G.R. No. 132223June 19, 2001BONIFACIA P.
VANCIL,petitioner,vs.HELEN G. BELMES,respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:Petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45650, "In the
Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil
Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes,
Oppositor-Appellant," promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its
Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the said Decision.The facts of the case as
summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision are:"Petitioner,
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy
serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said
country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two
(2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife,
Helen G. Belmes."Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil
commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a
guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors
Valerie and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB.
At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a
2-year old child. It is claimed in the petition that the minors are
residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting
of proceeds from their fathers death pension benefits with a
probable value of P100,000.00."Finding sufficiency in form and in
substance, the case was set for hearing after a
3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily."On July
15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and
Vincent Vancil Jr."On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the
minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject
guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a
similar petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No.
2819 before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City."Thereafter,
on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a
motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One,
asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag,
Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing;
that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at
the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of
140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a
naturalized American citizen."On October 12, 1988, after due
proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes motion to
remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and
Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to
enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the
posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a
reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November
24, 1988."1On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed
Decision reversing the RTC order of October 12, 1988 and dismissing
Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB.The Court of Appeals held:"Stress
should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the
father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her
minor children. The law on parental authority under the Civil Code
or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the Family
Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule
93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the
parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need
of a court appointment and only for good reason may another person
be named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on
record of any reason at all why Helen Belmes, the biological
mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as natural guardian
of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen would
be an abdication and grave violation of the very basic fundamental
tenets in civil law and the constitution on family solidarity."2On
March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present
petition, raising the following "legal points":"1. The Court of
Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a
parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the
minors is absolute, contrary to existing jurisprudence."2. The
Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G.
Belmes, the biological mother, should be appointed the guardian of
the minors despite the undisputed proof that under her custody, her
daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped seven times by Oppositors
live-in partner."3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely
erred when it disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil to be
appointed as judicial guardian over the persons and estate of
subject minors despite the fact that she has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on
the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is clearly not a statutory
requirement to become guardian."At the outset, let it be stressed
that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated September 15, 1998,
respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter Valerie turned
eighteen on September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth
Certificate.3Respondent thus prayed that this case be dismissed
with respect to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of
guardianship proceedings. The said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted
by this Court in its Resolution dated November 11, 1998.Considering
that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become moot
with respect to her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points"
raised by petitioner should be resolved.The basic issue for our
resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minor
Vincent should be his guardian.We agree with the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of the
minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his
guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family
Code which provides:"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision
shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
xxx."Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent
has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
InSagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals,4this Court held:"Of
considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts
that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is
one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported
by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which
is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives
from the nature of the parental relationship."Petitioner contends
that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.Petitioners claim
to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way
ofsubstitute parental authoritypursuant to Article 214 of the
Family Code, thus:"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall
be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."InSantos, Sr. vs.
Court of Appeals,5this Court ruled:"The law vests on the father and
mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of absence or death of either parent,the parent
present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case
of the parents death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent."Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise
substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very
much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over
Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the
minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however,
has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is
not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists
that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering
that her (respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several times.
But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this
guardianship proceeding.Even assuming that respondent is unfit as
guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a
substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American
citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able
to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of
discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To
be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who
may not also qualify as a guardian.Moreover, we observe that
respondents allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the
Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides,
petitioners old age and her conviction of libel by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No.
CBU-168846filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second
thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming back to this country
just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two
years is not certain.
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not
appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of
our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
InGuerrero vs. Teran,7this Court held:"Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was,
as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment
was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint
residents only as administrators or guardians. However,
notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements
upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities
of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate,
etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by
appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no
statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the
appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts
here."WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with
modification in the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of
majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of respondent
Helen Belmes.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73831February 27, 1987REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by the BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS,petitioners,vs.HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and CITY OF ZAMBOANGA,respondents.
CRUZ,J.:The instant case presents an issue of first impression,
the respondent court having decided a question of substance not
heretofore determined by this Court. The matter is now before Us in
this petition for review praying for the reversal of the decision
below escheating a parcel of land in favor of the City of
Zamboanga.The property in dispute was among the lands taken over by
the United States Government under the Philippine Property Act of
1946 enacted by the American Congress. It was registered in 1930
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9509 of the Register of
Deeds of Zamboanga in the name of Kantiro Koyama, a Japanese
national, who has not been heard from since the end of World War
II.1Under the said Act, the land was supposed to be transferred to
the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to its Section 3 reading
as follows:All property vested in or transferred to the President
of the United States, the Alien Property Custodian, or any such
officer or agency as the President of the United States may
designate under the Trading with the Enemy act, as amended, which
was located in the Philippines at the time of such vesting, or the
proceeds thereof, and which shall remain after the satisfaction of
any claim payable under the Trading with the Enemy Act, costs and
expenses of administration as may by law be charged against such
property or proceeds, shall be transferred by the president of the
United States to the Republic of the Philippines.The transfer was
never made, however, and the property remained registered in the
name of Koyama. Nevertheless, the lot has since 1978 been covered
by Tax Declaration No. 42644 in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines with the Board of Liquidators as
administrator.2Earlier, in 1976, the Republic of the Philippines
had filed escheat proceedings against the said property, claiming
that the registered owner of the land "had been absent for the past
ten years or more and he, therefore, may be presumed dead for the
purpose of appointing his successor." It also alleged that since he
left no heirs or persons entitled to the aforementioned property,
the State should inherit the same in accordance with Rule 91 of the
Rules of Court.3After the required publications, hearing was held
at which the City of Zamboanga did not appear and no claim or
opposition was filed by any party. The Solicitor General allowed
the appearance of the Board of Liquidators as administrator of the
disputed land and the City Fiscal of Zamboanga City did not
object.4Finally, the trial court declared the property ...
