i Fire PreParation, resPonse and recovery THE HON. BERNARD TEAGUE AO – CHAIRPERSON RONALD MCLEOD AM – COMMISSIONER SUSAN PASCOE AM – COMMISSIONER ORDERED TO BE PRINTED July 2010 By Authority Government Printer for the State of Victoria PP No. 332 – Session 2006-10 FinaL rePort voLume ii Part one
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i
Fire PreParation, resPonse and recovery
The hon. Bernard Teague ao – ChairPErSON
ronald Mcleod aM – COmmiSSiONEr
SuSan PaScoe aM – COmmiSSiONEr
ordered To Be PrInTed
July 2010
By authority
Government Printer for the State of Victoria
PP No. 332 – Session 2006-10
FinaL rePort voLume ii Part one
volume ii: Fire Preparation, response and recovery
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volume ii: Fire Preparation, response and recovery
Parliament of Victoria 2009 Victorian Bushfires royal Commission iSBN 978-0-9807408-3-7 Published July 2010
iSBN Summary 978-0-9807408-1-3 Volume i 978-0-9807408-2-0 Volume iii 978-0-9807408-4-4 Volume iV 978-0-9807408-5-1
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The Commission is conscious of the wide interest in its report—not only in Victoria but elsewhere in australia and internationally. its readership will be broad and readers’ interests will vary. Some chapters will be of keen interest to many, including people affected by the late January and February 2009 bushfires. Other chapters are directed at a more technical readership and might be of interest to academics or practitioners. Governments and their agencies will probably examine the entire report in detail, seeking to understand its implications for policy, operational practices and service delivery.
in view of this broad audience, the Commission tried to make its report as accessible as possible, without undue technicalities, and thus more easily read by the general public. Each chapter is designed to stand alone to help readers who might have more discrete interests. Such an approach inevitably results in some repetition. Each chapter’s introductory remarks provide brief background information, describe the chapter’s purpose, and summarise the essential position the Commission is advocating.
The report is available in hard-copy and digital form. The digital version contains links to the evidence for those interested in seeing additional detail about the material discussed (the transcript and exhibits) and submissions. The report was written with electronic production in mind, and this influenced decisions about matters such as the presentation of endnotes.
Following are some of the terms used in the report in the interests of consistency and simplicity:
bunkers—when referring to personal bushfire shelters■■
community refuges—rather than designated refuges ■■
bushfire shelters—rather than neighbourhood safer places, except where the current policy framework ■■
is being discussed
roadblocks—rather than traffic management points■■
code red days—rather than Code red/Catastrophic days■■
stay or go—to refer to Victoria’s bushfire safety policy■■
vulnerable people—incorporating groups such as young people, older people, the ill and the infirm.■■
Technical terms are, however, used if a direct reference is made to existing government policy or in a direct quote, to ensure that the meaning is conveyed accurately. Further, some of the terms used in this report differ from those used in the Commission’s interim report. The decision to use different terminology is based on new evidence and a desire to simplify and clarify the language used.
The Commission recognises that a number of different terms are used to describe bushfires—for example, wildfire and megafire, as used in the United States. To ensure consistency and minimise confusion, this report uses the term ‘bushfire’ in all instances other than when referring to the name of a policy or report. The Commission also tends to use the words ‘ferocious’ and ‘severe’ to describe the type of fire that occurred on 7 February.
For simplicity, the Commission also uses the term ‘wind change’ generically when referring to the complex interaction between changes in the wind’s direction and fire behaviour. Chapter 1 in Volume i discusses the impact of wind on fire behaviour and the nature of the wind change on Black Saturday.
Overall, the Commission did not reach a firm view about the appropriateness of using any of these terms beyond its final report, but it does note a preference for plain language. in Chapter 11 in Volume ii the Commission expresses support for further work being done in order to identify the best words to use in public communications about bushfire.
Three other conventions applied in this report warrant mention. First, for consistency with fire agencies’ use in bushfire warnings and other measurements of time, the 24-hour clock is used in the discussion of the fires in Part One of Volume i. Throughout the rest of the report the 12-hour clock is used to refer to time. Second, although metric measures are generally used in the report, imperial measures are used if they reflect more commonly understood terminology—for example, a quarter-acre block.
