FIT Annex4 Technical Report Part 3 Fire Response Management

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Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels 2/63

Copyright WTCB, Brussels, Belgium

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior writtenpermission of BBRI. It is allowed to quote data from this publication, provided that the sourceof the quotation is clearly mentioned.

Although all care is taken to ensure the integrity and quality of this publication and theinformation herein, no responsibility is assumed by the publishers, the authors or theEuropean Community for any damage to property or persons as a result of operation or useof this publication and/or the information contained herein.

This publication does not necessarily represent the opinion of the European Community.


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Technical Report Part 3

Fire Safe Design

Rapporteur Norman Rhodes, Mott MacDonald

Thematic Network FIT Fire in Tunnels issupported by the European Community under

the fifth Framework ProgrammeCompetitive and Sustainable Growth

Contract n G1RT-CT-2001-05017

Thematic NetworkFIT Fire in Tunnels


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Overview of the FIT reports

Technical report Part 3 Fire Safe Design 5/79


The Thematic Network FIT Fire in Tunnels aims to establish and develop a Europeanplatform and optimise efforts on fire safety in tunnels. The Networks ambition is to develop aEuropean consensus on fire safety for road, rail and metro tunnel infrastructures andenhance the exchange of up-to-date knowledge gained from current practice and ongoingEuropean and national research projects.

The outcome of the FIT network is presented in 3 complementary formats: FIT website (www.etnfit.net) General report Technical Reports on

o Design fire scenarios;o Fire safe design; and

o Fire response management

The FIT website(www.etnfit.net) contains the 6 consultable databases, the co-membership,the presentations of the International Symposium on Safe and Reliable Tunnels (Prague2004) and the technical reports. The reports are available after registration as acorresponding member.

The General reportpresents the outcome of the FIT activities. After the introduction of theFIT Network, the general approach to tunnel fi re safetyis presented. This chapter can beconsidered as a strategic introduction to the consecutive safety aspects and the integratedapproach to safety in tunnels. It introduces the highlights of the technical reports of the FIT

network with the executive summarieson design fi re scenarios, fi re safe design and fireresponse management.

The Technical reportson the FIT workpackages presents the detailled reflexion and resultsof the network on the items in more then 450 pages state of the art research work. Thereports are available from the FIT website after registration as a corresponding member.

Technical report Part 1 Design fire scenarios describes recommendations ondesign fire scenarios for road, rail and metro tunnels. Design fires to cover differentrelevant scenarios (e.g. design fires referring to the evacuation of people, design firesreferring to ventilation purpose or design fires referring to the structural load) arepresented and recommended.

In Technical report Part 2 Fire Safe Design, a compilation of relevant guidelines,regulations, standards or current best practices from European member states (andimportant tunnel countries like e.g. Japan and USA) is given. The analysis is focusedon all fire safety elements regarding tunnels properly said and are classified accordingto the transport nature: road, rail and metro.

The occurrence of a fire in a tunnel provokes a need for response from the tunnelusers, the operators and the emergency services. The Technical report Part 3 Fireresponse managementpresents the best practices which should be adopted bythese different categories to ensure a high level of safety.


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The Technical reportson the FIT workpackages presents the detailled reflexion and resultsof the network on the items in more then 450 pages state of the art research work. Thereports are available from the FIT website after registration as a corresponding member.

Technical report Part 1 Design fire scenariosRapporteur Alfred Haack, STUVA

The technical report of FIT Work Package 2 is devoted to design fire scenarios for road,rail and metro tunnels. It collects data from different countries (e.g. Germany, France,Italy, UK), international organisations (e.g. PIARC, ITA, UPTUN) as well as from theexperiences in individual tunnels (e.g. Mont Blanc, Tauern, Nihonzaka, Caldecott,Pfnder). The report includes basic principles of design fires, tunnel fire statistics andimpacts of fires and smoke in tunnels on people, equipment and structure. The data isanalysed and different sets of data are compared to ascertain the degree of confidenceattributed to the information. Recommendations are made within the text on specificissues when this was deemed appropriate and reliable.

Technical report Part 2 Fire Safe DesignRapporteur Bruno Brousse, CETU

Fire Safe Design Road Niels Peter Hoj, COWIFire Safe Design Rail Giorgio Micolott i, RFIFire Safe Design Metro Daniel GABAY, Arnoud Marchais, RATP

The FIT Workpackage Compilation of guidelines for fire safe design presents thecompilation of relevant guidelines, regulations, standards or current best practices fromEuropean member states, including reference documents from important tunnelcountries like e.g. USA and Japan, or from European or international organisations, e.g.PIARC and UN/ECE. The report is classified according to the transport nature in three

similar main sections: road, rail and metro tunnels. The three sections in the reportpresents the collected guidelines and regulations, their analytical abstract and table ofcontent. About 50 safety measures are presented and compared related to structuralmeasures (19), safety equipment (36) and structure and equipment with response tofire (3). For each type of measure the impact on safety is presented with a synthesisand a detailed comparison of the comprehensive list of safety measures.

Technical report Part 3 Fire Response ManagementRapporteur Norman Rhodes, Mott MacDonald

The objective of the FIT Work Package 4 Best practise for Fire ResponseManagement is the definition of best practices for tunnel authorities and fire emergency

services on prevention and training, accident management and fire emergencyoperations. The occurrence of a fire in a tunnel provokes a need for response from thetunnel users, the operators and the emergency services. The technical systems whichare installed in many tunnels are described in Chapter 2. These systems contribute tothe possible levels of safety that can be achieved and are mentioned later in relation toresponse planning. The viewpoint of the fire brigade is then presented in Chapter 3 inorder to establish the context of fire response management. Best practices for Road,Rail and Metro tunnels then follow in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively. They arepresented according to the conceptual phases before, during and after a fire, takinginto account the different involved parties (users, operators and emergency services).


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Table of contents


Table of contentsChapter 1 : INTRODUCTION 19

1.1 Objectives 19

1.2 Outline of the Report 20

Chapter 2 : TUNNEL SYSTEMS 232.1 General 232.2 Ventilation and smoke exhaust systems 232.3 Fire Detection and alarm systems 242.4 Fire Fighting systems 252.5 Computerised controls for ventilation and smoke exhaust systems 252.6 Radio telecommunication, telephone systems and mobile telephones 262.7 Electrical - traction power isolation systems 272.8 Emergency lighting 27

2.9 Closed Circuit TVs (CCTVs) 282.10 Public Address (PA) System 282.11 Signage 282.12 Traffic Management System 282.13 Passive fire protection relation to fire response management 292.14 Fire compartmentation 292.15 Evacuation routes, shafts and staircases 292.16 Use of fire resistant materials 30

Chapter 3 : THE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES PERSPECTIVE 313.1 Concept of Tactics for Rescue Operations 31

3.2 Fire and Rescue Operation 333.3 Methods Available to the Fire Services for Fighting a Tunnel Fire 333.4 Fires in Road Tunnels 353.5 Fires in Railway Tunnels 383.6 Fire and Rescue Operation Problems Encountered in Tunnel Fires 41

Chapter 4 : ROAD TUNNELS 474.1 Factors before a Fire 474.1.1 Objectives 474.1.2 Tunnel Operator 474.1.3 Emergency Services 514.1.4 Users 53

4.2 Safety Factors curing a Fire 544.2.1 Objectives 544.2.2 Tunnel Operator 544.2.3 Emergency Services 554.2.4 Users 56

4.3 Safety Factors after a Fire 574.3.1 Objectives 574.3.2 Tunnel Operator 57

4.3.3 Emergency Services 57

4.3.4 Users 58


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Chapter 5 : RAIL TUNNELS 595.1 Safety Factors before a Fire 605.1.1 Objectives 605.1.2 Operational Company 605.1.3 Eergency Services 625.1.4 Passengers 64

5.2 Safety Factors during an Fire 655.2.1 Objectives 655.2.2 Operational Company 655.2.3 Emergency Services 665.2.4 Passengers 66

5.3 Safety Factors after a Fire 675.3.1 Objectives 675.3.2 Operational Company 675.3.3 Emergency Services 67

5.3.4 Passengers 68

Chapter 6 : METRO TUNNELS 696.1 Safety Factors before a Fire 696.1.1 Objectives 696.1.2 Operational Company 706.1.3 Emergency Services 726.1.4 Passengers 74

6.2 Safety Factors During a Fire 746.2.1 Objectives 74

6.2.2 Operational Company 746.2.3 Passengers 76

6.3 Safety Factors after a Fire 776.3.1 Objectives 776.3.2 Operational Company 776.3.3 Emergency Services 776.3.4 Passengers 78