escheated to the State in favor of the City of Zamboanga where the
property is located for the benefit of public schools and public
charitable institutions and centers in the City of Zamboanga.Not
satisfied with the decision, the petitioner elevated the same to
the Intermediate Appellate Court, where it was affirmed. The
respondent court held that the City of Zamboanga which had later
intervened with leave of court was entitled to the property in
question under the provision of Section 3, Rule 91 of the Rules of
Court, providing that Sec. 3.Hearing and judgment. Upon
satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order
that such order has been published as directed and that the person
died intestate, seized of real or personal property in the
Philippines, leaving no heir or person entitled to the same, and no
sufficient cause being shown to the contrary, the court shall
adjudge that the estate of the deceased in the Philippines, after
the payment of just debts and charges, shall escheat; and shall,
pursuant to law, assign the personal estate to the municipality or
city where he last resided in the Philippines, and the real estate
to the municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is
situated. If the deceased never resided in the Philippines, the
whole estate may be assigned to the respective municipalities or
cities where the same is located. Such estate shall be for the
benefit of public schools, and public charitable institutions and
centers in said municipalities or cities.The court, at the instance
of an interested party, or on its own motion, may order the
establishment of a permanent trust, so that only the income from
the property shall be used.In so ruling, the respondent court
rejected the position taken by the petitioner which it asks us now
to consider as its justification for the reversal of the appealed
decision. That position, simply stated, is that there was a mere
oversight on the part of the American government which prevented
the formality of a transfer of the property to the Philippine
government. That neglect should not divest the Republic of the
property which under the spirit and intendment of the Philippine
Property Act of 1946 should belong to it as successor-in-interest
of the United States.5Oversight or not, says the respondent court,
the fact is that the property was not transferred as required by
the said law. Hence, it was properly escheated to the City of
Zamboanga, on the unrebutted presumption that the registered owner
was already dead, and there being no heirs or other claimants to
the land in question. Moreover, the Board of Liquidators had no
personality to claim the land because it had the authority to
administer only those properties that had been transferred by the
U.S. Alien Property Custodian to the Republic of the
Philippines.6We reverse, We rule for the petitioner.It is clear,
and the respondent City of Zamboanga does not deny it, that there
was mere inadvertence on the part of the American government in
omitting to transfer the disputed land to the Republic of the
Philippines. The obvious purpose of the Act was to turn over to the
Philippine government all enemy properties situated in its
territory that had been seized and were being held for the time
being by the United States, which was then exercising sovereignty
over the Philippines. The transfer of such enemy properties to the
Philippine Republic was one of the acts by which the United States
acknowledged the elevation of this country to the status of a
sovereign state on July 4, 1946.While it is true that there are no
records of such transfer, we may presume that such transfer was
made. The lack of such records does not mean that it was not made
as this would run counter to the mandate of the Philippine Property
Act of 1946, which, to repeat, intended to vest title in the
Philippines enemy properties found in its territory. It would be
more reasonable to suppose that the President of the United States,
or the person acting under his authority, complied with, rather
than neglected (and so violated) this requirement of Section 3 of
the said Act, if only on the basis of the presumption of the
regularity of official functions. In the extreme, we can even say
that this section legally effected the transfer, to be evidenced
later by the formality of the corresponding deed, and that the lack
of such deed does not mean that no transfer was made. Otherwise, we
would have to face the dubious conclusion that the said property is
still owned and so still subject to disposition by the United
States.In support of its position, the City of Zamboanga argues,
without much spirit, that anyway the land in question has an area
of only 4,533 square meters and that for all practical purposes it
can be better administered and used by the city
authorities.7Perhaps so; but surely that is not the point. We are
dealing here not with the pragmatic question of who can benefit
more from the disputed property but with the legal question of who
is its legal owner. That is the point.We hold that where it comes
to ordinary real properties the owners of which may be presumed
dead and left no heirs, the same may be escheated, conformably to
Rule 91 of the Rules of Court, in favor of the political
subdivisions in which they are located. The said Rule, however,
does not cover properties taken from enemy nationals as a result of
World War II and required to be transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines by the United States in accordance with its own
enactment commonly known as the Philippine Property Act of 1946.
