Fissile Material Treaty Prospects and Challenges – Pakistan’s Perspective

Adil Sultan1Research Paper No.49

Fissile Material Treaty Prospects and Challenges – Pakistan’s Perspective January 2011

Proliferation is generally understood as a “shorthand for the spread of nuclear weapon –

a ownership beyond existing possessors2.” Most nonproliferation efforts traditionally have been led by major powers and are generally focused towards disarming the rest, while legitimizing their respective accretions. Central to the debate - the question as to why states proliferate has remained most important.

It is therefore important that the phenomenon of proliferation puzzle3 is best understood – if the success or failure of new non-proliferation initiatives is considered essential to deal with security challenges of the 21st century. A simplistic explanation of the proliferation puzzle could be that; “states will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means; if they do not face such threats, they will willingly remain non-nuclear states.”4 Security however, is not the only factor driving nuclear motivations. Other considerations such as prestige, domestic-politics, etc also contribute

towards states’ desire to acquire nuclear weapons, which according to Scott Sagan is termed as ‘multicausality’.5

Multicausality is in fact not a new phenomenon, but provides a simplistic understanding of why do states proliferate. For some security considerations could be the primary cause for developing nuclear weapons, such as Pakistan. For others prestige could be the overriding factor, but not necessarily the only nuclear driver. Other drivers such as security and domestic-politics would also impact the national decision-making process – whether to proliferate or not. This Sagan terms as ‘multi-causality’.

The debate on nuclear motivations is also useful to understand states’ behavior towards arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives. Like proliferation, the ‘unproliferation’6 priorities also vary for each individual state, thus making it extremely difficult to build universal consensus on various disarmament initiatives. The issue of Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) is one such example, which is being pursued

Fissile Material TreatyProspects and Challenges – Pakistan’s Perspective

ByAdil Sultan1

1. Adil Sultan is a PhD scholar at Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad. 2. Michael Quinlan, “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects”, (New York: Oxford

University Press, 2009), p.76. 3. The word puzzle has been used to connote variety of proliferation issues, involving both causes and effects.

See Ogilvie-White, “Is there a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of Contemporary Debate,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No.1 (Fall 1996), p.43.

4. Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb”, in Michael Brown, et al., (eds)., Going Nuclear:Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century (London: The MIT Press, 2010), p.3.

5. Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?, p.4.6. The term ‘unproliferation’ is synonym to disarmament and same processes are required for both, but Perkovich

has used this term for convenience and as an antonym for proliferation. For more details see, George Perkovich, “India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation”, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), p.7.

2Research Paper No.49 Adil Sultan


aggressively by some and opposed by others, for varied ‘securitization’7 priorities.

This article provides an overview of fissile material treaty; its origin and the reasons for impasse at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The paper discusses Pakistan’s approach towards major arms control and disarmament initiatives, including the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty [FM(C)T]; highlighting some of the recent developments that Pakistan believes have compounded its security dilemma. The allegation of moving on a fast-track nuclear development program has also been discussed, which according to Pakistani understanding is part of propaganda to discredit the country’s nuclear program. In the end the paper offers some suggestions, which may help concluding a fissile material treaty – only if the proponents of the treaty are genuinely interested.

Negotiating FM(C)T at the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

Geneva

President Eisenhower in his 1953 “Atoms for Peace” speech called for a ban on production of fissile material apparently to prevent ‘proliferation epidemic’8 or a ‘nuclear outbreak’.9 The idea however did not gain much credence

due to Cold War exigencies. There was also a sense of fear that the proposal, if implemented, could lead to perpetual asymmetries between those who had already crossed or were nearing weapons threshold, and others who were yet to understand the true potential of atomic power. The failure to reach an agreement led to the rapid increase in global fissile inventory with the nuclear weapon states (NWS)10 becoming the primary stock-holders of nuclear material. In addition there was no rapid progress on curtailing vertical proliferation.

The end of the Cold War shifted the security orientation of the leading NWS. Further increase in fissile stocks was no longer a desirable option. The US and Russia agreed to halt arms race and agreed to initiate START process in 1991. Limited progress was made towards any substantial reduction in nuclear armories. Focus mostly remained to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons, and limiting the potential of those who had already joined the nuclear club.

After almost four decades, since President Eisenhower first proposed a ban on fissile material production, the UN General Assembly in 1993 passed a Resolution 48/75L, entitled “Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear

7. Buzan & Waever have defined the term as “the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.” Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security”, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 491.

8. Mitchell B. Reiss, “The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices”, in Kurt M. Campbell, et.al. (eds). (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2005), p.4.

9. The initial efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation were mainly directed to limit the number of nuclear weapons countries rather than with an intent of giving up own nuclear capability.

10. According to Article 9 of the NPT, the NWS are those that conducted nuclear weapon test before 1st January 1967. All others would be considered non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), but this distinction is only applicable in the context of the NPT. For a complete text of the NPT, see http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull104/10403501117.pdf.



Explosive Devices.” The Resolution called for a “non-discriminatory multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”11

The following year Conference on Disarmament (CD) a sixty five member UN body decided to negotiate began discussing the basis for initiating negotiations on a fissile material treaty and the Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon was appointed as the Special Coordinator to discuss the modalities. However, differences over the scope of a prospective treaty soon became a polarizing issue between the CD members. Several countries supported banning only the future production of fissile stocks, i.e. a Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty [FM(C)T], which would essentially be a nonproliferation measure. Others, however argued for a comprehensive approach leading towards nuclear disarmament as per the agreed mandate of the CD, and demanded inclusion of existing stocks in the scope of the prospective Fissile Material Treaty (FMT).