Chapter 7 : REFERENCES 79


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FIT Partnership


FIT PARTNERSHIP

BELGIAN BUILDING RESEARCH INSTITUTE(BBRI)

(Co-ordinator & WP1 leader on ConsultableDatabases)Johan Van DesselYves Martin

www.bbri.be

BUILDING RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT LTD

(BRE)(Manager Database 3: Overview of numerical

computer codes)Suresh KumarStewart Miles

www.bre.co.uk


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CENTRE FOR CIVIL ENGINEERING RESEARCHAND CODES/CENTRE FORUNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION(CUR/COB)Jan P.G. Mijnsbergen

www.cur.nl www.cob.nl

ENTE PER LE NUOVE TECNOLOGIE,L'ENERGIA E L'AMBIENTE (ENEA)Franco Corsi

www.enea.it

GESELLSCHAFT FUER ANLAGEN- UNDREAKTORSICHERHEIT(GRS)Klaus Kberlein

www.grs.de

HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE (HSE)Richard Bettis

www.hse.gov.uk

INSTITUTO DE CIENCIAS DE LACONSTRUCCION "EDUARDOTORROJA" CSIC (IETCC)Angel Arteaga

www.csic.es

INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L'ENVIRONNEMENTINDUSTRIEL ET DES RISQUES (INERIS)

(Manager Database 2: Tunnel test site facilities)(Manager Database 5: Assessment reports on fire

accidents)Guy Marlair

www.ineris.fr


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SP SWEDISH NATIONAL TESTING ANDRESEARCH INSTITUTE (SP)Haukur Ingason

www.sp.se/fire

NETHERLANDS ORGANIZATION FOR APPLIEDSCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (TNO)Kees Both

www.bouw.tno.nl

TECHNICAL RESEARCH CENTRE FINLAND(VTT)Esko Mikkola

www.vtt.fi/rte/firetech

FIRE SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP -UNIVERSITY OF GREENWICH (UOG)E. R. Galea

http://fseg.gre.ac.uk

OVE ARUP PARTNERSHIP (ARUP)Paul Scott

www.arup.com

COWI CONSULTING ENGINEERING ANDPLANNERS AS (COWI)

(General approach to tunnel fire safety &WP3 rapporteur Fire Safe Design - road)Niels Peter HjSteen Rostam

www.cowi.dk

DEUTSCHE MONTAN TECHNOLOGIE GMBH(DMT)

(Manager Database 4: Data on safety equipment intunnels)Horst Hejny

Werner Foitwww.dmt.de


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FIRE SAFETY DESIGN AB (FSD)Yngve AnderbergGabriel Khoury

www.csic.es

MOTT MACDONALD LIMITED(WP 4 rapporteur Fire response management)

Norman Rhodeswww.mottmac.com

SISTEMI ESPERTI PER LA MANUTENZIONE(SESM)Fulvio Marcoz

www.sesm.it

STUDIENGESELLSCHAFT FUERUNTERIRDISCHE VERKEHRSANLAGENE.V. (STUVA)

(WP 2 rapporteur Design Fire scenarios)Alfred Haack

www.stuva.de

FOGTEC BRANDSCHUTZ GMBH & CO KGStefan KratzmeirDirk Sprakel

www.fogtec.com

TRAFICON NVIlse Roelants

www.traficon.com


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DRAGADOS CONSTRUCCION P.O., S.A.Enrique Fernandez GonzalezCarlos Bosch

www.dragados.com

HOCHTIEF AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTHermann-Josef Otremba

www.hochtief.com

ALPTRANSIT GOTTHARD AGChristophe Kauer

www.alptransit.ch

CENTRE ETUDE DES TUNNELS (CETU)(Chair & WP3 rapporteur on Fire Safe Design)

Didier LacroixBruno Brousse

www.cetu.equipement.gouv.fr

FRANCE-MANCHE SA (EUROTUNNEL)Alain Bertrand

www.eurotunnel.com

METRO DE MADRID S.A.Gabriel Santos

www.metromadried.es

REGIE AUTONOME DES TRANSPORTSPARISIENS (RATP)

(WP3 rapporteur Fire Safe Design - metro)Daniel GabayArnaud Marchais

www.ratp.fr


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SUND & BAELT HOLDING A/SLeif J. VincentsenUlla Vesterskov Eilersen

www.sundbaelt.dk

STOCKHOLM FIRE BRIGADEAnders Bergqvist

www.brand.stockholm.se

KENT FIRE BRIGADEIan MuirManny Gaugain

www.kent-fire-uk.org

LYON TURIN FERROVIAIRE (LTF)Eddy Verbesselt

www.ltf-sas.com

RETE FERROVIARIA ITALIANA S.P.A. (RFI)(WP3 rapporteur Fire Safe Design rail)

Giorgio MicolittiRaffaele Mele

www.rfi.it

TECHNICAL UNIVERSITT GRAZ - INSTITUT

FRVERBRENNUNGSKRAFTMASCHINEN(TUG)Peter-Johann Sturm

www.virtualfires.org


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FIT Co-membershipThe FIT partnership is strengthened with a co-membership(co-opted members andcorresponding members) to receive ample feedback and input and obtain a larger forum forthe dissemination of its outcome.

The objectives of the corresponding and co-opted membership is the following: provide a large platform for the FIT working items ensure European feedback and input via organizations active in 'fire in tunnels' ensure member-state support via national and regional representatives

Co-opted membersare organisations invited to contribute to the FIT activities in a veryintensive way. They have the same access level as FIT network members (workingdocument, etc.). Co-opted members are bound by an agreement of collaboration andconfidentiality. Seventeen organisation have been invited and agreed as FIT Co-optedmembers.

Corresponding membersfurther enlarge the FIT Network. Corresponding members are

these organisations and national representatives that are interested to follow closely theactivities of FIT and registered themselves via the FIT website. They have a priviligedaccess to the endorsed FIT working documents and the Consultable Databases on fire andtunnel. A FIT public working document is a draft document that is being prepared for finaledition by the FIT network. It is made available for the FIT corresponding members forconsultation, input and comment.

More then 1200 corresponding members have been registered on the FIT websitewww.etnfit.net(status March 2005).

FIT CO-OPTED MEMBERSAmberg Engineering AG (Hagerbach test gallery)Contact name: Mr. Felix AmbergRheinstrasse 4, Postfach 64, 7320 Sargans Switzerland

Asociacion Latinoamericana de metros y subterraneosContact name: Mr. Aurelio Rojo GarridoCavanilles 58, 28007 Madrid - Spain

CENIM - UPMContact name: Mr. Enrique AlarconJos Gutirrez Abascal 2, 28006 Madrid - Spain

Centro Ricerche Fiat Societa Consortile per AzioniContact name: Mr. Roberto BrignoloStrada Torino, 50, 10043 Orbassano (TO) - Italy

Railway Scientific and Technical Centre Naukowo-Techniczne KolejnictwaContact name: Mrs. Jolanta Radziszewska-Wolinskaul. Chlopickiego 50, 04275 Warsaw - Poland

CTICMContact name: Mr. Jol Kruppa


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Btiment 6 domaine de Saint Paul - 102 route de Limours78471 Saint Remy-Les-Chevreuse - France

Deutsche Bahn AGContact name: Mr. Klaus-Juergen BiegerTaunustrasse 45,

60329 Frankfurt - Germany

European Association for Railway InteroperabilityContact name: Mr. Peter ZuberBoulevard de l'Impratrice 661000 Brussels - Belgium

European Commission Directorate-General for Energy and TransportContact name: Mr. Bernd Thammrue de la Loi 200, 1049 Brussels - Belgium

European Fire Services Tunnel Group (EFSTG)Contact name: Mr. Bill Welsh

ME13 6XB Tovil, United Kingdom

EurovirtunnelContact name: Mr. Gernot BeerLessingstrasse 25/II, 8010 Graz - Austria

Federal Highway AdministrationContact name: Mr. Tony Caserta400 Seventh Street S.W.,HIBT-10 Washington, D.C. 20590 - USA

Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology

Contact name: Dipl. Ing. Rudolf HoerhanStubenring 1, 1010 Wien - Austria

Holland Rail ConsultContact name: Mr. Mark Baan HofmanPostbus 2855, 3500 GW Utrecht - The Netherlands

Ministerie van het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk GewestContact name: Mr. Pierre SchmitzVooruitgangstraat 80/11030 Brussels - Belgium

