Florida, Cuba And The Spanishâ•fiAmerican War: The ...

Tampa Bay History Tampa Bay History

Volume 21 Issue 1 Article 6

1-1-2007

Florida, Cuba And The Spanish–American War: The Intelligence Florida, Cuba And The Spanish–American War: The Intelligence

Game Game

Joe Knetsch

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/tampabayhistory

Recommended Citation Recommended Citation Knetsch, Joe (2007) "Florida, Cuba And The Spanish–American War: The Intelligence Game," Tampa Bay History: Vol. 21 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/tampabayhistory/vol21/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tampa Bay History by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected].

http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/

http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/tampabayhistory

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/tampabayhistory/vol21

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/tampabayhistory/vol21/iss1

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/tampabayhistory/vol21/iss1/6

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/tampabayhistory?utm_source=scholarcommons.usf.edu%2Ftampabayhistory%2Fvol21%2Fiss1%2F6&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/tampabayhistory/vol21/iss1/6?utm_source=scholarcommons.usf.edu%2Ftampabayhistory%2Fvol21%2Fiss1%2F6&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages

mailto:[email protected]

TheIntelligenceGame55

Florida,CubaAndTheSpanish–AmericanWar:

TheIntelligenceGame

byJoeKnetsch,Ph.D.

In 1898 officers headed to the newly erupting conflict between theUnited States and Spain in Cuba were handed a valuable piece of information.Entitled “Military Notes on Cuba” and issued by the Adjutant General’s Office,Military Information Division (MID), this document provided the youngcommanding officers with valuable data on nearly every important city, railroad,harbor,etc.on that long-suffering island. The intelligencegathered tocreate thisusefulandcarefullydocumentedvolumecamefromourmilitaryattache’s,theSpanisharchives (and those of other countries), consular reports, travelers and numerousunnamed“insurrectionists”bothinandoutsideofCuba,manylivinginTampa.Itscompilationbeganwith theeffortsofCaptain (laterBrigadierGeneral)GeorgeP.ScrivenoftheArmySignalCorpsin1892,afullthreeyearsbeforetheoutbreakoftherevolutionof1895.Scrivennotonlygaveapictureofthephysicalcharacteristicsbut also an explanation of the Cuban railway system, Cuba’s topography and itcontainedageneraldiscussionofthemilitarysituationontheisland.Somepersonalreconnaissancewasalsoincludedinthevolumebutitsmostimportantcomponentscame from Cubans. As Colonel BruceW. Bidwell has explained in his “HistoryoftheMilitaryIntelligenceDivision,DepartmentoftheArmyGeneralStaff,”(theunpublishedversion),“Inadditiontothissource,awell-organizedCubanNationalistJuntahadbeenfunctioninginNewYorkCityeversince1868.HavingengineeredthestillsmoulderingrevoltagainstSpanishrulewhichopenedin1895,itsmembersremainedperfectlywillingatalltimestofurnishtheWarDepartmentwithdesired

JoeKnetschholdsaPh.D.inhistoryfromFloridaStateUniversity.Knetsch,aGovernmentAnalystIIwithinFlorida’sBureauofSurveyandMapping,DivisionofStateLands,hasauthorednumerousarticlesonFloridatopics,withanemphasisonFlorida’spioneereraandmilitaryhistory.

1

Knetsch: Florida, Cuba And The Spanish–American War: The Intelligence Game

Published by Scholar Commons, 2007

56TampaBayHistory

information about the Caribbean area. When supplemented by a considerableamountoffurtherresearchalongsimilarlines,thesetwomainsourcesenabledtheMilitaryInformationDivision,AGO,inJune1898,topublishaverycomprehensivepamphletentitled“MilitaryNotesonCuba…”Thisbookwasplaced“atthedisposalofeveryofficer”oftheArmyheadedtothattroubledland.1

The gathering of military intelligence by the U. S. Army in an organized,bureaucraticsensedidnotbeginuntilAdjutantGeneralR.C.Drum,onhisowninitiative,establishedtheMilitaryIntelligenceDivisioninthefallof1885.ThiswasthreeyearsaftertheU.S.Navyhadcreateditsownintelligenceagency,theOfficeofNavalIntelligence(ONI).LiketheNavytheArmywasverysoonattachingMilitaryAttachestoourforeignlegationsthroughoutmostofEuropeandthemajorcapitalsinLatinAmericaandAsia.DrumcreatedtheMIDfromtheReservationsDivisionoftheMiscellaneousBranchoftheOfficeoftheAdjutantGeneral.HeplacedtheneworganizationunderthecommandofMajorWilliamJ.Volkmar,thechiefoftheMiscellaneousBranch. Theassignmentof thenewagencywastogatherasmuchinformationasit“deemedusefulandbeneficialtotheArmyatlarge.”2Mapsweregatheredingreatquantitiesfromallavailablesourcesbothathomeandabroadandcheckedagainsteachotherforaccuracyandotherfinepointsthatmaybestrategicallyuseful.ReportsfromthenewlyappointedattachesalsoaddedtothedepthoftheDivision’sknowledgeandtheseofficerswererequiredtosearchnewspapers,reports,libraries,archivesforusefuldataandtoquestiontravelersaboutthingstheywitnessedorsawinthecountrywhilevisiting.TheDivision’savidcollectingdemandedthatthespaceandnumbersallottedtoitshouldbeincreasedwhichsoonbroughtittotheattentionoftheheadoftheSignalCorpswhofeltitwashisoffice’sdutytocollectthisdata.Theinfightingsoonbecameverybitterandcounterproductive.3

BrieflytoldtheSignalCorpsunderthedynamicleadershipofBrigadierGeneralAdolphusW.Greelywascertainthat ithadbeenassignedthedutyof intelligencegatheringandwasnotwillingtosharetheresponsibility.GreelybasedhisassumptiononanactofCongresspassedinOctoberof1890statingthattheSignalCorpswould“collectinformationfortheArmybytelegraphandotherwise.”Bythebeginningof1892Greelywasreadytoputupafullfightforthisduty.Unfortunatelyforhim,DrumhadthestrongsupportofSecretaryofWar,StephenElkins,andLieutenantGeneraloftheArmy,JohnM.SchofieldwhowasthentheCommandingGeneraloftheArmy.ByMarch1892theWarDepartmentGeneralOrderswereissuedthatgave the task of gathering “military intelligence” to the MID. Not only was theDivisiongiventhisdauntingtaskbutitwasalsoassignedthedutiesofmakingand

1 BruceW.Bidwell.“HistoryOfTheMilitaryIntelligenceDivision,DepartmentOfTheArmyGeneralStaff.”OfficeOfTheChiefOfMilitaryHistory,DepartmentOfTheArmy,“HistoricalManuscriptFile–Unclassified”2-3.7Aa.NPt.1.WashingtonD.C.,1959-61.Vii-1ThruVii-3.2 BruceW.Bidwell.History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941.Frederick,Maryland:UniversityPublicationsofAmerica,1986.54-55.3 Ibid.,55.