Such properties, including the land in dispute, belong to the
Philippine government not by virtue of the escheat proceedings but
on the strength of the transfer authorized and required by the said
Act.
It may really be that, for practical reasons, the disputed
property should be entrusted to the City of Zamboanga, for the
purposes indicated in the Rules of Court. That may still be
effected. But this will require a transfer of the land to the city
by the Republic of the Philippines, to which it belongs and which
has the power to dispose of it.WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
reversed and another one is hereby entered declaring the Republic
of the Philippines to be the legal owner of the land subject of the
instant petition. No costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-16185-86May 31, 1962TRUSTEESHIP OF THE MINORS
BENIGNO, ANGELA and ANTONIO, all surnamed PEREZ Y TUASON,PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, Judicial Guardian, J. ANTONIO
ARANETA,trustee-appellee,vs.ANTONIO M. PEREZ,judicial
guardian-appellant.
CONCEPCION,J.:These are two (2) incidents of the trusteeship of
the minors Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all surnamed Perez Y
Tuason. The issue in G.R. No. L-16185 is whether or not the
trustee, J. Antonio Araneta hereinafter referred to as the appellee
may be allowed to pay a sum of money to the law firm, Araneta &
Araneta, of which he is a member, for services rendered to him, in
his aforementioned capacity as such trustee, in several judicial
proceedings, whereas G.R. No. L-16186 concerns the question whether
the purchase of certain shares of stock nude by the appellee for
the benefit of the trusteeship merits judicial approval. Both
questions were decided by the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Quezon City Branch) in the affirmative. Hence, this appeal by
Antonio M. Perez hereinafter referred to as the appellant as
guardian of the person of said minors.With respect to G.R. No.
L-16185, it appears that the law firm Araneta & Araneta,
through its assistant, Atty. Francisco T. Papa, had rendered
services, as counsel for the appellee, in connection with the
following:1. The approval of his accounts for January to March,
1956, which were objected to by the appellant. Said objection was,
on October 19, 1956, overruled by the lower court, the action of
which was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-11788, on May 16,
1958, on appeal taken by appellant.2. The appellee's accounts for
April to June, 1957; which were approved by the lower court on July
13, 1957, despite appellant's objection thereto. Although appellant
appealed to the Supreme Court, he, subsequently, withdrew the
appeal.3. In 1958, appellant instituted CA-G.R. No. 22810-R of the
Court of Appeals for a writ ofcertiorariandmandamusagainst the
appellee and the lower court, the latter having sustained the
action of the appellee in withholding certain sums from the shares
of the minors aforementioned in the net income of the trust estate
for July to September, 1957, in view of the appellant's refusal to
reimburse to said estate identical sums received in the form of
allowances for the period from April to June, 1957, in excess of
the shares of said minors in the net income for that period. After
appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
on June 25, 1958, dismissing said petition.The lower court
authorized the payment of P5,500.00 for the services thus rendered
by Araneta & Araneta, which appellant assails upon the ground
that, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:When
the executor or administrator is an attorney he shall not charge
against the estate any professional fees for legal services
rendered by him.that the services above referred to inured to the
benefit, not of the trust estate, but of the trustee; that the
amount of the award is excessive; and that the lower court should
have required the introduction of evidence on the extent of the
services rendered by the aforementioned law firm before making said
award.Appellant's pretense is untenable. Said Section 7 of Rule 86
refers only to "executors or administrators" of the estate of
deceased persons, and does not necessarily apply to trustees. It is
true that some functions of the former bear a close analogy with
those of the latter. Moreover, a trustee, like, an executor or
administrator, holds an office of trust, particularly when, as in
the case of appellee herein, the trustee acts as such under
judicial authority. Hence, generally, the policy set forth in said
Section 7 of Rule 86 basically sound and wise as it is should be
applicable to trustees. The duties of executors or administrators
are, however, fixed and/or limited by law, whereas those of trustee
of an express trust like that which we have under consideration
are, usually, governed by the intention of the trustor or of the
parties, if established by contract (Art. 1441, Civil Code of the
Philippines). Besides, the duties of trustees may cover a much
wider range than those of executors or administrators of the estate
of deceased persons. Again the application of Section 7 of Rule 86
to all trusteeships without distinction may dissuade deserving
persons from accepting the position of trustee and consequently
have a deterrent effect upon the establishment of trusts, at a time
when a sizeable part of the burden to undertake important and even
essential activities in advanced and/or developing communities or
states, particularly in the field of education, science and social
welfare, is borne by foundations or other similar organizations
based upon the principles of trust. We believe it, therefore, to be
the better policy to acknowledge the authority of courts of justice
to exercise a sound judgment in determining, in the light of the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case, whether or not a
trustee shall be allowed to pay attorney's fees and charge the same
against the trust estate, independently of his compensation as a
trustee.In the case at bar, considering that the appellee was
merely defending himself in the proceedings that required the
services of counsel; that in each case the stand taken by the
appellee was upheld by the court; that the will creating the trust
and designating the appellee as trustee explicitly grants him the
right to collect for his services such reasonable fees; that, in
view of the nature of the relations between the trustor and the
trustee, on the one hand, and the trustor and appellant on the
other, there can be little doubt but that the trustor would have
sanctioned the payment of the attorney's fees involved in this
incident; and that it may have been more costly for the trust
estate to engage the services of a law firm other than that of
Araneta & Araneta, we are not prepared to hold that the lower
court has erred in authorizing the payment of said attorney's fees
by herein appellee.For the rest, it is well settled that "a trustee
may be indemnified out of the trust estate for his expenses in
rendering and proving his accounts and for costs andcounsel fees"
in connection therewith (54 Am. Jur. 415-416), apart from the fact
that the nature of the professional services in question appeared
in the records before the lower court and that the amount of P5,500
fixed by the same as compensation for such services is not
excessive.Referring now to G.R. No. L-16186, it appears that from
July to September, 1958, the appellee had bought for the trust
estate, through a broker (Pedro Nolasco da Silva & Co.), a
total of 118 common shares of stock of the Philippine-American Drug
Co. at P100 each, and that, upon submission of appellee's accounts
for said period, appellant objected to the items of expenses
relative to the acquisition of said common shares, upon the ground
that the investment therein is "unwise in that (the operation of)
said company has not, to our knowledge, proved profitable and
unlawful in that it is actually an act of self-dealing between the
trustee and the beneficiaries of the trust", because the former
(appellee) is, also, a stockholder of said company. After the
introduction of the evidence of both parties, the lower court
overruled the objection and approved said accounts.It is not
disputed that appellee holds, in his individual capacity, 199 out
of 30,000 common shares of stock of the Philippine-American Drug
Co., whereas his children own 270 out of 5,000 preferred shares of
stock of the same enterprise. As a consequence, the interest of
appellees and his children in said company is not such as to
warrant the charge that the purchase of 118 common stocks for the
trust estate amounts to self-dealing by the appellee with himself.
What is more, said purchase by the trustee may be considered as an
indication that he had displayed in the management of the trust
estate the same interest he had in the protection of his own
property.Upon the other hand, it has, also, been established that
the book value of each of said 118 common shares of stock,
purchased by the trustee at P100 each, is P202.80; that in 1954 the
Philippine-American Drug Co. had paid a cash dividend of 6%, side
from declaring a 33-1/3% stock dividend for its common shares; and
