Foreword Victory in Kargil is certainly a defining moment in the history of Independent India. It was the outcome of supreme sacrifice by the soldiers of this country, displaying valor with dignity. Kargil was not an easy win. The terrain was tough and the enemy was perched comfortably on high mountain peaks. The task was to regain the occupied peaks. The Kargil victory was a marvel for the Indian Armed forces as they conducted the war without violating any international norms. It was firm resolve of the then Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee who did not buckle under the US pressure to cease-fire before clearing each and every inch of the country. On the sixth anniversary of Kargil Vijay the BJP has decided to celebrate the victory as a part of its Silver jubilee celebrations. Taking a cue from it we are publishing a booklet to commemorate the valiant effort by the armed forces. This booklet carries two write- ups on the war in Kargil giving an account of its significance in India's History and Geography as well. We hope this booklet gives the party leaders workers and even the common man first hand information about the war in Kargil. Publisher
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Foreword
Victory in Kargil is certainly a defining moment inthe history of Independent India. It was the outcome ofsupreme sacrifice by the soldiers of this country,displaying valor with dignity. Kargil was not an easywin. The terrain was tough and the enemy was perchedcomfortably on high mountain peaks. The task was toregain the occupied peaks. The Kargil victory was amarvel for the Indian Armed forces as they conductedthe war without violating any international norms. Itwas firm resolve of the then Prime Minister Shri AtalBihari Vajpayee who did not buckle under the USpressure to cease-fire before clearing each and everyinch of the country.
On the sixth anniversary of Kargil Vijay the BJPhas decided to celebrate the victory as a part of its Silverjubilee celebrations. Taking a cue from it we arepublishing a booklet to commemorate the valiant effortby the armed forces. This booklet carries two write-ups on the war in Kargil giving an account of itssignificance in India's History and Geography as well.We hope this booklet gives the party leaders workersand even the common man first hand information aboutthe war in Kargil.
Publisher
TALKING POINTS
1. Maps of India, J&K and of the Kargil area may beprocured and distributed to the party workers.Operational map of the battle, if required, can be madeor procured from Army HQ.
2. Commemoration points must be fixed in every districtand at the state capitals where all party functionaries toattend. Talk can be divided into two parts; one by themilitary expert and the other by the party man onpolitical and international fallout of Kargil
3. All Shaheed family of Kargil war and others from otherwars or insurgency to be invited at the district and statelevel and honoured with "Shradhanjali Patra". Properhomage to be paid to the Shaheed of the area.
4. All official buildings and homes of all party men to belit in the evening. Specially two diyas to be lighted inevery home
GeneralA nation wide programme on Kargil Day- 26 July is
to be celebrated as Vijay Divas as a part of the Rajat Jayanti
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Year of BJP. Talking points for the same have been workedout and sent herewith for your perusal and approval. Pleasefor further dissemination to the states and Morchas.
In 1999, fifty-two years after independence, Pakistaniforces once again intruded into Indian Territory across theLine of Control (LOC) in J&K initiating the Kargil War.This was the fourth attempt on the part of Pakistan to grabJ&K by force, commencing in 1947-48, then in 1965 andlater in 1971. It met with humiliating defeat all the time. Butthe problem of J&K remained unresolved, as though Indiawon every war on the Battlefield, but unfortunately lostevery peace negotiation on the negotiating table, a dismalfailure on the part of our diplomacy and the total lack ofstrategic vision on the part of the government of the day. In1948 when our forces were on the victory march and neededjust a few months to clear today's Pakistan OccupiedKashmir (POK), they were halted by the Nehru governmentand instead the matter taken to the UN, making it the mostcomplex issue and giving a chance to the world powers toplay tootsie in our affairs. In 1965 Indian Army capturedthe strategic Uri-Punch bulge with the strategic Haji Pirpass at its head. Biggest blunder took place by returning itto Pakistan at Tashkent. In 1971 Indian Armed forcescaptured 93,000 POWs. At Shimla we returned them withoutmaking certain of a inviolable agreement on J&K. All thesestrategic blunders led Pakistan to believe that it could getway by making another effort at grabbing Kashmir valleyand forcing India to sue for peace. Fortunately for India wehad the Bhartiya Janata Party at the head of the governmentwith Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the Prime Minister.
