FMEA Objective, scope and goal(s): Key Date: System: Potential Subsystem: Failure Mode and Effects Analysi Component: Design Design Lead: Core Team: rev 1.0 42303 Item / Function 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 © TLC, 2003 Potential Failure Mode(s) Potential Effect(s) of Failure S E V Potential Cause(s)/ Mechanism(s) of Failure P R O B Current Design/Process Controls D E T R P N
FMEA Analysis
Oct 31, 2014
Automotive core tools FMEA refernce.
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
FMEA Objective, scope and goal(s):
Key Date:
System: PotentialSubsystem: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)Component: Design
Design Lead:
Core Team:
rev 1.0 42303
Item / Function
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0© TLC, 2003
Potential Failure Mode(s)
Potential Effect(s) of Failure
SEV
Potential Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s) of Failure
PROB
Current Design/Process
Controls
DET
RPN
FMEA Type: Design
Potential FMEA Number: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Prepared By:
FMEA Date:
Revision Date:
Page: of
Action Results
Actions Taken
New
Sev
New
Pro
b
New
Det
New
RP
N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Recommended Action(s)
Responsibility & Target
Completion Date
Design FMEA Ex.
Page 3
Key Date:
System:
Subsystem:
Component:
Design Lead:
Core Team:
Item / Function
Seals
Compression set
Potential Failure Mode(s)
Coolant containment. Hose connection. Coolant fill. M
Sensor mount. Seal
Sensor mount. Seal
Loosen during sensor assembly/service
Sensor mount. Seal
Damaged internal thread
Sensor mount. Seal
Damaged external thread
Coolant containment. Hose connection. Coolant fill. M
Crack/break. Burst. Side wall flex. Bad seal. Poor hose rete
Design FMEA Ex.
Page 4
System:
Subsystem:
Component:
Design Lead:
Core Team:
Item / Function Potential Failure Mode(s)
Stress crack
Stress crack
Stress crack
Corrosion
Corrosion
Puncture
Coolant containment. Hose connection. Coolant fill. M
Crack/break. Burst. Side wall flex. Bad seal. Poor hose rete
Coolant containment. Hose connection. Coolant fill. M
Crack/break. Burst. Side wall flex. Bad seal. Poor hose rete
Hold fluid, flow path, Heat transfer structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Heat transfer structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Heat transfer structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Heat transfer structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Heat transfer structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Heat transfer structure
Design FMEA Ex.
Page 5
System:
Subsystem:
Component:
Design Lead:
Core Team:
Item / Function Potential Failure Mode(s)
Seam fail
Burst fail
Plugged
Ballooning
© TLC, 2003
Hold fluid, flow path, Heat transfer structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Heat transfer structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Heat transfer structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Heat transfer structure
Design FMEA Ex.
Page 6
FMEA Objective, scope and goal(s):
FMEA Type: Design
Potential FMEA Number: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Prepared By:
Design FMEA Date:
Revision Date:
Page: of
Action Results
Actions Taken
New
Sev
New
Pro
b
New
Det
0
0
Leak 8 Gasket material 7 1 56
8 2 Added rib. 1 16
5 2 1 10
4 3 1 12
Leak 8 Over pressure 8 1 64
Potential Effect(s) of Failure
Sev
Potential Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s) of Failure
Prob
Current Design/Process
Controls
DET
RPN
Recommended Action(s)
Responsibility & Target
Completion Date
Pressure cycle w/cold shock.
Use imported material
Leak. Fall inside tank
Fitting not held in place
Implement holding rib in design. New fitting design. Prototype validation.
J.P. Aguire 11/1/95
Cannot install sensor
Damaged during installation or transportation
Cannot install wire nut
Damaged during shipment to piracicaba
Damaged fitting not used by Piracicaba
Burst, validation pressure cycle.
Test included in prototype and production validation testing.
J.P. Aguire 11/1/95 E. Eglin 8/1/96
Design FMEA Ex.
Page 7
Potential FMEA Number: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Prepared By:
Design FMEA Date:
Revision Date:
Page: of
Action Results
Actions Taken
New
Sev
New
Pro
b
New
DetPotential
Effect(s) of Failure
Sev
Potential Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s) of Failure
Prob
Current Design/Process
Controls
DET
RPN
Recommended Action(s)
Responsibility & Target
Completion Date
Failed mount 5 Vibration 9 3 135 J.P. Aguire
Hose leak 6 5 2 60
0 Operator instruction
0
8 7 Thermal cycle 1 56 E. Eglin 8/1/96
0
8 7 5 280 Coolant ordered
8 10 1 80 E. Eglin 8/1/96
Vibration w/road tapes
Obtain GMB vibration road tape.
Overpressure. Poor clamp
Burst, validation pressure cycle w/GMB clamps.
Obtain GMB clamps and clamping specification.
J.P. Aguire 12/1/95
Air conditioning does not work. Sudden refrigerant loss.
