Bachelor’s thesis Foreign Fighters – aspiring and returning Prevent, protect, pursue and respond Author: Julia Johansson Email: [email protected]Supervisor: Anders Persson Examiner: Daniel Silander Date: 2016-05-25 University: Linneaus University Department: European Studies Level: G3-level Word count: 11 225
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Bachelor’s thesis
Foreign Fighters – aspiring and returning Prevent, protect, pursue and respond
Author: Julia Johansson Email: [email protected] Supervisor: Anders Persson Examiner: Daniel Silander Date: 2016-05-25 University: Linneaus University Department: European Studies Level: G3-level Word count: 11 225 Course code: 2SK300
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Abstract This research resulted in a foreign fighters analytical framework aiming to identify the
reasons for an increase of foreign fighters travelling from the European Union to
jihadist organisations in Syria and Iraq. The theoretical framework is built on EU’s
Counterterrorism strategy (ECTS) on prevention, protection, pursuing and responding
towards terrorism. The theoretical framework has in this essay been applied on ECTS in
order to search explanation to the phenomenon of foreign fighters in the EU. The
analytical framework is built on the concepts operationalized in the theoretical
framework in order to obtain further clarifications on foreign fighters in relation to the
EU. The results and analysis of this essay show that ECTS somewhat approaches the
phenomenon of foreign fighters. However, further analysis shows that the strategy does
not completely explain the phenomenon of foreign fighters nor entirely contemplate
preventing, protecting, pursuing or responding towards foreign fighters. The
contributions that could be drawn from the essay are mainly interpretive that should be
kept in mind when discussing the ECTS in relation to foreign fighters.
Key words: EU’s Counterterrorism strategy, foreign fighters, ECTS, the European Union, EU, terrorism, prevent, protect, pursue, respond
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Abbreviations ECTS – EU’s Counterterrorism Strategy ENER – European Network of Experts on Radicalisation EU – European Union Frontex – The European Borders Agency PNR – Passenger Name Records PWGT – Police Working Group on Terrorism
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT I
ABBREVIATIONS II
1 INTRODUCTION 5
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM .............................................................................................................................. 5 1.2 PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION ..................................................................................................... 6 1.3 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS ....................................................................................................... 6 1.4 MATERIAL ............................................................................................................................................... 7 1.5 DISPOSITION ........................................................................................................................................... 8
5 ECTS APPROACHES ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN THE EU 24
5.1 RESULTS – FOREIGN FIGHTERS TRAVELLING FROM THE EU ............................................................. 24 5.2 RESULTS – FOREIGN FIGHTERS APPROACH IN THE ECTS ................................................................. 25 5.2.1 PREVENTION ........................................................................................................................................ 25 5.2.2 PROTECTION ........................................................................................................................................ 27 5.2.3 PURSUING ............................................................................................................................................ 28 5.2.4 RESPONDING ........................................................................................................................................ 29
6 FOREIGN FIGHTERS - ASPIRING AND RETURNING 32
6.1 PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT OF EU CITIZENS ............................................... 32 6.1.1 UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM ............................................................................................................... 32 6.1.2 EQUALITY IMPROVEMENTS .................................................................................................................... 33 6.1.3 STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL COOPERATION ............................................................................... 34 6.2 PROTECTING EU CITIZENS FROM TERRORISM ................................................................................... 35 6.2.1 CIVIL PROTECTION ............................................................................................................................... 35 6.2.2 MODERN TECHNOLOGY ........................................................................................................................ 35 6.2.3 STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL COOPERATION ............................................................................... 36 6.2.4 PURSUING OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF FINANCING TERRORISM ...................................................... 37 6.2.5 MODERN TECHNOLOGY ........................................................................................................................ 37 6.2.6 HORIZONTAL EXCHANGE ...................................................................................................................... 38 6.2.7 GLOBAL COOPERATION ......................................................................................................................... 39 6.3 RESPONDING JUDICIALLY AGAINST TERRORIST ................................................................................. 39 6.3.1 MILITARY INVOLVEMENT/SANCTIONS ..................................................................................................... 39 6.3.2 STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL COOPERATION ............................................................................... 40
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 42
7.1 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 42 7.2 FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................................................................................................... 43
8 BIBLIOGRAPHY 44
8.1 BOOKS AND ARTICLES .......................................................................................................................... 44 8.2 INTERNET SOURCES .............................................................................................................................. 48
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1 Introduction This chapter will present the research problem, followed by the purpose and research
question, limitations and delimitations, material and disposition of the essay.
1.1 Research problem
“The phenomenon of foreign fighters – i.e. individuals who join insurgencies abroad and
whose primary motivation is ideological or religious rather than financial – is anything but
new”1.
The European Union (EU) has had the issue of citizens travelling to other countries to fight
for an ideological or religious cause. The recruitment and radicalisation of such citizens as
well as the return to Europe have however not existed in the dimension that it does today2. In
addition, EU’s Counterterrorism strategy (ECTS) that the Council of the European Union
published concerns the different aspects and measures against terrorism for Europe and for
the international arena3. The strategy, which contains of four branches – prevent, protect,
pursue and respond – considers international terrorism and travelling and returning foreign
fighters as an approach towards fighting terrorism4.
Furthermore, since hostilities in Syria and Iraq continue and terrorist attacks and activities
seem to increase, the EU member states are more than ever concerned about the problem
regarding aspiring and returning foreign fighters5. Therefore it is fundamental to address the
mistakes that the EU strategy against terrorism contains, concerning both the document
published in 20056 and the document published in 20117.
1 Bakowski, P. and Puccio, L. (February 2015). ‘Foreign fighters’ – Member States’ responses and EU action in an international context. Published by the European Parliamentary Research Service, The European Union. p. 2 2 Ibid. 3 Council of the European Union. (2005). EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Published by the Council of the European Union, Brussels. 4 Council of the European Union. (2005). 5 Bakowski, P. and Puccio, L. (February 2015). p. 1 6 Council of the European Union (2005). 7 Council of the European Union (2011) EU’s Counterterrorism Strategy. Published by the Europan Union, Brussels.
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Although it has become almost impossible to adequately insure the broad ECTS policy in a
single paper, such overviews8 remain a necessary complement to more specialized articles on
issues such as the fight against radicalisation and recruitment of EU citizens9, unsafe border
controls and infrastructure10, financing of terrorism and judicial cooperation11. In particular,
by providing a critical reading of the ECTS, this essay seeks to provide a counterpoint to the
official summary of EU’s achievements. Therefore, by adding other theoretical measures, this
essay will address the functionality of ECTS by stressing the increase of foreign fighters from
Europe.
Consequently, due to terrorism and foreign fighters’ increased influence in Europe, the issue
is traditionally associated with the sovereignty of the state whereas policing against terrorism
and control of crime and safety and investigation against foreign fighters increases12.
1.2 Purpose and Research question
On the basis of the preamble above, the purpose of this essay is to examine why ECTS has
not been able to avert the increased rate of foreign fighters in the EU to decrease rather than
increase. The research questions that will be answered to fulfill the purpose read as follows:
• What are the approaches towards aspiring and returning foreign fighters in the ECTS?
o Why have the amount of foreign fighters increased from the EU despite ECTS,
according to the theoretical framework?
1.3 Limitations and delimitations The first delimitation is that the essay considers foreign fighters only from and to the borders
of the EU. This delimitation was considered being necessary in order to concretize the amount
of information on counterterrorism strategies as well as the amount of foreign fighters
8 Monar, J. (2007). Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Problems. In Government and Opposition. 9 Nesser, P. (2010) Joining jihadi terrorist cells in Europe. In Ranstorp, M. Understanding violent radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe. Published by Routledge, England. p. 108 10 Flynn, S.E. (2000). Beyond Border Control. In Foreign Affairs. Vol.79. No 6. Published by The Council on Foreign Relations. p. 57 11 Nilsson, H. (2007). Judicial cooperation in Europe against Terrorism. In The European Union and Terrorism. Edited by D. Spence. London, John Harper Publishing. p. 71-87 12 Den Boer, M., Hillebrand, C. & Nölke, A. (2008). Legitimacy under pressure: The European web of Counter-terrorism networks. In Journal compilation. Published by Blackwell Publishing. p. 101
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aspiring and returning. The second delimitation of this essay will therefore involve the foreign
fighters from the EU to jihadi organisations. Moreover, the reason for this delimitation is due
to the current situation for the EU, and the most common destination for foreign fighters to
aspire to and return from is jihadist terrorist organisations13.