Third, readers should bear in mind that the Commission draws a distinction between ‘State’ and ‘state’. The State refers generically to the mechanisms of the Victorian Government, including the departments and agencies that were collectively represented as parties before the Commission. in contrast, the state is used in reference to Victoria as a place or geographic entity.
A note for reAders
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Contents
PART ONE
A NOTE fOR REAdERs iii
INTROducTION xvi–xixthe impliCAtions for poliCy reform xvi
ThE RuRAl–uRbAN INTERfAcE xvi
clImATE chANgE xvi
struCture of this volume xvii
1 VIcTORIA’s bushfIRE sAfETy POlIcy 1–681.1 stAying or going 3
1.2 the poliCy At 7 februAry 4
1.2.1 ThE EmPIRIcAl bAsIs fOR ThE sTAy OR gO POlIcy 5
1.2.2 cOmmuNITy EducATION 6
1.3 lessons before 7 februAry 7
1.4 lessons from 7 februAry 8
1.4.1 WhAT PEOPlE dId 10
1.4.2 ThE PEOPlE WhO lEfT 10
1.4.3 ThE PEOPlE WhO sTAyEd 14
1.4.4 VulNERAblE PEOPlE 17
1.4.5 bushfIRE AWARENEss ANd kNOWlEdgE 17
1.4.6 PREPARATION ANd PlANNINg 19
1.4.7 PlAcEs Of shElTER 19
1.4.8 ThE PsychOlOgIcAl ImPAcT 21
1.5 ChAnges sinCe 7 februAry 22
1.5.1 ThE sTAy OR gO POlIcy 22
1.5.2 INfORmATION ANd WARNINgs 25
1.5.3 EmERgENcy cAlls 28
1.5.4 EVAcuATION ANd REfugE 28
1.6 towArds A better bushfire sAfety poliCy 31
1.6.1 EVERy fIRE Is dIffERENT 31
1.6.2 humAN bEhAVIOuR VARIEs 32
1.6.3 AdVIcE ANd lOcAl PlANNINg ARE cRucIAl 32
1.7 the revised poliCy frAmework 32
1.8 before A bushfire 34
1.8.1 buIldINg ON ThE sTRENgThs Of ThE ExIsTINg POlIcy: lEAVINg EARly 34
1.8.2 cONTINuINg cOmmuNITy AdVIcE ANd ENgAgEmENT 34
1.8.3 cRucIAl kNOWlEdgE 35
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1.8.4 lOcAl PlANNINg fOR bushfIRE sAfETy 37
1.8.5 INdIVIduAl PlANNINg ANd PREPARATION 41
1.8.6 IdENTIfIcATION ANd dEVElOPmENT Of shElTER OPTIONs 42
1.8.7 PlANNINg fOR EVAcuATION 48
1.9 during A bushfire 50
1.9.1 WARNINgs ON sPEcIfIc bushfIRE ThREATs 50
1.9.2 EmERgENcy EVAcuATION 52
1.9.3 sTAy ANd dEfENd 53
1.9.4 ThE blAck sATuRdAy uPgRAdE 54
1.10 After A bushfire 54
1.10.1 gAThERINg INfORmATION ANd REsEARch 54
1.10.2 mONITORINg ANd REVIEW 54
1.11 the bigger piCture 55
1.11.1 schOOl EducATION 55
1.11.2 REmEmbERINg 56
2 EmERgENcy ANd INcIdENT mANAgEmENT 69–1102.1 primAry ConCerns 70
2.2 prepArAtion And plAnning 71
2.2.1 PREPARATIONs fOR 7 fEbRuARy 71
2.2.2 PlANNINg fOR jOINT INcIdENT mANAgEmENT TEAms 72
2.3 leAdership And CommAnd 73
2.3.1 PRImARy fuNcTIONs Of EmERgENcy mANAgEmENT: cOmmANd, cONTROl ANd cOORdINATION 73
2.3.2 ThE PRImARy POsITIONs ON 7 fEbRuARy 74
2.3.3 ThE mAIN fAcIlITIEs ANd fuNcTIONs ON 7 fEbRuARy 75
2.3.4 cONTROl AT ThE sTATE lEVEl 75
2.3.5 ThE fuNdAmENTAl REsPONsIbIlITy Of ThOsE IN cOmmANd 78