Ministry of Transport, Public works and Watermanagement

Contact name: Ir. Evert WormPO Box 20.0003502 LA Utrecht - The Netherlands

Norwegian Public Roads AdministrationContact name: Mr. Finn Harald AmundsenPO Box 8142 Dep0033 Oslo - Norway


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Chapter

Technical Report Part 3

Fire Safe DesignRapporteur: Norman Rhodes (Mott MacDonald)

Contributions:Norman Rhodes (Mott MacDonald), Ulla Eilersen (Sund & Bealt), AndersBergqvist (Stockholm Fire Brigade), Christophe Kauer (AlpTransitGotthard Ltd), Eddy Verbesselt (Lyon Turin Ferroviaire), ArnaudMarchais (RATP), George Leoutsakos (Athens Metro), Gabriel Santos(Metro de Madrid)

Workpackage MembersNorman Rhodes (Mott MacDonald), Christophe Kauer (AlpTransit),Johan Van Dessel (BBRI), Manny Gaugain (Kent Fire Brigade), EddyVerbesselt (Lyon Turin Ferroviaire), Gabriel Santos (Metro de Madrid),Arnaud Marchais (RATP), Anders Bergqvist (Stockholm Fire Brigade),Leif Vincentsen, Ulla Eilersen (Sund & Bealt), Peter-Johann Sturm (TUG)


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Introduction

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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objectives

The objective of Work Package 4 (WP4) is the definition of best practices for tunnelauthorities and fire emergency services on prevention and training, accident managementand fire emergency operations.

The occurrence of a fire in a tunnel provokes a need for response from the tunnel users, theoperators and the emergency services. The purpose of WP4 is to define these responses inthe context of these different categories and so determine the best practices, which shouldbe adopted to ensure a high level of safety.

Thetunnel userswill in all probability be unfamiliar with their environment and with thetechnical features available in the tunnel. It may be in their best interests to take action withregard to self-rescue prior to the arrival of the emergency services. This may depend on theirprior education with regard to tunnel safety.

The tunnel operatorunderstands the features available and should take appropriate actionto implement procedures, which will minimise the danger to occupants. The operator will callin the emergency services and generally follow a pre-prescribed plan. The development ofthis plan and how it should be refined through exercises and training is also addressed.

The emergency servicesface an unpredictable situation on their arrival at the fire site. Anunderstanding of the tunnel details and the knowledge of tunnel operational possibilities arerequired to take control of the situation and begin the rescue operation with maximum safety.

The complexity of this interface cannot be underestimated, with a need to interpret possiblyincomplete information in a situation, which may change rapidly, and to deal with humanbehavioural problems.

The knowledge of safety related to a specific tunnel and the responses in case of an accidentwill differ, depending on the tunnel operator, the emergency services and the users. It isimportant to have in mind that a balance between prevention of accidents and reduction ofconsequences (for structure, human life and environment) has to be based on a risk analysisfor the individual tunnel with its own specific geometry, traffic, environment etc.

Best practice for emergency response requires the consideration of several safety factorswhich influence the level of safety in a tunnel. No consideration has, in the list of safety

factors, been taken to account for different tunnel lengths and traffic volumes. An attempt todivide safety factors in compulsory and optional has been found to be too theoreticaldepending on the fact that each tunnel is individual in many different aspects. Some of thesafety factors are not relevant for all tunnels, for example, responses from traffic operators ifno manned control room exists.

The concept of best practice is presented in the form of a three-dimensional matrix, Figure1.1, which shows the complexity of tunnel safety and emphasises the dependences requiredbetween different dimensions in order to create safety at a high and balanced level.

The first dimension covers the parties involved in the different phases namely the tunneloperator, emergency services and tunnel users. The second dimension covers the

conceptual phases namely (1) before a fire, (2) during a fire and (3) after a fire. The thirddimension covers safety factors for each phase and each involved party.


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Figure 1.1: Tunnel Safety Matrix

Safety factors should be evaluated for each individual tunnel, since each tunnel operator orotherorganisation is presumed to be able, from their own knowledge and competence, to judgethe convenience of implementation. It is important to stress that tunnel operation at a highsafety level and with efficient handling of incidents and accidents can be achieved only in aclose co-operation between the three involved parties - the tunnel operator, the emergencyservices and the tunnel users

All the safety factors are not always relevant for all parties or for all phases. For example, thesafety factors comprising strategies/analysis are only relevant for the conceptual phasebefore a fire. Not surprisingly best practise in the conceptual phase before a fire are themost extensive because this gives the basis to the whole tunnel safety set-up. For the

conceptual phases during a fire and after a fire the most important safety factors for allinvolved parties are to act according to this set-up.

1.2 Outline of the Report

The structure of the best practice guidelines are presented in global terms as Road, Rail andMetro, to differentiate the conditions and actions required for these different situations. Withineach of these sections, the conceptual phases before, during and after a fire form themain divisions.

Prior to the discussion of these details, however, the technical systems which are installed inmany tunnels are described in Chapter 2. These systems contribute to the possible levels of


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safety that can be achieved and are mentioned later in relation to response planning. Theviewpoint of the fire brigade is then presented in Chapter 3 in order to establish the context offire response management. Clearly, tunnel users and the fire & rescue services encounterthe highest risk in the event of a fire in a tunnel. Best practices for Road, Rail and Metrotunnels then follow in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively.

The ultimate aim of best practice for emergency response is to create a situation where thetunnel users and fire and rescue services are exposed to the least risk.

These guidelines are written in the context of the other FIT work packages which establishthe present level of knowledge of the conditions within a tunnel following an accident andregulatory frameworks that might apply. WP2 Design Fire Scenarios provides information onthe development of actual fires, recommendations for design fires and technical issuesrelating to structural integrity and safety equipment, such as ventilation, thus providing afoundation for the development of life-safety issues.WP3 Fire Safe Design brings together knowledge of current guidelines for fire safe design,

hence defining regulatory expectation of facilities, equipment, standards and procedureswhich will prevail in a design or refurbishment exercise. These recommendations aresummarized in terms of structural safety facilities (emergency exits, rescue teams access,safety niches, etc.) safety equipment (power supply, ventilation / smoke control, signs,sensors, communication, monitoring, fire suppression, etc.) and reaction and resistance tofire of structures and equipment.


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CHAPTER 2 : TUNNEL SYSTEMS

2.1 General

In the Fire Response Management for an incident in a road, railway or metro tunnel, severalelectromechanical and railway systems are usually involved. These systems provide theoperators with tools and means to optimise the response, provide the necessary informationto everyone involved and eventually assist in the minimisation of the loss of lives and/orinjuries. Immediate and coordinated use and activation of these systems is critical to theincident response. These systems include:

Ventilation and smoke exhaust systems Fire Detection systems Fire Fighting systems

Computerised controls for ventilation and smoke exhaust systems Radio telecommunication, telephone systems and mobile telephones Traction power isolation systems Emergency lighting CCTVs Public address Signage Traffic Management systems

In parallel, the passive fire protection design which includes:

Fire compartmentation, Evacuation routes, shafts and staircases Use of fire resistant materials,

is also of critical nature in the planning of a fire incident response, for road, railway and metrotunnels and systems.

The above are outlined in turn in the following sections:

2.2 Venti lation and smoke exhaust systems

The ventilation and smoke exhaust systems that take part in fire response typically compriseof the following installations.

Large size axial fans with all their related auxiliaries such as motorised dampers,sound attenuators, electrical installations etc. which generate the air flows thatprevent smoke backlayering in tunnels thus providing a smoke free evacuation route.In railway and metro systems, axial fans may also be used for dedicated smokeextraction from public areas of stations where the number and the concentration ofpassengers is high, and every effort is directed in keeping these public areas free ofsmoke for as long as it is possible.

Jet fans usually ceiling mounted in tunnels, providing longitudinal ventilation and oftenassisting and complementing the axial fan installations.

Saccardo nozzles in tunnels (this option forms a special case of a momentum devicedelivering high velocity through a special nozzle design in the tunnel civil works)


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In certain cases of railway and metro stations, smoke control may be assisted bywindows and hatches which are opened in case of a fire incident and allow the smoketo leave the confined areas and spaces, as a result of its buoyancy.

The main principles and operation objectives for the ventilation and smoke exhaust systems

are: Flow reversibility capabilities in tunnels that imply fully reversible fan installations.

Evacuation of people/passengers is selected in the opposite direction to that of the airflows generated by the forced ventilation..