India launched Operation Vijay to evict the enemyfrom our territory and inflict a crushing and humiliatingdefeat on him. The dates of this operation have been fixedas 05 May 1999 - 26 July 1999, though certain hostile activitieshad started much before this date and even continued afterthat also. But it was in this period that the main operationswere concluded.
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Why Kargil?Political Reasons1. Pakistan sponsored insurgency in the Kashmir valley
and J&K had been effectively contained by India, andPakistan political leadership was at a loss to keepKashmir boiling.
2. International community was no more interested in theKashmir problem and even USA and China were urgingPakistan to stop supporting the insurgency.
3. New government in India with Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayeeas the Prime Minister was making all efforts to establishgood friendly relations with Pakistan, provided Pakistanstopped cross border terrorism. India was prepared todiscuss all issues as a part of a composite dialogue.India had launched the Lahore Bus Yatra in Feb 1999,and a joint declaration issued for peace and friendship.(Pakistan army, however, had clandestinely alreadycommenced Operation Badr, the name given toOperations in Kargil).
4. Domestic problems of Pakistan were again raising theirhead, the Mullahs were demanding their pound of flesh,Taliban trained, equipped and supported by Pakistanfor invasion of Afghanistan now wanted same sort ofShariat rule in Pakistan, and the provinces were restive.
5. Pakistan's new Chief of Army Staff, Gen ParvezMusharraf was a mohajir and needed to establish hiscredentials as more Pakistani than even a Punjabi. Hewas a commando and a protégé of Zia-ul-Haq, andneeded to take on India to show his Napoleonic militaryqualities. He had been deeply involved in the fight inAfghanistan against Soviet forces. He felt that if hecould worst the Soviets, Indians would be a cakewalk.
6. Both countries were now nuclear weapons states, andan all out war was perhaps ruled out, as it involved thedanger of escalation to nuclear war, thus negating India'sconventional superiority and permitting Pakistan to
fight the war on its ground and time of choosing.
Military Reasons
It chose Kargil for the military reasons as given belowand the time when winter was still not over and the passesto connect Kargil were still not open.
1. Kargil is the most crucial part of Indian held sector onthe LOC, where the NH1A passes closest to the LOCand Pakistan can intercept our Lines of Communicationto Leh in Ladakh region, thereby cutting off Indianarmy's 3 Infantry Division in Ladakh facing Chinese onAksai chin and Pakistan at Siachin.
2. Kargil is far removed from both Srinagar and Leh forany quick reaction by Indian army. It is in a bowl,flanked by Zojila on this side and Tungla on the otherside.
3. Zojila, the pass of blizzards at 11,578 ft remains closedfor over six months in the year, thus cutting the line toKargil from Srinagar. Kargil sector is stockpiled for sixmonths, any more ammunition or rations have to bebrought through Zojila only
4. Terrain is the most inhospitable in this region, on parwith next only to Siachin. Any territory captured onceby the Pakistanis will be most difficult to recapture dueto the difficulty of terrain and weather.
5. Kargil defended by only one infantry brigade of Indianarmy, with four infantry battalions covering an area ofover 200 Km frontage, thus with very low density oftroops.
6. Indian army due to inhospitable weather in winterswithdrew to lower posts leaving upper posts empty,and only surveillance mounted by foot patrols in thelower regions as higher region extremely difficult toreach.
7. Aerial surveillance mounted irregularly due to badweather conditions.
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8. Pakistan Lines of Communication on the other side aremore stabilized and he can reach the heights even inwinters from Skardu side, as Skardu is connected toGilgit through an all weather motorable road throughoutthe year.
