First PCC Congress and the Socialist Constitutionshodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/14948/8/08_chapter 3.pdf · The congress also elected the party's leadership--Fidel Castro

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CHAPTER III

First PCC Congress and the Socialist Constitution

The preceding Chapter attempted a brief description of the antecedents of the

Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) since the beginning of the Cuban revolution. In an

attempt to institutionalize the revolution--Fidel Castro's 26 July Movement (M-26),

Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and Revolutionary Directorate--formed an Integrated

Revolutionary Organisation (ORI). But, it proved a short term coalition because of its

repressive policies and the domination of the organisational structure by the PSP. It

resulted in a process of purging the OR! and subsequently forming the United Party of

the Socialist Revolution (PURS). But the PSP, 111 its attempt to maintaining its

hegemony and presumably acting on the advice of the Soviet leadership, caused

fissures within the ranks of the PURS. The resulting situation compelled Castro to

initiate drastic steps to reorganise the PURS which, in the final analysis led to the

launching of the PCC in 1965. Also, efforts were made to discipline the bureaucracy,

and at the same time strengthen and institutionalize the PCC. In the absence of a

coherent ideology that would encompass the aims and aspirations of the different

constituents that combined to make the PCC, Castro moved from humanist socialist

democracy to the people's democracy i.e. Marxist-Leninist under a single party

banner. Yet, the future of the newly evolved PCC in its wake remained uncertain.

It is in these circurnsrances, it may be added that ten years after founding of

the PCC and seventeen yeats after installation of the revolutionary government in

power, the PCC held its first congress in December 1975. However, it marked the

85

culmination of what may be described as the "institutionalization" of the PCC. A

preliminary draft of the party programme and the formal statutes of the constitution

were adopted, thus, "giving the party, for the first time, coherent operational and

policy guidelines. "1 In the years since the first congress, the PCC further refined

and codified its procedures with a series of regulatory mechanisms on the operation of

the party's various organs.

Fil·st Congress' Initiatives towards Institutionalisation

The first PCC congress met between 17-22 December 1975. The delegates

attending the congress (numbering 3116 from all levels and sectors of the Cuban

society as well as grass-roots members), examined and approved important theses and

resolutions which had been previously approved by the party's Preparatory

Commission after innumerable meetings throughout the country. The approved theses

and resolutions included issues and policies regarding internal organisation of the

party, the social and economic five-year programme ( 1976-80), the Organs of

People's Power (OPP), the new System of Economic Management and Planning

(SDPE), the mass media, the educational, scientific, cultural and artistic aspects of the

post-revolutionary Cuba.

The congress laid down party procedures, set up guidlines for

decision-making, delineated its relations with the international communist movement,

1. Fidel Castro, "Reports of the Central Committee to the First Congress", in First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, Havana, (December 17-22, 1975) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p.20 l.

86

and legitimized the party and the regtme. It took measures purported to

institutionalize the PCC while at the same time setting the stage for the

institutionalization of the state. It approved the socialist Constitution that gave legal

and juridical framework to the political system under the revolution. The people's

participation in the decision- making process was secured by holding a national

referendum iti 1976, in which the new Constitution was approved. With it began the

process for the national election of delegates for the mui1icipal Organs of People's

\

Power held later in October 1976. It was the first-ever election held under the

revolutionary government.

The congress also elected the party's leadership-- Fidel Castro was elected

First Secretary of the PCC, followed by Raul Castro as the Second Secretary. Castro

also headed the Politbureau, and thus presided over the two main centres of power in

the PCC, the Secretariat and Politbureau. The original eight-men Politbureau was

enlarged to 13 members. Out of the five additional members, three came from the

ranks of the PSP (Bias Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Arnalda Milian) and two

were from the M-26 (Pedro Miret and Jose R<lmon Machado). The membership of

the National Secretariat was increased from 7 to II members to facilitate a wider

division of responsibilities. In 1969, the Central Committee had 100 full members

with no alternates. Btlt as the PCC grew in numbers, it was necessary to incorporate

more people into positions of leadership. The PCC avoided the process of demoting

some of the Central Committee full members by inventing the concept of alternates.

Thus, at the first PCC Congress thirteen members of the 1965 Central Committee

were dropped, thirty-five full members and twelve alternate members were

87

appointed. 2 The new Central Committee had 150 full members and 12 alternates.

According to one observer the new Central Committee was "somewhat more

balanced [al body when compared with the old in terms of political and institutional

affiliations." 3

1 n the wake of the first congress, several initiatives were made, the basic

objective of which was to institutionalise the state apparatus as well as the party.

Important among these initiatives are the drafting in its charter--the ,Cuban

Communist Party as the only political party in the political system; implementation of

democratic centralism as the organizational principle behind the system of hierarchical

relations among the different state organs; establishment of Organs of People's Power

(at national, provincial and municipal levels); other socio-political organisations (for

citizens, workers, women, and peasants); establishment of an economic system based

on the pub! ic owncrsh ip of the means of production (with the exception of privately

owned small farmers); and a socialist economic pattern (which accepts the existence

of income variation: from each according to his ability, to each according to his

work). In this section, an attempt is made to sketch brietly these initiatives.

A constitutional commission appointed on 22 October 1974, submitted a draft

constitution consisting of 12 chapters and 141 articles, four months later in February

1975. It was subsequntly approved by the First Party Congress in December 1975

2. See, Max Azicri, Cuba: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Pinter Pub-lishers, 1988), p.84. ·

3. Edward Gonzalez, "Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies", in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, eJs.,Cuba in the World (Piw;burgll : University of Pittsburgh, 1979), p.11.

00

after extensive public discussion, and further ratified by a popular referendum in

February 1976. Before the referendum again, 160,000 meetings were held in almost

all sectors of the society. More than six million people--almost the entire population

over the age of fourteen--discussed and made proposals on every article of the draft

constitution. In the end, about sixteen thousand modifications were proposed and

hundreds of those incorporated in the final document which was then put to a national

vote. The referendum on the constitution was conducted by voluntary secret ballot \

open to all over the age of fourteen. 98 per cent of the eligible voters went to the

polls: 5,473,534 (97.7%) voted "yes"--in favour of the draft constitution; 54,070

( 1 %) voted no. This new Constitution replaced the amended and outdated

Constitution of 1940.

Article I of the Constitution provided for the creation of elected national,

provincial and local governments throughout the country. From 1959 to 1976, the

cabinet had the legislative powers but under the provisions of the new Constitution

these were shifted to the National Assembly (481 Deputies). In turn, the Assembly

elected a Council of State (31 members) to function when the former was not in

session. The president of the Council of State (Fidel Castro) also became the

president of the Republic and of the Cabinet. Unlike other socialist constitutions

where the head of the state was different from head of the government, the new

Cuban Constitution specified separate powers for the president of the Council of State

(the head of state) and the president of the Council of Ministers or Cabinet (the head

of government) but required that the same person may hold both the offices, 1n a

sense, more consistent \Vith the general Latin American constitutional practice. The

Cabinet had the charge of administration and was endowed with considerable powers,

including the power to draft legislation. The National Assembly decided on the

constitutionality of legislation, the Supreme Court and other courts were subordinated

to the Assembly and the Council of State. No basic change was made in the role and

functioning of the vanguard party as the most authoritative source of political

guidance, Notwithstanding, the party members were restrained to give legally binding

orders to state administration, although these orders had to pass through the official

hierarchy. The new Constitution increased the institutional cohesiveness of the state,

formalised its socialist nature as well as the character of the society and economic

system. The PCC was given legal status and the 1976 charter Article 5 of the

Constitution gave the party legal authority over state and society. It stated:

The Communist Party of Cuba, the organised Marxist-Leninist Vanguard of the working class, is the highest leading force of the society and of the state, which organizes and guides the common effort towards the goals of the construction of socialism and the progress towards a Communist future. 4

At the same time, an effort was made to prevent the PCC from actually

running the government administratively as it did before 1976. While the party still

performing its constitutionally established guiding and supervisory role over the

government, the administration of the state was no longer the direct responsibility of

PCC members. It was in the hands of government officials and of the Organs of

People's Power. A report in the Granma expressed the position thus:

4. ~ho?a P. Rabkin, "Cuban Political Str~cture: Vanguard Party and the Masses", 111 Sand_or Hal~bsky and John M. Kirk, cds., Cuba: 7ivcnty Five >h1rs of Revo!utLon, /9)9-1984 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p.255.

