Headquarters Oepartment o f the Army . "- - +-- - " , --- \\ - SPECIALIZED W A R FARE AND REAR AREA SUPPORT DISTRIBUTI ON RESTRIC TION : This publication contains technical or operational information that i s for official Government use only. Distribution i s limited to US Government aaencier. Rsauesta - -7 - - from outside the U S Government for release of this publication under he Freedom of Information Act or the Foreign Milita ry Sales Program must be made to H Q TRADOC. Ft Monroe. VA 23651.
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DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: This publication contains technical or operational information that
is for official Government use only. Distribution i s limited to US Government aaencier. Rsauesta- - 7 - -from outside the US Government for release of this publication under he Freedom of Information
Act or the Foreign Military Sales Program must be made to H Q TRADOC. Ft Monroe. VA 23651.
This field manual is part of FM series 100-2,TheSot r i e tAmy . The other volumes are
FM 100-2-1,m e Sozriet A r m y : O p a t i o r z s a n d T ac tic s, and FM 100-2-3,The SorMet
A m y : Troops,Organization atzd Equipnzent.These manuals cannot stand alone but
should be used interchangeably.
These field manuals serve as the definitive source of unclassified information on
Soviet ground forces and their interaction with o ther services in combined arnls
warfare. These manuals represent the most current unclassified information and they
will be updated periodically. More information would become a.railable in the event o f
war o r national emergency.
Users of this publication are encouraged to recommend changes and submitcomments for its improvement. Key comments to the specific page and paragraph in
which the change is recommended. Provide a reason for each comment to insure
understanding and complete evaluation. To send changes or comments, prepare DA
Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and fomard it
to Deputy Commander,USA CACDA, ATTN: ATZL-CAT, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.
3 H F L I B O R N E O P E R A T I O N S . . . . . . . . . . 3 -1DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 1MISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 1
5 U N C O N V E N T I O N A L W A R F A R EO P E R A T I O N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 -1DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 1MISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 -1
R e g im e n ta l M e d ~ c a l u p p o rt . . . . . . 1 3 - 2 0Div is ion Medica l Suppor t . . . . . . . . . 1 3 - 2 1Army-Leve l Medica l Suppor t . . . . . . 1 3 - 2 1
This field manual is part of FM series 100.2. T i k
.W)zr'et 3nr!1~.t should be i lxd with the othe r manualsin this series, FM 100-2- , Thr.W)z$rtAn~(~*:pratiorz.q
and tactic.^, and FM 1 00-2-3,7he So r r'rt An?qt: troop.^,
Oq~lizjz~ltzorli t z f / ~izdiptric~t~t.
The term "specialized ~.a rf are ," I X ~ n the title of
this FM , is intended to be an abbreviated, collectivedescription of combat actions ~v hi ch , n ITS termi-nolog): may be descr ibed as "special operat ions" or"operations in special conditions." These a re arbitrar)categorizations used onljr o describe combat actionsothe r than those general forms of Soviet ground forcesoperations and tactics discussed in FM 100-2- . Ike of
the tern1 "special" does not imply that the combat;ictions discussed in this FM represent abnormal fonnsof operatio ns or tactics. They are all an integral part of
Soviet military doctrine. Special operations includeairborne, heliborne, and amphibious operations, andunconventional Lmrfilre in the enemy rear.
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
During W'orlci War 11, the Soviets gained s omeexperience with airborne operations in combat.Because they lacked the transport aircraft required forlarge-scale operations. they employed the airborne
troops mainly as infiintr). Since the war, the Sovietshave completely reequipped their large airborne forceand built a large f ee t of transport aircraft to support it.Airborne units played key roles in Soviet intementionin Czechoslovakia ( 1968 ) and Afghanistan ( 19'9 ).
The airborne force currently consists of sevendivisions.
Heliborne operations are relatively new to theSoviets. They ha\,e built an impressive fleet of transportand gunship helicopters and have trained assault
troops. Ho~vever. ntil the Afghanistan intervention.they lacked actual cornki t experience \vith this hp e ofoperation. Motorized rifle o r airborne troops o r ;in airassault brigade assigned to a ,f?orzt, could conduct
~ heliborne opperations.
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
Amphibious operations are primarily the respon-sibilih of the Soviet naval infantq ( nlarines), a smallbut growing force. Di~rillgWorld War 11, the SovietArmy and Na\y conducted many amphibious opera-tions, mainly on river and inland seas within the SovietUnion. They have never conducted massive
amphibious assault opera tions like those co nducted bythe ITS n the Pacitic and the Allies in North Africa andEurope during W'orld K'ar 11. 111recent years, the Sovietnaval infantq has been revitalized and reequipped. Itcurrently has three independent regiments ;tnd one~lnclerstrength ivision and is supported by :I growing
fleet of amphibious ships and small aircraft carriers.This elite force trains in joint e ser cises with airborneilnits, and it undoubtedly has an intemention or poure rprojection mission.
The So~~ietsave a varieh of special purpose iulitschat are trained and eqiripped for unconventionalu.arfarc ( I AX')missions. Recause of their political sen-
sitivih. I'W' activities are managecl at the highest levelof govemmel-tt authority. They are directed by theCommittee for State Securih ( K G B ) and the General
Staffs &lain Intelligence Ilirectorate (CiRIr).
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Special operations certainly ~vill e conducted inwartime, atld some of thes e will play important roles inpeacetime inten tmio n and pow er projection beyondSoviet borclers.
Operations in special conditions include rivercrossings, mountain and desert \\w-kire, and combat in
extreme colcl, in cities, and at night.Soviet grou nd forces are well equipped and trained
for river crossings.The Soviets consider the capabilityto cross water barriers from the march on a broadfront with minimal delays an essential element inmaintaining a rapid rate of advance in an offensive.River crossings ar e a consistent feature of Soviet fieldexercises.
'VZhile no particular Soviet divisions are identified asbeing tailored or trained specificalljr for mountain ordesert ~mrf'are. ome di\.isions are suited for combat inthese envirolltnents as a result of their base locations.The Soviets undoubtedly a re gaining more experiencein mountain \\.arfare from their increased use ofmilitary force in po\ver projection, such as inAfghanistan.
Soviet ground forces also are well prepared forcombat in estremc cold. The majorit). of Sovietdiirisions are located in areas ~ vi th arsh lvinters.
Rased on their W'orld WarI 1
experience andrecognition of the ~lrb anizlt ion f Europe, the Sovietsrealize that combat in cities \vould be common to mostmilitar) operations. 'fheir training reflects thisrealization.
One of the principles of Soviet operational art ancltactics is the prosecution of combat rel entl ess l~~,tndcrall conditions of ~~isibilih. ith this principle, theSoviets strive to be capable of continuous combat,during daylight, o r at night. The Soviets concluct mucho f their training during hours of darkness.
The last part of this FM dc-als with the organizationand fittlctions of the elenlents which constitute the
Soviet "rear." (;ollecti\.el~~,hese elements pro~ride\vhat, in ITS te rn~ in ol op , s called comh ;~tsenrice
support.Soviet logistics have been inacci~rate ly escribed as
;I major ~ veak ness n Solriet militar). pow'cr. Sovietforces d o receive effective logistic support, but i t is
different in concept and organization from I[S Amqrlogistic support .
Since the 19(10s, the So\.iets h;tire given increasedattention to the devclopnient of their airborne cap;[-bilities. Extensive reequipment of the Soviet airborneforces has given them increased mobility and fire-po\\,er. i ; ro ~~ ndssault tactics also have changecl. Once
landed, airborne units can operate as motorizedrifle units. Soviet air transport capabilities have also
been greatly improved.This moclernization prograni is based on tlie Soviet
principles of tmmobilitj; surprise, and combat activeness .Tlmc So\ icts view their air1,orne forces as a means to
carry the into the depths of the enemy's position.'T1icjr believe that :tirhorne forces can and must be ~tscci\viclely on tlie moclern battletield.
The Soviets h;c\,e long recognized the value of an
airborne force. Sovict nmilitiuq, planners, such asGener;cl Tukhachevsh~~,oresa\v the value of troopslvho cou ld he deployed by air as e;~rly s the 1920s.On
August 2. 1950-the otficial "birthday" of the SovietAirborne-the first airborne exercise in ~o l\ ~i ng2men \ras conducteel. Within 0 years, tlie Soviets \\.erefielding indepenclent ;cirborne brigades \\hichincluded xtilleq. armor, antitimk, reconn:ciss;tnce.and air transport subunits. HI , the beginning of \YforlclWar 11, the Soviets had 1i independent airhorne
brigades.'l'he Soviets' use of their a ir l~orne roops during
Wforld Wr:cr 11 isas se\.erely restricted for lack ofaviation assets. Nevertheless, nlore than 50 Sovietairborne operations \yere conducted during the \%.ar.Most of tlmese operations wer e stmmall in scale. The large-scale oper;ctio& that \vere conclucted Lvere m;crkedhj.poo r planning and execution. Questions of theor) andexecution concerned Soviet militan' planners for tlienext LO years. Attention \vas centered o n tlie problenm
of linkup b et ~veen irborne units operating in rearareas and advancing ground force ~ttmits.
In an effort to find solutions to the problems ofemplo)ment, the?, s\\.itched control of the airborne
forces from one conimand organization to another andincreased the available tirepmver. In 19+6, conmmandof tlme airborne \%is s\vitclm& from tlme Air Forces to theMin is ty of I>efcnse, in 1956 to the Soviet (irounclForces, anti finally in 19 6i , Iwck to the Mitlistq. ofIlefense. Tlmc principal \veapons added t o the airborne
in\,entoq during the tirst LO post\\,ar years kvere theAS : - i 7 self-propelled assault gun ( 1955 )a nd thc ASIT-X i self-propelled ;issaitlt gun ( 1900 ).
Hou,ever, it is not until the 1900s that the Sovietmilitary bcg;un to x) l\ ,e the problenms o f force linkup.
Solutions resulted primarily from the Soviet decisionto deploy nonstrategic nuclear wrapons. Nuclearstrikes \vould pernmit I;~rge round force format ions to111o\.e rapidlj. into tlie enemy's depth. Today, theSoviets' huge buildup of conventional weapons hasalso made possible a massive conventional air, missile,and artillen. strike to make linkup easier in a non-ni~clear var.
l'lie resolution of the linkup problem resulted in a
niajor program to reequip airborne units. The 120-mmmortar, the 122-mrnhowitzer. modern antitank and airdefense \\,capons, rocket launchers, and the airborneamphibious iimhtmtr). combat vehicle (BMI ) ) \vereadded to equipment inventories. The BMD is of par-ticular importance. With its deployment in the 1970s.
airhorne units made significant gains in mobility andfirelx)\\~er. oday airborne units can conduct a broadrange of combat missions to include many nornmallyassociated with nmotorized rifle or light armor units.
The present Sn ie t airborne force is formidable. Itcan be delivered to great distances. It is highly mobile,and can assault a prepared position or a well-armedenemy force. It is also an excellent force to use forpower projection.
DOCTRINE
Soviet military doctrine calls for using airborneforces in both conventional and nuclear environments.Airborne units are an integral part o f many opera tionsat army and .fiu)jlt levels. Aerial en\relopment of theenemy has become an important maneuver in modernoffensive operations. The primary theater \varFxe roleof airhorne units is to support the rapid adl anc e of alarge conmhinecl arms force deep into the enemy's
ol,c~rntiotitil or o/,c.t-rrtiotz~I-strc~tc~~~icepth. Airborneunits may be uscd in coi~junc tionwith an operationalmaneuver group (Obi(; ) during offensive operations.Tlme OhlG is a combined arms formation employed in;irmy- and,@otrt-level offensive operations to raid deepinto the enemy's rear area. The Soviets conducted theirmilitary cxercise ZAPAIl-81 to test "new concepts ofmilitary science and art." I l~ lr ing hese exercises,airborne units \vere used extensively in support of anolxrational timaneuver group.
Tile Soviets also use airborne forces as a means of
projecting po\lrer. This \vas demonstrated by theirinmsions of i:zcchoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in1Y79. In both instances, a major portion o f the Sovietinvasion force consisted of airborne units. Airborne
sities with r exnre officer commissioning programs.
Commissioned graduates of the Ryazan Higher
Airborne Command School usually spend their entire
Like warrant officers throughout the Soviet armedforces, warrant officers in the airborne forces are
selected and sent to warrant officer training schools
f
after being trained and having senred as -noncom-
missioned officers. Warrant officers serve as platoon
leaders; company technicians, or company first
sergeants.
~ ir tu al ly ll airborne noncommissioned officers - 1began their senriceas two-year conscriptswho demon-
strated high motivation and political reliability. Many iare selected for noncommissioned officer training by - 1the district military registration office at the time of
induction. They are then assigned directly to the
airborne training division for at least 6 months of
speciali~edraining. Upon completion of this training,
they are awarded an NCO rank and are assigned to one
of the regular airborne divisions
All enlisted conscripts in airborne units ( like almost
all Soviets youths) have undergone at least 140 hours
of IIOSAAF-sponsored premilitary training either
during their last 2 years of formal schooling, or at theirjobs. Most have undergone DOSAAF premilitary
parachute training, thus reducing the training that
conscripts need. <:onscripts receive 4 weeks of basic
training after which they receim additional instruction
Drop zones are as close t o objectives aspossible. TheSoviets prefer that DZs be within 30 kilometers of thefinal objective. If circurnstancespernlit, d ro p zones areon the objective itself.
The first element is a securit). element and is respon-sible for eliminating enemy resistance in the DZ. TheSoviets try to conlplete the operation in one flight.However, if more than one flight is used, the firstassault wave will contain forward command post s and
crew-served air defense and antitank weapons, as wellas maneuver units. The second wave will consistprimarily of support elements.
Airborne Assault
Assaults can be conducted up to 500 km from the
- . -FEBA ~n support of Army or front operations
DROP ZONEb
Preferred bo p zones are w~t hi n 0 km
of final objective
fT v ~ ~ c a lror, zones mea-
s&e 3 km b y 4 km.
Regiment is allocated
one or two drop zones-
If two drop zones are
used, battalion integrity
will be maintained.
Division uses 4 to 6 drop
zones.
Alternate zones designated for
emergency use.
If circums tances permit, drop zones are on me
objective itself
ALTERNATE ZONES
Flight routes are chosen to minimize flight time t othe d rop zone. They also are planned to minimize thethreat of aerial intercept and ground air defense.
Airborne unit marshaling areas are dispersed toprevent detection of an imminent operation and toreduce vulnerabilih to nuclear strikes. Conversely,marshaling areas must be close enough to departureairfields t o make loading on aircraft eas ier. Normally,no more than a company can be expe cted in any onearea.
Airborne troops scheduled for an operation arestrictly segregated from the surrounding population.Units receive their rnissions in the marshaling areas.Having received their missions, unit commandersorganize their units for loading on aircraft.
Loading is accomplished so that lead aircraft over adrop zone carry reconnaissance and se cur ih troops tosecure the I>%.The security force is armed to defendagainst enerny air and armor attack. Main assault forcesare loaded s o that platoons, companies, ;~ nd attalionsland with as much unit integrit j. as possible.
For securit) rcasons, airdrops are planned to takeplace at night, whenever possible. llnit s normally move
to departure areas after nightfall. Radio silence is
obsemed in marshaling areas and while en route t o andat departure airfields.
Normally, more than on e airfield will be used if morethan on e regiment is involved in an operation. Ft-orztcill
aviation and,porzt and army air defense weapons mayprovide air defense for both the marshaling anddeparture areas. In an emergency, close-in air defensecould b e provided by the airborn e unit's \ileapons.
Asa minimum, aviation, rockets and missiles, groundforces incursions, unconventional ~ var fare , r naval firesupport must gain local air superiority for theoperation. Recognizing that local air superiority maybe achitlred for only a short period of time, Sovietsprefer to accomplish the airdrop in on e flight.
Air Movement
During the flight to th e dro p zone (DZ ) o r landingzone (LZ) , aircraft fly in a formation that insurzs the
prope r jump sequence. Commanders and their chiefsof sta@ at batta lion level and above are in separateaircraft to insure that a unit's entire commandstructure would not be lost if one plane we re shot
down.The S oi~iets onsider the air movement phase of an
airborne operation to be its most \.ulnerable phase.They emphasize the necessity for creating a threat-freeflight corridor from the departure area to the DZ or LZ.All a long the flight path, fire support assets ar e targeted iagainst enemy air defenses. Fighters and fighter- - 1bombers escort transport aircraft to protect them fromenemy fighters and ground fires. Protection of the airmovement phase will be carefully coordinated.
Passive defense measures taken during the airmovement phase include conducting movementduring hours of darkness, using more than o ne flightroute, maintaining radio silence. ar.d flying at lowaltitudes. The Soviets also may use elect ronic warfaremeasures during air movement.
Airdrops 9The Soviets attempt to complete their airdrops
before dawn. To sirnplifi the a irdrop, the Soviets
probably emplo!. only one t ?pe of riircr;tft for each 11Z.The Soviets normall! conduct con11,;1t airdrops at an
altit~ldeof 150 to $00 meters. 'lliey cniphasize the
necessity to drop at lo\\, ;~ltitutle o t-ninimize theamount of time indivicluals are in the air. I,o\v altitucledrops also increase the likelihood that ;I n nit's
personnel and equipment \ \ , i l l I;lnd close together.During some training exercises, the Soviets haveconducted personnel clrops as low as 100 meters. but
there is no indication that such lo\\ altitudes arestandarcl. I h e Soviets also h:lvc used stcerithleparachutes in an effort to increase tiit it integrit).cluringairdrops.
The tirst element to be dropped is a srn;lll reconnais-sance and security force. *She main assault force is
dropped at Ic-ast 15minutes filter. Ihe I1MI>sand crc.n,-sened \vc;ipons precede their respective personnelduring the ;tirdrop.
The Soviets li;~\,eeveral rnetliods for dropping c;irgo
by pa ra ch ~~ te . quipment ~vcigliing less than $0kilognmls ( 6 6 p o ~ ~ n d s )s clropped in paddeclcontainers. Equipment \\.cighing up to 1,000kilograms ( 2 ,2 0 0 poirncls ) is securecl to stanclard cargop1;ttforms. Rhll1s. motor vehicles, self-propelled guns.and other he;ny items rna!Ire s e c ~ ~ r c do speci:~I hock-ahsor1,ing pl;~tformstnci clroppecl niulti -par;~chutesystem. Tlie Soviets also use. notishock-;~bsorl,ingplatforms \vi th a retro-rocket britking p;tr;ichu te
I . .system. ' fi e retro- rocke t s?.stem, ~t se d xtensively todr op Bbll)s, is supposed to ;illon, its cargo to descendfive to six times ktster than the multi-parachute system.TLVO round probes, mounted o n diagonal corners ofthe cargo platform, elcctric;~lly ire the ret ro-rocketsystem's explosive charge. 7'he explosive chargedetonates \vlien the sensors toc1c.11 the ground andclose the electricill circuit
Drop Zone Procedures
The reconnaiw;lncc :mcl security force's imt-nedi;ttrmission is t o secure the 11%before the main body lands.'Iliis force, ~vhi ch ould be up to a company for eachd ro p zone ~ ~ s e dn a regimental :~irdrop ,akes itp defen-sive positions around the I)%'s perinieter . Of sr)eci;llconcern are the main enem!. ;ivenues of appro;ich int o,the I >% . The force also est:ihlisIies listening ancl obser-vation posts tw!vnd the 11% to provide e;lrly \\-arningofan appr(~~c11ingnctny. Antitank and air defenx
weapons itre integrated into the perinietcr clefense.If the main bod!. is airrlroppcci during da!,liglit
hours, personnel rrio\.e directly t o their predesignateclattack positions. Iwt if the drop zone is not o n tficobjective, personnel assemble in battalion assembly
areas. fio\\.ever, if the airdrop is con dt~c ted t night,personnel assemble before occupying predesignatedattack positions. If the drop zone is not o n the ohjec-tive, personnel dropped during the hours of darkness:~sscmhle s companies and tnove to battalion assembly3 eas.