9. Pakistan had an overlooking position on the Srinagar-Leh road even in normal times and could monitor ouractivities.
10. Kargil sector had remained dormant since 1971 afterthe Shimla agreement. No activity of infiltration orsabotage had taken place as it was a Shia dominatedarea and was far removed from the Kashmir valley.Indian security forces thus were less vigilant.
General description of the WarPakistan intruded into Kargil sector starting
sometime in Oct 1998, and when found out in May 1999denied participation of its regular army in the intrusionexcept for carrying out offensive patrolling along the LOC.It also claimed that the LOC in the area was ambiguous,refusing to take notice of the delineated and signed mapsattached to the Shimla Agreement. Pakistan Northern LightInfantry (NLI) troops recruited from Baltistan and Gilgitarea are hardy and tough mountaineers. They preparedsanghars and bunkers and converted some of ours to theiruse. Stockpiling of ammunition and rations was carriedout by porters and soldiers in early winter and later duringthe April period.Pakistan intruded in three sub-sectors1. Dras-Mushkoh sub-sector using three NLI Battalions,
4,6 &12 NLI supported by three companies (Coys) ofSSG group. This was the most threatening as itcontrolled all movement on the NH1A in area of Dras.Famous battles of Tololing, Three Pimples and TigerHill were in this sector. On Indian side, initially fromone battalion we built up a force of the famous 8Mountain Division that came from the valley. This isthe Division that fought in Italy against the Germans in
Second World War, and later was the main counterinsurgency force in Nagaland till in 1991. It was movedto the Kashmir valley to bring insurgency under control.
2. Kaksar Sub-Sector. This is the nearest point to the NH1A.Pakistan 4 NLI with SSG intruded into this sector,Indian Army deployed troops from its 3 InfantryDivision.
3. Batalik Sub-Sector. This is the farthest from the NH1Aand has Batalik, Yaldoer and Chorbatla as importantpoints. Pakistan intruded with 5 NLI along withelements of 3 & 8 NLI and two coys SSG. Indian Armydeployed troops from its 3 Infantry division to evict theenemy from this sector. Division at the same timecontinued to look after its responsibility on the Chinesefront and at Siachin.
The torturous terrain of the Kargil mountains, atangled mass of heights and ridges, riven by steep nullahs,made normal infantry deployment impossible. The widthof most of the ridges and spurs was such that seldom couldmore than one platoon or two sections at most be deployedfor an assault. The fearsome nature of the task that thesoldiers faced when assaulting strong, well built sangars,often manned by more than one machine gun, was enoughto daunt the stoutest heart. And the Indian soldier did notfalter. He pressed on regardless of the casualties, hardships,hunger and cold, because he knew that the nation expectednothing less than the supreme sacrifice from him and inthe bargain take many more enemy with him.
Most of the credit for the victory at Kargil will go tothe grit, determination and dedication of the Jawan andyoung officers. But in the final analysis, war is the ultimateuse of the nations military to achieve its political objective.Military objectives of the Kargil war were derived thusfrom the political objective set to the forces. Though notwritten but for the first time made clear, they entailed,getting the Kargil intrusion vacated, and restore the sanctityof the LOC. An unambiguous term of reference was also
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that LOC must not be crossed, but it was not really binding.In order to deter Pakistan from escalating the war Indianforces deployed for a full-scale war.
Pakistan suffered a humiliating defeat at Kargil,militarily and politically. The major lesson of the war wasthe synchronous activities of the military and diplomacy.This combination completely put Pakistan on the defensive.The military victories on the battlefield strengthened ourdiplomatic maneuvers and that boosted the militariesmorale. This was the greatest achievement of the BJPgovernment that forced Pakistan to first run to China forsupport. Having been disappointed there, they rushed toWashington on 04 Jul, a holiday in USA. Nawaz Sharifpleaded with President Clinton to help save face. Clintonhad rung up Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Hon'ble PrimeMinister of India who politely declined to meet him inWashington, letting the Pakistan prime minister squirm inhis own stew. India acceded to the request to let thePakistan forces withdraw, but when they reneged on that,military was asked to resume operations forcing thePakistan to flee from the battlefield leaving their deadunburied and unsung.