After prolonged deliberations amongst the CD members, Ambassador Shannon formally presented CD Document 1299 (CD/1299) in 1995, also known as the Shannon Mandate. The Mandate called for establishing an Ad-Hoc Committee to ban production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and recommended negotiations for a “non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty.”12 Shannon

Mandate did not specifically address the issue of scope - but did provide the basis for the start of a meaningful discussion while taking into consideration interests of all stake holders.

The CD however, could not make any forward movement in the next one decade due to conflicting political and security priorities of major powers. The terrorist incidents of 9/11 led to significant shift in national security thinking of the major powers, especially the United States. Threat of nuclear terrorism became the core of US national security priorities. Preventing fissile material from falling into wrong hands became a global priority. For this purpose halting production and securing of existing fissile material inventories, assumed renewed importance at multilateral disarmament forums such as the Conference on Disarmament.

Despite this significant shift in global security perception, it took considerable time for the US to focus its efforts towards the issue of FM(C)T. No progress however, could be achieved towards building a consensus at the CD, mainly due to US preference for ‘unilateralism’ and its apparent abhorrence towards multilateral institutions. The US Administration under President Bush sought negotiations on a fissile material treaty but did not want it to be verified. This created discomfort amongst the other CD members. It was only once President Obama assumed power that the US dropped its objections to the issue of verification and started pursuing the FM(C)T vigorously.

11. Text available at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r075.htm>12. Text available at <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/shannon.html>



Revitalizing the Work of CD

To revitalize the work of the CD and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations, the UN Secretary General convened a High Level Meeting on 24th September 2010. The meeting mainly focused on the issue of FM(C)T, and neglected other core issues that are lying dormant on CD’s agenda, which made apparent the real intent behind the High Level Meeting was to revitalize the process of FM(C)T alone, and not of the CD.13

To break the current impasse at the CD, some of the participants at the meeting suggested exploring alternate means to start negotiations on a FM(C)T. Some of the proposals included; negotiating FM(C)T outside the CD, such as the UNSC etc; holding parallel discussions outside the CD to iron out key differences; re-interpreting the rules and procedures, especially the ‘consensus rule’ for decision-making at the CD.

These proposals are being seen by majority countries as a threat to the CD, which is the only independent, multilateral and non-discriminatory disarmament negotiating forum. Most countries seem weary of such ideas, as it could undermine the working of the CD, and set a wrong precedent for negotiating other issues on the CD agenda.

More recently, the UN Secretary General, in order to follow-up on his previous effort, once again addressed the CD members on 26th Jan 2011, and urged

the member states to commence early negotiations on FM(C)T. In his speech, the Secretary General also cautioned member states that “the membership of the Conference on Disarmament is a privilege. So is the consensus rule. …members of the Conference must accept that this privilege comes with responsibility.” In an unusual remarks he stated “just one or two countries must not be able to block the process indefinitely”, and that “we must not risk pushing States to resort to alternative arrangements outside the Conference on Disarmament”14 The Secretary General’s warnings and efforts to directly influence the work of the CD could set a wrong precedent and would undermine the credibility of the CD as an independent disarmament negotiating forum.

The Current Impasse

In the last fifteen years no progress could be made on any of the core agenda items of the CD, including; Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security Assurances (NSAs), Prevention of an Arms Race in the Outer Space (PAROS), and the Fissile Material Treaty. There seems to be a growing frustration amongst the member states over this persistent deadlock, which is primarily a result of shifting national priorities of major stakeholders and the complex inter-linkages of various items on the CD’s agenda.

The Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) that are members of the CD, want negotiations on Nuclear Disarmament and

13. Secretary General’s Closing Statement to High-Level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations. Text available on <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=4808>

14. UN Secretary General’s Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament, 26 January 2011.



NSAs to commence alongside the FMCT. Whereas, Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) are only willing to discuss the issue of FMCT - with little consideration for security interests of other stakeholders. Some countries like Russia and China in the recent past had offered conditional support to a fissile treaty, as a quid pro quo for starting parallel discussions on the issue of PAROS, but the CD could not make progress on any of the four core issues.

Faced with this deadlock, some of the Western countries led by the US have suggested changing the CD rules and procedures, especially the ‘consensus’ rule. The problem with the current stalemate, in fact is not with the rules and procedures, but is more of a political nature that stems mainly from the policies of ‘selectivity’ and ‘exceptionalism’ being followed by few countries. The CD did not come into existence to negotiate only the issue of FMCT. Other core agenda items are equally, or may be of greater significance for countries that are not involved in the nuclear business, but constitute majority at the CD.

Explaining the current impasse at the CD, Pakistan’s Ambassador at the CD in his statement of 31 August 2010, highlighted three main factors. First, “the noble words that have been uttered at the highest levels about arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament have not been translated into deeds”, which compelled countries to tread more cautiously, thus precluding the possibility of developing a consensus on nuclear disarmament. Second, “the pursuit of

discriminatory policies by some states in the field of nuclear collaboration… to the detriment of the security interests of affected states.” And finally, the refusal of some states to recognize the reality that arms control and disarmament measures can only be concluded “on the basis of the principle of undiminished and equally security for all.”15

Hold-Out States

The CD could not make any progress on the issue of FMCT that is on its agenda for the last over 15 years. The recent momentum is however due to changed US priorities after Obama Administration took over in 2009. Despite renewed efforts by the US, no progress has been made so far as several countries have stakes in the outcome of the FMCT. The history of the CD indicates that several countries have been impeding the start of FMCT negotiations in the past for various reasons.