Another delimitation of this essay was the amount of strategy documents within the EU that
was considered. Since the EU and its member states have individual strategies as well as a
joint strategy for all member states, the delimitation concludes the documents provided by the
EU. The main focus will be on the two counterterrorist strategies from 2005 and 2011
collected among the EU member states14.
Since this essay is a policy study and analysis of ECTS, the very limitation lies in the
theoretical and methodological reasoning15. In the Method-chapter of this essay it is explained
how the theories will be used and why. Thus, the theories that build the theoretical framework
are far from all theories that exist on the subject and are chosen to fill the gaps that may be
missing in ECTS.
1.4 Material
The material used in this essay is limited to certain topics, like ECTS, aspiring and returning
foreign fighters in the EU and different theories around foreign fighters and counterterrorist
strategies. The main material consists of academic books and articles as well as some
statistics from the well recognized and respected EU. The material will be presented
thoroughly in the Theoretical framework as well as in the Result in this essay. The sources of
books and articles chosen for the build-up of the theoretical framework is consistent to the
phenomenon of counterterrorist strategies alongside foreign fighters enables to interpret the
concepts and to also control the conceptual level in the latter analysis16. Also, the results of
13 Hegghammer, T. (2013) Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting. Published by American Political Science Review, USA. p. 4 14 Ibid. 15 Giolia, D. (1999) Response: Practicability Paradigms and Problems in Stakeholder Theorizing. Academy of Management Review. p. 228
16 Orlikowski, W.J. (1993). CASE Tools as Organizational Change: Investigating Incremental and Radical Changes in Systems Development. Published by MIS Quarterly (17:3). p. 310
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the essay are limited to the perspectives of ECTS and its different branching of policies
implemented by member states of the EU.
1.5 Disposition In its configuration this essay is presented with the research problem to address the issue that
will be considered and analysed for, and the purpose and research question follows in the lead
of the research problem. Under the subheading of the introduction will also include the
material used for this essay as well as the structure. Furthermore is the previous research
presented in order to provide earlier approaches and angles of the case of European foreign
fighters as well as the issue on ECTS. The theoretical framework will be presented and
operationalized in order to be able to explain the case on foreign fighters. The results of ECTS
will be thereafter presented as well as results on foreign fighters development the last few
years. The analysis on the case of foreign fighters in the EU will be as a continuous inquiry,
using ECTS, and the developed theoretical framework. Thereafter can a conclusion be made
of what approaches ECTS has on foreign fighters and why foreign fighters from EU have
increased despite the ECTS17.
17 Esaiasson, P. Giljam, M, Oscarsson, H. Wängnerud, L. (2012) Metodpraktikan. Published by Nordstedts Juridik AB. Stockholm. p. 41
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2 Relevance and previous research This chapter provides academic contribution and previous research on the topic regarding
both analyses on ECTS and the aspiring and returning of foreign fighters in EU.
2.1 Academic contribution
The academic contribution of this essay is to apply a theoretic framework concerning foreign
fighters on the policy ECTS. The specific subject of foreign fighters and built theoretical
framework will be applied and analysed for in order to create and enlighten the issues of
ECTS, and to find answers to why aspiring and returning foreign fighters increases in Europe
rather than decreasing because of the strategy. The strategy, with the four branches – prevent,
protect, pursue and respond – will be used in order to create a theoretical framework
considering foreign fighters as an approach towards fighting terrorism18.
2.2 Previous research – Foreign fighters Previous research concerning foreign fighters is a common subject for Thomas Hegghammer,
whereas he attempts to pinpoint the differences between a domestic and a foreign fighter, and
the reasons for choosing one or the other19. He focuses first and foremost on the difference
between the two by investigate why Western Jihadists choose to go abroad, but also why
some choose to return and the legislation of returnees20.
In addition, Magnus Ranstorp who is a research director of the Center for Asymmetric Threat
Studies at the Swedish National Defence College and a Member of EU Expert Groups on
Radicalisation has a twenty-year experience on the research concerning counterterrorism
issues.21 Understanding Violent Radicalisation edited by Ranstorp concerns radicalisation as
a broad-based phenomenon and also radicalisations in the Untied Kingdom, France, Spain,
Italy and the Netherlands.22
18 Council of the European Union. (2005). 19 Hegghammer, T. (2013). p. 2 20 Hegghammer, T. (2013). p. 4 21 Ranstorp, M. (2010). Understanding violent radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe. Published by Routledge, England. p. i 22 Ranstorp, M. (2010). p. 7
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Moreover, Hegghammer recognises the issue of understanding foreign fighters in the global
context. First and foremost he mentions the reasons for the foreign fighters upbringing in the
1980s, in which he seeks to explain23. He continues by stressing the lack of foreign fighters as
a phenomenon in the current social science literature. The main reason for the deficiency of
such a term is that foreign fighters comprise a transitional actor absent between local rebels
and international terrorists24. Further, Hegghammer explains the foreign fighters from the
West towards jihadist organisations as being a threat to the security of nation states where
foreign fighters return. Moreover, the risks of foreign fighters than return to the originated
country, there is not necessarily higher risk of a terrorist attack to occur than otherwise,
however if an attack would take place, as he claims, will entail grander damage than
otherwise25. The issue at hand uphold a dilemma for the EU, where ECTS has to include
foreign fighters from the EU in a larger dimension than ever before.
Also, The EU as a counter-terrorism actor abroad: finding opportunities, overcoming
constraints, written by Peter Wennerholm, Erik Brattberg and Mark Rhinard resembles most
of the research within the field of EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The issue paper provides
a consolidated version, considering EU’s assistance in countries outside the union during a
crisis of terrorism. The assistance made, according to the issue paper consider five countries
in which EU has alongside the strategy prevented, protected, pursued and responded against
terrorism.26
Furthermore, Scott Pynting and Davis White on Counter-terrorism and the terrorist state
examines the war on terror and the significant social impact than the terrorism of the
mentioned ‘sub-state’ or ‘non-state’ groups27. The approach concerns and demonstrate
counter-terrorism strategies as a connection and cause to a range of forms of state terror;
genocide and cultural genocide, mass killings of civilians by state-sponsored militants and
23 Hegghammer, T. (2010). The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalisation of Jihad. In International Security, Vol.35, No. 3. Published by The Harvard Coolage and the Massachusetts Insitute of Technology. p. 54 24 Hegghammer, T. (2010). p. 55 25 Hegghammer, T. (2013). p. 9 26 Wennerholm, P. & Brattberg E. & Rhinard, M. (September 2010) The EU as a counter-terrorism actor abroad: finding opportunities, overcoming constraints. Published by The Swedish Institute of International Affairs. 27 Pynting, S. and White, D. (2012). Introduction: counter-terrorism and the terrorist state. In Pynting, S. Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence – The ’war on terror’ as terror. Published by Routledge. England. p. 1
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paramilitaries, military raids on and carpet bombing of civilians, mass rape as a weapon of
terror, politically motivated destruction of civilian infrastructure etc.28
28 Pynting, S. and White, D. (2012). p. 2
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3 Method In this chapter the essays selected case, approach and material will be presented and
motivated for. 3.1 Methodological and epistemological understandings
The methodological approach for this essay is abductive, which in this process refers to a
method often used in case studies due to the combination of both induction and deduction.
Abduction as a method proposes a single case and interprets it from a hypothetic overall
pattern, which, if it were true, explains the case in question29. A pure theoretical branch as a
method is most often referred to as deductive, while empirical material in various forms is
most often referred to as inductive30. Abduction compared to induction and deduction,
according to Alvesson and Sköldberg, provides a method where the empirical area is
developed gradually during the process, and the theory is regulated and advanced31.
Moreover, this is a case study method, a method that has been much discussed both in terms
of its strengths and weaknesses. This especially when it comes to sustainability for theory
development, and in terms of its limitations when it comes to theoretical conclusions32. The
reasons for analysing a single case is to in detail examine the issue of aspiring and returning
foreign fighters33. As according to the deductive part of the method, the theoretical framework
will provide logical prediction of the case and the issue behind the solutions on solving the
problem34.
29 Alvesson, M. and Sköldberg, K. (2009). Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research. Published by SAGE, England. p. 4 30 Tohmé, F., Caterina, G., Gangle, R. (2014). Abduction: A categorical characterization. In Journal of Applied Logic 13. Published by Elsevier, online. p. 78 31 Alvesson, M. & Sköldberg, K. (1994). p. 31 32 Örnberg, J.C. (2009). The Europeanization of Swedish Alcohol Policy. Published by Stockholm University, Stockholm. p. 34 33 Esaiasson, P. Giljam, M, Oscarsson, H. Wängnerud, L. (2012). p. 211 34 Örnberg, J.C. (2009). p. 34
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3.2 Method for building a theoretical framework
This essay considers a theoretical framework, which further is developed and constructed
through a process of qualitative analysis35. First and foremost, the framework was built on
theories using the key concepts of ECTS – prevent, protect, pursue and respond.