CasualtiesIndian Army
Indian Army suffered normal rate of casualtyattrition, despite the terribly difficult terrain and having tophysically assault every sanghar and bunker of the enemy.Casualties were reduced due to the intense use of Firepowerof the artillery and direct firing weapons like rocketlaunchers and missiles that were more effective indestroying targets pin pointedly than indirect fire. Artilleryinnovated new methods to provide support to the assaultingtroops even to the last few yards by resorting to direct firewith the Bofors guns and missiles. Army used heavyconcentration of artillery fire to soften up the enemy positionbefore the assaults were launched. At one time 120 artillery
guns (including Bofors) were supporting a single battalionattack, a density even perhaps the Russian Army cannotdream of. The total casualties figures during the Kargiloperations (Operation Vijay) are as given here.
The performance of the regimental officers, JCOsand soldiers in the Kargil war was unsurpassed. Officercasualties were out of all proportion to those in the variouswars since 1939. In the Second World War in the Britishand Commonwealth armies, one officer was killed for everytwenty-seven soldiers. In India's post independence warsthe rate had been 1: 24, even though Indian platoons arecommanded by JCOs, thus having much less number ofofficers per battalion as compared to western armies. AtKargil, the average was 1:16 even though India is short of12000 officers, and the Battalions were down to 12-14 officerswhen they are authorized 24 officers. In the case of 2Rajputana Rifles battalion after the battle of Tololing thisfigure was 1:7, and after the battle of "Three Pimples", itwas down to 1:3.
What greater contribution could any nation ask fromits young officers and junior leadership?Assessment of enemy Casualties
Pakistan government has refused to recognise itsNLI and SSG casualties and never accepts to publish thefigures; these figures are based on eyewitness reports oftroops in contact, radio intercepts, and intelligence sources.These are estimated at over 1187 killed and over 1000wounded. This includes 69 officers and 76 SSG personnel.Some Important Points for Clarification1. Intelligence failure. Much has been made of this bythe opposition at that time. Facts are as under:
Kargil sector was a low priority area due to the veryhostile terrain and no further outlet to the valley.
This resulted in Indian Army deploying only oneBrigade troops in the area and those also used towithdraw to their winter positions due to heavysnow and inaccessibility.Pakistan carried out secretive moves to build troopsopposite the sector. They have better communicationsand easier access.Aerial surveillance was carried out but did not revealmuch.External intelligence agencies did not put correctmeaning to the purchases by Pakistan of highaltitude equipment at large scale.BJP government set up a Group of Ministers (GOM)
committee to study all aspects of the Kargil war with specialreference to intelligence failure. Corrective action wassuggested and taken during the office of the government.2. Army Reaction. It is alleged that the army was notready for the war. This has to be understood in its correctperspective. While army is always ready for war, yet ittakes time to gear up for the specific theatre and particulartype of operations. To cite an example from 1971 war, ittook the armed forces 9 months to get ready for theBangladesh operations. This time is taken in making updeficiencies, normally occurring in peacetime, training forspecific type of operations and gathering intelligence andplanning. Kargil operation was a surprise by Pakistan, andwe had to respond immediately, so normal deficienciesremained which had to be made up during the course ofthe operations. Certain type of equipment had to beimported as General Reserve with the army is not to theextent that it caters for large-scale operations. Besides,certain equipment that has been used during operationsneeds to be procured to ensure adequate general reservesfor future requirement after the war.3. Indian Air Force Employment. It has been said thatIAF was employed late and that too not in adequatenumbers. Air is a force multiplier in these difficult terrain