United States. The US, which is spearheading the recent offensive in support of FMCT - to supplement Obama’s nonproliferation goals, has mostly been inconsistent in its own position over the last many years. In 2002, the US Administration under President Bush put a halt to the CD proceedings by ordering a review of its national strategy, which continued for two years and no progress could be made. After this ‘time-out’ and once the review was completed, the US declared that since fissile material treaty could not be effectively verified, therefore, it cannot agree to FMCT negotiations under the Shannon Mandate.16 As a follow-up, the US forwarded a proposal (CD/1777) that

15. Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the CD, 31 August 2010, pp.1-2.16. UNIDIR, Fissile Material Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, 2009, p.7 <www.UNIDIR.org>



excluded verification clause thus negating the consensus reached under the Shannon Mandate. This practically dashed all hopes for a meaningful outcome from the CD on fissile material negotiations.

In his Prague speech of April 5, 2009, President Obama declared that in order “to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons.”17 This gave a renewed political momentum to US led nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. While US was ready to negotiate a new treaty, it ruled out any possibility of accepting inclusion of existing stocks in the scope of a future treaty. This could perpetuate the division between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ and remains unacceptable for several countries who would like FMCT to be negotiated as a disarmament measure.

Despite this apparent urgency by the US to start negotiations, it remains to be seen, how far the US would go in pursuing its FMCT objective, especially once interests of its major ally Israel and the new strategic partner India, may not necessarily be in synch with that of the US.

India. The issue of FMCT is of significant importance for India - not necessarily from security point of view, but mainly to reap benefits of India-US nuclear cooperation agreement. The Indian position has found respite in the deadlock by taking a position behind Pakistan. On several occasions, it has also

used the opportunity to discredit leading opponents of FMCT, such as Pakistan, for its own political advantage. According to Bharat Karnad, a well respected Indian scholar, while Pakistan is stalling FMCT negotiations at the CD;

Instead of quietly encouraging this – as any delays afford India the time to augment fissile material stockpile – the Manmohan Singh government has chosen to join the West in dumping on Islamabad.18

Karnad’s criticism seems rational from a realist perspective. The India-US nuclear deal that allows India to maintain eight of its nuclear facilities outside the safeguard provides significant advantage for India to build its fissile stocks for military purposes. If the FMCT is concluded earlier, these facilities would have to be put under safeguards thus negating the basic premise of the nuclear separation plan, for which India negotiated extremely hard and eventually succeeded even at the risk of India-US nuclear deal. It would therefore be unrealistic to expect that India would ever give up its hard won ‘exception’ and agree to a fissile material cut-off treaty in the foreseeable future.

Notwithstanding the military advantage that India is likely to gain from the India-US nuclear agreement, according to the 18 July 2005 India-US Joint Statement, India is morally bound to work with the United States “for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.”19 The question here is what kind of a cut-off treaty? The nuclear deal and subsequent waiver

17. Speech by President Obama at Prague, 5 April 2009.< http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague> accessed on 01 Aug 10

18. Bharat Karnad, “Nuclear Morality”, Deccan Chronicle, 20 Jan 2011, available at <http://www.deccanchronicle.com>19. Text of the India-US Joint Statement 18 July 2005. Available at <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/nic/indousjoint.htm>



granted by the NSG has made FMCT negotiations, less likely.20 This was also reflected in India’s national statement, once the CD agreed to a PoW in 2009, and the Indian Ambassador had to come out in the open and explicitly state his country’s reservations in the following words:

We will not accept obligations not in keeping with or prejudicial to our national security interests or which hinder our strategic program, our R&D as well as three-stage nuclear program. The treaty should not place an undue burden on military non-proscribed activities.21

Subsequently, in another statement of August 2009, the Indian Ambassador further made it clear that:

The future treaty would have to meet India’s national security interests. India is a nuclear weapon state and a responsible member of the international community and would approach these negotiations as such.22

Israel. Unlike India and Pakistan, Israel prefers to maintain its posture of ‘nuclear ambiguity’ by neither denying nor declaring its nuclear weapons status, but is believed to be increasing its stockpiles for weapons.23 While Israel would continue to hold its existing stocks even if FMCT is concluded, but a verifiable treaty could require Israel to open its facilities for inspections. This may not be in its own interest as it would end its ‘nuclear ambiguity’ and could carry serious political implications, at the

regional as well as global level, both for Israel as well its major ally - the United States. It is therefore not certain, how the US would continue to play the guarantor of Israel’s ‘nuclear opacity’, while demanding others to verify that no more fissile material is being produced in any of their nuclear facilities.

Israel may also not like to close its options for the uncertain future, where several regional countries could well be on the course towards nuclear weapons. Israel’s abstention at the previous First Committee Resolution on FMCT was a significant signal that it would not be interested in negotiating FMCT in the CD or at any other forum.

Iran. Iran could be other problematic cases that may create impediments in the final conclusion of a verifiable treaty. Iran has publicly refuted the allegations that it is pursuing a nuclear weapons program and is building fissile stocks. While there may not be any credible evidence that could possibly substantiate Iran’s weapons ambition, but under the current circumstances, Iran may avoid any treaty bound obligations that could limit its future options.