2

Tampa Bay History, Vol. 21 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 6



issuingallmilitarymaps,booksand instructions foruseby theArmyandmilitiaofficersandStatetroops.ItwasalsotodevelopandprepareplansformobilizationandthetransportationofvolunteerunitsandStatetroops“andfortheconcentrationofthemilitaryforcesoftheUnitedStatesatthevariousstrategicpointsonornearthefrontiersofthecountry.”InotherwordstheMIDwastotakeonthefunctionsofasmallerGeneralStaff,whichtheUnitedStateshadnotyetimplemented.UndertheleadershipofMajorArthurL.WagnertheDivisionsoonbeganorganizingforthesetaskswithastaffofelevenofficersinadditiontofortystatebasedofficersandsixteenmilitaryattaches.OneofthemoststrategicallyplacedattacheswasCaptainTaskerBlisswhosereportsfromMadrid,whenaddedtotheinformationprovidedby the Junta and exiled Cubans in Florida, allowed the Army to compute, “withunusualaccuracy”theactualstrengthoftheSpanishArmyunitslocatedthroughoutCuba.4Wagner’smenalsocooperatedwiththeSecretServiceinidentifyingSpanish

4 Ibid.,55-61.AlsoseeRhodriJeffreys-Jones.American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA.NewYork:TheFreePress,1977.26-27.

MembersofCompanyH,157thIndianaVolunteerInfantry,areseendrillingamongstthepalmettoandpinenearPortTampa.Thoughmakingupalmosthalfofthe30,000soldiersencampedinandaroundTampabeforethewar,volunteertroopsmadeupaverysmallpercentageofthosewhoactuallyparticipatedintheSpanish-AmericanWar.

University of South Florida Special Collections Department

3



58TampaBayHistory

spiesattemptingtoinfiltrateAmericanunitsheadedforCubainTampaafterthewarbegan.5

TheNavyalsowasjustbeginningitsintelligenceserviceinthiseraandhadactuallyprecededtheArmy’sorganizationbyacoupleofyears.Theemphasisherewasalsowiththeattachesandtheirdutiesoverseas.TheOfficeofNavalIntelligencewas created as a part of the Bureau of Navigation in 1882. There had been amovementwithinthenavalestablishmenttomodernizetheUnitedStatesNavyandawiderecognitionofitsdeclinesincetheCivilWarincomparisontoothernavies.ThereformersincludedAdmiralStephenB.Luce,CaptainFrenchChadwick,W.W.Kimball,CharlesC.Rogersandayoungofficerjustthenenteringthemainpartofhiscareer,AlfredT.Mahan.ThefirstchiefoftheofficewasLieutenantTheordorusBaileyMyersMason,awidelytraveledandsavvycollectorofdata.Atfirst,Masontried to work with the established Naval Institute but found that this was toocumbersomeandtheparticipantswereinterestedinthemechanicalmodernizationbutnotintelligencegatheringanddistribution.Masonworkedwellwithhisbureauchief,CommodoreJohnGrimesWalker,whoappreciatedhissubordinate’stalentsandtenacity.TheywerefortunateinhavingWilliamH.ChandlerasthenewSecretaryof the Navy who supported most of their efforts. At the 25 July 1882 meetingbetweenMasonandChandlertheSecretaryoutlinedaplantogatherintelligence,compile, record and correct information and he created fourteen categories intowhicheachtypeofintelligencewouldbeplacedandorganized.Followingaperiodof political interferencewith the intelligence gatheringbyUnder Secretary of theNavyJamesRussellSoley,theONIunderwentadramaticchangeforthebetterwiththeappointmentofFrenchE.Chadwickasthenewchiefin1892.Budgetcutsintheelectionyearof1892didnotenhancethegatherofintelligencepreparatorytothewarwithSpain.Theattachéstaffwascutandthecollectionofoverseasintelligencefellasaresult.ChadwickdidnothaveachancetoreformorimprovetheproductsincehewasinonlyforaboutayearThesecondClevelandadministrationdidnothaveitseyesoncollectingintelligencesinceitopposedtheRepublicanexpansionistprogramandwasforcedtodealwiththePanicof1893-94,domesticviolence,labordisputesandinflation.Luckily,ONIhadoneallyinthenewadministration,SecretaryoftheNavyHilaryHerbert.HerbertallowedobserverstogointotheSino-JapaneseWarareaandsentintelligenceagentstoobservetheharboratRiodeJaneiroduringtheBrazilianrebellionof1893-94.HerbertallowedONItodispatchattachesandothersthroughoutLatinAmerica,includingVenezuelawheretheUnitedStateshadamajordisagreementwithGreatBritain. DespitethepresenceofareportthatSpainhadapproachedGreatBritainaboutapossibleanti-UnitedStatesalliance,theONIdidnotbecomeinvolvedintheimmediateplanningfornavaloperationsintheAtlantic,Caribbean or Asia. Not until Lieutenant Commander RichardWainwright tookoverONIwiththenewMcKinleyadministrationdidtheofficebegintogearforwar.

5 Jeffreys-Jones,26.

4




WainwrightsharedmanyideaswiththeoldreformerswithwhomhehadgraduatedfromtheNavalAcademyandwiththenewUnderSecretaryoftheNavy,TheodoreRoosevelt.InagreementwithMahan,Roosevelt,SenatorHenryCabotLodgeandothers,Wainwrightsharedthe“largepicture”concept.6 Wainwright had to face the immediate task of getting vast amounts ofinformationreadyfordistribution.JapaneseinterestinHawaiihadbeenbroughttotheforewiththepressureoftheHawaiianRevolution,thelargeAsiaticpopulationin the islands and the development of U. S. interests in the Asian market andexpansion. At the same time theGerman fleet had increaseddramatically undertheskillfulguidanceofAdmiralVonTerpitz.DisputeswithGreatBritainoversealsinthePacificNorthwest,Venezuela’sboundaryandotherlittleproblemsmadetheincreasinglyimportantAnglo-SaxonalliancebetweentheUnitedStatesandBritainunlikelyalthoughparadedconstantlyinthepressandpopularmagazines.

