.76 Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities,” p. 2.77
Interview with a DOD official, May 1998.78 The weaponization
equipment was removed to Russia in1990-1991. Interview with a DOD
official, May 1998.79 Known as Petryanov filters, they were
probably a Sovietversion of the High Efficiency Particulate Air
(HEPA) filtersused in the West.80 Interview with a DOD official,
May 1998.
in response to the scaling down of BWprograms. After the
collapse of the SovietUnion, Moscow stopped providing
financialsupport for SNOPB, resulting in a largeoutflow of
biotechnology specialists. A numberof them left to work in
commercialorganizations, while others left Kazakhstanaltogether.
After work had ceased in thebuildings at SNOPB, special
decontaminationmeasures were undertaken, and some military-related
equipment was dismantled anddestroyed.81
Scientific Research Agricultural Institute(NISKhI)
The Scientific Research AgriculturalInstitute (NISKhI) belonged
to a separategroup of Soviet BW facilities that developedagents
harmful to livestock and plants. Theinstitute was the only BW
research center inKazakhstan specializing in viruses. It
hadcooperative ties with Russian centersconducting similar research
in Vladimir (underthe Ministry of Agriculture), in Sverdlovsk(under
the MOD), and at Vector inNovosibirsk (under Biopreparat),82 where
theagents produced at NISKhI were tested. Theinstitute did not have
direct links with theStepnogorsk and Vozrozhdeniye
facilities,evidently because of its special-ization in anti-crop
and anti-livestock agents.
One of the oldest Soviet BW developmentcenters, NISKhI was
established in 1958 in thesettlement of Gvardeyskiy outside the
city ofOtar, about 180 kilometers from Almaty.83
81 By order of Biomedpreparat authorities in 1991, the
aerosoltesting chamber was cut up and destroyed. Currently, only
theoctagonal platform remains at the facility. Interview with
BBCjournalists who visited Building 600 in May 1998.82 Among other
facilities, Vector incorporated theExperimental Agricultural
Production Enterprise.Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial
Complex,” p.111.83 NISKhI stands for Nauchno-issledovatelskiy
selskokhozyaystvennyyinstitut. Gvardeyskiy, in the Korday region of
Zhambyl Oblast,is 3 kilometers from the Otar railroad station and
has apopulation of about 5,000. Information obtained during
theauthors’ visit to Gvardeyskiy in October 1998;
“NISKhI.Scientific Research Agricultural Institute. Settlement
ofGvardeyskiy. National Center for Biotechnology of the
-
Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan
12
Although the institute was subordinated to theUSSR Ministry of
Agriculture, its director heldmilitary rank. Moreover, the
institute waslocated within a military settlement and it
wasnecessary to pass three security posts to reachit.84 It occupied
a territory of 19 hectares,including 15 laboratories, a
vivarium,greenhouses, agricultural technology, and avaccine
production facility, and employed morethan 400 people.85
Research on anti-crop agents possiblybegan in the 1970s, when
NISKhI receivedorders from military authorities to study
theresistance of crops to various biologicalpathogens.86 The
institute had broad expertisein highly pathogenic and exotic
diseases oflivestock, fowl, and crops caused by viruses andother
agents, including Rinderpest virus,Newcastle disease virus, African
swine fevervirus, sheep pox virus, goat pox virus, fowl poxvirus,
blue-tongue virus (catarrhal fever ofsheep), herpes virus
(Aujeszky’s disease), andcereal rust fungi.87 In 1991, Moscow
terminatedall military research and left the NISKhIwithout central
administration or funding. Thedirector of the institute and some
specialistsleft to work at institutes in Russia.88
Republic of Kazakhstan,” brochure presented by NISKhIDirector
Dr. Seydigappar Mamadaliyev, October 1998, p. 1.84 The military
guards have remained to the present daybecause the Kazakhstani
Ministry of Defense operates a largetraining center in
Gvardeyskiy.85 Interview with Dr. Seydigappar Mamadaliyev, Director
ofNISKhI, October 1998.86 Anne M. Harrington, “Briefing on
Stepnogorsk InitiativeDiscussions in Almaty, October 22-25, 1996.
