PROVIDED TO MARl0N C.I. ON FOR MA!UNG. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT MICAH LAMB, Petitioner, Case No.: SC17-1397 vs. L.T. No.: 16-2002-CF-00115-AXXX-MA STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents. .. . "DOUBLE MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT" AND "WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS" AND/OR "MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT TIMELY FILED 3.850" POSTCONVICTION MOTION OF OCTOBER 4, 2004, WITH d * NEW SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OF LAW AND FACTS' SHOWING TRIAL COUNSEL DAVID MAKOKFA WAS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR HIS FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR POLICE AND STATE ATTORNEYS' MISCONDUCT OF COERCING, THREATENING, CALLING ALLEGED EYEWITNESS A LYING MOTHERFUCKING BITCH, FOR IST APPEARANCE COURT FOR PROBABLE CAUSE.AND IDENTIFICATION AND ETC. UNDERMINED ALL GOVERNMENTS EVIDENCE AS FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE REQUIRING DISCHARGE OF PETITIONER MICAH LAMB. AND MOTION TO ENFORCE TRANSFER ORDER FOR NEW INTERVENING CHANGE OF LAW COME NOW, the Petitioner Micah Lamb pro se, hereby files' this Writ of Habeas Corpus, and/or Motion to Supplement Petitioner's timely filed 3.850 1, Plus, Appendix 1A-169A
41
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PROVIDED TO MARl0N C.I. ON
FOR MA!UNG. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
MICAH LAMB,Petitioner,
Case No.: SC17-1397vs. L.T. No.: 16-2002-CF-00115-AXXX-MA
STATE OF FLORIDA,Respondents.
.. . "DOUBLE MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT"AND
"WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS"AND/OR
"MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT TIMELY FILED 3.850"POSTCONVICTION MOTION OF OCTOBER 4, 2004, WITH
d * NEW SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OF LAW AND FACTS'SHOWING TRIAL COUNSEL DAVID MAKOKFA WASINEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR HIS
FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR POLICEAND STATE ATTORNEYS' MISCONDUCT OF COERCING,
THREATENING, CALLING ALLEGED EYEWITNESS ALYING MOTHERFUCKING BITCH, FOR IST APPEARANCE
COURT FOR PROBABLE CAUSE.AND IDENTIFICATIONAND ETC. UNDERMINED ALL GOVERNMENTS EVIDENCE
AS FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINEREQUIRING DISCHARGE OF PETITIONER MICAH LAMB.
ANDMOTION TO ENFORCE TRANSFER ORDER FOR NEW
INTERVENING CHANGE OF LAW
COME NOW, the Petitioner Micah Lamb pro se, hereby files' this Writ of
Habeas Corpus, and/or Motion to Supplement Petitioner's timely filed 3.850
1, Plus, Appendix 1A-169A
Postconviction Motion of October 4, 2004, with new case law and facts' see, as
follows:
. "BASIS FOR INVOKING JURISDICTION"
This Honorable Court does have jurisdiction under Florida Statutes 79.01
(2017); Article V, §3(b)(4) and pursuant to Vetree v. Wainwright, 184 So. 2d 420
(Fla. 1966) ("Change of law can be filed in a 3.850 Postconviction Motion.");
Saucer v. State, 779 So. 2d 261 (FN1) (Fla. 2001) (Citing Rozier v. State, 603 So.
2d 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Ayers v. State, 708 So. 2d 318, N. [2, 3] (Fla. 5th
DCA 1992); Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 991, N. [6-10] (9th Cir. 2016) ("en
banc")
"FACTS' AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE CASE"
1.) Petitioner timely filed a Postconviction 3.850 on October 4, 2004 after the
denial of Petitioner's direct appeal mandate, Lamb v. State, 871 So. 2d 211 (Fla.
1st DCA 2004).
2.) Petitioner also filed a "Writ ofHabeas Corpus" on or about 2007, which was
denied, that trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to charge Petitioner,
3.) On or about 2013 Petitioner filed a motion on (2) two black ski masks not
matching victim/employee bank teller Mrs. Sharon Seagrooves identification as
having "floppy loose ends" when trial counsel David Makokfa "lied" and said
Bank surveillance videotapes' did not exits, was contradicted by pending (FOIA)
2
Freedom of Information Act in State Attorney's Office from 2004-2013, see,
DCA 2007); U.S. v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1952)("Remand to consider
entire transcript").