Iran has also been voicing its concerns over discriminatory treatment. On one hand Iran is being asked to accept added obligations to indicate its commitment towards nonproliferation, while on the other hand, countries like India that never accepted any nonproliferation, are being facilitated in civil nuclear pursuits. Such discrimination

20. George Perkovich, The US-India Nuclear Deal, Paper Commissioned by International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. Available at <http://www.icnnd.org/research/US_India_Nuclear_Deal.pdf>21 Statement by India in CD Plenary after the adoption of PoW, 29 May 2009. 22. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/politicla/cd/2010/statements/part3/17August_India.pdf23 Global Fissile Material Report 2010, Fifth Annual Report of the International Panel of Fissile Material (IPFM), p.9



based on political interests could possibly encourage several emerging nuclear states with peaceful nuclear programs – to oppose a fissile material treaty that mainly widens the gulf between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have not’.

Pakistan. Pakistan has been facing the brunt of Western criticism for blocking negotiations on the issue of FMCT. It has also been accused of keeping the CD hostage by blocking negotiations on FMCT by using the principle of ‘consensus’. In fact Pakistan is the only country that has been consistent in its position over the last many years. Since the adoption of Shannon Mandate, Pakistan has actively participated and supported discussions at the CD, and has voiced reservations mainly on the scope of the proposed treaty. For Pakistan, a treaty that does not take into account existing fissile stocks would essentially perpetuate the asymmetries and thus remains unacceptable. This position emanates mainly from its India-specific threat perception. In addition, Pakistan has stated that only ‘cut-off’, would mainly be a nonproliferation initiative and not a disarmament measure, and is therefore against the spirit of CD’s objectives.

As long as differences on the scope of a proposed treaty are not resolved, Pakistan has suggested start of discussions on other core issues that are on CD’s agenda, without keeping the CD hostage to the issue of FMCT. The Conference on Disarmament has a broad

agenda and a comprehensive purpose. Indeed, the raison d’etre of the CD is to negotiate comprehensive nuclear disarmament, and not only to focus on a fissile material treaty. However, the US along with few other Western powers continues to view Pakistan’s position as a ploy to delay the FMCT negotiations.

In its bid to increase pressure on Pakistan, US Special Assistant to President Obama, during a High Level Meeting convened by the UN Secretary General on 24th September 2010, accused Pakistan for CD’s failure, and stated that it is; “unwarranted for a single country to abuse the consensus principle and thereby frustrate everyone else’s desire to resume serious disarmament efforts.”24 Pakistan has forcefully rebutted these charges and has made it clear through its Ambassador at the CD that “we are ready to stand in splendid isolation if we have to,”25 In another statement, Pakistan’s Ambassador said that while Pakistan has clearly stated its reservations on FMCT, likewise, “those who oppose negotiations on the other three core issues should also state their position with equal clarity or allow progress to be made on these issues.”26

Other Prospective Beneficiaries. There are several states that have serious reservations on the CD’s Program of Work (PoW). The G-2127 including, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Sri Lanka, Syria, etc., support Pakistan in arguing for a more balanced PoW, highlighting the necessity for discussions on nuclear disarmament.

24. Remarks by Mr Gary Samore, Special Assistant to the President Obama at the UN High Level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament. Text available at <http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/147931.htm>

25. Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the CD Geneva, 18 February 2010. 26. Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the CD Geneva, 25 January 2011.27. Group of 21 mainly includes members of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM)



Likewise, China does not support focus only on the FMCT. There is yet another set of states that do not consider fissile treaty to be in their interest, but have preferred to remain silent by taking advantage by the current stalemate at the CD.

In order to cater for an uncertain nuclear future, several ‘nuclear aspirants’ therefore would want to have their own enrichment and reprocessing technologies, and stay clear of any additional obligations under the FMCT. The most significant lesson learnt after the India-US nuclear cooperation agreement is that nuclear cooperation would mainly be guided by commercial and political interests of major powers, and not necessarily by the principles agreed under various nonproliferation instruments.

Leading nuclear suppliers have significantly lowered the bar for nuclear cooperation by offering unprecedented concessions to the new entrants in the nuclear field. The gold standards established for countries like UAE may no longer be applicable for other nuclear aspirants such as Vietnam, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia etc. In its bid to contain China, the US has already commenced negotiations with Vietnam for transfer of technology “that would allow Hanoi to enrich its own uranium.”28

The domino effect generated by the India-US nuclear deal could eventually lead to more number of countries with their own enrichment and reprocessing technologies. In fact enrichment technology may be the new status symbol for countries aspiring

to acquire nuclear weapons capability, or be seen as technologically advanced countries - without technically crossing the nuclear threshold. In conclusion, the increase in nuclear proliferation, and with more countries in possession of enrichment know-how, would make it further difficult to develop a consensus on a prospective fissile material treaty.