InstituteDescriptions and Proposal Abstracts,” p. 76.87 The agents
listed are considered to have potential BWapplications. See The
Royal Society, “Scientific Aspects ofControl of Biological
Weapons,” Report of a Royal SocietyStudy Group, supported by the
Leverhulme Trust, July 1994,pp. 16-17. The pathogenic
microorganisms studied by NISKhIwere indicated in “NISKhI,” pp.
4-5; and S. Mamadaliyev,“Determining the Probability of Bringing in
ParticularlyDangerous Infections to the Territory of the Republic
ofKazakhstan and Developing Scientifically Based Measures ofControl
and Prophylaxis,” in Harrington, “Briefing onStepnogorsk Initiative
Discussions in Almaty,” p. 46.88 Interview with Dr. Seydigappar
Mamadaliyev, Director ofNISKhI, October 1998.
Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute
The Anti-Plague Scientific ResearchInstitute was established in
1949 in the suburbsof Almaty under the authority of the
MainDirectorate for Quarantine Infections of theUSSR Ministry of
Health. It was part of theSoviet system for the control of
highlypathogenic diseases and operated a CentralAsian network of 19
epidemiologicalmonitoring stations.89 During the Soviet era,the
Anti-Plague Institute employed about 450people. The institute had
four laboratories,including one devoted to genetic research, anda
vaccine preparation plant with a capacity of21 million vaccine
doses per year. The institutedeveloped diagnostic tests and
vaccines forseveral infectious diseases, including anthrax,plague,
tularemia, brucellosis, cholera, andlisteria. In addition to
serving civilian needs, theinstitute was involved in
military-relatedresearch and development on defensivemeasures
against BW agents. To this end, theinstitute received Soviet
intelligence onbiological agents developed by Westernmilitaries,
including pathogenic strains modifiedfor military purposes, and
prepared vaccinesand diagnostic preparations against them.
The Almaty Anti-Plague Institute had nodirect links with the BW
research centers underthe Soviet MOD, the Ministry of
Agriculture,or Biopreparat, although it participated inexchanges of
scientists and of technicalknowledge.90 Nevertheless, the
possibility thatthe Anti-Plague Institute was involved inoffensive
BW developments cannot be ruledout.91 In 1992, Moscow terminated
funding forthe institute’s research and all military-relatedwork
ceased.
89 About 1,600 square kilometers of Kazakhstani territory,mostly
located in Kzylorda and Atyrau Oblasts, containendemic plague
areas. Interview with Dr. Alim Aykimbayev,Deputy Director of the
Anti-Plague Institute, Almaty, October1998.90 Ibid.91 Ibid.
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Bozheyeva, Kunakbayev, and Yeleukenov
13
INITIAL EFFORTS AT CONVERSION
After the collapse of the Soviet Union,one of the many tasks
facing independentKazakhstan was to address the Soviet
military-industrial facilities on its territory. In 1991-1992,
Russia cut off funding for the formerSoviet BW centers in
Kazakhstan, closed downtheir military programs, and abandoned
thesites. Since these facilities had all beensubordinate to central
Moscow agencies, localKazakhstani authorities had little idea
abouttheir activities.
The government of Kazakhstan wascommitted to converting the
former SovietBW facilities to peaceful activities. In 1991,
theMinistry of Health and the Ministry ofAgriculture began planning
the conversion ofSNOPB and NISKhI, respectively, but theseefforts
were unsuccessful because the ministrieslacked the necessary
expertise. In 1992, theKazakhstani government launched the
StateConversion Program and allocated somebudget funding for the
civilian reorganizationof the former BW facilities in Stepnogorsk.
Itwas not until 1993, however, that new civilianinstitutions were
established for this purpose.