2.3.6 chIEf OffIcERs 79
2.3.7 VIcTORIA POlIcE 82
2.3.8 ThE chIEf cOmmIssIONER Of POlIcE 83
2.4 the minister And emergenCy mAnAgement 84
2.4.1 ROlE Of ThE mINIsTER 84
2.4.2 kEEPINg ThE mINIsTER INfORmEd 85
2.5 A stAte of disAster 86
2.5.1 lAck Of AdVIcE 86
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2.6 using Aiims And whAt CAn be improved 87
2.6.1 cONTROl Of INcIdENTs 88
2.6.2 ThE INfORmATION uNIT 88
2.6.3 ThE dEPuTy INcIdENT cONTROllER 89
2.6.4 lOcAl kNOWlEdgE 90
2.7 informAtion shAring on 7 februAry 91
2.7.1 INfORmATION shARINg: INcIdENT AcTION PlANs 91
2.7.2 INcIdENT AcTION PlANs: ThE WAy AhEAd 93
2.8 AgenCy integrAtion 94
2.8.1 ThE INTEgRATEd EmERgENcy cOORdINATION cENTRE 94
2.8.2 A lAck Of INTEgRATEd sysTEms 94
2.9 fACilities for inCident mAnAgement And CoordinAtion 97
2.9.1 INcIdENT cONTROl cENTREs 97
2.9.2 muNIcIPAl EmERgENcy cOORdINATION cENTREs 97
2.9.3 lEVEl 3 INcIdENT cONTROllERs 98
2.9.4 VOluNTEERs 99
2.9.5 TRAINEEs 100
2.10 roAdbloCks during the 2009 viCtoriAn bushfires 101
6.5.1 clAusE 15.09: cONsERVATION Of NATIVE flORA ANd fAuNA 241
6.5.2 clAusE 52.17: NATIVE VEgETATION 242
6.5.3 clAusE 52.43: ThE 10/30 RulE 243
6.5.4 ENVIRONmENTAl ANd lANdscAPE OVERlAys 243
6.6 bAlAnCing the ConservAtion of nAtive vegetAtion And the mAnAgement of bushfire risk 244
6.6.1 ThE 10/30 RulE: bIOdIVERsITy cONcERNs 244
6.6.2 cONsIdERATION Of bushfIRE hAzARd by ThE dEPARTmENT Of susTAINAbIlITy ANd ENVIRONmENT 245
6.6.3 NATIVE VEgETATION OffsETs 245
6.6.4 bIOdIVERsITy mAPPINg 246
6.6.5 fIRE-REsIsTANT VEgETATION 246
6.7 loCAl plAnning sChemes 247
6.8 high-risk AreAs 249
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6.9 building regulAtion 252
6.9.1 As 3959: cONsTRucTION Of buIldINgs IN bushfIRE-PRONE AREAs 254
6.9.2 REVIsION Of As 3959-1999 254
6.9.3 PublIcATION ANd AdOPTION Of As 3959-2009 255
6.9.4 AccEss TO ThE buIldINg cOdE Of AusTRAlIA ANd AusTRAlIAN sTANdARds 256
6.9.5 As 3959-2009 257
6.10 bushfire bunkers 262
6.11 bushfire sprinklers 262
6.12 retrofitting of buildings 263
6.13 enforCement And mAintenAnCe of plAnning And building Conditions 264
6.13.1 PlANNINg PERmIT cONdITIONs 264
6.13.2 buIldINg mAINTENANcE 265
6.13.3 chEcks AT ThE POINT Of sAlE 266
6.14 muniCipAl fire prevention 267
6.15 eduCAtion And trAining 267
7 lANd ANd fuEl mANAgEmENT 277–3207.1 the expert pAnel 279
7.2 the impACt of presCribed burning on bushfire 280
7.2.1 EffEcTIVENEss Of PREscRIbEd buRNINg 280
7.3 leArning from others 284
7.3.1 WEsTERN AusTRAlIA 284
7.3.2 ThE us fOREsT sERVIcE 286
7.3.3 NEW sOuTh WAlEs 288
7.4 presCribed burning in viCtoriA 288
7.4.1 ThE PAsT 289
7.4.2 ThE PREsENT 291
7.4.3 TARgETs 292
7.4.4 cOsTs 295
7.4.5 fIRE EcOlOgy 296
7.4.6 ThE cOdE Of PRAcTIcE 298
7.5 fuel breAks 304