90

The Party is the ruling organ of the entire society, but in order to carry out its function as such it must have the support of an instrument that is essential to it; the state and its institutions. Thus, the Party advises and leads and the Organs of People's Power--the highest state authority--administer the state. 5

Regarding the position of the party in relation to the political system's political and

administrative institutions, Raul Castro stated that "the Party directs, the state directs,

and the mass organizations direct," but "the legitimacy of the Vanguard Party is more \

fundamental than that of any other institution. True democracy resides in government

for the workers, and, only secondarily, in government of and by them. "6

Albeit institutional lines of authority were demarcated among different

institutions, in case of conflict between the legislature, which expresses sovereign

will of the working people, and the PCC, which expresses the class interest of the

proletariat, the latter will have a final say. Moreover, the political direction exercised

by the party is qualitatively different from the state organs. According to Raul

Castro:

The methods and means of directing are very different. While those of the state organs are mainly administrative, the party's methods and the mass organizations are basically those of persuasion, and of being able to convince others on the basis of a higher political authority. 7

5. Granma Weekly Review, 18 January 1981.

6. ibid., 8 September 1974.

7. Azicri, n.2, p.74.

Q1

While expressing his op11110n on the control of the party over the political

system, Raul Castro said: "This term ... [control] ... could be used in the sense of

governing, managing, reigning, examining, inspecting. "11

The institutionalization of the state in 1975 was followed by a similar process

1n the PCC. The PCC I ike the government was structured with parallel

representation throughout the society from the national, to provincial and local

levels. 9 Party-government relations were clearly defined except at the top echelons of . the political hierarchy. ln a similar vein, relations between the PCC and the mass

organisations and OPP were clearly demarcated. The PCC's internal structure

processes were formalized, including determining the functions of the Central

Committee.

At the top of PCC hierarchy was the General Secretariat, headed by Fidel

Castro as the First Secretary and Raul Castro as the Second Secretary. Next in

8. ibid.'

9. PCC

General Secretariat First Secretary: Fidel Castro Second Secretary: Raul Castro

Politbureau Central Committee 14 Provincial Secretariats 169 Municipal Secretariats Party Nuclei:

Local/Work Centre Committees

PCC Membership

OPP

92

Council of State National Assembly 14 Provincial Assemblies 169 Municipal Assemblies Grassroot Assemblies

hierarchy was the Politburcau. These individuals were responsible for the overall

ideological and political direction of society. They consulted in important instances

with lower level party figures but made the final decisions themselves. The

top-ranking party figures were elected at the party congress, the supreme PCC organ.

Central Committee membership was held by persons who hold positions of

authority in other social groups. According to some Cubanologists, representation of

groups in the Central Committee "can be taken as a measure of the relative intluence

of various institutions in the political system. "10 If this method is any indication,

there was a steady decline of the military representation since I 970 and a relative gain

for the party and state apparatus. There was also an increase in the representation of

mass organ is at ion leaders. At the same time, "other groups, although

non-institutional ones, which ... thadJ increased their share of the Central Committee

membership ... [were of! persons who [had] performed international service and

workers I inked directly to production." 11

Below the Central Committee and its staff were the provincial party

organisations and the party cells--the PCC rank-and-file. The lower party ranks were

necessary instruments of the top party leadership's mobilization and legitimation

goals. The activities of the party members in aid of production, attention to workers'

living conditions, involvement in mass political education, and general morale

10. William M. LeoGrande, "Continuity and Change in the Cuban Political Elite", Cuba11 Studies (Pittsburgh), vol.8, no.2, July 1978, p.3.

ll. Jorge I. Dominguez, "Revolutionary Politics: The New Dema1Jcls for Orderli­ness", in Jorge I. Dominguez, eel., Cubo: Internal and flllernational Afffairs (Beverly llills : Sage Publications, 1982), p.24.

93

-boosting and trouble-shooting were extremely important for the maintenance of the

system. Decisions made at a higher level were binding on party members at lower

levels. The party's interlocking levels of authority were purposely structured so that

the central and operational principle of democratic centralism functioned effectively.

The party's organisation provided enough avenues for discussion and participation at

the different structural levels. Even the dissenting views were accepted. As Castro

stated:

'Yes, opposition exists. One carries it out within the Party, within the Lmassj organizations, the factories .... It has to be within the Party because the essence of the Party is precisely its democratic spirit, ... the right to criticize and the duty to carry on self-criticism ...• There exists the right to disagree.· 12

But, it also sought to guarantee that the line of command throughout the

party's hierarchical structure was followed, and that discipline among party members

was properly enforced.

Before the 1976 Constitution, the Cabinet headed by prime minister had

centralized political powers exercising-- executive, legislative, and judicial functions.

In the 1976 Constitution tht provision of local, provincial, and national elected

representative institutions was introduced. Institutionally different from the PCC,

these Organs of People's Power were to function in· coordination with the party.

Electoral procedures were enacted in such a fashion that individuals who enjoyed the

confidence of the PCC were able to be elected to a large extent. On 11 October 1976,

12. F.Mankiewiez and K.Jones, With Fidel: A Portrait of Castro and Cuha (Nt:w York: Ballantine Books, 1975), pp.84-5.

some 10,725 delegates were elected in the national elections for the 169 municipal

assemblies. These assemblies then elected 1,084 delegates to the provincial

assemblies and 481 deputies for the National Assembly. Preliminary results

indicated:

Of the almost 500 delegates to the National Assembly, generally 97 per cent have been members of the Party or its youth branch, the Young Communists. Party representation has been somewhat less at the provincial level and declined to about 75 per cent at the municipal level. 13

In the National Assembly, a Council of State was elected, with Fidel Castro as

president and Raul Castro as first vice-president; five other vice-presidents, a

secretary, and 23 other members were named. OPP's National Assembly met for the

first time on 2 December 1976 and thereby displaced the Cabinet and eliminated the

post of prime minister. In this new situation, the president of the Council of State

(National Assembly) and of Executive Committee (the Council of Ministers), holding

both positions became the actual president of the Rep ubi ic.

The OPP as a three tier structure consisted of the National Assembly, fourteen

provincial assemblies and 169 municipal assemblies. The municipal assemblies were

headed by a president, vice-president, and secretary; and the provincial assemblies by

an executive committee of seven to twenty-one members, in proportion to the strength

of population. The de!~gates to the OPP, as provided for in the Constituion were

elected directly by secret, popular vote of their neighbours for two and a half years

term on the basis of one municipal delegate for each constituency. In tum, the

13. Rabkin, n.4, p.258.

95

municipal delegates elected the delegates for the provincial assembly (indirect

electoral system). The number of provincial delegates was determined according to

the population of each province, i.e. one delegate for every 10,000 citizens or a

fraction greater than 5000. In the same way, the municipal delegates elected the

deputies to the National Assembly (indirect electoral system) for a five-year term,

with one national deputy for every 20,000 citizens or a fraction greater than 10,000.