11.) Petitioner made a complaint to the Judicial Qualifications Commission of
the State ofFlorida, Case No.: 17-291; Dearing, on State Trail Judge Peter Dearing
for convicting Petitioner of a non-existent crime of Petitioner aiding and abetting
himself, filed on or about June 6, 2017, see Appendix 98A, see as follow:
8
GROUND #7
Writ Of Habeas Corpus,.And/Or
Motion To Supplement Timely.Filed 3.850 Postconviction Motion OfOctölfer 4, 2004, With New Change Of Law And Facts' Showing .Trial Counsel David Makokfa Was Ineffective Assistance Of CounselFor His Failure To File A "Motion To Dismiss" For Police And StateAttorneys' Misconduct Of Coercing, Threatening, Calling AllegedEyewitness A Lying Mother-Fucking Bitch, For 1st AppearanceCourt For Probable Cause, And Identification And Etc., UnderminedAll Governments Evidence As Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree DoctrineRequiring Discharge Of Petitioner Micah Lamb.
Prejudice and cause to Petitioner preseñts extraordinary circumstances,'
beyond control ofPetitioner Micah Lamb, who is factually innoceñt, ofArmed
Robbery of Educational Community Credit Union on December 7, 2001,
Attempted murder, shooting and throwing deadly missiles' using a AK-47 assault
rifle, Bank of America armed robbery of September 17, 2001, (State failed to
prosecute); carrying a concealed firearm ofDecember 21, 2001, (State failed to
prosecute) has made it ineffective/impossible to obtain collateral review, justifies
this courts intervention, due to the futility ofPetitioner having no viable avenues'
for redress of the instant violations' of the 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 14th U.S.
Constitutional violations, and Florida Constitution, to a procedure of fairness.
No State or Federal Court has not conclusively refuted with records', files',
or Motions that petitioner is not entitle to relief, see Dupart v. U.S., 476 F.2d 597,
N. [3] (6th Cir. 1973); Thomas v. State, 707 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998);
9
Corp v. State, 698 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Bennet v. State 904 So. 2d
. 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Clisby v. Jones 960 F.2d 925,.938, N. 17 (11th Cir.
1993); Fox V. Maloney 515 F.3d 1, 3 N. 1 (1st Cir. 2008), have not been followed
in the State ofFlorida Courts on the following ground:
That trial counsel David Makokfa was ineffective assistance of counsel for
his failure to file a "Motion to Dismiss" where alleged eyewitness Betty McDuffey
was coerced, threatened, and.subjected to abusive language of being called a
"Lying Motherfucking Bitch" by the Jacksonville Florida Police and State
Attorney's Office, is a bad faith egregious misconduct that was knowingly used as
false manufactured identification and probable cause utilizéd as the primary
establishment of the Tainted Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree doctrine exploited by the
instant illegality, substantiated by newly discovered fact and.law, and change of
law requiring discharge ofPetitioner, see Santos v. Thomas 830 F.3d 987, 991, N.
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10] (9th Cir. July 28, 2016). ("Evidence that witness confessions which
implicated accused in (Petitioner Micah Lamb) kidnapping were obtained through
torture and coercion constituted explanatory evidence that was generally
admissible, discharged Petitioner") Id. 991 ("The Supreme Court has described the
extradition hearing to determine probable cause as Akin to a grand jury
investigation or a preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
5.1, see, Charlton v. Kelly, 33 S.Ct. 945 (1913); Benson v. McMahon, 8 S.Ct. 1240
10
(1888); ("FJC Manual at 10 as the First Circuit described the process:") See, also,
Rozier v. State, 693, So. 2d 120 N. [2] (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) ("Tonjia swore she was
terrórized¹ into lying that Rozier killed Mary Baker. At the time, she made
statement, the man who was terrorizing her had admitted to her, he killed Baker;
further. Rozier, Defendant filed a motion to supplement a motion for
postconviction reliefwith the affidavit of a witness who alleged that she falsely
incriminated petitioner before his murder trial and that sheha£offered without
success to testify at Petitioner's trial that he was innocent. The trial court
denied the motion; Rozier N. [2] for the question of timeliness out Supreme Court
has recently start referring to amended rule 3.850 motions that the (2) two year
limitation does not preclude the enlargement of issues raised in a timely filed
1st motion for post conviction relief, Brown v. State, 596 So. 2d 1026 (Fla.
