The Chronology of Events IA Flight 814 takes off from Kathmandu
at 1615 (IST) hours on December 24, 1999. Air traffic control is
reported as asserting that shots were heard on the plane.
The five armed hijackers make pilot Captain Saran divert the
plane over Lucknow and head for Lahore in Pakistan. The Lahore
airport authorities refuse to permit the aircraft to land, forcing
it to head back to Amritsar, India. The plane lands at Amritsar
where the hijackers demand that the aircraft be refueled. The
airport is sealed off. The airport authorities send over a tanker
for refueling, but due to some problem they seek that the aircraft
be brought closer to the tank. After a 25-minute wait, the
hijackers make the aircraft take off by killing a passenger, Mr.
Katyal and head for Lahore, with just enough fuel for the trip.
India persuades the Pakistani authorities to permit the aircraft to
land. Lahore airport is sealed off. The aircraft nearly crash lands
and is surrounded by Pakistani commandos. It is refueled and headed
for Kabul. But because of the lack of night-landing facilities
there, and later, at Kandahar, the plane is diverted towards Dubai.
It finally lands at the Al-Minhat air force base. The hijackers
demand food, medicines and a step ladder since none is available.
The UAE officials agree to negotiate if the women and children are
allowed to disembark. The hijackers release 25 passengers, and
allow the body of Mr. Katyal to be released to the UAE authorities.
Early on December 25, 1999 morning, the flight takes off from Dubai
for Afghanistan. At 0855 hours, it lands at Kandahar. Senior Indian
officials opened talks with the hijackers to secure the release of
hostages. Hijackers demand release of 35 other jailed terrorists
besides Mohammad Masood Azhar and US $200 million for the release
of 154 hostages. Later hijackers dropped their demands for a $200
million ransom and the exhumed remains of Afghan terrorist Sajjad
Afghani. Passenger were released on December 31, 1999 after
Government of India releases 3 terrorists. January 6, 2000:
Hijackers have been identified as Pakistani nationals with links to
ISI, an intelligence organization of the Pakistan Government.
Initial demand by the hijackers The hijackers initially demanded
the release Mohammad Masood Azhar, who is currently serving jail
sentence in India for terrorist activities. Azhar is a Pakistani
national and is the General Secretary and ideologue of the
Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), an organization based in Pakistan
which was in October 1997 designated as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization by the United States Department of State. The HUM was
re-designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State
Department in its latest list released on October 8, 1999. Latest
demands by the hijackers The hijackers of the Indian Airlines
flight IC 814 have demanded the release of 35 other jailed
terrorists besides Mohammad Masood Azhar and US $200 million for
the release of 154 hostages. The hijackers have also demanded that
the body of Harkat-ul-Ansar chief in Jammu & Kashmir Sajjad
Afghani be exhumed and the coffin be handed over to them. According
to news reports, the hijackers have dropped their demands for a
$200 million ransom and the exhumed remains of Afghan terrorist
Sajjad Afghani (06:30 AM EST, December 29, 1999). Final Solution
India released 3 terrorists for the exchange of the Indian Airlines
passengers.
Summary of External Affairs Minister's comments at a press
briefing - December 27, 1999. The Government of India continues to
monitor the situation. The Government has shared with the leaders
of political parties in India information on developments in
respect of the hijacking of flight IA-814. The leaders of political
parties said that since developments were taking place at a fast
pace, it was for the Government to decide on shapes should be
taken. The safety and security of the passengers and crew and,
above all, the national interest of the country remain the two main
elements of India's approach. The meeting condoled the sad and
regrettable death by stabbing of Shri Rupin Katyal. An airplane
with essential materials, doctors, relief crew and a negotiating
team is in the process of leaving for Kandhar. It was our
expectation that the aircraft will leave for Kandhar within the
next 2-3 hours. In the course of the last two days EAM had
contacted his counterparts in several countries including
Australia, Russia, Canada, Great Britain, USA, Switzerland, Italy,
Bangladesh and Nepal to seek their active cooperation on
humanitarian grounds. In response to questions, EAM said the
following: The Government was aware of reports of the deadline
apparently set by the hijackers. Our direct contacts with them will
enable us to know the exact nature of their demands. The relief
aircraft would have gone yesterday but for procedural difficulties
not on account of the Government of India. The cooperation we are
receiving from the US administration is totally satisfactory. EAM
has been in touch with his counterpart in Pakistan. The Pakistani
reaction was that whatever they do will be within the four corners
of the law and transparent. Statement by Jaswant Singh, External
Affairs Minister at a Press Conference - December 26, 1999 It has
been 48 hours since the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight 814.
The Government's first concern remains the welfare of the
passengers and crew who continue to be held captive by the
hijackers. Their comfort and early safe return remains our first
priority. This requires that the hijacking be terminated at the
earliest. That is why, in the circumstances, we have been taking
all steps that we believe are both prudent and productive towards
these objectives. Ever since the aircraft was hijacked, we have
been constantly monitoring the situation. It left Dubai yesterday
morning and reached Kandahar around 08-30 am. Since then, constant
contact has been maintained with Taliban officials in Islamabad and
Kandahar on this matter. In these contacts, we have consistently
emphasised the importance that we attach to the safety and welfare
of the passengers and crew. Late last evening, a Taliban official
in Islamabad informed our High Commission that two persons had come
out of the aircraft. They were met by Taliban officials. They
conveyed the demand for the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, a
Pakistani national who has been in our custody, on charges of
terrorism, since January 1994. Masood Azhar belongs to the
Harkat-ul Mujahideen, which has been involved in terrorism in India
and also in the kidnapping of five foreign nationals in India in
1994. Repeated attempts have been made by the Pakistan Government
to secure his release. Additionally, some other Pakistani terrorist
organizations have also, in the past, resorted to terrorist and
criminal methods for this very purpose.
The Government of India like a large section of the
international community, condemns terrorism in all Its aspects. We
have been engaged with our partners and friends abroad, bilaterally
and in addressing international fora, in addressing this menace, of
which many countries are targets. The present incident of
hijacking, once again highlights the need for the international
community to rally as one, to address the problem. Ambassador
Naresh Chandra's interview on CNN December 26, 1999 ANDRIA HALL,
CNN ANCHOR: Joining us now from Los Angeles, Naresh Chandra, the
Indian ambassador to the United States. Ambassador Chandra, thank
you for joining us. Your government has said that it refuses to
negotiate. Why, and if you don't open a dialogue, how do you expect
this incident to end peacefully? NARESH CHANDRA, INDIAN AMBASSADOR
TO THE UNITED STATES: Well, it is the policy of most governments
not to negotiate with terrorists, because the danger is, if you
succumb to these kinds of demands from terrorists who have involved
in kidnapping, hijacking and murder, you will be setting a very bad
incident. This is not the first case where people have been
kidnapped to secure the release of this particular individual from
Pakistan. We had five people kidnapped by the same group some years
back, and they killed one hostage -- Monstro (ph) -- beheaded him,
and the fate of the other four hostages they have taken, it is
still not known, which included an American and three Europeans.
HALL: The incident, of course, has fueled the political fire
between India and Pakistan. What is the priority for your country
then at this point for ending the crisis? HALL: Well we would urge
that this act of hijacking is not seen in the India-Pakistan
context. It is the work of a terrorist group. It cannot be allowed
to go on in this fashion. There is no question of succumbing to the
demands under duress. We are, of course, focusing on the safety and
the security of the passengers and finding the best way to secure
their release. HALL: What do you suppose that best way is? CHANDRA:
Well, we will negotiate. There are people there, and the
negotiation is not to be carried on through agencies like the U.N.
They are there for humanitarian aid and assistance. We feel that if
international pressure is there, then the terrorists will find that
the propaganda advantage they hope to derive from this dastardly
act is not forthcoming. Then they will relent. If they are
encouraged through the success of their propaganda, then of course
they will persist for some time. HALL: Are you advocating this to
be a waiting game then at this point? You're going to wait these
hijackers out? CHANDRA: Well, I'm not directly involved with the
negotiations at the ground or the concentration being given to it
at Delhi. But it's a very hard (ph) choice that has been forced
upon the government, and we are keeping our options open. But our
policy not to negotiate with the terrorists in this kind of
situation holds. HALL: We received a press release from the embassy
of Pakistan. I want to read to you a question that this press
release raises. "Why did the Indian government refuse permission
for the airliner to land at Lucknow, as requested by the captain.
Can you answer that question for us, sir? CHANDRA: Well, I'm not
aware of the full facts. I'll have to check whether they requested
permission to land at Lucknow. I'm sure if the permission was asked
and it was safe to allow the plane to land there, the
permission would have been given. So I'm not of the moment aware
of all the facts at Lucknow. In fact, this is the first time I'm
hearing of this addition. HALL: And can you tell us your country's
next step at this point, right now, today in the third day of this
hostage standoff? CHANDRA: We are in touch with friendly
governments. There are nationals of other countries who are on the
aircraft. The U.N. coordinator of Afghanistan, he's at Kandahar.
And we are hoping that through the Taliban representatives, the
U.N. representatives a proper message will be given to the
terrorist group who are holding these people hostage that this is
not going to succeed and that they have to come to terms with the
reality. HALL: Naresh Chandra, Ambassador to the U.S., we thank you
for being with us on WORLDVIEW. CHANDRA: Thank you, thank you.