BytheadventoftheMcKinleyadministrationthesituationinCubawasrapidlyheatingup.Thewarhadbegunin1895andwasdraggingonwithneithersidetheapparentwinner.ThelimitedresourcesofSpainwerebeingrapidlyusedupaswas itseligiblemilitary-agepopulation. Withthebeginningsof therevolutionin the Philippines the end was clearly on the horizon. Getting information toanswerpolicyquestionsandmilitaryinquiriesmeantthattheONI(andtheotherintelligenceagencies)wouldhavetogreatlyincreasetheirpresence.Atthesametime,theNavalWarCollegewasorganizingandplanningforthecomingwarbyproducingnumerousscenariosthatcouldbeappliedgivencertainsituations.ONIwascalledupontosupplementtheinformationavailableatthecollegeandtoquietlyassistinimplementingtheplansshouldwarcomeaboutinthenearfuture.Oneofthemajorproblemswaswheretofocustheattention.InresponsetosomealarmingreportsandRoosevelt’spublicstatementsmoreattentionwasactuallypaidtoGermanaimsthanthoseofSpain.NotuntilthesinkingoftheMainewastheattentionentirelydrawntowarwithSpain.7

ONI reliedheavilyupon the reportsof attachesduring this crucialperiod,especiallythosestationedinEurope.FromMadridLieutenantCommanderGeorgeL.Dyerreportedin1897theSpanishrumorsofwaragainsttheUnitedStates.TheSpaniards,accordingtoDyer,hadfullfaithintheirsquadronsandbelievedthatifanencounter shouldtakeplace theycoulddefeat theU.S.Navyanddestroyourcommerce. Brash talk inSpanish circles of attacking theAmerican coastlinewasalsobandiedaboutinMadrid.FromGermanycamethewarningsofAlbertNiblackthatSpainhadpurchasedtwoItaliancruisersmoreheavilyarmedthantheNew York,thought tobe thebest in theU.S.Navy. Roosevelt requiredONI toproduce anumberofpapersoncoalingstations,firepowerofopposingvessels,cruisingrangeof

6 JefferyM.Dorwart.The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America’s First Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918.Annapolis:NavalInstitutePress,1979.,12-54.7 Ibid.,55-59.

5



60TampaBayHistory

bothourshipsandthoseofSpain,andothervitalintelligenceformilitaryplanning.WiththesmallstaffallottedovertherecentyearsandthemanyareastobeexploreditisnosurprisethattheintelligencesystemwasnotuptothestandardsofthedayandboththeNavyandArmyhadmuchtolearninaveryshorttime.8

TensionswiththegovernmentofSpaininCubawereaddingtotheincreasedneedforinformation. ManyCubanshadmigratedtotheUnitedStatesprimarilytogo intobusiness toassist their familiesandfriendsbackhome. Manyof thesemen and women brought back information concerning conditions in Cuba andthe problems of the Spanish administration and army. This led to the arrest ofnumerous individuals who held such citizenship and put the United States in anawkwardposition relative to thedispositionof their cases. Thearrest in1896ofMark(Marcos)E.Rodriguez,LuisSomeillanyAzpeitiaandLuisSmoeillanyVidalcreatedsuchasensationthattheSenateCommitteeonForeignAffairsinvestigatedthematter.RodriguezwastakeninbroaddaylightwhileboardingtheOlivette,ofthePlantSteamshipLine,forareturntriptoTampa.Allthreemenwerearrestedand

Membersofthe71stNewYorkVolunteerswaittoboardCuba-boundtransportsatPortTampa.The71stwasoneofthefewvolunteerunitstofightinCubaduringtheSpanish–AmericanWar.

University of South Florida Library Special Collections Department

8 Ibid.,60-62.

6




chargedwithseditionandrebellion.SenatorWilkersonCallofFloridaledthechargetogetthesemenreleasedandreturnedtotheirfamilies.JustwhatinformationthesemencouldpassonisinquestionbuttheSpanishgovernmentwassurethattheywerespiesassistingtherebelsandrefusedtoreleasetheminatimelymatter.9 When it came to raising the diplomatic and emotional heat no one wasbettersuitedtothetaskthanthegreatCubanrevolutionary,JoseMarti.MuchhasbeenwrittenaboutthisintriguingfigurebutoneofthemostimportantservicesheperformedforhiscountrywasingettingthepeopleofFlorida,andespeciallyTampa,directlyinvolvedinsupportingtherevolution.AshistorianJoanSteffyhaswritten:“ThusitwasTampawhichbecamethecatalystforthemovementtojoinallCubansinthestruggle for independence. Itwas inTampathatMartiproposedhis idealsofnationalunity,ofdemocraticrevolutionaryactivity,andthejoiningofallgroupsunder a common banner.” It was also inTampa where the Spanish governmentallegedlyattemptedtoassassinatethewriter-turned-revolutionarybypoisoninghiswine.FromthattimeoneachvisittoTampafoundhiminthehomeofRupertoandPaulinaPedroso,anAfrican-CubancouplewhomMartitrusted.Marti’sinterestinTampawasthecigar-workersandtheirassociations.InthesehefoundfollowersandcontributorstotheextentthatthemoneydonatedbythepeopleofTampaandKeyWestgrossedmorethanthatreceivedfromallotherLatinAmericancountriescombined.Almostallofthefundsraisedwenttothepurchaseofarms,ammunitionandmedicalsuppliesfortherevolutionaryarmyinCuba.10 Tampawaslookeduponas“theveryheartoftheAmericanconspiracy,”tofreeCubafromSpanishcontrol.11ItwasinTampathatMartiannouncedthecreationoftheCubanRevolutionaryParty(PRC)andtheplacewherethepartyorganizationbegantotakeshapeintheformofmanylocalized“juntas”.Manyofthelocaljuntas,organizedbythecigarworkersandsomeofthemanufacturers,wereactivelyinvolvedinfundraisingandcampaigningonbehalfofCubanindependence.Moredirectlysome of the juntas inTampa and elsewhere “coordinated support of filibusteringexpeditions leavingFlorida forCuba.”12 That theseorganizationswere infiltratedbySpanishspiesisundoubtedbuttheywereremarkablytightintheirlocalsecuritymeasures.