According to provisions of the Constitution the National Assembly was

invested with supreme legislative authority. The Assembly elects from its members, a

Council of State that acts on behalf of the Assembly when it is not in session. The

president of the Council of State (Fidel Castro) acts as the president of the Council of

Ministers (the Cabinet) whose members he appoints with the approval of the

Assembly. The Assembly is empowered to frame legislation as well as to supervise

every aspect of the government from the Cabinet down to the local level. OPP

Assembly received reports from various ministries and critically deliberated on the

executive performance.

In practice, on occasions, the Assembly was by-passed on certain important

personnel and policy decisions in favour of Council of State. 14 Another factor that

subordinated the Assembly was the Politbureau customarily reviewing the "draft

14. Major dismissals and demotions of ministers were made before and after the National Assembly session in December 1979, as a result, reducing the role of the Assembly only of ratifying the decisions of the Council of State. Many of the vacated posts were filled by members of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, a body that overlapped with the Politbureau. Thus, the PCC decision makers responded to political difficulty by wncentrating authority in their own hands, not by enlarging the role of the legislature.

96

legislation before it is submitted to the Assembly and decide[d] certain policy matters

on its own authority." 15 Also, virtually the Council of State was dominated by the

Politbureau, as of the Council's 31 members in 1980, 19 were either full or alternate

members of the Politbureau.

At the local level, the elected officials instead of taking initiative from below

in policy formulation and decision making have the duty of implementing the policy

guidelines of the centre. As a result, many problems originated in the n~tional

planning decisions over which the local officials lacked control. For example, in one

of the main areas of OPP responsibility-restaurant and retail services--the comments

of local officials suggested that problems in the local enterprises resulted from poor

economic decisions at higher levels. To overcome such hurdles, a variety of local

production, retail and service enterprises were transferred to the local assemblies.

Commenting on this transfer issue, Cuba's minister of planning, 1-iumberto Perez,

said: "The Organs of People's Power were created on the basis that they could

manage the country's resources more efficiently than the State's central agencies." 16

Albeit Cuba has had a centrally planned economy, the local government was given

powers to run local enterprises but without altering prices, wages, and many other

norms decided by the central administration. The Constitution had assigned political

and administrative functions to the municipal and provincial assemblies, and in

addition to it, legislative functions to the National Assembly, within their respective

15. Granma Weekly Review, 11 January 198l.

16. ibid, 13 July 1980.

jurisdiction.

According to Article 67 of the Constitution the National Assembly is the

"supreme organ of state power", and expresses "the sovereign will of all the working

people". It has legislative and Constitution-amending powers, and it can revoke the

decree laws issued by the Council of State, which legislates while the National

Assembly is not in session. Along with the above functions, it was empowered to i)

declare a war in case of military aggression; ii) approve the national budget;

iii)exercise control over the organs of state and g<?vernment; iv) appoint the members \

of the Council of State, the president, vice-president, judges of the People's Supreme

Court, and the attorney general.

The National Assembly consisting of 492 deputies was provided for in the

Constitution to meet twice a year in July and December for short sessions, usually

lasting two days. In case of an emergency, a special session can be convened. To aid

and assist the National Assembly, twenty standing commissions composed of National

Assembly deputies worked throughout the year for drafting legislation. These

commissions work in close coordination with the National Assembly's Commission on

Juridical and Constitutional Affairs. The national deputies (and the provincial and

municipal delegates) continue holding regular jobs in addition to their OPP's

responsibilities. They take leave to attend the sessions or other related meetings. No

national deputy or provincial and municipal delegate is paid for his or her work in the

OPP, the pay comes only from regular jobs. In addition to the national deputies, laws

can be proposed by the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, the different

commissions of the National Assembly, the mass organisations, the People's Supreme

98

Court. the attorney general, and through a petition signed by at least 10,000 citizens

eligible for vote.

According to Article 102 of the Constitution, both the municipal and provincial

assemblies "govern in all that concerns them ... (directing) economic production and

service units which are directly subordinate to them ... (providing) economic, cultural

educational and recreational services.'' To cnntrol schools, hospitals, clinics, stores,

mov1e theatres and transportation is the responsibility of the municipal assemblies

within their respective areas. The provincial assemblies have the responsibility to

control the services and production units tran.scending the municipal boundaries but

operating within the domain of provincial boundaries. The municipal and provincial

OPP were assigned the following functions: (i). enforcing rules and regulations

coming from superior authorities; (ii). electing their executive committees, and

revoking their mandates if proper cause demands such an action; (iii). oversee1ng

matters related to political and administrative units under their jurisdiction; (iv).

electing and recalling the judges of the People's Courts in the areas under their

jurisdiction; and (v). studying and evaluating reports submitted by their executive

committees, judicial organs and assemblies, the national deputies and provincial and

municipal delegates, and adopting relevant decisions regarding their reports.

Article 95 of the Constitution allows the Executive Committee to rule on

matters normally under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers. It is the highest

body for taking administrative and executive decisions. The Council of Ministers

along with irs Executive Committee, and the National Assembly along with its

Council of State work "in a dual system of horizontal collaboration and vertical

99

subordination, which again functions according to the principle of democratic

central ism". 17 It provides for coordination and cooperation in bureaucratic

administration and decision making (by Council of Ministers) and administrative

policy-making, supervision of services and legislation (by OPP's National Assembly

and Council of State). In the process, the OPP and government institutions work side

by side from national to down local level. In practice, little efforts were made to

separate the role of the party and the government at the top echelons of the political

hierarchy. The top executive body, the Council of Ministers (36 members) was

dominated by its Executive Committee ( 14 ministers) all of whom were either

members of the Politbureau, or alternate Politbureau, or of the Central Committee.

Also, most members of this group served on the National Assembly.

Mass organisations were created in revolutionary Cuba to represent different

sectors of the society and have been described "as the nation's primary channel for

articulating popular demand". PI According to Article 7 of the Constitution: "The

state relies on the social and mass organizations, which, in addition, directly fulfill the

state functions that are intended to be assumed by the same, in accordance with the

Constitution and the law." Under this provision four major mass organisations--the

Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC), the National Association of Small Farmers

(ANAP), the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR), and tile

Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) -- were envisaged.

17. Azicri, n.2, p. 100.

18. Rabkin, n.4, p.257, All state workers belong to the CTC, all small farmers to the ANAP and approximately 80 p~r cent of all adult citizens belong to the CDR, and .more than 80 per cent ot wnmen belong to the FMC.

100

While representing their sepcrate professional interests, Cuban mass

organisations, are subject to the "leading and orienting role of the party". The party

formulates "general directives concerning fundamental questions of economic, social,

political, ancl cultural development of the country, such as concerning the problems

that pertain to the different social sectors" . 19 Again, it is the PCC which ensures the

most adequate selection and placement of cadres on the part of the mass organisations.

Thus, the mass organisations, lacking autonomy, can represent their interest within

the revolutionary govcrnn;ent framework but certainly not antagonistic to the latter.

The leaders of the mass organisations enjoy fairly higher ranks in the party. During

the first PCC congress at least six per cent members of the Central Committee were

from the mass organisations.