The above violations' made trial counsel David Makokfa ineffective/inept
assistance of counsel for his failure to file a "Motion to Dismiss" when concrete
evidence before County Court Judge Eleni Elia Derke, and State Attorney John G.
Kalinowski, existed see, Appendix 158A. Police and State utilized their illegal
pecuniary gain to false imprison and illegally detained petitioner. Resorts' from the
' "Oxford pocket American Thesaurus of current English of 2002 by Christine aLinderg, page 752, Terrorize = Terrorize the hostages strike terror in/into, terrify,frighten to death, scare stiff, petrify, horrify, 2. Terrorize them into leaving theirhomes coerce, browbeat, bully, intimidate, menace, threaten, inf. Bull doze."
11
face of the record, see, Trapp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 976 (8th Cir.
So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1949); Sullivan v. State Ex. Rel. McCoy, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla.
1951): Raines v. State, 14 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) gives' this Court
21
authority and jurisdiction to use the face of the record enclosed, to discharge
Petitioner, under Florida Statute 79.01(2017), see, State Ex. Rel. Scaldeferri v.
Sandstorm, 285 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1973)("holding that Circuit.Court may entertain
Habeas Corpus proceeding and discharge.Petitioner held under an illegal or void2
order issued by a court over which there is not appellate jurisdiction but may not
review the legal sufficiency of the order"); Alachua Reg'l Juvenile Det. Ctr. v.
T.O., 684 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1996).
(B). Petitioner was arrested at 1645 or 4:45 P.M. for "carrying a concealed
firearm," and being a suspect in a Bank Robbery see, Appendix 81A-82A when the
seizure of the 380 Tarsus handgun found under the rear-department of the
passenger seat is not a violation of Florida Statutes 790.01 see, Alexander v. State,
477 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1985)("Petitioner's pouch a zipped gun case, and therefore his
carrying of it in his automobile was not a violation of the statute") Petitioner had
his firearm in (2) plastic gags' under the seat.
Petitioner was not taken to the County Jail, but was taken to the Police
Headquarters; were at 4:00 P.M. Police had snatched the alleged eyewitness out of
Petitioner's truck earlier, but she Betty McDuffey inclupatory statements' were
made at 8:30 and 10:45 P.M. see, Appendix 64A-67A which State County Judge
2 "Petitioner filed informal and formal grievances' showing Department ofCorrections Florida, Respondents', that Petitioner has not been duly charged,convicted and sentenced, using same Exhibits, they relied they could not correctcommitment order, only thru a Court Order."
22
Eleni Elia Derke, see, Appendix 158A at 1st Fist Appearance Court without a
"Voluntariness Hearing," Davis v. North Carolina, 310 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1962),
did not ask the%itness (in the presence ofMicah Lamb) was she not coerced or
threatened for her statements'.
3.) The inculpatory statement's of alleged eyewitness started on December 21,
2001, at 8:30 see, Appendix 64A ("Betty McDuffey requested that indicate my
statements' to Det. Wright. It was my decision to do this I was not pressured in
any way for the statement"); Fischer v. U.S., 382 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1967);
Williams v. U.S., 382 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1967).
See, Appendix 70A ("Alleged witness Betty McDuffey sworn deposition
testimony)("so they Detectives' were talking to me and they went showirig me
pictures'. The threatened me and told me that it I did not work with them they were
going to make them checks' stick. It was going to be just like I did do it"), see,
Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 130 S.Ct. 8, 9, (2009).