According to Mishler are “qualitative studies ultimately aimed to describe and explain
relationships, which can only be done with a set of conceptually specified categories”36. The
theories collectively, in a framework, seek to generate new interpretations of the original
characteristics in ECTS and further include the concept of foreign fighters37. The conceptual
framework is therefore built by the categories prevent, protect, pursue and respond in order to
add an interpretive approach to the social reality of counterterrorism and foreign fighters. This
seeks to provide as Levering would express it soft interpretations rather than hard facts about
the case selected38.
3.3 Validity, reliability & generalisation Since this study is considering foreign fighters, the issues of validity and reliability are a few.
First and foremost, the generalisations of this essay lay in the concept of foreign fighters,
whereas different backgrounds, up bringing, gender, age or specific citizenships are not
considered. The generalisation mainly specifies the very statistics of foreign fighters as well
as the citizenships from EU member states. However, according to Yin, case study methods
lack objectivity, which contributes to the further criticism of a lack that postulates
generalisations. This gives further issues around case studies where the study may not give
representation enough to seem reliable or valid39. In order to avoid lack of objectivity, this
essay will consider each material source as equally valuable and useful. The theoretical
framework, that will provide analysis to the empirical material, will carefully be chosen in
order to contribute further objectivity. Also it should be clarified that, concerning previous
35 Jensen, L. A., & Allen, M. N. (1996). Metasynthesis of qualitative findings. Qualitative Health Research. Published by SAGE Journals. 6(4). p. 554.
36 Mishler, E.G. (1990). Validation in inquiry-guided research: The role of exemplars in narrative studies. In Harvard Education Review, 60. Published by Yale University, New York. p. 431. 37 Strauss, A. (1987). Qualitative analysis for social scientists. Published by Cambridge University, UK. p. 224 38 Levering, B. (2002). Concept analysis as empirical method. In International Journ al of Qualitative Methods, 1. Published by Univeristy of Alberta, Canada. p. 38 39 Yin, R.K. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Published by SAGE Publications, England. p. 10
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delimitations, does not this essay seek to generalize foreign fighters in the EU as a concept.
More likely will this essay provide EU’s approach towards foreign fighters, whereas new
hypotheses may evolve to further improve the strategies against terrorism.
3.4 Analytical framework
The analytical framework of this essay will structurally follow the concepts created and
developed in the theoretical framework, and thereafter be applied to the result and information
provided by ECTS and its for sub-headings prevent, protect, pursue and respond.
Below a figure shows the connections between foreign fighters and the counterterrorism
strategy that will be addressed in the analysis of this essay. The link between the four sub-
headings will be the theoretical framework.
Figure 1.
Foreign Fighters
Prevent Protect Pursue Respond
EU’s Counterterrorism strategy
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4 Different aspects of counterterrorist strategies
– A Theoretical Framework Due to the increased amount of foreign fighters that the EU now faces40, the strategic plan
may be considered incomplete or unsuccessful. The theories that are presented below fill gaps
in the strategic plan, or give another approach to the strategy against terrorism.
4.1.1 Prevent
Primarily, the prevention against terrorism is a common area of issue to investigate, whereas
Tore Bjørgo also has investigated. Bjørgo uses key analytical terms such as, terrorism,
prevention, strategy, and measures41. Lara Fakih describes the measures of prevention against
terrorism as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures. According to Fakih, the soft measures are more of
preventing kinds whereas initiatives are motivated for in part of understanding terrorism, so
that the strategies prevent terrorist attacks42. The understanding on how to prevent in soft
measures is, as Bjørgo would portray prevention, non-observable. Bjørgo claims that
measures at different levels of society can systematically contribute to larger understanding of
terrorism, and the reasons for why individuals choose to join terrorist groups43. The
community, Bjørgo argues, have to make essential improvements within economic and social
measures such as poor environments for children to grow up in, high unemployment, social
divisions or economic inequality44.
Furthermore, Rogelio Alonso claims environments such as prisons to be a level in society
where terrorism can be prevented by diminishing radicalisation and recruitment45. In regards
to for instance prisons, Tal Becker sort the prevention of terrorism as an obligation towards
the State in its entirely. Becker claims that the motivation and determination against terrorist
attacks and organisations is the States mission to complete. This is in order to deploy the
40 Bakowski, P. and Puccio, L. (February 2015). p. 2 41 Bjørgo, T. (2013). Strategies for preventing terrorism. Published by Palgrave Macmillan, London. p. 5 42 Fakih, L. (2013). Soft measures, realm: Somalia and the US ”War on terror”. In Satterthwaite, M.L. & Huckerby, J.C. Gender, National Security and Counter-terrorism: Human Rights. Published by Routledge, England. p. 183 43 Bjørgo, T. (2013). p. 15 44 Bjørgo, T. (2013). p. 10 45 Alonso, R. (2010). Radicalisation and recruitment among jihadist terrorists in Spain: Main patterns and subsequent counter-terrorist measures. In Ranstorp, M. Understanding violent radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe. Published by Routledge, England. p. 226
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message internationally and domestically46. Becker also adds that, as international law does
not impose an absolute duty on the State to guarantee that no act of terrorism will emanate
form its territory. Instead, a standard of due thoroughness is required, demanding the State to
use all means at its clearance to prevent and conquer terrorist activity. If the State meets the
due thoroughness standard but the private terrorist activity nevertheless occurs, no State
responsibility is engaged47.
On the other hand, Anna Bella Korbatov, Erika Suzuki and Bethany L. Goldblum claims the
need for a stabilising force in an increased destabilised world. Unlike Becker, argues
Korbatov et.al. that mainly global cooperation can ensure nuclear security and also prevent
nuclear terrorism48. Graham Allison agrees that in order to prevent terrorism globally, is to
deny terrorists access to nuclear weapons or materials49. Terrorist groups and organisations
that attain increasingly lethal weapons and other capabilities creates, according to Korbatov
et.al., an increase towards global responsibility to fight nuclear terrorism50.
4.1.2 Protect
As previously mentioned, Tal Becker stresses the importance of increased State responsibility
in the matter of counterterrorism. Continuously, Becker claims that terrorists count on
governmental inaction, toleration or support. On the other hand the citizens look to the State
in order to be protected from danger that for instance terrorists pose51. Dieter Mahncke writes
about the difficulties of protecting the State and its citizens in a modern society. Due to the
activity of terrorists across borders, that not necessarily is arranged by a hierarchal structure
and instead cells act independently of each other. In addition the media and modern
technology from cell phones to the Internet are effective enough. Therefore it is most difficult
to predict an attack or protect States citizens to not get harmed52.
46 Becker, T. (2006). The standard of care and the burden of proof. In Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the rules of State Responsibility. Bloomsbury Publishing, England. p. 139 47 Ibid. 48 Korbatov, A.B, Suzuki, E. and Goldblum, B. (2015). The fight against nuclear terrorism needs global cooperation – and the IAEA. In Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Published by SAGE, England. p. 67 49 Allison, G. (2004). Nuclear Terrorism: The ultimate preventable catastrophe. Published by Macmillan, England. p. 141 50 Korbatov, A.B, Suzuki, E. and Goldblum, B. (2015). p. 68 51 Becker, T. (2006). p. 2 52 Mahncke, D. (2006). Introduction. In Mahncke, D. & Monar, J. International Terrorism: A European response ro a global threat?. Published by Peter Lang, Belgium. p. 17
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For instance, the protection against terrorism is an essential fragment for the citizens living
within the borders of the terrorist target. By protecting a state from such threats are usually
considered through controlling terrorists to not cross the borders. Stephen E. Flynn explains
the current system of boarder controls in a critical matter, where he argues that the economic
aspects of border controls internationally is damaged.53 Further Flynn points out that the
current border controls globally are inefficient, and instead he suggests that countries
involved in international transportation systems, must tighten security from beginning to end,
and not only the final destination of transportation goods54.
Moreover Flynn argues that by implementing such a system, criminals and terrorists will be
less likely to exploit the liberalised global market of today. Thereafter, Flynn claims, that
countries need to encourage international companies to implement and develop transparent
systems for tracking flows and transportations. Such a system, accordingly, will also help
conduct inbound traffic and its contents long before arrival. Finally Flynn argues that border
control services need more efficient capabilities to gather information of exports and imports.