Statement by the Prime Minister - December 25, 1999 Yesterday an
Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu to Delhi was hijacked. Since
then, the hijackers have flown from airport to airport landing at
Qandahar in Afghanistan earlier this morning. My first concern is
the safety of the passengers and the crew on board the aircraft. We
are doing everything possible to ensure that they return home
unharmed. These last 20 hours have been extremely stressful for the
families of the passengers and the crew. I understand and fully
share their anxiety. I also share the anger and grief in the
country, particularly over the killing of Rupin Katyal. I and my
colleagues have been constantly monitoring the situation. We are in
touch with various countries, as well as the United Nations. This
hijacking is an act of terrorism by desperate men who have no
respect for human lives and human rights. It has brought home with
full impact the horror of terrorism that the country faces. We have
to face this challenge with determination and self-confidence. My
Government will not bend before such a show of terror. President of
India's Message - December 25, 1999 The heinous terrorist action of
hijacking an Indian Airlines flight causing death, injury and
grievous trauma to innocent passengers needs to be condemned in the
strongest terms. This incident once again highlights the need for
concerted international action to prevent terrorists from holding
the world to ransom in the name of whatever causes they may claim
to espouse. I would like to express India's appreciation to all
countries that extended cooperation in dealing with this serious
incident. I join the nation in mourning the loss of life and in
extending sympathetic support to the passengers and their near and
dear ones who are undergoing prolonged anxiety and agony as a
result of this dastardly act. Profile of the terrorist group
involved in hijacking, December 27, 1999 An Indian Airlines
aircraft on a routine flight from Kathmandu (Nepal) to New Delhi on
Friday December 24, was hijacked and, after a traumatic journey
that took it to Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, is currently
in Kandahar in southern Afghanistan since the early hours of
Saturday December 25, where over 160 passengers and crew members
continue to remain hostage in rapidly deteriorating
conditions. A team of officials from India is presently
negotiating with the hijackers in Kandahar in order to secure the
safe and speedy release of all the hostages. The hijackers have
demanded the release from jail in India of Mohammad Masood Azhar,
whom sections of the international media have euphemistically
described as an Islamic cleric from Pakistan, but who is in fact
the General Secretary and ideologue of the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen
(HUM), an organization based in Pakistan which was in October 1997
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the United States
Department of State. The HUM was re-designated as a Foreign
Terrorist Organisation by the State Department in its latest list
released on October 8, 1999. Azhar is an Islamic cleric only in the
sense that Sheikh Omar Abdel Rehman of the World Trade Center
bombing notoriety was also said to be one. In its Background
Information on Foreign Terrorist Organisations released on October
8 1999, the Office of Counterterrorism of the US Department of
State has described the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), a.k.a.
Harakat-ul-Ansar, HUA, Al Hadid, Al Hadith, Al Faran as an Islamic
militant group based in Pakistan whose leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil
has been linked to Bin Laden and signed his fatwa in February 1998,
calling for attacks on US and Western interests. Khalil, who was
the Commander-in-Chief of the Harakat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami
International (HUJI), broke away from the parent organization in
1985 to form a separate group Harakat-ul-Mujahideen. There were
subsequent attempts to re-unite the two breakaway factions, and the
merged group came to be known as the Harakat-ul-Ansar. It changed
its name to Harakat-ul-Mujahideen in 1997 after it was designated a
terrorist organization by the United States. Masood Azhar, the
General Secretary of the organisation, who hails from Bahawalpur in
Pakistan, entered the state of Jammu & Kashmir in India in
January 1994 on a false Portuguese passport and was arrested by the
Indian police the following month because of his involvement in
terrorist activities. There have been several earlier attempts by
the HUM to secure the release of Masood Azhar by resorting to
abduction as a bargaining tool. Two British nationals were
kidnapped on June 6, 1994 at Pahalgam in Jammu & Kashmir.
Another group of three Britishers and one American was abducted in
Delhi in September the same year. Six foreign tourists, including
two American nationals, were kidnapped again at Pahalgam in July
1995. One of the hostages, John Childs (a citizen of the USA)
escaped, another (a Norwegian national) was beheaded by the
Harakat, and four others, including an American national, are still
missing. The recent hijacking of the Indian Airlines aircraft is
the most brazen terrorist attempt yet by the HUM to secure the
release of its General Secretary Masood Azhar. The Government of
India most vehemently condemns this and all acts of terrorism. The
United States Government today has also condemned in the strongest
terms the hijacking of the Indian Airlines aircraft and the holding
of 160 passengers as hostages. Indias External Affairs Minister Mr.
Jaswant Singh has called attention to the need for the
international community to rally as one to address the problem. US
Reaction to the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 Press
Statement by James B. Foley, Deputy Spokesman December 31, 1999
Release of hostages from hijacking of Indian Airlines We join India
and those other countries affected by the hijacking of Indian
Airlines Flight 814 in welcoming home the hostages who were
released December 31. We reiterate our condemnation of this
horrific and inhuman act. We are gratified that the hijacking was
resolved with no additional loss of life. Our sympathy goes out to
the family of Mr. Katyal, the Indian national who was killed during
the hijacking. We wish to acknowledge the important role played by
the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red
Cross, which provided valuable humanitarian support to alleviate
the plight of the hostages during this ordeal. We were in close
touch with the Indian government during this incident and were
impressed by the tireless efforts of Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee,
External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, and other Indian officials
to resolve the incident. We will continue to work with India and
others to strengthen our cooperation to combat international
terrorism. As Prime Minister Vajpayee said in his address to
the
Indian people on New Years Eve, "The battle against terrorism
can be won by all nations acting together." The release of the
hostages is not the end of the matter. We will work with other
governments to see that those responsible are brought to justice.
In this connection, all parties to the relevant international
convention on aircraft hijacking are obliged to prosecute or
extradite those who committed this hijacking and the murder of Mr.
Katyal during the course of it. This should be our highest priority
in the days ahead. Statement by Spokesman, US Department of State,
December 27, 1999 The United States Government condemns in the
strongest terms the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight 814 and the
holding of 160 passengers as hostages since Friday, December 24. We
consider this terrorist act inhuman and we call for the immediate
safe release of all hostages. We understand that the Indian
Airlines flight that originated in Kathmandu, Nepal, continues to
be held at the Kandahar Airport in Afghanistan by hijackers. We
understand from press accounts that the hijackers are demanding the
release of a number of individuals under detention in India. These
include Masood Azhar, whose release was the objective of an earlier
terrorist kidnapping in Kashmir. Azhar was affiliated with the
Harakat ul-Ansar, a group now known as the Harakat ul-Mujahideen
and designated by the U.S. government as a "foreign terrorist
organization." We welcome the news that an Indian negotiating team
is in Kandahar and has begun its work with Taliban authorities, UN
representatives, and the hijackers toward a resolution. We call on
the Taliban authority and the governments of the region to work
together in close coordination to end this hijacking and to
restrict their public comments to those that serve this objective.
Obviously, the hijackers are responsible for the safety of the
hostages they are holding. We also welcome UN preparations for
contingencies at the Kandahar airport. We will remain in close
contact with the governments of India and Pakistan as well as with
UN representatives. Congressman Frank Pallone condemns Indian
Airlines hijacking; calls for greater India - US cooperation in
fight against terrorism December 31, 1999 Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr.,
D-NJ, today strongly condemned the hijacking of Indian Airlines
flight 814 and the holding of 160 passengers and crew as hostages.
Pallone, who has been one of Congress's most outspoken voices
warning of the danger of the armed separatist movement operating in
India's state of Jammu and Kashmir, said that the incident
demonstrates the need for the U.S. to upgrade its cooperation with
India on counter-terrorism efforts. "At this time, our foremost
thoughts are with the hostages and their families," Pallone said.
"I appeal to the hijackers to release the passengers and crew, and
I urge the Taliban authorities to play a helpful role in bringing
this crisis to a peaceful conclusion. "This incident is another
reminder of the threat that terrorism poses to all democracies.
India and the United States have both been particularly targeted by
Osama bin-Laden and the loose network of militant forces who share
his goals. This is a further indication of the need for increased
partnership between the U.S. and India in identifying the shared
threats we face and devising ways to protect our citizens in ways
consistent with open, democratic societies." Pallone said the
current hostage situation is linked to the militant movement waging
a campaign of terror and violence against both military and
civilian targets in an effort to end Indian governance of Kashmir.
Pakistan has acknowledged its "political and moral" support for the
separatist movement, but Pallone has frequently charged that
Pakistan's support goes far deeper. The U.S. State Department has
described the Harakat-ul-Mujahudeen as an "Islamic militant group
based in Pakistan." One of the hijackers' demands is the release of
the organization's General Secretary, Masood Azhar, who hails from
Pakistan.
"I hope this incident will alert the world to the threat India
faces from this terrorist movement," Pallone said. "I believe that
Pakistan must be held accountable for contributing to this violence
and instability. There should be more pressure brought to bear on
Pakistan to be part of the solution, instead of continuing to
exacerbate this problem." Senator Harry Reid denounces hijacking of
Indian Airlines Jet, December 29, 1999 Washington, DC U.S. Senator
Harry Reid (D-NV), Assistant Democratic Leader in the U.S. Senate,
today condemned the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814 by
terrorists and expressed his strong support for the Indian
government's ongoing efforts to release the hostages. "The
hijacking of the Indian Airlines jet and murder of an innocent
civilian are reprehensible acts of lawlessness and must be
condemned by the international community. My thoughts and prayers
go out to the victims of this criminal act and it is my hope that
the situation will be resolved immediately," said Senator Reid.