4.) Lead Detective R. P. Crews Jacksonville Sheriff Detective utilize the above
coerced testimony in a search warrant and affidavit to go inside Petitioner's 5,500
square foot (2) story house and seize all and any expensive assault rifles' he
wanted, see Appendix 39A-54A; 42A-43A 5617 Tempest Street, and then utilized
the coerced information to arrest alleged Co-Defendant Aaron Lamb in his arrest
affidavit see, Appendix 81A, 27A, and omitted from Lead Detective R. P. Crews
23
search warrant affidavit information that (2) alleged suspects fired (18) eighteenth
AK-47 Assault shell casings' and (4) 9mm Luger shell casings', were left at the
crime-scene see, U.S. v. Bowers, 534 F.2d 186, 193 (9th Cir. 1976) Cert. Denied
97 S.Ct. 360 (1976)("that affiant has observed the following items of evidence
taken from the scene of the murder:
a.) One VPT 44 finish remanufactured nine-millimeter shell casing: b.) One
Yugoslavian shell casing having 11, 52, as well as two asterisks thereon: c.) One
Winchester western 9-millimeter shell casing: d.) of two bullets removed from the
body ofKenneth C. Patrick which the FBI Laboratory Washington D.C. has
identified as being the same type bullet as the bullets which are normally encased
in the Yugoslavian type casing as opposed to the above finish and Winchester type
casing"). Allowed Police and prosecuting Attorneys' unlimited authority, to seize
and plant evidence befittingly to the State ofFlorida, see, U.S. v. Cortina, 630 F.2d
1207 (7th Cir. 1980)("intentional and reckless misrepresentation of the search had
to be voided and fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable
cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit seized to only defraud the court");
U.S. v. Simmons, 771 F.Supp. 908 (Ill. 2011)("Officer omitted material
information, good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply"); Franks
v. Delaware, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978); U.S. v. Scully, Lexis 9576 (7th Cir.
1992)("granted motion to quash warrant and process"); warrant was defective and
24
over-broad for seizure of any and all firearms', see, U.S. v. Garner, 537 F.2d 861
(6th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Townsend, 394 F.Supp. 736, N. [24, 36] (Mich. 1975);
U.S. v. Fuccilo, 808 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1973); U.S. v. One Parcel of Property, 774
F.Supp. 699 N. [1-6] (Conn. 1991)("return currency3 because warrant was over-
broad and Police could not match serial numbers") allowed Police and
prosecuting Attorneys' a illegal opportunity to double-back and now say the
planted evidence was used in the crimes; is Police fabrication, see, Smith v.
(9th Cir. 2010) the AK-47 Assault rifle seized gave Petitioner (2) two natural life
sentences', illegally.
Moreover, Lead Detective R. P. Crews/Affiant corroborates' that the
execution of threats and coercion did in fact happen, see, Appendix 76A: ("Lead
Detective/Affiant R. P. Crews', A. the only thing she made a mistake of it was
Dale Carson that told her that if she did not answer our questions truthfully, then
t_hhey were going to make the check charges-they were going to charge her with
the check charges' and everything and [make] her part of the principle");
Moreover after Police coerced Betty McDuffey they created another alleged
Co-Defendant Aaron Lamb, see, Appendix 81A-82A, which Affiant/Lead
3 "Police seized form Petitioner's "star floor safe," was $22,000.00 that was notconnected to any armed robberies' see, Appendix 79A, but was from a previousjob Petitioner held at Winn Dixie Grocery Store chain driving Semi-tractors for 17-years' under their T. Rowe Price 401-K Plan."
25
Detective R. P. Crews uses' his affidavit for arrest ad etc., compare also, Appendix
79C: ("do you know whether or not if any conversation that took place in that
room between Aaron Lamb and Betty MgDuffey was recorded?)
A. Yes Sir. Q. Okay Mr. Mantel (Prosecuting Attorney) I do have that tape.
I've got all (5) five of them, was a violation of clearly established.Federal Law,
see, Brown v. Beto, 468 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1972)("Court found intimidating
setting statement inadmissible where he was in gustody with no Miranda
Warnings"); see, also, Carbo v. Lavallee, 270 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1959); Santos v.
Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 1003-1005 (9th Cir. 2016) (En Banc) was breached see,
Appendix 81E ("...Lying Mother-Fucking Bitch in Jail. The reason I did that was
to try put may be Aaron on the side of (Detective) Wright to see if he would talk
some more!), see Appendix 81E.
Aaron Lamb refused to and invoked his rights' to a authority and Police got
made, and started walking Aaron to the county jail, and half way there after
Detective Wrights' conjunctions' of intimidations' and repeated questioning of
Aaron, they return back to Jacksonville Police Headquarters to the robbery office,
were Aaron made involuntary inclupatory statements', see, Moss v. State, 60 So.
