Ignacia Diaz vs. Ana De LeonG.R. No. 17714, May 31, 1992
Facts:
Jesus De Leon, the testator, executed 2 wills, shortly after the
execution of the first will, he asked it to be returned to him and
ordered his servant to tear the document. The first will was
destroyed in the presence of a nurse. After some time, Dr. Cornelio
Mapa asked the testator about the will, the testator said that it
had been destroyed.
The petitioner argued that there was no revocation of the first
will, while the contestant argued that the testator revoked his
will by destroying it, and by executing another will expressly
revoking the first will.
Issue:
Is the revocation of the first will made by the testator
valid?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the revocation made by the
testator was valid. Although the second will was found to not have
satisfied the requisites in order to constitute a revocation, the
destruction of a will animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a
sufficient revocation (Sec.623, Code of Civil Procedure). The
testators intention of revoking the will is also manifest from the
fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or change the
provisions he had made in his first will.
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA
JUAN VDA. DE MOLOvs.LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLOG.R. No. L-2538,
Sept. 21 1951
Facts:
Mariano Molo y Legazpi, the testator, executed 2 wills, the
first one on August 17, 1918 and the second one on June 20, 1939.
The testator died on January 24, 1941 without leaving any forced
heir either in the descending or ascending line. However, he was
survived, by his wife, the petitioner, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and
by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria
and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children
of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator.
Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, the widow, filed a petition for the
probate of the second will. The second will that was executed in
1939 was admitted to probate but was subsequently set aside on
ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution and
due to the petition of the oppositors.
Due to the disallowance of the the June 20, 1939 will, the widow
filed a petition for the probate of the August 17, 1918 will.
Issue:
Can the August 17, 1918 will still be valid despite its
revocation in the disallowed June 20, 1939 will?
Held:
Yes. It was held by the Supreme Court that the August 17, 1918
can still be valid because the June 20, 1939 was disallowed for the
reason that it was not executed in accordance with law and thus
cannot revoke the previous will. The revocatory clause was held as
void and therefore there was no valid revocation.
The August 17, 1918 will can still be probated under the
principle of dependent relative revocation. The doctrine applies
when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an
instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a
new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new
disposition fails of effect for some reason.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO
CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLOvs.COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO
MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTOG.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988
Facts:
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her
niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and
Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and
Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a
last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4,
1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's
estate.
On February 1, 1964, the parties (Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo,
and Felino) executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of
Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of the
estate into four equal parts among the parties.
Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio
Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel discovered a
document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated
January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of
Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the
original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the
cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas.
Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs
in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger
and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they
received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement
they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and
legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo
de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion
Miraflor.
Due to this, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by
the other devisees and legatees named in the will filed a petition
in court for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings
therein and for the allowance of the will. The will was allegedly
burned by the househelp under the instruction of the testatrix.
The lower court denied the probate on the ground that theanimus
revocandiin the burning of the will was sufficiently proven.
Issue:
Is there a valid revocation of the will?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that there was no valid revocation of
the will because the intent to revoke the will and whether the
paper burned was really the will was not established.
Revocation through animus revocandi requires that the testatrix
herself or another under his express direction and presence, which
in this case was not established, therefore not satisfying the
requirement and making no revocation.
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.FRANCISCO GAGOvs.CORNELIO
MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA
MAMUYACG.R. No. L-26317, January 29, 1927
Facts:
Miguel Mamuyac, the testator, executed 3 wills, one on July 27,
1918, one on April 16, 1919, and another on 1920.
Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of
Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged
that the will was already revoked and that the testator executed
another will on April 16, 1919. The petition for probate was denied
because of the said second will.
Francisco Gago then filed a petition for the probate of the
second will of Miguel Mamuyac. The oppositors alleged that the
second will presented by Francisco Gago was merely a carbon copy,
that the same has been revoked, and that the said will was not the
will of the testator. The probation of said will of April 16, 1919
was denied upon the ground that the same had been cancelled and
revoked in the year 1920.