Oneofthestoriesofclandestinewarfare,thenotificationoftherevolutionariesinCubathatthe“gritodeGuerra”wastobegin,wassentwrappedinaspecialcigarmarkedbytwotineyellowspecksbyBlasO’HalloranintheO”HallorancigarfactoryinWestTampa.MiguelAngelDuquedeEstradacarriedthemessagethroughthe

9 UnitedStatesSenateDocumentNo.16.54thCongress,1stSession.1896.SerialSet3353.10 Joan Marie Steffy. “The Cuban Immigrants of Tampa, Florida: 1886-1898.” Masters Thesis.University of South Florida, 1975, 43-74.The author would like to thank Consuelo Stebbins at theUniversityofCentralFloridaforsharingherworkregardingtheCubanRevolutionarypartiesinTampaandKeyWestduringthistimeperiod.11 Steffy,78.12 LouisA.Perez,Jr.“CubansinTampa:FromExilestoImmigrants,1892-1901.”Florida Historical Quarterly.Volume57,October1978,133-134.

7



62TampaBayHistory

tightSpanishcustomsofficeanddeliveredthemessagetoJuanGalbertoGomezwhosetthefinaldateforFebruary24,1895.13RecentscholarshipandthepublicationinHavanaofJuanGualbertoGomez’smemoirshavebrought to light the facts inthismatter.InactualitythemessagewastoolargeforanycigartoholdanditdidnotgothroughthecloselywatchedTampaJuntasbutitwassentthroughthemoretightlycontrolledCubanConventioninKeyWest.ThechainofcurriersbeganwithGonzoladeQuedadainNewYorkthroughtoJuandeBarriosthencetoManueldelaCruzwhodeliveredthefinalmessageinCubatoGomez. AlthoughthesemenwereknowntotheSpanishofficialstheirquickandsilentworkwithinthegrowingnetworkmadetheirmissionasuccess.14

Publication of the Spanish correspondence between its Consuls and theMinistry of Ultramar by Dr. Consuelo E. Stebbins indicates the intensity of theintrigue at this stage. Since many of the revolutionaries were participants in theTenYearsWaritwassomewhateasiertofollowthemandreportontheircontactsinTampaandKeyWest.InareportdatedMarch8,1895,PedroSolis,theConsulinKeyWestnoted:“ThisconsulateiscloselyobservingandreportingontheactivitiesoftheSeparatists,notonlyinKeyWestbutalsoinTampaandothercitiesinFlorida.SinceIassumedtheresponsibilityofthisofficeseveralyearsago,Ihavemaintainedconstantsurveillanceoftheinsurgents,andIhavesentdetailedreportsoftheirplansto Cuba and Washington D. C. …” Solis then noted the eminent threat of anexpeditiontobeledbyGeneralsCarlosRoloffandSerafinSanchez.ItleftBigPineKeyandlandedinLasVillasprovinceonJuly24,1895.Evenwithforeknowledgetheconsulcoulddolittlebutinformthoseinchargeofenforcement.15Thedocumentsclearlyshowanactiveconsularservicebutalsotheconstantfrustrationitexperiencedin trying tohalt thenumerous filibusteringexpeditionsor the revolutionary fundraising especially by the cells of the Central Revolutionary Council in Key WestorthenumerousclubsinTampa.16EvenwhenEnriqueCollazowas“organizingacouncilofwarinTampa,”thefrustratedconsul,M.R.Esudero,wasadvisednottoevenpresschargesasitwouldbeawasteoftimeandmoney.ConvincedthatthisassessmentofthesituationwasaccuratetheconsuldidnotpressforchargesknowingthatnoconvictioncouldbewonagainsttheinsurgentswhohadthesupportofthepopulaceinbothKeyWestandTampa.17

13 Steffy.,79-80.14 Consuelo E. Stebbins. “KeyWest DeclaresWar on Spain.” Unpublished paper delivered to theFloridaHistoricalSocietyannualmeeting,Clearwater,Florida,May26,2007.SeealsoJuanGualbertoGomez.Por Cuba Libre.Havana:1905.348-349:andManuelDeulofeu.Marti, Cayo Hueso y Tampa.Cienfuego.ND.285. Theauthorwould like to thankDr.Stebbins forher assistance in seeing thesesourcesandsharingherworkinprogress.15 ConsueloE.Stebbins.City of Intrigue, Nest of Revolution: A Documentary History of Key West in the Nineteenth Century.Gainesville:UniversityPressofFlorida,2007.,183.16 Ibid.,177-233.17 Ibid.,232.

8




Thismapshowstheproximityofthevariousencampments,thedocksatPortTampaCityandtheCityofTampa.HenryPlant’ssingletrackrailroad,connectingTampaandPortTampa,wasoverwhelmedbythenumberofpeopleandamountofsuppliesthathadtotravelitsnine-milelength.

Tony Pizzo Collection, University of South Florida Library Special Collections Department

9



64 Tampa Bay History

Filibustering relied upon secrecy and tact in the face of constant observation. The Ten Year War had proven that the Spanish Navy could not stop all such traffic and this was to be true in the War for Independence too. However, Marti and company were not always successful in getting their arms and supplies to their compatriots in Cuba. In one of the most conspicuous captures made by the Spanish and American customs agents during the period before United States intervention the insurrectionists were stopped in mid-shipment in Fernandina. Simply put the plot at hand was the smuggling of arms and ammunition to Cuba through the sleepy port of Fernandina, which had little in the way of military shipping in early 1895. Marti, using the name of D. E. Mantell, a wealthy “Englishman” about to sail on a cruise to the West Indies, chartered the yacht Lagonda through the good offices of his friend, Nathaniel Barnett Borden, a prominent Fernandina businessman. Borden’s warehouse held a number of ammunition crates variously labeled and destined for the Lagonda. Two other vessels were hired for the adventure, the Amadis, out of Rockland, Maine, and tramp steamer Baracoa then in harbor at Boston. The latter was hired out to one “Abe Moreas of Tampa. The claim of Borden was that around two hundred men, laborers, would be picked up at various ports in the West Indies and transported to work on one of the islands, name unspecified. Such uncertainty aroused the suspicions of one of the captains. The New York World got wind of the sailing of the Lagonda and alerted its Fernandina correspondent, T. A. Hall, to be on the look out for anything suspicious because rumor on the New York docks had it that a filibustering expedition might be sailing from the quiet port. Hall, a county judge, showed this dispatch to the local Collector of Customs, George L. Baltzell who began to pay closer attention to the comings and goings of some newly arrived vessels. In New York City, an informant, James Batewell, wrote to Secretary of the Treasury John G. Carlisle, that the Lagonda and the Amadis had been chartered for a filibustering expedition. The fate of the expedition was therefore sealed before the arrival of the final ship. The agents of the customs service, including special agent S. W. Paul of Tampa, descended upon Borden’s warehouse and seized the vessels in the harbor. The expedition had been crushed. However, it did have a positive impact on the Cuban cause and, as historian Antonio Rafael de la Cova has noted, it inspired the cause with greater energy and determination to organize even more expeditions to obtain national independence for Cuba.18