Pakistan’s Approach towards Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament

Pakistan was a reluctant entrant into the nuclear field. To avoid engaging itself into a costly nuclear competition, it sought security assurances from allies and simultaneously embarked upon ‘assertive non-proliferation diplomacy’.29 Once Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was being negotiated, Pakistan like India, supported the NPT primarily to keep the region free from nuclear weapons. In a statement at the UN General Assembly, President Ayub stated:

This imminent peril [of the spread of nuclear weapons] demands that the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the conclusion of a treaty to outlaw the further spread of nuclear weapons and the knowledge of their manufacture, whether by acquisition from the present nuclear powers or by any other means.30

Likewise, once Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was being concluded in 1963, Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave Pakistan’s position in the following words:

28. Jay Solomon, “U.S., Hanoi in Nuclear Talks”, The Wall Street Journal, 3rd August ,2010.29. Bhumitra Chakma, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons”, (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 14.30. “Address by Mr Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan”, 26 Sep 1962, in General Assembly Official

Records, 17th Session, 1133rd Plenary Meeting, 26th September 1962, p.150.



as a measure of disarmament, the test-ban treaty is important more for it promises than for what it has achieved. …the prohibition of testing would be followed soon by agreements to cease underground tests also and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.31

The stance taken by the Pakistani Government at the General Assembly was intended to prevent India from embarking upon nuclear weapons path, and was a result of its Indo-specific threat perception. In Pakistan’s view acquisition of NWs by India would have permanently shifted the regional balance of power, which was not acceptable to it. Pakistan favored NPT but also advocated for security assurances for Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) against the nuclear attack from Nuclear Weapons State (NWS). Failure to receive such assurances discouraged Pakistan to sign the NPT, as by signing the NPT without security guarantees would have made Pakistan essentially an ‘orphan’ state. According to Michael Mandelbaum, “insecure states that lack firm security commitments from allies and fear for their survival are essentially ‘orphans’ in a nuclear armed world.”32

India on the other hand had a different approach towards the issue and maintained that any nonproliferation obligations that

could create permanent divisions between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have not’ would remain unacceptable to it. However, once the major powers ceded to a demand of the less privileged countries, led mainly by India, in the form of a ‘grand bargain’33, India refused to sign the NPT by terming it as ‘nuclear apartheid’. Pakistan, with its India-specific threat perception followed the Indian suit and decided to retain the ‘option policy’,34 for a “just in case” contingency, which Ariel Levite terms as “nuclear hedging.”35

To avoid being forced into nuclear competition with India and to keep the region free from nuclear weapons, Pakistan offered several proposals in the past. In 1974, Pakistan submitted a proposal to UN general Assembly to declare South Asia as nuclear weapons free zone.36 In 1978, Pakistan proposed for a joint declaration for renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, and mutual inspection of each other’s nuclear facilities. In 1979, it offered simultaneous acceptance of NPT or full-scope IAEA safeguards; and in 1987, a bilateral or regional Nuclear Test ban Treaty was also offered to India. The proposal for a South Asia Zero Missile Zone was shared with India in 1994, which was followed by a non-aggression pact in 1997. In October 1998, Pakistan

31. General Assembly Official Records, 18th Session, 1220th Plenary Meeting, 30 September 1963, p.132. Michael Mandelbaum in Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Proliferation Motivations: Lessons from Pakistan”, The

Nonproliferation Review, Vovember 2006, Volume 13, Number 3, p.502. 33. NPT is seen as a grand bargain between NWS and NNWS. This arrangement was reached only after stiff

opposition by NNWS, including countries like India to not to cede unilateral concessions to NWS. Once this major demand by the NNWS was met, India backed out and refused to sign the NPT, terming it as nuclear apartheid.

34. This term has been repeatedly used by Chakma to explain that while Pakistan was a reluctant entrant in South Asian nuclear competition but at the same time it took a conscious decision to keep its option of developing nuclear weapons in the future, if and when India manages to build a nuclear weapon. See Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, p. 13.

35. Ariel Levite in Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Proliferation Motivations: Lessons from Pakistan”, The Nonproliferation Review, Vovember 2006, Volume 13, Number 3, p.503.

36. Chakma, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons”, p. 23.



also offered to India the Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR), which consisted of conflict resolution, establishing missile and nuclear restraint regime, and bringing conventional balance in the region.37

In 1992, Pakistan also proposed a P-5 Conference to discuss ways and means to establish a non-discriminatory and equitable nuclear-weapon free regime in South Asia. In its final bid to prevent South Asia from moving towards the overt nuclearization the international community was forewarned about impending Indian nuclear tests. Pakistan’s warnings however, went unheeded, and India tested five of its nuclear devices between May 11 and 13, 1998. This fundamentally altered Pakistan’s security perception, and its approach towards various arms control and disarmament issues.

As a result of South Asian nuclearization the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1172, encouraging all states to prevent export of sensitive materials that could assist nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs of both India and Pakistan with an objective to strengthen international nonproliferation regime.38

Additionally, the P-5 countries in their Joint Communiqué of June 5, 1998 pledged “to cooperate closely in urgent efforts to prevent a nuclear and missile arms race in the Subcontinent and to bolster the non-proliferation regime.” The Communiqué committed the P-5 “to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in anyway assist programs for

nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons.”39

Despite UNSC Resolution and the commitment made by the P-5 through its 5 June 1998 Communiqué, India has been granted exceptional waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), paving the way for major nuclear suppliers, mainly the P-5 countries to enter into nuclear cooperation agreement without any seeking nonproliferation commitments from India. On the contrary, Pakistan continues to face nuclear opprobrium for its attempt to restore regional strategic balance that was essentially disturbed by India in 1998. These double standards have made Pakistan extremely sensitive on issues, such as the FMCT that could have consequences for its national security interests.