Since leaders of the mass organisations enjoy dual position in tile PCC as well

as 111 their own special interest organisations, in case of competing claims and

potential contlicts of loyalty, the consensus approach and accommodation was, more

often than not, followed. And in such a11 event these leaders have to be subordinated

to the larger interests and public good of the society. But it does not mean that mass

organisations have no role to play. At the same time, mass organisations played an

important role in articulating opinion from the mass base upto the Cuban political

hierarchy. So, the mass organisations acted as an important source or moulding and

intluencing the leadership to achieve their goal even "each of the Cuban interest

19. PLatform Program of Communist Party of Cuba (Havana: Department of Revo­lutionary Orientation of Central Committee of Communist Party of Cuba, 1976), pp.137-38.

101

organisations has at some time publicly advocated policies divergent from the policy

• t" I I . II 10 preference o ot 1er government eaoers . - Occasionally, their lobbying efrons

consistently yielded positive results.

Committees for the Defence of the revolution (CDRs) were organised in 1960 to

safeguard and ingrain the revolution by maintaining vigilance against the

counter-revolutionaries. CDRs, open to all revolutionaries of the nation, were

organised nationally on a neighbourhood by neighbourhood basis for multi-faceted

functions. By 1975, more than 70 per cent of the adult population was CDRs cadres,

representing more than 50 per cent of the entire population. Commenting on the role

of CDRs Fidel Castro said that "the CDRs are our people's militant, enthusiastic,

versatile and irreplaceable instrument, from which the Revolution will always seck

support in carrying out its tasks" .21 But after the first congress of the PCC, however,

the political control of the CDRs had visibly decreased. At the same time, CDRs

representation in the Politburcau and Central Committee also decreased. Due to the

establishment of the Organs of People's Pnwer in 1976, the state political structure led

to the loss of the CDRs role. The rcspot1sibility for vigilance and good-citizen project

(i.e. neighbourhood beautification, inoculation campatgns, etc.) continued, but the

interest representation function declined.

During the institutionalization of the 1970s the role of labour under social ism

was examinee!. As Raul Castro stated in 1974:

20. Rabkin, n.4, pp. 262-63.

21. Castro, n. I.

102

One of the principal functions of trade unions under socialism is to serve as a vehicle for orientation, directives and goals which the revolutionary power must convey to the working masses .... The Party is the Vanguard. Trade Unions are the most powerful link between the Party and the working masses. That is one of their principal missions under social ism _22

Thus, the CTC was intcndl'd to defend the interests of a huge mass

membership. Its secretary general was empowered to attend sessions of the Council

of Ministers. CTC was best institutionally represented at higher leadership levels of

all of Cuba's mass organisations. Notwithstanding its overwhelming importance,

CTC has been criticised for excessive passivity and lack of initiative in championing

worker's interests. As CTC's secretary general, Roberto Veiga, stated that "there arc

times when the trade union movement does not contribute energetically enough to

carrying out labour legislation and to seeing that the worker's rights arc fully

l " '3 respectcc . - In 1980, Politbureau member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez offered a

critical assessment:

We don't think, however, that tile Unions play the role that they should. Our Unions are much better at transmitting the party's orientations to tht.: working class than they are at gathering from the working class the desires, the criticisms, the suggestions to which the lcackrship has to be alert. 24

22. Granma Wee/.:ly RevieiV, 26 Septembt.:r, 1974.

23. Gr!illllla, 23 May I 97lJ.

24. Quoted in Rabkin, Il.4, p.264.

103

In such a situation, CTC leaders have had to respond not only to criticisms of their

passivity but also to denunciations of weak worker discipline and the expectations that

the CTC should work as the "non- antagonistic counterpart of the management" and

that it should be primarily concerned with raising productivityY 13y 1980, workers'

revolutionary consciousness and activism increased and labour movement became an

integral part of the PCC.

National Association of small Farmers (ANAP) was formed by inclepenclcnt

farmers who ow11Cd agricultural land outside of the collectivized state farm system.

They had economic and political significance because of their control over about a

fifth of all cultivated land. Like other organisations, it provided a channel of

communication between the PCC and small peasants. ANAP provided an opportunity

to independent farmers for political participation and integration into the revolutionary

process and prevented this important sector from drifting away.

Uptil the promulgation of the 1976 Constitution, ANAP was institutionalised.

Family members, engaged in the cultivation were allowed to inherit it under Article

24. Also, the right to own the land privately was allowed under Article 20. llowcver,

the government had certain preferential option ~o purchase the land as if it was for

sale, and also, it had to approve whatever transaction might be agreed upon (Article

21). The government provided the farmers--credit, fertilizers, seeds and tools. In

turn, they were required to sell a percentage of their crops to the state at official

prices which were below market prices. 13ut in the long run, the government aimed at

25. Cranma Weekly Review, 15 December 1979.

104

shifting the private land to the public control by implementing legal restrictions on the

sale, mortgage and inheritance of tand. Also, with the educational opportunities open

to their children it provided for choosing careers other than farming.

Different women organisations were blended into a single Federation of

Cuban Women (FMC) on 23 August 1960 including women above 14 years old. Its

membership increased rapidly from 17,000 in 1960 to 2,167,171 in l97o. The FMC

encouraged women· to "learn technical skills including agriculture, tractor driving,

specialized farming techniques, cattle rearing, and political instructions". 2(J Women

were taken as men's equals but certainly not as their opponents. The FMC was

aimed at integrating its members into the revolutionary process and its major task was

to support and strengthen the revolution. The FMC's commitment to gender equality

was officially endorsed by the PCC, and in many respects the government was more

favourable towards FMC aspirations than the population as a whole. Similarly, in

drafting the Family Code, the FMC. worked effectively as a catalyst bringing women's

concerns to the revolutionary leadership's attention. But such an approach was not

followed in all cases. The society's overall development took preccd<.:nce over

women's sectoral interests. Thus,it would be rational to co1Jclude that when the

interests of regime and women's coincided, the FMC issues got preference. FMC

president, Vilma Espin supported their case by explaining that the "Cuban women's

revolutionary movement is feminine, not feminist" Y Further, while criticising the

26. Azicri, n.2, p.l15.

27. Quoted in Jorge I. Dominguez, Cuba: Order at Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p.268.

105

United States brand of feminism, she said:

In reality ... we have never had a feminist movement. We hate that, we hate the feminist movement in the United States. We consider what we are doing part of the struggle. And for that reason we consider we are more developed. We see these movements in the United States which have conceived struggles for equality of women against men' .... That is absurd! It doesn't make sense! For these feminists to say they arc revolutionaries is ridiculous! ... That's what is more tragic. They are just being manipulated, being used. The feminist movement! Ha! 2x

In theory, all Cuban mass organisations expressed their interests and

influenced the decision-making process in their favour. But in practice, representation

took place through a consultation process that had political initiative ancl control

largely in the PCC appointed representatives, who instead of confrontation adopted a

closely cooperative approach with the highest PCC leadership. In sum, the mass

organisations encouraged citizens to watch and report on their neighbours, urge

workers to produce faster and better. encourage peasants to join cooperatives and

exhort women to join the paid labour force.