If the 11% is unclcr strong enern! attack, personnelassemble and move immediately to the I)Z perimeterto establish ciefensi\.e positions. I'ersonnel i~ s e ny
a\xilahlc H,1.111 to reinforce defensive positions. and donot sort out the Bhll>suntil after the enemy attack has
been repelletl.If the I> % is not o n the objecti\,e an d battalions
assemble first, they tqp o avoid combat \vith enemyunits. They attempt to evade enemy groutid forces and
hide from an air thrcat. If required to actively defendagainst an air attack, at least one entire platoon percompany or one company per battalion is assigneti themission.
The Soviet5 consicicr ;in enemy air attack to he aserious threat to ;I landed ;tirlrorne force. Hesides theregiment's cre\~. -sc rved rid shoulder-fireel stir defense\\.eaipons, the So~iets .oitld use small arms fire. andeven KPCts, .YT(;IZts, anel the HMI)'s miin gun against airattack.
M'lien a n enemy threat against the I)% h;is been suc-cessfully neutralized or suppressed, units move tobattalion i~ssen11>1!' are;^^ Ioc;~ted either at tlic 11%boundaq. o r a k\v h~tndredmeters o~ttsicle he 11%.
If a follorv-on air laneling is planned, the regiment's
initial assault force leaves a rear detachment at the I>Zto provide sec~~rit!.nd to ;~ssist n the landing of thefollo~\.-onorce.
The airclrop and reorg;uiizatior~ph;ise ;it the I>% isconsiderecl t o I,e the second-most \vlnerable period inan airborne operation follo\ving the air movementphase. Al l actions taken at tlic I)% are to clear the I>Zbefore ;un enem\. fi)rce arrives.
Movement to the Objective
A regimental-sized :~irbortieoperation uses threepredesignatecl batt:~lionassetnhlj. areas o n or near theboun d;~ q f the I )% . hlovernent t o the final objectivemost often is niadc in h;~tt;ilionm:lrcli columns alongparallel routes. Battalions may he assigned separatefinal objectives. (:or-npanics and pl;ltoons are oftenassigned interniediate missions (r ai ds ) to he
accomplished during their niovement to the finalobjecti\,e.
Speed and security are the primal?, concerns duringrnovet-nent to the ol,jecti\-c. Hatt:tlions ~i io \, e n atactical marcll formation as long ;IS possible. Ttiis
formation ;~ l lo \vshe ba t ta lion t o m ov e s\vikl!. :und stillmaintain securit). . A unit in tactical march formationestablishes fo w ar d , f lank. and rear secur i ty e le rncnts .A batt;l l ion adva nce guar d coulcl b e i tp to I re i~ l forcec lcompany in s t rength . In th e m;dn body of any marchformat ion. a t tached a r t i l le ry e lements a re Ioc ;~ ted tt he he a d o f t h e c o lum n to a l l o~ v im m ec li at edeployqnent . Ant i tank wea pons a r e I txa ted behind the;trtillery follo\ved by any attached ere\\.-seneel ant i -
aircraft \f reapons.The a i r bo r ne f o r c e t r i es t o m a in ta in m o\ . c m e n t t o
the ob jec t ive even if an enem y force is enco i ln tc reddur in g th e march. If poss ib le , they evade enem!forcesdur ing the m a r c h . If no t , t hey a t ta c k the e ne m j r o r c c\v ith th e f o n~ t r c l e c u r ity e l e m e n t o f t he a dva nc eguard, but not necessarily \ \ , i t11 the main body. Thede c i s ion to de p loy the m a in body de pe n ds on the s iz eo f the e ne m y f o r c e . If t l ie force is too la rge to he
I~anc lled uccessful ly b j , the ad\ance guard but smalle n o u g h t o be dest royed quickly by the main body, thenth e c om m a nde r p r ob ;~ b lp v ill u se the m a in body toattack the enemy. 13owe\,er , if the enemy force is sol a r ge tha t t he c om m a nde r be l i e ve s the m a in bodywou ld bec om e dec isive ly engaged in an a t tack. then h e\vould a t te tnpt t o avoid contac t a nd lead th e main bocl j,on a n a l t er na te r ou te to the objective. In this case, theadvance girard \vould be lef t i n contac t \v i th thee ne m y.
If th e a i rbo rne force is mo\ . ing a t n ight , es tabl ishedroad ne tnrorks a re used to reach t he objec t ive quickl?.before dakvn. If m ovem ent is during th e day, th e unitmoves c ross-country us ing te r ra in fea tures to providec onc e a lm e n t i ~ he n e v e r o s s ib l e . I li t ri ng m ove m e n t ,the a i rborne force keeps the radios in the " rece i \ . eonly" mo de unt i l contac t i s mad e wi th th e enem) . . Inthe " r e c e ive on ly" m ode , on ly the c om m a nde rtransmits messages.
Dur ing the rnarch, the uni t mainta ins $00-degree
acrid ssun.eil lance. BMI) anci antiaircraft ( ,M ) gut1cre \vs a re g iven ; in a i r sec t or to kee p und er constantsun.eil lance. Visit ;d sun.eil lance is required Ixcaitscthere is no a ir defense rad; ~rn Soviet airb orn e units. If ;I
un i t c o r nc s und e r a s t r ong a i r a tt a c k , t he c o m m a nde rde p loys the AA gun s. If th e air attack is not repillsedim m c di ;~ te ly . he n the AA ele me nt may b e left in p1;lc.eto p r ov ide c ove ra ge ~ v h i l che m a in body c on t i t l i~ e stsmovem ent to th e objec ti \ re .
R e c o n n a i s s a n c e m i s s i o n s d u r i n g t h e g r o u n d
movement phase a re ext remely impor tant , s i r ice theinformation rcce i \ . ed before dep ar tu re may h e l imi tedo r perishable. For in l iw n~at io n n t l ie routes of marchan d e nem y fi)rces in th e area, th e ; i irborne comnl:underscncls out his recon naissa nce teitlns. Ho\vevcr , the on ly
clcdicatcd rcc,orinaiss;~ticc l l l i [ lssigncd to I I ~ lirl,orncf o r c e is t he r c c onn ; l i s~ u ic c o r npan) . ;kt cli\.isior~ e\.el.'Ih erc fo rc. ;un :tirl>orne I,;itt;llion cl ep lo !~ ~ n c of itsorganic p l ;~ to ons ;ls a rcconn:tiss;tncc ~xltrol.7ll ispl at oo n tn;l!, I1a1.e cn gi nc er o r cltc mi cal clefenscelerncnts :tttachccl.
71'l~e econ naissa nce patrol in\ .estigatcs the traf i ca-bi li ty of routes , ; ~ n d oss ible ambush and r i \ ,e r c ross ingsi tes. In t he o bjec t i \v a rea , the reconna issa tlce p ;~ tr ol
t r i e s t o loc ;~ tegood battalion assembly arc-as. Ther e c o n n a i s s a n c e p a t r o l a l so ; ~ t t e n i p t s t o g a ininfortnation o n enetn y secu rity out pos ts, fortif ications.tank an d antit:uik \Yeapons dispositio n. ancl resem cs.
I t1 genera l , the reconna issance c le tncnt movesi ~ n d e r o v er o f clarkness using the NiZ.II)'s onboardnavigation equipment to assist i ts movement. I t mayo p e r a t e u p t o I 5 kilometers in f ront of the main body.Reconnaissance pa t rols seek t o avoid co mba t n it11 th ee ne m y. If ; t t t ;~cked y ;In enem y force, they attem pt tobreak cont ; ic t and t o con t inu e to mov e fon\, arc l.
C om pa n ie s o r p l a toon s tha t ha ve a c c om pl i shed'1 1011ntern1edi ;i te miss ions ( ra id s) , march to b a t t I'
itssembly areas near their hattalion's final ol>jective.Th ere they join the i r ba t ta l ions in the assa~t l t
The Attack
Tim e spent in h a t t ;~ l ion ssembly a reas is kept to a
minimum. Bat ta l ion commanders conf i rm the i r uni ts t rength :&er the road march and ra ids . and receiveene lny s i tua t ion repor ts f rom the i r reconna issancepa t r o ls . B e c ai ls e a i r bo r ne ope r a t ions a r e c on duc te d\vitl lin ene my te rr itory ;mci requi re spe ed and surpr ise ,Soviet commanclers p lan to con du c t opera t ion s\vithout f i t11 personal reconnaissance. After com-manders have been i tpda ted on the s i tua t ion, theyre l ine th e rn iss ions of the i r subord ina te and a t tachedunits. Plans of attack almost al~ vay snvolve ; ~ nnve lop -
me nt o r llanli ;rtt;lck.Offensi\ ,e tactics of ; t irhome forces are similar t o
tho se of Soviet mot orized r ifle forces. I :nlike raids, thea t tack a t th e t ina l objec t ive usual ly i s con duc ted toove nv l i elm the e ne m y a nd to ga in c on t r o l o f an c ne m y-hel d areit or fr~cilit), . inal objectives m o s t c o m m o n in% ) \ k t a i r bo r ne e se r c i se s a r e r iver c r os s ing s i t es , ai r-f ields, ;lnd mo un tain passes.
Before the a t t ;~ck. uppo r t ing uni ts a re deployed top n ) \~ i ci e n ; ~ x i r n i l n ~uppo r t . Attachec l ;~r t i l Ie r ) supp or ts
the airborne imit as i t c loses in on :In objective.Engineer e lemen ts a rc posi t ioned to n iove in quickly;~ n d \veep the a rea of obstac les . Air c lefense sec t ionsa r e ~ x ~ s i t i o n e d' lierc. they can engage a t tackin genem yairc raf t o r he l icopte rs .
Hatt;~lionsnormall!. depart assembl!, areas in pre-battle formation. 71'l~is onsists of three compvnicsarrayed in a line, \+.eclge, or echelon. (:ompan)prebattle formation consists of three platoon columns1vitI-r 150 to LOO meters bet~ vee n olumns.
Attack formation norm;~lly s assumed within 1000meters of the objective, b ~ ~ t~lbullitsry t o get 21scloseas possible before dep1o)ing. A b o ~ ~ tOO fne ter s s tl-ren-rinimum distance for deployment into attack
formation.Platoons in a company attack formation deploy wit11
a 50 -meter in t en d between squad RMl)s, and a 50- toIo hn et er in te nd bet\veen platoons. The maximumattack frontage for at1 airborne company would be 500meters.
Before receiving the signal to attack, BMD radios arein the "recei\,e only" n-rode. Only the company com-mander and platoon leacler can transmit messages.On ce the attack begins. :ill radios can transmit and
receive messages.If the enemy is estimated to be weak-especially in
antitank \veapons-the airborne force may attack inone echelon \\it11 personnel nloi~ntecf n their RMIIs.Ho~vever.f the enemy is considered to be strong, theairborne force most likely \voi~ld attack in hvo
echelons Fvit1-r personnel dismounted. Ilismountedpersonnel adwnce between the HMIls and couldeither precede or follo\v them. The I3MDs fire fromshort halts.
In a night attack, the company commander gives theplatoon leaders an azimuth upon \vhicI-r to advance tothe objective. The. azirn~~thill be set on the direc-tional gyrocompass onboard the BMDs to guide eachplatoon o n its direction of attack.
kiz urc of a river crossing site hpicall). takesplace inthe same manner. Hokvever, the commander adjustshis plans to ;~c countor the peculiarities of the mission.'fie reconnaissance patrol's mission is modified to
include fincling s~l itable rossing sites so that units canbe deployed to seize key terrain o n both sides of theriver. <:omhat engineers also scout the riirer to de ter -mine its depth ancl u.icitl-r, speed of the current, riverbottom characteristics, existence of floating obstaclesand rnines, riverbank composition and slope, andapproaches o n the ri\,er's far hank. Subunits also ;iredesignated to prc\.cnt the enemy's destruction ofbridges or ferries during the attack.
An airfield protx~blywould be seized using two
directions of att;~ck. Iuring the attack, ~l ni ts emainmounted in HhII>s as long as possible. In the attackplm. commanders designate units to seize the controlto\ver. I>( I. storage are;ls, ancl any radio beacon to\+.ers.In addition, designated ~l ni ts ttack the enemy's main
:u-rcl re se nc securit). eletnents as well as any air defensecre\+,s situ;ited around the airfield. The engineer;~t tachment clears the airfield of enemy-emplacedmines. Iluring the attack, the main force takes thecontrol tower ;ind destroys the airfield security force.
In securing a mountain pass, the airborne unitdesignates as its objective the key terrain surroundingthe pass. Soviet commanders tailor their force size andcomposition to the size and availability of dro p zones,
as \%,ell as to the difficulty of movement onmountainous terrain. The Soviets plan to drop only abattalion or smaller-sized i~t-riton each DZ in themountains. They also expect more injuries due to theruggeclness of the terrain. In some areas, BMDs will nothe used in the a irborne operation. Also, the Soviets do
not plan on using attached :irtillery in every mountainoperation.
I)rop zones may be closer to the objective andlocated o n several sides of an objective to compensate
for the decreased speed of movement in then-rountains. If the IlZs are not Itxated near theobjective, the So ~i et s lan to move only on roads toreach the objective area. Finally, the Soviets rely more011 radio cornmu~c;~tionsn the mountains eventhough radios are less reliable in such regions.
The Defense
Once a Soviet airborne regiment or battalion hasseized an objective, its mission is to defend theol>jective ~l nt il he arrival of Soviet forces advancingfrom the front line. In almost all cases, they use a 360-
degree perimeter ctefense. Whether the defense isestablishecl in depth o r with all unitsfonvard, dependsupon the enemy threat and the terrain. If the com-mander puts maximum po\ver for nar d, he maintains asmall t-r-robile re se ne . For a regiment, this reservewould l x no more than a company. A ba t~ di onefense
\ v o ~ ~ l deep n o more than :I platoon-sized element inreseme.1)efensii.e positions are built on a series of subunit
strong points. A company is assigned a strongpoint\\+thin ;I hi~ttaliondefensive position. The companyma! establish a defense in depth o r a defense with allplatoons fo r\ ~i rd . he company commander designsthe cfefensive position so that g ro i~ nd ivenues of:~p~xo;~cl-rire hea\.il!. defended by antitank weapons.He places shoulder-fired air defense \veapons forward
of the perimeter. The air defense sections are locatedo n high ground so that an enemy air threat can bechallenged before it reaches the company's position,or in th e case of helicopter gi~nships.\.hilt. i t is firingfrorn a dist;~nce. The company commander places
obstacles anci ;untit;rnk \\,e;ipons in inten.als het\\,eenplattx)ns as \vet1 as het\veen his comp;tny ;tnd ;ldj;tcentcompanies.
A coml>;~n)~'sciefenscs built ;tround a series ofpht txm strongpoints. These strongpoints are q7proxi-matcly - tOO meter:, across. H!kiI)s ;we placed LO O
meters apart kvitl~in e;tcIi platoon position. Forprotec tion, are p1;tccd in hi111 clcfilade o n th ereverse side of hill slopes. <;olnp:rn!~ commandersclesignate both priman. and alternate platoondefensive positions. In turn. platoon ci)ml-uandersdesignate both prim;tn and alternate positions fbr
their squads.The company commander prepares a company fire
plan that insures t he entir e company defensive arca is
covered by interlocking tires. Intenxls hct\\.een the
company and flanking companies arc also covered byfire. *lbeplan inclt~desrim;tr). ;uld alt erlute ;~zimuthsof fire for the platoon's prim;^ ;tnd alternate positions.In the fire plan, sqrlads are numlwred from 1 throi~ghso that the company commander can cont rol his ~lnit' sdefensive fires dojvn to squad level.
The c o n ~ ~ a n fommander may sp ec ie one platoonto provide air defense coverage for the company. If a
platoon receives such a mission, it concentrates all o f
its weapons onan
air threat ~v he n irected to do s o bythe company comman der. This platoon eflfort supple-ments t he air defense tires of the SAM section.
IJpon receiving t he prirnar).azimuths of fire from thecompany co~nm;tnder , latoon command ers lay eachBMD using the onboard directional g?rocompass. 'nleplatoon comtnander indicates terrain features to beused as the RhlD's lateral limits. The RMDs are placedin hull defi1;ide approximatel!, LOO meters apart and 50
to 100 meters to the rear of squad personnel. Squad
ln el nk rs prepare prone firing positions to raakc them-selves less \ulnerable t o enemy or friendl!, tire. 'f i eplatoon co~nrnancfer ocates MY; tntit;lnk gren;~delaunchers benveen the BX11)s. The Kl'Gs are alsoassigned sectors of fire.
1)uring th e dcfensi\.e bi~t tle, nem). tanks are gi\,entarget priority. The Soviets engage arrilor at ~n ; ~ s i r n i ~ mranges \vith all a\,~tilabletntitank \\~eapons. he SojFietsseek to awid having a BMI) engage a tiink one-on-one.
The individual Soviet soldier is trained to conduct"11:und-to-hand combat" against tanks. Firing from
prone positions, soldiers i~ s cutomatic \ve:pons fireto destroy an enetny tank's ohse nati on devices. Uh ena tank c omes within 8 to I 0 meters, a soldier jumps upand throws a grenade at the tank. If the tank is
damaged, he shoots the cr ew as they exit the vehicle.Ambush sites may be created o n primar). avenues of
approach approximately 5 kilome&rs from the main
clefensive perimeter. Platoon-sized rtmbushes may beem~>loyedn a role similar to that of a con~eringorce.
The location of an ; ~mb ush s chosen to facilitate
attacking an enemy as it crosses : naturitl defile. Theenemy ro ute into the ambush is mined s o that 1e;td andrear elements of the enemy march ti)rtnation aredestroyed so as to block exits from the dcfi e. Mineexplosions are the signal to open tire. Lead tanks arethe prin.~ar). argets in th e ambush.
The unit conducting it11 anibush a\,oids decisiveengagement wTith he enemy. Once the commanderhas made the decision to \\.ithdran., the unit moves to
its previously prqared defensive positionon
th eobjective.
Linkup
Airborne units either await a linkup \vith friendlyforces o r Aght their ~v ay ack to friendly lines. 7'0accomplish linkup, the airbo rne unit sends its recon-naissance element to meet advancing ground forceunits. The reconnaissance element provides
information o n the best ;tppro;tches into th e area, thesecurity situation on the objecti\,e, and th e enemysituation. Once linkup has been completed.oper;~tional ontrol o f tile airborne unit returns to thefi.otlt or n11.
Helibome operations have been a part of Sovietm i l i t q doctrine since the 1900s. 711e I T Sairmobileexperience in Vietnam incre;aed Soviet interest in the
combat uses of the helicopter. Heliborne operations inSoviet ground force maneuvers increased during the1970s. Such operations now are standard in militaryexercises. Since early 1980, Soviet forces inAfghanistan have been conducting heliborneoperations in combat.
The Soviets appreciate the tactical advantage ofheliborne operations-rapid nuneuver of combattr(n)ps, ~lnconstrainedby obstacles o n the ground.When compared to parachute drops as a means of
inserting troops, heliborne operations require lesstraining and can penetrate enemy air space at a lowlevel. O n the o ther hand, availabiliqand capabilitiesof
helicopters limit the size, scope, and frequency ofheliborne operations.
DOCTR INE
Theoretically, by day or night, Soviet heliborne unitsare inserted in enemy territory, 50 kilometers or mor eforward of the line of contact. How7ever,Soviet descrip-tions of practice opera tions imply that the -assault forceis iauillly of battalion size or smaller, is assigned an
objecthrewithin range of Soviet divisional artillery ( i.e.,within about 15 kilometers of the line of contact ),
operates in daylight, and links up with an advancingfriendly force within hours.