All related equipment (fans, dampers, cables etc) exposed to the exhaust airflowsshould be fire resistant (typical specification is 250 OC for 1 hour). All cables, flexiblecouplings, paints and other materials that may eventually catch fire should be freefrom toxic fumes and halogen free

All power supply systems providing power to the fan installations should beredundant, ie power should be available from at least two independent sources.

In road tunnels ventilation may be provided in a longitudinal, semi transverse or fullytransverse manner, depending on the tunnel size, length and tunnel design specifics,while this issue also relates to the normal tunnel operation.

Recent developments in the semi transverse and transverse types of ventilation onroad tunnels involve smart motorised dampers which maximise the smoke extractionby activating the smoke extraction dampers only close to the fire incident, thusoptimising the smoke extraction process at the incident location. For certain metrosystems, this also applies to the platform level of certain stations, where verticaldownstand barriers under the ceiling create smoke reservoirs to each one of whichthere is a motorised damper activated automatically according to the smokeextraction needs.

2.3 Fire Detection and alarm systems

Various types of fire detection systems are currently in use in road, railway and metro tunnelsas well as railway and metro underground stations. Fire detection systems cover all publicareas, technical areas, staff areas while more specialised systems are often used in thetunnels where the environmental conditions are more demanding and the need for regularperiodic testing and maintenance is higher. Some of the main characteristics of fire detectionsystems are outlined below:

They may be triggered as smoke or heat detectors, They have capabilities to operate in an addressable mode thus giving the exact

incident location, while facilitating maintenance and replacement In tunnels, linear heat detectors may be used (long cables with linear sensors) which

are more robust and require less maintenance In public areas of railway/metro stations they may operate optically thus reducing the

number of visible cables and resulting in architecturally accepted solutions In technical areas (e.g. a substation) they are interfaced with the ventilation and fire

suppression systems, optimising the response Digital technology and related algorithms practically eliminate false alarms through

cross checking of several detectors

It must be stressed that fire detection and alarm systems become very effective when they

are correctly interlocked with several other systems, mainly with the ventilation and smoke


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exhaust, the fire suppression systems which depend on the area, as well as with otheralarms.

2.4 Fire fighting systems

Fire fighting systems offer the principal means for response to a fire incident, whether in aroad or railway/metro tunnel or a passenger station where the concentration of people islikely to be high especially at specific hours of the day. The type of systems installed, usuallydepend on the function of the area they serve, and they usually include:

Dry stand pipe systems with outlet valves at specific distances, eg every 60 m formetro tunnels, less often used in other railway tunnels. Dry systems are used in orderto minimise the risks of electrocution from the 3rdrail. In a tunnel incident, power willbe cut first remotely or locally, while firemen will need to carry fire hoses that will beconnected to the outlet valves nearest to the incident location. The dry system shallbe energised and automatically fill with water within approximately 1-2 minutes upona remote or a local command from a control centre or adjacent station, using

electrically activated central valves. Redundancy provisions are always made to haveat least two separate points where the dry standpipe system will fill with water. In ametro system this is usually between the two adjacent metro stations.

Wet stand pipe systems with fire hoses in road and rail tunnels which depending onthe location of the tunnel -, are fed from usual water supply networks or assisted byfire fighting pumping stations if the tunnel length is significant.

Automatically activated fire suppression systems based on inert gases in the case ofelectrical equipment rooms (eg. traction power substation, telecommunicationsequipment room etc). These systems are interlocked with the ventilation systems thatshut down, all fire dampers close thus isolating the incident room, and then the areais flooded with an inert gas that puts out the fire by reducing the oxygen content, asthe room is filled with the inert gas. These systems are designed so that the oxygencontent that remains is such that it is just sufficient to allow a person to enter the roomsafely.

Water sprinkler systems, which are sometimes used in special areas such as railwaydepots whether overground or underground, with careful provisions taken to minimiseelectrocution risks. Also, for rooms containing electrical equipment but with humanoccupancy (such as a station master room or a control room) water sprinkler systemscould be used, but with a dry stand pipe system within the room.

Auxiliary fire fighting equipment located at easy to reach locations usually withinmetro or railway stations, containing equipment such as fire extinguishers, axes,

blankets, buckets with sand, breathing apparatus etc. A recently developed fire fighting technique with wide applications is based on water

mist that is sprayed at or near the fire from fixed piping systems with spray nozzles.The water mist particles fight the fire by lowering the temperature of the materialsunder fire as well as in the near vicinity, while capturing the smoke particles and thusimproving the visibility. This method is not used in tunnels, but certain metrooperators have started using it for specific limited applications in passenger stationsand vehicles.

2.5 Computerised controls for ventilation and smoke exhaust systems


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Tunnel Systems


One critical link in the chain of fire response is the computerised/automation controls thatmonitor and control the ventilation and smoke exhaust systems upon command from anoperator or upon input from fire detection systems. These central control systems usuallytermed as controls for ECS (Environmental Control Systems) or BMS (Building ManagementSystems) or as a recent European Standard EN_ISO 16484 uses the term BACS (BuildingAutomation and Control Systems), have the following capabilities:

They can energise pre-programmed emergency scenarios with the optimumresponse combination of the involved tunnel fans, activated with a mouse click,without the need of the operator to decide at the hour of the incident which fancombinations to use, thus minimising the response time and ensuring the correct fancombination activation. The scenarios involve activation of several items of equipmentsuch as fans, dampers, roller shutters etc. Activation of the correct scenario andfurther coordinated actions to inform the people and passengers to follow a specificevacuation direction are important for the fire response management and its success.

They allow further individual fan operations to be activated from the operator, ifdecided by the incident management team to further improve the smoke extractionprocess.

On a local level, in railway /metro stations, a control panel easily accessible andvisible is often installed. This control panel, sometimes called a fireman's box, hasbuttons that automatically energise specific response scenarios (e.g. fire in stationplatform) regarding the fans emergency operation, and this may be performed eitherby a fireman at the incident scene or by a staff member after consultation with thecontrol centre.

The above mentioned control systems are usually interlocked with fire detection and firefighting systems in order to maximise the transmission of the critical information and alarmsignals and optimise the fire response.

2.6 Radio telecommunication, telephone systems and mobi le telephones

Communication systems are used for conveying the information about an incident to thepeople and organizations that need to be involved in the fire response. These systemsinclude:

Emergency telephones installed at specified locations in road or rail tunnels thatenable drivers (in road tunnels) or railway staff (in rail/metro tunnels) to communicatedirectly to the operator control centre and report the exact location and nature of theincident. In some cases these emergency telephones may allow communication

directly to the police, fire brigade and other authorities. The main difference betweenroad and rail/metro tunnels is that anyone may use the emergency telephones in aroad tunnel (eg a private car driver) while in rail/metro tunnels this action shall usuallybe taken by a member of the staff (eg a train driver or attendant) and is thus morecontrolled and reliable. In metro tunnels these telephones are sometimes situatedside by side with emergency plunger buttons that cut the electrification power. Fromthe time that an incident has been reported, a well-organised sequence of activationof various authorities should follow, and depending on the incident, these may includethe police, the fire brigade, the ambulances, special emergency crew units, near byhospitals and others. For optimisation of the cross communication betweenemergency services, usually operator control centres for road and railway/metrotunnels and systems have direct telephones to the police and the fire brigade.


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Tunnel Systems


Radio telecommunications offer a parallel means of communication that isindependent of location or position. Usually tunnel operators do provide a radiotelecommunications system for their staff mainly for facilitating maintenance but forincident response as well. A point of special interest here is that it would be veryhelpful if the radio telecommunications of not only the tunnel operator but of severalor all of the parties involved such as the police, the fire brigade, the ambulances etcshould be organised to go under the same telecommunications umbrella. Anexample is that of the recent 2004 Olympic Games in Athens where all the radiotelecommunications for the road operators, the metro, the tram, the suburban railway,the police, the fire brigade, the ambulances etc were under one universal (calledTETRA) radio system which made cross communication between the variousservices and incident response much easier to implement.

Another facility which may prove critical to the early activation and incident responseis the coverage of road and rail/metro tunnels by the mobile telephone companies,since this would greatly enhance the capability of any driver of passenger tocommunicate and inform of the fire incident at its beginning, well before it isdeveloped beyond control.

2.7 Electrical - traction power isolation systems

In metro tunnels and other railway tunnels, a system is provided to cut out the electrical(traction) power to that section of the tunnel close to the incident. This action may beperformed remotely from the control centre or locally from emergency plunger buttonsinstalled at regular distances in the tunnels. Cutting of the electrical power is the first actionthat needs to be taken in a tunnel fire incident.