At that time, Galym Abilseitov, thenminister of science and new
technologies,clustered together former military facilities
andrelated civilian institutes of the KazakhstanNational Academy of
Sciences into nationalcenters for nuclear research,
radioelectronicsand communications, and biotechnology,which were
financed and managed by theMinistry of Science. The new centers
weredesigned to use the advanced expertise offormer military
facilities for Kazakhstan’speaceful needs. By organizing these
centers, theKazakhstani government introduced itsadministrative
control and local specialists intobiotechnological institutions
that formerly hadbeen operated exclusively by Moscow andstaffed by
Russian specialists.92
92 Before he was appointed minister, Galym Abilseitov
wasdirector of one of the large laser centers outside of Moscow.His
reform of the scientific research structure elicited the
The National Center for Biotechnology(NCB), founded in 1993,
brought togethermost of the former Soviet military and
civilianbiotechnology facilities in Kazakhstan.93 Inaddition to
SNOPB and NISKhI, the Centerincludes three civilian facilities: the
Progressplant and the Institute of PharmaceuticalBiotechnology
(both at Stepnogorsk) and theAlmaty Biological Combine.94 Also
under theNCB umbrella are the microbiology institutesof the
Kazakhstan National Academy ofSciences.95 The NCB’s main goal since
itsestablishment has been to foster theapplication of
biotechnology—including thatdeveloped at former military
facilities—tomedicine, agriculture, and industry, and toimplement
the most promising ideas andtechnologies.
The NCB has significant researchpotential: about 40 doctors of
science and 160candidates of science participate in its
research
opposition of the Kazakhstani National Academy of
Sciencesbecause of the transfer of a few academic institutes to the
newcenters and the loss of the Academy’s privileged
financing.Abilseitov was also a deputy prime minister, and after
steppingdown from his post, he became one of the leaders of
theAzamat political opposition movement.93 The NCB was founded by
Presidential Edict No. 1090,dated January 21, 1993, and Decree of
the Cabinet ofMinisters No. 1140, dated November 16, 1993.94 The
Progress factory, which served as a cover for SNOPB,was constructed
in Stepnogorsk from 1971 to 1975. A total of3,000 people worked at
Progress and produced a variety oflegitimate products, including
antibiotics, amino acids, andfeed additives. In 1993, Progress
became a joint stockcompany (AO), and it was subsequently divided
into threecompanies. The Institute of Pharmaceutical
Biotechnology(IPB) in Stepnogorsk is a state enterprise created in
November1993 by reorganizing the Biomedpreparat
KazakhstaniScientific Production complex. IPB has a modern
laboratoryand experimental base that is developing technology
forobtaining new drugs from microbial and animal sources. TheAlmaty
Biological Combine was founded in 1931. Until 1991,it was
subordinate to the Main Directorate for BiologicalProduction of the
Soviet Ministry of Agriculture; it becamepart of the NCB in
November 1993. The facility, located incentral Almaty, prepares
vaccines and other preparations forthe prevention, diagnosis, and
treatment of infectious diseasesof livestock and fowl.95 The
institutes include the M.A. Aytkhozhin Institute ofMolecular
Biology and Biochemistry; the Institute of PlantPhysiology,
Genetics, and Bioengineering; and the CentralLaboratory for
Biological Control, Certification, and Pre-Clinical Experiments
(all based in Almaty).
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Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan
14
and development activities. Biotechnologicalfacilities belonging
to the NCB also haveconsiderable production capacity. The
AlmatyBiological Combine has a production facility of40,000 square
meters, suitable for the large-scale manufacture of vaccines. In
Stepnogorsk,the Progress plant and the former SNOPBconstitute a
unique biotechnology complexwith a combined production area of
500,000square meters.96
The NCB participates in the Programs forFundamental Research of
the KazakhstaniMinistry of Science-Academy of Sciences, andis also
the head organization for implementingthree National Special
Scientific and TechnicalPrograms (NSSTPs): on the use
ofbiotechnology methods and geneticengineering in medicine,
agriculture, andindustry; on scientific support for the
agro-industrial complex of the Republic ofKazakhstan; and on the
development andindustrial production of phytochemicals toprovide
domestic medicines to medicalinstitutions and the Kazakhstani
population.NCB scientists also conduct joint researchprojects with
universities and institutes inBelgium, Brazil, Germany, Hungary,
Israel,Russia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, andthe United
States. In the fall of 1998, under theUS Department of Energy (DOE)
Initiativesfor Proliferation Prevention program, the NCBand DOE’s
Pacific Northwest Laboratorylaunched four projects worth a total
of$771,000.97
96 "Interview with specialists from the NCB; Interview withMr.