Fissile Material Treaty and Pakistan

Pakistan’s Indo-specific threat perception based on long history of mutual suspicion due to outstanding disputes makes it extremely difficult to de-hyphenate India-Pakistan security equation. Pakistan’s ‘securitization’ priorities are guided mainly by the developments at the regional level. Therefore, while Pakistan has mostly remained supportive of various international arms control and disarmament initiatives, but has remained unyielding on issues those are perceived as threatening its core security interests.

Pakistan’s uneasiness with the CD process focusing primarily on the FMCT could be attributed to recent developments

37. Naeem Salik, “The Genesis of South Asian Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective”, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.249.

38. Text available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement39. Text available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/6/605.html#3



that from Pakistan’s perspective are threatening for the regional security environment. Efforts by the US and other major powers to help India build its military prowess and emerge as a ‘global’ power, has only deepened Pakistan’s anxiety, thus forcing it to tread cautiously on arms control related issues such as the FMCT.

Since the start of the process to negotiate a fissile material treaty under the Shannon Mandate, Pakistan has remained supportive with a proviso that any arrangement negotiated, must take into account the issue of existing stocks. This position, according to Pakistan, also reflects the consensus reached at the First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I) that the fissile material treaty should be a nuclear disarmament measure, and not merely a nonproliferation initiative. Exclusion of existing stocks from the scope of a fissile treaty, from a Pakistani perspective, would only perpetuate existing asymmetries in the South Asian context, and thus remains unacceptable for Pakistan.

Immediately after the 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan outlined its preconditions in a statement made at the CD by Ambassador Munir Akram, once he said; Pakistan would not agree to:

the treaty being described as a Fissile Material ‘Cut-off’ Treaty, implying only a halt in future production. We cannot

endorse the loose abbreviation – FMCT – in any formal description of the treaty which is to be negotiated by the CD.40

Pakistan fears were rooted in Indian advantage of a head start in the nuclear weapons program, as India’s weapons program has long remained embedded in its civilian nuclear program, but without making it too visible and without a formal acknowledgement. According to Zafar Cheema, the Indian nuclear weapons program was:

designed to remain secret until complete self-sufficiency was achieved and political circumstances demanded making it visible. Technologically, it continued to promote nuclear weapons option based upon the dual-use infrastructure. Politically, India maintained a policy of not making nuclear weapons…41

India may not have achieved complete self-sufficiency, but the India-US nuclear agreement and ensuing India-specific Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)42 exemption for India would allow it to make significant progress towards improving its weapons stocks. India has been provided unprecedented assurances for fuel supplies in perpetuity, for its civilian power plants. This would allow India to divert indigenous uranium reserves purely for weapons program, thus facilitating significant build up in India’s military nuclear potential.43

40. “Fissile Material Treaty”, Statement from Munir Akram, Ambassador of Pakistan, August 11, 1998. Quoted in Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Future of FMCT: assessing the prospects and constraints”, ISSI, p.56. Available on <www.issi.org.pk/ss_Detail.php?dataId=518>

41. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security”, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.64.

42. The NSG is an informal arrangement of 46 member countries that regulate nuclear commerce as per the guidelines mutually agreed amongst themselves, and by consensus.

43. Adil Sultan, “Regional Implications of India-US Nuclear Deal” Stimson Center, 12 July 2006. Text available at <http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/regional-implications-of-the-us-india-nuclear-deal>



Impact of India-US Nuclear Agreement. The India-US nuclear agreement is the most significant event that could have serious implications for South Asian regional strategic balance as well as for the global nonproliferation regime. The nuclear deal would allow India access to civil nuclear technology without taking upon itself any of the nonproliferation obligations. By according such exceptionalism to a country that tested nuclear weapons but refused to sign the NPT, the US has not only undermined its own credentials as a serious proponent of arms control initiatives such as the FMCT, but has also encouraged several NPT states to re-evaluate their commitment to the NPT principles, which are increasingly being applied selectively. According to Sharon Squassoni:

The Bush administration justified its actions [India-US nuclear deal] by declaring that India would be brought into the “mainstream” of nonproliferation. …Rather than India moving into the mainstream, the mainstream has moved to it.44

Under the July 18, 2005 India-US Joint Statement, India is morally bound to work with “the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty.”45 However, this does not put any legal obligation, and therefore may not constrain India’s fissile material production.

According to some experts, the India-US nuclear deal also contradicts NWS

obligations under Article 1 of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which states:

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.46

US Administration however does not agree to this point of view, and has rejected the charge that the nuclear deal in any way could assist India’s military nuclear program. This interpretation by the US Administration however, could be self-serving piffle, guided mainly by political and commercial interests.

After Obama Administration took over there appeared some hope that the US will try to reverse the damage done to the nonproliferation regime by the previous Bush Administration. Such hopes were not ill-founded as several past critiques of the nuclear deal were now part of the Obama Administration and in a position to demand nonproliferation commitments from India to lessen the negative impact of the nuclear deal. For example, Ms Ellen Tauscher, the US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security before joining Obama’s Administration,

44. Sharon Squassoni, “The U.S.-Indian Deal and Its Impact”, Arms Control Association, July/August 2010. Available at <http:www.armscontrol.org>

45. Test of India-US Joint Statement of 18 July 2005. 46. Text of the NPT available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull104/10403501117.

pdf.



in her New York Times op-ed wrote; if NSG supported the nuclear cooperation, “the Non Proliferation Treaty would be shredded.”47

She had also recommended that the deal must only be offered if the recipient country agrees to two prior conditions, i.e. signing of the Comprehensive Test ban Treaty (CTBT) and agreeing to halt production of nuclear material for weapons. However, after becoming part of the Administration responsible for nonproliferation related issues – she no longer considers the nuclear agreement a threat to the NPT, and therefore made no attempt to undo or limit the damage caused by the India-US nuclear deal. She has also not asked India to demonstrate serious resolve towards the issue of FMCT by declaring a moratorium on fissile material production.