2.8 Emergency lighting

Tunnel lighting systems should be designed for the case of a fire incident. Although thelighting fixtures themselves are usually not fire resistant, one may assume that a number oflighting fixtures will be destroyed in a fire incident, but sufficient lights and lighting levels shallremain for the people/ passengers to escape from the incident location. Hence tunnel lightingsystems need to be designed with redundancy, using different electrical phases for differentsequential lighting fixtures, power supply shall need to come from both sides of the tunnels,while UPS or individual battery systems shall need to be used to ensure a minimum level oflighting in the event of total power loss. Periodic maintenance of tunnel lighting systems isimportant to ensure their correct operation in an incident.

In railway/metro stations, lighting systems are designed with several degrees of redundancy(multiple electrical circuits, fed from multiple power sources, backed up by UPSs and batterysystems) as the large number and concentration of people require certain minimum lightinglevels for emergency evacuation, especially in cases where smoke is present.

In all cases of tunnels and stations, battery based safety lights, lighting the emergency exitsigns and pictograms, in case of a total power loss, are also installed in addition toemergency lighting. In certain recent metro systems a series of small size, intense levelindication lights are installed along the route of emergency and evacuation exits to facilitateevacuation of passengers under low visibility conditions.In all cases all lighting cables are toxic fumes free and halogen free.


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Tunnel Systems


2.9 Closed Circuit TVs (CCTVs)

CCTVs, are extensively used in road tunnels and in railway/metro stations, for monitoring thenormal operation as well as providing immediate pictures in case of an incident. CCTVs maybe of the type with a fixed view field or may have electrically activated pivoting mechanisms

which enable monitoring of a much wider field, with also zoom in/out capabilities, as operatedfrom the control centre of the Operator. In case of a fire incident, they provide information onthe exact incident location, they give an indication of the smoke visibility levels and offer avery valuable tool for decision making on the fire response management, while the incidentmay be video-taped for further analysis and evaluation.

The usual problem with CCTVs is that the human operators that monitor them at the controlcentre level, are usually insufficient for the coverage that the CCTVs provide and an incidentmay take place without anybody noticing, until it may be too late. Hence efforts are underway to develop smart CCTVs that may be programmed for automatic recognition of anincident. An example of that of a system that has been proposed for further development forrailway/metro stations, that takes continuous digital images from CCTVs, compares them on

line with pre-specified flows of passengers of a laminar or turbulent flow nature and hencedecides whether an incident has taken place, since people move with different patterns(faster and in a more random manner) in the case of an incident.

2.10 Public Address (PA) System

Public address systems are usually not installed in road or rail and metro tunnels, but theyare an important system in the fire response management in railway/metro stations.Announcements from the PA systems shall need to be exercised with great care in the caseof a fire incident, aiming to promote the orderly evacuation of the passengers from the station

and prevent panic that in many cases has proved to be more destructive and fatal than thefire incident itself. Also, it is extremely important that the directions and instructions given tothe public and passengers from the operator through the PA system either on a local levelfrom a station master or remotely on a control centre level, are the correct actions to befollowed, totally in line with the evacuation strategy that has been decided. A number of fatalincidents have resulted from changes in the fire response strategy, mid way during anincident.

2.11 Signage

Signage is a passive measure whose role in a fire response is to indicate clearly andunambiguously the evacuation routes and exits from the incident area. In certain cases signsbecome lit if required. Signs are usually placed in visible locations at a sufficient height, andthe line of sight to the signs should not be impeded by other information signs or otherequipment such as road signs or jet fans in road tunnels, or destination signs, clocks etc inrail/metro stations. In evacuation exits and staircases, fluorescent stripes are sometimesinstalled at the edge of steps or on the sidewalls, to further assist evacuation under lowvisibility conditions.

2.12 Traffic Management System

Although the term refers to road traffic in road tunnels, the principle equally applies torailway/metro tunnels. In road tunnels the electronic information signs along roads and


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Tunnel Systems


motorways leading to the tunnels should immediately be programmed from the control centreto inform drivers not to enter the incident tunnel. This action although it is likely to createtraffic queues before the tunnels, will allow the cars that are already inside the tunnels to exit,while access to the fire brigade, the police, the ambulances and the emergency services willbe facilitated. In railway/metro tunnels, the train traffic operators shall immediately direct thetrain drivers to keep away from the incident tunnel.

2.13 Passive fire protection relation to fire response management

All the above measures, with the possible partial exception of signage, refer to activemeasures for managing the response to a fire incident. However, mainly for the case ofrailway/metro stations, the passive fire protection is an integral part of the fire responsemanagement, as it provides barriers to fire and smoke and assists in formulating the fireresponse strategy. Passive fire protection covers mainly three areas, the firecompartmentation, the evacuation routes, shafts and staircases, and the preventive measureto maximise the use of fire resistant materials. Each one is outlined in turn in the following

sections.

2.14 Fire compartmentation

In the case of railway/metro stations, all staff and equipment areas where a fire incident maytake place have been designed with fire compartmentation in mind. This at the least ensuresthat a local fire incident in one of those areas will not affect the public areas, while the firedetection and fire fighting systems may be triggered automatically. Response in suchincidents is usually fast because it involves only staff members, and possibly emergencyservices, while the automatic fire suppression and fire fighting systems usually perform

satisfactorily. Fire compartmentation also protects the technical and staff rooms from a fire inthe public areas, so that the systems in the technical areas shall continue to operate safelyand the staff could continue to operate and deal with the incident.

2.15 Evacuation routes, shafts and staircases

All types of road and railway/metro tunnels and all types of railway/metro stations have beendesigned with evacuation routes, shafts and staircases that provide the means for escapingsafely from a fire incident. In tunnels, evacuation routes, shafts and staircases are providedat regular intervals according to the codes (NFPA or other) while fire response management

with respect to the minimization of casualties and loss of lives, is related to the maximiseduse of these safe evacuation routes. The strategy of evacuating people or passengers from atunnel or a station, is built around the capabilities and capacities offered by these safeevacuation routes, since time is the principal factor in all the strategy analyses.

Another important factor to be considered in the evacuation strategies is the use of theseevacuation routes as access routes by the emergency services, in order to reach the incidentlocation in the least possible time, without however moving towards the incident concurrentlywhile the escaping passengers are moving in the opposite direction. Finally, thepressurisation of emergency evacuation routes and staircases is another safety measure thatmay enhance safe evacuation, but this issue is sometimes debated with regards to thetechnical solutions proposed for its implementation.


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Tunnel Systems


2.16 Use of fire resistant materials

Minimization of the combustible materials in tunnels and stations is an ever-developing topicas it indirectly dictates the time available for responding safely to a fire incident. Reduction ofthe combustible materials, development of fire resistant materials, development of materialsthat even when burned do not produce toxic fumes and other dangerous products mayprovide the additional critical time to safely evacuate the people/passengers involved in anincident, hence it is important that system Operators do invest in the technology of materials.This topic is more applicable to railway/metro tunnels and stations where efforts arecontinuously being made to improve on items such as train floors and seats, cables, plasticsused in lighting fixtures, insulation materials, paints etc. For the case of road tunnels theissue is redirected to the automobile manufacturers for similar items as above, while howeverthe petrol carried in vehicles is an inflexible item with regards to fire safety and presents thehighest risk.

In conclusion, all the above active and passive means that are involved in fire responsemanagement can only be effectively used if the strategies are analysed and actions areprogrammed in detail beforehand. This involves not only the Operator/Authority that runs thesystem (road or railway/metro) but also the fire brigade, the police, the hospitals and theambulances, other emergency units and crews, the press etc. Each one of the above shouldbe well trained to take part in a fire response, while central coordination between all theabove during the incident from the operator/authority is also important. In cases ofemergency at a larger scale the central coordination may be undertaken by a higher-levelgovernmental entity.

Fire response drills and tests and similar rehearsals need to performed periodically, in orderto test the response characteristics of each system involved in particular as well as theoverall fire response mechanism and its management.


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The Fire and Rescue Services Perspective


CHAPTER 3 : THE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES PERSPECTIVE

As mentioned above, incorporating safety into the design of tunnels involves thoroughinvestigation of the various safety features in terms of both design and construction and is

generally accompanied by extensive risk analyses. Work includes consideration andcalculation of the various design rating events and their consequences, with careful analysesof how persons involved in accidents are likely to behave. The knowledge derived from theseinvestigations and analyses is used to design and determine the necessary capacities ofsafety systems in the tunnels. An essential part of the design process is a detaileddescription of the various pro-active and consequence-reducing actions which can be takenonce an accident has occurred. These would normally be performed by the Fire and RescueService.