3d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)("suspects' re-initiation was involuntary"); U.S. v.
Rosario-Cintron, Lexis 90363 (1st Cir. 2016).
26
Then R. P. Crews again uses' a search warrant affidavit for Petitioner's
5617 Tempest Street Home, see, Appendix 31A-54A, 43A, with alleged Co-
Defendants' involuntary/coerced/intimidated extended the Fruit of Poisonous
Tree Doctrine to other evidence, see, Appendix 43A, Line 24-25: ("Micah Lamb
was arrested and found to be wearing shoes' virtually identical to those worn by
one of the robbery suspects' depicted in surveillance video photographs").
R. P. Crews sworn depositions' see, Appendix 78A, Page 45, Lines' 16-18:
("this is the photograph that you reference in you (affidavit) when you discuss Mr.
Lamb-Micah Lamb shoes? A. yes, sir; see, Appendix 78A: ("Q. what marking?
A. what I take being low cut-low top black tennis shoes"); inventory
report see, Appendix 90A: ("black high-top shoes (Charles Barkley NBA Tennis
shoes")) in Petitioners' home star floor safe Police found $19,000.00 see, R. P.
Crews sworn deposition see, Appendix 79A: ("A. Tempest Street Address. Q.
Okay. And you indicated that you had found I think $19,000.00 inside of a safe at a
later time?
A. yes sir. Q. Was there anything about the cash you connected to either of
the robberies? A. no. sir") the money was from T. Rowe Price investment thru
Winn Dixie Warehouse Grocery Store see, Appendix 52A-54A.
27
See, also, Appendix 76A, Page 20 Lines 20-22 ("A. no sir, we did not
threaten her. M told her that if she did not cooperate with the agreement made by
her Attorney, she would be prosecuted on everything");
See, also, Appendix 81E Sgt. Rutherford ("So I went in the room and when
Detective Wright went back in there, and I said Detective, when you get through
here go out and put that lying, "I think that I said lying motherfucking bitch in
jail") see, U.S. v. Alston, 311 F.Supp. 296 (D.C. Cir. 1970), has not been
addressed by any Court, see, Cusby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 938, N. 17 (11th Cir.
1993): Fox v. Maloney, 515 F.3d 1, 3, N. 1 (1st Cir. 2008); Stachulak v. Cougallin,
5.) However in October 25, 2016, Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 991 N. [6,
7-10] (9th Cir. July 28, 2016)(en banc) came inside Marion Correctional Institution
see, Appendix H:
("But the Supreme Court has made clear the aim of the requirement of due
process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence but to prevent fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false Lisenda v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941). The court offered an extended explanation in
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484-85, 92 S.Ct. 619 (1972) there may be a
relationship between the involuntariness of a confession and its un-reliability. But
our decision in Jackson v. Dennon, 378 U.S. 368, 377, 84 S.Ct. 1774 (1964)(a
28
defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right at some stage in the
proceedings' to object to the use of an allegedly involuntary confession and have a
fair hearing and a reliable determination of the issue of "voluntariness"
uninfluenced by truth or falsity of the confession").
Moreover Id. 991 ("The Supreme Court has described the extradition
hearing to determine probable cause as akin to a grand jury investigation or a
preliminary hearing under federal rule of criminal procedure 5.1 see, e.g. Charlton
v. Kelly, 33 S.Ct. 945 (1943); Benson v. McMalon, 8 S.Ct. 1240 (1888) FTC
manual at as the first circuit describe the process:
("In probable cause hearings' under American law, the evidence taken need
not meet standards for admissibility at trail. In deed at a preliminary hearing in
federal court a finding, a probable cause may be based upon hearsay in whole or
part. Fed.R.Crim.P. 5.1(a). This is because a preliminary hearing is not a mini-trial
of the issue of guilt; rather its function is the more limited one of determining
whether probable cause exists to hold4 the accused for trial. An extradition hearing
similarity involves a preliminary examination of the evidence and is not a trial,
4 "The (2) two armed bank robberies' of bank of America September 17, 2001, andeducation community credit union ofDecember 7, 2001, had no eyewitnesses' ateither crime scene, or at Jury trial to say Petitioner Micah Lamb was involved or aparticipant to the crimes', is why Police used alleged eyewitness Betty McDuffey,is because she has been to prison for murder, see, Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d462 (2d Cir. 2004) (Another witness credibility was significantly eroded by hisextensive criminal record"); see also, Duhart v. U.S., 476 F.2d 597 N. [1, 3] (6thCir. 1973)("Illegal Arrest").