Battalions of motorized rifle regiments are trainedfor helib ome operations employing helicopters from
arniy or fir>r?t elicopter regiments.
M ISS IONS
Typical rnissions for a heliborne operation areneutralization of enemy command, control, andconlmunications facilities; seizure of critical terrainsuch as an opposite shore of a river crossing site;pursuit of a withdrawing enemy; attack enernydefensepositions from the rear; neutralization or disruption oftnemy combat support or combat semice supportelements; or deception. The Soviets expect thehelibome force to be threatened by superior enemytirepower and mobility after landing in th e enemy rear.Therefore, the assault force generally requires externalfire support and early linkup if it is to Ix recovered.
A typical hel ihorne mission is the seizure of a bridge-h a d in support of a river crossing. Other possible
objecti\res are mountain passes, bench exits. desertoases, crossroads, or other featitres ~v ho se enial to theenemy will make the overall maneuver plan eilsier.ffeliborne units also can block enemy attempts tobreak out of an encirclement or to reinforce a meetingeng;tgement.
tfeliborne units also can he inserted into the enemyrear area for reconnaiss;lnce ~nissions. mall reconnais-sance units may he inserted with light arr-noredvehicles. In the Soviet rear area, heliborne units canperfornm rear area securih missions. lliey can screen,delay, or defend against ;in enemy approach to a\ .~~lnerablelank.
Ambushes, raids, sabotage, and deceptionoperations are exarnples of other missions suited toheliborne op ent ion s. Ilel ibome units also can lay and
clear mines in t he enemy rear. In World War 11duringthe forcing of the enemy Dnieper river defenses, Sovietforces inserted company-sized units by parachute intoGerman division rear areas on the f;~r ide of the river.On th e I hie per , the enemy was hard-presseci from thefront and was iinable to provide adequate rear areasecurity. The result was that enemy combat supportactivities were disrupted at small cost to the St)\iets.On o ther occasions, a disproportionately large enemyforce was diverted from the front to deal with a rear
area threat. In comparable situations today,helicopters could be L I ~ W ~o insert combat units intothe enenly rear area rather than parachute drops. Insupport of deception operations, helibome units canbe ilsecl to r epresen t larger fi) rn~a tions n feints,demonstrations, and ruses.
ORGAN IZAT ION
Motorized rifle battalions are tailored for heliborne
operations and probably ~ ~ o ~ ~ l de selected from adivision's seco nd echelon o r combined arms reserve.The tailoring eliminates asscts not mission-essential.The battalion antitank platoon may be augmented. Asapper company, an anti;~ircraftbattery, and a batteryof tokved artillery may be attached. Rear servicepersonnel rnay be attached to the force to deal withsupply of an~n ~un it ion ,edical supplies and treatment.and any special problems for a giw n operation, s i ~ chssupply of drinking water.
Some light armored or ~vhee lcd sehicles can beincluded in the force for use as missile carriers andreconnaissance vehi cles A1 hli-(>/HOOK l~ ea \ytransport helicopter is required to lift most of these
vehicles. 'l he number ofhl i-0 sorties ;t\ailal>le \ - i l l liriiit
the number of \,chicles. U'itll all aitgmentations ancl
deletions cotlsidered (particularl!. cleletion of AI'(:sand most other battalion t.chicles), the battalionheliborne force could contaiti o\rr 500 troops.
'Transport helicop ters from either the ;tssaulthelicopter regiment or the tr;tnsport helicopterregiment can be usecl for helibome operations. HINI)attack helicopters are capable of c: ~r ~) .i t~ gotile troopsbut are nornmlly not i~sedn that role.
TRAINING
Soviet motorized rifle troops require a minimum ofon e day's training in prepar;~ tion for helibornc
operations. Individual companies require 2 to -t hoursto practice loading and unloading procedures. Six orstTen hours a re required to re11e;trsc the actions in thedeparture area before embarkation ancl those :actiotls
required after landing. Training stresses antitanktactics and other pertinent aspects of dismountedcombat aswell as se t routines for troops in aticl aroundaircraft. Mockup helicop ter fuselages may be used andcerta in individuals may receive :tdditional specializedtraining in tlie tasks of loading ;itid secilring t)i~lkyitems in the helicopter.
A battalion or company helihorne ;wsault is astandard prac tice in field training exercises at di\isionlevel and above. In 1978,Exercise HEREZINA inclucied
a heliborne operation that employed :I mix of Mi-WHIPand Mi-(,/HOOK helicopters to land a motorized riflebattalion in the enemy's re;tr.
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
Planning Considerations
Helibome operations in the otfense exploit fleetingopportunities. In the defense, they counter t11re;its\vhich suddenly materialize. I-ieliborne pl;innitig has tob e rapid, thorough, a nd flexible. Planning begins withthe selection of the objective. The responsible com-mander designates the objectives, one or morehelicopter landing zones at o r near the objective, and adeparture area for the force.
1)uring the oper;ttions, helicopters shoitld spenclonly a minimum of time in any one place. They Ltre par-ticularly tv1ner;ible \+.hen stationar),, either o n the
ground or hovering in t he air. The pickitp ;111t11;tnclingof the assault force must he accomplished quickl!..withoitt cotlfusiot~.
The lift capabilih. of t-acli helicopter is a v;triahledepending on air density encottntrred during the
mission. 'l'he lift c;tp;tl>ility is degr;tcJecl seriously astemlwrature or ;tltitttdc ittcreases.
W'c;tlx)tis, supplies, ;tncl key personnel arc spreadthroitghoitt the l~~licopteri~ rceo that the oper;ltion\\.ill not bil hecause of;( fen. unlitck~.osses among the
helicopters.An ;ws;iitlt itnit onc e or1 the groiund in the enemy rear
area rn;i!. I>e att;tckecl from ;in!. tlirection by sitperiorenemy forces. I t is likel! t o require more external Aresitp1x)rt than a motorizccl rifle unit of similar size inst;tnclard configuration. 'llic groitt~cl force is in atet~i~oitsiti~;i tioti oncerning resuppl!,. 1)ilring heavycngagemcnt at close qit;trters. tl ~ ebasic load ofammunit ion can be csha usted \.eg. quickl!:
Command and Control
A division commander is the lokvest ranking groundforce oficer likely to order :1 helihonle operation.
I + - o t i t or army cotnrnanders may order ;I heliborneoperation dralving o n the assets of a motorized rifle or
airborne division. In 311). case, ;irnly and ,f ,r)tzt willknow of and appro\.e tile operation in advance.
'The comtnander of the Iielihorne force \vill Ix thecomm;~nder f the battalion. comp;tn!?, or other unitsforming the Ixtsis for the ass:lult force. The gn,undh r c e comm;lnder is responsible h)r preparation andpositioning the trtnlps ii)r lo;~ding.He shares with theaviation comnlander the decision to proceed with th e
landing, based o n their assessment of tlie situation atthe landing zone. After the landing is made, the groundforce commatlder is solely responsible for conductingthe operation.
W'hile the grouncl force commander may be able torefine the .scheme of tn;ttleitr,er, most of the decisionsrequired for the operation ;is ;I \vliole \+.ill have beenmade by higher authorit). The operations plan isfollowed as closely as possible.
>lost helibome operations require at least asquadron and possihly a regiment of transporthelicopters. Tl-tese units belong to either the army orfiurrt. The ;t\.iation conim;lnder's responsibilitiesinclitde p roper 1o;iding of troop s and c;irgo in the pickit17 zone and navigation and tactics in the air. The
ground and air cotnmander for the operation nornlallyride in the same helicopter. ~ vh il e heir respectivedeputies ride in another helicopter. Ground and airofficers work o ~ t t otlflicts in the mission planning
process by negotia tion. \vitli appeal to higher authorityin case of disputes . Air liaison officers in ground unitshelp the aviation commander to identify the bestapproach and departure routes, and coordinate thehelicopter activity with ground force air defenses.
The gmuncl force radio net interlocks \vith theaviation net . An airborne command post may be usedto relay cornmunic;~tions rom the assault unit on theg r o ~ ~ n dack to its parent itnit. Minimal radio trans-missions :we ;I standard So\.iet procedure . Prearrangedco de v+.ords keep transmissions short and uninfor-mative to the enemy. Color coded signal flares andsmoke are ~ ~ s e d .
LoadingThe departure ;uea is located approximately 2 0
kilometers behind the line of contact to avoid enemyartillery fire. The departure area is large enough toallow troop dispersal. It contains subareas forhelicopter pickup, disposition of troops, and itnits
preparing to embark. The departure area is locatedwhere it can be ni;akecl from enemy observation byprotective features of the terrain, and by camouflageand dispersal. Units which cannot be completelyhidden from enemy reconnaissance should appear assnlall reserve or second eche lon units.
The pickup zone is located as close as possible to thedisposition area to minilnize delay and confusion enroute to the helicopters. A unit may move from itsdisposition area to a short- term waiting area closer toth e pickup zone. The waiting area also is canlouflagedand allows for troop dispersal. It can be used todistribute special equiplnent and t o receive specialist
personnel attached to the force for the operation.The force is prepared to load before the helicoptersarrive. While waiting for the helicopters, the com-mander briefs his subordinates and joins the politicaldeputy in exh orting the t roops. The commander's finalbriefing includes recognition signals to be usedhetween subunits and the plan for linking up withfriendly forces. Staff officers responsible for communi-cations and other services brief t he force chief of s t s .The chief of staff has prepared and coordinated a
detailed list, approved by higher authority, ofu~ li at illbe loaded into each helicopter.
The helicopter crew, having prepared the aircraft inadvance to receive its assigned load, supervises theloading process. For palletized cargo, the center ofgravity is chalk-marked on the cabin floor. For bulkyitems such as artillery pieces. unnecessary obstruc-tions are removed from the cabin of the helicopter.The helicopter crew provides the \\,inches, booms,ladders, ramps, chocks, lashing material, and any oth er
items required for loading.'The ground forces provide the labor for loading
cargo into the helicopters. Specialists of the rearservices attached for the mission may be used. The
cargo is placed 1 0 to 15 meters from the expectedposition of the he licopter receiving cioor. I'ersonnel to
be loaded form in a single colunln at a similar distance.The senior man present, normally ;I sqi~ ad eadersergeant, identifies hirnself;~nd he cargo to be loaded.He provides a ~vrittennanifest sho\ving the helicopternumber and the cargo \\.eight by item. ffelicoptersdesignated for th e most time-consuming loadingolxrations land first.
If the ca rgo consists of equipment o r supplies, the
helicopter commander checks the rnanifest andord ers, "Begin loading." \Y'hen he has inspected andapproved the positioning of the cargo inside theaircraft, he orders, "Begin lashing." Personnel to betransported are marchect into the aircraft and arechecked for proper seating by the senior ground forcerepre.wntative and th e helicopter cre\v. While in thehelicopter, the ground forces personnel follow theinstructions of the helicopter commander.
Landing Zones
The heliborne force lands on its objecti\re if l>ossible.If not o n the objective, the landing zone should be as
close and as advantageo~~slylaced ;LS possible, butoutside direct fire range of a clefended objective. Therewill be at least o ne alte rnate landing zone and possiblym~tl tipl e anding zones for subunits of the force.
The heliborne force commander is limited in his
ability to reconnoiter lanciing zones and routes to th eobjective. Ilsually he must depend o n maps, aerialreconnaissance. and human sources such as prisonersor line crossers. The terrain in question is likely to be
beyond reach of ground reconnaissance patrols. Tooo b v i o ~ ~ sin air reconnaissance jeopardizes the chanceof surprise. Minutes before the landing, an armed
helicopter or otlier aircraft perfornis a final reconnais-
sance of the landing site.In selecting the landing zone. there are hazards to
cons ider \vhich may not he reflected o n maps or aerialphotography. The greatest danger is that the enemy,either through acl~ lnc eino\\,ledge oftl lc mission or bychance, u7illbe in position to defeat the operation and\vill exploit his advantage hilly. Another hazard may beundetected changes in the NH<: situation in thelanding zone and the objective. Li ~~ s el yacked snow,sand, or dust driven by rotor \msh can obstruct pilotvision. Snow can hide hazards such as boulders andcre\.;lsses in the landing zone. The firmness of the
grounci, on \vhich th e force artil len. ciepioyrnent maydepend, can change rapidly \vith precipitation ortempcraturc cl~ilnges. n th c tun dr;~.having creates abog on to p of the penii;ifrost \+.here rock-hard soil
Naval Infantry Company. The naval infantrycompany is made up of a small company headquar tersand three naval infantry platoons . The company head-quarter s consistsof the company commander, political
officer, technical officer, first sergeant, mes-senger/clerk, medic, three SA-7 gunners, and thedriver and gun ner of their BTR-60 armored per sonnelcarrier. Each platoon consists of three squads of tenmen each. Each squad consists of the squad leader, amachine gunner, an RPG gunner, an assistant RPG
gunner/rifleman, four riflemen, the APC machinegunner, and the APC driver.
Tank Battalion. The naval infantry tank battal ion hasa mix of PT-76 light amphibious tanks and mediumtanks. Each of the tank companies has three platoons of
four tanks each with t he company commander's tankbringing the total t o 13 anks. While the medium tanksare not amphibious, they can disembark in shallowwater as a follow-on landing force behind the PT-76and BTR-60 first o r second wave. In task organizing alanding force, on e platoon of tanks normally suppo rts anaval infantry company.
Reconnaissance Company. The reconnaissancecompany may be task organized to provide a platoon ofat least o ne PT-76 and three BRDMs to the battalionassault force for the amphibious landing. The Sovietsconsider this platoon to be one of their amphibious
assault advance teams. These teams also includecombat engineers and hydrographic personnel whoreport beach conditions. In certain instances, recon-naissance vehicles may swim to shore under thei r ownpower. Conditions permitting, they may be landed byair cushion vehicles. Some reconnaissance teams alsomay be airlanded by helicopter or dropped by para-chute behind de fended positions. The reconnaissanceplatoon has two objectives:
To provide information to t he main landing force
about enemy defensive positions and ene my reinforce-ments on the march toward the beach.
To screen forward and to the flank of the amphib-
ious landing teams.
Multiple Rocket Launcher Battery. With theexception of the three mortars organic to each navalinfantry battalion, the regiment's six BM-21 multiplerocket launchers constitute the sole organic artilleryassets of the naval infantry regiment. BM-21s provide
fire support for amphibious landings and also may beused by the naval infantry in a coastal defense role.Each launcher can deliver considerable firepower withits forty 122-mm high-explosive rockets.
Antitank Battery. The naval infantry regiment's sixBRDMs of its antitank battery are fornlidable antitank
weapon systems. These weapons augment the man-pack antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and SPG-9recoilless guns employed at battalion level andgenerally constitu te th e regimental antitank reserve.The ATGM/BRDMs normally are employed to protec tthe flanks of the landing force from counterattacking
tanks and against enemy weapons emplacements.
Air Defense Battery. Besides the three SA-7s atcompany level, air defense is provided to regimentalunits by the four ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraftguns and four amphibious SA-9 surface-to-air missiles(SAMs) of the air defense batter): Supporting navalships provide air defense throughout all phases of thelanding operation.
Engineer Company. The engineer companycontains th ree combat engineer platoons. Normally, acombat engineer platoon is provided to support eachbattalion assault force. It clea rs obstacles and mine-fields along the approaches to the shore, on thebeaches, and on routes leading inland from thebeaches.
Signal Company. The signal company of the navalinfantry regiment consists of a headquarters andse nl ce section, a radio platoon, and a wire/telephone
platoon. The headquarters and service sectionprovides courier senrice and limited signal and vehiclemaintenance support for the company. The radioplatoon provides vehicles, radios, and operato rs for theregimental commander and staff. The Pr.ire/telephoneplatoon installs and operates switchboards for com-mand posts and the message center, and lays wirewhen directed.
Chemical Defense Company. The regimental
chemical defense company consists of a companyheadquarters, a decontamination platoon, and achemical and radiologcal reconnaissance platoon.The decontamination pla toon is organized into threesquads with one ARS decontamination vehicle each.The chemical and radiological reconnaissance platoonconsists of three squads with one BRDM rkh in eachsquad.
The chemical defense company of the regimentnormally provides one reconnaissance squad to the
battalion assault force t o determine and report levelsand types of contamination in the landing area and tomark cleared lanes for advance of the main force. If theregiment i s not conducting similar landings elsewhere,
the remaining t ~ . oeconnaissance .yu;tds also can Ixemploj,ed to check alternate ad nn ce routes. I>econ-tanination vehicles normally set up on the fir sicle ofthe contaminilted areas to spray the adrzncing navalinfantry \,chicles 011 the march. One o r more squads
can be employed, depending on regimentalrequirements.
Rear Service Units. Rrar senice units (trans-
portation, supply, maintenance, ancl rnedical ) are small
in keeping \vith the limited scope and clumtion ofmission assigncd to na n l infant?. Principal supply isfrom the ships offshore. Senice units may provideplatoon-sized units to suppor t battalion assault forces.Casuitlties are evacuated in ret~~rningmpty supplytrucks and othe r se ni ce vehicles.
With th e Soviet N a y playing the dominant role.units of all branches of the armed forces may providesupport for amphibious landings. The na1-y transportsthe naml infantn* o the enemy-held shore; providesgunfire; sweeps offshore minefields; protects thelanding with rnissile ships, gunboats, and anti-submarine warfare ships; and provides logisticsupport.
Naval aviation and the Soviet Air Force provide airsupport on the beach. They also attack enemy shipshindering th e advance of the amphibious assault force,and conduct aerial reconnaissance. Air defense unitsprotect the ;tmphibious force against air attack during
embarkation. sea passage, deb;trkation, and shorecombat operations. nlissile and artillery units strikebeach defense forces and wrapon systems.
Soviet Ground Forces. The Soviets considermotorized rifle troops of the ground forces to bepotential participants in amphibious operations.
Ground forces will probably conduct an amphibiousoperation with naval infantry troops. The navalinfantry's special skills are utilized to the maximum to
insure success of the assault landing.N;tval infantr). landing teams probably lead the
assault. 'lhey have responsibility for breitching anti-landing obstacles il l the urater and on the shore, forseizing a beachhead, and for securing the approach of
the main force to the landing area. The mitin hody,consisting largely of motorized rifle troops, follo\vs.Naval infa ntn personnel m;ly be attached to motorizedrifle subunits to assist in overcoming the specialproblems of an assault landing.
CONDUCT OF THE
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
The Soviets maintain that anlphibious assaults can beconducted both day and night, in inclement \.eather,and under radio silence until successful landing.Airborne, heliborne, air, ground. and naval forces haveparticipated jointly in such landings.
The five phases in a Soviet amphibious assault are:Preparing of equipment and amphibious units.Loading of personnel and equipment on ships and
transports.Moving by sea to the objective area and
debarkation.Battle for the beachhead by the amphibious units.Landing of ground forces and withdnwal of the
naval infantry.The naval infantry is trained to commence opera-
tions either while at sea or from an alert status at theirland bases. When alerted. an amphibious assault forcemans its equipment and moves out to its embarkationpoints for loading aboard landing ships. The landingships ideally arrive at the embarkation points shortlybefore or at th e same time as the arrival of the assault
forces. This precludes congestion of the anlphibiousforce at th e embarkation point awaiting transport.
The vehicles are loaded on in reverse order so thatthe assault vehicles can disembark first at the taxget
area. Vehicles are then tied down for th e movenlent bysea. After loading, the ships form a cow o). under theprotect ion of combat ships and aircraft.
The amphibious landing ma!. take place in conjunc-tion with a ground force battle under aay near the sea-coast. In this case, th e supported ground force usuallysends a reconnaissance party of up to a motorized riflecompany with engineers attached to reconnoiter thelanding area. The information from this reconnais-
sance party is passect to the amphibious force andsupporting air forces. The enemy defenses them nu).be fired upon by aircraft, naval gun ships, and groun dforce artiller)..