The role of the Fire and Rescue Service should be seen as an integral part of the tunnelsoverall safety concept. Tunnel designers need to understand the factors which enable theFire and Rescue Service to safely, quickly and efficiently deal with any accidents that occur,

and the services needed on hand to assist the tunnel owners/operators in determining thenecessary capacity of services required.

Fire and Rescue Authorities generally have two roles to play. One role is to be that of apublic authority, ensuring that the design of the tunnel fulfils the guidelines and various formsof practice that ensure a sufficient level of safety for individual users. They also provide theorganisation that maintains and applies the various actions and responses in the event ofaccidents.

Tunnel owners have a major responsibility in terms of preparedness for accidents, whichincludes making it possible to perform rescue work and to limit damage arising from anaccident. Legislation can impose a responsibility on an operator or owner to ensure that

conditions are such that rescue work could be carried out in the event of an accident, andparticularly if the property is large and complicated, such as a tunnel. By working closely withthe Fire and Rescue Authority, a tunnel owner can arrive at a solution that integrates the Fireand Rescue Service with other safety aspects of the tunnel.

3.1 Concept of Tactics for Rescue Operations

In simple terms, fire and rescue operations can be said to consist of a number of differentelements:

The working methods or active measures for which the personnel have been trained andequipped, with the outcome depending largely on the ability of the personnel to makebest use of the equipment under the conditions of the particular accident with which theyare dealing.

Coordination of the various individual methods, so that they work together to produce aneffective rescue action.

Selection of tactics for effectively fulfilling the objective of the rescue action.

The tactics in fire and rescue operations can be described as the ongoing decisions by theincident commander regarding the resources to be used, and the actions to be carried out inorder to achieve the objectives in the most efficient manner, Figure 2.


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The specific tactical thrust will be dependent on the type of accident concerned, the localconditions, the objective of the work, the resources available and the competence of thepersonnel available for the action.

Clearly, the fire and rescue operation in connection with a fire in a cable tunnel will be carriedout in a different manner to tackling a fire involving private cars in a tunnel. The biggestdifference between these two can be seen to be the fact that the main thrust of the operationin the road tunnel would be to rescue persons involved, which is not the main purpose ofoperation in the cable tunnel. Fire-fighting operations need to be adapted to suit the manydifferent situations.

Figure 3.1: Tactic for rescue actions

There are considerable variations in the design of tunnels throughout the world, and fires candiffer greatly in terms of intensity or extent, depending on what is burning. In road tunnels, itmay be road vehicles that burn; in railway tunnels, it can be trains or fires can occur inaccumulations of rubbish. It is therefore difficult to define a fire in a tunnel. However, thisreport will concentrate on how rescue and fire services can deal with catastrophic fires intunnels.

As far as the Fire and Rescue Services are concerned, the most important measures thatcan reduce the severity of accidents are:

That there should be short distances to, and simple means of reaching, escape routes forthose escaping from a fire.

That the fire fighters can approach the fire as safely as possible. That the fire cannot grow excessively before fire-fighting work can start.

These various conditions can be achieved in different ways, but there must be an overallsafety programme that identifies all the parameters involved, makes them work together andcreates the best conditions for high safety levels.

Objective of therescue action

Results of therescue action

Tactical execution ofthe rescue action

The type of accidentand the environment

in which it hasoccurred

Resources availablefor the rescue action


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3.2 Fire and Rescue Operation

Safety in tunnels depends on many different factors and conditions: the actual design of thetunnel itself, and the type of traffic using it, will have a considerable effect. Escape routesand approach routes for the public fire service are only parts of this overall safety, although

they are the vital parts that must operate satisfactorily in the event of an extensive tunnel fire.The fire and rescue operations should be so structured, and matched to the design of thetunnel and the conditions likely to be encountered, as needed to suit each particular specificcase. Todays Fire and Rescue Service have developed many methods for dealing withdifferent types of accidents. In general, it can be said that the more common the type ofaccident, the more developed are the methods for dealing with it.

The concepts of upstream and downstream of the fire relate to the direction of air flow in thetunnel. The area upstream of the fire is that away from the fire and against the direction ofair flow. Downstream of the fire is the zone away from the fire itself, in the direction of the airflow. It is in this latter direction that most of the fire gases flow. Backlayering is thephenomenon by which the fire gases flow against the direction of air flow in the tunnel. The

distance to which this effect can occur depends on the size of the fire, the volume of the airflow in the tunnel and other parameters.

3.3 Methods Available to the Fire Services for Fight ing a Tunnel Fire

In principle, the Fire and Rescue Services apply the following tactical approaches to tacklingfires in tunnels:

Working in the tunnel to extinguish the fire, thus eliminating the threat to those caught init,

Working in the tunnel to assist/rescue those caught in the fire, to get them out of thetunnel as quickly as possible, Ventilation of the tunnel, where possible, in order to drive the smoke away from the fire in

one direction, thus facilitating evacuation and fire-fighting, Fighting the fire from a safe position, in order to limit its consequences, Actively dealing with those escaping from the fire to safe conditions or outside the tunnel.

These various approaches must then be brought together to provide a suitable combinationfor dealing with each specific accident.

An important aspect is that of the time before the fire starts to grow rapidly. These resultsseem to indicate that fires tend to take hold fiercely after about the first 5 - 10 minutes. Thiscan be compared with the golden 60 seconds that are available for tackling aircraft fires,and which indicate the maximum time that can elapse before the first fire-fighting work starts.If the Fire and Rescue Services are to be able to start fighting fires within about ten minutes,much needs to be done in order to improve the efficiency of their work.

The working methods normally employed by Fire and Rescue Services have come to reflectthe accidents and fires most commonly encountered today. In the case of major fires intunnels, it is highly likely that it will be necessary to use very different methods from thoseemployed in tackling fires in residential buildings or ordinary traffic accidents. Serious fires,such as those in the Mont Blanc Tunnel or the Tauern Tunnel, show all too clearly that themethods employed by the Fire and Rescue Services are based on the necessary responses

after the fire has been brought under control, and the assumption that the Fire and RescueServices will be able to get to the fire easily. Working methods that can be considered fordealing with fires in tunnels are as follows.


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Entry into the tunnel to ascertain conditions, i.e. to note the conditions at the accidentsite and to obtain an overall picture. This is done with the aim of providing informationneeded for further work. It may be necessary to do this in smoke-filled conditions,which means that those carrying it out must be appropriately protected. It must alsobe done immediately on arrival, and be fast and effective, in order not to delay therest of the work.

Entering the tunnel to extinguish the fire and eliminate the threat to persons in thetunnel. This may have to be carried out under dangerous conditions, facing smokeand high thermal radiation levels, which means that those involved must be suitablyprotected. Actually extinguishing the fire may be very difficult, and can probably bedone in a number of different ways, of which the following are examples of possiblemethods:

o The use of ordinary hoses and nozzles.o The use of portable water monitor.o The use of vehicle-mounted water monitor.

o The use of fans, with water being injected into the air flow.o Moving the burning object etc. out of the tunnel.o The use of remotely controlled fire-fighting equipment.

Work in the tunnel in order to guide those escaping from the fire, i.e. those capable offleeing. This may also have to be carried out under dangerous conditions of smokeand high radiation levels, which means that those performing the work must besuitably protected.

Work in the tunnel physically to carry out victims, i.e. what is generally called life-saving. This may also have to be carried out under dangerous conditions of smokeand high radiation levels, which means that those performing the work must be

suitably protected.

Work in the tunnel to rescue those involved in the fire and help them to survive in thevicinity. This may also have to be carried out under dangerous conditions of smokeand high radiation levels, which means that those performing the work must besuitably protected.

Ventilation of the tunnel in order to control the quantity and direction of flow of smokein the tunnel. The purpose of this can be:

o to ventilate the tunnel in order to assure the existing air flow through it, thusfacilitating evacuation and rescue work.

o to ventilate the tunnel in order to start air flow through it, thus creating apossible escape route and a means of approach for the firefighters.

o to ventilate the tunnel in order to reverse the direction of flow of smoke, thusfacilitating the rescue of those in the smoke downstream of the fire site.

Advanced care for victims, under safe conditions in the vicinity of the fire. Thismethod is likely to require very considerable resources if large numbers of personsare involved.