Issue:
Is there a valid revocation of the will?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court
that the April 16, 1919 will was already cancelled in 1920. In view
of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after
the death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the
positive proof that the same had been cancelled, the Supreme Court
sided with the lower court. It was presumed that the missing will
that was last seen in the possession of a testator, in the absence
of other competent evidence, was cancelled or destroyed.
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONALvs.EVANGELINE R.
CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGASG.R. No. 123486,
August 12, 1999
Facts:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and
Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of
the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for
probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on
January 16, 1990. In the petition, respondents claimed that the
deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing
mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was
no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the
testator, and the will was written voluntarily.The assessed value
of the decedents property, including all real and personal property
was aboutP400,000.00, at the time of her death.On June 28, 1990,
Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an oppositionto the
petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a
forgery and that the same is even illegible.Petitioners argued that
the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and
trickery.Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various
documentary evidence.Petitioners instead of presenting their
evidence, filed a demurrerto evidence, claiming that respondents
failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the
probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal.The Lower court granted the demurrer. The respondents the
filed a notice of appeal and in support reiterated the testimony of
the 6 witnesses. The Court of Appeals reversed the Lower Courts
decision.
Issue:
Is Article 811 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines
mandatory?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals and ruled that Article 811 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines which states that in the probate of a holographic will,
it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that
the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator.
If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be
required. is mandatory
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.
BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELASvs.AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL.G.R. No.
L-58509, December 7, 1982
Facts:
Ricardo B. Bonilla, the testator, executed a holographic will on
January 25, 1962. He died on May 13, 1976. On January 11, 1977,
appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will
of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground
that the deceased did not leave any will.
The Lower Court dismissed the petition for probate since the
original will was lost and they held that a photocopy cannot stand
in lieu of the original in a probate.
Issue:
Can a holographic will be proved by means of a photocopy?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that a holographic will can be
proven by a photocopy because then the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
The will may still be probated given that all the requisites
required by law are satisfied.
TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO
E. GANvs.ILDEFONSO YAPG.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958
Facts:On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of
heart failure in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving
properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.On March
17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated proceedings in court with a
petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed
by the deceased.Opposing the petition, her surviving husband
Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor
executed any testament during her lifetime. The will itself was not
presented, Gan tried to establish its contents.After hearing the
parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose,
Judge refused to probate the alleged will that resulted to this
appeal.Issue:May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony
of witnesses who have seen the will and declare that it was the
handwriting of the testator?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court upheld the earlier ruling that a
holographic will may not be probated by mere testimony of witnesses
who have seen or read such will.
The Rules of Court allow proof (and probate) of a lost or
destroyed will by secondaryevidence, the testimony of witnesses in
lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have
contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly made
here.
The difference between holographic wills and ordinary will lies
in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of
authenticity is the handwriting itself, in the second, the
testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the
notary). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the
only medium of proof, if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing
witnesses are available to be authenticated.
ROSA K. KALAWvs.HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of
the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K.
KALAWG.R. No. L-40207, September 28, 1984
Facts:
On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW,
claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K.
Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her holographic Will
executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a
sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10,
1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in
substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations,
corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by
the full signature of the testatrix
Rosa Calaws position was that the holographic will, as first
written, should be given effect and probated so that she could be
the sole heir thereunder.
The Lower Court denied the petition for probate.
Issue:
Is the will valid despite the alterations and/or insertions that
were not signed/authenticated by the testatrix?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the will was already
revoked/void because the holographic will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the
original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the
requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the
testator, the effect must be that the entire will is voided or
revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will
after that which could remain valid.
This was held even as the National Bureau of Investigations
confirmed that the handwriting in the original text is the same as
in the alterations and/or insertions, it was the failure to
authenticate/sign the alterations and/or insertions that was the
reason of the court.
TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO,
AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO,
PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO
ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA *
ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs,
JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDAvs.HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate
of Mateo CaballeroG.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993
Facts:
on December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any
children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a
last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before
three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio
Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted
by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty.
Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last will.It was
declared therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving
by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to
Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito
Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do
not appear to be related to the testator.
On April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition
seeking for the probate of his last will and testament.
On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition
could finally be heard by the probate court.
Upon probate, the will was opposed on the ground that the
attestation clause is fatally defective for the failure to state
that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator
signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and
ofone another.
Issue:
Does the will contain a valid attestation clause?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the absence of the questioned
statement is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily
result in the disallowance of the will. The Supreme Court said that
it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the
said witness affixed their respective signatures in the presence of
the testator and of each other since the presence of said
signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but
it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The Supreme
Court directed to forthwith dismiss its Special Proceeding No.
3899-R (Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of
Mateo Caballero) and to Revive Special Proceeding No. 3965-R (In
the matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active
case and thereafter duly proceed with the settlement of the estate
of the said decedent.
In re will of Ana Abangan.GERTRUDIS ABANGANvs.ANASTACIA ABANGAN,
ET AL.G.R. No. L-13431, November 12, 1919
Facts:
On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu
admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of
two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of
the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in
the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three
witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause
duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses.
Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the
testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and
these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects
whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.
Issue:
Was the will validly probated considering the solemnities and
the dialect that was used on the will?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the will was validly probated
because the will was executed in Cebu City and in the dialect of
the place where the testatrix is a resident; it is enough to
presume that she knew the dialect in the absence of any proof to
the contrary. It was also held that in a one page will, the
witnesses and the testatrix need not sign in the upper left margin
of the will if they already signed in the bottom part. It was held
that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains
all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by
the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the
attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three
witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed
on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be
paged.
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZvs.AGUSTIN LIBOROG.R. No.
L-1787, August 27, 1948
Facts:
In 1947, Don Sixto Lopez, the testator who died on the age of 83
at Balayan, Batangas, executed a willwhere Jose Lopez was named an
heir. Agustin Liboro questioned the validity of the will based
onthe following grounds: That the first sheet, which is alsothe
first page is not paged either inletters or in Arabic numerals,
that the witnesses to the willprovided contradictory statements,
that Don Sixto used his thumbmark to sign the will, and that there
was no indication in thewill that the language used therein is
known by Don Sixto Lopez.
Issue:
Is the will valid?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the will of Don Sixto Lopez was
valid and affirmed the decision of the lower court in ordering the
probate of the will.The Supreme Court ruled on the grounds that
were presented by Agustin Liboro, the oppositor.
First, the unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first
page by the internal sense ofits contents considered in relation to
the contents of the second page. By theirmeaning and coherence, the
first and second lines on the second page are undeniably
acontinuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the
attestation clause, which starts at thebottom of the preceding
page.
Second, the contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental
witnesses as are set out inLiboros appelantsbrief are incidents not
allof which everyone of the witnesses can be supposed to have
perceived, or torecall in the same order in which they
occurred.
Third, Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark tothe instrument instead
of signing his name. The reason for this was that hewas suffering
from partial paralysis. There is nothing curious or suspicious in
the fact that thetestator chose the use of mark as the means of
authenticating his will. Itwas a matter of taste orpreference. Both
ways are good.
Lastly, there is no statutory requirement which prescribes that
it mustbe expressly placed in the will that thetestator knows the
language being used therein. It just required that the
testator/testatrix knows the language the will is being written
in.
Suroza v. Honrado110 SCRA 388
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and
PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the minorsvs.LEON
BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA,
AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA
of the Court of First Instance of AbraG.R. No. L-41715, June 18,
1976
Facts:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio
Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla,
instituted a civil action in the Court to quiet title over certain
parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the
complaint, but before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the
counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to
include certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the
complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their
amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead
and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to
dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for
the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked
for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the
petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately
dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a
real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of
the order dismissing the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved
to set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and
17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff for lack of
merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a
written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and
Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother,
but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From
the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion
for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint claiming
that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court but the same was denied.