conditions, and its use is different in mountains from theplains. It cannot be employed in mass, nor for specifictargets from such heights. As for the release of IAF for usein war it was at the advice of the Chief of Air Staff by theCCS. IAF provided very crucial support to the troops onthe ground and effectively intercepted enemy supply lines.4. LOC Crossing. It is criticized that army wasprevented from crossing the LOC. This was a veryimportant strategic point for the international communitywhereby Indian government came through as adhering topeaceful means and according to norms.5. Nuclear Escalation. It was feared that any escalationof conflict in the Kargil sector could lead to the war beingraised to nuclear level. Government of India at no timeeven under most intense pressures from the battlefieldeven considered the use of nuclear weapons, though alwaysbeing ready for the same.6. Role of Media. Media played a very positive roleright through the operations bringing the latest actionsinto the homes and to every Indian live. This boosted thenations morale and prompted everyone to feel part of thewar. The media and diplomatic offensive helped to bringabout a polarization of the international opinion in favourof India.7. Welfare Measures for the Shaheed. For the first timein the history of India a Shaheed was given his due respectsby doing his anteshthi through military honours at his home.This not only honoured the Shaheed but his family, hiscommunity, his village and the nation. Every old andyoung was with the soldier in the field and his family athome. Besides, the Vajpayee government gave a massivefinancial package to every Shaheed family so that they donot have to look to someone for help. This started with theKargil war and has now become the norm.Conclusion
Kargil war came as a great surprise to India andinitially its leadership was caught off guard, particularly in
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the wake of Lahore Bus yatra. But the nation rose as oneand the BJP government was able to provide the reallyneeded leadership and guidance to make mince meat ofPakistan on the battlefield and in the diplomatic arena.Kargil was a tremendous success for the country andnational morale rose to the extent that it has never lookedback since. It also showed the greatness of the charismaticleadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayeeji who did not hesitate tooffer the hand of peace again to Pakistan through his Agrainvitation and then later the Islamabad meet. WhileMusharraf carried on changing colours like a chameleon.India did not stray from its chosen path of peace andfriendship. That is what is paying dividends today.
Kargil was a great victory for India, having achievedthe political aim set by the BJP Government to evict theenemy occupied posts and to restore the sanctity of theLOC, It was a victory for dynamic political leadership,rousing of the nation by the party in support of the militaryeffort and maintaining social and communal harmony.Militarily it as a victory for distinguished command,magnificent leadership, unshakeable devotion to duty andhigh gallantry at every level, essential qualities of the trulyprofessional army.Attachments
Two attachments are made for background studyand general awareness. These may be quoted whereneeded.
1. Historical background to the Kashmir Problem.2. An outline chronology of the war.
Historical Background to the Kashmir ProblemBritish paramountcy over princely India lapsed with
the passage of The India Independence Act of 18 July 1947.The princes were to choose which of the two newDominions, India or Pakistan, they wished to join. Of the574 states, which lay within the future boundary of India,three, namely Hyderabad, Junagarh and J&K did not signthe instrument of accession. The first two, Muslim ruled
states within the boundaries of India and with Hindumajority population were brought to book by Sardar VallabhBhai Patel through short swift military action (called policeaction). The situation in J&K was that the ruler was HinduDogra, Maharaja Hari Singh with a population that wasMuslim majority in Kashmir and Baltistan area, Hindu inJammu, and Buddhist in Ladhak, but the state with overallMuslim majority. The State also bordered both the newDominions. Maharaja Hari Singh signed a 'Standstill'agreement with Pakistan. It was rejected by India. Lessthan three weeks later, on 03 September 1947, Pakistaniirregulars (army men in civil clothes) and tribals from theNWFP called Qabalis invaded the state from Muzaffarabadside in the valley and from Mirpur-Kotli side inPunch-Rajauri sector. Brigadier Rajinder Singh,Commander-in-Chief of the J&K forces died fighting andBaramulla town fell to the invaders on 25 September.Raisers continued their pillaging and massacre in the valleyand by 25 October were in the vicinity of the Srinagarairfield and cut off the electric supply to Srinagar. Unableto protect his people any more, Maharaja Hari Singh signedthe Instrument of Accession to India on the evening of 25October. Indian troops (First Battalion the Sikh Regiment)landed at Srinagar airport still under attack by the raiders.On the morning of 27 Oct 1947. Same day SheikhMohammad Abdullah was appointed Prime Minister andhead of the administration.