A h;~tt:tlionassault force ( BAF) ccinmmander usuallyis assigned an immediate mission, a direction of attack,and ;he overall landing objective. Normally theimmediate mission is to destroy personnel andFveapons in the enemfs tirst line of defense and tocapture shore terrain fi)r the landing and deploymentof follo\v-on grotlnd forces. 'l'he depth of the BAF'si~nnlediatemission depends upon the strength and
disposition of the enemy defenses.A company landing as part o fa RAF isgiven an imme-
diate mission. normally t o seize a strongpoint in theenemy's defenses and t o protect the landing and
deployment o f follow-on forces. The company also isgiven ;I direction for further advance. A plitoon isassigned an attack objcctivc and a direction for further
a&ance.The ba ttle for the beachhead begins with naval gun-
fire on coastal targets. Fires are con cent rat ed onenemy artillery, obstacles, and troo p concentrations.
AI I ;~irbornc r helibortle as.sault inland t o block
enemy re se nes heading to the beachhead may support-the amphibious assault forces. Naval infantry units mayconduct this type of airborne o r heliborne operation.
W'hile naval gi~r lfirc nd air strikes suppress enemytire, mines\veepers clear paths through offshore mine-fields for passage of the landing ships. Destroyers andother antisubmarine uarfar e (ASW') ships protect theamphibious force from attach by submarines andothe r warships. When approach lanes are cleared, thetirst \Give of amphibio~~sanks disembarks and swims
toward the shore. 'fie amphibious tanks commencefiring with their main guns at targets of opportunitywhile in the surf.
Soviet Naval Infantry Battalion Assault Force (BAF)
B A T F A L I O N
A S S A U L TFORCE (BAF)
"Can include any or all of the followrng elements med~urnan k reconnaissance, mult~plerocketauncher,antitank, arr defense, engrneer, signal, chemical defense, transportatran, supply, maintenance. medical
The follo~vingwave is made up of RTR-60s. Recentamphibious exercises in the Raltic have employed aircushion whicl es t o c a r p aportion of the assault forcesto th e shore.
Troops do not dismount from their BTR-(10s afterreaching the shore irnless the bealch is defended.Normally, in the ;tbsence of defenses or in the face of
lightly defended positions, cornhat vehicles continuefo ma rd to seize the objectives. They the while on themove, maitltaining the momentum of the attack, and
pushing on to link up \vith a n airborne or heliborneforce or ground force ti) secure the beachhead for thefollon.-on forces.
In the Face of determined resistance, the natalinfantry troops dismount to seize their objectives, tosecure the beachhead, and to provide cover for themain force landing o n the beachhead behind them.
The follow-on groilnd force units disembark, moveto shore, and continue the battle inlmd ~v hil ehe natalinfantry unit is mit11dr:twn. Writhdra\val of the naval
infantry terminates th e :irnphibioils assault phase of th eoperations.T?Assault Formations
The formation of the b:tttalion assault force isvariable. A first xvave force may contain an amphibioustank lat to on as the lead clement xvith one or Gvo of thenaval infantry comp;mics, support ing engineers. and a
chemical defense platoon. A second Ivave ma), consistof the remaining tl&tal rdtntncortlpan),orcompanies.led by a platoon of amphibious tanks.
The ent ire nax;ll in fa ntn battalion could deploy inc o l u m ~ ,ine, \veilgr, or other \ariation in a singlewave. Ground force units such as a motorized riflebattalion deploy :is a second uave.
The diagram at the right shows the assault of a navalin fantq batt:ilion clepl&yed in line in a single uave.Amphibioits lalnding ships h3t.c launched th e APCs and
amphibious tanks. Tank fire is directed at antitankweapons. art ill en, tn)oq> strongpoints, bunkers andtroop concentrations. The Sot.iets train to f re theirweapons while afloat.
For a regimental operz~tion, naial i nfa ntn battalionattacking in line ti)nnation coirld constitute the firstwave. 'Ihe renraining b;lttalions ;ire held back for thesecond and possibl!: third lvaves o r echelons.
If offshore ohst;tcles are present, the combatengineer s clear thret. t o six lancs for the battalion. Onwide frontages xvith feu. or no obstacles, the battalion
/? may adopt ;I line h)r:rx~ti<)n.;~m)iv ront:~ges laycallfor cornpan!,-sized a\\at ilts either o n line or in coliirnnformation.
Surprise. If t he ships of the amphibious force aredetected en route, the defenders have time toreinforce likely landing areas with troops, ar til len , andair support. The anlphibious force also may be attackedby enemy naval forces.
Air Cover. If the amphibious landing force does nothave tactical air superiorit)., the assault force woi~ ld evulnerable to air strikes at sea and on the beaches. SA-7s, ZSU-L3--is, and SA-9s can be fired from the decks ofth e landing ships and ashore. 'These weapons coni-plement naval antiaircraft fire, but might not be suf-
ficient to insure success of the rtssault.
Weather. Fog, hea\y rain, or other periods ofreduced visibiliq could cause disorientation of the
assault force. Such disorientation could cau.welements of the units to be dispersed beyond thecontrol of the unit conlmanders and even outside theobjective area altogether.
Sea Conditions. Hemy surf could capsize vehiclesand break u p the assault fornlation. Troops inside thevehicles would not have stable pla tfor n~srom whichto tire. Fire from amphibious tanks in the wa ter wouidbe useless in any but the calmest conditions. Sea-
sickness could become a problem and decrease theeffectiveness of assault troops.
Enemy Obstacles. A well-prepared s)stem ofobstacles and mines could slow or stop an :lss;~itltlanding. Air cushion \,chicles may skill1 successli~ll~~o v a submerged obstacles, but passage of amphibiousvehicles could be blocked.
Enemy Armor. Enemy tark s or guns could destroy
the assault force. Amphibious vehicles are lightlyarmored ;ind estrcmely. ~u ln er ab le o niost t!.pes of
enemy fire.
Rates of Advance. If the first m ;c\.es arc pre \rnte dfro111 moving inland from the Iwachhcad, massing oftroops, vehicles, and Lveapons can occur. The Sovietsplan for rapid advance inland of the naval intintry tofollow up \vith a large ground force with supportingartiller) and staying po\\.er. 1 psetting the t imetable byforcing th e naval inf;~ntq. nits to stop or slow downwould not only reduce the momentum of the attackbut u.ould subject tr oo l~ oncentrations to enemyrtire.
Marking of Lanes. The orderly procession of theassault columns depends on cleared lanes being
marked clearly ~ v i th uoys or panels. If these weredestroyed or moved, the columns might deviate fromthe c leared lanes to th e sho re anci could be destroyedby obstacles or mines.
Communications. 'I'he Soviets rely hca\~ily n pyro-technics. panels, and other forms o f n o n - r1d ' 0com-municat ions before the assai~lt. Rapidly changingtactical sit~mtionsma). make raclio communications
essential. Enemy janlnjing or inteticring ~v it h adiocomnlunications could seriousl!~degrade the assault'sSLIcceSS.
Airborne Landings. The Soviets often cotiduct
anlpliibious exercises in conjunction ~v i thirborne orheliborne landings. The airborne or heliborne forcesattelilpt to keep reinforcements from reaching theamphibious Iimding area. If these troops land in thewrong area or are o the mis e prevented from landingsuccessfillly, the na\,al illfantry could face stiffenedresistance.
Beach Conditions. Not all shorelines are suitablefor landing of amphibious vehicles or 1;lnding ships. If
Stwiet beach reconnais sance teams rue prevented fromaccurate1~- hcertaining l>e;ich gradien ts, soil con-ditions, and othe r landing sitc factors, the alnphibiousassault could fail.
Soviet unconventional warfare (UW) consists of avariety of military and paramilitary operations. UWincludes partisan warfare, subversion, and sabotage,conducted during periods of peace and war. It alsoincludes other operations of a covert or clandestine- nature.
Past Examples of Unconventional Warfare-Bolsheviks employed partisan guerrilla unitsagainst the Czarists and other oppon ents duringthe Russian Civil War of 1917-20.
Soviet partisan forces were used extensivelyagah st the Germans during World War 11 .
Special purpose troops were used to crushresistance to Soviet domination over EasternEurope.
Soviet special purpose forces we re used in theSoviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 toarrest Czech leadership and secure key objec-tives in Prague.
Soviet special purpose forces played animportant role in the invasion of Afghanistanand the elimination of President Am in.
DOCTRINE
Unconventional warfare (UW) is a key element ofSoviet doctrine. SovietUW capabilities constitute a for-midable threat. UW forces conduct reconnaissance,espionage, sabotage, assassination, and interdiczion oflines of communications.
Soviet unconventional warfare is designed primarilyto support a surprise attack Before the start ofhostilities, clandestine operations in the target areaincrease the probability of destruction of key targetswell before enemy rear area security measures areheightened.
The Soviets also appreciate the important role thatUW can play in support of a main offensive. Even if
there is success in on@part of the planned UW opera-tions, it may be enough to disorganize the enemy and
to insure that Soviet forces can seize and maintain theinitiative.SovietUW activities are managed at the highest level
of government authority. The Committee for State-Security (KGB) and the Main Intelligence Division
(GRU) of the General Statfare the most Likely agenciesto screen, recruit, select, and train CJW personnel.These agencies also can be assumed to plan andexecute Soviet UW operations. liW activities are pro-tected by stringent security measures.
Soviet writings point out the effectiveness of UW
units and boast of their accomplishments in WorldWar 11:
During the war, the partisans killed, wounded,
or took prisoner hundreds of thousands of
German troops, collaborators, and officials of
the occupation administration. They derailed
more than 18,000 trains, and destroyed or
damaged thousands of locomotives and tens o f
thousands of railway cars and cisterns. The
partisan war affected the morale of the GermanArmy, keeping the German troops in a constant
state of fear.
Pospelov
Great Patriotic W ar of th e
Soviet Union, 194 7 - 1945.
MISSIONSSoviet unconventional warfare missions are divided
into three basic categories: strategic, operational, andtactical. The principal differences in the missions arethe level of command and control used and the natureof the targets engaged. The overall objectives aresimilar:
Weaken military capabilities of target country.Support follow-on conventional military
operations.
Strategic
Strategic UW missions are controlled by the KGB.UW forces conduct strategic missions in the enemy'sheartland to reduce the enemy's ability to continue thewar. Strategic missions include efforts to:
Intimidate and demoralize the population.Create chaos and disrupt public services.
Undermine national resistance.Selected regular airborne forces also may performstrategic UW missions. These are not normal airbornemissions which generally require coordination withfront-line operations. Rather, small elite airborne
Teatlls attempt to place their explosives andincendiary devices on the targets and set them todetonate at H-Hour. All efforts are made to preventassociation of these acts with the LESR and to maintainthe e lement of surprise for the main attack.
Immediately before 13-Hour, the LW teams locate
targets and prepare to:Destroy nuclear capable Iveaponry.Jam radar installations.Disrupt enemy command, control and communi-
cations ( C 3 .
Kidnap or assassinate key political-militaqleadership.
.Seize or destroy radio and W broadcastingfacilities.
At H-Hour, a wide spectrum of sabotage actions areinitiated simultancously to weaken the military capa-bilities of the enemy. This sudden coordinated assaultwill have serious and inmediate effects on enemyoffensive capabilities. Special units of the regular a ir-borne forces are tasked to destroy nuclear depots,
installations, missile units, and nuclear-associated air-fields. Also, GR l J special purpose units and sabotageand recotlnaissance units of .front, army, and divisionare fully operative behind enemy lines. Their primarymissions ar et o neutrdlize enemy nuclea r systems. Butsecondary missions include disrupting communi-
cations, sabotage of airfields, depots, air defense, keyheadquarters, and logistic centers. Destruction ofthese targets will greatly assist the main offensive, asthe enemy will find it more difficult to organize his
adjust ing fir e on steep slopes and because of the
decreased bursting radius caused by firing in
sno w or forested areas. Quantiti es of explosives
used in obstacle reduction may increase as
muc h as tenfold.
Spare parts. High consumption-rate spare
parts include tires, tracks and pads, fuel pumps,
brake shoes, tie rods, and transmissions.
C O M M A N D A N D C ON TR OL
Since mountainous terrain restricts line-of-sightcommunication such as FM and multichannel radio,extensive use is made of relay and retransmission sites.However, siting communication facilities on highground has its own problems. These include
difficulties in establishing the sites, loss of communi-cation mobility, and increased likelihotxi of locationsbeing predicted or discovered and then destroyed.Wire may be used extensively, but because of rnoun-tainous areas installation and maintenance effort isgreater than normal, especially in deep sno\v andextreme cold.
In general. Soviet command elements are echelonedin depth and dispersed over the entire frontage. Theyalso locate as near aspossible to the troops, nearer than
they would be on flat terrain. For exanlple, divisionmain command posts may be as close as 3 kilometersfrom the fi ~m ar ddge of the battle area ( FERA). Tt ~e ymove, at least daily, with divisional fowa rd commandelenlellts moving every 2 hours . Division headquartersdeploy on the main axis of advance.
A I R D E FE N S E
In mounta ins, air defense is more difficult because of
problen~sn maintaining unit integrity of both maneu-ver and air defense units. Comprehensive air sumeil-lance and air defense fire support is mor e tiifficult. Airdefense units operate iinder a greater than normal
degree of decentralization. This flects fire controldown to section level. As a result, the inlportance ofshoulder-fired surface-to-airmissiles (SAMs) is greatlyincreased, as is the antiaircraft role of small arms fire.
5lobile air defense systems may be unable to
accompany maneuver elements. Instead they movefrom high point to high point along the best availableroutes of advance to obtain the best radar coverage,obsenation, and fields of fire.
N B C E FFE CTS
Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NRC) effects arereduced significantly in mountain warfare because ofterrain and the more rapid t~atural econtamination
caused by changing weather conditions and constantwinds. Terrain and minds hamper accurate predic tionof downwind toxic agent travel. Generally, cooldaytime temperatures s l ou the evaporation process,
permitting a contamination hazard to remain longer.However, mountain winds may nulli@ this feature.Mountain winds and stable atmospheric condit ions
enhance downwind coverage of chemical and bio-logical agents. Temperature and humidity also altecttheir sunival>ilit).. Cool temperatures generally favorsurvival of chemical and biological agents, and higherhumidit). increases effectiveness. Snow deposi ted ontop of a contaminated area can increase the hazard'sduration. Sunlight, however, destroy3 most chernical
and biological agents. With little protection from thesun available above the t imberline, the effectiveness ofchemical and biological agents is reduced at highaltitudes.
The following bct or s influence the effectiveness ofnuclear strikes in the mountains.
Mountain terrain reduces the casualty zone of a
nuclear weapon.Shock m~ v e ropagation is intensified in narrow
valleys and defiles o pe nk g in the direction of the burst.
Casualties may result from rockfalls, avalanches,and landslides, which may occur at considerabledistances from ground zero .
Reverse slopes greatly attenuate the shock wave
e k c t when the height of burst does not exceed theheight of the ridge.
h nuclear weapon may be used only when the
burst wrill not impede the advance of friendly forces bycausing rockfalls, landslides, and destruction of roads.Ix,w-yield air bursts are considered to be the best
choice of nuclear firepower,Irregular terrain patterns reduce the accuracy of
Snow melted by thermal radiation may cause flashflooding.Thermal radiation also may be reflected by snow
and the thinner atmosphere of higher elevation,thereby arnpllfylng its effects.
Fallout prediction is unreliable because of thestrong winds varying in speed and direction.
Melting snow will contribute to the residual radia-tion pattern, possibly polluting water and bathingsources.
MOVEMENT
Mountain marches are always carried out along themost accessible routes into the area. The rate ofadvance in low mountains and hills may be halved,even without the additionally slowing effect of enemyaction, poor weather, or natural obstacles.
Terrain restrictions often make deploying from themarch impossible. Security measures are of greater
concern, and surprise is more dacult to achieve. Inthe Soviet view, well-prepared defenders generallyhave several advantages over attacking units:
The defender probably is more familiar with theterrain.
The defender can achieve surprise more readily.The defender is more mobile.Attacks are more vulnerable.
In the offense, Soviet forces attempt to locate breaks,gaps, and breaches in the enemy's defenses and seekdead space and covert approaches to the enemy'sposition. Approaches may be created by reducing oneor two defensive strongpoints by the heaviest availablefire support and following this with a smokescreen.Flank attacks and envelopments take on even greaterimportance in mountains. Frontal attacks rarely areconducted without coordinated diversionary attackson the flanksor rear. The frontal attack must have very
h ea~ yir or artillery supportif
it is not supported bydiversionary attacks.Attacking directly from the march is possible only
when routes and space permit combined arms deploy-ment. Since room for maneuver and fire support, anddetailed knowledge of the terrain and enemy defensesare required, attacking directly from the march willnot occur often.
Attacking from positions in direct contact providesthe time for Soviet commanders to make personal
reconnaissance, to develop fire support plans, and toplan flanking and enveloping attacks. However, the factthat attacking forces are vulnerable to enemy fire whilein their static positions is a great disadvantage.
CONCLUSIONS
Soviet military doctrine stresses speed, firepower,and shock action at all levels. However, mountainclimate and terrain seldom permit even one of these
offensive features, let alone ail three. As a result, theSoviets have had to adjust their offensive doctrine tothe mountain environment. These modificationsinclude the following:
Limiting the use of nuclear firepower. Sincenuclear weapons create extra obstacles in themountains, the Soviets stress the use of small-yield airbursts.
Increasing the role of the helicopter for command,control, and communications, evacuation, resupply,close air support, artillery adjustment, and troop lift,particularly for troop placement behind enemy lines.
Placing greater emphasis on initiative and self-sufficiency of units operating in the mountains.Combat actions are much more decentralized. Sub-units are reinforced and task organized at lower levels.
Placing artillery and mortars close to the FEBA
since mountains considerably restrict their mobility.
direction for 1.5hours with no greater than a2 degreeerror. With careful adjustment, these systems can beused up to 5 hours without orientation.
Since the desert offers few handicaps to maneuver,attacks normally are carried out from the march and athigh speed. In general, offensive tactics are the same asdescribed in FM 100-2- . However, frontages normallyare wider, with gaps being accepted, and objectives areat greater depth. Regiments attack on separate axes.They are reinforced with sufficient support assets to
allow independent action. Motorized rifle battalionsalso may operate independently.
Forward detachments are employed to penetrategaps in enemy defenses and carry out harassing attacksin enemy rear areas. Airborne or airmobile forces mayseize objectives in depth, normally at night.
Frontal attacks in the desert against prepareddefenses historically have proven unsuccessful. There-fore, the Soviets generally conduct mounted attacksagainst the flanks or rear of enemy defenses. When this
is not possible, dismounted infantry may be used tocreate gaps, which then are exploited by tanks.
THE DEFENSE
Defense in the desert is difticult du e to open terrain,lack of cover and concealment, wide frontages, gapsbetween defending units, and reliance on local watersources. The attacker probably will probe constantly
and attack when visibility is reduced.Soviet defenses are organized in greater depth.
Distances between echelons are greater and forcesmore dispersed. Reserves, mainly tank-heavy, are heldin greater depth than usual and may be employed tocounter enemy enveloping and encircling movement.Motorized rifle company and battalion frontages in theforward area are similar to those in the normal defense.Motorized rifle companies normally organize in asingle echelon. Divisions and regiments may defendindependently. Mined sectors, and areas of limited traf-ficability may be lightly defended. They may be
covered only by mobile patrols or outposts.Since the possibility of a night attack is greater in the
desert, the night defense requires:Maximum use of night-vision devices and elec-
tronic surveillance.Forward repositioning of tanks after dark, with
tank fires and antitank weapons fires concentra ted on
roads and likely avenues of approach.Intensive patrolling and many observation andlistening posts.
Carefully prepared counterattack plans and routes.