7.5.1 VIcTORIA PlANNINg PROVIsIONs ExEmPTIONs 304
7.5.2 ThE PRO fORmA OffER 305
7.6 roAdside CleAring 305
7.6.1 mANAgEmENT Of ROAds 306
7.6.2 ThE OblIgATION TO REducE bushfIRE RIsk 306
7.6.3 ThE OblIgATION TO PROTEcT ThE ENVIRONmENT 306
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7.6.4 cOmPlExITy ANd cOmPETINg ObjEcTIVEs 308
7.6.5 mANAgEmENT Of fIRE RIsk by cOuNcIls 308
7.6.6 VIcROAds ANd mANAgEmENT Of fIRE RIsk 309
7.6.7 ThE cfA ANd ROAdsIdE WORks 310
7.6.8 ROAd sAfETy duRINg fIREs 311
7.6.9 ROAdsIdE VEgETATION ANd fIRE bEhAVIOuR 312
7.6.10 fIREWOOd 313
8 RElIEf ANd REcOVERy 321–3508.1 plAnning 324
8.2 prepArAtion for relief And reCovery 326
8.3 during And After the fires 326
8.3.1 fIRsT AId 327
8.3.2 WElfARE chEcks 328
8.4 CounCil relief And reCovery Centres 329
8.5 informAl relief Centres And Community initiAtives 330
8.6 nAtionAl registrAtion And inquiry system 332
8.7 CommonweAlth support for reCovery 333
8.8 viCtoriAn bushfire reConstruCtion And reCovery Authority 334
8.9 trAumA 336
8.9.1 lONg-TERm EffEcTs Of TRAumA 337
8.10 Community 338
8.11 insurAnCe And reCovery 339
8.12 other reCovery issues 341
8.12.1 ENVIRONmENT 341
8.12.2 fOddER 343
8.12.3 ANImAls 344
8.13 the future 345
9 shAREd REsPONsIbIlITy 351–3589.1 the Commission’s view 352
9.2 stAte AgenCies And muniCipAl CounCils 352
9.3 individuAls 353
9.4 households 354
9.5 Communities 354
9.6 ComplACenCy 354
9.7 Community memory 355
9.8 deCision mAking 356
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10 ORgANIsATIONAl sTRucTuRE 359–39010.1 Current ArrAngements 360
10.1.1 ThE cOuNTRy fIRE AuThORITy 360
10.1.2 ThE dEPARTmENT Of susTAINAbIlITy ANd ENVIRONmENT 361
10.1.3 ThE mETROPOlITAN fIRE bRIgAdE 363
10.1.4 OThER bOdIEs ANd cOORdINATION ARRANgEmENTs 363
10.1.5 INTEROPERAbIlITy 364
10.2 the need for operAtionAl improvement And reform 365
10.2.1 OPERATIONAl shORTcOmINgs 365
10.2.2 gOVERNANcE, POlIcy ANd lEgIslATIVE mATTERs 367
10.2.3 OThER cONsIdERATIONs 368
10.3 options for ChAnge: proposAls to the Commission 369
10.3.1 ThE sTATE’s POsITION 370
10.3.2 OThER VIEWs 371
10.4 other models And pAst reviews 371
10.4.1 ThE sITuATION INTERsTATE 371
10.4.2 ThE sITuATION IN ThE uNITEd sTATEs 372
10.4.3 PREVIOus REVIEWs 372
10.4.4 lAck Of cONsENsus 373
10.5 the Commission’s view 373
10.5.1 PROmOTINg OPERATIONAl ImPROVEmENT ANd REfORm 375
10.5.2 bETTER mANAgEmENT Of lEVEl 3 fIREs 375
10.5.3 AccOmmOdATINg ThE POTENTIAl fOR fuTuRE chANgE 375
10.5.4 ThE PROPOsEd cOuRsE: A fIRE cOmmIssIONER fOR VIcTORIA 375
10.5.5 ThE ExIsTINg fIRE AgENcIEs 377
10.6 impliCAtions of the new struCture 379
10.6.1 POsITIONs 379
10.6.2 bOuNdARy chANgEs 380
10.7 funding And the fire serviCes levy 381
10.7.1 INEquITy 382
10.7.2 lAck Of TRANsPARENcy 384