For many in the United States the first real indication that the nation had an intelligence network was the assignment given to Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan. Rowan was perfect for the job which entailed getting into Cuba, making contact with General Calixto Garcia Iniguez, commander of Cuban forces in the eastern end of the island. Like many others who preceded him to the island, he took advantage

18 Antonio de la Cova. “Fernandina Filibuster Fiasco: Birth of the 1895 Cuban War of Independence.” Florida Historical Quarterly. Volume 82, September 2003., 16-42. Also see Enrique Collazo. Cuba Heroica. Havana, Cuba. 1911., 170-172.

10




ofthenetworkestablishedbythefilibusterersinobtainingpassagetoCuba.RowanhadexperienceatintelligencegatheringinthefieldhavingmadeaninspectionoftheentirelengthoftheCanadianPacificRailroad.HealsohadexperienceinCubaandauthoredabookontheisland’sresources.InadditiontocontactingGarciaRowanwasalsotoattempttocontactGeneralMaximoGomezyBaeztheleadingmilitaryofficerintheinsurgentranksand,likeGarcia,aholdoverfromthe“TenYear’sWar”from 1868-1879. Rowan’s mission was an overwhelming success but hardly thedaring-doadventurewrittenupinthefamous“MessagetoGarcia”pieceofElbertHubbard.GarciawastogiveRowanthelayoutoftheSpanishforcesontheisland,theirnumbers,weapons,dispositions,etc.ForMIDthiswasnotallnewinformationbutitsupplementedthatwhichwasalreadyknownthroughotherCubansources,namelytheexilesinFloridaandNewYork.19ForAmericansreadingtheadventurepublishedbyHubbard,itromanticizedtherolesofthefilibusterersandothersdaringtoflauntthepowerofSpain.

Ona lessadventuresome level, local intelligencegatheringtookonsometypically peculiar twists. In her charmingly brief “My Service in the Spanish-AmericanWar,1898,”MabelBean(Williams)tellsherstoryofminorbutimportantespionage.Ms.Beanworkedinherfather’sstoreandpostofficeatPortTampa.AfterdescribingtheimpactofthousandsoftroopsdescendinguponthetownshetellsofhersittinginthefamilyparlorwhenColonelGroesbeckarrived.TheColonelwasanoldfriendofherparentsandcouldbetrustedtolookaftertheyoungladyinhernewrole–followingtheactivitiesandmailingsoftwowell-knownSpaniardssuspectingofspyingontheoperationsinTampa.Thesemenwereregularcustomersandoftenseeninthevicinity.Herjobwasrelativelysimple.Keepaneyeonthesemenandsearch theirmail. Shewas to reporther findings toGeneralWilliamR. Shafter,CommanderofFifthCorps,personally.Theresheoftentranslatedthedocumentsforthegeneralandpresumablyhisstaff.Thebrightyoung,curlyheadedgirlinthetrimsailorsuitwouldhardlybesuspectedofbeingaspybythemenandthatwaswhatGroesbeckexpected.Asshesummedupherexperience:“Gen.Shafter,Col.GroesbeckandmyfatherallseemedpleasedwiththeworkIhaddonebutIcouldn’tseethatitamountedtomuch.Perhapsitdidpreventcontrabandinformationfromgoingthroughthemail.”Whatevershedeliveredithadtoaccountformorethanjustgeneralinformationforhertobereportingitdirectlytothecommandingofficer.Inespionagelittlethingsadduptolargerthingsandinthebiggerpictureitcouldbeveryimportant.20

19 G.J.A.O’Toole.Honorable Treachery: A History of U. S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA..NewYork:MorganEntrekinBooks,1991.194-195.AlsoseeWillliamR.Corson.The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire.NewYork:TheDialPress,1977.,46.20 Mabel C. Bean. “My Service in the Spanish-American War, 1898.” Tampa, Florida: HistoricalRecordsSurvey,StateArchivesSurvey,1937.,4-7.

11



66TampaBayHistory

Few areas indicatethenatureoftheintelligencewar during the CubanRevolutionandtheSpanish-AmericanWarof1898thanthe episodes involving thefilibusterers, most leavingfrom Florida ports. TheUnited States was neutralin the war between Cubaninsurgents and the Spanishgovernment and thereforewasrequiredbyinternationallaw to forbid and prohibitsuchexploitsasfilibustering.Raids into Cuba from theUnited States were of longtradition.Themostfamousoftheearlyexpeditionswerethose of Narciso López inthe period from 1849-52.During the Ten Years Warthere were many attemptsto get arms to the Cubaninsurgents and many ofthesecamefromFloridaandLouisiana.Themostfamousaffair in this era came withthe capture and executionof Captain Fry and the crewof the Virginius. As soon asthe war of 1895 began theboats coming from Florida, New York, Pennsylvania and other points along theeasterncoastoftheUnitedStatesappearedtobeacontinuousflotilla.TheRevenueServicewasdrawnintoaconstantgameofcatandmouseallalongthecoast.TheMorrill,theMcLane,theForwardandtheHamiltonallattemptedtohaltthetrafficinarms,ammunitionandmenheadedforCuba.Theyreceivedconstanttipsfromthe Spanish Ambassador, the Spanish Consular service and numerous spies upanddownthecoastline. TheGeorge W. Childs, theLark, theCommodoreandtheLauradawereallpartoftheearlyshipsattemptingtolandarticlesofwarandmenonCuba’sbeleagueredshores.InNovember,forexample,theSpanishAmbassadorrequestedthattheCustomsServicedetainandsearchtheJames W. Fosterasshesat

The Starry Flag Weekly was a popular Dime Novel during thetimeoftheSpanish-AmericanWar.Though“Tampa’sDynamiteFiend”wasafictionalstory,thethreatofSpanishsaboteurswasonthemindsofmanyAmericansduringthistime.