Relationship between Organisations

PCC and Institut ionalisecl People's

Orr was initiated as an antidote to bureaucratic domination. The 1976

Constitution guarantees a number of fundamental political rights and freedoms to the

citizens, and the orr provides an institutional framework for the selection of political

leadership ancl for shaping public policy. At the same time, the PC:C: acts as a

28. The Vvashingto1z Post, 26 March 1977.

106

philosopher-guide ro advise OPP on ic!eological and public interest matters. Fidel

Castro speaking at the first PCC congress stated:

A formal Jet is all we have left: to state that, at this mome11t, the Revolutionary Government transfers to the National Assembly the power it has held upto now. Thus the Council of Ministers invests this Assembly with the constitutional and legislative functions it exercised for almost eighteen years, the period of the most radical and deepest political and social transformations in our country's life. Let history judge this epoch objectively. 29

According to Article 4, the people are supreme and exercise their power through the

OPP. But according to Article 5, the PCC controls and guides the OPP. Thus, the

relations between the PCC and OPP on operational grounds turned potentially

problematic. Formally and constitutionally, the OPP members do not have to agree

with, nor approve in their deliberations. But practically, ways and means has to be

adopted so that there is PCC domination in the National Assembly.

If the party has to implement a proposal, it can submit it to the OPP through

its members who have been elected to the OPP. The members argue for that proposal.

29. Quoted in Freel Ward, Inside Cuba Today (New York: Crown Publishers, 1978), p. 236. According to Article 4 of the Constitution:

In the Republic of Cuba all the power belongs to the working people, who exercise it either directly or through the assemblies of People's Power and other organs of the state which derive their authority from these assemblies.

According to Article 5 of the Constitution:

The Communist Party of Cuba, the organized Marxist-Leninist Vanguard of the working class, is the highest leading force of the society ami of the state, which organizes and guides the common effort towards the goals of the construction of socialism and the progress toward a communist future.

107

All of the OPP members discuss it in their constituencies and subsequently in their

assemblies, then a vote is taken. Generally, the proposal is approved because it is

introduced by the party members who feel the pulse of the general population. In case

the proposal is not accepted however, the party can introduce and seek its approval at

the next level of OPP. I3ut if it consistently runs into disagreement with a particular

proposal, that is clear signal to the party members to sit down and collectively

re-evaluate the proposal itself. In the process, the party's leadership, born of direct

experience among the working people, is further strengthened and legitimised in the

process of consultation and feed-back.

Once a proposal put forth by the PCC is accepted by the OPP, the

responsibility lies with OPP to take decisions about management, personnel, and the

allocation of resources to implement it. Even at the first PCC congress a clear role of

the OPP was endorsed when it was resolved : "The Organs of People's Power are the

highest state authority on the territories under their jurisdiction. "30 This allowed the

OPP to carry out their day-to-day administrative functions without interference. The

OPP thus was empowered "not only to enact legislation, but to supervise every aspect

of government performance from the cabinet [Council of Ministcrsl down to the local

Organs of Popular Power. "31 At the same time, the

Party mun guide, promote and control the work of state organs, control the policy for the promotion and training of cadres and perfect the mechanisms of the state; but the Party should never replace the state in

30. Granma Vleekly Review, ll January 1976.

31. Rabkin, n. 4, p. 258.

108

the exercise of its power and functions. 32

The Party has the responsibility not only to ensure the correct functioning of the OPP,

but also to ensure that leadership selection and policy formulation are in accordance

with the building of communist society. The party, unlike the state, has no coercive

power. It has no army, no police force, no judges. It does not hire and fire. Its only

"authority is political and ideological, and its only mechanisms for asserting the

authority are education, example and persuasion. In sum, Raul Castro explained:

The Party can and must make suggestions, proposals, recommendations ... but it must never 'hand clown' decisions, never impose decisions, never take any manner of reprisals as regards an organ of people's power or members of such organs who do not agree with or carry out something the Party has suggested. 33

In other words, legitimacy of the PCC is more fundamental than that of any

other institution. True democracy resides in government for the workers, and only

secondarily in government of and by them. On the eve of inaugurating Cuba's new

representative institutions, Raul Castro reaffirmed:

When a state like ours represents the interests of the workers, regardless of its structure, it is much nwn.: democratic state than any other kind which has ever existed in history, because the state of the workers, the state which has l:lndertaken the construction of socialism is in any form, a majority state of the majority while all other previous states have been states of exploiting minorities. 34

Further, PCC maintained its legitimacy as its members were drawn from all sectors of

Cuban society and were the most active and exemplary citizens and operated at all

levels -- in the work-places, the OPP, the administrative agencies, the armed forces,

32. Grawna, 16 February 1979.

33. Quoted in Terence Cannon, Democracy in Cuba (New York: Yencermos Brigade, 1976), p. 33.

34. Gramna H0ekly Review, 8 September 1974.

109

ami the mass org~tnisati(lllS. Th·:y ltelp to c-_·aluatc the program111es and activities of

the organisations in which they work and prnvidc insights for solving problems ami

achieving goals. In e:-trly 1981, Granma elaborated the respective roles of the PCC and

OPP thus:

The Party is the ruling organ of the entire society, but in order to carry out its function ::~s such it must lnve the support of an instrument that is essential to it: the state and its institutions. Thus, the Party advises and leads and the organs of People's Power-the highest state authority-­administer the state. 35

Since the beginning, the party had a strong presence in the municipal

assemblies. In l97'J, 75.'8. per cent of all ~elected delegates were either PCC members

or aspirants, or Young Colnlmmist League members. Similarly, 95.6 per cent or the

members of the Executive Committees had party affiliation. Question arises as to

35. ibid, 1'8. January 198l.Political affiliation in the OPP in 1979 (per cent of totals)

Muncipality Province

Political Assem-Affiliation blies

Communist Party: Members or AspircJ.nts

Young Communist League Members

Non-

G4.7

1L 1

affiliated 24.2

Total 100.00

Executive A:;sem·­Committees blies

~0.4 JO.G

'J.2 3.3

4.4 6.1

100.00 100.00

Executive Committees

9:!.:2

0.4

0.4

100.00

National Assembly

Ar~sem- Council blies of State

91.7 100.00

5.0 0

3.3 0

100.00 100.00

.C>ource:Archibold R. lv!. Ritter, "The Organs of People's Power and the Communist Party: The Nature of Cuban Democracy," in Sdndor Halebsky, and cTCllm t---1. Ki1k, ec1~3.. 11.4, p.279.

110

what accounts fur such a high PCC pt.:rct.:ntage. 011 the basis of a11 oiJst.:rver's

survey:

OPP has been an important instrument 111 improving local service systems .... The OPP seem to have functioned effectively in leading people's energies towards making solutions to their own problems. At this level, the OPP decentralise [the] decision-making and place the discussion of problems close to problems thcmselvcs. 36

It shows that people had great interest in the local administration as well as faith in

the PC C. Yet another important factor was the personality of Fidel Castro. On the

part of the PCC, there were a number of mechanisms to shape electoral outcome.

First, the PCC members contesting elections were widely supported within their

constituencies because of politically more active, better connected, and ideologically

certified citizens. Further, their behaviour, character, and distinction in their work

was the added advantage to their candidature. It was highly improbable that a

candidate with dubious character, noncomplaint disposition, and questionable

background would dare to be a nominee, thereby risking public embarrassment.

Second, if a non-affiliated candidate was elected, there was always a danger of recall

by the electors. It happened in February 1979, when 108 out of 10,725

municipal-level delegates were recalled. But, in case of a PCC member, he had to

work under strict PCC d;scipline and had to comply with all its orders. The recall was

aimed at ensuring that delegates were responsive and responsible to their electors.

According to Archibald R.M. Ritter: "It is possible that this mechanism could be used

36. I3. Jorgensen, "The Interrelationship I3etween I3ase and Superstructure in Cuba," lbero-Americana: Nordic Journal of Latin American Studies, vol 13, no. I, 1983, p. 37.