Flynn continues by claiming that if customs are well informed on how to target high-risk
goods or persons, the inspections of those of less harm will work quickly and confidently.55
However, Carsten Stahn comments on the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty and the report published on State responsibility56. In relation to
counterterrorism, the commission in question, comprehend a trend whereas whenever States
are unwilling or unable to protect its citizens from catastrophes conforming terrorist attacks,
there is a growing acceptance if the wider international community engaged responsibility57.
4.1.3 Pursue
Thirdly, the discussions on how to pursue counterterrorism have brought several aspects of
the issue. For instance, Jörg Monar claims that in order to counteract against terrorism some
claim that one have to consider operational aspects. By operational measures within strategies
53 Flynn, S.E. (2000). Beyond Border Control. In Foreign Affairs. Vol.79. No 6. Published by The Council on Foreign Relations. p. 57 54 Flynn, S.E. (2000). p. 58 55 Ibid. 56 Stahn, C. (2007). Responsibility to protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?. In The American Journal of International law, Vol. 101, No. 1. Published by American society of International law, USA. p. 99 57 United Nations. (2004). A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, report of the High-Level Panel on threats, challanges and change. Published by United Nations Foundation, USA. p. 65-66. par. 201.
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in pursuing counterterrorism, are of more repressive kinds, as Monar calls it58. Simon Hix
continues on the same trail and comments on the pursuing of counterterrorism as a strategy of
common objectives. That is, not only one nation, but also several have to participate in a
process where compromises are necessary in order to come to terms with how these
objectives will be achieved59. Christoph Meyer argues that this may force some states to
reshape their own initial interests and ambitions as their interaction with other state actors
may make them aware of other dominant norms and beliefs within the group and may
accordingly change their own perception of security to better reflect the prevailing world
view60. Monar claims that by pursuing counterterrorism, financing of terrorism has to be
considered in order to fight terrorism in its entirely61.
Continuously Jordi Comas, Paul Shrivastava and Eric C. Martin explains pursue against
terrorism through controlling terrorist networks and thereby the funding of terrorism. They
frame terrorism as a network of two branches, that is, informal and formal relationships. The
networks over all, they claim, access and deploy critical resources, such as people, finances or
information.62 Comas et al. explain the informal relationships as a common strategy within
terrorist organisations, mainly to maintain secrecy towards those against them. Information,
coordination and propaganda are often of bidirectional flows, where these can be flown out
from terrorist groups while at the same time resources flow in. They also reason costs for
terrorist organisations to minimise due to the usage of networked technologies such as
computer networks and mobile telephones. These technologies, Comas et al. explains,
strengthen and quicken the extent, flexibility, and value of networks around the
organisations63.
Furthermore, Comas et al. clarify that terrorism also can be organised as networks of formal
organisations, institutions and other organised foundations that helps achieve numerous
opposing goals. They address two types of functions in the formal organisation of terrorism.
58 Monar, J. (2007). The EU’s approach post-September 11: global terrorism as a multidimensional law enforcement challenge. Published by Cambridge Review of International Affairs, England. p. 274 59 Hix, S. (2005). The political system of the European Union. Published by Palgrave Macmillan. England. p. 400 60 Meyer, C. (2005). Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms. In European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no.4. Published by Sage Publications. p. 536 61 Monar, J. (2007). p. 274 62 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). Terrorism as formal organisation, network, and social movement. Published by Sage, Journal of Management Inquiry. p. 49 63 Ibid.
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One is where association groups bind networks where ideological and cultural similarities are
considered. The other concerns transnational support groups that are organised in favour of
the terrorist organisation. Both functions are, however, characterised by horizontal
communication and exchange, which is voluntary and reciprocal. Comas et al. claims that
these types of organisations are most often not led by a hierarchy system, but for getting the
job done for a greater cause64.
4.1.4 Respond
Finally, as a response towards terrorism and terrorists has Jenny Hocking concluded a strategy
that generally occur in western liberal-democratic countries, which contains of the five
elements – legislation, intelligence, police special squads, military involvement in civil
disturbances, and media management65.
Hocking explains the legislation as ‘exceptional’, which is further clarified by actions that lie
in its functional amendments to the procedures of criminal justice organisation and the
capability for legal systems to uphold common law values66. On the other hand, according to
Paul Wilkinson the limitations lay in, according to him, that first nations have to assess the
individual components of emergency powers adopted to combat terrorism before coming to
hasty conclusions about the role and value of special anti-terrorist legislation in democratic
states67. Also, Wilkinson claims, that some legislation appears to have primarily symbolic or
psychological functions of expressing public revulsion at particular outrages and reassuring
the public that something is being done68.
In contrast to Wilkinson’s opinion, Hocking means that the ‘exceptionality’ of the nature of
this type of counterterrorism strategy is a temporary solution that can have an effective
outcome. The dimension behind this temporary solution, although the issue occurs within
immediate and limited state borders, has extended the normality for integrating criminal
justice administrative measures69.
64 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 50 65 Hocking, J. (1986). Terrorism and counter-terrorism: institutionalising political order. In The Australian Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 3. Published by Australian Institute of Policy and Science. p. 299. 66 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 300. 67 Wilkinson, P. (2011). Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response. Published by Taylor & Francis, England. p. 96. 68 Wilkinson, P. (2011). p. 93. 69 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 301
20
On the other hand, Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter agrees with the argument that
Wilkinson argues for, namely that nations act to respond against terrorism rather than
preventing or understanding the issue in before hand70. Jakana Thomas continues on the same
track and evolves the argument by considering violent and nonviolent tactics when
responding against terrorism. Thomas argues that nonviolent response such as legislation
against terrorists; terrorism can be affected in a positive way, as governments have not fully
developed a secure strategy on exact punishment for different acts of terrorism71. However,
Hocking also criticise the nonviolent responses in the dimension of general counterterrorism
strategies in the form of sanctions. The argument lies in the measurement where the terrorist
act has already occurred. The previous work, which is the ‘exceptional’ legislative settlement,
is the most efficient response against terrorism72.
Moreover, terrorist violence is according to Thomas Schelling irrational. This is further
argued for that the response by governments against terrorism in the form of violence is also
irrational. Schelling claims that the impact of governments towards terrorism has to show
good behaviour. It is the expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behaviour, if the
power to hurt can get it at all73. Continuously Richard J. Thomas argues that indiscriminate
government responses to terrorism radicalize latent rebel supporters and rival groups alike.
Thereafter she claims that excessive government responses to terrorism may also cause
individuals who would otherwise support the government to offer support to rebels instead74.
70 Kydd, A.H. and Walter, B.F. (2006). The Strategies of Terrorism. In International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1. Published by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. p. 50. 71 Thomas, J. P. 806 72 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 302 73 Schelling, T. (1966). Arms and Influence. Published by Yale University Press, New Haven Conneticut. p. 3 74 Thomas, R.J. Profiles of people in power: The world’s governemnt leaders. Published by Routledge, England. p. 80
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4.2 Operationalization of the theoretical framework This sub-chapter will provide a summary and operationalization of all theories in order to be
able to use this as a theoretical framework.
4.2.1 Prevent
According to the theoretical framework, first a strategy must be providing the understanding
of terrorism and foreign fighters. The understanding includes systematically understanding
each level of society and the different aspects of equality measures. In order to manage these
non-observable measures through social and economic inequalities, the understanding of
terrorism is more observable.
Also, different levels of society whereas radicalization and recruitment is made, such as
prison environments, are accordingly to be managed by the sovereignty of the nation-state.
The responsibility of the state is ultimately to be able to shield the citizens from terrorist
attacks and foreign fighters, and then to provide the results to other nations.
Finally, the international responsibility is to fight together to prevent terrorism also, but on the
level whereas the same framework of definitions of terrorism, as well as securing the use of
nuclear weapons and other war materials.
4.2.2 Protect
Furthermore, to protect is defined by managing border controls even further by the border of
the state. The protecting lay in state responsibility in order to keep the borders safe. The state
is responsible to have a safe system, but also to preserve the pace of modern technologies in
order to ultimately protect the country from terrorist attacks. The modern technologies of
computers and cell phones are important to understand and to supervise and protect.
Furthermore is the ultimate protection to keep terrorists from crossing borders, and what
enables a state to do so is through global cooperation when it comes to all international
transport. There is a necessity to control transport on all levels to be able to protect all
countries from terrorism and foreign fighters.
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4.2.3 Pursue
In order to pursue counterterrorism there has to be a common objective and a common
operationalized strategy to manage the financial flows of terrorism according to the
theoretical framework. The necessity for some states to reshape initial interests is crucial in
order to create a more superior counterterrorism strategy. For instance, networks concerning
the internet, social groups and financial networks are greater than within the borders of a
state, and therefore can global cooperation develop flexibility, efficiency and quicker
responses towards terrorism rather than the opposite.