that 6- % and 4% cash dividends were paid in 1955 and 1957,
respectively. Furthermore, the statement of accounts of the company
for the years 1954, 1955, 1956 and 1957, satisfied the lower court
that the enterprise "is financially stable and sound". Under the
circumstances, we cannot say that the investment in question is
unwise.Appellant's allegation to the effect that shares of stock of
the San Miguel Brewery pay higher returns, even if true, does not
establish his pretense. Whether an investment is good or not does
not depend upon the general, abstract possibility of better
investments. Again, one factor that should be taken into account is
the degree of influence that the investor may have upon the
management of the enterprise concerned, which appellee admittedly
has in the Philippine-American Drug Co., but which it is not
claimed he wields in the San Miguel Brewery Co.WHEREFORE, the
orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. It is so ordered.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93May 21, 2009IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF
MICHELLE P. LIM,MONINA P. LIM,petitioner.IN RE: PETITION FOR
ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,MONINA P. LIM,petitioner.
The CaseThis is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1dated
15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City,
Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259,
which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for
adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.The FactsThe
following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were
entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so
eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered
the children to make it appear that they were the childrens
parents. The children2were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and
Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old
when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.3Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to
petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4The spouses
reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They
sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim"
in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28
November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married
Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.Thereafter, petitioner
decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5given
under Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner
filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and
1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.Michelle and her husband
gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits
of Consent.7Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown
in his Affidavit of Consent.8Petitioners husband Olario likewise
executed an Affidavit of Consent9for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael.In the Certification issued by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an
abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were
unknown.10The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.11The
Ruling of the Trial CourtOn 15 September 2004, the trial court
rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled
that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed
the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family
Code.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision
but the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In
denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not
fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of
RA 8552. Petitioners argument that mere consent of her husband
would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are
additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in
this case, must comply.As to the argument that the adoptees are
already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint
exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint
adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from
his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.Hence, the present petition.IssuePetitioner
appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether
or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.The Courts
RulingPetitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be
relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to
protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex"
is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental
authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental
authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated
having attained the age of majority.We deny the petition.Joint
Adoption by Husband and WifeIt is undisputed that, at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined
by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the
trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption.Dura lex
sed lex.The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552
reads:SEC. 7.Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:(a) Any
Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity
and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted
of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen
(16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to
support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of
the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between
the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter
is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the
adoptees parent;(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as
above stated for Filipino nationals:Provided, That his/her country
has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that
he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is
entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she
has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that
his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter:Provided, further,That the
requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the
following:(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity; or(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter
of his/her Filipino spouse; or(iii) one who is married to a
Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or(c) The guardian with respect
to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance
of his/her financial accountabilities.Husband and wifeshalljointly
adopt, except in the following cases:(i) if one spouse seeks to
adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or(ii) if one
spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter:Provided, however,That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or(iii) if the spouses are legally
separated from each other.In case husband and wife jointly adopt,
or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other,
joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
(Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This
is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over
the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted
is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural
to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses.12The law is clear. There is no room
for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself,
without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.Neither does
petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate
children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the
children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each
other.The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as
shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of
RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must
maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4)
he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the
adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved
during the trial.These requirements on residency and certification
of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner
or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.Effects of AdoptionPetitioner contends that joint
parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have
been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is
untenable.Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the
children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development
of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.13The
father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children.14Even the remarriage of
the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over
the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children.15It is true
that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when
he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and property of the
child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of
civil life.17However, parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the
effects of adoption, thus:ARTICLE VEFFECTS OF ADOPTIONSEC.