Issue:
May the action in court prosper in lieu of the death of a party
during the pendency of a case?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the action may still prosper
despite the death of one of the parties. While it may be true that
a dead person cannot sue, he can be substituted by his heirs in
pursuing the case up to its completion. Article 777 ofthe New Civil
Code of the Philippines provides "that the rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." When
Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the
parcels of land inlitigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by herdeath but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
death.
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC.GRL-8437,
Nov.28,1956
Facts:
This was an Appeal by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The Luzon Surety Co. had
filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different
indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a
distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety
solidary guarantor in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon
Surety Co.s of having guaranteed, the various principals in favor
of different creditors.
Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim,
of the value of the 20 bonds it executed inconsideration of the
counterbonds, and asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and
documentarystamps affixedto thebonds, with12 % interest thereon.CFI
dismissed the claims ofLuzon SuretyCo.,on failure to state the
causeof action.
Issue:
What obligations are transmissibleupon the deathof the
decedent?Are contingentclaims chargeable against the estate?
Held:
Under the present Civil Code (Art. 1311), Contracts take effect
only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation orby provision
of law.While in our successional system the responsibility of the
heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of
the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact
that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but
also to his obligations. Articles 774 & 776, NCC, provides,
thereby confirming Art. 1311.ART. 774. Succession is a mode of
acquisition by virtue of which theproperty, rights and obligations
to the extent of thevalue of the inheritance, of aperson are
transmitted through his death
toanotherorotherseitherbyhiswillorbyoperationoflaw.ART.776. The
inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligationsof a
person which are not extinguished by his death.The binding effect
of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by
the provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased
must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is
distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever
payment is made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the
heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact
diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirswould have been
entitled to receive. The general rule is that a partys contractual
rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The
rule is a consequence of the progressive depersonalization of
patrimonial rights and duties.Of the 3 exceptions fixed by Art
1311, the nature of obligation of the surety or guarantor does not
warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are
contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. Creditor
Luzon Surety Co. expects from Hemady when it accepted the latter as
surety in the counter bonds was the reimbursement of the moneys
that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of the
obligations of the principal debtors. This reimbursement is a
payment of a sum of money, resulting from anobligation to give;and
to the Luzon Surety Co.,it was indifferentthat the reimbursement
should be made by Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf,
so long as the money was paid to it. The 2nd exception of Art.
1311, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being
exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this
intransmissibility should not be easily implied, but must be
expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from
the provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the
agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are
non-transferable. The 3rd exception to the transmissibility of
obligations under Art.1311 exists when they are not transmissible
by operation of law. The provision makes reference to those cases
where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are
extinguished by death: legal support, parental authority, usufruct,
contracts for a piece of work, partnership & agency. By
contract, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or
suretyship (Art 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the
guaranty is extinguished upon the death of theguarantor or the
surety. The contracts of suretyship entered into by Hemady in favor
of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the
nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts
themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability
thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The
contracts give rise to contingent claims provable against his
estate under sec. 5, Rule 87.The most common example of the
contigent claim is that which arises when a person is bound as
surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead. Under
the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim
whatever against his principal until he himself pays something by
way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When he
does this, there instantly arises infavor of the surety the right
to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the
surety has contributed something to the payment of the debt, or has
performed the secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no
right of action against anybody - no claim that could be reduced to
judgment. Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantors liability
is not extinguished by his death, and that in such event, the Luzon
Surety Co., had the right tofile against the estate a contingent
claim for reimbursement. Wherefore, the order appealed from is
reversed, and the records are ordered remanded to the court of
origin.
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN
P. RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCEvs.COURT OF
APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO
ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO
ALSUAG.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
Facts:
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Do;a
Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together with all their
living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua
thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de
Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement,Escritura de
Particion Extrajudicial(Exhibit 8), over the then present and
existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina
enumerated in a prepared inventory.