The nuclear deal also contradicts the understanding given in the P-5 Communiqué of June 5, 1998, in which the NWS committed not to assist India and Pakistan in their weapons pursuit. Notwithstanding their commitments, four of the P-5 countries have already signed nuclear cooperation agreements with India, without seeking any reciprocal commitments from India that could further the goal of nuclear nonproliferation.

Another significant concession that has been accorded to India under the civil nuclear cooperation agreement is the right to reprocess US supplied fuel within India. US will also assist India build two dedicated reprocessing facilities for the

purpose. Such concessions in the past were not even available to closest US allies in the past except Japan and Euratom, and therefore reduces incentive for India to work towards nonproliferation goals such as conclusion of FMCT. India has also been assured of fuel supply for its civilian nuclear facilities, in perpetuity. This would add to India’s comfort in accelerating its military nuclear development, and provides cushion for “India to devote more of its limited domestic uranium supply to building up its nuclear arsenal.”48

India’s Inclusion into NSG. Consequent to the nuclear agreement, the US also facilitated country-specific NSG exemption for India, thus allowing it to enter into nuclear cooperation with other members of the NSG, without India accepting NPT related obligations. Such ‘exceptionalism’ not only accords India, the status of a de-jure nuclear weapon state, but offers unprecedented concessions that may not be even available for the NWS that are signatories to the NPT.

The NSG takes it decisions by consensus and none of the NSG member objected to the India-US nuclear deal, which paved the way for India to ink nuclear pacts with several major nuclear suppliers. Interestingly, country like Japan that had been championing the cause of nonproliferation for so long and had opposed nuclear cooperation with a Non-NPT country like India - has finally decided to abandon its nonproliferation principles, mainly for commercial incentives associated with the $150 billion emerging Indian nuclear market.49

47. Edward J. Markey and Ellen O. Taucher, “Don’t Loosen Nuclear Rules for India”, New York Times, 20 August 2008.48. Eric Auner, “Pakistan Raises New Issues at Stalled CD,” Arms Control Today, March 2010 49. Shamshad A. Khan, “Towards Indo-Japan nuclear agreement: Prospects and Challenges”, Institute for Defense

Studies and Analyses (IDSA), 24 August 2010.



The NSG was created following India’s nuclear test of 1974, which highlighted that the nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused. In order to preclude any such possibility in the future, NSG Guidelines were published in 1978, to ensure that nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities. The US not only ensured an NSG exemption for India, but has recently supported India’s inclusion into NSG and other technology control regimes. In a Joint Statement on 8 November 2010, President Obama stated that:

the United States intends to support India’s full membership in the four multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement) in a phased manner,…50

India’s possible inclusion into technology control regimes such as the NSG, the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime), Australia Group and the Waasenaar Arrangement - could have significant bearing on Pakistan’s threat perception. Following this new development, Pakistan’s NCA expressed serious concern over policies and trends of ‘selectivity’, ‘exceptionalism’ and discrimination relating to strategic export control regimes, The NCA further stated:

Such policies, detrimental as they are to international peace and security, undermine the credibility of the existing non-proliferation regime and are inconsistent with the national laws and international

obligations. Revisionism based on strategic, political or commercial considerations accentuates asymmetries and would perpetuate instability, especially in South Asia.51

These concerns may not be unfounded. If India becomes a member of the NSG - a group of technology advanced countries which owes its very existence to India’s nuclear test of 1974, Pakistan fears that India could possibly ‘misuse’ the principle of consensus to block its on membership case in the future. On the technical side, access to NSG would allow India to build its conventional and nuclear military capabilities.

This may have accentuated Pakistan’s security concerns as was reflected in a statement issued by Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) after its meeting held on 13th December 2010, wherein it was emphasized that the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives in South cannot be delinked with regional security dynamics. The NCA statement made it clear that;

Pakistan’s position will be determined by its national security interests and the objectives of strategic stability in South Asia. Selective and discriminatory measures that perpetuate regional instability, in any form and manner, derogate from the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and, therefore, cannot be accepted or endorsed. Pakistan will not support any approach or measure that is prejudicial to its legitimate national security interests.52

50. Indo-US Joint Statement, 8 November 2010. Text available at < http://roydendsouza.wordpress.com/2010/11/08/indo-us-joint-statement-nov-8-2010/>

51. The NCA Statement 14 December 2010. Available at < http://ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2010/12/14>

52. Statement by Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) of 13th Jan, 2010. Available at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2010/1/13, accessed on 3rd August 2010.



Is Pakistan on an Accelerated Nuclear Development Program? On several occasions, Pakistani policy makers have reiterated that though Pakistan does not want to compete with India in the nuclear field, but at the same time cannot remain oblivious to the disturbing developments across its Eastern border. Some of these developments that may have influenced Pakistan’s strategic thinking over the last few years are:-

- India – US civil nuclear cooperation agreement, which Pakistan believes - could allow India to make qualitative and quantitative improvement in its fissile material stocks.

- India’s desire to acquire anti ballistic missile system, which could erode the credibility of existing deterrence posture.