16.Parental Authority.- Except in cases where the biological parent
is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then
be vested on the adopter(s).SEC. 17.Legitimacy.- The adoptee shall
be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all
intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to
them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee
is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
means of the family.SEC. 18.Succession.- In legal and intestate
succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal
rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a
will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.Adoption has,
thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological
parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a
legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of
the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii)
the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory
heirs of each other.18Therefore, even if emancipation terminates
parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate
child of the adopter with all the rights19of a legitimate child
such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2)
to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to
the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy
all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled20such as
support21and successional rights.22We are mindful of the fact that
adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests
and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless
couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble
and compassionate objectives of the law.23But, as we have ruled
inRepublic v. Vergara:24We are not unmindful of the main purpose of
adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a
manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law
must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less
severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes,
love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably,
the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial courts decision
favoring adoption in the case at bar,for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against
judicial legislation.Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses
petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)Petitioner, being married
at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our
own legislation to suit petitioner.Petitioner, in her Memorandum,
insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could
no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for
dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles
Superior Court.We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is
not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and
unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the
marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was
married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.WHEREFORE, weDENYthe
petition. WeAFFIRMthe Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC.
Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.G.R.
No. 182497June 29, 2010NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN,petitioner,vs.JUDGE
VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37,
DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT.
CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO
QUIMSON,respondents.
PEREZ,J.:Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 651of the Rules of Court assailing the Order dated 25 April
2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in
Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 which denied the petition for
Habeas Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan in
behalf of her husband Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan2(PO1
Ampatuan).Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1
Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station.
On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police to report to
the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael
Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to
Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to
stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being
informed of the cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 April
2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport
and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila.
Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was
turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor
Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto
Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted
where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the
killing of two Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was
then detained at the Police Jail in United Nations Avenue, Manila.
Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato
Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the
alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law
Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was
turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.3Petitioner continues that on 21 April
2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the release for
further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan.4The Order was approved by
the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co
Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to
release PO1 Ampatuan.This prompted Petitioner to file the petition
for writ ofhabeas corpusin the RTC of Manila, Branch 37.5Private
respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They
narrated that at around 7:08 oclock in the evening of 10 November
2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden
D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the
corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila.
Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD)
Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as
PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD
District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest
proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office.On 18
April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto,
rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan,
finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct
(Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to
summary hearing.On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct
was executed against PO1 Ampatuan, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
CHARGE SHEETTHE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby charges
above-named respondent of the administrative offense of Grave
Misconduct (murder) pursuant to Section 52 of R.A. 85516in relation
to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular 93-024, committed as follows:That
on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del
Pilar and Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, above-named respondent
while being an active member of the PNP and within the jurisdiction
of this office, armed with a cal .45 pistol, with intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shot
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Jr., COMELEC official on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
gunshot wounds which directly cause (sic) his death.Acts contrary
to the existing PNP Laws rules and Regulations.7Also, through a
Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General Avelino I.
Razon, Jr. directed the Regional Director of the National Capital
Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under
restrictive custody, thus:1. Reference: Memo from that Office dated
April 15, 2008 re Arrest of PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the
killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both
COMELEC Legal Officers.2. This pertains to the power of the Chief,
PNP embodied in Section 52 of RA 8551, to place police personnel
under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave
administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a
criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police
personnel.3. In this connection, you are hereby directed to place
PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig
and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers, under your
restrictive custody.4. For strict compliance.8On 19 April 2008,
through a Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008, respondent Police
Director Geary L. Barias requested for the creation of the Summary
Hearing Board to hear the case of PO1 Ampatuan.9On 20 April 2008,
Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director Edgardo E.