The prime aim of all these methods is to save lives, although they also represent differentand, in many cases, equally important, methods of ensuring an effective input, depending onthe particular conditions of the accident. The reason that several of these methods are oftennot considered as methods of saving life is probably because most fires occur in

considerably less complicated areas, involving considerably fewer persons. Under suchcircumstances, it is not as apparent that, for example, information is one of the most


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important points when starting the work, or that quickly evacuating those who are first foundis not necessarily the most effective way of saving lives.

3.4 Fires in Road Tunnels

The size of a fire in a road tunnel will have a very considerable effect on the ability of the Fireand Rescue Service to perform effective rescue and/or fire-fighting operations. Whentackling fires in road tunnels, personnel and equipment should be capable of dealing withfires of the magnitude that can be encountered. This is important, as many persons can beinvolved in road tunnel fires.

Fires in private cars in twin-bore tunnels will almost be within the capabilities of a fire-fightingforce to handle. However, the same fire in a single-bore tunnel could lead to considerabledifficulties, depending on whether there is any air flow through the tunnel or whether there isa ventilation system capable of evacuating the smoke from the fire.

The factors that will set the capacity requirements for fighting a fire in a tunnel will be:

The number of persons whom the rescue and fire services must assist out to safeconditions

The size of the fire, and thus the temperature and thermal radiation power that will facethe fire-fighters

The distance that the fire-fighters have to travel in a smoke-filled environment to reachthe fire.

Fires in trucks and coaches are likely to reach such output levels that it can be difficulteffectively to tackle the fire. As the carriage of goods by road is generally increasing in

Europe, this can also mean that the probability of fires in freight vehicles is also increasing.Many tunnels have been designed with capacities that are capable only of dealing with fireswith outputs of up to 20 30 MW [1].

Fires of this order of size will generate very high radiation levels, both from the smoke andfrom the actual flames. The table below shows the thermal radiation levels recorded at thefire trials in the Runehammar Tunnel in Norway in 2003.

Basis of the fire Thermal output(peak),HRR (MW)

Radiation level5 m upstreamof the fireq (kW/m2)

Radiation level10 m upstream ofthe fireq (kW/m2)

Radiation level20 m upstreamof the fireq (kW/m2)

Wooden pallets andplastic pallets, 10

tonne

200 MW 110 (peak)40-60 (17

minutes)

10-12 (17minutes)

2 (peak)

Wooden pallets and 170 MW 29-35 (5 9-19 (6 minutes) 3 (peak)


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mattresses, 6 tonne minutes)Furniture, 7.7 tonne.Truck tyres, 0.8 tonne

130 140 MW 20 (short period) 9 (short period) 2 (peak)

Cartons of plasticbeakers on woodenpallets, 2.6 tonne

70 80 MW40 (short period) 8 (short period) 4 (peak)

Table 3.1: Measured thermal outputs and radiation values from fire tests in the Runehammar

Tunnel, September 2003 [4].

Tackling fires in twin-bore tunnels

When a fire breaks out in a twin-bore tunnel, traffic in the affected bore must be stoppedupstream of the fire. The normal ventilation of the tunnel must ensure that those escapingupstream from the fire are not affected by smoke from it. All traffic downstream of the fireshould be able to continue to drive out of the tunnel before it is filled with smoke. Traffic inthe other bore of the tunnel must be stopped, so that the Fire and Rescue Service can enterthe tunnel and reach the fire via the connections between the two tunnel bores.

Figure 3.2: Tackling a vehicle fire in a twin-bore tunnel [4]

Tackling this type of fire will involve the following elements:

Stopping all further traffic into both bores of the tunnel. Experience shows that thisclosure must be in the form of an actual physical barrier.

The fire tenders enter the unaffected tunnel in the normal traffic direction from the nearestentrance point. It is important that there should be clear access routes for the fire servicevehicles, as there is likely to be traffic chaos outside the tunnel.

First personnel to arrive quickly tackle the fire in the vehicle. At the same time, the smoke-free part of the tunnel upstream of the fire site should be

evacuated. Depending on the size of the fire, the second and third crews to arrive should assist the

first crew in putting out the fire and start to extinguish any fires downstream of the originalfire and search the tunnel for persons trapped. The purpose of this action is to rescueanyone trapped in the smoke, and to remove the danger of the fire spreading to anyvehicles in the smoke downstream of the fire: see Figure 3.

Air movement


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If the tunnel is in a major urban environment, it is very likely that there will be traffic queues.Dealing with a tunnel fire under such circumstances means that the most important step inprotecting those already in the tunnel is unavailable: vehicles downstream of the fire will notbe able to drive out of the tunnel, but will be trapped in the traffic queue and unable to move.This means that there will be a large number of persons trapped in the smoke downstream ofthe fire. Some of them will escape through the connections to the parallel tunnel bore, but isunlikely that all will do so. As a result, the fire service will suddenly be faced with theproblem of dealing with large numbers of people trapped in the smoke.

Figure 3.3: Fire and rescue operation dealing with a car fire in a twin-bore tunnel with queuing

vehicles [4]

Tunnel ventilation, activated after the fire has been extinguished, will dilute the dangerousgases in the smoke, thus improving survival conditions in the smoke. If the firefighters fail toextinguish the fire, it will be necessary to reverse the direction of air flow and smoke in thetunnel after the tunnel upstream of the fire has been cleared of people and vehicles. Theeffect of this will be to create a safe environment for those trapped in the original downstreamdirection of the fire: see Figure 5.

Figure 3.4: Fire and rescue operation dealing with a car fire in a twin-bore tunnel withqueuing traffic, after reversal of the direction of air flow

Tackling fires in single-bore tunnels

Tackling a fire of this type will involve the following elements:

Quick reconnoitring of the tunnel in order to obtain a picture of the situation, and also tosee how far the smoke has spread.

Ensure an air flow through the tunnel by starting ventilation in the most suitable direction. If possible, those who were first into the tunnel to investigate the conditions should start

to put out the fire in the vehicle. If not, they should take themselves out of the tunnel:see Figure 9.

Evacuate persons in the tunnel upstream of the fire site. Enter the tunnel from the downstream end (against the smoke) with the aim of rescuinganyone in the smoke close to the tunnel mouth.

Air movement

Fan

Air movement


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Once the fire has been put out, ventilate the tunnel in order quickly to reduce the toxicconcentrations in the smoke, thus improving the prospects for survival of those trapped in thesmoke. If it is not possible to put out the fire, the air direction in the tunnel must be reversedin order to dissipate the toxic smoke from anyone trapped in the tunnel, after the upstreamend has been cleared of persons and vehicles.

Figure 3.5: Tackling a car fire in a single-bore tunnel

Figure 3.6: Fire and rescue operation dealing with a car fire in a single-bore tunnel after reversing

the direction of air flow

3.5 Fires in Railway Tunnels

Railway tunnels may be relatively long and large, in which respect they differ veryconsiderably from the normal fires tackled by fire services, occurring in apartments orhouses, and of which it is relatively easy to quickly to grasp a situation overview. However, inthe case of fires in tunnels, it is very difficult to get any impression at all of what is reallyhappening and why smoke is coming out of the tunnel. This difficulty creates majorcoordination problems for the operative management of the work at the site. The work isconsiderably complicated by the relatively large geographical areas and distances involved,as the Fire and Rescue services may need to attack the fire from several different pointsalong the tunnel. If such a large operation as this is to be successful, it is most important thatthe work has been properly planned and equally properly carried out. In turn, this requires

careful pre-planning of the work and facilities that would be needed in the real event.The information that the fire and rescue services need in order to deal with such a situation isas follows:

The length of the tunnel. The location of the train. The location of the fire on the train. The location of the passengers and crew. Whether there are any other trains in the tunnel and their location. The size of the fire and its growth rate. The air direction in the tunnel. The slope of the tunnel.

Air movement

Flkt

Air movement

Fan


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The location of access points to the tunnel - can the fire and rescue services find theirway to the site, to the tunnel openings and to access roads, and how will they knowwhere they are in the tunnel?

How will coordination be arranged between the various parties involved in any suchextensive rescue operation?

How well prepared are the fire and rescue services to use all the necessary equipment?This is a factor that is often forgotten. Local fire services, for example, often find it verydifficult to keep up to date with information on everything for which special knowledge isrequired.

One of those with whom the incident commander establishes contact is the tunnel operator,in the form of the operational company, in order to obtain information. Information must bepresented in such a way that it can be assessed and used by the rescue services'decision-makers working under stress at an accident site.