- India’s doctrines of ‘Cold Start’ and ‘Pro Active Operations’ apparently aimed at launching limited conventional military operations to achieve political objectives, while remaining below the nuclear threshold – are considered dangerous from the Pakistani perspective. It could possibly impact on Pakistan’s nuclear posture.

- Growing conventional military imbalance due to massive increase in Indian defense budget over the last few years has added to Pakistan’s concerns.

- India’s bid to acquire/ develop sea-

launched second strike nuclear capability is seen as another destabilizing factor from the Pakistani perspective.

According to some of the nonproliferation advocates, Pakistan’s perceptions about the India-US nuclear deal appear to have degraded Islamabad’s willingness to engage in key nonproliferation and disarmament talks. The nuclear deal and other related developments that could increase conventional and nuclear asymmetries between India and Pakistan, “seems to have accelerated Pakistan’s unsafeguarded uranium – and plutonium – production capability.”53 According to a more recent Washington Post report, Pakistan has doubled its stockpile over the past several years.54

However, senior officials responsible for Pakistan’s nuclear management have repeatedly stated that Pakistan has no intent of competing with India in the nuclear arms race. The reported nuclear related developments are only aimed to ensure that the credibility of minimum deterrence posture is not compromised.

According to Lt Gen (Retd) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, Director General Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Pakistan’s requirements for the foreseeable future have been clearly identified and its weapons program is progressing satisfactorily, to meet the desired objectives, without entering into arms race with any other country of the region. He further stated that:

53. Sharon Squassoni, “The U.S.-Indian Deal and Its Impact”, Arms Control Association, July/August 2010. Available at <http:www.armscontrol.org>

54. Karen De Young, “New Estimates Put Pakistan’s Nucler Arsenal at More Than 100”, The Washington Post, January 30th, 2011. Available at <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/



the new facilities that Pakistan is consistently being accused of constructing, are in fact not new, but were conceptualized well before the India-US nuclear deal or even the recent military developments across Pakistan’s Eastern border.

While discarding the allegations of Pakistan moving on a faster pace, Gen Kidwai added:

such concerns are ill founded and sometimes deliberate to discredit Pakistan and to divert the focus from Indian nuclear weapons program, which has been put on a fast track through the India-US nuclear deal, and subsequent nuclear agreements with several other nuclear suppliers.55

Can FMCT be Negotiated?

The dilemma at the CD is whether to continue keeping the CD hostage to the issue of FMCT or make a forward movement by discussing other core agenda items that may be ripe for negotiations. There could be several possibilities to unlock the prevalent deadlock, and to prevent the CD from becoming paralyzed.

First, the CD members may agree to discuss FMT that also caters for the existing stocks. This would make a fissile material treaty a disarmament measure, which would be in-line with the genesis and functioning of the CD. If nuclear terrorism is the driving motivation for a FMCT - banning only the future production may not be sufficient to achieve the desired objectives. Existing stocks are equally vulnerable to terrorists seeking sensitive nuclear material. It is therefore essential that a fissile treaty must not only focus on banning the future

production - but must also take into account the existing stocks.

The second option could be that the CD members could agree to discuss other agenda items that are ripe for discussions and are relatively less controversial. In the meanwhile, efforts could be made to build consensus and resolve outstanding issues impeding progress on the FMT.

Third – some of the CD members have also suggested taking the issue to other forums such as the UN Security Council. Theoretically it may be possible but in practice it could force several stake holders to oppose the move for their own interests. This would undermine CD’s credibility as the sole negotiating forum for all disarmament related issues and could possibly lead to its untimely death, without achieving the desired objectives.

Pakistan has always stated that it remains firmly committed to the CD as the sole disarmament negotiating body, and therefore “will not be able to join any endeavor to negotiate a FMCT outside the CD.”56 However, those willing to negotiate FMCT outside the CD forum may still do so. Countries with reservations could stay out of such an arrangement as non-FMCT countries, like the non-NPT countries. The only advantage to this kind of partial arrangement would be to bring large group of states, especially the new nuclear states under treaty bound obligation. Later, once the security concerns of rest of the members are addressed, the treaty could possibly be universalized.

There are other less significant proposals being floated by countries for whom FMCT is essentially cost-free.

55. Discussion with Lt Gen Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, DG SPD on 24th September 2010.56. Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, 31 August 2010, p.6.



Some of these include; creation of a separate body to negotiate the FMCT; discussions amongst P-5+3 countries; and the suggestion to change consensus rule or re-defining ‘consensus’ for the purpose of CD, i.e. ‘agreement by the majority’ instead of ‘agreement by all’.

Conclusion

The major issue with the fissile material related discussions at the CD is that the US and other major proponents view the issue from a global security perspective, and overlook the regional dimension of ‘securitization’, which directly impinge upon national security interests of countries like Pakistan. This divergence in approach may

not be helpful for the bilateral relationship of the two key allies, and would not help break the deadlock at the CD.

If the US and other states are really interested in concluding a fissile material treaty, it should have no major reservations on including the existing stocks in the scope of a prospective treaty. Modalities of an acceptable verification mechanism for existing stocks could always be worked out with consensus, and should not be a major stumbling issue. Else, the issue could remain on the hold with more number of countries getting access to the enrichment technology, thus making it increasingly difficult to build a consensus on a fissile material treaty.

Fissile Material Treaty Prospects and Challenges – Pakistan’s Perspective

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