FO B6 American Enterprise Fdr- 5-11-04 Gingrich Briefing Papers and Charts on Terror and Security (Fair Use)

8/14/2019 FO B6 American Enterprise Fdr- 5-11-04 Gingrich Briefing Papers and Charts on Terror and Security (Fair Use)

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PRINCIPLES FOR INCREASINGAMERICAN SECURITY AFTER 9/11

Newt GingrichM ay 11,2004

SU MMA R YThe N ational Comm ission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the Un ited States (alsoknown as the 9/11 Com mission) has an oppo rtunity to describe the system ,culture, structures, budgets, m etrics, and goals that America needs to be safein an increasingly dangerous world.The greatest co ntribution the 9/11 Commission can make is to tell thecountry the tru th about the scale of change tha t is needed and then let theelected and appointed officials make the compromises.To achieve these goals the following steps w ould be helpful:

1. Focus on the future security needs of America using 9/11 as a casestudy from which to learn. It is not nearly as important to discoverw hat 's w rong w ith the current system of intelligence as it is to designth e values, the structure, the metrics, systems architecture a nd theculture of the new system. The cu rrent system is a hybrid product ofthe Cold W ar competing w ith the KGB and being changed from theoutside by the C ongress. It began w ith the FBI, O SS and m ilitaryintelligence c om petition of the Second World War and was then firstchanged by the N ational Security Act of 1947. Trying to reform thecurrent system is exactly the wrong strategy, what w e need to do isdesign the transforming 21st century system and then build bridgesfrom the curren t reality to the desired e nd state.2. Future security needs are vastly greater, more urgen t, and morechallenging than people think:

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a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD, mostly nuclear) andW eapons of Mass M urder (WM M , mostly biological but withsome chemical weapons) are more real and much more deadlythan either the Am erican people or their political-governm entalsystem think. Despite all of the rhetoric since 9/11, America ismuch more like Britain in 1935than B ritain in 1940. W e arevastly underestimating the threat and the urgency;

b. The Islamic Civil W ar between th e irreconcilables (largelyW ahhabi and Deobandi) and the modernizing wing (very smalland mostly in Europe, the US and outside the Arab world) andthe traditionalists is likely to last until 2070 or later. Today th eirreconcilables have th e energy, th e moral force, and themomentum. There may be 39 to 52 million potential recruits forviolence and the number is grow ing (source: CIA CounterTerrorism Center senior analysts);

c. Centers of danger beyond the Islamic Civil W ar continue togrow with Pakistan (possibly th e mo st precarious an ddangerous nu clear-capable co untry in the w orld in 2004) andSaudi Arabia. North Korea and their state-controlledW M Denormously complicates the intelligence challenges of trying tofocus on both non-state and state at the same time. The China-Taiwan relationship, Russia and Iran are additional examples ofconcerns Am erica must have beyond th e Islamic terrorist threat;

d. There is an enormous am oun t of ungoverned territory on theplanet (seeattached map Possible Remote H avens for Terroristand Other Illicit Activity) and there is no practical way toimplem ent a no sanctuary policy for terrorists w ithou t anenormous expansion of governed areas (themap illustrateslargely rural ungovern ed areas but most third w orld large citieshave huge ungo verned zones in w hich police are powerless);e. There is a Gray World of people sm ugg ling (including 800,000slaves a year), illegal arms trade, illegal international narcotics,illegal transportation and illegal crime of traditional sorts. ThisGray World (theterm is George Tenet's) provides a gray

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underside to the emerging global econom ic system and is aforce multiplier for any terrorist group with money.3. Our o pponen ts are intelligent, determined, and adap tive. Theyincreasingly stud y us and practice denial and decep tion. We shou ld

find it very sobering that they could carry off bombings in Madrid,Chechnya and Iraq virtually with impu nity. W e should have noillusions about how little w e have accomp lished in trying to penetratean d defeat our terrorist opponents. Furthermore, their use of publiccommunications to convey their messages has been vastly superior toour efforts to do the same. W e should be very humbled by the resultsof the first three years of the direct w ar betw een Am erica andirreconcilable Islamists.4. Intelligence in a 21st century highly-complex world w hich includesreal t ime information systems and weapons of mass m urder and massdestruction has to be:

a. Comprehensive;b. Real time;c. Dem and pulled across all institutiona l boun daries;d. Centered on human intelligence;e. Analyzed by people w ith sophisticated unde rstanding ofcultures and personalities we are opposing; andf. All of the abov e should be reflected in a comp letely new formof daily presen tation to the President, the senior Nationa lSecurity and Homeland Security officials and the leaders ofCongress to ensure they are staying informed about a very

complex real time w orld.5. To create the kind of large scale strategic achievem ents Alfred Sloandeveloped at General Motors in the 1920s and General George CMarshall managed in the Second World War you must:

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a. Insist on coming to the right solution and only then begin tocompromise. If policy makers only see the compromisedversions, they will never know what their advisers thoughtshould really be done. Let the elected officials make the toughcompromises but insist on giving them th e real options tochoose from;

b. Create a systemic planning process to ensure that all echelonsthoroughly understand wh at they are supposed to accomplish(see attached Planning & Leadership Model);c. Make sure you have the right theory of the problem and thesolution (see John Nagl 's Counterinsurgency Lessons from

Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife for aclassic example of learning by the British and rejecting learningby th e Americans);d. Plan back from victory (this was the key to successfu llyfighting the Second World War in such a short time). The keymeasurem ent is not how far you have come but how far youhave to go.e. Plan everything in a deep-mid-near model where deep is ten

years out, mid is four to five years our and one is the next year.The absence of disciplined focus on deep first and then mid iswhy so m any daily decisions in Washington have no profoundimpac t over time. Decisions withou t context are simplyenergetic activity.f. Establish the right metrics to m easure achievement so youknow every day if you are doing the right things in the rightway. Establishing measurable metrics is a key to effective

implementation.6. Insist on including Congress in you r analysis. Un der our Constitution,Congress has co-equal responsibilities fo r establishing th e institutionsof national security. Congressional budgeting, congressional

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oversight, congressional limitations on activities have all had adramatic impact on our intelligence and national security institutions.To try to explain the absence of adequate human intelligencecapabilities on 9/11 without reference to the Church Comm ittee and aquarter of century of congressional hostility to dealing in hostileenvironments is simply historically false. To try to develop the futurenational security system by focusing only on the Executive Branch isa profound misreading of the American Constitution. It is time forsome group to tell the truth about the need for Congressional reformin national security.

7. Without getting into partisan scape-goating it is important to put theintelligence and policing functions in their historic context. Thepeople who were leading the FBI on 9/11 were operating in a culturethat had been p rofo und ly aloof at least since the early days of theSecond World War some 60 years earlier. The people who were tryingto get the intelligence co mm unity to w ork had been battered andshaped by attacks on the comm unity going back at least 30 years tothe attacks on Director Helms and others. Fixing these tw o sets ofinstitutions and cultures will require profound and not merely shallowchanges.

8. When we have everything right, everything fixed, with even the bestintelligence system in the world and the wisest leaders willing tolisten, we will still run a high risk of being surprised because we haveactive opponents who study us and practice denial and deception.Therefore, we need to have a surprise-surviving defense andHom eland Security system.

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Planning & LeadershipVISION

STRATEGIES

PROJECTS

TASKS

("A project is a definableI delegatable achievement and theI key to entrepreneurial rather thanL bureaucratic behavior.

c

Listen > Learn >A ppreciative unders

(active listening between tTRUE PRAGMA

(Listen for new facts and2004 A ll Rights Reserved The Gingrich Group, LLC

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The Nature of the RealIslamic Civil War(1.3 billion people) Modernizers Traditionalists Non-violentIrreconcilables

IraqAfghanistanSaudi ArabiaIndonesiaLibyaSyriaIranE g y p tPakistan (most dangerouspotentially)North KoreaColombia

9/11Osama

bin Laden'sSymbolic Victory"

Pool of Poten(39 - 52million

PotentVioleIrreconciThe Gray W orldand theUngoverned Areas

- Illegal narcotics and drug-dealing,- Illegal transportation,- International arms dealers,- International crime, and- People smuggling (800K slaves ayear and millions of others)

The 9/11 event proved you can focus the irreconcilables


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Memo on Previous Statements Relating to TerrorismbyFormer Speaker Newt Gingrich