Institutions and organisations that have an expertise on the subjects have the ability to reach
and understand the networks of for instance foreign fighters, and can therefore provide the
formal information of terrorism and foreign fighters. The horizontal cooperation and
exchange between states, institutions and organisations is therefore essential in order to reach
a operative counterterrorism strategy.
4.2.4 Respond
Lastly, according to the theory, there are both positives and negatives concerning the response
to counterterrorist strategies. The positives lay in the prosecutions efficiency and the potential
that the legislative strategy contains. Between states it is essential to have common law
values in order to fairly prosecute, but the state is also responsible to have the ability to
respond on its own.
Continuously, the military interventions as a response towards terrorism and foreign fighters
is considered being symbolic and ultimately have a psychological function, and does not
prohibit foreign fighters to commit terrorist acts in the future. Therefore, responses in the
sense of sanctions or other soft measures can both make countries show what good behaviour
looks like, but also to peacefully negotiate and understand the issues of terrorism and foreign
fighters. However, if a state is attacked by terrorism in the form of warfare, the state has the
responsibility to act upon terrorism in the form of military involvement to protect citizens.
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Figure 2. Table of concepts from the theoretical framework describing what and how to build a Counterterrorism strategy Prevent Protect Pursue Respond
What
Radicalization Citizens Operational aspects Acts of terrorism
Recruitment Transportations Financing of
terrorism
Recruitment
Acts of terrorism Infrastructure Radicalization
How
Understanding
terrorism
State responsibility Modern technology Military involvement
Equality
improvements
Border controlling Horizontal exchange Sanctions
State responsibility Modern technology Global cooperation State responsibility
Global cooperation Global cooperation Global cooperation
The concepts on how to prevent, protect, pursue and respond terrorism and foreign fighters
will be the main concepts used to describe and analyse ECTS, and why the strategy’s scarcity
affects the deterrence towards foreign fighters.
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5 ECTS approaches on foreign fighters in the EU This chapter will provide the different approaches of foreign fighters in the ECTS, and its
appliances under the four branches prevent, protect, pursue and respond. Before that, the
chapter will present results of foreign fighters travelling to jihadist organisations in Syria and
Iraq.
5.1 Results – Foreign fighters travelling from the EU Statistics from the European Parliament, still quite unclear whether these statistics show the
true numbers of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, show that almost 5000 out of
27 000-30 000 foreign fighters originate from the EU75. This development compared to
previous statistics of foreign fighters during the 1990s and 2003-2008 is exceeding and more
combatants come from other countries than where the conflict76. Consequently, due to
terrorism and foreign fighters’ increased influence in the EU, the issue is traditionally
associated with the sovereignty of the state whereas policing against terrorism and control of
crime and safety and investigation against foreign fighters increases77.
According to Europol, the European Law Enforcement Agency, in the European Union
terrorism situation and trend report 2015 that the main cause for terrorist attacks and arrests
occurring in Europe currently are religiously inspired78. Compared to the report written by
Europol in 2008, terrorist attacks and arrests in Europe does not occur as often as currently. In
more detail, in 2006-2007 about 26 % of terrorist attacks and arrests occurred under religious
inspiration79, while in 2014 the report shows that terrorist attacks and arrests under the
influence of religion occur about 51 % out of all acts80.
75 Bakowski, p. and Puccio, L. The European Parliament. (2016). Foreign Fighters – Member state responses and EU action. Published by the European Parliament. p. 2 76 Bakowski, p. and Puccio, L. The European Parliament. (2015). p. 2 77 Den Boer, M., Hillebrand, C. & Nölke, A. (2008). p. 101 78 Europol. (2015). European Union terrorism situation and trend report 2015. Published by European Police Office, Hague p. 41 79 Europol. (2008). EU Terrorism situation and trend report. Published by Corporate Communications Europol, Hague. p. 51 80 Europol. (2015). p. 41
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5.2 Results – Foreign fighters approach in the ECTS 5.2.1 Prevention
First and foremost, the prevention against terrorism according to the EU concerns the
radicalisation and recruitment of individuals internationally towards terrorist organisations.
The first document from 2005 structures the prevention of terrorism in the way to prevent
people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to
radicalisation and recruitment, in the EU and internationally81. The argument for the
prevention of recruitment and radicalisation is that terrorism is a threat to the entire Union,
and therefore an extensive preventive strategy on the practical reasons for why individuals
choose to radicalise and join terrorist groups82. Examinations include internet monitoring and
the understanding of the clash between the West and Islam. The examination on why the
worldviews of individuals, and that makes them consider and justify violence83.
To understand this development of terrorism and to understand terrorism and its levels, the
EU has put up divisions between member states in order to prevent radicalization and
recruitments. For instance, the UK is leading communication with countries having Muslim
majorities as well as with Muslim communities within the EU in order to understand
important challenges as well as having a pro-active communication84. Further, the
communication networks are directed to help and support Muslim communities, as well as
having direct dialogue about radicalisation and recruitments. This strategy is also shared with
other countries in order to help in the challenge against terrorism and foreign fighters85.
In Spain there is a programme on imam-training at university-level, where the ultimate goal is
to aspire pastors, rabbis and imams to work together in accordance to the constitutional
values86. For instance, in an interview made by Marco Nilsson it is well defined that the first
step that generally made these people go to Syria or Iraq to fight for terrorism was to help
their fellow brothers to protect the Muslim lands87. One for example explains his decision to
leave Sweden for Syria because he heard an imam saying that it is a duty to help other
81 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 3. 82 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 7. 83 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 8. 84 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 3 85 Great Britain: Home Office. (2011). Prevent Strategy. Published by The Stationery Office. p. 48 86 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 3 87 Nilsson, M. (2015). Foreign fighters and the radicalization of local Jihad: Interview evidence from Swedish Jihadists In Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Published online by Routledge. pp. 343-358.
26
Muslims in need. In before hand, what the previous reasons are leading up to these people
travelling to a foreign country is left with different answers and conclusions. However, in
general, according to the people interviewed there are extensive evolving goals in Syria and
Iraq. In today’s society of radicalization its practical goals is to create a Khalifat, and this can
be achieved by fighting and terrorizing those who want democracy, or to fight for those who
do not want democracy, which is enabled by the ‘Rule of God’. Moreover, the interviews
generated information about the socialization towards global jihad had to do with the fact that
America is behind all the corruption. As long as the Islamic State is not accepted, they will
fight those against them88.
Also, the understanding of radicalization amongst young people has been a main focus in
Denmark since 2009 with a project on deradicalisation89. Furthermore, the Danish Prison and
Probation Service were given approval to another project on deradicalisation in prisons
starting from 201190. One part of the project is to have continuous conversations with young
people who are already part of extremist groups. Another part of the project aims to develop a
concept of mentoring young people who for instance socialize with extremists or are inspired
and express extremist behaviours. This project’s primary goal is therefore to develop
measures of intervention and prevention of radicalisation91.
Continuously the European Network of Experts on Radicalisation (ENER) is composed of
experts whose job is to gather and critically assess knowledge and expertise on the subject92.
Seminars are held in order to create policy papers and practices focusing on the paths into
violent radicalisation and recruitment, meaning the influence of extremist propaganda and the
role of the internet93. However, not until 2014 were foreign fighters travelling to Syria and
Iraq seen as a major threat to European security in 201494.
88 Nilsson, M. (2015). p. 349 89 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 3 90 The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. (2011). Denmark’s deradicalisation efforts. Published by The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. p. 2 91 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 4 92 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 7 93 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 8 94 Bakowski, p. and Puccio, L. (2015). p. 4
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5.2.2 Protection
Moreover, in accordance to the EU framework for counterterrorism is to protect the people
living within the EU increased security concerning border controls, transport and critical
infrastructure95.
One part of the civil protection, including internally and eternally for a EU perspective, are
disasters that carry substantial threats to provide development and poverty reduction. In order
to reduce the impacts of disasters and to save lives it is essential to reduce and prevent
terrorism. The management policies include prospects such as to protect the environment and
health, and to ensure sustainable development, poverty eradication and economic growth
worldwide96.
In order to fulfil the demands, the member states will be guided by EU institutions, for
example to improve the technological measurements for both capture and exchange of data
between states. The European Borders Agency (Frontex) has a role in providing risk
assessment as part of the effort to strengthen controls and surveillance at the EU’s external
border97. In 2014 the Council adopted conclusions on Terrorism and Border Security, which
encourage member states to exchange best practices and lessons learned regarding border
management capabilities, especially for returning foreign fighters98.