Acua, placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the
Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008. Said Special
Order No. 921, reads:Restrictive CustodyPO1 Basser B. Ampatuan
128677, is placed under restrictive custody of the Regional
Director, NCRPO effective April 19, 2008. (Reference: Memorandum
from CPNP dated 18 April 2008).BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR
GENERAL RAZON:10Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of
Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for
further investigation and that the latter be released from custody
unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.11Armed
with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila Citys
Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan,
filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before
the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. The petition was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 and was raffled to Branch 37.On 24
April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, respondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents
to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents
to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty
of PO1 Ampatuan.12On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition
in its Order which reads:Essentially, counsels for petitioner
insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being illegally detained by the
respondents despite the order of release of Chief Inquest
Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated April 21, 2008. They further claim
that as of April 23, 2008, no administrative case was filed against
PO1 Ampatuan.Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal
case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan, assert that the latter is
under restrictive custody since he is facing an administrative case
for grave misconduct. They submitted to this Court the Pre-charge
Evaluation Report and Charge Sheet. Further, in support of their
position, respondents cited the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon.
Calderon, G.R. No. 178920 claiming that habeas corpus will not lie
for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody. They claim that this
is authorized under Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551 authorizing the
Chief of PNP to place the PNP personnel under restrictive custody
during the pendency of administrative case for grave
misconduct.Petitioner countered that the administrative case filed
against PO1 Ampatuan was ante-dated to make it appear that there
was such a case filed before April 23, 2008.The function of habeas
corpus is to determine the legality of ones detention, meaning, if
there is sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if
there is none to discharge him at once. For habeas corpus to issue,
the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom which must be actual and
effective, not nominal or moral.Granting arguendo that the
administrative case was ante-dated, the Court cannot simply ignore
the filing of an administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. It
cannot be denied that the PNP has its own administrative
disciplinary mechanism and as clearly pointed out by the
respondents, the Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan
under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A.
8551.The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is
a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order
the release of the subject police officer.Lastly, anent the
contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of PO1
Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic,
the same could not be accepted by this Court.It must be stressed
that the resignation has not been acted (sic) by the appropriate
police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was
filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the
PNP.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas corpus
is hereby DISMISSED.13Distressed, petitioner is now before this
Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to question the validity of the RTC Order dated 25 April
2008. The issues are:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B.
AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL;II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCEDED
THE AUTHORITY OF RESPONDENT AVELINO RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52, PAR.
4, R.A. 8551 TO PLACE AMPATUAN UNDER RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL DUTY TO ORDER THE
RELEASE OF PO1 AMPATUAN FROM THE CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS MAMANG
PULIS.14Essentially, a writ ofhabeascorpus applies to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty.15Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the
procedure to be followed in the issuance of the writ. The Rule
provides:RULE 102HABEAS CORPUSSECTION 1. To what habeas corpus
extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of
habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ of
habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member
thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or
any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so
granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and
may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or
before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing
and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of
First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and
returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial
district.x x xSEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines,
or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.The
objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.
What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention
as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ
of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception
illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal
at the time of the filing of the application.16Plainly stated, the
writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally
confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however,
should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue
of a judicial process or a valid judgment.17The most basic
criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom
of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ
of habeas corpus is unavailing.18Fundamentally, in order to justify
the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty
must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action.19In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is
legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely
nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.20In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court
or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being
restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused.
Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such
restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be
unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be
refused.21While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue
as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the
filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its
issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the
writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being
unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas
corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the
petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.22Petitioner
contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody of
respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative case
filed against him. When the release order of Chief Inquest
Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served upon respondents on 21 April
2008, there was still no administrative case filed against PO1
Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1
Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no
warrant of arrest issued by any judicial authority against him.On
the other hand, respondents, in their Comment23filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General, argue that the trial court correctly
denied the subject petition. Respondents maintain that while the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that PO1
Ampatuan be released from custody, said recommendation was made
only insofar as the criminal action for murder that was filed with
the prosecution office is concerned and is without prejudice to
other legal grounds for which he may be held under custody. In the
instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges
for Grave Misconduct. They cited the case ofManalo v.
Calderon,24where this Court held that a petition forhabeascorpus
will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being
detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive
custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police
officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of
illegal detention or restraint of liberty.25The Solicitor General
is correct.In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under
Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the
Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as
amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine
National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly
provides that members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of
the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including
restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated
supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of
internal discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No.
8551 reads:Sec. 52 x x x.x x x4. The Chief of the PNP shall have
the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of dismissal from
the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination
thereof for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days.