S. Ababkin, Deputy Director of Almaty BiologicalCombine, 1998."97
The four projects are the following: “Production ofCarotenoids and
Related Products Using FungalFermentation,” “Roseofungin-Macrolide:
The Basis forMicrobiological Production of the Pharmaceutical
Product,”“Phytoremediation: Phytosiderophore Augmentation
forEnvironmental Cleanup,” and “Diagnostic Probes for PlantPathogen
Identification.” One more IPP biotechnologicalproject, entitled
“Development of a Process for a NovelTherapeutic Product for the
Prevention of FoodContamination,” was signed between the
Kazakhstani Ministryof Science and the DOE Oak Ridge National
Laboratory.
The status of efforts to convert threeformer BW facilities in
Kazakhstan—SNOPB,NISKhI, and the Almaty Anti-PlagueInstitute—is
discussed below.
AO Biomedpreparat—Heir to SNOPB
In early 1993, SNOPB was reorganizedinto a joint stock company
called AOBiomedpreparat.98 Initial funding for this effortwas
provided by the Kazakhstani StateProgram on Conversion.99 At that
time, theKazakhstani government developed plans forreconstruction
and technical renewal of thefacility that required a capital
investment ofapproximately 58.9 million rubles. TheGiprobioproyekt
Institute in Moscow wasgiven the task of designing
productionequipment for genetically engineered insulin,the
antibiotic roseofungin, and otherpharmaceutical products. The
facility alsobegan to manufacture disposable syringes andpolymer
products, and organized for theproduction of nutrient media and
substrates.100
Biomedpreparat had high expenses,however, because of the costs
associated withmaintaining and amortizing the buildingsowned by the
enterprise, high energyconsumption, the large workforce,
andmanagement and transport costs. As a result,the company’s
products were overpriced andnoncompetitive. Kazakhstani
governmentsupport, totaling about $1 million in 1993-1994,was not
sufficient to fully reconstruct thefacility for civilian needs or
to provide all of theformer BW specialists with civilian
jobs.101
Cooperation between the governments ofthe United States and
Kazakhstan on BWdisarmament began at a March 1994 meeting
98 Initially, the facility was called the Kazakhstani Branch of
theBiokhimmashproyekt Moscow Scientific Research
Institute.Lepyoshkin, “Flagmanu farmindustrii byt,” p. 126.99
Decree No. 661of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republicof
Kazakhstan, dated June 17, 1994, “On Measures toImplement the Law
of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘OnConverting Defense
Industries.’”100 "Interview with specialists from the NCB."101
"Interview with specialists from the NCB."
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Bozheyeva, Kunakbayev, and Yeleukenov
15
between the US and Kazakhstani committeeson defense conversion,
at which the two sidessigned an agreement to allocate $15 million
forthe development of industrial cooperation. At afollow-on meeting
in November 1994, theUnited States agreed to sponsor a
conferencefor managers of US and Kazakhstanienterprises, at which
Biomedpreparat receiveda grant for civilian industrial development.
Toimplement the conversion of the formerSNOPB, a joint venture
called Kamed-Resources was founded with support from theUS
Department of Defense’s CooperativeThreat Reduction (CTR) program.
The twopartners in the joint venture, Biomedpreparatand the US firm
Allen & AssociatesInternational, agreed to undertake
thecommercial production of vitamins, antibiotics,and other
pharmaceutical products atStepnogorsk. Funding for the project was
$5.8million, of which $2.8 million was provided bythe US government
and the remainder by theUS partner-firm. Unfortunately, the
jointventure with Allen & Associates Internationalfailed for a
number of reasons. The mainproblem was the lack of infrastructure
tosupport the venture after the facility supplyingutilities cut off
service due to lack of paymentby Biomedpreparat. Another problem
was thatcontracts were drawn up and signed before athorough
evaluation of both sides could beundertaken. A poor working
relationshipbetween the two partner-firms also
hinderedprogress.102
From 1993 to 1995, the Kazakhstanigovernment maintained a “life
support” regimefor the buildings and structures at Stepnogorsk,but
the costs of heat and power were high andthe facility’s debts to
workers, the government,energy suppliers, and others rose
quickly.Repaying these debts through production wasimpossible for
the aforementioned reasons, sopartial repayment was undertaken by
sellingunused equipment and other non-liquid assets.In 1995, the
Kazakhstani government stoppedproviding funds for the conversion
program at 102 "Interview with specialists from the NCB."