Reid, who will be a part of a congressional delegation trip to six
countries in early January, including India, said that he expects
to discuss how the U.S. Government can work with India and other
nations in a multilateral effort to fight terrorism. "Combating
terrorism at home and abroad will be one of our biggest national
security challenges in the new century, and because it's a global
problem, it demands a unified global response from peace-loving
nations," said Reid. Reid pointed to the recent rumor that a
suspected terrorist bought an airline ticket to Las Vegas as an
example how terrorism can affect people's daily lives. "No one is
immune from the fear that terrorism can instill in people, as
evidenced by the unconfirmed reports that a suspected terrorist
planned to travel to Las Vegas. It demonstrates the need for law
enforcement to be constantly vigilant and to keep the fight against
terrorism at the top of the international agenda," said Reid. Reid
said he contacted the FBI after the reports and was informed that
the FBI has not uncovered any credible evidence that anyone
suspected of terrorism has traveled to Las Vegas. Reid has asked
federal law enforcement to keep him informed of any developments
concerning the matter. Congressman McCollum Condemns Terrorist
Hijacking of Indian Airlines December 28, 1999 Washington, D.C.
Rep. Bill McCollum (R-FL), Chairman of the House Task Force on
Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, issued the following
statement condemning the actions of the hijackers of an Indian
Airlines aircraft currently grounded in Afghanistan:
"State-sponsored terrorism, such as this hijacking, is
unacceptable. The United States and the civilized societies of the
world must never condone this most inhumane form of terrorism. We,
along with our allies such as India, must together fight terrorism
in order to protect the lives of innocent men, women and children
around the world." "It is my hope and my prayer that this tragic
situation be resolved as quickly as possible, and all of the
hostages will remain unharmed and will be freed. May our prayers be
with the passengers, flight crew and their families during this
tragic ordeal." Congressmen Gilman and Gejdenson Condemn Terrorist
Hijacking of Indian Airlines Jet Washington DC, December 26, 1999-
House International Relations Committee Chairman Ben Gilman (R-NY)
and Ranking Democrat Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) condemned the hijacking
of Indian Airlines flight 814 as a blatant act of terrorism and
urged for the immediate release of all passengers and crew. "The
kidnapping and murder of innocent civilians and the hijacking of an
airplane is a hideous form of terrorism that our nation and the
civilized world will never condone," Chairman Gilman stated. "The
Committee on International Relations and the U.S. Congress sends
its sympathy to the victims and families and its support to the
Indian government during this tragedy."
"This is a cowardly act of terrorism against innocent
civilians," Gejdenson stated. "Our hearts go out to the passengers
and families as they endure this horrible ordeal. Chairman Gilman
and I extend our deepest sympathies to the family of Mr. Katyal and
others who may have lost their loved ones to this barbaric act."
The two lawmakers pledged the support of the United States Congress
in working with India and other countries to combat global
terrorism. "Terrorism is the single biggest threat to our national
security." Gejdenson noted. "As we have seen by this latest
hijacking, terrorism knows no boundaries. I intend to discuss with
the Indian government ways in which the United States and India can
work together to combat terrorism." The Connecticut lawmaker will
be leading a trade delegation to India in January. "We urge the
hijackers to release the passengers and crew of Indian Airlines
flight 814. Freedom loving nations around the world will never
sympathize with a political cause that commits unforgivable crimes
against innocent civilians," Chairman Gilman pointed out. "Rep.
Gejdenson and I believe that this ordeal once again strongly
indicates that the United States and India face similar threats to
our common democratic forms of governments and we must forge closer
ties on every level and particularly in combating terrorism." Media
reports on hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814
U.S. Pressures Pakistan to Cut Ties With Extremist Groups -
Washington Post, January 26, 2000 U.S. Concludes Pakistan-Backed
Group Played Role in Hijacking - New York Times, January 25, 2000
Use leverage on Pakistan while we can - Los Angeles Times, January
18, 2000 Weapons against terrorism - Washington Times, January 11,
2000 Hostage Confirms Hijackers' Identities - Associated Press,
January 11, 2000 Undiminished terrorism threat - The Washington
Times, January 5, 2000 Hunt these hijackers down - The Chicago
Tribune, January 03, 2000 We must formulate plan to deal with
terrorists - The Buffalo News, January 01, 2000 Hijackers Demand
$200 Million and 35 Rebels' Release - Los Angeles Times, December
29, 1999 3rd Attempt to Free Pakistani Militant - New York Times,
December 29, 1999 Hijackers wage their holy war - Christian Science
Monitor, December 27, 1999
Some of the longest hijackings: July 23 - September 1, 1968 (40
days): Members of the popular front for the liberation of Palestine
divert a Rome to Tel Aviv flight on El Al to Algiers. The last
hostages are released on September 1, 1968. June 14 - July 1, 1985
(18 days): Shiite gunmen seize a TWA Boeing 727, forcing it to
Beirut, Lebanon. They demand the release of 700 Arabs held by
Israel. A US Navy diver is killed and 39 Americans are held until
they are released after Syrian mediation. April 5 - 20, 1988 (16
days): Shiite gunmen hijack a Kuwait Airways Jumbo jet en route
from Thailand to Kuwait and divert it to Iran, Cyprus and Algeria.
They demand Kuwait free 17 pro-Iranian terrorists. The hijackers
kill two passengers and free the rest. March 2- 14, 1981 (13 days):
Three Pakistanis hijack a Pakistan International Airlines plane on
a flight from Karachi to Peshawar, and force it to fly to
Afghanistan and then to Syria. They leave the aircraft after
Pakistan agrees to free 54 political prisoners. December 24 - 31,
1999 (8 days): Hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC - 814 June 27
- July 4, 1976 (8 days): Palestinian and German terrorists hijack
an Air France airliner to Entebbe, Uganda, and demand the release
of 53 pro-Palestinian prisoners in Israel, Kenya and Europe.
Israeli commandos raid the craft and rescue the hostages, killing
four civilians during the rescue.
December 3 - 8, 1984 (6 days): Shiite gunmen seize a Kuwait
Airways plane from Dubai to Karachi and force it to land in Tehran.
They demand that Kuwaiti free 17 people convicted of carrying out
bombings on US and French facilities in Kuwait. Two Americans are
killed. Iranian security forces then storm the Jetliner.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Lessons
from Entebbe and Kandahar Leadership and Strategic Capability B.
Ashok* Faultlines: Volume 20, January 2011
The hostage release operations at Entebbe (Uganda, 1976) and
Kandahar (Afghanistan, 1999) are studies in contrast from the point
of view of classic phases in hostage crises and the respective
responses of the state actors. The strategic centrality of the
hostage takers' demands is emphasized as the key dynamic that sets
a series of option-searching and decision-making acts in motion.
The various preconditioning factors determining the interests of
hostage takers and state actors in the developing crises are traced
out, in addition to an analysis of why the Indian response to
Kandahar was operationally and strategically flawed, with a
long-term impact on India's hostage doctrine. Two Crises, Two
Outcomes July 4, 1976, and December 31, 1999, are crucial dates
that changed the way two important democracies facing the most
protracted and destructive territorial disputes (Palestine and
Kashmir) respectively faced their 'moment of truth' with different
strategies, styles, tactics, capabilities and end results. These
divergent challenges, decisions and responses had dramatic and
lasting impact on the two nations' counter-terror doctrines and on
their popular psyche. The first of these incidents ended in Entebbe
in Uganda with the forced storming, extraction of hostages and
execution of all directly involved terrorists by Israeli commandos.
The second ended in Kandahar in Afghanistan, marked by the
negotiated release of hostages with the exchange of crucial
previously arrested terrorist assets, including motivationally and
doctrinally important leaders.