Movements of firefighters with breathing apparatus, and work carried out by them, can bevery difficult and slow in a smoke-filled area. Problems are likely to be encountered due to

the lack of visibility in the smoke and the limited working time available, as determined by theamount of air carried. This is further complicated by the fire itself and its directconsequences, in terms of high temperatures and possible thermal radiation from the fire andfire gases. In addition, the tunnel must be searched, looking for persons escaping from thefire, with the further burden of the heavy physical load of the necessary equipment and, lastbut not least, the pulling of fire hoses, which often have to be water-filled.

There is little knowledge of experience of putting out major fires in tunnels. Once a fire hasstarted in a carriage or locomotive, the work of putting it out will be very difficult due to thethermal radiation, the fire gases and the physical obstacles presented by the rail vehicles, allcombining to make it difficult to reach and extinguish the fire.

Monitoring and surveillance equipment, if it is available in a tunnel, can provide informationthat provides answers to the questions that the fire and rescue services will need to put inorder to decide how best to deal with the fire. This equipment might include detectors forCO, CO2and O2, air flow meters, television monitoring, hot bearing detectors, combinationsof temperature and smoke detectors and indicators for showing the positions of trains.

Locomotives and carriages, if they are fitted with such detectors, can provide early alarms tothe train crew, and to assist the fire and rescue services in assessing the size and extent ofthe fire.Sprinklers in locomotives and carriages can be one way to improve protection in trains.Early detection, in combination with an automatic fire-fighting system, would radicallyimprove the ability to tackle fires on trains. In addition, such a physical protection systemneeds to be complemented by training of the train crew in tackling fires effectively.

One of the important factors to be determined, whether in prior planning or at the time of theevent, is what means of evacuation there are in the tunnel. Is the tunnel designed, and/or ofsufficient size, for those involved in a fire to be able to get away from the fire, or is it theintention that they should be assisted by the fire services? Is evacuation possible throughemergency exits or only through the tunnel openings? Which of these strategies isreasonable, and what is the capacity of the local fire services in the event of an evacuation orlife-saving situation?

If there are emergency exits in the tunnel, it is important that they are so designed that they

will actually be used by those escaping from the fire. Considerable thought must be put intotheir design, so that they can be found in the circumstances of a situation in whichevacuation is necessary.


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In a tunnel where it is not possible to control the direction of air flow, it can be difficult todecide in which direction it is best to attempt to evacuate. In the worst case, the evacuationmay be directed by persons who, in their normal work, are not accustomed to dealing withcritical or uncommon accident situations. This can mean that their decisions may complicatean evacuation, depending on their ability and procedures for handling the situation.

In the situation of a fire in a train in a tunnel, it seems that basic human reactions drivepeople to escape from the fire, without thinking about the spread or direction of smoke. It isthe fire and its flames that drive evacuation more than the spread of smoke, which meansthat those escaping from the fire will leave in any direction available, regardless of the winddirection. As a result, some will go downwind, and have a long distance to go before theyreach safety outside the tunnel.

In order to reduce the time taken by evacuation, the train crew should be trained andrehearsed in dealing with passengers in accident situations. They should also have access totechnical equipment to assist the evacuation. The fire and rescue services should develop

methods of enabling firefighters wearing breathing apparatus to assist those escaping fromthe smoke. The fire and rescue services need to develop improved methods of assistingevacuation by driving the smoke away from those fleeing from the train, together withimproved methods of extinguishing the fire and thus eliminating the underlying threat. Asdescribed above, the work of assisting evacuation requires a good knowledge of conditionsin the tunnel, which needs to be available to the fire officer from the start and throughout therest of the work.

As it is very difficult to forecast the progress of a fire if it is not known how much is on fire,any risk assessment of a tunnel fire becomes very difficult. How can the risk of the fireoverwhelming the train, and developing very high temperatures, be assessed? It is difficult,too, to assess what will be the effect of flames and heat on the tunnel walls and roof, and

how they will be affected by the shock of extinguishing with cold water. The fire officer needsto constantly assess the risks, in order to reduce risks to those in the tunnel.

Additionally, all types of rescue work on or near rail tracks involve considerable risks withelectricity and other trains.

In order to be able correctly to assess the real-time risk situation while work is in progress,the incident commander must have a good knowledge of the performance capacity of hisservice in dealing with the particular type of situation. He should know clearly what theservice can do, and what it cannot do. With this knowledge, he knows the limitations of theframework within which he can act.

Those likely to be in charge of such situations need to carry out rehearsals of thiscomplicated risk assessment process in an accident situation. This training and rehearsalneed to be carried out with an eye to the various situations that the persons concerned maybe called upon to face.

The incident commander must be actively supported in order to enable him to assess the risksituation. This support can be in the form of various checklists or outline plans, which canprovide a better basis for tackling the work. There should be an active analysis of the risks towhich the personnel are exposed, with the results being used actively to reduce these risks.

It is equally important that the owner of the site or facilities should be aware of what the fireand rescue services can do, so that other parts of the safety system can be provided with thenecessary abilities and capacities.


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3.6 Fire and Rescue Operation Problems Encountered in Tunnel Fires

The rescue and fire services will be faced with several problems which must be consideredwhen tackling the fire. Some of these problems are described in more detail below.

A pic ture of the f ire scene

A first priority for the Fire and Rescue Service is to establish the conditions at the fire site.This is made difficult by lack of communication, possibly poor visibility and a potentiallyrapidly changing situation. There is therefore a considerable lack of information on what ishappening, which makes it difficult to decide what to do, resulting in time lost.

Design aspects can help to resolve these difficulties. Probably the most effective way is forthe tunnel-owner to install surveillance equipment and to ensure that there is goodcommunication with the Fire and Rescue Service. If there is no physical equipment toprovide the information, the Fire and Rescue Service will have to make inspection of the firesite a priority. This needs to be done quickly and effectively, and must provide an accurate

picture of conditions.

More investigation is needed of combinations of rapid methods, either using vehicles or onfoot, and with the assistance of aids such as IR cameras and illuminated tracking lines, laidby the fire-fighters, and without pulling fire hoses with them into the tunnel.

Controlling the air flow in the tunnel

Together with the tunnel operators, the firefighters need to know in what direction to drive thesmoke in order to facilitate evacuation, rescue and fire-fighting. Ventilation is likely to be theonly effective method of tackling serious tunnel fires, as mentioned in the typical proceduresoutlined above. It is important, therefore, to know the capabilities and operational methods ofthe ventilation systems employed in the specific tunnel and any limitaitons that the systemmay have.

Large and complicated objects

Tunnels can be large and extensive structures having long and complicated routes from safeenvironments, to the final point where rescue or fire-fighting is needed. Plans should bemade in order to find ways for the Fire and Rescue Services to make their way to a safeposition in the vicinity of the fire and to those requiring rescue. On the international plane,this has been resolved in a number of different ways in long single-bore tunnels, usingeverything from special rescue vehicles to special trainsets in the tunnel, and also with

special-purpose access tunnels in parallel with the main tunnels. This need not normally bea decisive problem in the case of twin-bore tunnels, as in most cases it is possible to providerelatively frequent connections between the two bores.

Tackling the smoke

Smoke-filled tunnels make it necessary to use breathing equipment when entering them.This severely limits the scope for action, as well as the distance that can be covered in thetunnel. Breathing apparatus is generally more suited to use in normal house fires. Suchequipment and methods have definite limitations when used in tunnel environments. Tests toinvestigate the effective working range of a firefighter wearing breathing apparatus in atunnel environment are as shown in the table below.


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Test conditions Movement speed(m/minute)

Maximum range (m)*

Smoke-filled tunnel, dry hose 4.3 58Non-smoke-filled tunnel, pulling awater-filled hose

18 243

Non-smoke-filled tunnel, no hose 80 1080Trials in an industrial environment inanother investigation

6 80

* Based on 2400 l of air, an air consumption of 62 l/min and ability to retreat

Table 3.2: Movement speed and range of breathing apparatus groups in tunnel environments [4]

Clearly, these limitations need to be considered when planning Fire and rescue Serviceinterventions.

Extinguishing the fire

Actually extinguishing the fire can be very difficult. It has been found that fires in trucks andbuses can be relatively extensive, reaching high temperatures and producing high levels ofradiation and dense smoke. If the tunnel is ventilated, the Fire and Rescue Service canprobably reach the seat of the fire without having to pass through excessive smoke or heat.Nevertheless, radiant heat at the site

FIT Annex4 Technical Report Part 3 Fire Response Management

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