Excerpts from Window of Opportunity by New t Gingrich with David Drake an dMarianne Gingrich - Chapter 10: The Dilemmas of Am erican Foreign and MilitaryPolicy (1984) "Any terrorist group which systemically exploited the vulnerabilities of oureconomy would discover that there was remarkably little planning forbackup systems in case the norm al routes and structures w ere destroyed. Ineffect, we have made ourselves vulnerable to any serious group terroristswho want to paralyze large portions of our economy and society." (p . 230) "Terrorism must be confronted because it is far m ore likely to have animpact on our lives than is nuclear war. Terrorism is more likely to killAmericans and to challenge o ur policies than is any other kind of force." (p .231) "We m ust develop a doctrine wh ich states clearly Am erican policy tow ardviolence aim ed at the destruction o f our society. W e m ust take the stepsnecessary to prove that no terrorist orga nization can kill Americans withimpunity." (p. 232) "The long-term struggle against terrorism will be a dark and bloody one,

involving years o f vigilant counterterrorism...and a willingness to strikeback with substantial force at the o riginators o f the action rather the footsoldiers of the terrorist action.. .W e m ust develop a doctrine which soseverely and directly threatens the leaders of terrorist m ove m ents thatthey refrain from attacking th e United S tates because they fear personalconsequences. Any other policy is an invitation to a blood bath in whichwe will certainly be the losers." (p . 232) "At a m i n i m u m , we will need closer relationships between the intelligenceagencies, th e diplomatic agencies, th e economic agencies, th e military

agencies, the news m edia, and the political structure. There h as to be asynergism in which our assessment o f what is happ ening relates to ourpolicies as they are developed and im plem ented. Bo th analyses andimplementation m ust be related to the n ew s m edia and political sy stem

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because all basic policies m ust have pub lic support if they are to succeed."(P - 239)

Gingrich Comment made 8/3/85 "We are a nation that has a nag ging toothache called terrorism. We havegotten throug h the last terrorist assault with almost no casualties, few lessonsan d no medicine."

The National JournalAugust 3, 1985"Reagan Gets Mixed Reviews for His Loud Speech But Small Stick on Terrorism"By Christopher Madison

Gingrich Comment made 12/20/86 "What I'm trying to do is start an argument on how we live in the first thirdof the 21st century . M y centerpiece is that we are now a coun try whoseproblems are 100 or 1,000 times bigger than its solutions. Our three biggestproblems are that governm ent costs more than society will pay, we are notcomp etitive in the world market an d there is a requirement that we lead thefree world through the [Western] alliance and in the fight against terrorism."

The National JournalDecember 20, 1986"Eye of Newt"By Richard Cohen

Gingrich Comment made a day after February 26, 1993 World Trade CenterbombingThen mino rity whip, G ingrich said that Clinton needed to be "cautious" in cuttingthe defense budget. "There's a very real requirement for hum an intelligence andmilitary strength. Every time we hav e any display of weakn ess, any display oftimidity.. .here are people eager on the planet to take advantage of us."

www. opinionjournel. com (2/2 7/93)"A n Unheeded W arning" - 9/30/03,By Richard M initer2DRAFT 5/11/2004 2004 All Rights ReservedAmerican Enterprise InstituteP h: (202) 862-5948


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Comment made by Dr. Roy Godson 4/6/95 "It is entirely proper fo r Congress, if necessary, to take the lead in calling fo rthis type of com prehensive assessme nt of terrorism In the early 1980s,Congress, at the prodding of a then relatively little-known Congressmanfrom Georgia, New t Gingrich, forced the E xecutive Branch to issue annualpublic reports on Soviet efforts to influence W estern public o pinion, and inso doing perform ed a great service. If not for C ongressional urgin g, todaywe wou ld probably be without a national narcotics assessment as a weaponagainst international organized crim e. As the national interest demanded it,Congress pushed the Executive Branch; today, a comprehensiveoppo rtunity-oriented assessm ent of terrorism is very m uch in that samenational interest."