Over the next thirteen months, Indian army pushedback the invaders and retook important towns of Dras,Kargil, Gurez, Kupwara, Punch, Rajauri, Uri, Naushehraand liberated Leh by opening the road link through ZojilaPass at the height of 11,578 ft that remains closed for oversix months in the year. Tanks were used to assault the passon 01 Nov 1948 creating history of using tanks at the highestpoint ever in war in the world. Having got a firm hold onthe enemy, Indian Army was now ready to liberate the restof Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, but Pandit Nehru droppeda bombshell. Without consulting the army, he announced
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a unilateral ceasefire with effect from 01 Jan 1949, and tookthe matter to the UNO. The consequences of this precipitateaction were that India had to repulse four aggressions byPakistan, and that, to this day, a de facto war is still goingon. No less than 83,294 Sq Km or 35% of the erstwhile Stateof J&K remains under Pakistan control, and to make mattersworse, Pakistan has gifted 5,180 Sq Km of that territory toChina.An Outline Chronology of the warOct 1998 - Pakistan army Northern Light02 May 1999 Infantry (NLI) prepare defences on
Kargil heights stealthily andsecretively.
03 May 1999 Four sightings of Pakistan intruders atBanju. HQ 70 Infantry Brigade arrivesat Dras.
05 May Official starting of the war.06 May Border Roads open NH1A to military
traffic.16 May 56 Mountain Brigade arrives and takes
over Dras-Mushkoh sector.21 May Start of seize of Tiger Hill by 8 SIKH.23 May COAS visits Kargil sector and lays down
priorities.24 May 79 Mountain Brigade takes over
Mushkoh sector.26 May IAF begins air operations.01 June 8 Mountain Division takes over charge
of Dras-Mushkoh sector.03 June 8 Mountain Division starts operations.12 June -Ongoing talks between foreign
Ministers of India and Pakistandeadlocked.-50(Independent) Para brigade arrives inGumri from army reserve under
command 8 Mountain Division.13 June 56 Brigade takes Tololing and Point 4590.14 June "Bump" recaptured by 56 Brigade.15 June President Clinton urges Nawaz Sharif to
pull out of Kargil.20 June 56 Brigade takes point 5140.23 June General Zinni, Commanding General
United states central command urgesPakistan to withdraw.
26 June 192 Mountain Brigade arrives from thevalley under command 8 Division.
28 June Point 4700 captured.29 June "Black Rock", "Three pimples" and "
Knoll" captured.01 July Point 5000 captured.03 July Point 5287 captured.04 July - "Tiger hill" captured.
- Nawaz Sharif flies to Washington toplead with US President.
05 July Point 4875 captured and with thatcomplete Mushkoh- Dras sector clearedof enemy.
12-18 July Ceasefire to allow Pakistani troops towithdraw. Pakistan reneged andoperations resumed. Many posts clearedof enemy.