Provided, further, That the Chief of the PNP shall have the
authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody
during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against
him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in
nature, against such police personnel. [Emphasis ours].Given that
PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This
Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of
movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by
their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of
liberty.26Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which
is beyond the ambit ofhabeascorpus. It is neither actual nor
effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy
prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the
PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always
accounted for.27Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans restrictive
custody is the administrative case filed against him, his remedy is
within such administrative process.We likewise note that PO1
Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19 April 2008. To
date, the administrative case against him should have already been
resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should have been
rendered moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of
Republic Act No. 8551, which provides:SEC. 55.Section 47 of
Republic Act No. 6975is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the
filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more,
the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office for a
period not exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided,
however, That if it can be shown by evidence that the accused is
harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order the
preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge
is punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1)
day: Provided, further, That the preventive suspension shall not be
more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in the disposition
of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the
respondent: Provided, finally, That such preventive suspension may
be sooner lifted by the court in the exigency of the service upon
recommendation of the Chief, PNP.Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)Having
conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court, we have to dismiss the petition.In sum, petitioner
is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled
to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband,
PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the
latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and
enshrined in the Constitution.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.Costs against
petitioner.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184467June 19, 2012EDGARDO NAVIA,1RUBEN DIO,2and ANDREW
BUISING,petitioners,vs.VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in
representation of BENHUR V. PARDICOrespondent.
DEL CASTILLO,J.:For the protective writ of amparo to issue in
enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the persons
subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown
by the required quantum of proof that their disappearance was
carried out by, "or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, [the government] or a political organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give information on the fate
or whereabouts of [said missing] persons."3This petition for review
on certiorari4filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC5challenges the July 24, 2008 Decision6of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City which granted the
Petition for Writ of Amparo7filed by herein respondent against the
petitioners.Factual AntecedentsOn March 31, 2008, at around 8:30
p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation8(Asian Land)
arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A Lot
9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos
City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique
Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying
in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two
uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them
immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before
Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and
Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land
because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric
wires and lamps in the subdivision.9Shortly thereafter, Bong,
Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of
Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.10The
supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia
(Navia), also arrived thereat.As to what transpired next, the
parties respective versions diverge.Version of the
PetitionersPetitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to
their office because they received a report from a certain Mrs.
Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong
and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said subdivision.11The
reported unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio to
petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both
work as security guards at the Asian Land security department.
Following their departments standard operating procedure, Dio and
Buising entered the report in their logbook and proceeded to the
house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was there where Dio and Buising were
able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus repaired to the
house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying to invite the two
suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with
them.At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and
Ben. The suspects admitted that they took the lamp but clarified
that they were only transferring it to a post nearer to the house
of Lolita.12Soon, Navia arrived and Buising informed him that the
complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation.
Since there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong
and Ben. Bong then signed a statement to the effect that the guards
released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him.13His
mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry which states
that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house.
Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.Ben was left
behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be
involved in the reported loss of electric wires and lamps within
the subdivision. After a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben
to leave. Ben also affixed his signature on the logbook to affirm
the statements entered by the guards that he was released unharmed
and without any injury.14Upon Navias instructions, Dio and Buising
went back to the house of Lolita to make her sign the logbook as
witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody. Lolita
asked Buising to read aloud that entry in the logbook where she was
being asked to sign, to which Buising obliged. Not contented,
Lolita put on her reading glasses and read the entry in the logbook
herself before affixing her signature therein. After which, the
guards left.Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation15from
the Malolos City Police Station requesting them to appear thereat
on April 17, 2008 relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico
(Virginia) about her missing husband Ben. In compliance with the
invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City
Police Station. However, since Virginia was not present despite
having received the same invitation, the meeting was reset to April
22, 2008.16On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation.
Petitioners informed her that they released Ben and that they have
no information as to his present whereabouts.17They assured
Virginia though that they will cooperate and help in the
investigation of her missing husband.18Version of the
RespondentAccording to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely
invited. They were unlawfully arrested, shoved into the Asian Land
vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation. Upon
seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled "Ikaw na
naman?"19and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben begged for
mercy, but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming from
Navia hitting him on different parts of his body.20Navia then took
hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said, "Wala kang nakita at
wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben."21Bong admitted that he
and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area
where their house is located is very dark and his father had long
been asking the administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to
install a lamp to illumine their area. But since nothing happened,
he took it upon himself to take a lamp from one of the posts in the
subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. However,
the lamp Bong got was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on
the post from which he took it and no longer pursued his
plan.22Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the
guards logbook where she undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her
house anymore.23Thereafter, Navia again asked Lolita to sign the
logbook. Upon Lolitas inquiry as to why she had to sign again,
Navia explained that they needed proof that they released her son
Bong unharmed but that Ben had to stay as the latters case will be
forwarded to the barangay. Since she has poor eyesight, Lolita
obligingly signed the logbook without reading it and then left with
Bong.24At that juncture, Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be
left alone. However, since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and
Bong left the security office at once leaving Ben behind.25Moments
after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and
asked Lolita to sign the logbook again. Lolita asked Buising why