Biomedpreparat. In response, the enterprisehalted production and
cut power, and measureswere taken to mothball the energy
andtechnical systems and the production buildings.Personnel were
laid off and workers tookforced vacations. In June 1996, a
specialinteragency committee appointed by decree ofthe Deputy Prime
Minister reviewed thesituation at Biomedpreparat. The
committeeissued its conclusions and prepared a draftgovernment
decree, but neither document hadany effect. Most of the equipment
at theStepnogorsk plant was not converted to civilianuse and
remained virtually untouched foryears.103
During a visit by Ambassador RichardMorningstar and Assistant
Secretary ofDefense Ashton Carter to Kazakhstan inMarch 1996, the
parties reviewed a USproposal for cooperation between the
UnitedStates and Kazakhstan at the Stepnogorskfacility. The United
States proposed that itevaluate the factory infrastructure
atBiomedpreparat and, based on this analysis,arrange to dismantle
or destroy any militarilyrelevant equipment and systems that still
poseda proliferation risk. The two sides alsodiscussed the
possibility of converting theremaining infrastructure and
scientific expertiseto civilian research and production. US
officialsindicated that the project would attract supportfrom
private foundations and would help tofocus the efforts of various
US governmentagencies and nonproliferation programs.104
On the basis of these intergovernmentalnegotiations, Kazakhstan
and the United Statessigned a contract on December 5, 1996,
thatprovided for dismantling the main and auxiliaryequipment at
Biomedpreparat designed for
103 When program participants visited Biomedpreparat in
June1998, they found that the main production facility,
Building221, was not operating and needed massive repairs, but
thatthe basic equipment—fermentors, pipes, and power lines—was in
good condition.104 "Interview with specialists from the NCB."
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Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan
16
military microbiological production.105 InFebruary 1997, a
technical conference was heldin Washington, DC, to discuss the
future ofcontract work under the Stepnogorsk initiativewith the
participation of leading specialists ofthe NCB and Biomedpreparat.
In addition toagreeing on a list of dual-use equipment thatwould be
subject to dismantlement,participants addressed the issue of
setting up amodern environmental monitoring laboratoryto determine
the levels of microbialcontamination at the facility. This
Laboratoryfor Ecological Monitoring was founded inFebruary 1998 and
supplied by the UnitedStates with modern analytical equipment at
acost of $750,000.106
After the President of the Republic ofKazakhstan issued the
edict “On DevelopingSmall Business and Entrepreneurship” in
June1997, Biomedpreparat created a number oflimited partnerships
based on its subdivisions,using charter funds it had received. The
goal ofthis restructuring was to provide the limitedpartnerships
with the opportunity tomanufacture profitable goods and, in
theprocess, to start paying wages and taxes andcontributing to the
pension fund. Foreconomic reasons, the production facilitiesused
vacant space in Stepnogorsk. As of 1998,Biomedpreparat was managing
the followinglimited partnerships (TOO, in Russian): TOOPlimed
(production of disposable syringes, 31employees); TOO Media
(production ofnutrient media and substrates, 10 employees);TOO
Biogal (production of probioticpreparations, 52 employees); TOO
Biotim(production of pharmaceutical tablets, sevenemployees); TOO
Tulpar (production ofagricultural products, five employees);
TOOBiotrade (sale of unused equipment andmaterials, five
employees); and Bioaz Joint
105 “Preparation for Dismantling Infrastructure Equipment atAO
Biomedpreparat,” DSWA Contract 01-97-C-0018, datedDecember 5,
1996.106 Interview with Laboratory Head Dr. Aleksandr
Kosinov,Stepnogorsk, July 1998.