Dime Novel Collection, University of South Florida Library Special Collections Department

12




off of the Delaware Breakwater. In January of 1896 the Spanish minister statedthatthesteamerJ. W. Hawkinswas just leavingNewYorktorendezvouswiththeCommodore somewhere near Palm Beach and that the arms confiscated earlier atCedarKeysfiguredintothemixheadedtowardsGarcia’sarmy.ByMarchofthatyeartheministerwascomplainingoncemoreabouttheschoonerS. R. MallorytakingitscargofromCedarKeystomeetwiththeschoonerAdeloffofTampawheretheywouldlaterconnectwiththefamousThree FriendswhichwouldmakethefinallegtoCuba.ThislastexploitevenstatedthattheS. R. MallorycontainedthirtytonsofsuppliesfortheinsurgentsandthattheAdelwastransportingEnriqueColloandabodyofmentojoinupwiththeThree FriendsafterleavingLongboatKey(statedasLongportInletinthereport)andrendezvousingsomewherenearAlligatorKey.Such specific information could only have come from a rather sophisticated spynetworkoperatingoutofTampaandJacksonville.TheS. R. Mallorywasseizedinthisinstancebutsoonreleasedforlackofdirectevidenceshowingaviolationoftheneutralitylaws.21

AccordingtoareporttotheHouseofRepresentativesgiveninFebruaryof1898theU.S.CustomsServiceallegedlyputitsentireeasternforceof2,408menontothetaskofsuppressingthetradeinarmsandtheshipmentofmentoCuba.Thissamereportstated:“Thatonly6outof13,585AmericanvesselssucceededinreachingCubaandthatlessthan50havehadanyshareintheseexpeditions…”Itbragged that theU.S. citizenswere therebyproven tobe lawabiding and that a“wholesomeandrepressivefear”keptthosemoredisposedtoundertakesuchactioninline.TheServiceevenproducedanimpressivecharttoshowtheresultsofsixtyattemptedexpeditions,whichitclaimedveryfeweverreachedCuba.AccordingtoDr.SamuelProctor,NapoleonBonaparteBroward’sbiographer, theThree Friendsalonehad eight successful voyages toCubaprovidingweapons,menandhospitalsuppliestotheinsurgentarmy.22TheThree Friendswasassigneda“shadow”intheRevenueCutterBoutwellwhileinJacksonville,howeverthereweremanywellknownescapadeswherethecaptainofthiscuttersimplywaivedgoodbyeafterThree Friendscrossedthebar. ThesamereportstatingthattheRevenueServicehadstoppedsomanyoftheexpeditionsalsonotedhowmanytimes(completewithdates)thesesamevesselsactuallydeliveredtheircargoestoCuba.Inlightofmostoftheevidenceandthenumerousnewspaperreportsoftheseexploitsthereportcanonlybeviewedas“windowdressing”fortheSpanishgovernmentandananswertoitschargesthattheUnitedStateshadbeentoolenientwiththeviolators.23

TheCubanRevolutionof1895-1898was financedheavilybyCubansandtheirsympathizersintheUnitedStates,especiallyinTampaandKeyWest,Florida.

21 UnitedStatesSenateDocumentNo.180.54thCongress,1stSession,1896.SerialSet3353.22 SamuelProctor. “FilibusteringAboard theThree Friends.”Broward Legacy.Volume4,Spring/Fall1981.,19.23 UnitedStatesHouseofRepresentativesDocumentNo.326.55thCongress,2dSession,February28,1898.SerialSet3679.

13



68TampaBayHistory

ManyofthefundsraisedbytheeffortsoftheCubanJuntaanditsnumeroussub-organizations went directly to fund the guns, ammunition and hospital goodsshipped by the filibusterers. According to historian James Robertson, “GeneralMaximo Gomez, commander-in-chief of the Cuban Army, early and continuallyemphasizedtheimportanceandnecessityofpromotingfilibusteringasameansofsustainingtherevolutionarymovement,…”24CubanhistorianJoseRiveroMunizhasalsonotedthateventhoughtheattemptstoraisemoneyfortherevolutionwerepubliclyknownandpromotedinthelocalpress,UnitedStatesauthoritiesdidlittleifanythingtopreventthem.ThenearlyconstantmilitarypreparationswhichtheSpanish Ambassador and others denounced and demanded a halt to were almosttotallyignoredbythepowersinWashingtonandthroughoutFlorida.ClearlythesympathyandadmirationfortheCubancausewasonethatstruckaresponsivecordintheheartsofFloridiansandothercitizens.25Tampa’sdenizensinparticularwereverysupportiveoftheCubancauseanddonatedasmuchfromthisonetownaswasraisedinalltheotherAmericas.26Indeed,thecigar-makersofTampacontributedtheastoundingamountoftwelvetofifteenthousanddollarspermonth,or$150,000peryear(inroundnumbers).27ThecentersofCubanemigrantpopulation,Tampa,KeyWestandNewYorkwerethemostfertilefieldsforfund-raising.Withacombinedpopulationofover8,000CubansTampaandKeyWestwerequicktoraiseneededfunds.28

ProbablythemostfamousintelligencecoupofthewarcamewiththediscoveryofthewhereaboutsofthefleetofAdmiralPascualCerverayTopete.Thisfleetwaswellundermanned,incompleteincompositionanddidnothaveallofitsgunsandturretsinplace,yetasa“fleet inbeing” itpresentedathreat,especiallytothefrightenedandnearlyhystericalgovernorsoftheNewEnglandstateswhofearedthebombingofPlymouthorsomeothercoastalcommunity.IthadtobefoundanddestroyedbeforealandinvasionofCubacouldbeattemptedbecausetheArmycouldnotsailunprotectedtoCubainopenboats.TwooperativesoftheNavyDepartment,notlinkedtoONI,wereEnsignsHenryH.WardandWilliamH.BuckwhocharteredyachtstocruiseoffoftheSpanishcoastandkeepwatchonthefleetsofCerveraandAdmiralMigueldelaCamara.ThrownintotheintelligencemixinEuropewerethevariousoperativesoftheNavalAttaches,includingEdwardBreck,aformerfencingchampionwhowentindisguisetoSpainandplayedtheroletothehiltanddidnotgetcaught.Unfortunately,noneoftheseoperativesorattachescouldlocatethevitalfleetofCerveraonceit lefttheCapeVerdeIslands. Notuntil itreachedCuracaoon14May1898didtheUnitedStatesNavyhaveanideawhereitwasheaded.It