Both events deeply affected post-incident national attitudes:
the first marked by dynamic optimism and progressive though
prolonged negotiations towards a political solution for the
underlying problem; the second tainted by low morale, open drift
and weakness in the political leadership, escalated terrorist
violence, including attacks on audaciously demonstrative targets
such as the Indian Parliament using suicide squads, successful
strikes at numerous chosen targets by militants, and a state of
general pessimism, lack of confidence and indignity amongst the
responding (security) community. Both, therefore, were rare
instances of crucial successes: one from a State's point of view
and the other from an anti-State actor's point of view. Entebbe
reflected the military and strategic supremacy of Israel, which
could not possibly be regionally challenged any further, at that
stage, by Palestinian capabilities; while Kandahar brutally
reminded India that all its strength in conventional and strategic
forces did not necessarily add up to overcome the leadership
challenge which - combined with a series of real-time tactical
errors characterized by an intensely risk averse and bureaucratic
decision-making process, and by the extreme lack of accountability
of systems - established a legacy of capitulation and extreme
willingness to accept soft options. The Indian response
demonstrated unambiguously that strategic goals tended to be
ignored or pushed to the background by posturing and ephemeral,
rhetorical, highly questionable and whimsical policies
unfortunately thrust upon the nation arbitrarily. Entebbe
successfully demonstrated the effectiveness and reach of Israel's
swift military capability. Kandahar once again exposed India's
faction ridden political mosaic, incoherent and uncoordinated
policing and public service system, weaknesses in in-country and
foreign intelligence coordination, poor development of strategy and
tactical apparatus , and, overall, an unaccountable and capricious
leadership at the moment of crisis. Worse, the manifest failures to
arrive at timely decisions and the faulty decisions taken by senior
executives and political leaders in India were never systematically
examined post facto by any suitable public investigation, and no
accountability was ever fixed. The 'lessons not learnt and refused
to be learnt' further exposed India's aviation sector, which is a
key national asset for terrorist takeovers and even catastrophic
attacks like September 11, 2001. This paper explores eight crucial
aspects of the Entebbe and Kandahar crises and looks for learning
points from the Israeli and Indian experience. Aviation hostage
crises in history After the September 2001 attacks in New York, the
issue of aviation security in the context of terrorist takeovers of
civilian aircraft has assumed new significance. The 9/11 attack
also marked a profound tactical departure from conventional
hostage-taking, which was defensive, to the new and deadly
combination of human shields, aircraft fuselages as missiles, huge
quantities of aviation fuel as warheads, and the tactical choice of
high visibility targets, to enhance the damage potential to the
level of weapons of mass destruction. The first wave of hijackings
in the post-World War II era was mostly done by convicts or
refugees escaping from communist countries, or political
dissenters, fleeing hostile regimes. An analysis of all hijacking
incidents since 1947 shows that 61 per cent of these were committed
to facilitate refugee escapes.1 Hijackings exploded between 1968
and 1969, at the peak of the Cold War - nuclear deterrence was,
paradoxically, threatening civil aviation security. In 1969, there
were 82 hijack attempts in the World, more than the total number of
attempts in the preceding two decades between 1947 and 1967.2 After
1968, a majority of hijackings were executed by US's criminals
fleeing for Cuba or in attempts to escalate the Israel-Palestinian
conflict, where terrorists used hijacking as a political weapon to
publicize their cause and to secure release of key Palestinian
terrorist assets from prisons. The anti-Hijack measures initiated
in the US from 1973 and diplomatic initiatives such as the US-Cuba
hijack pact substantially reduced hijacks after the 1967 - 1976
period, when total incidents peaked, with 385 events world wide.3
Between 1977 and 1986, the phenomenon declined, with 200 incidents,
a level roughly maintained in the succeeding decade, with 212
incidents between 1987 and 1996.4
Between 1980 and 1990, however, terrorists shifted attention to
larger transport aircraft as 'stunt terrorism' targets. The Air
India bombing in 1985 near Canada and the Pan Am bombing over
Lockerbie (UK) in 1988 demonstrated this trend. However,
hostage-hijacks continued as an instrument to coerce state actors
to give concessions to prisoners. The TWA hijack to Beirut in 1989
and the Kuwait Airways hijack of 1988 were successful from the
terrorist point of view. On the other hand, the December 1994
hijacks by the armed Algerian Islamic Group (GIA) resulted in
French Gendarmerie storming the aircraft and releasing all
passengers and troops in Marseilles. When suicide hijackers gain
control of an aircraft, it is critical that the information
regarding its flight path and possible target or destination is
conveyed as rapidly as possible to crisis decision makers and that
air traffic control, civilian and military authorities coordinate
all emergency action. Post 9/11, aircraft have become potential
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Countries like France have
deployed surface to air missiles around key political targets to
provide swifter responses than interception by fighter aircraft.
Countries including India are also establishing 'no fly zones' and
well rehearsed plans to prevent 'suicide sabotage' scenarios. With
these, combined with a high degree of boarding gate and in-flight
security, aviation experts hope to contain the challenge. An
interesting technological innovation which would prevent purposeful
sabotage is a computer programme called Robolander which will allow
the ground air traffic controller to override the manual aircraft
landing system and land the craft safely, despite manifest control
by the pilot, thus avoiding the incentive for the hijackers to harm
passengers or pilots. Adoption of this system will, however, be
timeconsuming and demands a high degree of international
coordination and standardization. The chance of the Air Traffic
Control (ATC) itself becoming the target of hijack, subterfuge and
takeover cannot, moreover, be ruled out once such a system is
established. The Kinetics of Entebbe and Kandahar Both Entebbe and
Kandahar have all the classic phases of an aviation hostage crisis.
Though separated by more than 23 years in time, and by radical
intervening changes in the polarity of global political
arrangements, a quantum jump in military hardware, the digitization
of signals and warfare, internet and more sophisticated satellite
and human intelligence systems, they broadly conform to established
patterns in the tricks, tactics and strategies of a hostage taker.
Centrality and dynamics of objective and aggressors' demand The
primary attribute of the hostage taker/hijacker is the absolute
clarity of his/her objective and stake in the process. The
sophisticated scheming and tactics adopted by them follows a
doctrine which is established at fairly high levels of the terror
organization's hierarchy. The strategic objective of the Entebbe
hostage takers, the People's Liberation Front of Palestine (PLFP)
and the Kandahar hijackers, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) with the
support of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's
external intelligence agency, was to secure the release of some of
their key leadership and operatives jailed in the States fighting
the terrorist organizations. The Entebbe incident involved Flight
139, an Air France Jet carrying 256 passengers and 12 crew members,
flying from Tel Aviv (Israel) through Athens (Greece) to Paris
(France). Here, the hijackers demanded the release of about 50
terrorist leaders and supporters jailed in many countries,
including Israel, France and Kenya. In retrospect, by this tactical
blunder in demanding an internationally unattainable objective, the
hijackers forced Israel to seriously consider, plan and finally
execute the military operation at Entebbe. The successful IC 814
hijacking involved an Indian Airlines plane with 178 passengers and
11 crew members aboard. In this case, the hijackers exhibited great
flexibility and political awareness to narrow their tactical
objective down to the release of just three key militants jailed
within their target country, India, down from the release of 36
terrorists originally demanded. The hijackers also showed
willingness to drop two possibly difficult demands - the recovery
of the dead body of a terrorist and demands for a ransom (stated at
USD 200 million), in addition to tactical concessions exchanged
with national authorities during the flights interim halt at Dubai
(release of some women and some children for food and fuel). With
military support from the then Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and
overt support from the ISI, eventual negotiated settlement ended
the game very
much on the hijackers' terms. The lesson for all future possible
hijackers from the limited and precise nature of the HuM demands is
that demands which tend to be successful have a borderline status
of possible political acceptability, with the target Government
being able to make an explicit case that the outcome does not
amount to a major setback or an outright military defeat. Demands,
consequently, need more than amateur consideration; they need to be
weighed for tactical superiority, objective, morale, possibility of
compliance by the state actor, and flexibility to scale down to
essentials. The demands should never be set at a level that compels
military action as the only option left for key decision-maker in
the target country. The outcome must be politically marketable, and
must not cross the threshold into a 'no go' situation, forcing a
radical military response. Steeper demands can only be supported
with much weightier stakes, such as VIP hostages or WMD, to force
the target State to play the game on the terrorists' terms. Choice
of space and time In both Entebbe and Kandahar, the hijackers used
a third territory, where the threat perception to stage and board
the aircraft was lower. In the Entebbe case, Athens was much less
guarded as a target airport and the metal detector was not even
manned. The hijackers showed initiative and imagination in striking
at the point of least resistance. For Entebbe, the four 'muscle
hijackers' - two Arabs and two terrorists for hire who were German
nationals - transferred in transit from Singapore Airline flight
763 from Bahrain. In the IC 814 case, which ended at Kandahar, the
transfer of five hijackers was from a Pakistan International
Airlines (PIA) aircraft again through transit at Kathmandu (Nepal).
In this critical event at Kathmandu, the complicity of an ISI
officer has been established beyond doubt by local authorities.5
However, some complicity of the security details in Kathmandu
cannot be ruled out. In addition to the hand guns and Kalashnikovs
the hijackers brandished at onset of the crisis, they also
subsequently accessed a large cache of ammunition stowed in the
baggage hold of the aircraft, once the flight landed at Kandahar.
Flight 139 was hijacked immediately after departure from Athens.
Flight IC 814 was hijacked after a short delay, about 20 minutes
into the flight, after entering Indian territory. The hijackers
waited tactically for the cockpit hatch to be opened for beverage
services so establishing control over the pilots could be easier.
Both takeovers were rapid: less than a minute long and executed
very quickly, with full coordination, precision and role clarity.
Kinetic analysis reveals repeated rehearsals. Hijackers typically
sprung to the aisles and brandished weapons, attacked some closer
passengers with bare hands or the butt of weapons and ensured that
the entire passenger cabin received the shocking message loud and
clear. It is likely that the hijackers rehearsed this phase
repeatedly, since the potential for resistance or violence at this
point during the crisis tends to be at a maximum. Neutralizing any
potential resistance at the very beginning, if necessary, by
hurting a passenger or two who show poor or late compliance to
orders, is a stunning tactic used by many hijackers. Subjugation to
the fear of brandished weapons and taking cover from possible
bodily hurt is the key theme in the minds of the hostages and they
barely think about the medium term outcome or finale of the
unfolding drama. The tactical objective of hijackers is to dominate
the aisles and segregate passengers, with military-aged males (MaM)
securely tied up and at close gunpoint. In most instances, they are
the first targets of 'humane' execution. Choice of staging for
negotiation The first onset phase usually ends with the hijackers
securing and positioning the craft and hostages for negotiation and
easy selective targeting, in case they resort to execution. Family
members are segregated from each other and males, females and
children seated separately. By the time the craft is positioned or
stabilized, the key issue in the demands would be exchanged between
the hostages and negotiators or/and state party involved. In this
phase, the hijackers would vehemently try to evade the state
party's territory, particularly after the well publicized
positioning of anti-hijack squads in striking distance from most
important civil airports in strategic locations. In the Entebbe
case, the hijackers, with the help of their political masters,
chose Libya and Uganda as successive interim locations, where
no hostility to their political cause was to be expected.