29
U.S. v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997); resulted also into a illegal
seizure and search[s] violations' of the 4th and 14th Amendments'.
Santos v. Thomas, supra. N. [7] ("Id. 1004....in these cases' once the
evidence of coercion is admitted, court's weigh whether the allegations of coercion
are credible, and if so, whether probable cause still exists once the [tainted]
evidence is excluded from the analysis see, Cornejo-Barreto v. Selfert, 218 F.sd
1004, 1008, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000)("To isolate any possible taint the allege tortue
could have on the evidence supporting probable cause determination, the Judge
considered the sufficiency of the evidence without the challenged confessions")
see, also Belcke v. Boone, 527 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)("The steps a Judge
must take in finding probable cause"); Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 421 (9th
Cir. 1991) Cert. Denied 112 S.Ct. 870 (1992)("....come at by exploitation of that
illegality"); U.S. v. Jannott, 501 F.Supp. 1182 (P.A. 1980)("Dismissing indictment
on ground that government overreaching violates due process").
Santos v. Thomas, supra. N. [8] ("Id. 1006....the portion of our decision in
Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005) that appears to have presented
a stumbling block for both the extradition court and the district court here involved
different charge based on the exculpatory affidavit ofMakham Ram. Barapind
offered [a second affidavit from Ram in which Ram claimed that Police had forced
him to sign blank pieces' of paper, on which statements incriminating Barapind
30
was a falsification] Id at 1024 see, also Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749-50. The
extradition court analyzed this statement and factors going to its reliability, and
ultimately concluded that under the circumstances, the Court could not determine
Ram's credibility. Accordingly, the extradition Court concluded that Ram's
statement did not undermine probable cause. Extradition of sign, 170 F.Supp. 2d at
1024-25. We affirmed finding that Ram's statement constituted "conflicting
evidence," because it's credibility [could not be determined without a trial, and that
it would have been improper for the extradition court to engage n the kind of
review that would have been necessary to determine the statements' credibility.
Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749-50.
The extradition court and district court here relied on this section here relied
on this section ofBarapind in concluding that Rosa's and Hurtado's statements
alleging coercion were inadmissible evidence. But what the extradition court did
here is different from what the extradition court did in Barapind. In Barapind the
extradition court first considered the allegations of coercion, before concluding that
it could not determine their reliability without exceeding the scope of review. Here
however, the extradition court refused to consider Rosa's and Hurtado's statements
in the first instance. This was error. A Petitioner in an extradition proceeding has
the right to introduce evidence that a statement was obtained under coercion does
just by undermining the competénce of the governments evidence]. The 9th Circuit.
31
Court Appeals has retreated, the 11th Court ofAppeals refuses' to retreat/change
course, see, Appendix 123A.
6.) Petition asserts the start ofjudicial travesty, allows the fruit ofpoisonous
tree doctrine to permeate all Governments evidence that followed, which this
instant Ground #7 proves' egregious Police and State prosecutors' misconduct
allowed them, too exploit illegally, alleged eyewitness Betty McDuffeyss evidence,
too help them manufacture a criminal case Petitioner, see, D. L. v State, 128 So. 3d
499 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ("motion for judgment of dismissal due to
officers'(Detective R. P. Crews) conflicting testimony").
Moreover, and very important, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals' has also,
utilized Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005) this overruled law I
previous legal opinion's showing that Petitioner's federal habeas corpus §2254
. certificate of appealability merits were sabotaged, which has denied Petitioner a
fair shake, when the court ofAppeal relies' on erroneous principles' of law, see,
Saldana v. U.S.A.G., 431 Fed. Appx. 801 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Barapind v.
Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005) that's tainted their denial order of July 27,
5 "Alleged eyewitness Betty McDuffey made a 2d Sworn Deposition, see Appendix69A, 70A, 72A, explains' how the behind-the-scenes of the activities' ofJacksonville Police Department, and State prosecutors' in Florida, have a practicethat on or about in (1998-2002) HBO TV came to Jacksonville, Florida and made amovie of victim/suspect/prisoner Brian Butler being coerced and threaten by HeadSheriff Nat Glovers' son Detective Glover and another Detective, shows thru[record evidence] a line conspiracy is afoot."