111

to induce conformity and, in the extreme, to weed out troublemakers and upstarts. "37

Third, a PCC member has a wider circle in his constituency than any other

nonaffiliated. As there is no provision for electoral campaigning, so it turned, more in

favour of a PCC member.

The provincial and National Assembly are dominated by the PCC members or

aspirants and Youth Communist League (UJC) members. In 1979, 93.9 per cent in

provincial assemblies and 96.7 per cent in National Assembly were PCC and UJC

members. In the same manner, provincial executive committees and Council of State

had 99.6 and 100 per cent PCC or UJC members. It is also of interest to note that

about 45 per cent of the members of the National Assembly were selected by the

municipal assemblies from outside these assemblies themselves. Certainly it does not

mean that there is monopoly of the PCC but "elections are competitive, although

competition differs in several ways from that in multiparty representative systems ...

elections do reflect choice and competitive movement. "3x

Above-mentioned figures indicate that the blurring line between PCC and

National Assembly is very thin. Separation of the party apparatus from the organs of

the state as Ritter argues is "a qualified 'yes' at the municipal level, and a qualified

'no' at the national level. 39 Thus, the possibility that the National Assembly might

37. Ritter, n.35, p.276.

38. Sheryl L. Lutjens, "Democracy and Socialist Cuba," in Sandor Halebsky and John M. Kirk, eds., Cuba in Transition: Crisis and Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 63-4.

39. Ritter, n. 35, p.276.

reject a proposal supported by the PCC i) almost negligible. In the National Assembly

of 481 deputies, a minimum of 200 PCC deputies are required to oppose a bill

introduced by the party. According to another authority:

This could not happen if the Party itself was so irreconcilably divided that normal Party procedures were incapable of resolving the dispute. Yet even in this unlikely scenario, we would not really have a case of the National Assembly overruling the Party. Rather, it would be one Party faction prevaiiing within the PCC apparatus, and an opposing faction prevailing in the National Assembly. 40

The PCC maintains its political hegemony also through decision-making

process. Every important proposal is reviewed by the party's Politbureau. Even

critical issues, such as the decision to send troops to Angola and Ethiopia were

decided by the Politbureau itself. 41 The national economic plan and state budget are

not only reviewed by the Politbureau but also routed to the party Central Committee

for approval before submitting to the National Assembly. More routine proposals are

reviewed simply by the Politbureau and are then forwarded, even with amendments,

to the National Assembly for final action. In a way, the Politbureau enjoys a veto

power in Cuban decision-making process between drafting of bills and their adoption

by the National Assembly.

The Council of Stat~. the permanent executive organ of the National

Assembly, is elected by the National Assembly. Thirty of the thirty-one members of

40. William M. LeoCJrancle, "The Communist Party of Cuba Since the ~irst Congress," Latin American Studies (London), vol. 12, no. 2, 1979, pp. 417-18.

4l. For more details, see Grannw Weekly Review, 1 () March 1978.

113

the Council of State were PCC's Central Committee members. Every member of the

P0litbureau obtained a position in the Council of State, including the positions of

president, first vice-president, secretary ami the five vice-presidents. The party

heavyweights occupy the Council of State positions because of the party predominance

in the National Assembly. The National Assembly holds tw0 two-clays regular

sessions each year, with the possibility of special sessions. When the Assembly is not

in session the Council of State is the supreme organ, representing the Assembly and

implementing its resolutions.

With the dominance of the party stalwarts 111 the Council of State, and the

dominance of the party members, as deputies in the National Assembly, one can

conclude that the National Assembly is not a legislative body that can act independent

of the PCC or make either laws or pol icy in an independent way. But at the same

time, it cannot be said that people have no control over decision-making. The

discussion of major legislative bills nation-wide provides an opportunity to the people

to influence decision-making. In a similar vein, the citizens are entitled to participate

in the mass org~misations that possess decision-making powers in specific areas.

Citizens also play a role in the functioning of the planning system through their

affiliation with particular work centres.

Ideological Perspectives

For a revolutionary movement to succeed, there comes a time when

commitment, revolutionary ideology, and charismatic leadership alone are not

sufficient. Legitimacy, consistency, and administrative competency must be ensured in

order to evolve and consolidate the revolution. Authority must be structured,

responsibility aliocated, and reliable institutions developed if a revolution is to survive

to become a viable government. Cuban revolution reached this stage in 1975. Along

with the institutionalisation process, efforts were made to delineate the ideological

dimensions. Instead of Castro's extempore views on ideological perspectives

emphasis was shifted to constitutional and legal apparatus with a people's say in

decision making. An attempt is made in this section to analyse the ideological thrust

given to the institutionalisation of Cuban revolution.

At the first PCC congress, Castro highlighted the omnipotent role of the party,

even above himself. He stated: "The Party is the synthesis of everything. Within it.

the dreams of all the revolutionaries in our history are synthesized .... The Party today

is the soul of the Cuban Revolution. "42

Before 1975, the party's dominant role was questioned by the bureaucracy.

To counter it, the Organs of People's Power (OPPs) were initiated which were to

signify "without fail, the eradication of the bureaucratic centralism existing in many

parts of ... state apparatus and its substitution with democratic centralism, the

Marxist-Leninist groundwork for the functioning of the state. "43 Thus, the

decentralisation of state functions left a preponderance of policy-making and initiatives

at the centre and with the PCC but provided new mechanisms for control over

administration at each level of the administrative hierarchy.

42. Quoted in Terence Cannon, Revolutionary Cuba (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1981). p.249.

43. Raul Castro quoted in Lutjens, n.38, p.66.

The organisational principle of democratic centralism was adopted by the

PCC, as the base guideline for structuring participation in decision-making at all

organisational levels of the state. According to this principle, input into the

decision-making process was received from the lower levels of all social

organisations. This input provided an important basis for the policy decisions made

by the leadership at the higher levels of the party, state, and economic system. Once

a decision was reached in this manner, dissent or opposition to the decision ceased,

and the decision was to be faithfully carried out by everyone involved. Thus, the

PCC leadership "still regarded the revolutionary legitimacy of the party as more

fundamental, and more compelling, than the merely legal legitimacy of the state

institutions. "44

The evolution of political participation in revolutionary Cuba has been towards

increasing iev-;ls of participation, and toward greater participation by the people 111

influencing the formulation of public policy. According to a survey conducted 111

1975, 85 per cent workers felt tllat enterprise management should consult the rank and

file, 58 per cent had no doubt about the importance of their opinion. According to

another poll in 1976, out of 355 workers consulted, 80 per cent expressed they had a

significant role at production assemblies. In 1977, in a random selection of 1,000

workers, the majority said they had an active role in monthly production

44. Rhoda P. Rabkin, Cuban Politics: The Revolutionaty E'(perimellt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), p.68.

assemblies. 45

Even Fidel Castro. himself. adopted a very liberal approach. lie said: "I am

neither pragmatic nor dogmatic. I am dialectical. Nothing is permanent. everything

changes. "46 Also, instead of insistence on indigenous development of the revolution,

he was of the opinion that "if we would have been able to understand that

revolutionary theory was not sufficiently developed in our country, and that we really

lacked true economists and scientists of Marxism". Cuban revolutionaries would have

been able to learn, "with the modesty of true revolutionaries", from the experiences of

"other socialist countries" .. n

Further, there was depersonalization of governance ie. the delegation of

effective decision-making powers from Fidel Castro and his immediate confidants to

new and more technically qualified appointees and to governmental agencies that

could now function in more regularized and orderly fashion without the interventions

of the lider matima.