Venture (production of medicines and supplyand distribution
activities, three employees).107
In September 1998, a new contract worth$1.5 million was signed
for the dismantlementof main and auxiliary systems
atBiomedpreparat.108 The following month, in aneffort to support
and expand the cooperativeprogram, a group of US experts
inpharmaceuticals and industrial engineeringvisited Stepnogorsk.
The main purpose of thevisit was to find ways of reorienting work
at theformer BW facilities while retaining the existingpersonnel.
The US experts visitedBiomedpreparat, the Institute
ofPharmaceutical Biotechnology, the Laboratoryfor Ecological
Monitoring, and the NCB, andtook part in discussions of joint
biotechnologyprojects submitted earlier to internationalconversion
foundations. After their visit, theexperts prepared a report
designed to attractinvestment from US companies in civilian
jointventures.
Although the economic situation atBiomedpreparat remains
difficult to this day,there is reason to believe that if
sufficientfinancing were available, the company couldproduce
profitable items that would find amarket in Kazakhstan and in the
Central Asianregion as a whole. A team of US specialistsvisited
Biomedpreparat in 1997 and studied thecondition of the buildings,
equipment, andcommunications infrastructure. Theyconcluded that if
the facility is to be used toproduce pharmaceuticals, a significant
capitalinvestment will be required because thebuildings do not meet
international quality-control standards for
pharmaceuticalproduction. As it currently stands, however,
thefacility could be used to manufacture productsthat do not
require a sterile environment, suchas ethanol or biological
insecticides.109
107 "Interview with specialists from the NCB."108 “Dismantlement
of Biological Weapons Infrastructure atAO B,” DSWA Contract
01-98-C-0165, dated September 10,1998.109 “Summary Report on
Conversion of Enterprises (BiologicalWeapons) in Stepnogorsk,
Kazakhstan.” Prepared by the
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Bozheyeva, Kunakbayev, and Yeleukenov
17
At present, the NCB is trying on its ownto set up a production
line for disposable,sterile syringes at Biomedpreparat, but it
doesnot have sufficient funding to purchase therelatively low-cost
equipment it still needs.Another problem is the lack of experience
onthe part of facility managers in adapting tocivilian market
conditions.110
NISKhI
After Moscow stopped funding NISKhI,the institute fell under the
administrativecontrol of the Kazakhstani Ministry ofAgriculture,
but the ministry was unable tomake effective use of the institute’s
resources.Seydigappar Mamadaliyev, the new director ofNISKhI, began
to convert the institute topeaceful research. After the NCB was
foundedin 1993, NISKhI became a part of it.
At present, 230 individuals work atNISKhI, which consists of 15
researchlaboratories and a culture bank containingvarious strains
of viruses, bacteria, and fungiharmful to plants and animals. The
instituteconducts fundamental research into themolecular biology of
these pathogens. It alsodevelops methods of preparing nutrient
mediafor virology research. NISKhI’s vaccinepreparation plant can
meet all of Kazakhstan’sdemand for vaccines, diagnostics, and
antiserafor veterinary diseases.111
The institute participates in six nationalprojects on using
genetic engineering andbiotechnology in medicine, industry,
andagriculture. Its two main lines of work aredeveloping diagnostic
tools and vaccines forcombating animal viruses, and increasing
theresistance of wheat to fungal plant diseasessuch as yellow and
brown rust. NISKhI hascommercial ties with Kazakhstani
agriculturalenterprises that need sera, vaccines, and
otherbiological preparations. The institute has
Technical Department of SKS, Huntsville,
Alabama,500DD(205)971700, 1997.110 "Interview with specialists from
the NCB."111 "Interview with Dr. Mamadaliyev."
received two grants from the multilateralInternational Science
and Technology Center(ISTC) and financing under the
DOE’sInitiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)program.112
Anti-Plague Institute
The Anti-Plague Institute in Almatycurrently employs 332
individuals, including100 researchers. It is not part of the NCB
andis under the authority of the KazakhstaniMinistry of Health,
Education, and Sport. TheAnti-Plague Institute is the scientific
andmethodological center for the eight anti-plaguestations in
Kazakhstan (Uralsk, Atyrau, Aktau,Aktyubinsk, Aralsk, Shymkent,
Kyzyl-Orda,and Taldy-Korgan).