Due to sparse vegetation, deserts generally affordlittle natural concealment and even less means forcamouflage. Forces are particularly vulnerable toobservation, especially from aircraft, radar, and heatdetection. As a result, camouflage in the desert is ofincreased importance but is also much more difficultto accomplish.
The Soviets use camouflage paint designed to blendequipment and vehicles in with their background andto break up outlines. The following measures are used
to screen movement and attacks:Cover of darkness.Bad weather, especially sandstorms.Smoke.
Smoke also may be used to conceal firing positions.A supported unit sometimes uses smoke as referencepoints in artillery adjustment and control ofmovement. (For more information on smoke, see FM100-2-1.)
HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT
Helicopter employment in the desert is hindered by:Increased maintenance requirements.Lack of cover and concealment.
Low air density.Higher degree of pilot training required.Low-level navigation is more difficult in the desert
since reference points are few.
LOGISTICS
Desert operations place special strains on logisticsdue to:
Great dispersion of supported units.
Greater maintenance requirements.Limited concealment and toter, making logistic
facilities easier targets.Increased requirement for water and fuel.
Soviet commanders operate well forward and arehighly mobile. Communications may be affected bydesert weather and atmospheric conditions. Artilleryunits must be highly mobile to keep up with supportunits and to reduce their own vulnerability.
NBC EFFECTS
Desert terrain affects the behaklor and influences
the deployment of nuclear, biological, and chemicalweapons. Because of the relative flatness and lack ofvegetation, chemical and radiological effects arecomparatively even and steady in all directions.
Although their doctr ine stresses speed and dynamicmaneuver, the Soviets fully realize that movementthrough urban areas may result in greater ammunitionexpenditures and casualties and slower rates ofadvance. The Soviets have long acknowledged thatcombat in cities will be unavoidable at times. Givenurbanization trends in Western Europe, combat in
cities could be more the rule than the exception in thatarea.Soviet ground forces consider combat in cities to
consist of only those missions conducted in heavilypopulated cities and towns. Combat in isolated villagesor groups of buildings along roads in agricultural oropen areas are considered actions in or against strong-points and are outside the scope of this chapter.
The Soviets classify towns and cities according toshape, population, and perimeter. The Soviets calcu-
late that in Europe there are one or two small cities forevery 200 to 300 square kilometers of terrain. In aEuropean conflict, there is potential for involvement incombat in cities on the average of every 40 to 60kilometers.
The decision to attack a city or town may be politi-cally, strategically, or tactically motivated and normallyis made at army level or above. Tactical reasons forattack may include:
The city or town is key terrain.The area encompasses vital communications
crossings.It is necessary to protect an exposed flank.
It serves as a diversionary operation.It would tie down enemy troops and reserves.The built-up area is unavoidable due to the extent
of urbanization.In the offense, the Soviets plan for their lead
echelons to cut off and to destroy enemyforces before
they can occupy cities. Ifthis is not possible, the Sovietsplan to bypass pockets of resistance with leadingechelons and continue the advance. Bypassed enemy-held areas are sealed off and may be neutralized byfollowing echelons.
DOCTRINE
Soviet principles for offensive combat in cities atdivision level are:
Conduct initial attacks from the march, afterreconnaissance.
Launch attacks from positions in contact with theenemy if initial operations fail to make progress.
Decentralize command and control to the maxi-
mum possible extent.Maintain continuous pressure on the enemy
through day and night combat.Conceal movement through the use of smoke,
darkness, or low ~lsibility.Integrate company-sized tank,motorized rifle, and
combat engineer assault groups with the direct sup-port of antitank guns and the direct and indirectsupport of artillery and mortars.
While combined arms assault groups provide the
main effort during combat in cities, heliborne assaultson key points may be used. Helicopters may liftmotorized rifle troops to key points in the battle area.During combat in cities, a Soviet division normallyattacks in two echelons at each level of command withthe following frontages:
Diin'sion 4 to 6 kilometersRegiment 2 to 3 kilometersBattalion 400 to 600 metersCompany 200 to 300 meters
Main axes are along major roads to capture key areas,to disrupt the defense, and to cross the area in theshortest possible time. Division and regimental axesare major roads. A battalion might advance on two o rthree parallel streets, with one company axis perstreet.
Combat on such restricted frontages and axes ofadvance, results in the following sigtllficant controlproblems:
Difficulty in coordinating attacks progressing atdBerent rates with fire support.Communications problems caused by a large
number ofVHF radios operating in close proximity andbeing screened by buildings.
Soviet Classification of Urban Areas
POPULATION SIZE CLASSIFICATION ESTIMATED PERIMETER
Identification of targets and coordination of fire street patterns as well a s the strength of defending
against targets in depth. forces. Attacking forces are not evenly distributedLogistic problems, particularly the resupply of around the built-up area. They are employed over the
ammunition, which may be used at an extremely high most favorable avenues of approach. Because of the
rate in intense combat. manpower-intensive, close-combat nature of combat
The commander determines force size and compo- in cities, motorized rifle rather than tank units are pre-
sition based on the area's size, shape, building type,and ferred. Normally, regiments coordinate the attacks and
Tactics and Analvnis
REPRESENTATIVE TACTICAL FEATURES
OF CITY AlTACK
(Main Force bypasses. Second echelon
forces execute fro ntal holding attack and
attack from rear.)
LEGEND:
1. Forward detachment operating in advance to
seize critical bridges, junctions, or installations
2. "Reconnaissance by battle." Probing attac ksto
determine defensive positions.
3. Withdrawal routes blocked by tankelementsor
airlanded forces.
8obile obstacle detachments block withdrawal
routes and protect main force flanks.
SOVIET ANALYSIS
OF THE-LAYOUT OF CITIES- r---- - \ Ip-. . , . . ..-7- Z" .1. -2
txtttalion and normally remains ~lnderhe cetitralizedcontrol of the battalion conlmander. Engineer duties;re:
To lay mines and prepare obstacles.1'0 p r e ~ a r e or the tlcmolition of buildings and
clc;tr fields of fire.'10 create passages through buildings for covered
movement in and between strongpoints.To carry oi ~ t mergency rescue work.
<:hemic;tl defense specialists are attached to thehatt;~lion to monitor chemical and radiological1laz;rds. 'n'hey also perform decontamination afternuclear or chemical attack.
Abiation is used in ground attack to destroy enemynuclear deliver). systems, break up enemy attacks, andneutralize enemy forces attempting to bypass the city.In addition, aviation has th e mission to destroy enemyaircraft ~ ~ s e dn close support of ground combat.
According to Soviet sources, tactical air defense
requirements for cornbat in cities include a muchmore restricted use of air defense weapons due to th eclose, confined nature of combat in a built-up area.Smaller, lighter antiaircraft artillery can be deployed inopen spaces such as parks, major intersections and ontlat roofed buildings. Manportable surface-to-airmissiles (SAiMs) can be used in a sinlilar role. But thelarger SA'LIs, which depend on their engagementradars, may find the built -up area highly restrictive o rirnpossihle to operate in effectively. Air defense assets
may be deployed o n the more open , peripheral areas ofcities along likely avenues of approach by hostileaircraft.
Hefore establishing a battalion defense, the battalioncommancler conducts an estimate of the situationincluding the following:
Enern) maneuver areas and approaches to his
~mhition.Probable e ne ~n y uclear and conventional targets.Length of projectecf stay in the defensive position.
Support required from attached and flankingforces.
Stockpiling anmmunition, food, medical supplies,
and mrater.'Ike structure of buildings and likely areas of
defense.'The batt'tlion comm ande r the n locates the
clefencling con~panies'strongpoints and supportirigdetachments, obsemtion posts, and kill zones. The
battalion commander's order contains the followingbasic elements:
The mission and reinforcement of each company.Sectors of fire and areas of concentrated fire.
Boundaries and detiiil of flank protection.
Kcsene responsibilities.Tasks of supporting tanks and artillery.
Engineer duties.Security arrangements.Defense lneasiires and warnings against nilclear
*and chemical weapons. The battalion commanderends his ord er wi th details of tire coordination.
In organizing the fire plan, the battalion co mmanderpositions his tanks and antitank weapons at th e edge of
;he town. After the initial antitank- battle. rem ak in gweapons are ~vithdraw n o prepared positions withinthe built-up area. A few antitank guided missiles(ATGMs) may he relocated to successive firingpositions within the city. ATGMs are not suited for
firing at close-range targets because of their nlinirnun~range limitations. Tanks and antitank weapons covermajor roads, parks, and squares. Artillery and mortarscover possible enemy approaches. klected artilleryalternate positions allow the guns to be used in the
direct tire role. The guns cover lines or areas in naturalor engineer ohstaclis. Besides the firepower under th edirect c o~ nm an d f the battalion commander, theregiment also has an indirect fire si1ppor.t plan. Theweapons remaining under division and higher control
are located outside th e city fo facilitate their redeploy.ment. Air st rikes from tactical aviation, including bothfixed-wing and helicopters will also support groundforces.
A reinforced motorized rifle battalion deploys in one
or two echelons, depending on the s ize and layout of
its assigned sector. A re se ne of one or two platm)ilsnoimallyr is created when the battalion deploys in asingle echelon. W%en the battalion deploys in twoechelons , the mission of its secon d echelon is to hold aposition and to destroy by counterattack any pene-tration of the battalion's first echelon. Such counter-attacks may be carried out in conjunction with eitherbattalion or regimental reserves.
Thc company creates strongpoints in buildings andprepares for all-around defense. Doors and windows- -that are not required for use are filled lvith bricks orsandbags. Holes for firing handheld weapons areknocked through walls. 'The troops mine, barricade, ordestroy stairnays. Access betw een f loors is achieved bycutting holes through the floors and using ropes orladders. <;overed communication routes by under-ground passage connect the strongpoints. Food andira ter ar e stored in strongpoints in places wher e they
will be protected from nuclear or chemical contami-nation. Weapon systems locate on different floor levelsto cover dead space. Snipers are positioned o n roofsand in attics.
may be transmitted indicating the start or finish of an)activit), changes in di rection of nio\.ement, positionh.requests for fire support, ancl other tasks.
Strict light and sound disciplil-te is paramount andmust be maintained at all times, particularly \vhenpassing through open areas. Active infrared night\.ision devices are used \vhen approvecl by the marchcomnunder.
Comn~unications etween platoons and companiescan be conducted by messengers or betlveen
battalions by messengers using motorcycles. Shortradio transmissions can be employed for comniuni-cations between regiments. Ihring the night march,security elements are located closer t o the main Iwdythan during the day.
Reconnaissance is conducted before and during thenight march. Reconnaissance element s do not rangeout as far during th e night as they do during the day.Resides enemy information, Soviet reconnaissanceunits collect information on the condition of the
march route, exis tence of bypsses. favorable locationsfor Lvater crossings, and obstacles. The number andstrength of reconnais.sance units are increased at nighton both the flanks and the head of the column.Chemical radiation reconnaissance patrols areprovided with infrared devices, illun~inat ingmarkers,contaminated sector boundary ~lia rke rs, nd signs todefine contaminated sectors.
Concealment from enemy radar is aided by travelingnear population centers, near railroads, and on roads in
forests.Normally, long halts are not made at night hecausc
the hours of darkness must be ~ ~ s e do the maximumextent for movement. During short sunlnler nights.troo ps are given only a 5 - o 10-minute rest at each reststop. Rest s tops are taken at sources of \\ater or fitel.Rest stops must not be made near large populationcenter s, railroad stations, bridges, and other objects ofpossible enemy interest. Rest s tops are never taken inopen areas or near ravines or defiles. Strict blackoutand noise discipline are maintained. The use of lightand t he building of fires are prohibited.
Senior commanders organize traffic control service.Subordinate commanders are infonned as to h o ~ vtr&lc control is organized, where trait control postshave been set up, and ho\v b~p;ts.ses and difficultsectors of the route are marked.
THE OFFENSE
A night attack may be the continuation of daytimecombat, o r it may be the start of a new attack. A con-tinuation of a daytime attack must be carried through
without a break so that the enemy will not have time tobring up his reserve or t o regroup. An artilleryprepara-tion usually precedes the night attack. However, toavhieve surprise, an attack may be launched withoutpreparatory fires, tanks, or the use of illumination.
Nlght attacks are most often launched 2 or 3 hoursbefore da\vn to permit daylight explo itation of success.111e success of a night attack ultimately depends onprecise organization, concealment of preparations.surprise, control and coordination of combat and sup-
porting units, fire support, and illun~ina ting nd night\,ision dc ~i ce s.
The command er plans illumination of the objective,light signals for coordination. boundary lines forattitcking units, the means of destroying enemy illumi-
nating devices, and the assignment of reference points.'lhe battalion commamier locates himself where hecan obs ewe both enemy and friendly forces. The com-nun der of supporting artiller) ~tsi ~all ys located withthe battalion comnlancler.
Another control measure is the assignment of:ui~nuthso each unit. The Soviets depend on t he use ofazimuths imd cons ider the m a valuable supplement toreference points.
Control is exercised further by designating guide~lni ts. ach battalion designates a guide conlpany; eachcompany, a guide platoon; and each platoon, a guidesquad. Guide subunits are centrally located andprovided lvith night visio11 devices and illuminationmeans.
In an attack from a position in dir ect con tact withthe enerny, subunit direct ions of attack and passagesthro~tghminetields o r obstacles may be designated byone-way glo\ving makers emplaced in the ground.Markers for difierent subunits may have distinctiveshal xsor colors.
If the attack is made from the march, subunits maybe assigned an azimuth of attack. Locations for deploy-ment from march formation to prebattle formation andthen to attack formation mayk designated by groundmarkers, signal lights. o r tlares. The dep ths of subunitobjecti\,es in a night attack \vould probably be red ucedfrom da).time depths.
(;omplicated maneuvers are avoided because of dif-ficulties of control at night. A short halt at an assaultline may be ordered to orient subunits and to clarifythe missions. Thc Itrosl cottrrtzor~ rtl~ickomzatiotl a1
rziglb is tbc. litle .fi)?-ttzrrtiotl.
motorized rifle subunits usually attack dismounted
at night. They niay conduct a mounted attackif
theterrain is ver). open , if enemy defenses have k e nsuccessfiill~~neiitralizedyrcombat upport means, andif illumination is abundant.
recognition signals. me comrnander plans the number
tanks, dismounted riflemen. and APCs is reduced.Riflemen probably attack o n line with o r immediatelybehind the tanks. APCs prob;tbly follo\v at :I distance ofapproximately 100 meters.
E illumination is abundant, subunit attack frontagesare probably the same as those for an attack in daylight.Lf little o r no illumination is available or used, or if dif-ficult terrain must be crossed, attack frontages prob-ably are reduced. As in a daylight attack, the Sovietcommander tailors his forces and tactics to thesituation.
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact location ofartillery bursts and to conduct artillery reconnaissanceduring periods of artificial illumination and \%hen ightvision devices are used. Consequently, maneuver sub -units are assigned more supporting direct fire weaponsat night. Supporting lveapons either move separatelyfrom the maneuver subunits, nlove several hundredmeters to their rear, or move directly on line with
them. Some artillen may remain at the line of depar-ture to suppor t the.attack \%.hensubunits move out tothe attack.
Illumination assures effective artillery fire todistances of not more than 3,000 meters. The closestline of illumination ( wh en illuminating shells are usedin windless weather) is fixed at no less than 500
meters from the guns detailed to carry out direct tire.The targets to be destroyed by direct fire should bel~ca tedap~roximate lyn the center of the illuminated
zone.Illumination by searchligllt is periodic. Searchlights
are turned on for 10 or 15-seconds and then switchedoff for the same period of time. Illun~inatiot~semployed in a manner to hinder the etiemy's activitybut not dixlose the objective of Soviet activity.
Each artillery battalion designates one platoon forillumination missions. Illumination can be eitherperiod ic or continuous. In the latter case, illuminatingrounds are fired every 2 0 to 30 seconds, 5 to 1 0
seconds less than the full burning time of one round.The most important tasks of reconnaissance
elements in a night defense are titnely detection ofenemy preparation for a night attack, location ofenemy illumination equipment, and detection ofenemy engineers penetrating obstacles. Ambushesmay be s e h p , and friendly patrols may be sent ou t atnight to reconnoiter gaps between stron@oints or o n
exposed flanks.One of the most important measures in night
defense is illumination s~ippor t. This includesilluminating the ground area, blinding the enemy,setting up marker lights, and determining mutual
and location of illumination posts, the amount and typeof illu~ninating quipment to allocate to units, thereserve to be retained for his ow n disposal, targetindication procedures. and illumination readinesstime. Incendiary shells may be employed to s tart firesto blind o r illun~ inate he enemy.
Planning for a counterattack begins with thepreparation and organization of a night defense. Thenight counterattack must be simple and carried outquickly. A determined surprise night counterattack,even by a small force, could have considerable impacto n the enemy's night attack because of its psycho-logical impact.
Artiller)., mortars, and tanks are given preparatory
fire missions against any enemy penetration and insupport of the counterattack. The unit commanderallocates tasks t o th e artillery and mortars to prepareconcentrated fire in the area of probable enemypenetration.
Anight counterattack usually is conducted in oneechelon. With a single-echelon combat formation,
conlbined amls cooperation and control are con-siderably sinlplified.
THE DEFENSE
Night creates Inany difticulties for the attackingforces but offers considerable advantage to thedefender. Darkness reduces the effectiveness of an
attacker's reconnaissance, observation, and aimedfires. Darkness also provides the defender with be tte rconcealment than the attacker. It is more difficult atnight for the attacker to maneuver and control hisforces. The defender, on the other hand, can moveforces under the cover of darkness from the FEBA orfrom areas threatened by the enemy before the attackbegins, thus conseming his forces and causing theenemy to attack areas of little value.
The difficiilties in organizing a night defense requi re
a comprehensive defense operation order. Tl1e moreiniportant items of an order are:
Possible enemy night activities.Reference poin ts.Tasks for reconnaissance.k i d s .Location of observation and listerring posts.
Security.I-:tilization of night vision devices.
The fire plan.An illumination plan.Signals for \%,arning, ontrol, and ident if cation.
Comparison of US and Soviet military elements hasled to the incorrect view that the Soviet logistic struc-ture is austere and inadequate to support their combatforces. Because of differences in concept and organi-zation, Soviet logistic operations have been falselyreferred to as the "Achilles' heel" of Soviet militarypower. However, Soviet military forces do receive
effective logistic support. The Soviets have spentenormous sums of money to develop a modern andhighly mechanized logistic support system. Materiel-handling equipment is increasing in both quantity andquality. The use ofpallets, containers, and packages hasgreatly improved the efficiency of Soviet logisticefforts. The Soviets have increased the depth and rangeof forward service areas and increased the mobility andrange of logistic formations in support of frontline
forces. They have developed a tactical pipelinecapability and introduced improved transportationassets in great numbers. Also, Soviet capabilities for airdelivery to forward areas and the use of helicopters forresupply have shown marked improvements.
I Centralized PlanningThis principle requires concurrent tactical and
logistical planning as well as coordination with civilian
industry and transportation. Centralized planninginsures coordination of civilian war production withmilitary requirements.
I - Tailoring of Logistic Units
This principle allows allocation of logistic resourcesto the combat elements most essential to the successof the mission. Tailoring allows the Soviet military toassign priorities for logistic support.
Fixed Supply PrioritiesThe Soviet logistic system operates on the following
sequence of priorities:1. Ammunition of all types.2. POL.3. Technical supplies.4. Rations and clothing.
However, these priorities can change with the
combat situation. For example, a unit advancingrapidly with no opposition has a greater need for POLthan for ammunition.
Delivery Forward
Higher headquarters handle supply requirementsfor their subordinate units. Supplies and services aredelivered directly to subordinate units using theorganic transportation assets of the higher head-quarters. For example, an army headquarters uses itsown trucks to deliver supplies to its subordinatedivisions. In emergencies, one level maybe bypassed in
supply delivery.A division may deliver supplies directlyto subordinate battalions, or a regiment may deliverdirectly to subordinate companies. This concept doesnot prevent a subordinate unit from using its assets toobtain supplies from its superior headquarters,especially in critical situations.