24 GeorgeW.Auxier. “ThePropagandaActivities of theCuban Junta inPrecipitating theSpanish-AmericanWar,1895-1898.”Hispanic American Historical Review.Volume19,1939.,288-89.25 Jose Rivero Muniz. The Ybor City Story (1885-1954).Tampa: E. Fernandez and Henry Beltranpublishers,1976.,25.26 GaryR.MorminoandGeorgeE.Pozzetta.The Immigrant World of Ybor City: Italians and Their Latin Neighbors in Tampa, 1885-1985.Gainesville:UniversityPressofFlorida,1998edition.,80.27 Muniz,101.28 Marshall M.True. Revolutionaries in Exile: The Cuban Revolutionary Party, 1891-1898. DoctoralDissertation,UniversityofVirginia.1965.,172.

14




hadbeenassumedthatCerverawouldheadtoHavanawherecoalandnavalstoresawaitedhim. TheNorthAtlanticFleet,underAdmiralWilliamT.SampsonwaschargedwiththeblockadeofCuba,especiallythenortherncoast.Theblockadewasextendedeastandwestofthecapitalcitybutcoveredlittleofthesoutherncoast.ThesecondassumptionwasthatifnotHavanathenCienfuegoswouldbethenextlogicalportofcall.The“FlyingSquadron”underAdmiralWinfieldScottSchleywascalledupontopreventthispossibility.Yet,fortencompletedays,sotheoldstorygoes,thefleetofAdmiralCerverawaslosttoNavalIntelligence.29Thisissurelynotthecase. At the official declaration of war PresidentWilliam McKinley ordered theheadoftheU.S.ArmySignalCorps,A.W.Greelytotakecontrolofalltelegraphiclinesinthecountry.Thisorderincludedbothcableandlandlines.Mostimportantwere those fromHavana toKeyWest and fromCienfuegos toHaiti. This latterwascutunderseverecircumstanceson11May.ThelinefromHavanatoKeyWestwas not cut during the war for good reason, it provided too much intelligence,includingon19MaythearrivalofCervera’sfleetintheharboratSantiagodeCuba.CaptainJamesAllenhadbeenassignedtoKeyWestandthisenergeticofficersoonrecruitedthelocalmanagerofthetelegraphicservice,MartinL.Hellings.HellingsimmediatelyofferedhisservicesandthoseofhismeninHavana,inwhomhehadexplicittrust.HehaddonethesameforCaptainCharlesSigsbeearrivedinKeyWestwiththebattleshipMaine. Besides thecontrolof theofficial telegraphofficeandstaff,AllennowhadaccessthroughtothehighestofficesinCuba.Itwasthroughoneoftheseoperatives,namedVillarilthatthearrivalofCervera’sfleetbecameknown.ThisinformationwasimmediatelysenttoWashingtonwhereGreelystateshegavehisassurance to thePresidentandSecretaryof theNavyLongthat itwas for realandreliable.30CommodoreGeorgeC.Remey,thencommandingatKeyWest,wasgiventheinformationdirectlyandhealsovouchedforitsauthenticity.AsRemeyrelated:“Thenextmorning,May19th,about9A.M.CaptainAllenU.S.A.thechiefSignalOffice,came,excited,andevidentlyingreathaste,andsaidthat[he]hadaveryimportantdispatchtotellme.SoIclearedtheroom,andheinformedmethathisofficehad,afewminutesbefore,receivedatelegramfromHavana,statingthatAdmiralCervera’sfleetwasenteringtheharborofSantiagodeCuba.”RemeythensentthemessageontoWashingtonwhere,helaterlearned,theofficerofthedayattheNavyDepartmentdidnotbelievethestoryuntilhegotseveralstoriesoverthenextfewhours.31AdmiralSampsonwasnotifiedoftheeventandhesoonsenthismessagetoSchley, thenonthewaytoCienfuegos, tocontinueontoSantiagodeCubaandblockadethatport. Schleydidnotbelievethestoryeitheranddelayedforseveraldaysbeforeactuallyconfirmingthestorybydirectobservationsdoneby

29 Dorwart,64-65;andO’Toole,195-97.30 O’Toole, 188-90. Also see A. W. Greely. “The Signal Corps in War-Time.” Century Magazine.Volume66,October,1903.,816-17.31 CharlesMasonRemey.Some Exerpts from the Life and Letters of Rear Admiral George Collier Remey, United States Navy, 1841-1928. Washington: Self-published, 1939., 43-46. Copy obtained from theMonroe County Public Library, Key West, Florida. See also Rebecca R. Raines. Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U. S. Army Signal Corps.Washington:CenterofMilitaryHistory,UnitedStatesArmy,1996.,88-90.

15



70TampaBayHistory

LieutenantBlueaidedbyhisCubanguide.Inner-servicerivalryappearstohavebeentheculprit innotgettingSchley intopositionearlierandthefact thatSchleywasupsetthatSampsonwasoverhimeventhoughhehadlongerservicemadeitdoublybadandforcedthetwomenintoadisagreementthatledtoCongressionalhearingsandpublicdisgust. AfinalnotetothisepisodecamewiththepublicationofWillisMoore’saccountof thefoundingoftheWestIndianWeatherService,abranchoftheDepartmentof Agriculture. According to Moore’s story, the important message was encodedintotheweatherobservationsfromBeleneCollegeinHavanaanddecipheredatKeyWest.IfthisisthecasethePresident’sfearofahurricaneanditseffectsonthefleetmadeanimportantcontributiontothewareffort.32