At present, the Anti-Plague Institute isdeveloping diagnostic
preparations andvaccines for particularly virulent
infectiousdiseases, conducting epidemiologicalmonitoring, and
training specialists. Over thepast few years, the institute has
developed threediagnostic tests for anthrax, and in 1995,
itdeveloped a diagnostic test for a new naturalstrain of cholera
from India, called “Bengal,”that eludes all known diagnostic sera.
The Anti-Plague Institute was also named as one of fourWorld Health
Organization regional centers onplague for Central Asia. Although
the institutehas experienced financial hardship since itstransfer
to Kazakhstani control in 1993, it hasmanaged to obtain some
foreign assistancefrom the ISTC and European foundations.113
PROSPECTS FOR CONVERSION
Through the Stepnogorsk initiative, the USgovernment is pursuing
the following goals: (1)to reduce the threat of facilities
beingconverted back to production of dangerouspathogenic
microorganisms; (2) to assureWestern companies that Kazakhstan
is
112 "Interview with Dr. Mamadaliyev."113 Interview with Dr.
Aykimbayev, Deputy Director of theAnti-Plague Institute, October
1998.
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Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan
18
committed to putting the past behind it,thereby improving
prospects for foreigninvestment; (3) to reduce the possibility
ofproliferation of BW-related knowledge byproviding peaceful work
to scientists formerlyinvolved in biological weapons
development;and (4) to reorient production at theStepnogorsk
facility to peaceful purposes.114
Preventing “brain drain,” the exodus ofspecialists from military
microbiologyenterprises in Kazakhstan to countries of
BWproliferation concern, is a key objective of theprogram. Economic
decline, the prospect ofunemployment, and the reduced prestige
ofscientific work may lead specialists to sell theirknowledge and
experience to countries of BWproliferation concern. Indeed,
scientists in theformer Soviet republics receive an average of20 to
25 times less pay than their Westerncounterparts.115
Although much of the evidence for braindrain and the smuggling
of biotechnologymaterials and technology is anecdotal,
theseproblems appear to be real. According to datafrom the Russian
Institute of EconomicProblems of the Population, the number
ofscientists in the former Soviet Union hasdecreased over the last
decade from 3.4 millionto 1.3 million. Taking into account a
smallinflux of young scientists, at least 2.5 millionindividuals
have been forced to leave the field.People who spent numerous years
inlaboratories are now working in unskilled jobs.Moreover, the
official statistics do not take intoaccount the departure of
scientists who goabroad on contracts for a few months to a
fewyears.
NISKhI and the Anti-Plague Institutehave retained at least half
of their personnel,
114 “Disarmament of the Biomedpreparat complex inStepnogorsk,”
Report of the Joint Kazakhstan-United StatesCommission, November
19-20, 1996.115 N. Milashevskaya, “Nauka v zerkale statistiki”
(“Science inthe mirror of statistics”), Direktor, No. 7, 1998, p.
23; Ya.Tudorovskiy, “Kogda ne kormyat svoyu nauku, kormyatchuzhuyu”
(“When you don’t feed your science, you feedsomeone else’s”),
Direktor, No. 1 (1998), p. 32.
but since 1992, Biomedpreparat has lost 500 ofa total of 700
biotechnologists with variouslevels of training. A few of the
specialists whoformerly worked at Biomedpreparat have beenable to
stay in Stepnogorsk, having securedjobs at the Institute of
PharmaceuticalBiotechnology. Most of those who have lefthave gone
to work in commercialorganizations, or have moved to
Russia,Ukraine, Belarus, and other former Sovietstates.
Unfortunately, this process iscontinuing. As a rule, the scientists
who leaveare accomplished specialists who are confidentthey will be
able to find work in a new location.Defense conversion at the
former BW facilitiesin