Continuous Supply Base Support
Supply bases and repair facilities are established asfar forward as possible to insure the flow of suppliesfrom the central logistics level directly to combatunits. These echelons of bases from the homeland todeployed battalions assure continuous support fortactical elements.
Standardization of EquipmentThe Soviet system of standardization is both exten-
sive and effective. For example, of the 3,544 parts thatmake up the ZIL- 131 3 11'2-ton truck, 45 percent maybe used on other ZIL-produced vehicles, and 23
percent may be used on other trucks of the sameweight class. AT-62 tank and the MAZ 537 tank trans-porter share a common power plant. The chassis used'for the amphibious PT-76 light tank has been adaptedfor BTR-50 armored personnel carriers, SA-6 andFROG-2,-3, -4 and -5TELs, the GSP amphibious ferry,the GT-T amphibious tractor, the ASU-85 airborne SP
gun, and the ZSU-23-4 SPAA gun. Extensive standardi-zation has reduced the volume of repair parts andimproved the Soviets' ability to repair forward throughcannibalization. Also, obsolete vehicles and weaponscan be retained for training purposes without having tokeep a large stockpile of repair parts.
Supply Accountabilityand Resource Conservation
The Soviet system is stringent in these areas, andpenalties for unnecessary waste generally are severe.Soviet military publications continually stress resource
13-1
conservation and honor personnel who effectively Supply and service functions common to all military
manufactured goods, and other strategic raw materials
are stored in special government warehouses. Theseitems can be issued only with the express permission
of the State. While these stocks are considered to be
separate from the military items held in strategic
reserve, military use of at least part of these items is
anticipated.
Strategic Reserves. These reserves are stocks of
supplies and equipment controlled by the MOD. These
stocks are similar to stocks in State reserves and are not
planned for early use in a conflict.
Mobilization Reserves. These materials are held for
issue to newly activated, large military units and for
resupply to combat units in the early stages of a
conflict. One directorate in the MOD determines thelevel and configuration of these stocks. It also is
responsible for their accountability and maintenance.
The military districts coordinate mobilization
measures between military and civilian sectors.
Mob ile Reserves. Ammunition, fuel, rations, and
equipment are located with deployed ground units
and transported by the unit's organic transport.
Ground forces maintain these supplies for use in
immediate conduct of ground operations. These
supplies are distributed throughout the ground forces
in both tactical and support elements. Quantities of
these supplies are established by published norms.
They are constantly checked and kept at proper levels.
An emergency reserve of supplies is maintained within
these stocks. It can be used only on order of the unit
commander.
OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS
Within the Soviet logistic system, the bulk of logistic
units are concentrated at two levels,pant and army.
This concentration supports the Soviet philosophy of
streamlined, highly mobile combat elements at
division and below. The responsibility and the primary
means for logistic support are maintained at these
higher levels. Tactical units are free to engage the
enemy in high-speed and highly mobile action. This
reduction of logistic personnel at the tactical levelexplains how Soviet divisions can be smaller than US
divisions but have more firepower.
to meet specific objectives based on forces available,mission requirements, enemy forces, and the physical
geography of the area of operations. Tailoring atTects
the number and type of subordinate combat elements
and the number and type of assigned logistic units. The
logistic operation of the front is extensive and
complex, and it serves as the major connecting link
between the industrial base of the Soviet Union and
forces engaged in combat.
Generally located between 150 to 200 kilometers
from the FEBA, thefront rear area is served by air,high-way, rail, and pipeline from the USSR. Rail transport
bears the burden of movement requirements to the
m n t . Despite improvements in motor transport, rail
transport is used to carry the majority of Soviet war
materiel as far forward as possible.
The fro nt supply complex has a wide range of fixed
and mobile depots and other facilities such as major
hospitals and capital maintenance facilities. At this
level, depots are administered by each service, special
troop directorates, and the various subordinateelements under the chief of the rear. When the
distance between fm nt and army rear areas is great, a
front logistic base may be formed and located in the
forward portion of the front area This logistic base is
situated along a railroad line when possible and also issupported by highway, air, and pipeline.
The army is the highest-level peacetime combined
arms formation. It has a permanent staff plus assigned
combat support and combat service support elements.
With the exception of its reduced size, the army
logistic base is similar to that of the fron t. Logistic
elements are basically the same for both tank and com-
bined arms armies.
The army logistic base normally is located within
100 kilometers of the forward edge of the battle area
(FEBA). Like the m nt , the army rear area is served by
rail, highway, air, and pipeline when possible. Ifdistances between the army and its subordinate
divisions' rear area become great, or the number ofunits to be supported changes, a forward army logisticbase is established. Multiple transport modes service
this forward base as much as possible. From this base
forward, motor transport is used for the bulk of
materiel movement.
TACTICAL LOGISTICS
At the tactical level, Soviet logistic support is fully
mobile. Streamlined logistic elements support therespective tactical units with ammunition, POL, and
MAINTENANCE BASE HQ. REPAIR BATTALION REPAIR BATTALION I FRONT BASECHEMICAL EQU lPM ENT
& SUPPORT COMPANY. PARTS/EQUIP DEPOT REPAIR BATTALIONPARTS/EQUIP DEPOTa.• ARTILLERY/ORONANCE
a MAINTENANCE BATTALION II AMMUNITION DEPOTS IIa
& PARTS OEPOT. •t
a
BRIOGE ROAD RAILROAOCOHSTRUCTION CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCTION
TRAFFIC CONTROL
BATTALION BATTALION BATTALIONBRIGADE. • WHEELED TRACTOR. MAINTEMNCE BATTALIONI SAM MOBILE MISSILE I
a& PARTS DEPOT TECHNICAL BASE
a•a
b m B dREAR SECURITY MILITARY TRADE LAUNDRY SHOWER
OlVlSlONL TAFF DETACHMENTa
OETACHMENT
aMOBILE VEHICLE SSM MOBILE MISSILE
• RECOVERY BATTALION TECHNICAL BASEa k B I. RATIONS EQUIPMENT. - REPAIR DEPOT CLOTHING EQUIPMENT MOTOR TRANSPORT VETERINARY• ARMORED VEHICLE
MAINTENANCE BATTALIONIPARTS DEPOT
MISSILE TRANSPORT COMPANYREPAIR COMPANY BRIGADE DETACHMENT
BATTALION
J
MEDICALMEDICAL PIPELINE
TAWK REPAIR I MISSILE FUEL DETACHMENT CONSTRUCTION FIELO BAKERIESOTOR TRANSPORT
BATTALION TRANSPORT BATTALIOWBATTALION BRIGADE
LEGEND. Techn~cal hannel- ommand channel TANK RECOVERY I FIELD POST OFFICE MILITARY BANKBATTALION
SLAUGHTER HOUSE
----- When dellvery d ~stances ecome axcess~ve, he
base may be d~splac ed orward, or Front SupplyBase Sect~onsmay be establ~shed, r d~splacedo
the rear or Front Base Rear When necessary. MOBILE TANK REPAIRmob~l e Army Advance Supply Bases w ~ l l e WORKSHOPestabl~shed mmed ~atelyeh~nd ~v~sronectors
Supply elements deliver materials to the rear of combat supply actions. There are no branch depot chiefs at this
elements deployed on the FEBA. Medical and mainte-
nance elements deploy as far forward as possible toaccomplish rapid retum of lightly wounded personneland lightly damaged equipment to the combat units.
Personnel and equipment requiring additional atten-tion are evacuated from the battlefield.
Divisional combat service support elements are
completely mobile. The division mobile logistic basenormally is located approximately25 to 40kilometersfrom the FEBA in the offense, and up to 50kilometers
in the defense. Logistic elements are organized similarto logistic elements at army level. The logistic base isheaded by a logistics officer, assisted by branch depotchiefs, and subordinate to the deputy commander for
the rear. Maintenance operations are the responsibility
of the deputy commander for technical matters. Motortransport, medical, and field bakery facilities areorganic to the division. Supplies are delivered to
regiments and battalions.At regimental level, supplies are loaded on vehicles
tomaintainequal mobility with combat elements. Theregimental chief of rear services is responsible for a l l
Locations of Tactical Logistic Eleme nts
level to assist him. Maintenance functions are the
responsibility of the deputy commander for technicalmatters. Located up to 20 kilometers from the FEBA,
these logistic elements directly supply subordinatebattalions, and also may supply line companies when
required.Battalion logistic support is self-contained. Supplies
are maintaineu with the suppiy and maintenanceplatoon and transported on battalion vehicles. Pre-
scribed norms of supply are maintained for all classesof materiel, with replenishment provided directly by
regiment or division logistic elements. The battalion
chief of staff is the organizer of rear service functions.The deputy commander for technical matters is in
charge of maintenance support. The supply platoon
commander is responsible for receipt, storage, anddelivery of supplies to companies. He also deploys andoperates battalion ammunition, fuel, and ration points.
The battalionfel'dsher (a physician's assistant) is chiefof the battalion medical section. He is responsible for
gathering and evacuating woundedpersonnelfrom thecompanies and the battlefield.
U N I T
COMPANY
BATTALION
REGIMENT
LOGIS TIC E LE ME N T
Ammunition Supply PointRations Supply Point
Medical Point
Ammunition Supply Point
Repair Point
Rations Supply PointMedical Point
Ammunition Supply Point
Repair Point
POL Supply Point
Rations Supply Point
Medical Point
Damaged Motor Vehicle
Collecting Point
D IS TA N C E FR OM
FEBA ( I # T H E
OFFENSE)
4 KM5 KM
5 KM1.5-3 KM
10-15 KMUP TO 1 5 KM
10-15 KM
10-15 KM
5-7 KM5-7 KM
D IS TA H C E FR OM
FE BA ( I N TH E
D E FE N S E )
100-150 M
UP TO 1 KM
100 M
2-3 KM
3-5 KM
3-5 KM1.5-3 KM
10-20 KM
UP TO 20 KM
10-20 KM
10-20 KM
6-10 KM6-10 KM
The company commander is responsible for organi-zation of his rear services. The deputy commander fortechnical matters is responsible for organization of
elements, warehouses, shops, and other facilities.Military districts and groups of forces are the principalpoints of delivery for material and equipment con-
sergeant, who is a warrant officer or a senior non-commissioned officer, is responsible for accountabilityand maintenance of the unit's weapons, ammunition,fuel, food, etc. Medical and sanitary matters are super-vised by the unit commander and the battalionfel'ashw.
SUPPLY
Supply is an operational function of MOD subor-dinate directorates, of other directorates, and of troopcommands at MOD level that handle special-purposeequipment and supply. The Organizational and Mobili-ration Directorate of the General Staff is responsibiefor management of the uninterrupted supply of allforces in the initial phases of conflict.
Military district commanders have immediate direc-
tive and administrative authority for supply matters.They exercise these responsibilities through a deputy'1ommander for rear services. The deputy commanderdirects the operations of the subordinate logistic
tracted for by the MOD and delivered by industry. Theweapons, ammunition, and other manufactured goodsare shipped directly to the military district or group offorces. They assume full responsibility for storage andeventual release of the material to units.
Below the military district or group of forces, armyand division st& reflect the organization of the higherunit in logistic matters. Supply elements at army and
division are subordinate operationally to theircounterparts at the next higher headquarters.To simphfy logistic planning and to standardize
ordering and issuing procedures, the Soviets divide themajor classes of supplies into specific quantities ordistribution lots. These quantities are called "units offire" for ammunition, "refills" for POL, "daily ration"for food, and "set" for spare parts and accessories.These amounts originally are computed based onphysical conditions or limitations. However, once a
specific quantity has been prescribed as the unit ofissue, the quantity itself is no longer referred to, and allfuture references are given in multiples of the unit ofissue.
Motorized Rifle Battalion Rear Service Support Elements During the March
IMEDICAL POINT SUPPLY PLATOON
f I\
REPAIR SHOP
LEGEND:
Motorized rifle battalion, reinforced withFuel truck Field kitchen
- tanks and artillery in march column (van pak 170/MO)
Battalion ambulance with trailer Fuel truck with trailer Truck with water trailec
@ Battalion ammunition truck tT@a ck with field kitchen trailerKQepair workshop wi th trail er
NOTES:
1.When there is no enemy threat fuel trucks are often placed at the head
ofthe rear service elements.
2. Distances betwee n rear service vehicles in the ma rch are normally the same as thosese paratin gother
MRC Motorized rifle companyI A attalion technical observation point
I A attalion medical point
I A attalion refueling point
I A attalion food supply point
Battalion ammunition supply point
13-8
p &4 Motorized rifle c0mp.w n n f n *
+E.mpny medim, mruationoi,,,by tanks in the attack
Regimental commander's command h m p m y ammunition supply pointobservation post
P Battalion commander's command
observation postDepresw
Mixed mine field
,...A Regimental boundary adparmnnrl and antitank)
h Battalion boundary Mortar (12Omm) in fuing position
Ammunition
The chief of rocket troops and artillery plans priate amo unts by type and keeps a running account
the supplies and est imates the expenditure of al l of the am ounts o n hand in un its and in depo t stocks.types of ammunition. Th e amm unition officer o r his The chief of rear services integrates the arnrnuni-
Soviet planners use the unit of fire to computeammunition and transportation requirements.
A Soviet unit's basic load is a multiple of the unit offire. It includes the amounts hauled in the unit trainsand stored in the depot at the next higher head-quarters. It varies with the unit's mission, degree ofenemy resistance, e tc. A multiple of the uni t of fire isassigned for weapons before each major operation or
phase. The multiple assigned changes with the situa-tion. Assignment is based on the mission, the enemy,and the availability of ammunition.
The chief of rocket troops and artillery computesthe number of rounds by type of weapon needed tosupport the commander's operations. The chief of rearservices then calculates the weight to determinetransport requirements.
PO LFuels and lubricants are second only to ammunition
to resupply Soviet forces. Rail, pipeline, and waterwaysmove POL to Jhnt and army. At front, depots aremaintained with a 12-day supply. At army level, POLdepots maintain a 2- to 3-day supply. Advance bases areestablished near division rear boundaries when thedistance between army depots and first echelondivisions exceeds 100 kilometers. Divisions carry a 3-
to 5-day stock of mobile fuel.Atfront and army POL depots, fuel is stored in tanks.Oil and lubricants are stored in 150- to 500-literdrums. Divisions use fuel tankers (5,000 liters), fuel
twice.Computation of fuel requirements is based on
"refills." A unit's refill is the total requirement for allvehicles in the unit. For tracked vehicles, one "refill" isthat amount carried aboard in integral fuel tanks. Forwheeled vehicles, one refill is equivalent to thatrequired for a 500-kilometer range.
Tactical pipelines may deliver fuel as far forward as
division rear areas. Pipeline brigades o r battalions maybe found at front and army levels.
A brigade can lay about 45 miles of 4-inch pipelineper day, while a special pipeline battalion can lay up to19 miles per day. A recently developed pipelayingmachine requires only two operators to lay and couplepipe. Tactical pipelines normally are connected toportable fuel tanks. When the pipeline extends overflat terrain, mobile pumping stations are located atapproximately 9 mile intervals. In rough or moun-tainous terrain, the stations would be closer together.
A refueling point in rear areas may contain severalrubberized-cloth fuel containers capable of refuelingnumerous vehicles simultaneously. It may be estab-lished along a specific route to refuel all passingvehicles.
Army, division, or regimental fuel service trucks maydeliver fuel to battalion refueling points or, possibly,directly to vehicles.
Units on the move refuel their vehicles during resthalts, probably firom tanker trucks and trailers.Wheeled vehicles may refuel from cans carried onboard.
POL Held in Units 1IN VEHICLES IN UNIT LOGISTIC BASE
/ (METRIC TONS) I OR TRAIN METRIC TONS e
Combined Arms Army
Tank Army
Motorized Rifle Division
Motorized Rifle RegimentI
5,000
4,000
700
Motorized Rifle Battalion
Tank Division
Tank Regiment
17,500
1 1,000
1,450
90
Tank Battalions
160
1
9
800
120
11
1,700
240
NOTE: Motorczed r i f le and tank divisions normally carry suf f ic~e nt eserves to refuel their units twice.
i 1 NOTE: A unft's refil l is the total requirement for allve h~c lesn the unit.
Rations
MRR (BTR EQUIPPED)
MRR (BMP EQUIPPED)
Tank REGT
INDEP TANK BN (MRD)
ANTITANK B N (MRD)
ARTY REGT (DIV)
ARTY REGT (ARMY)
Rations are issued based on meals per man per day.The Directorate of Rations Supply of the Ministry ofDefense develops norms for a day's supply of rations.Norms are based primarily on expenditure of energyfor caloric requirements of military personnel. The
I Council of Ministers approve these norms and thenorms are announced by orders of the Minister ofDefense. Basic ration norms determine the amount offood products that are issued to feed one man for a 24 -hour period. Supplemental norms determine theamount of products to be issued in excess of the basicration norms based on conditions under which themen are serving or the nature of their service. Dryrations are issued on the basis of 1 kilogram per manper day while fresh rations are based on 2 kilograms
per man per day. Divisions cxrry a 5-day food supply.If
possible, at least one hot meal is served per day.The chief of the rear is responsible for all ration
support. He must provide a timely and uninterruptedsupply of rations and technical equipment for thepreparation of food and for baking bread under fieldconditions.
59,990
45 0
40,896
30 6
31,763
23 8
4,636
3 5
6,132
4 6
38,472
28 8
14,121
10 6
67,860
57 7
101,737
86 5
115,350
98 1
53,246
45 3
2,835
2 4
2,756
2 3
28,010
23 8
Clothing
Enlisted personnel and officers receive militaryclothing at the time of induction. Supplementaryclothing including field clothing is issued after they
127,859 ltters
102 7 metrlc ton
142,632 l~ters
11 7 1 metrlc ton
147,113 l~ters
121 9 metrlc ton
57,882 liters
48 8 metrtc ton
8,967 ltters
7 0 metrtc ton
41,228 llters
31 1 metrlc ton
42,13 1 ltters
3 4 4 metric ton
have arrived at their unit assignment. Subsequentreissues occur at specified intervals. Personnel equip-ment is issued from the unit depot. The depot stampsclothing articles with the month and year that the itemwas issued for wear. Accountable items for group use(tents, coveralls, sports equipment) are the personalresponsibility of the individual who signs the handreceipt.
Vehicles
Procurement and resupply of vehicles and end itemsare the responsiblity of the various chiefs of servicearms or technical services. The Soviet system does nothave a resupply procedure fo i unit end itemswhile the
unit is engaged tactically. The unit in combat isreplaced by another unit when attrition reaches acertain level.
Mobile contact teams fix repairable equipment andreturn it to action as soon as possible. This is the onlyway to replace equipment end items. Damaged equip-ment is not repaired in the field if it requires more thana few hours work. (See Maintenance and Recovery.)
A certain number of wheeled and tracked vehiclesare kept in storage in peacetime to preserve them. A
minimum number of vehicles are kept for normaltraining and administrative uses, generally from 15 to35 percent of the vehicles authorized
Repair parts and subassemblies are stocked at
maintenance units fromfmnt through battalion levels.Repair parts supply is accomplished by routine,
eliminates use of water for washing, laundry, and
bathing. The absolute minimum allowance of water is3 liters which is for drinking only and normally is not
medium, and capital maintenance units. Repair partsthat are stocked and used according to the followingsystem:
Routine repairs. These include replacement oftires, windshields, and common fuel and electric itemssuch as fuel pumps and carburetors. These repairsusually are done by units at regimental or divisionlevels.
Medium repairs. These rapairs involve replace-ment or overhaul of engines or transmissions, usuallyare accomplished by a division, army, or pont .