10.7.3 cONclusION 384
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11 REsEARch ANd EVAluATION 391–40011.1 bushfire reseArCh in AustrAliA 392
11.1.1 ThE bushfIRE cOOPERATIVE REsEARch cENTRE 393
11.1.2 OThER REsEARch INsTITuTIONs 393
11.2 reseArCh gAps And priorities 394
11.3 ChAllenges 395
11.3.1 lONg-TERm, sEcuRE fuNdINg 395
11.3.2 chANgINg ThE REsEARch AgENdA 395
11.3.3 bAlANcINg PuRE ANd APPlIEd REsEARch 396
11.3.4 cOORdINATINg ANd dEVElOPINg PRIORITIEs fOR bushfIRE REsEARch 397
11.4 A proposed model for future reseArCh 397
11.5 evAluAtion And Continuing poliCy development 398
12 mONITORINg ImPlEmENTATION 401–40612.1 the royAl Commission 402
12.2 the interim reports 402
12.2.1 ImPlEmENTATION 402
12.3 the finAl report 404
12.3.1 fAcIlITATINg ANd mONITORINg ImPlEmENTATION 404
12.3.2 cONTINuINg ImPlEmENTATION ANd EVAluATION 405
APPENdIx A 408government poliCy ChAnges sinCe 7 februAry 2009
APPENdIx b 409–414plAnning And building regulAtory frAmeworks
APPENdIx c 415–417the muniCipAl frAmework
shORTENEd fORms 418–420
glOssARy 421–429
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volume ii: Fire Preparation, response and recovery
introduction
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it is imperative that the Victorian community learn from the experience of 7 February 2009. Government regulation, policies and procedures need to change so they better recognise the risk of death from ferocious bushfires and work to substantially mitigate that risk. individuals and communities need to better understand bushfire and be more active in preparing for and responding to fire. it is only through a joint effort between government and citizens—an effort giving priority to saving lives—that the risk of repeating Black Saturday can be reduced.
Volume ii of the Commission’s final report builds on the material in Volume i, which describes the progress of the fires and the circumstances of the deaths of the 173 people who died as a result of the 7 February fires. Volume ii develops the main themes that were identified, analyses the lessons learnt, and makes recommendations on what can be done to reduce the risk and impact of future fires. it also considers policy, regulatory and organisational matters related to bushfire safety.
the impliCAtions for poliCy reform
although the fires of January–February 2009 were catastrophic, they were not the first fires to gravely affect the State of Victoria. The outcome of these fires, however—especially the loss of life—surpassed that of past fires. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to treat these fires as unprecedented or a ‘one-off’ event unlikely to be repeated and thus ignore the lessons to be learnt.