24 July recapture of important posts in Bataliksector complete.
26 July Official ending of the war but moppingup operations continued till 03 August'
03 Aug Indian troops along the LOC throughoutthe Kargil sector. Sanctity of the LOCrestored.
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Since 1965 and 1971 misadventures, intrusion acrossthe line of control (LoC) in Kargil early in 1999 wasPakistan's most audacious misadventure against India.It had all the elements of a grand strategy, surprise anddecept. That the misadventure was thwarted and thePakistani troops, entrenched at altitudes exceeding 4000meters, were soon routed out and made to beat retreatis a tribute to the professionalism and valour of theIndian armed forces. It is also a tribute to the BJP-ledNDA government that gave the armed forces all thesupport and, by its skillful policy decision, kept theconduct of the operation well below the nuclearthreshold and won endorsement of the internationalcommunity. Above all, it is a tribute to the people ofIndia, who stood unitedly behind the government andthe armed forces. In the general election that followeda few months later they gave a fresh mandate to NDAand expressed their endorsement of BJP's commitmentto nationalism.Operation Vijay - A legend in high altitude warfare
Kargil Committee, that was set up by thegovernment under the chairmanship of the noteddefence analyst K. Subrahmanyam, has come to the
conclusion that the plan to capture a 5 to 10 k.m. stripacross the 168 k.m. long LoC in the Kargil sector wasfinalized in October 1998, soon after General ParvezMusharraf became Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff. Hesecured approval of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whowas engaged in the camouflage of preparing for theLahore summit with Prime Minister Atal BihariVajpayee. While the summit was on, about 2000Pakistani soldiers along with a few Mujahideen hadbegun surreptitiously to sneek through the "unheldgaps" in the LoC to occupy positions to depths of 5 to10 kms. The intrusions were first noticed on 3rd Mayin the Batalik subsector by two shepherds. The patrolsthen launched by the Indian Army determined theextent of the intrusions made in the various subsectors,namely, Batalik, Dras and Manhkoh, Kaksar and Turtokthat adjoins Siachin. The Indian Army's response byway of operation Vijay was extremely rapid and strongand has become a legend in high altitude warfare. Theeffective use of air power and heavy artillery came as asurprise to the Pakistanis. Our troops fought withexemplary valour and were led by officers from thefront. When Tolioling was captured, the rout ofPakisanis was complete and the withdrawal statementby Nawaz Sharif in Washington was only a fig leaf. Onthe Indian side 474 men lost their lives and 1,109 werewounded. On the Pakistani side over 700 regularsoldiers and about 250 irregulars were killed.
Military experts are unanimous in their opinion thatthe intrusion on the scale attempted by Pakistan("salami slicing" in Cold War terminology) was totallyunsustainable because of the lack of supportiveinfrastructure on their side and was militarily irrational.Why, then, did Pakisan attempt the intrusion that wasdoomed to fail? Kargil committee is of the opinion that
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the politico-strategic motives of Pakistan were tointernationalise Kashmir as a nuclear flash pointrequiring urgent third party intervention, to alter theLoC and disrupt its sanctity by capturing unheld areasin Kargil and to achieve a better bargaining positionfor a possible trade-off against the positions held byIndia in Siachen. Among the military/proxy warrelated motives were: to interdict the Srinagar-Leh road(national highway IA) and to threaten the recently builtbye pass, to impair India's defences in Turtok andSiachin, to give a fillip to militancy in J&K and toweaken the counter insurgency gird by drawing awaytroops from the Valley to Kargil. Pakistan's underlyingassumption was that India's response would be weakand that, because Pakistan and India were now nuclearweapon states, the international community wouldintervene very soon and impose a ceasefire that wouldenable Pakistan to retain its territorial gains.
India's will and capacity to respond strongly for thedefence of its territory and honour has been consistentlymisread by Pakistan since 1947. So was it in 1999 also.Though the NDA Government at that time was acaretaker one and was awaiting a general election, itresolutely launched itself in the defence of India'sinterests. That is the difference made by BJP's ideal ofnationalism and unflinching commitment to nationalsecurity. Apart from launching Operation Vijay of theArmy, strong signals were sent out by the use of theAir Force and the western fleet of the Navy (OperationTalwar). But due caution was exercised (for instance,by the direction to the armed forces not to cross theLoC). By a competent and articulate management onthe diplomatic front and the media (Kargil was the firstwar fought in the sub-continent in the gaze of televisioncameras) we won support of the international
community. Pakistan, it is hoped, has now realised thelimits to nuclear blackmail. That may be the abidinggain of the Kargil conflict. By its conduct of the Kargiloperation the BJP led NDA Government has establishedthe imperative of co-existence between neighbouringnuclear weapon states in which misadventure andblackmail will have no place.Was Kargil avoidable?