Landing in Libya was planned for refueling. The Libyan, Pakistani
(Lahore) and Dubai leaderships behaved similarly. They allowed
refueling and replenishment of food and cleaning, but refused to
entertain the other demands, such as extended stay. The choice of
Uganda under dictator Idi Amin, who helped the Palestinian
hijackers overtly, and of Kandahar, where the anti-Indian hijackers
expected and promptly received military, logistical and political
support from the Taliban, with whom India was yet to establish any
diplomatic relationship after their take-over of the country in
1996, demonstrate this point. Israel also had no direct diplomatic
relations with Uganda and Amin's enmity to Israel and his support
to the Palestinian cause at that time was well known. Stabilisation
Phase Once the status quo between the hijackers and the hostages is
established and the rules of engagement are clear to both parties,
the hijack could be considered to be stabilised or poised for
resolution or escalation, depending on the next strategic moves by
the actors. The instances under present analysis entered the phase
of stabilization as soon as the craft touched down in Entebbe and
the hostages were secured in the old terminal block there; and, in
the Indian case, as they were securely held in the cold aircraft on
the Kandahar tarmac, freed from any risk of assault from Indian
Forces. This phase demonstrated the clear domination of, and
control of the tactical initiative by, the hijackers. They held the
bargaining chips the option of declaring and altering the deadlines
and specific threats of execution of or harm to hostages at
frequent intervals. The idea is to allow domestic pressure on the
hostage community to escalate and counter-balance the apparent
political inconvenience of the decisions demanded. Deadlines of
less than 24 hours are counter productive here. Sufficient time is
allowed for media to expand story as well as concentrate attack on
the state actors, usually for their presumed indecision and
inaction. Since there is no exigency on their part on account of
immediate threat and since they are well defended by friendly
national troops, the key choice left before the state actor is to
choose between negotiated processes or the option of military
force. Apart from debating the particular concessions sought, this
is the central dilemma of the state actor in any air hostage
crisis. The constraints on state actors in such cases include the
total lack of control in the territory where stabilisation has been
engineered, possible problems with international law of aggression,
and air traffic access; and the potential of full casualty, which
may domestically be perceived as a political and military defeat.
The Non-choice of No-negotiation There are two negotiation models
in vogue (1) the US / Israel professed model of no negotiations
with terrorists; and (2) the pragmatic model of talking formally to
avoid/delay harm, and simultaneously explore force or political
options, as frequently adopted by India and many other countries.
The engagement of negotiators is however inevitable in either case.
Even US and Israel negotiate through the national party in the
holding territory or through third parties, at least for the level
of logistics and supplies. Entirely cutting off communications with
the craft or the hijackers is never an option, since they can
always sacrifice a token hostage to force the reopening of the
doors of negotiation or take even more drastic actions. Once
negotiators from, or representing, the target country are
positioned and engaged, the onus of problem solving is shifts to
the target country. The highest executive authority will have to
consider the often politically damaging demands, while the military
option may resurface if a credible plan is offered and mounted at
this stage. Here, the military leadership, if consulted right from
the beginning, can explore windows of professional opportunity. One
clear rule to be kept in mind, from classic negotiation theory is
that the negotiators mandate must be fixed hourly or even more
frequently by the political advisors and key functionaries in
charge. The force option, if planned, must not be known at all to
the negotiators. If the storming is planned it must be done by a
separate team and the principal negotiator must be given the
mandate of distracting the lead terrorist. Before the storming
action is initiated, no word of it must even be contemplated in the
negotiation room. Even the slightest hint of the option of force
being explored in the voice or tenor of
the negotiator can provoke a catastrophic ending. Clearly, in
both the Entebbe and the Kandahar instances, the stabilisation
phase started on day three and four, respectively. In the Israeli
case, the hijackers exchanged French and non-Israeli passengers for
food and services, met the demanded release of some other hostages
and also set a 48 hour first deadline. In Kandahar also, after
December 27, 1999, a little too late according to some observers,
the civilian team led by an Indian diplomat engaged the hijackers
in negotiations and finalized the demand for release of three
terrorists, leaving roughly 72 hours for the Indian Government to
consider all their options. Both aircrafts and hostages remained in
captivity for almost eight days, Indians reaching freedom on the
eve of the millennial New Year in Delhi. The reason why Israel
considered the military operation early and actively can be
attributed to its freshly sanguinary history as a targetted nation;
a persistent hostage and victim consciousness, which prompts
retaliation; a strong resonance of the harsh memories of the
holocaust; and a determination in the political leadership that the
horrors of the past would never be repeated at any costs, (As the
then highest ranking officer of the Israel Defence Forces IDF
expressed it, "What good is Israel if Israelis are selected and
slaughtered?");6 and the early realisation that the demands of the
hijackers were unrealistic, amateurish and practically impossible
to meet. It was, interestingly, the Israeli Defense Minister Shimon
Peres who asked the Chief of Staff, Motuhai Motu Gaur, to prepare
"the plans he did not have". While Generl Gaur had initially
recommended a negotiated political settlement, Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin and Peres, who were political rivals by that time,
with Peres known to be eyeing the chair of the Prime Minister, had
detected the infeasibility of the political concessions the
hijackers had demanded.7 This gave considerable committed time for
making an 'impossible' rescue mission possible. The Entebbe mission
has, of course, since become a staple of instructions in military
schools for its precision, preparation, actionable, sharp and clear
intelligence, leadership, sacrifice, surprise and technical
prowess, even in that age of analog technology. In Kandahar case,
there was also a lag-time for the Indian response system to get its
act together. Though the signal intimating the hijacking of the
aircraft was available to the Delhi ATC at 4.40 PM on December 24,
the Crisis Management Committee chaired by the Cabinet Secretary
seems neither to have met nor communicated with candidate response
airports, where the plane could be landing, in the succeeding two
hours.8 Since the origin of the aircraft was Kathmandu, and since
the ATC radar gave indications that it was moving North-Westwards,
just two options were available, in the order of increasing gravity
and risk. One was to identify the candidate airports the hijackers
might choose and get at least local authority and force staged
there, with a clear mandate, or at least sufficient forewarning.
Why the cabinet crisis system failed to specify the mandate of
local authorities (meaning the District Collector and
Superintendent of Police/Commissioner/Inspector General of Police)
of Ahmedabad, Amritsar, Mumbai or Jammu till 6.04 pm, when it was
clear that Amritsar was to be the staging area, is not clear. At
6.04 PM, Amritsar received the aircraft's landing signals. Clearly,
the bureaucratic establishment did not conduct the basic
intellectual exercise of projecting the possible destinations.