Fires are part of the australian environment, and the states in the south-east of the continent are most at risk. it is possible, too, that the risks associated with bushfires are increasing as a result of population changes at the rural–urban interface and the probable impacts of climate change.1
The rural–urBan InTerface
The rural–urban interface is where the suburbs meet the bush—‘where human habitation sits alongside areas of vegetation’—and is an area particularly at risk of bushfires caused by humans, including fires that are deliberately lit.2
The six fastest growing municipalities in melbourne—Wyndham, melton, hume, Whittlesea, Cardinia and the City of Casey—are all at the rural–urban interface, and between 2006 and 2026 their population is projected to increase by 200,000.3 Population growth in areas close to bushland increases the risk of fires starting and makes the potential consequences of fire more severe.4
Substantial population growth is also expected in many other parts of Victoria, among them regional centres, coastal areas, rural areas around melbourne, alpine areas and along the murray river.5
although the population is projected to increase in these areas, communities’ capacity to respond to bushfires will not necessarily increase at the same rate.6 There are two main reasons for this:
People who move from melbourne to rural and regional areas typically have little or no bushfire awareness. ■■
Population change is expected to lead to an increased proportion of older Victorians—that is, Victorians aged ■■
60 years and older—living in rural areas.
Both these demographic factors could affect the ‘levels of direct participation by individual community members in volunteer fire brigades, and … the personal resources available to individuals and households to prepare for and protect themselves against bushfire’.7
clIMaTe change
To augment its understanding of climate change and the potential impacts on bushfire prevalence in australia, the Commission invited mr Kevin hennessy to give evidence before it. mr hennessy has been a Principal research Scientist with CSirO since 1987 and has expertise in the development of australian climate change projections. in 2007, as a member of the UN intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, he was among the recipients of the
introduCtion
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Nobel Peace Prize.8 The evidence mr hennessy presented to the Commission was based on peer-reviewed literature and was not contested by the parties in the hearings.9 The Commission therefore used this evidence as the basis for its conclusions, which are also consistent with the views of the State of Victoria and of australia’s leading climate science agencies.
The Victorian Government has acknowledged that climate change is one of the ‘greatest challenges facing Victoria, australia and the global community’, and the Premier, the hon. John Brumby mP, has stated that his Government is ‘committed to meeting the climate change challenge and committed to driving down greenhouse gas emissions’.10 in November 2009 the Premier asked the Victorian Parliament to accept ‘the overwhelming scientific consensus that human activity is causing global warming’ and urged ‘effective action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate the effects of climate change’.11 The Government’s position is supported by both the Bureau of meteorology and CSirO, which recognise that climate change is likely to magnify the factors associated with bushfire risk.12
Bushfire risk and bushfires’ severity are greater with higher temperatures, higher wind speeds, lower humidity and extended periods of drought. meteorological data show that australia’s average annual temperatures have increased by 0.9°C since 1910, most of this increase occurring since 1950. in south-east australia rainfall has decreased.13
Since 1973 droughts have become more intense as a consequence of the warmer average temperatures and decreased rainfall.14 an analysis of Forest Fire Danger index data for a range of sites in Victoria from 1974 to 2003 shows an upward trend in the rating associated with an increase in the number of days of very high and extreme fire danger.15
Climate change is also likely to increase the risk of heatwaves, hot days and dry conditions in Victoria, contributing to increased fire risk with time.16 in a report prepared for the Commission, mr hennessy stated:
Climate scientists have looked very closely at natural external forcing factors that have affected climate over the 20th century. Through these studies, they have been able to determine that none of these natural processes can explain the sustained rise in global temperature that has been observed. rather, changes due to natural forcing have been superimposed on a background warming trend, and it is very likely that most of the observed global warming since the mid 20th century is due to anthropogenic increases in greenhouse gases.17
in its formal hearings the Commission took limited evidence on the subject of climate change because it was persuaded by mr hennessy’s conclusions, which, as noted, are consistent with the opinions of the Bureau of meteorology and CSirO, australia’s leading climate science agencies. The Commission is aware of debate in the scientific community about the causes of climate change, but it did not see value in entering this debate when the Bureau of meteorology and CSirO, as well as Victoria and the Commonwealth, have concluded—as have the Commissioners themselves—that climate change is affecting the australian environment and its weather patterns.
struCture of this volume
State, Commonwealth and local government policy and regulation and their response to bushfire, the activities of emergency services, and the actions of individuals and communities are the subject of this volume, which also presents the Commission’s recommendations in relation to those areas.