Additionally, both nationally and cooperative research is to be shared in order to develop a
stable technical expertise, practical experiences, which also includes explosives99. The
policies in which the protection against foreign fighters involves controlling the borders,
amongst those include the Visa Code100. This involves digital facial image and fingerprints in
order to have concrete data to protect external borders101. Also, since the EU noticed a
development of technologies within terrorist organisations102, it was decided in 2011 under
95 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 3. 96 Council of the European Union. (2014). Press release, 3319th Council meeting, Justice and Home Affairs. Published by The European Union. p. 30 97 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 10. 98 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 28 99 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 14. 100 The European Parliament & the Council of the European Union. (2009). Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on Visas. In the Official Journal of the European Union. Published by the European Union. Article 56, paragraph 2(g). p. 26. 101 The European Parliament & the Council of the European Union. (2009). p. 2. 102 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 9
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the Spanish Presidency to implement a concerted strategy to combat cyber crime. This was
also including initiatives aimed at better understanding the phenomenon of foreign fighters103.
Continuously, transport remains a target for aspiring and returning foreign fighters from the
EU104. Accordingly is passenger transport, including urban transport systems and railways the
main focus of threat105. The EU cooperates within the member states, but also externally with
for example the USA in order to develop security measures at airports. Further the European
Commission and the Government of the United States have agreed to enhance cooperation in
technology research and exchange of terrorist information106.
5.2.3 Pursuing
Continuously, the EU demonstrates the pursuing against terrorism and foreign fighters, both
internationally and regionally. It presents a development of border controls by adding a
strategic surveillance of communications through networks. These strategies are set in order
to bargain and cut funding of attack materials, travel and planning107. In 2005 it is
demonstrated that the pursuit of terrorism involves the European Arrest Warrant, which
according to ECTS is important in pursuing and investigating foreign fighters108.
Another strategy plan is to create a hostile operating environment for foreign fighters also
means tackling terrorist financing. The EU has already put in place provisions for freezing
terrorist assets. The next stage of the strategy involves the implementation of the EU-wide
legislation concerning money laundering and cash transfers, and to agree steps to impede
money transfers by terrorists. The goal is to approach the global dimension of foreign
fighters109. One of the key elements in the fighting against international terrorism includes
Passenger Name Records (PNR) and is the most valuable tool to detect terrorist networks and
103 Eurojust. (October 2012). Cybercrime. In Eurojust News, Issue No.7. Published by Eurojust. Brussels, Belgium. p. 5 104 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 26 105 Council of the European Unio. (2011). p. 11-13 106 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 20 107 Council of the European Unio (2005). p. 3. 108 Council of the European Union. (2002). Council framework decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. In the Official Journal of the European Communities (2002/584/JHA). Published by the European Union. Brussels, Belgium. Article 2, Paragraph 2. p. 3 109 Council of the European Union, EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005). p. 14
29
movements. This is an element that is shared and cooperated with the US, Canada, and
Australia110.
Additionally, the plan of 2010 was to summarize different terrorist structures in nations and
then developing, cooperating and sharing information between member states within the EU.
The so far cooperation has been involving Spain, Belgium and France. To further joint and
more efficiently pursue counterterrorism the EU transformed Europol into a EU agency that
also covers terrorism and its trends111. This includes target groups such as foreign fighters and
other phenomena of terrorism112.
Further, financing of terrorism was in 2010 mentioned as part of the Stockholm Programme,
indicating that the detection of instruments for financing terrorism can be solved by increased
transparency and responsibility for charitable organisations113. Further, the EU mentions in
2014 that the goal is to develop guidelines to support implementations towards
counterterrorism as well as sharing conclusions of different aspects of financing of foreign
fighters114.
In addition to that, the EU strives to deliver technical assistance to enhance the capability of
priority third world countries115. In 2014, the Council and the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States adopted conclusions on the integration of third-country
nationals legally living in the European Union. The conclusions included the reaffirming of
their commitment to the common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the
EU116.
5.2.4 Responding
Lastly in the consideration of ECTS and protection from terrorism and foreign fighters, the
first approach is the civil protection. In such action whereas member states act in response
together cross borders against terrorism, it is stressed that civilians in that foreign country
110 The European Parliament. (April 2015). The proposed EU passenger name records (PNR) directive – Revived in the new security context. Published the European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium. p. 2 111 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 23 112 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 24 113 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 26 114 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 31 115 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 15. 116 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 27
30
need protection117. The consequences in which response against terrorism causes damages on
innocent victims, is somewhat the main focus in the strategy documents118.
A full protection of citizens within the EU borders and outside cannot be guaranteed
according to the document, and the most urgent strategy is for now to develop a crisis plan
against terrorism. The Council adopted decisions in 2014, which request on member states to
consider contributions of multinational units under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and
in which could improve the European disaster response capacity119. EU’s disaster response
capability all involves the response towards citizens such as water supplies and medical
assistance120. Externally the response capability involves military interventions, in order to
fight terrorism from where it originates. However, the crisis management against terrorist
actions at national level is not yet developed, in which the idea is to have a common policy on
how to respond towards terrorism121.
Other responses towards terrorist actions involve the EU return policy, the conclusions in
which the response against returning foreign fighters is included. The already existing rules
are still on going, meaning the member states decide the rule and response against returnees
respectively. The one implementation in 2014 was to underline that a key challenge for a
more effective and successful EU return policy should be to strengthen cooperation between
the EU and third countries, in particular as regards to identification and documentation of
returnees122.
For instance, the UK Government has drafted Counterterrorism and Security Act in 2015,
which seeks to disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to engage in terrorist activity and
then return to the UK123. The Act follows by explaining that passports and travel documents
can be seized for 14 days from twofold citizens at the borders when terrorist activities are
117 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 27. 118 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 28. 119 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 26 120 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 27 121 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 29 122 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 27 123 The U.K. Home Office. (2015). Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015. In U.K. Home Office Introduction. Published by the U.K. Home Office. p. 3
31
suspected. If there are further suspicions the UK can cancel passports and immediately report
the suspected terrorists to international no-fly lists124.
Also, Monica den Boer, Claudia Hillebrand and Andreas Nölke inform that the Police
Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT) provides cooperation between member of anti-
terrorism units of the EU member states, including Norway and Switzerland. In order to
respond towards foreign fighters, the group exchanges information, criminal intelligence and
operational cooperation125. The conclusion reached in the analysis of cooperating within
networks in the EU, den Boer et al. further explains that the EU itself acknowledge the need
for a sound balance between effectiveness and good governance in order to further prevent
terrorism. However, the struggle lays in the still existing sovereign secret services that exist in
each member states in the union126.
124 The U.K. Home Office. (2014). Factsheet – Temporary Passport Seizure. In Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill. Published by the U.K. Home Office. p. 4 125 Den Boer, M. Hillebrand, C, and Nölke, A. (2008). p. 116 126 Den Boer, M. Hillebrand, C, and Nölke, A. (2008). p. 120
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6 Foreign fighters - aspiring and returning This chapter provides analysis of the results that previously were presented. The concepts
used below to analyse ECTS are extracted from the theoretical framework, and this in order to
concretize what may be missing in the counterterrorism strategy. 6.1 Preventing radicalisation and recruitment of EU citizens In order to analyse how this exceeding development of foreign fighters originating from the
EU-countries can be prevented, the theoretical framework show that understanding terrorism
is crucial, equality improvements that has to be made, state responsibility alongside global
cooperation have to be defined and involved in the process.
6.1.1 Understanding terrorism
The ECTS tries to tackle the case of foreign fighters by understanding and building a
preventive strategy on the practical reasons for why individuals radicalise and join terrorist
groups127. First and foremost the soft measures, the non-observable ones, could contribute to
larger understandings of terrorism and why individuals choose to join terrorist organizations
can help prevent terrorism128,129. One understanding is the terrorist acts, where according to
Europol is fought for a religious cause most of the times130. Another aspect of understanding
terrorism was noticed in Marco Nilsson’s interview with Swedish Jihadists, meaning that one
of the callings was to help fellow Muslims in the war against the ones not accepting an
Islamic State or the creation of a Khalifat131. Also, the EU includes examinations such as
internet monitoring in order to understand the clash between the West and Islam132. The
understandings of religion and the impact it conveys towards individuals can be understood
through different levels of society according to the theoretical framework133.
Moreover, examples from Nilsson’s interview shows that foreign fighters from the EU see the
USA as the enemy. The clash between Islam and the West is therefore complicated to
127 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 7 128 Bjørgo, T. (2013). p. 5 129 Fakih, L. (2013). p. 183 130 Europol. (2015). p. 41 131 Nilsson, M. (2015). p. 348-349 132 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 8 133 Bjørgo, T. (2013). p.