Capiul *airs. These repairs involve major over-haul and reassembly of major subcomponents andrepair parts. This activity takes place only at army andabove, including evacuation to the industrial base.
Under this system, the users submit their requests tothe next higher maintenance unit which supplies theitem from stocks on hand. Mobile reserve supplies are
maintained on trucks fromfront to regimental levels.They are replenished as soon as possible after beingexpended.
Water Supply
The water supply in the field is planned by engineersin cooperation with the medical service. When timepermits, a water supply plan is drawn up to include a
survey, a water supply chart, and a work schedule. Thelocation of existing water resources in the expectedzone of operations is established for the survey. Thewater supply chart indicates which water wells to use,where to dig new wells. and how to deploy watersupply stations. The work schedule designates waterpoints and the soldiers assigned to them. The schedulealso shows daily water requirements, transportationrequirements for hauling the water, and equipment forhandling it .
Engineers organize water supply points in the rear ofJronts and armies. Water supply points for all lowerechelons are organized by organic engineer units or bythe soldiers themselves under the direction of the localcommander. The daily requirements for areas wherewater points are widely scattered are carefullycomputed to determine the amount of transportationneeded.
The normal rate of water consumption per man isabout 10 liters per day. This includes water for
drinking, food preparation, washing, laundry, andbathing. Under restricted water conditions, the dailyallowance is reduced to about 5 liters per daywhich
maintained for more than 3 days.
Engineer, Signal,Chemical, and Medical Items
Items peculiar to these services are procuredthrough separate channels under the supervision of
4
the chiefs of the services from front to regimental
levels. Medical supplies are handled through inde-pendent channels,a s a separate function of the chief ofthe rear.
Supply Distribution System
The peacetime military district, or the wartimefront, receives its supplies fkom the national storagedepots or in some cases directly from the industrialproduction line. Fm?zt delivers the items directly to
m y epots. In turn, army delivers equipment to sup-ported divisions, and the divisions deliver to theregiments. If necessary, intermediate echelons maybe
bypassed to deliver items directly to the user.
Supply Installations Schematic
F R O N T F O R W A R D
SUPPLY BASE(S)
IL I I *
CE NT RAL S T O RAG E DEPOTS
ARMY MOBILE ISUPPLY BASEp r r * r r
m
A D V A N C E A R M Y
SUPPLY BASE(S)
I --D I V I S I O N M O B I L E
SUPPLY BASE
* NOTE: When dellvery distances
become excessive, the base may
be d~spla ced forward. or front
Supply Base Sectlons may be
establtshed When necessary.
mobile Army Advance Supply
Bases uvlll be established Im-
m e d ~ a t e l y b e h ~ n d d ~ v ~ s i o n C O M P A N Y
sectors.
The front and army logistic bases are large com-plexes providing all combat service support needs. Atdivision level, supply bases are as closeto the ongoingbattle as possible. Critical ammunition and POL are
Rail TransportThe Soviet Union has over 83,000 miles of railway
track, of which over 20,000 miles are electric. Thissystem handles from 66 to 85 percent of the freighttrattic and 50 percent of the passenger traffic in the
uploaded and sent forward as required.Supplies are moved in bulk m a d y by rail and pipe-
line but also by road from the strategic rear into theoperational rear where dumps are established orreplenished. Fuel is sent to the tactical rear by tankeror pipeline, or is held in fuel dumps to replenishsecond echelon forces before they are committed.
The conditions of the ongoing battle dictate thelocation of dumps and stockpiles. Being highly mobile,divisions do not create stockpiles but maintain mobilestocks as far forward as possible.
At division level, replenishment depots are set up ata convenient road junction, but supplies remainuploaded whenever possible. The replenishmentdepot is under the command of a deputy commanderfor resupply, who is subordinate to the division chief ofthe rear. Usually, divisional supply points are well
dispersed.Air resupply may be considered on a small or
moderate scale when other methods have failed orwhen extreme speed is essential. High-value cargo,such as nuclear warheads or NBC protective clothing,
Soviet Union. Railroads are the principal means oftransporting military hardware from the USSR Railtransport also may be used to carry fuel from rear areasto the fmnt.
Rail transport in peacetime fills under the super-vision of the Ministry of Railways. This agency is auniformed sen ice with ranks similar to the military. It
also operates all civilian railway services within theUSSR Military rail forces work with civilians in every-day operations, but in wartime, the railway systemreverts to military control.
A Railroad Troops Directorate handles rail construc-tion and maintenance of the MOD-controlled tracks. Itoperates trains carrying sensitive military cargo such asmissiles over the civilian rail system. Also, militaryrailroad troops participate in construction projects inthe civilian sector.
In time of war, the military rail transport staff of them n t chief of the rear plans and directs rail shipmentsand movements. Front logistic bases probably wouldbe located near large rail centers. The chief of rail-
have high priority for air supply.
Rail System
~ T R A N S P O R T A T I O N
I The various transportation services under MOD aretraffic management, railroad operations, railroadmaintenanceind construction, highway constructionand maintenance, highway regulation, and operationof all transport modes including pipelines.
Traff ic Management
Tr&c management for the MOD is the respon-sibility of the Central Military Transportation Direc-
torate (VOSO). The VOSO is subordinate at MOD levelto the Chief of the Rear. They are responsible formanagement of defense transportation requirementsusing military and civilian resources. The VOSO hasst& elements down to army level. These elementsadvise chiefs of the rear services on transportationplanning requirements. The VOSO elements collocatewith civil transport authorities at rail, water, and airfacilities and assist them in developing transportationplans. The VOSO officers at various transport
ierminals, stations, and installations are assigned as"military commandants." They exercise garrison com-manders' functions for the facility.
Sovie t Union has 83,000 mi les o f ra i lway t rack
of wh ich over 20,000 mi les are e lectric .Rai l roads are the pr inc ipa l means of t rans-po r t i ng mi l i ta ry ha rdwa re f rom th e USSR.
66-85% FREIGHT
TRAFFIC
50% PASSENGER
TRAFFIC
R a i l w a y s y s t e mhand les f rom 66 to85 pe rcen t o f thef re igh t t ra ff i c and 5 0p e r c e n t o f t h epassenger t ra f f ic .
In t ime o f w ar t he mi l i ta ry ra i l t ransport s ta f f o ft h e front ch ie f o f the rear p lans and d i rects ra i lsh ipmen ts and movements.
transport at front level is responsible, through yard
and regulating elements, for dispatch of supplies fromrail stations to army logistic bases.
does not have to support itself. Thefmnt or army has
the support mission for the divisions.Besides military transportation, he Soviets intend to
level. If rail transport facilities are available atm n t ,
they are used with motor transport used at army level.
Motor transport units are organic to Soviet ground
forces fromfront to battalion levels. The normal sizes
of motor transport units are as follows:Front. Motor transport brigade.
Army. Motor transport regiment.
Dikision. Motor transport battalion.
Regiment. Motor transport company.Battalion.Motor transport section with the supply
platoon.Company.No specific motor transport section.
The primary means of delivery below army level is by
truck. The priority given to the movement of ammuni-
tion is shown by the two ammunition transportcompanies in the motor transport battalion at division
level. These companies have 60 URAL-375 trucks with
each having a 4.5-ton carrying capacity and GO cargo
trailers with a similar carrying capacity. These trucks
have all-wheel drive ( 6 X 6), giving them an off-road
capability that is well suited for frontline ammunition
delivery.
The petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) transport
company has the same basic truck as the ammunition
company. The POL version of the URAL-375 has a
5,550-liter tank with a 4,200-liter tank mounted on a
trailer. The POL company has 80 trucks and 80 trailers.
The other company in the battalion is the cargo
transport company. This company has about 60
medium and light cargo trucks. Its mission is to deliver
items of supply other than ammunition and bulk fuel.
A major strength of Soviet motor transport is the
great quantity and extensive use of trailers. Loaded
trailers are pulled forward to fighting units andexchanged for empty trailers. The empty trailers are
returned to rear logistic bases for reloading. In this
manner, fighting units maintain maximum quantities
of critical supplies such as ammunition and fuel.
At army level, the Soviets have one or more motor
transport regiments, with perhaps 1,000 plus trucks
per regiment that can be used to support subordinate
divisions. This massive amount of transport at army and
j k n t levels upholds the Soviet concept of "delivery
forward." This concept allows the chief of the rear atthese levels the flexibility to mass logistic support
assets to the engaged divisions. As a result, the division
use motor transport vehicles from the civilian sector.
They also mobilize reserve transportation units called
avtokolonnas. The avtokolonnas are drawn from the
civilian economy to make up for shortages in military
units. The individuals in the avtokolonnas are
experienced drivers with their own trucks and tool
kits. They drive their own trucks in the armed forces
and return to civilian life following demobilization.
Second echelon unit logistic elements support fmtechelon units. This practice increases the transport
capability for logistic support to the first echelon
regiments and divisions. Logistic bases can be located
deeper in the front or army rear areas. This placement
reduces congestion in the main combat area, but
requires long lines of communication that could be
likely targets for enemy air interdiction strikes.
To assist in control of their huge numbers of
vehicles, the Soviets have special traffic control
elements. The personnel of these units are trained
traffic regulators equipped with black uniforms, white
belts, gauntlets, helmets, signal flags, and wands. They
are positioned along march routes at critical points to
direct column movement. Because maps are sensitive,
restricted documents in the Soviet military, traffic
regulators are critical to vehicular movements.
Demand for POL will not diminish in the future,and
Soviet development of tactical pipeline construction
units is designed to meet this need. Construction ofpipelines as far forward as possible will allow the
Soviets to decrease their reliance on motor transport
of POL.
Weaknesses
The Soviet transportation system is not without
weaknesses. Due to differences in rail gauges between
the USSR and Eastern Europe, the Soviets have to trans-
load at the border. They have organized the necessaryequipment and personnel to conduct transloading
operations. However, it is still highly likely that during
peak trafEc periods delays will be experienced at these
border locations.
Traffic congestion also would be intense in the rear
since masses of wheeled vehicles move supplies to the
frontline units. Overtasking ofvehicles s normal under
certain conditions. During the offensive, vehicles
might be overloaded 75 percent for cross-country
movement and 100 percent on hard-surface roads.This overtasking leads to rapid vehicle malfunction and
breakdown.
MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY 1
Forward positioning of maintenance and recovery on higher-level maintenance units t o provide direct responsibility for specific commodities. In many unitsoperations provides effective support for the high- and backup support. this individual is the deputy commander of technicalspeed tempo of Soviet combat operations. Lower-level Maintenance responsibility above battalion level is matters. The arrangement of command and technical
units have limited maintenance capability and depend commodit y oriented.A staffofficer at each level has the channels for this system is shown in figure below.
Staff and Repair/Maintenance Unit Responsibilities
EC H ELO N S
Tank/Tracked Vehicle
Maintmancr
Mot or Vehicle/Tractor
Maintenance
T Y PE U N I T S / S Y S T E M S R E Q U I R I N G M A I N T E N A N C E
Tracked vehicles.Wheeled vehicles.Artillery and ordnance.Engineer equipment.Signal equipment.Chemical equipment.
Service for these items is provided by fvred andmobile repair facilities that extend repair capabilitiesforward into the battle area
Vehicle Repair
The Soviets classify repairs as routine, medium, orcapital.
Routine Repairs. Replacement, adjustment, orrepair of individual components that can be madewithin a short time. Major components are not dis-assembled. This category is performed at levels belowdivision.
Medium Repairs. Major overhaul of at least two
basic asemblies. This category of maintenance isperformed at regimental o r division level.
Capital Repairs. Major overhaul or complete dis-assembly of a piece of equipment. This is the mostextensive category of maintenance and can be
performed at army and front levels.In wartime, the types of repair that are performed at
each level depend on the tactical situation. Generally,they are of a lesser degree than in peacetime.
Technical Services
The Soviets also use periodic checks of equipmentknown as technical services. Examples of a technicalsenice for a tank are:
Routine iqectwn. Conducted before tank
movement as a preoperational check and takes 40minutes.
Preuentive maintenance swvice number I . Con-ducted after tank movement and at 100- to 150-kilometer intervals during a long road march. This
company level.
Battalion Level. The repair workshop contains ashop truck and four mechanics who make routinerepairs on tracked and wheeled vehicles. In combat,this repair workshop can be reinforced with a vehicle
recovery section.
Regimental Level. The maintenance company per-forms routine and some medium repair functions.Motorized rifle and tank regiments have both wheeledand tracked vehicle workshops. Each of these elementsmay form repair and evacuation groups (REGS) to,provide support to subordinate battalions.
Division Level. The maintenance battalion iscomposed of a headquarters company; tracked vehiclemaintenance company; wheeled vehicle maintenancecompany; ordnance maintenance company; andspecial task, recovery, and supply and sen ice platoons.Within the companies, there are shop vans, supplytrucks, tank retrievers, and tow trucks. Both routine
and medium repairs may be performed. In combat,these companies establish damaged vehicle repair andcollection points that are similar to regimental REGS.
Army Level. Combined arms and tank armies havetheir maintenance capabilities augmented byfmnt as
required. Army units can provide mobile detachmentsfor forward operations if necessary.
Front Level. Fmnt maintenance units are mannedand equipped for capital repairs. These units operatefrom fixed facilities or mobile detachments.
Maintenance Responsibilities
The chief of missile and artillery armament atregiment and above is responsible for the maintenance
of small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, artillery,and missiles. Motorized rifle and tank regimentsusually have two or three armorers to perform lightrepair on smallarms nd on some automatic weapons.Armorers in artillery regiments can d o routine mainte-
mobile repair shop for maintenance of artilleryweapons. It can perform electrical welding andriveting, disassembly and assembly of mechanical andoptical parts, and adjustment of fire controlequipment. Atfront level, the artillery repair capability
damaged item, it is evacuated to either army or@ntfor necessary maintenance. Higher-level unit transpor-tation assets accomplish the evacuation.
If evacuation from lower to higher echelons is notpossible, vehicles may be left along specified evacua-
includes complete overhauling of some types andcapital repairs on the heaviest types of artillery.
A signal company is found at regimental level. Theoperators repair signal equipment, when possible.Radio, telephone, and radar units generally have sometesting equipment and spare parts for routine repairs.Medium repairs are done at division level. Signal repair
units perform capital repairs at army level and higher.Engineer and chemical equipment maintenance andrepair are accomplished in the same manner as signalequipment at division and higher echelons.
Recovery and Repair During Combat
During battle, a technical observation point (TOP)is established in the forward area of each combatbattalion. The purpose is to monitor the battlefield for
damage, to assist crews, and to call repair and recoveryunits forward.
The TOP is composed of several vehicle operators,one or more mechanics, a medic. the battalion NBCinstructor, and at least one combat engineer. It issupervised by the deputy commander for technicalmatters. The entire go u p is mounted in an APC withradios and night vision devices. The TOP maintainsradio contact with the battalion commander and withrecovery and repair elements. Company TOPS maybeestablished if the battle area is beyond observationrange of the main TOP.
The chief of the TOP will assess the nature ofdamage and status of the crew of an out-of-servicevehicle and initiate action to recover the vehicle andaccomplish repairs. Ifrepairs can be made in 5hours orless, the battalion repair and evacuation group (REG)repairs the vehicle on site or evacuates it to the REGrepair and evacuation site. A REG usually is composed
of one tracked recovery vehicle, a tank repair work-shop van, and a parts truck. Regimental REGS may be
used to support a specitic battalion ifrequired. Repairpriorities are based on the required repair time, withequipment requiring the least time for repairs beingcompleted fmt .
~ q u i ~ m e n that requires more than 5hours to repairis taken along an ewcuation route to the regimentalREG. The division evacuates vehicles or equipmentdamaged beyond the repair capability or capacity of
the regiment t o the division's damaged vehicle collec-tion point. If the division is unable to repair the
tion routes to await mobile maintenance teams whichprovide direct or backup support. The higher unit'steam will remain to complete repairs as the lower unitsmove forward in support of continuing combat opera-tions. A major goal of the mcu at io n process is to cleardamaged equipment from avenues of approach offollow-on combat units.
Weaknesses
Anafysis of the Soviet maintenance concept revealssome possible weaknesses. First, their centralizedcontrol may be a substitute for poor low-level repaircapability.
Second, divisions are heavily dependent on backupmaintenance support from higher levels. Duringextended combat engagements, division maintenance
units could not keep up with repair requirementswithout backup support from army or front level.Therefore, it is critical to keep the evacuation routesand lines of communication open from division tohigher levels.
Third, there are no dedicated mechanics at companylevel. Should a damaged vehicle's operator or crew beincapacitated, the company must rely totally onmaintenance support from battalion or higher level.
MEDICAL SUPPORT
The Soviet military medical system provides supportto the ground forces under the direction of the CentralMilitary Medical Directorate of the Ministry ofDefense. The Central Directorate supervises thesupplying of medical equipment and the training ofmedical personnel. Besides the peace and wartimeprograms directly related to the active armed forces,
the system ties in with the civil sector in screeninghealth records of draft-age youth and in performingnatural disaster relief functions.
The two principal missions of the military medicalservice in combat are the evacuation and treatment ocasualties, and thepreventlon of disease in thearea of
operations. Other missions of the military medicalservice plans for and provides medical support to thearmed forces, and supervises troop unit medicaltraining programs. They organize and direct military
medical research, and publish articles on militarymedical subjects. The military medical service also has
responsibility for monitoring and maintaining
adequate health conditions within the area of combat
operations. The primary concern of this activity in thefield is the prevention of epidemic disease within the
ranks. The medical service is further responsible for
medical support units of battalions and regiments that
may redeploy several times during a 24-hour period.
Repeated forward redeployment of medical units andcontinuous rearward aacuation of casualties demand
medical transport is not available, the medical corps-
man accompanies the command element. The soldierstrained as orderlies ravel with their squads or crews. Ifthe regimental senior physician has allocated addi-tional personnel and evacuation transport to abattalion, the battalion commander may in turnaugment company medical personnel and transport.
Duties of the company medical corpsman includemonitoring personal hygiene, inspecting the companyarea for health hazards, and supervising sanitary andantiepidemic measures. He also instructs the troops in
first aid and the use of their individual medical
equipment.Before a combat operation, the battalion fel'dshw
informs the corpsmen of arrangements for the evacua-tion of the wounded. This information includes thelocation of casualty collection points and the coordi-nation of available medical evacuation transport.A fel'hher, a medical corpsman, an orderly, and a
driver form the nucleus of the battalion medical point.The point is located 1.5 to 3KM behind the FEBA.Depending on the number of additional medical
transport vehicles assigned, several driver and order&
teams also may senT e he battalion.Battalion medical personnel collect casualties from
the companies and provide minimum treatmentbefore evacuation to the regimental medical point.Casualties remain at the battalion medical point for avery short time. The battalion fel'dsher serves as thechief of the battalion medical point and organizes andsupervises battlefield medical operations. Besidesmonitoring t he health conditions in the battalion, hedirects ambulance teams manned by orderlies in the
@ Landing field
Q edical clearing point
I
( ospital for the lightly wounded
Medical battalion
Division medical point
lndependent medical detachment
(not deployed)
lndependent medical detachment
(deployed)
A Mobile field hospital
u
SS Specialized Surgical
ID Infectious Disease
N Neurological
T Therapeutic
NOTE: Soviet symbols used throughout.
evacuation of wounded from the company collection
points.The battalion medical corpsman's duties are demand-ing. He provides medical treatment to the woundedand supervises the orderlies at the battalion medicalpoint. He also participates in medical reconnaissancefor the battalion, assists in removing the wounded fromthe battlefield, and monitors radiation levels at thebattalion medical point. He directs decontaminationoperations, carries out antiepidemic measures, anddistributes supplies under the fel'&ber's direction.
13-19
Regimental Medical Support
At regimental medical points, the seriously
wounded are examined and provisionally treated by a
physician. The regimental senior physician is amember of the commander's staff and serves as the
administrative medical officer for the regiment. He
fel'dsbw may also check dressings and administer
analgesics.