Worse, despite the Cabinet Secretary being present in New Delhi,
there were no orders available to the Amritsar local authority for
the 40 minutes the aircraft stayed on tarmac. In fact, the Director
General of Punjab Police was not contacted at all; he was left to
collect the news from Television at 6.00 pm, by his own admission.9
That reflects also on his poor intelligence coordination. New Delhi
was clearly out of character as a national capital responding to a
national emergency: nobody assumed responsibility in these crucial
two hours after which the Captain of IC 814 was forced to fly off
across national borders to Lahore in Pakistan. The Flight Captain
was the only one in charge from the Indian side at that point. It
was at 6.40 pm that New Delhi told Amritsar to delay refueling as
far as possible - the first signs of life in Delhi's crisis ridden
crisis management system. By this time, however, a decision for a
nodecision could no longer be enforced - since the hijackers had
started killing hostages. One hostage was mortally wounded and
later died, upon which the pilot, was forced to take off at 7.45
pm. It was at the stage of intentional delay that the second option
could have become operational, when a late decision in New Delhi,
conveyed to the team in Amritsar, sought to instruct Punjab Police
Commandos to shoot
and deflate the tires of the AB 300 aircraft, which the local
team had some training for. But this could have provoked direct
retaliation from the hijackers in terms of the killing of more
hostages, or even of the pilots, or a finale in total disaster. The
reasoning in the New Delhi analyst's mind was to prevent the
aircraft being taken to hostile territory. But without a
concomitant storming, neutralization and extraction plan (which
Amritsar had executed successfully in 1994 against a lone, less
trained, hijacker) this was a non -starter. In retrospect, the
solitary act of disabling the tyres would have been extremely
counter-productive in the absence of an effective plan for
neutralizing the hijackers. This raises the key question, why was
the storming decision not left to the local authorities at
Amritsar, who could have acted legally under the mandate of the
District Magistrate, provided the local capabilities existed? It is
now known that New Delhi wanted the National Security Guard (NSG)
commandos to take on the storming, but they failed to reach
Amritsar before the aircraft took off for Lahore at 7.45 pm. These
failures indicate a key strategic and operational gap in New
Delhi's response system. Given three hours and five minutes of lead
time, it is astonishing that New Delhi could not decide and mount a
commando operation in a city as close as Amritsar. This was at
least six times off the NSG's stated response standard of 30
minutes. The other stark deficiency in India's response to Amritsar
was the total absence of military planners or of the Army or Air
Force in mounting the response. In retrospect, even the then Home
Minister, L.K. Advani, and Defense Minister, George Fernandes,
traded charges, each claiming that they were not adequately
consulted, and that the Foreign Ministry monopolized the response,
especially during the stabilization phase. Clearly, the Cabinet
Secretariat and Home Ministry, along with civil aviation
controllers (the Civil Aviation Safety Bureau) failed to remain in
full communication, compare options, predict outcomes and mount a
quick response. Worse, we have no evidence that any of the airports
in the episode had a quick response Force back-up which is
airlifted and actionable even after 1999, like the successful
Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN, the French
counter-terrorism unit) which stormed the hijacked Air France
aircraft successfully at Marseilles in 1994. Further, there was no
readiness to involve the operational command of the Air Force or
alert the Army, since the civilian establishment was clearly
determined to the handle this key development alone, with
far-reaching consequences, when handled as a Police crisis. The
Defence Ministry was almost entirely out of the picture from
beginning to end, except for Cabinet-level discussions. There is
hardly anything in the public domain even now, to determine whether
the Army, which had sufficient paratroopers and aircraft, was
preparing an operational plan in those four crucial days - forget
rehearsals or execution, for rescue and extraction, if needed, in
Kandahar. The fact of the matter was the Indian Army's did not have
the ready capacities for operational force projection beyond its
western frontier, in a remote locale like Kandahar. The country had
neither set superior ambitions nor trained extensively in
trans-border operations in the near abroad. The Force had entirely
missed tactical transformation, beyond sporadic acquisitions, which
were themselves bogged down by logistic and corruption linked
quagmires. Even Army lacked neither operable plans nor a feasible
extraction unit which could storm and retrieve the passengers, even
with collateral damage. Caught in a fight for survival on the
country's borders and the Kashmir Valley, ambient, offensive, city
specific capabilities simply did not exist, despite the
availability of necessary technologies. In sharp contrast, at
Entebbe, the military and not the domestic crisis team handled the
problem right from the beginning. With the IDF Chief sitting in
Cabinet, the viability of a distant and risky operation was always
present before the decision makers. The distance of Force
commanders from key decisionmaking bodies and their replacement by
civilian foreign policy experts and civilian negotiators cost India
dearly in the final count. India's diplomacy-based plan in the
negotiations at Kandahar was also flawed in its basic assumptions,
right from the beginning. The Foreign Service officer, who led the
team comprising internal and external security experts, as well as
his political leaders, were convinced that India had considerable
concessions to offer the Taliban, and hence some leverage. They,
for instance, regarded recognition of the Taliban regime by India
as a major concession. The diplomat's team was very skeptical about
the Taliban offering any hard on site cooperation in exchange for
unilateral recognition, and this, in fact, is exactly what
happened. Leverage just did not exist. Neither could sufficient
track-two pressure be
exerted by the covert establishment to elicit cooperation from
the Taliban. India was playing for high stakes without any cards to
back the gamble. Concessions of a monetary nature to the Taliban
would have been fully justified to neutralize their response,
particularly to secure the withdrawal of their offensive armored
vehicles which had been deployed visibly to preempt Indian forces
from storming of the craft. The option of neutralizing the
defensive Taliban Force guarding the aircraft was not explored at
all. The Final Faux Pax Finally, the negotiators established
working relationships with the hijackers and succeeded in eking
some concessions. They had started working through stable
communications and, with Taliban mediation, secured some key
results from the hijackers, when New Delhi did the final volte
face, unilaterally accepting all the hijackers' demands at one go.
This is known to have been a decision that surprised everyone in
the loop, including the negotiators. The perception was that it
came at a moment when the situation had stabilized and pressure was
building on the hostage takers to offer further
counter-concessions. Assessments suggest that India could have
retained two of the 'target assets' out of the three demanded, when
New Delhi abruptly and dramatically gave up the battle of wits. A
controversial unilateral decision was taken, allegedly at the
highest level, to accede to all the remaining demands at once, and
arrangements were made to release the key targets of the terorists'
demands, including Maulana Mazood Azhar, from Kot Balwal jail in
Jammu, where he was lodged. The express reason: the functionary did
not want hostages "to spend New Year in captivity".10 One express
rule in such negotiation under duress is that the stressor must
have full discretion in setting all deadlines. Setting arbitrary
and external deadlines is suicidal in terms of outcome, since this
forecloses the possibility of further reductions of the aggressor's
targets. Maulana Masood Azhar was flown to New Delhi by a RAW jet
and transferred to an IA aircraft in which the External Affairs
Minister Jaswant Singh escorted the terrorist ideologue and two
other 'terrorist assets' - Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar and Ahmed Omar
Saeed Sheikh - to Kandahar.11 While one camp in the establishment
justified this act of the Foreign Minister, as a caring and
sensitive gesture towards the super-stressed hostages, which also
helped contain the pressures on the Government exerted by the
families of the hostages, the move was widely portrayed as
capitulation of the highest order. This, indeed, was Masood Azhar's
subsequent and vehement projection in Pakistan. Home Minister L.K.
Advani, who had criticized both the Rubaiya Saeed episode, when V.
P. Singh was Prime Minister,12 as well as the trading of food with
hostage-takers at Hazratbal,13 was not in agreement with the final
decision on Kandahar. It would later transpire that the hijackers'
tactical objective in insisting on the Foreign Minister
accompanying the released terrorists was intended to preempt any
possible Indian misadventure, such as crashing the plane carrying
the key terrorist assets. In effect, the presence of the Minister
completely ruled out the force option. It was also lost on the
Indian covert establishment to plant a satellite linkable
transponder to the persons of the released hostages, in order to
locate and recapture or eliminate through a retaliatory strike by a
crack team after a few hours of the flight's return to safety. It
is not known whether such a capability existed at that time, or
whether such capabilities have even been acquired today. In stark
contrast, the Israeli commandos had the forethought to destroy the
radar at Entebbe and the few jets that Idi Amin had, in case they
pursued the rescue aircraft. The termination model The classic
termination phase described in the literature on such crises also
throws light on the Entebbe and Kandahar cases. While the
negotiators successfully or unsuccessfully manipulated the
relationships developed through the standoff phase, the termination
follows the acceptance of negotiated settlements
or, in their absence, the exercise of the force option. There
are only three logical real world outcomes: 1. Partial or full
acceptance of demands / hijackers surrenders peacefully and are
arrested and tried. 2. Force option: Police/commandos storm the
craft and kill, maim or arrest hijackers with or without harm to
hostages. 3. Partial or full acceptance of demands and hijackers
are given some lead time for escape, with complicity of the host
country and they disappear to live in safe havens, which are
prenegotiated with host or state party. In any eventuality, the
onset phase and the termination phase hold maximum risk for the
hostages, and it is in these phases that maximum casualties are
recorded. The Entebbe operation, which took 72 hours of planning
and an imperfect Sinai desert exercise for night landing, which was
a limited success, left four dead and one seriously injured. The
commander of the Israel Defence Force raiders, Lt. Col. Yonatan
Netanyahu, and three hostages were killed. Nevertheless, the
Israelis and the world accept the operation as a total and
exemplary success, and these sacrifices were perceived as necessary
for the objectives achieved. In other words, the operation reduced
a near total damage scenario to fewer than 3 per cent casualties, a
proportion entirely acceptable and politically saleable
domestically, when balanced with the huge strategic and political
success at Entebbe. Collateral damage was overwhelmingly balanced
out by the doctrinal and political gains. The real criterion of
success is the strategic and political balance secured through the
end game. To India's credit, it may be said that it chose wisely to
concede just one casualty - that too, in the onset phase, and in a
chance event. From the perspective of lives saved, the chosen
option was a near-total success. In hindsight, however, the
political and material costs of the release of dreaded and
potentially highly destructive fanatical motivational leaders
proved very costly. The complicity of Saeed Sheikh in the 9/11
attacks in the US and the Daniel Pearl killing, and of Masood
Azhar's group - Jaish-eMohammed - in the attack on India's
Parliament in December 2001, and in a rash of lesser, but
devastating terrorist operations in Jammu & Kashmir and other
parts of India, imposed an enormous strategic cost in India and
beyond - a price that is still being paid. In one estimate, the
loss of some 2,500 lives was attributed to direct acts of Azhar's
outfit, just between 2000 and 2003.14 The aftermath of Kandahar The
US stance at the time of the Kandahar crisis was repeatedly
critiqued by Indian leaders. The US apparently sought to dissuade
from undertaking any military operation on Afghan soil, as
Washington was then hoping to develop military and commercial
relations with a 'moderate Taliban'. Post 9/11, it dismantled its
oil pipeline plans for Unocal, a US oil giant, and went all out
after Taliban, who were then harboring Osama bin Laden. At that
time, however, US inaction and failure to assist India politically
and logistically in its moment of great need discredited Washington
in the eyes of Indian strategic planners, for a considerable period
of time. It is only now, after the renewed nuclear agreement and
deepening cooperation on a range of other issues that that the
quality of the relationship has been somewhat restored. The
strategic and tactical edge the IC 814 hijackers maintained
throughout the operation needs special mention. The involvement of
an immediate relative of one of the terrorist assets whose release
they were demanding made the effort very emotional and direct
(Mazood Azhar's brother, Ibrahim Athar, was one of the hijackers).