Kargil Committee has answered the question in thefollowing words:
"A Kargil-type situation could perhaps have beenavoided had the Indian Army followed a policy ofSiachenisation to plug unheld gaps along the 168 km.stretch from Kaubal Gali to Chorbat La. This wouldhave entailed establishing a series of winter cut-off postswith communications and other logistic support andspecially equipped and trained soldiers to hold thesepositions and undertake winter patrolling despite riskof cold injuries and avalanche casualties, which wouldhave had to be accepted. Such a dispersal of forces tohold uninhabited territory of no strategic value wouldhave dissipated considerable military strength andeffort and would not have been at all cost-effective....The alternative should be a credible declaratory policyof swiftly punishing wanton and willful violations ofthe sanctity of the LoC. This should be supplementedby a comprehensive space and aerial based surveillancesystem."
Based on the recommendations of the committeethe NDA government undertook wide-ranging reformsin our intelligence framework and undertook infusionof new technology.
BJP has always regarded the soldier as thecentrepiece of our defence. In the wake of the Kargilconflict and subsequently utmost attention was given
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by the NDA government to catering to the weaponary,equipment and other requirements of the troops andeverything possible was done to enhance their moraleand esteem. Departing from the past practice, bodiesof the martyred soldiers were brought to their homesand were cremated/buried with military honour; thelocal communities participated with due solemnity. Theinjured soldiers were given the best possible medicaltreatment. Financial grants to bereaved families and tothe soldiers, permanently disabled were increasedmanifold.Vijay Veer Awas Yojana
A special mention should be made of the Vijay VeerAwas Yojana in the Dwarka area of Delhi. A self-contained complex (including medical and canteenfacilities) of about 400 two and three bed-room flatswas constructed by the Delhi Development Authority.By waiving off the cost of land (which, in Delhi,constitutes three-fourths of the total cost of a flat) andadministrative charges for construction, the flats wereprovided to the families of those martyred in Kargiland to the soldiers permanently disabled in operationVijay at prices between Rs. 3.5 to 5 lakhs, as comparedto the normal DDA prices of Rs 15 to 20 lakhs. Thecomplex was dedicated by Shri Vajpayee and Shri.Advani and stands as a monument of BJP's homage toour brave soldiers.
During its six years in office the NDA Governmenthas done more than any previous government did forthe welfare and esteem of our soldiers and ex-servicemen. Had it been returned to office in 2004 thedemand for "one rank one pension" would also havebeen met.
We should recall the Kargil operation, which wasboth a military and diplomatic triumph for India. The
Pakistani intruders were evicted with heavier casualtiesthan those suffered by India. The sanctity of the LoCreceived international recognition and Pakistan wasisolated in the comity of nations.Kargil Day - Our Focus
In the programmes to observe the Kargil Day thisyear our focus should be on the following:
1. We should recall the Kargil Operation, whichwas both a military and diplomatic triumph forIndia. The Pakistani intruders were evicted withheavier casualties than those suffered by India.The sanctity of the LoC received internationalrecognition and Pakistan was isolated in thecomity of nations. Pakistan was made to realisethe limits of nuclear blackmail.
2. We have to reiterate that our armed forces arethe centerpiece of our national defence. Themorale and esteem of our soldier, his welfareand the provision of the requisite wherewithalto him must be given the highest priority, as wasdone by the NDA government throughout itssix years in office. The cynical criticism by theCongress and the left parties deservescondemnation.
3. It is disappointing that the UPA government isunable to control the balance of the India-Pakistan peace process. It has let the processacquire an unduly Kashmir-centric complexionand has let the Hurriyat push its pretension ofbeing representative of Kashmir, to the relativeexclusion of the elected institutions.
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