Each regimental medical point also has an isolationsection and a decontamination section. ?he isolation
section, staffed by an orderly, accommodates those
usually does not practice as a physician at the regi-
mental medical point. The chief of the medical point is
subordinate directly to the regimental senior
physician. He directs and participates in the medical
treatment of casualties. There are two additional
officers, a junior physician and a dentist. Additional
medical personnel assigned to the regimental medical
point include twofel'dsbers, two medical corpsmen, a
pharmacist, seven orderlies, and four ambulance
drivers. Support personnel serving the medical point
include an electrical mechanic, a radio operator, and a
field kitchen staff.
The duties of the regimental senior physician before
enemy contact are extensive. He must know the
regiment's objective and the desired organization of
the rear services. He receives instructions from the'
division senior physician with regard to augmentationand the replenishment of medical supplies.I
The major elements of the regimental medical point
are reception and sorting, dressing, and evacuation.
Other elements are a disinfectionldecontamination
area and an isolation area.
The physician at the receiving and sorting element is
usually the chief of the medical point. Medical order-
lies and a registrar are selected from the lightly
wounded to assist him. As the chief of the medical
point receives casualties who have passed through thesorting point, he divides them into four categories:
those who require immediate medical attention at the
regimental medical point; those who are to be
evacuated to the next medical echelon with little or no
treatment; those who are lightly wounded who will
remain at the medical point and return to dutywithin 3to 5 days; and those for whom medical treatment is
futile. Within the receiving and sorting element, anti-
biotics, antitoxins, and antidotes are provided only to
casualties with NBC injuries.The major part of the medical treatment provided in
the regimental medical point takes place in the
dressing area under the direction of the junior regi-
mental physician and dentist.
The evacuation element of the regimental medical
point occupies an area of 15 to 20 square meters. It
consists of separate holding areas for the stretcher-
borne and for the ambulatory wounded. Afel'dsher
supervises the evacuation element according to
instructions from the medical point chief concerning
evacuation priorities and modes of transportation. The
suspected of having contracted contagious diseases.
Such casualties remain in isolation at the medical point
until they can be evacuated to a specialized field
hospital or a higher-level isolation facility.
Regimental Medical Treatment
TREATMENT OF
PHYSICAL WOUNDS:
Arrest of external bleeding.Treatment for shock, including inject ions.Performance of t racheotomy.Closed heart massage and/or intracardial
inject ion.
Catheterization.Emergency ampu tat ion.Primary dressing of burns.Removal of radioact ive substances from
gastrointest inal t ract.
TREATMENT OF
CHEMICAL AGENT CASUALTIES:
lnject io n of ant idotes.Art i f ic ial respirat ion and oxygen therapy.
Treatment for pulmona ry edema.lnject io n of gastr ic lavage.Adm inis t rat ion of absorbents.
TREATMENT OF
BACTERIOLOGICAL CASUALTIES:
Isolation.Placement of protect ive mask on each
infected soldier.Adm i n i s t r a t ion o f an t i b i o t i c s and s u l -
fani lamide.
TREATMENT OF
LOWEST PRIORITY:
Spl int improvement .Treatment of extensive soft-t issue wounds
and in jur ies to large jo ints or nerve t runks.Provis ion of nova caine blocks for shock.lnject io n of analgesics.Transfus ion therapy for second- and th i rd-
degree shock.lnject ion of ant ibiot ics and ant i toxins.
Division M edical SupportXtw primary combat mission of the medicul
battalionis
the akployment and operation ofthe
diuision medical point. Before reaching this level,
casualties receive only the most basic medical treat-
ment. Even at division level, only minor surgical opera-
point deploys approximately 12 kilometers from the
FEBA during offensive operations or some 20kilometers when in defense. It normally deploys along
the main supply route and uses existing structures
tions can be performed due to limited personnel and
facilities. Any major operations must be deferred until
the casualty reaches an army-level mobile field
hospital.
The division senior physician commands the
medical battalion of each combat division. As with the
regimental physician, the division senior physicianoccupies a primarily administrative post, assuming
responsibility for the overall supervision of division
medical support. He also serves on the division com-
mander's staff. His immediate subordinate, the chief of
the division medical point, serves on the staE of the
deputy commander for the rear.
The division medical battalion contains the
following elements:
Headquarters.
Medical company, which contains a surgicalplatoon, an internal medicine platoon, a receiving and
evacuation platoon, a resuscitation section, a dental
section, a pharmacy section, a morgue.
Collection and evacuation company.
Disinfection and decontamination platoon.
I Transport platoon.I Supply and service platoon.
The medical company forms the operational core of
the division medical point. The medical company has
at least three surgeons, a therapist, and a stomatologist
(mouth specialist) on its staff. The disinfection and
decontamination platoon is staffed with an epi-
demiologist and a toxicologist. It supervises the treat-
ment of casualties who have infectious diseases and-
with the field laboratory facilities-monitors the bio-
logical environment. The personnel of the collection
and evacuation company are used to augment both
regiment and battalion casualty collection efforts. The
primary mission of the transport platoon is evacuationof casualties from the regiment to the division. At the
discretion of the division senior physician, personnel
and vehicles from this section may assist in battlefield
casualty collection and evacuation. The supply and
service platoon has responsibility for the reception,
storage, distribution, and replenishment of medical
and food supplies for the division and subordinate
medical units.
The division medical point is designed to handle up
to 400 casualties per 24-hour period. Casualties areexpected to reach the division medical point Erom the
battlefield within 12 to 18 hours. The division medical
point requires an area 150 meters square. The
receiving and sorting facilities deploy &itst, closely
followed by the disinfection and decontamination
facilities and the operating area The dressing station
and hospital accommodations receive the next
priority. The evacuation section, the medical supply
point, and the medical personnel accommodationsmake up the final stage of deployment. Full deploy-
ment requires approximately 2 to 3 hours.
The initial steps of division sorting remain the same
as at the regimental level. Casualtieswho present ahazard to others because of NBC contamination are
sent to the decontamination or isolation area. ?h ephysician at the receiving and sorting area divides the
patients into the same four general categories as wasdone at regimental level. Though the majority of
wounded continue evacuation through the medical
point with only minimal treatment, more casualties
remain for treatment and/or convalescence than is thecase at the regimental medical point. The larger staff
and facilities permit a broader range of medical
treatment, but the rate of casualties and the battle
conditions determine the extent.
The Soviets stress the need for rapid and efficient
performance of battlefield medicine in the event of
massNBC
casualties. ?he facilities and organizationalarrangements for the treatment ofNBC casualties that
exist at every command level indicate Soviet antici-
pation and preparation for combat in an NBC
environment.
As with the battalion and regimental medical points,the division medical point maintains close contact
with advancing combat units. Soviet doctrine calls for
movement by echelon to accomplish the necessary
forward deployment while still providing an accept-
able level of care for the incoming wounded and non-transportable casualties.As many of the personnel andas much equipment as can be spared are moved to the
next deployment area. The division senior physician
coordinates with the army chief of medical service in
arranging for the transfer of the casualty flow to
another division medical point or an independent
medical detachment.
Army-Level Medical SupportAt army level, there are two types of medical support
elements: the independent medical detachment and
13-21
the mobile field hospital. Independent medical
detachments are medical battalions under the com-
mand of the army chief of medical service. He uses
these units to augment the division medical battalions
in the event of mass-casualty situations. Independent
forward of the hospital base. Here physicians examine
casualties aboard each ambulance and, if the nature of
their injuries permits, routes the ambulance directly to
the appropriate mobile field hospital.
The evacuation hospital deploys in the rear of the
than just the rear of military forces in contact with the
enemy. The Soviets also believe that general war willinvolve more than the armed forces fighting along
i established front lines. A future large-scale war,whether conventional or nuclear, will include wide-
spread espionage, sabotage, infiltration, airborne and
amphibious operations, and massive destruction thatwill occur throughout the nation. So total war willinvolve the total population.
The Soviets have established an extensive and
encompassing program of organizations and pro-
cedures to conduct rear area security. Security andprotection of the rear area is critical. It includes
vital installations, airfields, communications and
transportation nets, critical industries, strategicweapons, and large troop formations. In the event
of a large-scale general war, this program wouldimmediately go into operation insuring, among other
things, the following:Rear area security and protection of combat,
combat support, and combat service support units and
areas of operation.Security and protection of lines of communication.Security and protection of borders and coastlines.
Mobilization of reserves.
Civil defense.
Suppression of local insurgents.Defense against airborne attack.
Defense against unconventional warfare
(including saboteurs, partisans, and propaganda).Damage control.
UNIT SECURITY
All units, fkom the smallest through front level,are responsible for-the security of their own rearareas. In larger organizations (regiment and up),
elements of the second echelon have most of theresponsibility for security. Organic personnel and
equipment carry out basic security and damage con-
trol in the rear area. Appropriate measures includethe following:
Comprehensive security plans.Locating support units near combat troops for
added protection.
Temporary assignment of combat units to securitymissions (usually second echelon elements).
Employment of guards, sentries, and patrols.
during repair).Use of convalescent sick and wounded for defense
during critical situations.
At army and front level, electronic warfare and air
defense elements are located to provide thoroughcoverage of the entire area of operations. Combat
support and combat service support elements alsohave rear area security responsibilities from the rear
area of units in contact to the rear boundary.
KGB TROOPS
Besides its major role in intelligence activities, the
Committee for State Security (KGB) is responsible for
border security and special communications. In theevent of an enemy invasion, the KGB border guard
detachments would fight delaying actions untilrelieved by ground forces units. Conversely, during a
Soviet offensive, border guard missions would include
securing the operational armies' rear, conductingcounterespionage, forestalling desertions, thwarting
deep enemy penetrations, and conducting mop-upoperations in the rear area.
MV D TROOPS
Interior troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MVD) are primarily responsible for maintaining
domestic security. Missions in the civilian sectorinclude criminal investigation, motor vehicle inspec-tion and control, and issuance of visas. In wartime, theyalso have the missions to suppress insurrection, to
conduct counterespionage,and to transport prisoners.
KGB and MVD troops are organized, equipped, andtrained much the same as Soviet ground forces, but
special attention is given to security functions. Ingeneral, KGB and MVD troops are considered to be
extremely reliable and are very well trained.
MILITARY DISTRICTS
The 16 Soviet military districts are administrativecommands which do not correspond to the politicalboundaries of the Soviet Union's 15 republics. In
wartime, the assets of many military districts probably
would be organized into fronts, providing both thecommand and control structure and units for combat
operations.
Military activity within a military district continues,however, wen when troop units are deployed else-where. Military installations such as schools andgarrisons, and operations such as logistics and com-munications would continue to function, and in
Civilian civil defense formations insure a potentiallyvaluable labor force for the Soviets. They are also asource for intelligence gathering, particularly in areasthreatened by airborne or seaborne attack, guerrilla orpartisan activity, or large-scale invasion.
certain instances, even be augmented.Military district mobilization plans cover not only
units, installations, and activities of the district, but alsothe call-up of reserves. Reserve call-up is selective topermit orderly activation and to insure an adequatelabor force for critical civilian occupations. Civil
defense activities also are conducted through themilitary district command structure.
Overall civil defense of the Soviet Union is directedby a Deputy Minister of Defense. Civil defense troops,numbering approximately 40,000,are a branch of theSoviet military under the command ofthe Chief of CivilDefense. They are subordinate to deputy commanders
for civil defense in the 16military districts.Most civil defense efforts involve organization and
training for survival, rescue, repair, and restoration.?he intent is to involve the Soviet population. Civildefense is one of several means of involving the popu-lation in disciplined activity and of keeping them awareof the ever-present "threat" posed by the enemies ofthe Soviet Union.
Perhaps 70 percent of workers engaged in vitalindustry belong to civil defense organizations. Their
principal objectives are:To prevent panic.To maintain law and order.To maintain agricultural and industrial
production.To insure organized decontamination.
Civil defense activities involve over thirty millionpeople and are closely tied to the overall war and sur-vim1 effort. Organized and trained personnel, con-trolled by the government, will be capable of at leastthe following activities:
Fire fighting.First aid.Camouflage of industrial targets.Chemical defense and decontamination.Damage control.Rescue.Public order and safety.Communication and warning.
Evacuation.Reconnaissance.Radiological monitoring and decontamination.
ment in the Soviet media. There is civil defense trainingin schools, for housewives, and for retirees besides thetraining given in factories and civil defense formations.
However, Soviet civil defense programs have beencriticized for their lack of imagination, heavy ideolo-
gical (rather than practical) emphasis, lack of realism,poor quality instruction, inadequate planning, andpoor coordination. Many mass evacuation plans havenot been rehearsed for years, if at all. Nevertheless, theSoviet civil defense program reaches virtually everycitizen in the nation with at least minimal instructionand indoctrination. Despite widespread cynicism andapathy, the program is large and growing. It is probablythe most highly developed civil defense effort in theworld.
RESERVES
Soviet conscripts have a reserve obligation until age50. The total Soviet potential reserve manpower poolis estimated to be twenty fwe million men. About 6.8million of these men are young, recently-trainedveterans.
Soviet reservists are not organized in specific reserveunits. Instead, reservists called up for training report t o
existing active units. In the event of a large-scalemobilization, reservists will be assigned where irequired. Many would fill out low-strength divisionsand other units.
The Soviet reserve system provides a vast resource offormer servicemen. Younger and more recentlytrained personnel probably would be mobilized forcombat service. Older reservists easily could take overnumerous garrison, guard, and rear arearesponsibilities.
Given such vast numbers of men with prior militaryservice plus a citizenry which has received consider-able exposure to civil defense indoctrination andtraining, the Soviets can count on a population that ispotentially more aware and prepared, and that is usedto discipline. (For more information on Sovietreserves, see FM 100-2-3).
I NDUSTR I AL SURVI VAL
The Soviets expect to survive and to win any futurewar. To do this, special attent ion has been devoted to
protecting the industrial and technological base. Pro-
tective measures include dispersion of industrial
facilities, physical hardening of Eactories, stockpilingmaterials and parts, constructing shelters for workers,
and creating evacuation plans. Dispersion reduces
vulnerability but it also increases the transportation
over 14 and the Soviets claim about eighty million
members. DOSAAF stresses each citizen's obligation to
defend the Soviet Union. Its basic propaganda themesare patriotism and the external threat.
Major DOSAAF activities include sports, preinduc-
tion military training, and technical specialist training.
A A l C V . . . . . . airborne amphibious infantrycombat vehicle. . . . . . .C R V .artillery command andreconnaissance vehicle. . . . . . . .CV .armored command vehicle
A GI. . . . . . . . .
auxiliary intelligence gatherers. . . . . . . .IC V .amphibious in fantry combatvehicle
A M R P . . . . . . . artillery mobile reconnaissancepost
An-(no.) . . . . . Soviet designation for aircraftfrom Antonov design bureau
A P C - T . . . . . . . armor piercing cappedtracer round. . . . . .P I - T . . .armor piercing incendiary
tracer round. . . . . . . .P-T .armor piercing tracer roundAPVO . . . . . . . Aviation of National Air Defense. . . . .S-(no.) .US designation for Soviet
air-to-surface missileA S C . . . . . . . . armored scout carA S M . . . . . . . . . ir-to-surface missile. . . . . . . .S W .antisubmarine warfare. . . . .T-(no.) .US designation for Soviet
antitank guided missile
. . . . .T G M . . .antitank guided missileBAF . . . . . . . . . battalion assault force
(naval infantry)BV R . . . . . . . . . . eyond-visual-rangeCBU . . . . . . . . cluster bomb unit. . . . . . .E S . . .chief of engineer services. . . . . . .I N C . .commander-in-chiefC O M I N T . . . . communications intelligence
(US term). . . . . . . .O P .command observation postC R P . . . . . . . . . combat reconnaissance patrolCRTA . . . . . . . chief of rocket troops and
artilleryD A G . . . . . . . . .division artillery groupD F . . . . . . . . . . direction findingDO1 . . . . . . . . . date of introductionD O S A A F .... Voluntary Society of Assistance
to the Army, Aviation, and Navy(premilitary training organization)
MiG-(no.) . . . Soviet designat ion for aircraf tf rom Mikoyan-Gurev ich des ignbureau
MOD. . . . . . . . Min is t ry of Defense; Minis terof Defense
MOD . . . . . . . Mobi le Obstac le Detachment(Engineer Element )MOP . . . . . . . . mobile observat ion postMPA . . . . . . . . M ai n Pol i tica l D irec torateMRBM . . . . . . .med ium-rang e ball is tic m iss i leMRD ........ motor ized r i f le d iv is ionMRL . . . . . . . . mult ip le rocket launcherMRR . . . . . . . .motor ized r i f le regimen tMSD . . . . . . . . movement support detachment
(engineer e lement )
MVD . . . . . . . . Min is t ry of Internal Af fa i rsOMG . . . . . . . . operat ional maneuver groupPOL . . . . . . . . . petroleum, oi ls, lubricantsPPO . . . . . . . . . pr imary par ty organizationPGM . . . . . . . . .prec is ion-guided muni t ionsPVO.. . . . . . . . ai r defensePWP . . . . . . . . plast ic ized wh i te phosphorusRAG . . . . . . . . regimen tal ar t i l lery groupRAP. . . . . . . . . . ocket-assisted project i leR D F . . . . . . . . . radio d i rec t ion f inding
REC.. . . . . . . . . adioelectronic combatREG . . . . . . . . . epai r and evacuat ion grouprkh . . . . . . . . . . . ussian abbreviat ion ( l i teral ly:
radio-chemical) used as suff ix inSoviet designat ions for NBCreconnaissance vehicles
RVGK . . . . . . . Reserve of the Suprem eHigh Command
SA-(no.). . . . . US des ignat ion for Sov ietsurface-to-air missi le
.....PAAG .se l f-propel led ant ia i rc raf t gu n. . . . . . .RBM. short-range bal l ist ic missi le
. . . . . . . .RF. .strategic rocket forcesSS . . . . . . . . . . . pin-s tabi l ized round 1.....S-(no.) .US des ignat ion for Sov iet
surface-to-surface missi le
. . . . . . . . .SM surface-to-surface missi le A
......TOL.. .shor t takeof f and lan ding a i rc raft. . . . .u-(no.) .Soviet designat ion for aircraf t
f rom Sukhoi des ign bureau. . . . . . . .ASM tact tcal air-to-surface missi le
..........D . tank d iv is ion. . . . . . . . . .EL t ransporter-erector- launcher
. . . . . . .ELAR transporter-erector-launcher-
and-Radar
........OP. . technical observat ion point. . . . . . . . . .R . t ank reg iment. . . . .u-(no.) .Sov iet des ignat ion for a i rc raf t
f rom Tupolev des ign bureau. . . . . . . . .VD . theater of mil i tary operat ions
. . .AZ-(no.). . l ight t ruck produced byUlyanovsk Moto r Vehic le Plant
. . . . .ral-(no.) medium t ruck produced by
Ural Motor Vehic le Plant (not anacronym)
. . . . . . . . . .W unconvent ional warfare i. . . . . . . .OSO Centra l M i l i tary Transportat ionDirectorate
. . . . . . . . . .TA mil i tary t ransport aviat ion. . . . .TOL.. . .vert ical takeoff and landing
. . . . . . .VS.. .Soviet Air Force. . . . . . . .P. . .wh i te phosphorus....ak-(no.) .Soviet designat ion for aircraf t
f rom Yakov lev des ign bureau *
. . . . .IL-(no.) .med ium t ruck f rom L ikhachevMo tor Vehicle Plant
Glossarv-2
NATO N ICKNAMES
Air-To-SurfaceMissiles
KANGAROO, AS-3KELT, AS-5KERRY, A S- 7KINGFISH, AS-6
Antitank GuidedMissiles
SAGGER, AT-3SPANDREL, AT- 5SPIGOT, AT-4SPIRAL, AT -6