The hijackers were able to pressure the onset and standoff phases
effectively, and secure a termination at a port of their choice,
and with local defense preventing any adventurism by any potential
aggressor. The exit route they had pre-negotiated with the Taliban,
with the support of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (they
had an iftar party in Kandahar before being driven across to
Quetta, capital of the Balochistan province in Pakistan) was also
ingenious. Some observers believe that it was the convenience of
the exit routes that prompted the successive choice of Dubai,
Lahore and Kandahar as target ports for the hijackers.
As a near-total failure of its internal security apparatus and
the exercise of the use of force option, Kandahar should have sent
India's strategic planners back to their drawing tables. It
established a precedent for future Governments to follow a weak
'negotiations and selective release of assets', even as it exposed
deep infirmities in the Force capabilities of the purported
'regional hegemon'. India was seen to be a slow, pliant,
elephantine giant, with a soft underbelly of un-crystallized
political expression, poor civil-military coordination, deeply
distrustful of empowering strategic military assets, of involving
them in decision-making, and coordination with paratroopers,
commandos and Force transport systems. Terrorists are bound to
exploit the windows of opportunity created by this, the fragmented
civilian leadership, and uncoordinated intelligence and Force
capabilities, to further their objectives in future as well. The
'path of least resistance' response to the Kandahar crisis did have
one positive consequence: the Indian Penal Code was amended to make
the death sentence mandatory for any convicted future hijackers.
Conclusion The Kandahar and Entebbe episodes, in sharp contrast,
demonstrate the distinguishing absence of relevant and effective
strategic and tactical leadership in India. The Israeli national
leadership at the time averaged the age of 50; the Entebbe mission
was executed by a team which averaged an age of 30. India's
traditional leadership, having stuck in around for far too long,
was in no hurry to prove anything. For them, there were no legacies
to be left in the fight for survival. The leadership factor could
become much more crucial in the foreseeable future, with India
behaving like a tottering giant, with poor coordination and
dexterity in maneuvering across the troubled and muddied waters of
the simmering extremist and fundamentalist politics of South Asia.
It is imperative that the leadership factor is addressed by intense
capacity building across services and calling in the security
apparatus for responding well to emergent situations, especially
after the experience of the Mumbai attacks. The need to expose the
intensely secretive covert apparatus to hold them accountable also
is evident. * Dr. B. Ashok is an Indian Administrative Service
(IAS) officer, currently Private Secretary to the Minister of State
for Agriculture. He served earlier on the Faculty of the Lal
Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA),
Mussoorie. He was also a Scholar in Peace and Conflict at the Turin
University in Italy. Views expressed in this paper are personal.
The author is grateful to Indrajitpal, Associate Professor in the
Centre for Disaster Management, LBSNAA, N.V. Joseph, Research
Officer, and Sachin Agarwal, Computer Programmer, for assistance in
preparing this paper. 1. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus
Democracy: The Liberal State Response, London: Frank Cass, 2001, p.
161. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Praveen Swami, "Bowing to
Terrorism," Frontline, Chennai, vol. 17, no. 01, January 8-21,
2000. 6. Operation Thunderbolt: Entebbe, film by Eyal Sher ,
(Director), 2000. 7. O. P. Sabharwal, The Killer Instinct, Delhi:
Rupa, 2000, p. 109. 8. Swami, Frontline, vol. 17, no. 01, January
8-21, 2000. 9. Ibid. 10. IC 814 Film, National Geographic.
11.Swami, Frontline, vol. 17, no. 01, January 8-21, 2000. 12. The
then Union Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Saeed's daughter, Rubaiya
Saeed, was abducted by militants of the Jammu & Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF) on December 8, 1989. The negotiated release
of extremists was seen a surrender on the part of the Government,
tremendously weakening India's anti-terror doctrine and spurring an
escalating insurgency in
the State. 13. The Hazratbal Mosque, considered among the
holiest because of its association with the Prophet's relic, was
brought under siege in October 1993, after Pakistan backed
terrorists occupied it. In one of the longest and most incoherently
managed operations lasting over a month (October 15 to November
16), State Forces eventually conceded, and the terrorists were
given safe passage from the shrine. 14.Praveen Swami, "The Kandahar
Plot," Frontline, vol. 20, no. 24, November 22-December 5, 2003.
--------------------------------------:The
Truth Behind Kandahar
Dec 24, 2008 Kanchan Gupta, dailypioneer.com Was it really an
abject surrender by the NDA Government? There have been innumerable
communal riots in India, nearly all of them in States ruled by the
Congress at the time of the violence, yet everybody loves to
pretend that blood was shed in the name of religion for the first
time in Gujarat in 2002 and that the BJP Government headed by Mr
Narendra Modi must bear the burden of the cross. Similarly, nobody
remembers the various incidents of Indian Airlines aircraft being
hijacked when the Congress was in power at the Centre, the deals
that were struck to rescue the hostages, and the compromises that
were made at the expense of Indias dignity and honor. But everybody
remembers the hijacking of IC 814 and nearly a decade after the
incident, many people still hold the BJP-led NDA Government
responsible for the shameful denouement. The Indian Airlines flight
from Kathmandu to New Delhi, designated IC 814, with 178 passengers
and 11 crew members on board, was hijacked on Christmas eve, 1999,
a short while after it took-off from Tribhuvan International
Airport; by then, the aircraft had entered Indian airspace. Nine
years later to the day, with an entire generation coming of age, it
would be in order to recall some facts and place others on record.
In 1999 I was serving as an aide to Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee in the PMO, and I still have vivid memories of the
tumultuous week between Christmas eve and New Years eve. Mr
Vajpayee had gone out of Delhi on an official tour; I had
accompanied him along with other officials of the PMO. The
hijacking of IC 814 occurred while we were returning to Delhi in
one of the two Indian Air Force Boeings which, in those days, were
used by the Prime Minister for travel within the country.
Curiously, the initial information about IC 814 being hijacked, of
which the IAF was believed to have been aware, was not communicated
to the pilot of the Prime Ministers aircraft. As a result, Mr
Vajpayee and his aides remained unaware of the hijacking till
reaching Delhi. This caused some amount of controversy later. It
was not possible for anybody else to have contacted us while we
were in midair. Its strange but true that the Prime Minister of
India would be incommunicado while on a flight because neither the
ageing IAF Boeings nor the Air India Jumbos, used for official
travel abroad, had satellite phone facilities. By the time our
aircraft landed in Delhi, it was around 7:00 pm, a full hour and 40
minutes since the hijacking of IC 814. After disembarking from the
aircraft in the VIP bay of Palam Technical Area, we were surprised
to find National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra waiting at the
foot of the ladder. He led Mr Vajpayee aside and gave him the news.
They got into the Prime Ministers car and it sped out of the
Technical Area. Some of us followed Mr. Vajpayee to Race Course
Road, as was the normal routine. On our way to the Prime Ministers
residence, colleagues in the PMO provided us with the basic
details. The Kathmandu-Delhi flight had been commandeered by five
hijackers (later identified as Ibrahim Athar, resident of
Bahawalpur, Shahid Akhtar Sayed, Gulshan Iqbal, resident of
Karachi, Sunny Ahmed Qazi,
resident of Defence Area, Karachi, Mistri Zahoor Ibrahim,
resident of Akhtar Colony, Karachi, and Shakir, resident of Sukkur
City) at 5:20 pm; there were 189 passengers and crew members on
board; and that the aircraft was heading towards Lahore. At the
Prime Ministers residence, senior Ministers and Secretaries had
already been summoned for an emergency meeting. Mr Mishra left for
the crisis control room that had been set up at Rajiv Bhavan. In
between meetings, Mr Vajpayee instructed his personal staff to
cancel all celebrations planned for December 25, his birthday. The
Cabinet Committee on Security met late into the night as our long
vigil began. Meanwhile, we were informed that the pilot of IC 814
had been denied permission to land at Lahore airport. With fuel
running low, he was heading for Amritsar. Officials at Raja Sansi
Airport were immediately alerted and told to prevent the plane from
taking off after it had landed there. The hijacked plane landed at
Amritsar and remained parked on the tarmac for nearly 45 minutes.
The hijackers demanded that the aircraft be refuelled. The airport
officials ran around like so many headless chickens, totally
clueless about what was to be done in a crisis situation. Desperate
calls were made to the officials at Raja Sansi Airport to somehow
stall the refuelling and prevent the plane from taking off. The
officials just failed to respond with alacrity. At one point, an
exasperated Jaswant Singh, if memory serves me right, grabbed the
phone and pleaded with an official, Just drive a heavy vehicle, a
fuel truck or a road roller or whatever you have, onto the runway
and park it there. But all this was to no avail. The National
Security Guards, whose job it is to deal with hostage situations,
were alerted immediately after news first came in of IC 814 being
hijacked; they were reportedly asked to stand by for any emergency.