After the creation of OPPs, PCC members were directed to minimize their

candidacy in local union elections. The major role of the party was neither to look

out for workers interests. nor to manage workers input into decision-making. In fact,

45. For more details. see Janette Habel. Cuba: The Revolution in Peril (London: Verso, 1991), p.83.

46. Quoted in ibid, p. 107.

47. Quoted in Luis E. Aguilar, "From Immutable Proclamations to Unintended Consequences: t\1arxism-Leninism and the Cuban Government, 1959-1986", in Irving Louis Horowitz, eci., Cuban Communism (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989), p.l78.

117

it was intentionally discouraged from getting involved in this last area. The party was

to harbour a broader perspective of the entire revolutionary process, as l)pposed to the

narrower viewpoints held by administrators and workers.

The leadership was no more monolithic. What happened was there elllcrged

factions. The pre-revolution M-26 (26 July Movement) and PSP (Popular Socialist

Party) took new shapes. M-26 turned into "Fidelistas" and PSP took asylum under

Raul Castro, forming "Raul istas". As argued by Edward Gonzalez:

While there exists a high level of elite consensus, I do not hold the Cuban regime to be monolithic. Rather there are divisions within the Cuban leadership which stem from differences among political elites in their ideological and issue orientations, power considerations, and bureaucratic and organized interests. 4x

"Fidel istas" were more nationalist, revolutionary and pragmatic, while

"Raulistas" were more inclined to uphold the cause of Marxism-Leninism and

espoused closer ties with the Soviet bloc. Also, different mass organisations had a say

in influencing the decision-making process. But limits were set for all factions and

organisations i.e. the exercise of all political rights--whether freedom of speech,

freedom of association, or the right to hold office --was conditioned on loyalty to

socialism and the PCC. Once elected, Cuban officials took an oath pledging to

"respect in complete awareness and willingness the leading role of the Communist

Party of Cuba in our society. "49

48. Gonzalez, n. 3, p. 5.

49. Bias Roca, "Specific Features of Socialist Democracy in Cuba", \Vorld M(IJ:tist Review (Toronto), ·vol.20, no.2. February, 1977, p.l4.

Cuba made a historic progress in improving the standard of its people, to

mention a few--Cuba's indexes of life expectancy raised to seventy-three years,

literacy raised to ninety-six per cent and infant mortality rate fell to seventeen per

thousand live birth. This standard was highest among the Latin American countries,

and more comparable with developed countries.Commenting on the over-all

development in Cuba, a Cubanologist wrote:

Even if some freedoms are sacrificed in order to lift a society from under-development to relative prosperity, doing so is entirely justifiable because freedom of expression, for example, or the right to make a meaningful choice of rulers is not as important as ensuring that everyone eat, be educated, and be employed. 50

By the end of 1979, all was not well as planned during the first PCC congress.

There emerged--favouritism, nepotism, corruption, mutual back-scratching among

workers and administration. In December 1979, Castro in a closed-door speech

before the National Assembly declared:

It is necessary to ask ourselves why certain problems, certain ideological weaknesses, greater lack of discipline, certain symptoms of corruption ... have recently begun to appear. ... ls it because we have felt too good, too much to ease? ... We are sailing in a sea of difficulties . We have been in this sea for some time and we will continue in this sea .... 51

50. Juan M. del Aguila, Cuba: Dilemma's of a Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.l76.

51. Quoted in Sergio Roca, "Revolutionary Cuba", Current Hist01y (Philaclclphia, Pa), vol.80, no.463, February l98l. p.53.

Further, he warned that "we are not going to have a 'cultural revolution' but we have

to propose that all these factors and elements ... which irritate the people be radically

suppressed."

One of the major problems that was discussed during the eighth plenum of the

PCC Central Committee was that "there were times when the trade union movement

does not contribute energetically enough to carrying out labor legislation and to seeing

' that the worker's rights are fully respected. "52 Thus, there was a communication

gap, lack of command through a proper channel that led to chaos in the masses.

Politbureau member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez assessing critically the lack of

communication admitted that unions have not served as effectively "transmitting the

party's orientations to the working class" as they have been in "gathering from the

working class the desires, the criticisms, the suggestions to which the leadership has

to be alert. "53

To overcome these problems five members of the Pol itbureau took control of

the ministries of agriculture, interior, justice, public health, and transportation. As a

result, the PCC's position was strengthened over the government. In addition, the

PCC increased its role in the operational management of state business, violating the

1975 principle of supervision by the party and administration by the government.

Further in December 1979, Castro explicitly asked the National Assembly to transfer

52. Quoted in Rabkin, n.4, p.264.

53. ibid.

to the Council of Ministers its authority to consider and write tougher crime laws.

Further steps were taken to dilute the local autonomy. Raul Castro expressed:

..... the higher offices have the power to nullify an agreement or decision of the assemblies and executive committees at the lower levels when these COlltradict laws and regulations in force, or affect the broader interests of other communities throughout the country. 54

Despite PCC's consistent and sustained efforts, the mass discontentment was

aggravating at a high level, both clue to internal and external facto)·s. Finally,' Castro

opened the borders for the Cubans who wanted to leave the island, and were not in

agreement with the socialist revolution. As a result, from April to September 1980,

about 125,000 Cubans left the island, from the port of Marie!, and almost all of them

settled in the United States. The jails were opened in Cuba, so most of the anti-social

elements fled to US. But US warned that many criminals amongst the refugees would

be sent back to Cuba. Castro responded on l May 1980 that the US had sought to

provoke the outflow, and should now "s\vallow the dagger whole". In December

1980, he boasted to the secoilcl PCC congress that the "exodus of the scum" to the US

had reduced crime against properLy in Cuba. 55

After the Marici episode, some efforts towards diluting the powers of the

PCC, and changes in the constitution we;-e aired. But Castro made abundantly clear

that at the party congress, the party presents goals and directions for the next five

54. Quoted in John Lister, Cuba: Radical Face of Stalinism (London: Left View Books, 1985), p.47.

55. ibid, p.49

years, includi11g economic and political directions. That party line will be followed by

the state and the mass organisations. If that did not happen, the party would be

discredited and there would be a political crisis. Initiatives for laws may come from

various sources--the party, the National Assembly, or others--but no one can go

against the programme. When the party line is being discussed in a party congress, it

can be changed. Even the constitution can be changed through the proper means. But

no one can go against the party line or against the Constitution. 56

In the preceding Chapter, Cuba's economic problems were discussed. The

factors responsibl~ for these problems were internal systemic

shortcomings--negligence, privileges, irresponsibility, corruption, indiscipline and

inefficiency. To overcome these problems, one of the measures suggested by Fidel

Castro was "to strengthen the authority of the administrator" .57 Other basic measure

adopted by the PCC was its own economic liberalisation programme--Economic

Planning and Management System (SDPE). SDPE was designed to provide greater

monetary incentives to increase efficiency and improve the distribution of labour force

between regions, economic sectors and enterprises.