InoneofthestrangestfetesofimaginationtheCubanArmydoesnotreceiveanycreditforitsroleinthefivemonthcampaignconductedbytheUnitedStatesinCubawhichbroughtabouttheendtotheCubanRevolutionandtheSpanish-American War. The movement of Fifth Corps, under the command of GeneralWilliam Rufus Shafter, was slow and ponderous. There was little secret as to itsdestinationonceCerverawasbottleduponSantiago’snarrowharbor.PriortotheirleavingTampatheS. S. Floridatook312CubanvolunteersfromTampaandotherFloridacitiesandlandedthemnearBanes.TheRowanmissionhadalsointroducedGeneralNelsonMilestotwoofGarcia’smosttrustedsubordinates,GeneralEnriqueCollazoandLieutenantColonelCarlosHernandez.ThesegentlemengavetheMajorGeneralsomeofthemostvitalinformationonthestrengthoftheSpanishforcesnearSantiago, the entrenchments and thepossible reinforcements available toGeneralLinarescommandingSantiago.MilessentamessagebacktoGarciaandaskedhimtoprovidemoredetailsandbroachedpossiblecooperation.Garciarepliedon9JunethathewouldconsiderMiles’ordersashisordersandcooperateanywayhecould.HeofferedalmostexactnumbersofSpanishtroopsintheareaandpromisedtoholdtheforcesatHolguininplace.WhenShafterandtheFifthCorpsfinallyarrived,theofficersimmediatelydisembarkedandrowedtoshoretomeetwithGarciaunopposedbyanySpanishguns.Garcia’sforceshadclearedtheareabeforetheshellingofthe“forts”bySchley’sfleetandfewwerelefttoopposeeithertheofficers’landingorthedisembarkingof theFifthCorps. Reinforcements fromManzanillo,HolguinandGuantanamohadbeenblockedbysmallerforcesunderGarcia.WhenShafterandtheArmylandedatDaiquiriandSiboneyon22-24Junetheywereunopposed.AllofthisthankstoGarcia’sforcesandafeintofabout500menattackingfromthewestofSantiagounderhiscommand.MilesacknowledgedthecontributionoftheCubanArmyandnotedthattheyheldthemoststrategiclocationsonthewesternsideofthetownandharborandassistedintheassaultontheentrenchmentsbeforethetown.33Yetnowheredoyouseethiscontributionmentionedinthetextgivingthehistoryofthiswar.

32 WillisLutherMoore.“IAmThinkingofHurricanes.”The American Mercury.Volume12,September1927.,81-82.33 HouseofRepresentativesDocumentNo.2.55thCongress,3dSession.AnnualReportoftheWarDepartment,Washington:GovernmentPrintingOffice,1898.,27-28.

16




This cursory review of the Cuban Revolution and the Spanish-AmericanWar’sintelligencebattlesisnotmeanttobeallinclusive.HoweveritshouldbringquestionstomindastowhyShafter,MileyandotherstestifiedinfrontoftheDodgeCommissionintotheConductoftheWarthattheyhadlittleintelligenceconcerningtheforcesinfrontofthem.Giventhe“MilitaryNotesonCuba”compiledsocarefullybyScriven,theverylargenumberofexileswillingtogiveinformation,theforcesofGarciaandGomezwhoassistedinthelandingofUnitedStatestroopsandthenearlyfourhundredyearsofinteractionwiththeislandtheseassertionsringveryhollow.

AnAmericanofficerquestionsanallegedSpanishspyinthisdrawingdatingfromtheSpanish-AmericanWar.

from TheStoryoftheSpanish-AmericanWar by W. Nephew King (1898)

17



72TampaBayHistory

Almosteveryharborandtheroadnetworksurroundingitweremappedandavailabletothecommandingofficers.Thetrainscheduleandothertransportationfacilitieswerewellknownaswasthetopographyofmostoftheisland.TheConsularreportsandtheinformationgleanedfromourattachécorpsaddedevenmoredepthtotheavailableknowledge. Tomaketheclaimthattherewas little intelligencetouse isalmostludicrous. In one of the more revealing letters of the day, Brigadier GeneralWilliamLudlow, then Chief Engineer, wrote to Adjutant General Henry T. Corbin thefollowing:“TheSpanishstrengthhasbeengreatlyexaggerated.Theyclaimtohavehad250,000troops.Theyneverhadthem.Theyhaveexistedonpaperdoubtless,anddrawnpay,but150,000wouldcoveralltheyhad.Ofthese,manyhavebeensenthome,manyhavebeenkilled,andverymanyhavediedofdiseaseintheirfilthyandunsanitarybarracksandhospitals.”Ludlowcontinued:“Atthistime,fromdetailedand specific information, checked from several well informed sources, I cannotfindmorethan70,000SpanishsoldiersintheentireislandofCuba,andthesearedividedintoscatteredgarrisons.Icanapproximatelylocatethemfromrecentdata.”Ludlow thenbecamevery specific as tohowmany forceswere inwhat locations.Most importantly for the operations around Santiago, he noted that the easterntroops were almost totally isolated from the middle and western groups and thatthetransportationsystemdidnotallowanyrapidconsolidationorconcentrationofSpanishforces.Healsospeculatedthatitwouldbeverydifficult,evenwithfourraillinesleadingintoHavanatoconcentrateanymorethan40,000troopsforthecapital’sdefense. GeneralLudlowthenstatedthatwiththeSpanishtreasurynearlybroke,the fall ofManila in everyone’smind, the constant sightingof theNavy cruisingalongthecoastinterceptingalltraffic,knowledgethattheirfleetwasbottledupinSantiagoandknowingthattheCubanswereconstantlybeingfurthersuppliedbytheexpeditionssentbytheArmyandsupportersintheUnitedStatesthattheonlycourseopentothinkingSpaniardsinCubawasarapidcapitulation.Theletterisdated5June1898,andwassentfromTampa.JustthreedaysbeforethefirstordertosailwasgivenandexecutedGeneralLudlowwasinpossessionofsomeveryspecificdatathatallowedhimtogivesuchanaccuratepictureofwhatwasgoingoninCuba.34Theproblemwasnotenoughoraccurateinformationbuthowtoputittouseduringthecampaign.ThatisthecruxoftheproblemforMajorGeneralWilliamShafterandhisstaff.ItwouldtakethistypeofcampaigncompletewithalltheerrorsandfaultstobringaboutthemostimportantchangeintheArmy,thecreationofarealGeneralStaff.

34 Henry T. Corbin Papers: Library of Congress. Container No. 1, Folder “Gen. Wm. Ludlow.”ManuscriptDivision.Washington,D.C.TheauthorwouldliketoacknowledgetheassistanceofGerardCasaleofBethesda,Marylandforhisprocuringofthisdocument.

18



Florida, Cuba And The Spanishâ•fiAmerican War: The ...

Documents