The Home Ministry was again alerted when it became obvious that
after being denied permission to land at Lahore, the pilot was
heading towards Amritsar. Yet, despite IC 814 remaining parked at
Amritsar for three-quarters of an hour, the NSG commandos failed to
reach the aircraft. There are two versions as to why the NSG didnt
show up: First, they were waiting for an aircraft to ferry them
from Delhi to Amritsar; second, they were caught in a traffic jam
between Manesar and Delhi airport. The real story was never known!
The hijackers, anticipating commando action, first stabbed a
passenger, Rupin Katyal (he had gone to Kathmandu with his newly
wedded wife for their honeymoon; had they not extended their stay
by a couple of days, they wouldnt have been on the ill-fated
flight) to show that they meant business, and then forced the pilot
to take off from Amritsar. With almost empty fuel tanks, the pilot
had no other option but to make another attempt to land at Lahore
airport. Once again he was denied permission and all the lights,
including those on the runway, were switched off. He nonetheless
went ahead and landed at Lahore airport, showing remarkable skill
and courage. Mr Jaswant Singh spoke to the Pakistani Foreign
Minister and pleaded with him to prevent the aircraft from taking
off again. But the Pakistanis would have nothing of it (they wanted
to distance themselves from the hijacking so that they could claim
later that there was no Pakistan connection) and wanted IC 814 off
their soil and out of their airspace as soon as possible. So, they
refuelled the aircraft after which the hijackers forced the pilot
to head for Dubai. At Dubai, too, officials were reluctant to allow
the aircraft to land. It required all the persuasive skills of Mr
Jaswant Singh and our then Ambassador to UAE, Mr KC Singh, to
secure landing permission. There was some negotiation with the
hijackers through UAE officials and they allowed 13 women and 11
children to disembark. Rupin Katyal had by then bled to death. His
body was offloaded. His widow remained a hostage till the end. On
the morning of December 25, the aircraft left Dubai and headed
towards Afghanistan. It landed at Kandahar Airport, which had one
serviceable runway, a sort of ATC and a couple of shanties. The
rest of the airport was in a shambles, without power and water
supply, a trophy commemorating the Talibans rule.
On Christmas eve, after news of the hijacking broke, there was
stunned all-round silence. But by noon on December 25, orchestrated
protests outside the Prime Ministers residence began, with women
beating their chests and tearing their clothes. The crowd swelled
by the hour as the day progressed. Ms Brinda Karat came to
commiserate with the relatives of the hostages who were camping
outside the main gate of 7, Race Course Road. In fact, she became a
regular visitor over the next few days. There was a steady clamour
that the Government should pay any price to bring the hostages back
home, safe and sound. This continued till December 30. One evening,
the Prime Minister asked his staff to let the families come in so
that they could be told about the Governments efforts to secure the
hostages release. By then negotiations had begun and Mullah Omar
had got into the act through his Foreign Minister, Muttavakil. The
hijackers wanted 36 terrorists, held in various Indian jails, to be
freed or else they would blow up the aircraft with the hostages. No
senior Minister in the CCS was willing to meet the families. Mr
Jaswant Singh volunteered to do so. He asked me to accompany him to
the canopy under which the families had gathered. Once there, we
were literally mobbed. He tried to explain the situation but was
shouted down. We want our relatives back. What difference does it
make to us what you have to give the hijackers? a man shouted. We
dont care if you have to give away Kashmir, a woman screamed and
others took up the refrain, chanting: Kashmir de do, kuchh bhi de
do, hamare logon ko ghar wapas lao. Another woman sobbed, Mera beta
hai mera beta and made a great show of fainting of grief. To his
credit, Mr Jaswant Singh made bold to suggest that the Government
had to keep the nations interest in mind, that we could not be seen
to be giving in to the hijackers, or words to that effect, in
chaste Hindi. That fetched him abuse and rebuke. Bhaand me jaaye
desh aur bhaand me jaaye desh ka hit. (To hell with the country and
national interest), many in the crowd shouted back. Stumped by the
response, Mr Jaswant Singh could merely promise that the Government
would do everything possible. I do not remember the exact date, but
sometime during the crisis, Mr Jaswant Singh was asked to hold a
Press conference to brief the media. While the briefing was on at
the Press Information Bureau hall in Shastri Bhavan, some families
of the hostages barged in and started shouting slogans. They were
led by one Sanjiv Chibber, who, I was later told, was a noted
surgeon: He claimed six of his relatives were among the hostages.
Dr Chibber wanted all 36 terrorists named by the hijackers to be
released immediately. He reminded everybody in the hall that in the
past terrorists had been released from prison to secure the freedom
of Ms Rubayya Sayeed, daughter of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, while he
was Home Minister in VP Singhs Government. Why cant you release the
terrorists now when our relatives are being held hostage? he
demanded. And then we heard the familiar refrain: Give away
Kashmir, give them anything they want, we dont give a damn. On
another evening, there was a surprise visitor at the PMO: The widow
of Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, whose plane was shot down during the
Kargil war. She insisted that she should be taken to meet the
relatives of the hostages. At Race Course Road, she spoke to
mediapersons and the hostages relatives, explaining why India must
not be seen giving in to the hijackers, that it was a question of
national honour, and gave her own example of fortitude in the face
of adversity. She has become a widow, now she wants others to
become widows. Who is she to lecture us? Yeh kahan se aayi? someone
shouted from the crowd. Others heckled her. The young widow stood
her ground, displaying great dignity and courage. As the mood
turned increasingly ugly, she had to be led away. Similar appeals
were made by others who had lost their sons, husbands and fathers
in the Kargil war that summer. Col Virendra Thapar, whose son Lt
Vijayant Thapar was martyred in the war, made a fervent appeal for
people to stand united against the hijackers. It fell on deaf ears.
The media made out that the overwhelming majority of Indians were
with the relatives of the hostages and shared their view that no
price was too big to secure the hostages freedom. The Congress kept
on slyly insisting, We are with the Government and will support
whatever it does for a resolution of the crisis and to ensure the
safety of the hostages. But the Government must explain its
failure. Harkishen Singh Surjeet and other Opposition politicians
issued similar ambiguous statements.
By December 28, the Governments negotiators had struck a deal
with the hijackers: They would free the hostages in exchange of
three dreaded terrorists Maulana Masood Azhar, Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar
and Ahmed Omar Sheikh facing various charges of terrorism. The CCS
met frequently, several times a day, and discussed the entire
process threadbare. The Home Minister, the Defence Minister and the
Foreign Minister, apart from the National Security Adviser and the
Prime Minister, were present at every meeting. The deal was further
fine-tuned, the Home Ministry completed the necessary paper work,
and two Indian Airlines aircraft were placed on standby to ferry
the terrorists to Kandahar and fetch the hostages. On December 31,
the two aircraft left Delhi airport early in the morning. Mr
Jaswant Singh was on board one of them. Did his ministerial
colleagues know that he would travel to Kandahar? More important,
was the Prime Minister aware of it? The answer is both yes and no.
Mr Jaswant Singh had mentioned his decision to go to Kandahar to
personally oversee the release of hostages and to ensure there was
no last-minute problem. He was honour-bound to do so, he is
believed to have said, since he had promised the relatives of the
hostages that no harm would come their way. It is possible that
nobody thought he was serious about his plan. It is equally
possible that others turned on him when the popular mood and the
Congress turned against the Government for its abject surrender. On
New Years eve, the hostages were flown back to Delhi. By New Years
day, the Government was under attack for giving in to the hijackers
demand! Since then, this shameful surrender is held against the NDA
and Mr Jaswant Singh is painted as the villain of the piece. Could
the Kandahar episode have ended any other way? Were an Indian
aircraft to be hijacked again, would we respond any differently?
Not really. As a nation we do not have the guts to stand up to
terrorism. We cannot take hits and suffer casualties. We start
counting our dead even before a battle has been won or lost. We
make a great show of honouring those who die on the battlefield and
lionise brave hearts of history, but we do not want our children to
follow in their footsteps. We are, if truth be told, a nation of
cowards who dont have the courage to admit their weakness but are
happy to blame a well-meaning politician who, perhaps, takes his
regimental motto of Izzat aur Iqbal rather too seriously. End
Kandahar decision wont have been easy: Chidambaram NDTV
Correspondent, Thursday, January 22, 2009 (New Delhi) Home Minister
P Chidambaram said on Thursday that there is no set formula for
dealing with terrorists. When asked if India should have a policy
not to negotiate with terrorists, he said that while this worked in
principle, in reality, when the human element came into play, he
was unsure of how he would deal with the crisis. I do not know how
I would have reacted if 150 families came to my door and pleaded
that their loved ones in that aircraft must be saved. It is easy to
criticise but if one is in that position, it is a very difficult
decision, he said at the NDTVs Indian of the Year Awards function
in New Delhi on Wednesday night. The NDA governments decision to
release dreaded terrorists in exchange for hostages in the Kandahar
hijack 10 years ago had come under attack from several quarters but
Home Minister P Chidambaram is not sure saying it is a very
difficult decision. The decision of the Vajpayee government to
release three dreaded terrorists including Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
chief Masood Azhar in December, 1999 received a lot of flak from
various political parties including the Congress, more so because
the then external affairs minister Jaswant Singh accompanied them
(terrorists) to Kandahar. Azhars name has subsequently figured in
the December 2001 terror attack on Parliament and the attack
outside Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in Srinagar in the same month.
(With PTI inputs)