Testimony April 06, 1995President National Strategy Information Center House Judiciary InternationalTerrorism

By D r. Roy G odsonGingrich Comm ent made 5/10/95

"But the objective fact of the future is that the primary dangers of terrorismon the planet are essentially those of Islamic extremism and particularlythose financed and abetted by the Iranian governm ent." The RecordMay 10, 1995"Gingrich: Main Terrorist Threat Still From Iran"

Gingrich Co m me nt made 3/7/96 "We are, in fact, entering the age of terrorism," Gingrich said. "We've hadthis fantasy since the fall of the Be rlin W all that the age of freedo m hasarrived." Terrorism means m ore than bombs set off by shadowy groups,Gingrich said, but can extend to states threatening neighbors.

Telegraph Herald (Dubuque, IA )M a r c h ? , 19963

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Gingrich Com ment made 7/29/96 "I'm just saying I think you've got really look at what is your overallsystematic plan for dealing with terrorism, where do you get the best punchfor th e dollar? I'm just suggesting to you that we want to be very helpful butwe wan t to be helpful in a way that is effective and that actually gets the jobdone to save lives; it doesn't just make people feel good spending money,lots of activity, and then you discover, oh, here's this huge loophole thatsomebody over here was able to walk right throug h and pull off their act ofterrorism."

The NewsHour with Jim LehrerJuly 29, 1996Gingrich remarks made during the Keeper of the Flame A ward D inner, Center fo rSecurity Policy (9/18/96)

".. .There should be a thoroug h investigation of the current CentralIntelligenc e Agency " [note: Deutch was in charge at the time] "We should insist on the establishment of a professiona l Central IntelligenceAgency with a profession al director dedicated to the defen se of the U nitedStates rather than to the defense of left-wing politicians." "I believe there are three levels of dangers that we should deal with using

three different strategies...The first is terrorism; the second is adventurousor ou tlaw states; and the third is great powers." "We should insist on the re-establishment of hum an intelligence and thecapacity of the intelligence agency to.. .have spies." "This [Clinton] administration is stretching our military, frankly, [to] theverge of the breaking point." "We have to talk honestly about m ode rnization .. .at th e core of the survivalof our children's coun try, we need to reestablish a seriousness o f purpo sean d an hon esty of intellect an d a willingness to ha ve clarity, to havecoherence, and to have consistency. Or w e are going to once again face acrisis of enormous proportions, and we will pay in blood what we are givingup today in time and preparation."

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Gingrich Response to U.S. intelligence failures to anticipate Pakistani un derg roun dnuclear tests ".. .We have too little funding for intelligence, too few assets, too fewanalysts. I hope law ma kers will consider this wh en they adopt theintelligence budget."

The Wash ington PostMay 14, 1998Gingrich Response to Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania

"We need much better human intelligence, much more sophisticated effortsto go after terrorists and others."The Baltimore SunAugust 8, 1998

Gingrich Response to U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan after Embassybombings "We cannot allow a terrorist group to attack American embassies and donothing. And I think we have to recognize that we are now committed toengaging this organization and breaking it apart and doing wh atever we haveto suppress it, because we cannot afford to have people who think that theycan kill A mericans w ithout an y consequence." "I think it 's very im portant that we send a signal to countries like Sudan andAfghanistan that if you house a terrorist, you become a target. And if youwa nt to get rid of the target, yo u've got to get rid of the terrorist."

Gingrich response to US Strikes against Osam a bin Laden's networkC N N BREAKING NEWS 13:45 pm ETAugust 20, 1998; Thursday 1:45 pm Eastern Time

Gingrich Discussing the $1.5 billion emergency supplemental funds approved forU.S. intelligence agencies for FY99

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Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-Fla.) chairman of the House Permanent SelectCom mittee on Intelligence, credited Gingrich as the m ain architect of thespending package, saying he had been pushing for an additional $1 billionfor intelligence for several months. $200 million of the package was addedto intelligence fo r anti-terrorism efforts involving the FBI along with theCIA and the Pentagon. "Past cuts in intelligence have h urt key programs, including innovation ofadvanced technological collection techniqu es as well espionage ope rationsand analysis. The new programs are specifically tailored to provideprotection to both U .S. citizens and our co un try's interests in the newmillennium."