Air conditioning does not work. Sudden refrigerant loss.
Leak. Loss of heat transfer.
Wicking. Material strength
Included in Product Specification
Air conditioning does not work. Sudden refrigerant loss.
this is a test while dan is here
Leak. Loss of heat transfer.
Coolant quality. Contamination. Environment - int/ext.
SWAT, service simulation. Coolant evaluation.
Brazilian coolant to be evaluated. Zince lined tubes may need to be released. Simulated service test w/GMB coolant to be performed.
J.P. Aguirre 11/1/95
Leak. Loss of heat transfer.
External damage. Coolant velocity. No reinf sawcut.
Leak test. Simulated service.
100% cores tested in production. Simulated service included in Product Specificatin.
Design FMEA Ex.
Page 8
Potential FMEA Number: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Prepared By:
Design FMEA Date:
Revision Date:
Page: of
Action Results
Actions Taken
New
Sev
New
Pro
b
New
DetPotential
Effect(s) of Failure
Sev
Potential Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s) of Failure
Prob
Current Design/Process
Controls
DET
RPN
Recommended Action(s)
Responsibility & Target
Completion Date
5 Environment - int/ext. 1 1 5 E. Eglin 8/1/96
8 2 Burst/leak pressure 5 80 GMB 12/1/95 Study originated
8 7 1 56 Coolant ordered
5 9 8 360 GMB 12/1/95
0
0
0
Leak. Loss of heat transfer.
SWAT, service simulation.
Included in Product Specification.
Leak. Loss of heat transfer.
Over pressure contamination.
GMB to study engine cleanliness.
Loss of heat transfer. Leakage due to increase flow velocity
Contamination. Coolant quality.
GMB coolant to be evaluated. GMB to study engine cleanliness.
J.P. Aguirre 11/1/95
Leak. Loss of heat transfer.
Over pressure contamination.
GMB to study engine cleanliness. Clustomer profile to be determined.
Design FMEA Ex.
Page 9
Action Results
New
RP
N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Design FMEA Ex.
Page 10
Action Results
New
RP
N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Design FMEA Ex.
Page 11
Action Results
New
RP
N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Severity Criteria
Page 12
System FMEA Severity Rating
Effect SEVERITY of Effect Ranking
10
9
Very High 8
High System inoperable with equipment damage 7
Moderate System inoperable with minor damage 6
Low System inoperable without damage 5
Very Low System operable with significant degradation of performance 4
Minor System operable with some degradation of performance 3
Very Minor System operable with minimal interference 2
None No effect 1
Hazardous without warning
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe system operation without warning
Hazardous with warning
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe system operation with warning
System inoperable with destructive failure without compromising safety
Severity Criteria
Page 13
General SEVERITY RANKING TABLE
Rank Category External and Internal Effect
10 Liability Failure will affect safety or compliance to law
9 Catastrophic customer impact
Moderate to major reliability failures
Reliability / End user recalls
Reputation Premature end-of-life (wear out)
at risk Increased early life failures
Intermittent functionality
Major customer impact
8 Minor reliability failures
7 Customer line impact / lines down
Impacts the yield of customer
Customer Wrong package / part / marking
quality Products performing marginally
inconveniences Involved customer's special handling
Damaged the customer's equipment
6 Product assembly error
5 Equipment cross contamination
Internal yield Damaged to down stream equipment
or special Major yield hit
4 handling Significant line yield loss
required Minor yield hit
3 Low line yield loss
2 Special internal handling, effort or annoyance
1 Unnoticed Unnoticed either internally or externally
Severity Criteria
Page 14
Prob. of Failure Criteria
Page 15
PROBABILITY of Failure Failure Prob Ranking
Very High: Failure is almost inevitable >1 in 2 10
1 in 3 9
High: Repeated failures 1 in 8 8
1 in 20 7
Moderate: Occasional failures 1 in 80 6
1 in 400 5
1 in 2,000 4
Low: Relatively few failures 1 in 15,000 3
1 in 150,000 2
Remote: Failure is unlikely <3.4 in 1,000,000 1
Detectability Criteria
Page 16
Detection Likelihood of DETECTION by Design Control RankingCannot Detect 10
Very Remote 9
Remote 8
Very Low 7
Low 6
Moderate 5
Moderately High 4
High 3
Very High 2
Almost Certain 1
Design control cannot detect potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Very remote chance the design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Remote chance the design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Very low chance the design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Low chance the design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Moderate chance the design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Moderately High chance the design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
High chance the design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Very high chance the design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
RPN InterpretationRPN NumberHigh Due to prob. of failureHigh Due to severityHigh Due to detectionModerate Due to detectionModerate Due to prob. of failureModerate Due to severityLow All
Change design or process Change design or process Change process control/test methodConsider improving present control/test methodConsider changing design or process Consider changing design or process Maintain present status
Related Documents