SDPE enterprises were given financial autonomy, with the right to maintain a

bank account. They were free to apply to the National Bank for loans, which in

return were to be paid with interest within the stipulated time. Even the bank could

deny further credit to those that fail in their payments. This was aimed at

56. Ward, n.29, pp.66-7.

57. Roca, n.48, p.54.

encouraging the enterprises to operate efficiently. Against ''Che" Guevara's ideas of a

non-monetised less economy, material incentives were enhanced further with the

introduction of a system of bonuses (primas) and awards (primos). Late in 1978, the

conversion of the agricultural land in private hands into state property was slowed, if

not, stopped. Many people in the service sector--tailors, plumbers, auto mechanics,

carpenters--were allowed to operate freely. An entrepreneur was allowed to employ

upto five persons, including members of his or her family, in production or service

. chores. Not only this, to make workers more conscious, Cuba advanced its ambitious

social agenda. A ninth-grade education for all became a national goal. House-wives

went to night schools. The students worked half a day in the fields of nearby

agricultural enterprises. The linking of work and study pcrvaclecl Cuban education. It

was designed to acquaint all Cubans with the difficulties and dignity of manual labour.

Notsatisfied with the economic progress, 111 December 1977, Fidel Castro

accused that "our cadres have no export mentality, only import mentality. "5xi3ut the

output was not upto the m8rk. Castro admitted to the National Assembly that in 1979

only one-half of the necessary convenible currency was available and declared that the

1980 economic plan was "to be executed solely with our country's resources and

without any external loans. "59

In 1980, procurement (acopio) prices paid to producers were raised, and in

1981, consumer prices followed suit. Reforms were introduced to bring prices more

58. Quoted in George Volsky, "Cuba Twenty Years Later", Current 1/istory, vol. 76, no.444, February 1979, p.55. ·

59. Roca, n.49, p.54.

111 line with opportun~ty costs and with the market forces. These price changes were

designed to encourage profitability of enterprises and some degree of self-finance as

well as to bring supply and demand more in line with each other. The volume of

consumer commodities available for purchase increased. As a result, a worker's

interest in earning money in order to spend it could be intensified. Penalties were

established for habitual shirkers and free-riders, by means of an anti-loafing law. The

purpose of all these changes was to intensify the use of monetary and material rewards

as means of activating people for the tasks of the economy. Also, the parallel market \

(mercado paralelo) and the free peasant market (mercado fibre compesino) were

established. There was minimal state control upon the peasant's markets. Producers

interacted directly with consumers and prices were determined purely by supply and

demand.

The SDPE advocated decentralisation and managerial discretion, allowed

greater play of market forces, introduced methods to increase efficiency of enter-

pnses, elaborated a series of material incentives, proposed self-financing and

encouraged workers participation. The purpose of SDPE was clearly to improve the

flexibility, running and efficiency of the economy. There was less emphasis on the

diversification of the economy. The production and export of sugar remained the

fundamental economic activity. In November 1980, Castro admitted that

the sugar industry is today the axis of our economy ... because everything else can function weil only if we have foreign exchange ... and the st.:gar industry is the greatest producer of both socialist and convertible foreign exchange. 60

60. ibid, p. 55.

By the end of 1980, economy was rushing out of the control of the leadership.

Raul Castro blamed bureaucracy for the creeping problems:

The main ones to blame for all these weaknesses and the lack of work discipline are not the workers but the managers and functionaries of enterprises who, we know, fiddle with the statistics, reporting land ready or planted when it is not, production that hasn't been done, using and abusing the prerogatives that go with their post and the resources of their enterprises to solve problems of their own and their friends. They have no standing when it comes to bring demanding of others .... 61

Also, Castro warned that "we have not sacrificed, nor will we ever sacrifice,

quality for the sake of quantity". In a similar vein, he added it is necessary to

preserve, above all, "the revolutionary morale, authority, prestige and example of the

communist militants. "02

In his closing speech at the first congress, Castro said that Cuba would never

abandon its principled policy of supporting liberation movements and defending

peoples subjected to imperialist aggression. "If this price is demanded of us," he said

at a mass meeting in Havana, "we shall never have relations with the United States in

spite of the fact that the policy of our Revolution is a policy of peace and cooperation

with countries whose ideology and social system differs from ours. "1'3

•

61. Quoted in Lister, n.54, p.35.

62. Quoted in Tzvi Medin, Cuba: 71ze Shaping of Revolutiona1y Consciousness (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p.62.

63. Quoted in 0. Darusenkov, "Cuba on the Road to Socialism," Intemational Affairs (Moscow), no.3, March 1976, p.53.

In the early 1960s, Cuba aided t!Je Algerians in their struggle for imlcpcndellce

against France. In 1964, "Che" Guevara led a small force of Cubans to equatorial

Africa to participate in the struggle of Congo against Belgian colonialism. In 1967,

''Che" Guevara lost his life in Bolivia when he was on a mission to bu~ld a

revolutionary movement there. Given Cuba's African heritage, Castro expressed:

"We are a Latin American and Latin African nation as well. African blood tlows

freely through our veins. Many of our ancestors came as slaves from Africa. "04 In

1975, Castro launched "Operation Carlotta", air! ifting thousands of troops to Angola,

to help save the socialist regime of Agostino Neto. Cuba's ground forces were

involved in direct combat against Movimento Popular Para a Liberacao de Angola

(MPLA) opponents. From training of soldiers to fighting in the battle field, all was

under the Cuban military Command. Finally, the victory of MPLA was only due to

the active role that Cubans played. In 1977-78, Cuba entered in the Ethiopian crisis

and played a vital role. Thus, in the era of Cold War, "owing to its role in Angola

and Ethiopia, Cuba gained the status of a privileged ally !of Soviet Union!, which

yielded increased leverage in insisting on increased economic and military aid from

the Soviet Union. "65

In Grenada and Nicaragua in 1979, Cuba with its strongest interest and

knowledge of the Caribbean Basin, took the initiative which initially led to

establishing of relations with Grenada's New Jewel Movement (NJM) and 111

64. Quoted in George W. Grayson, "Cuba's Developing Policies", Current History, vol.72, no.424, February 1977, p.5l. ·

65. R. Narayanan, "The Role of Cuba in Africa", Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi), vol.27, no.5, May 1978, p.9l.

supporting Nicaragua's Sanclinistas before they defeated Somoza in July 1979.06 In

the case of Nicaragua, the Cubans were even more open and independent because they

directly aided the Sandinistas in their coming to power. The Sandinista National

Liberation Front (FSLN) received little Soviet attention during its struggle against

Somoza in 1978. Cuba helped train the FSLN, and the Cuban military advisers were

with FSLN colun1ns fighting in the final offensive in Mid-1979. Havana's

commitment to the victorious Sandinista armed struggle and revolutionary changes in

Nicaragua intluenced Moscow to revise its position on the efficacy of armed struggle

in Central America. n?

Also, Castro strongly opposed the US concept of "nco-globalism" by which

was meant the anti-communist activities of the US against Soviet Union's Third

World Marxist-Leninist clients in countries like Afghanistan, Angola, Libya and

Nicaragua. Castro as president of the Non-aligned Movement, in September 1979,

addressed the United Nations General Assembly ancl pledged for a New International

Economic Order for a just and exploitation-free world.

66. For more details see Herbert Apthekar, "Lynching of Grenada". Political Affairs (New York, NY), vol.62, no.l2, December 1983, pp.33-8; R. Narayanan, "Latin America: More Grenaclas?," World Focus (New Dclh i), vol.l6, no.!, January 1985, pp. 24-8.

67. For more details see D. Gilbert, "Sandinistas in Power," Latin American Research Review (Pittsburgh, Pa), vol.l9, no.2, 1984, pp.214-19; R. Narayanan, "Nicaragua: Where Reagan Goes Wrong". Mainstream (New Delhi), vol.23, 3 March 1984, pp.8-9; and "Latin A111erica : I !egemonic Perceptions", World Focus, vol.3. no.2, February 1982, pp. 14-6.

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