33
prevent, much due to the strong belief that the West are against Muslims134. These types of
arguments can according to the theoretical framework be promoted for in environments such
as prisons135. However, the only member state working towards the prison environment
presented in ECTS is the Danish Government’s conversations with foreign fighters in prisons,
as well as young citizens close to radicalisation or recruitments136. Also, the meanings of
practical reasons for why individuals choose to radicalise or to be recruited that the EU wants
to prevent, are not in accordance to the theoretical framework. Even though the non-
observable perspectives can be difficult to explore, could these be the key to understanding
foreign fighters and terrorism.
6.1.2 Equality improvements
Also, the theoretical framework continuously claims being a preventive measure is to make
essential improvements within economic and social measures at all levels of society137. In
connection to the understanding of terrorism, the EU put in programmes in different levels of
society to understand terrorism, but also to make improvements between different groups of
society. For instance, the UK leads frequent communication with the Muslim communities in
order to integrate more into society. Since the UK through communication tries to help and
support Muslim communities, the equality measures in the social aspect should be improved
and the Muslim communities should feel more involved in the EU138. The same applies to
Spain, where imams works together with pastors and rabbis in order to learn and share
experiences with other religious cultures139. The acceptance of different religions applies in
this aspect both ways, in order to prevent the thought that was expressed in the interview by
Nilsson on fighting anyone against them140. The ECTS shows an attempt to examine different
levels of society, however, the theoretical framework considers different levels of society on a
more narrow level. Equality improvements, both socially and economically, are not part of the
strategy in the sense as the theoretical framework points out being an important aspect in the
work towards preventing terrorism and foreign fighters. In order for the strategy to function
and to implement policy changes, the member states of the EU all have to consider different
134 Nilsson, M. (2015). p. 349 135 Alonso, R. (2010). p. 226 136 The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. (2011). p. 2 137 Bjørgo, T. (2013). p. 10 138 Great Britain: Home Office. (2011). p. 48 139 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 3 140 Nilsson, M. (2015). p. 348-349
34
aspects of equality improvements. State responsibility in this aspect is essential to create a
stronger strategy document on counterterrorism141.
Economic or social inequality is not an aspect in which foreign fighters in the EU necessarily
express being one of the reasons to go fight in Syria and Iraq. However, these can be
contributions for why many choose to leave the EU.
6.1.3 State responsibility and global cooperation
As already mentioned, many member states of the EU had different programmes to
investigate and to share results from with the other member states. The ENER helped
stressing the spreading of information between the member states, but maybe not efficiently
enough142. For instance, the recruitment and radicalization in prisons has been mentioned in
other countries as an issue, but nothing has been done except for Denmark’s efforts for policy
changes143. The state responsibility when it comes to new policies and contributions to the
prevention plan against terrorism, each state according to the theoretical framework has to
take their responsibility144.
On the other hand, in the EU there also has to be cooperation alongside state responsibility.
Like the theoretical framework explains, that terrorism can never be prevented unless global
cooperation against weapons and nuclear material is prevented145. Therefore the responsibility
of the state alongside the EU and internationally has the responsibility to prevent terrorism
together. The fact that the recognition of Daesh being seen as a major threat not until 2014 by
the European security, and that new preventive measures came in 2013 against radicalizations
and recruitments shows that the EU does not work as efficiently together as it should during
such times146.
141 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 3 142 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 7 143 Hellmuth, D. (2015). Countering Jihadi terrorists and radicals the French way. In Studies in conflict & terrorism. Published by Routledge. England. p. 986 144 Becker, T. (2006). P. 139 145 Allison, G. (2004). p. 141 146 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 16
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6.2 Protecting EU citizens from terrorism
From the results of the counterterrorism strategy and the theoretical framework, the border
controls, the modern technology and state responsibility and global cooperation will be
assessed below.
6.2.1 Civil protection
According to the theoretical framework, the most important for a nation is to be able to
protect its citizens from dangers and threats147. The civil protection in the ECTS involves the
member states and third world countries that need to be aided in a crisis of terrorist act. The
protection of citizens according to the EU was to be able to reduce risks and save lives from
disasters. For the disasters that can be protected from are mostly directed at the civilians that
are in danger of terrorist attacks or similar, and the protection of citizens being lose to
radicalization or recruitments148.
The activity across borders and in today’s modern society is an issue, accordingly, in order to
protect its citizens from such disasters. The framework finds the inefficient border controls
and how it can be changed to a global dimension where the same policies are applied in order
to create a safe environment for all149. The EU tries to extend security all over Europe through
the Visa Code by airports and more150. However, foreign fighters are still able to travel
through and return into the EU, which is a sign that the protection by the borders is not as safe
as the EU strives to achieve. The global cooperation and the sharing of information is today
not as efficient as it should be within the border of the EU, most due to the fact that many of
the still existing security police forces are not sharing information amongst each other
between member states151.
6.2.2 Modern technology
Since the terrorist acts are no longer connected to one single stem within terrorist
organisations, it is today difficult to connect a foreign fighter to a certain terrorist
147 Becker, T. (2006). p. 2 148 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 27 149 Flynn, S.E. (2000). p. 58 150 The European Parliament & the Council of the European Union. (2009). p. 26. 151 Den Boer, M., Hillebrand, C. & Nölke, A. (2008). p. 101
36
organisation152. Therefore it is essential according to the theoretical framework to protect the
internet flows and to protect people being recruited and radicalized153.
The EU does not yet consider the protection of modern technology in pretence of a terrorist
act or of a foreign fighter trying to travel through the EU border risk free. The modern
technology that the EU considers concerns the Visa Code of facial recognition or the
fingerprints recognition. This is still in the development phase, as well as building a group of
expertise on the technology levels in terrorist organisations. Since the pace of modern
technology keep evolving in terrorist organisations it is essential to preserve the same pace,
however, it seems that the EU has not yet been able to fully develop since the beginning of
such a strategy in 2011154.
6.2.3 State responsibility and global cooperation
Continuously, the border controls and its cooperation between member states was handed
over to Frontex, in order to develop surveillance and border control risk assessments155. These
assessments have however so far only been of encouragement for all member states to
consider in their own border control systems. This difficulty does, even though by good
intentions, not create a cooperative border control system for the entire Union as the
theoretical framework considers156. Both concerns of state responsibility and global
cooperation are not fulfilled due to the fact that the member states have choice whether to
implement the system Frontex suggests. The member states’ interests are still considered in
ECTS157. The international cooperation with the USA is extended, and has been developed
well. However, even though the global cooperation, there are still necessities to enhance the
exchange of information and expertise on border controls and modern technology.
Although there are no completed cooperation between member states of the EU or
internationally, there are cooperation developing between member states and USA. The
enhanced cooperation seeks to evolve the security measures first and foremost at airports, but
152 Mahncke, D. (2006). p. 17 153 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 49 154 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 14. 155 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 10. 156 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 28 157 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 10.
37
since the cooperation has worked so far the exchange of information will continue to develop
in the future158.
6.2.4 Pursuing operational aspects of financing terrorism
Continuously, below will ECTS and the theoretical framework be the pillars for analysing
modern technology, horizontal exchange and global cooperation.
6.2.5 Modern technology
Continuing on the aspect of modern technology, the theoretical framework determines the
importance of finding the networks in which foreign fighters are radicalized and recruited.
Since, as previously mentioned, the modern technology preserves communications between
foreign fighters and terrorist organisations and it happens across borders without
limitations159. ECTS also considers the importance of surveillance of communications
through networks, especially to find planning of finances of terrorism and travel of materials.
By finding the financing of terrorism, the EU means can provide information about explosives
and other warfare materials160. The pursuing of modern technology in counterterrorist
strategies are important according to the theoretical framework in the sense where informal
relationships through the internet, computers and telephones keep the secrecy from those
against them161.
However, even though the Stockholm Programme was implemented, it mainly, again,
encouraged member states of the EU to solve increased transparency of finances for and of
foreign fighters162. There are no clear organisations in which every member states cooperates
with in order to increase transparency of financing, which creates issues in the strive to freeze
funds of terrorist actions and foreign fighters163. In accordance to the theoretical framework
the transparency is essential in order to control both border controls, but also all networks
used in terrorist organisations. In order to pursue foreign fighters through networks it is more
difficult to hide information and thereby being recruited and radicalised164.