The Commission recommends a major review of the policy framework for supporting members of the Victorian community in maintaining a safe lifestyle despite the occasional occurrence of serious bushfires. it examined the systems and structures needed to ensure that government, emergency services agencies and individuals make informed, effective decisions in connection with bushfires in such a way as to minimise loss of life and other damage. These matters are discussed in Chapter 1, ‘Victoria’s bushfire safety policy’, Chapter 2, ‘Emergency and incident management’, and Chapter 3, ‘Fireground response’.
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The risk of fires starting should be reduced wherever possible. The evidence on the 15 fires the Commission examined makes it clear that most of these fires started as a direct or indirect result of human activity. The failure of electricity assets and fires that are suspected of being either deliberately or accidentally lit were the most common causes. The Commission discusses and makes recommendations in relation to how the incidence of such fires might be reduced in Chapter 4, ‘Electricity-caused fires’, and Chapter 5, ‘Deliberately lit fires’.
The Commission also looked at ways of limiting the loss of human life caused by bushfires and reducing exposure to and the intensity of fires when they do break out. recommendations in this regard are presented in Chapter 6, ‘Planning and building’, and Chapter 7, ‘Land and fuel management’.
Chapter 8, ‘relief and recovery’, discusses helping people recover from the impacts of fires. The Commission is mindful that recovery is a long process and, because this process has a long way to go in the case of the January–February 2009 fires, it is too soon to evaluate the entire recovery program. The Commission focused instead on the response immediately after the fires and how government might later assess and improve its long-term recovery strategies.
The Commission also recognised the need to look at priorities in the long term, with a view to creating an environment in which individuals, communities and fire agencies all give more emphasis to community safety, using the experience of and lessons learnt from the Black Saturday fires. These matters are discussed in Chapter 9, ‘Shared responsibility’, Chapter 10, ‘Organisational structure’, and Chapter 11, ‘research and evaluation’.
Finally, the Commission acknowledges that all governments, and particularly the State of Victoria, have made a considerable number of changes to bushfire policies and approaches since 7 February. The State’s decision to have its response to the recommendations made in the Commission’s interim report independently reviewed by mr Neil Comrie, former Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police, is commended.
From now, though, there will no longer be a royal commission to automatically keep a focus on implementing reform. in the light of the experience of past bushfire inquiries—when many recommendations have been only partially implemented or not implemented at all and moves for reform have lost their momentum with the passage of time—in Chapter 12, ‘monitoring and implementation’, the Commission outlines a framework for ensuring that government agencies’ progress in implementing the Commission’s recommendations is reported on, independently and transparently, to government and the community.
While dealing with a complex and varied range of topics in this volume, the Commission strove to ensure consistency and coherence throughout the analysis and recommendations. as noted in the introduction to the Commission’s entire report (see Volume i), the recommendations are framed broadly and their rationale is detailed in the surrounding text. readers wanting to probe further into evidence that was presented to the Commission and the views of parties who appeared before it are encouraged to read the transcript of hearings, the submissions of counsel assisting and the responses from the parties. This material will be available on the Commission’s website for 12 months and after that will be available through the website of the Department of Premier and Cabinet.
The recommendations and suggestions the Commission makes in Volume ii are formulated against the background of the types of fires that ravaged Victoria on 7 February. Those fires were as ferocious as any that had previously beset the state. as a consequence, the Commission was particularly focused on identifying the changes that are needed to better prepare the State for dealing with similar circumstances when they next occur.
Not all the recommendations have equal relevance to the preparation for and response to bushfires of lesser intensity. The Commission expects that the State and its agencies will sensibly reflect the thrust of what is proposed in a way that graduates the implementation of change so as to maximise its relevance to different bushfire circumstances.
The Commission considers that adoption of its recommendations will strengthen the fire agencies’ capacity to deal with a wider range of bushfire possibilities than were envisaged by the previous operational arrangements and practices. if this does occur the overall capabilities of the agencies will expand and community protection will improve.