The WashingtonPostOctober 23,1998

Recommendations from the Hart-Rudman Commission (The United StatesCommission on National Security/21st Century) Recommendations, Phase I(9/15/99) - NewW orld C oming: American Security in the 21 st Century, Phase II(4/15/00)- Seeking a National S trategy: A Concert fo r Preserving Security andPromoting Freedom, andPhase III (3/15/01) - Building ForPeace Phase I, commission's view of the future believes in part that, (11): "We

should expect co nflicts in which adversaries, because of cultural affinitiesdifferent from our own, will resort to forms and levels of violence shockingto our sensibilities." Conclusions to draw, Phase I, in part, (1): "America will becomeincreasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our militarysuperiority will not entirely protect us.. .States, terrorists, and otherdisaffected groups w ill acquire weapo ns of mass destruction and massdisruption, and some w ill use them. Am ericans will likely die on Am ericansoil, possibly in large numbers." First key objective stated in Phase II: "To Defend The Un ited States And

Ensure That It Is Safe From The Dangers Of A New Era." First section of executive summary in Phase III, Securing theNationalHomeland: "The com bination of unco nven tional weapons p roliferation withthe persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulne rability6DRAFT 5/11/2004 2004 All Rights ReservedAmerican Enterprise InstitutePh: (202) 862-5948


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of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack againstAmerican citizens on American soil is likely ov er the nex t quarter century." Among the 50 recommendations in Phase III that the commission pushedfor: 1) "The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heightenAmerica's ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attack on the

hom eland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail."Gingrich Testimony: Hou se Comm ittee on Armed Services

.. ."Terrorism is a much m ore profound threat than we have responded to. Itshould trouble every American that we've been trying to get bin Ladensince 1993. You just m entioned the cost of repairing an Am erican wa rshipdamaged by terrorists. W e should all be concerned that we don't have theintelligence to know where they are, the ability to preempt, or the capacity topunish. And in fact, we have people who ro utinely go around the worldholding press conferences explaining they're at war w ith the United States.This is a serious strategic challenge to us."

In response to question during Q&A period: "We felt that a HomelandSecurity Agen cy w as a more appropriate response.. .w e felt that in term s ofhaving a better grip on wh at happens around ou r coasts and around ourborders, that the Coast Gu ard and the enforcem ent parts of the CustomsService and the Border Patrol are logically a coherent part of this kind of aHom eland Security A gency, far more so than they are in the cu rrent agencieswhere they're em bedded. But I strongly commend w hat you've introduced. I do hope that all of yourcolleagues in both parties will look at it carefully. And I do think we needsome kind o f systematic effort to develop a capacity to respond to an eventof mass destruction or mass d isruption in one of our major cities." .. ."The customs and the Border Patrol ought to be integrated, in ourjudg m ent, into a Hom eland Security Ag ency. It is absurd when onecomputer can't talk to the other a nd they're sitting right on the bordertogether, or when on e union w ork rule blocks somebody from being

practical. W e ought to have the most efficient possible bo rder, because wewant the maximum flow of trade, and that cannot happen if there's greatinefficiency." House Committee on Armed ServicesMarch 21, 2001

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Senator Ru dm an's Senate Testimony (9/21/01) praising Newt Gingrich as the"Father" of the Homeland Security concept

"Let m e tell you, interestingly enough, you know, Newt Gingrich, who wasthe father of this idea, on the theory that no good deed goes unpunished,when he left the House, was put on this commission. And he is a historianwho brought a lot of insight."Senator Warren RudmanSenate TestimonySeptember 21,2001

CIA Director George Tenet's comment at Joint House and Senate SelectIntelligence C omm ittee on pre-9/11 intelligence failures that Ne wt Gingrich w asthe only person to obtain an intelligence fun ding increase in the 1990s (10/17/02)

"Counterterrorism funding and manpower needs were number one in everylist I provided to Congress and the adm inistration. Indeed it was at the top ofthe funding list approved by Speaker Gingrich in 1999, the first year inwhich we received a significant infusion of new money for intelligence. Thatsupplemental and those that follow it that you supplied were essential to ourefforts and they helped save American lives."C IA Director George TenetJoint House and Senate Select Intelligence CommitteeOctober 17, 2002

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FO B6 American Enterprise Fdr- 5-11-04 Gingrich Briefing Papers and Charts on Terror and Security (Fair Use)

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