158 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 20 159 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 49 160 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 14 161 Den Boer, M. Hillebrand, C, and Nölke, A. (2008). p. 120 162 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 26 163 The European Parliament. (April 2015). p. 2 164 Flynn, S.E. (2000). p. 58
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6.2.6 Horizontal exchange
Furthermore, according to the theoretical framework, there has to exist a developed horizontal
exchange of information in order to fully supervise the financing and communication
networks between foreign fighters165. This formal exchange of information is accordingly
between organisations and institutions. For one, the EU implemented a EU-wide legislation
concerning money laundering and cash transfers, which is accordingly to the theoretical
framework166. Also, the exchange of information concerning PNR has been seen as the most
shared and important tool to pinpoint financing of terrorism167.
In addition it is according to the theoretical framework a necessity to exchange horizontally,
most due to the fact that terrorist organisations work the same way. Therefore, in order to
pursue such organisations in the same structure, ideological and cultural similarities between
organisations can be found, much for the reason that communication and exchange in terrorist
organisations also work horizontally168. As previously mentioned, The EU has not yet
implemented technology that is developed enough to pursue terrorist organisations. However,
a surveillance system through the European Arrest Warrant works as a network of
communication horizontally between member states169.
However, concerning the informal flows of information and propaganda there is a difficulty
of finding and pursuing counterterrorist strategies. There are mainly plans for the future in
order to implement a support programme for organisations in exchange of transparency of
information170. The theoretical framework also suggest that companies and organisations
should have a developed transparency system in order to easier find targets of foreign
fighters171. Unfortunately, as mentioned under Modern technology, these systems are not yet
fully developed in the EU for a working horizontal cooperative network to catch foreign
fighters.
165 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 49 166 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 14 167 The European Parliament. (April 2015). p. 2 168 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 47 169 Council of the European Union. (2002). p.3. 170 Flynn, S.E. (2000). p. 58 171 Ibid.
39
6.2.7 Global cooperation
As an extension of horizontal exchange is the global cooperation in order to spread
information and to evolve strategies on transparency of finances. For instance, between
member states of the EU only Spain, Belgium and France have been involved in cooperating
for sharing information and experiences of terrorism and foreign fighters172. Even though
Europol is supposed to work for efficiency, as a collector of information and then sharing
with other member states173, it has not yet achieved to distribute the same common values and
strategies to member states in order to pursue counterterrorism and foreign fighters174.
Also, global cooperation in the sense of other countries outside of EU being involved is the
USA, Canada and Australia in order to share information under PNR175. Also, the EU have
tried to encourage member states as well as other well developed states to try and reach third-
world countries in order to extend the information through transparency of finance in
organisations and institutions there as well176. However, for this to work it is a necessity, as
mentioned earlier in this essay, that member states are not only encouraged to implement such
values or strategies177.
6.3 Responding judicially against terrorist
Lastly will the ECTS and the theoretical framework be used to analyse the military
involvements and sanctions alongside State responsibility and global cooperation in order to
respond tot terrorism and foreign fighters.
6.3.1 Military involvement/sanctions
The legislation in counterterrorism strategies is according to the theoretical framework an
essential part to respond towards foreign fighters and terrorism178. This means that there is a
necessity of other responses than military involvements. As mentioned, the EU implemented
in 2014 a disaster response document that is directed towards civilians in a foreign country
that have been exposed to a terrorist attack. This involves medical assistance alongside water
172 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 23 173 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 24 174 Hix, S. (2005). p. 400 175 The European Parliament. (April 2015). p. 2 176 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 26 177 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 28 178 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 299
40
supplies179. Legislative measures such as non-violent strategy plans are however not fully
considered in ECTS. The only thing mentioned is the documentation of returnees of foreign
fighters, such as passports and travel documents. Also, as mentioned is that information and
exchange of such documents can provide proof in order to be able to prosecute a returning
foreign fighter180. However, the still existing sovereign secret services makes this strategy
inefficient in the sense where these services do exchange the information amongst them181.
The soft form of response against terrorism and foreign fighters, that is sanctions in this case,
was somewhat criticised in the theoretical framework. The argument lays in the fact that the
violent terrorist act has already occurred182. The ECTS does not consider sanctions as a form
of response against terrorism and foreign fighters; instead the focus in the strategy is the
military interventions abroad in order to fight terrorism183. The opposite argument is thus that
governments or the EU has to show good behaviour in order to not legitimize the violence
that is performed by foreign fighters184.
6.3.2 State responsibility and global cooperation
Continuing on the same topic, the return policies and response against terrorism and foreign
fighters has been put on each member state separately, since each member state still has
separate military connections as well as legislation185. The EU has however considered the
civil protection of any military intervention in cross border warfare. The EU has also put out a
request to help in the multinational civil protection, but this is also a choice in which each
member state186. For instance, the legislation of returnees in the UK is only active in the UK,
which can create confusion as of where there is supposed to be the states responsibility to act
on responses versus the aspect of global cooperation187. According to the theoretical
framework, this can create issues in the sense where common law values can both efficiently
affect the ECTS, but also in the long-term prevent terrorist acts in the EU from for instance
foreign fighters. And the global cooperation that the EU want to develop is not yet
179 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 30 180 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 50 181 Den Boer, M. Hillebrand, C, and Nölke, A. (2008). p. 120 182 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 302 183 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 299. 184 Schelling, T. (1966) p. 3 185 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 27 186 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 29 187 The U.K. Home Office. (2015). p. 3-4
41
implemented due to the different policies already exists in each member state separately on
how to respond towards terrorism and foreign fighters188.
188 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 27
42
7 Conclusions and Future Research This ending chapter will offer the conclusions that can be drawn from this essay and present
some overall guidelines for future research. The conclusion will review the findings in the
Result and Analysis chapters and the future research will advocate further explorations of this
study and essay.
7.1 Conclusions The European Union (EU) has had the issue of citizens travelling to other countries to fight
for an ideological or religious cause. The recruitment and radicalisation of such citizens as
well as the return to Europe have however not existed in the dimension that it does today189.
The ECTS uses different approaches towards foreign fighters, whereas preventive measures
focus on radicalisation and recruitment of EU citizens. The strategy seeks to understand
foreign fighters through practical reasons, and through dividing different programmes
amongst member states. The state responsibility is an important factor to prevent foreign
fighters being recruited or radicalised. Continuous approaches towards foreign fighters
include developments of expertise on the phenomenon in order to evolve the strategy of
preventing foreign fighters. Moreover, in order to protect EU and pursuing foreign fighters
ECTS approaches networks through terrorist organisations and modern technology to
investigate recruitment and radicalisation sites as well as finding foreign fighters that aspires
from the EU. Finally the strategy considers responding of returning foreign fighters by
assigning member states and its state responsibility to judicially respond towards these
actions. Responding from the account of EU is mainly military intervention abroad.
Moreover, the reasons for foreign fighters’ rate to increase despite ECTS in accordance to the
theoretical framework are extensive measures on many aspects. For instance, understanding
terrorism is a difficult concept to comprehend, however, the ECTS lack understanding of
different levels of society concerning individuals, organisations, religion and socio-economic
inequalities. Improvements on each level can through a counterterrorism strategy be made in
cooperation between member states, the EU and internationally to fully understand the acts of
terrorism. Also, border controls between all member states in which the same principles are
shared can create safer borders as well as improved efficiency. Modern technology in the 189 Bakowski, P. and Puccio, L. (February 2015). p. 2
43
form of networks and communication is and approach where the ECTS succeeds to evolve
programmes that find foreign fighters networks as well as other terrorist activity. However,
the strategy can be improved in the sense of transparency and sharing of information
horizontally and vertically, as well as nationally, regionally and internationally. Lastly, in
responding towards foreign fighters the ECTS mainly considers terrorism as a whole and not
specifically foreign fighters. The strategy according to the theoretical framework lack
response strategies towards returning foreign fighters, and also this is left to state
responsibility of all member states. The theoretical framework shows that ECTS include
short-term solutions rather than long-term solutions.
7.2 Future research The claims made in this essay are initiating theoretical claims in need of further presentation
and study. This could be made in several ways: for instance by going deeper in the theoretical
framework, using more theories or creating further concepts to analyse. In addition, these
concepts can further explain why the ECTS has not been successful in the case of foreign
fighters.
Thus future research can be provided with concrete strategies towards foreign fighters, since
this is a relatively new phenomenon for EU. Different strategies can be provided and be
analysed for in order to research a common pattern between counterterrorism strategies to
seek common issues between member states of the EU. The development of foreign fighters
and how to avert the merge of them aspiring and returning. Whereas this essay may have only
touched the tip of an iceberg of facts and theories around foreign fighters, it perhaps have
found some answers to why foreign fighters continue to increase in the EU.
44
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