32
2012, case #12-11771-F and this, courts case numbers' Lamb v. Crews, 133 S.Ct.
1859 (2013); Lamb v. Jones, 137 S.Ct. 19 (2016) has caused the Supreme Court
Justices' and their law clerks' to be duped, that superseded Petitioner's due
diligence of timely fillings', from State and Federal Courts; to further have
Petitioners' guaranteed United States Constitutional Rights; trampled, resulting in
a unreasonable seizure of Petitioner.
The Catch-22 to a successful "Motion to recall mandate and amend .
judgments," is to show Petitioner has no viable assets' to obtain Judicial review in
State and Federal Courts' without the help of all the United States Supreme
Courts' justices, to look at just the face of records', without extensive paper
turning; and the merits' will justify redress and resolve by remanding for a "M
evidentiary hearing/voluntariness hearing", to weigh whether a due process
violations' has occurred, see Mesarosh v. U.S., 77 S.Ct. 1, N. [8] (1956) ("Mazzel
by his testimony has poisoned the water in the reservoir"); U.S. v. Williams,
382 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1967); U.S. v. Zerbst, 111 F.Supp. 807 (4th Cir. 1953)
("Motion to Dismiss Granted")· U.S. v. King, 482 F.2d 768 (DC. Cir. 1973); U.S.
v. Shober, 489¥.supp. 393 (PA. 1973); Washington v. Ziemmer, 339 F.2d 715
(DC. Cir. 1964) ("Habeas Corpus replaced 5 (2) with 5 (1)"), requires uniformity
of the law, which shows' 9th Circuit Court ofAppeal retreated back, to old
establish law, lith Circuit refuses'.
33
7.) Jurisdiction by the Florida Supreme Court and its Courts' Supreme Court
law justifies this court's intervention, see, Gondeck v. Pan American World
Airways, 86 S.Ct. 153 (1965) ("In that case the Supreme Court faced a Petition for
rehearing. Two men had been killed in an automobile accident outside a defense
base where they were employed. For one Frank Gondeck, the District Court set
aside an award made by the Department ofLabor to his supervisors, and the 5th
Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari and denied rehearing. The
4th Circuit reaches the opposite result for the other employee. Over 3-years after
the original certiorari petition was denied, Gondeck Petition the Supreme Court for
rehearing again, this time successfully. The Supreme Court noted that Gondeck
supervisors were the only ones who were eligible for compensation from the
accident who did not receive it. This according to the Court justifies application of
the established doctrine that the interest in finality of litigation must yield where
the interest would make uniform the stringent application of the court rules. The
Court vacated its order denying certiorari and reversed the decision of the 5th
Circuit"); U.S. v. Ohio Power Co., 77 S.Ct. 652 (1957) ("Finding that judgment
below in instant case could not stand if there were to be uniformity in application
ofprinciples announced in the other (2) two cases, the Supreme Court granted the
Petition for rehearing, vacated the order denying certiorari granted the petition for
certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Court of claims"); see, also Ashmus v.
34
Calderon, Lexis 7104 (9th Cir. 1998); Walker v. Supreme Court of California,
Lexis 63689 (9th Cir. 2016); Cahill v. New York N.H.R. Co., 76 S.Ct. 758 (1956);
Fed. Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 741 F.3d 353, 357-58 (2d Cir. 2013);
Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 130 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1942) ("Motion to Recall granted
to prevent injustice"); International Terminal Operating Co. v. N.V. Neder Amerik,
89 S.Ct. 482 (1968) ("Motion to Recall Granted"); Walker v. Southern R. Co., 87
S.Ct. 1300 (1967); Williams v. Glimer, 91 S.Ct. 2167 (1971); Stewart v. Wilson,
80 S.Ct. 874 (1960); Wallings v. Reuter, 321 U.S. 671-678 (1944); Zap v. U.S., 67
S.Ct. 857 (1947); Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo Marcus, 238 U.S. 647 (1955)
precludes' all parties "from changing their positions' at any phase of this
proceedings known as Judicial Estoppel see, Scarano v. Central, 203 F.2d 510,