she had to sign again when she already twice signed the logbook at
the headquarters. Buising assured her that what she was about to
sign only pertains to Bongs release. Since it was dark and she has
poor eyesight, Lolita took Buisings word and signed the logbook
without, again, reading what was written in it.26
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security
office to visit her husband Ben, but only to be told that
petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night
before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the
barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia
reported the matter to the police.In the course of the
investigation on Bens disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that
petitioners took advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They
made her sign the logbook as a witness that they already released
Ben when in truth and in fact she never witnessed his actual
release. The last time she saw Ben was when she left him in
petitioners custody at the security office.27Exasperated with the
mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition
for Writ of Amparo28before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the
petition sufficient in form and substance, the amparo court issued
an Order29dated June 26, 2008 directing, among others, the issuance
of a writ of amparo and the production of the body of Ben before it
on June 30, 2008. Thus:WHEREFORE, conformably with Section 6 of the
Supreme Court Resolution [in] A.M. No. 07-[9]-12-SC, also known as
"The Rule On The Writ Of Amparo", let a writ of amparo be issued,
as follows:(1) ORDERING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and
Andrew Buising of the Asian Land Security Agency to produce before
the Court the body of aggrieved party Benhur Pardico, on Monday,
June 30, 2008, at 10:30 a.m.;(2) ORDERING the holding of a summary
hearing of the petition on the aforementioned date and time, and
DIRECTING the [petitioners] to personally appear thereat;
(3) COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew
Buising to file, within a non-extendible period of seventy-two (72)
hours from service of the writ, a verified written return with
supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the
following:a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did
not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty
and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;b)
The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or
persons responsible for the threat, act or omission; andc) All
relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners]
pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved
party.(4) GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order
prohibiting the [petitioners], or any persons acting for and in
their behalf, under pain of contempt, from threatening, harassing
or inflicting any harm to [respondent], his immediate family and
any [member] of his household.The Branch Sheriff is directed to
immediately serve personally on the [petitioners], at their address
indicated in the petition, copies of the writ as well as this
order, together with copies of the petition and its annexes.30A
Writ of Amparo31was accordingly issued and served on the
petitioners on June 27, 2008.32On June 30, 2008, petitioners filed
their Compliance33praying for the denial of the petition for lack
of merit.A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. Petitioners
presented the testimony of Buising, while Virginia submitted the
sworn statements34of Lolita and Enrique which the two affirmed on
the witness stand.Ruling of the Regional Trial CourtOn July 24,
2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision35granting the
petition. It disposed as follows:WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants
the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems it proper and
appropriate, as follows:(a) To hereby direct the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to immediately conduct a deep and thorough
investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and
Andrew Buising in connection with the circumstances surrounding the
disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in the process, as
part of the investigation, the documents forming part of the
records of this case;(b) To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the
family of [Benhur] Pardico and the witnesses who testified in this
case protection as it may deem necessary to secure their safety and
security; and(c) To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan to investigate the circumstances concerning
the legality of the arrest of [Benhur] Pardico by the [petitioners]
in this case, utilizing in the process, as part of said
investigation, the pertinent documents and admissions forming part
of the record of this case, and take whatever course/s of action as
may be warranted.Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the
NBI, through the Office of Director Nestor Mantaring, and to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.SO ORDERED.36Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration37which was denied by the trial court in
an Order38dated August 29, 2008.Hence, this petition raising the
following issues for our consideration:4.1. WHETHER X X X THE
HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS
ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO.4.1.1. WHETHER X X
X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONERS HAVE COMMITTED
OR ARE COMMITTING ACTS IN VIOLATION OF HER HUSBANDS RIGHT TO LIFE,
LIBERTY, OR SECURITY.4.1.2. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED THE FACT OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO.4.1.3.
WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ALLEGED
DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS.39Petitioners ArgumentsPetitioners essentially assail
the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ
of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal
bases of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved
partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners
assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to
establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as
it failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged
unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a
violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and
security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence
Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a
hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries
in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are
eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at
around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred
in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Bens
disappearance.Our RulingVirginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is
fatally defective and must perforce be dismissed, but not for the
reasons adverted to by the petitioners.A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The
Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its
purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity."40Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly
settled as the parties do not dispute his identity as the same
person summoned and questioned at petitioners security office on
the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso facto
established Bens inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to
life, liberty and security. Article 641of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights42recognizes every human
beings inherent right to life, while Article 943thereof ordains
that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to
life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and
security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in
accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation
of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also
embodied in our fundamental law.44The pivotal question now that
confronts us is whether Bens disappearance as alleged in Virginias
petition and proved during the summary proceedings conducted before
the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and
relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:SECTION
1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security
is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis ours.)While
Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage, said Rules does
not, however, define extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. This omission was intentional as the Committee on
Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence and
through substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.45Then,
the budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v.
Tagitis46when this Court defined enforced disappearances. The Court
in that case applied the generally accepted principles of
international law and adopted the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition
of enforced disappearances, as "the arrest, detention, abduction or
any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or
by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law."47Not long thereafter,
another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came
about after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 985148on
December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or
involuntary disappearances as follows:(g) "Enforced or involuntary
disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction
of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on
the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of
removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.
Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo49where Justice Arturo D.
Brion wrote in his Separate Opinion that with the enactment of RA
No. 9851, "the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law
anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the rights to
life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition
as well of what an enforced or involuntary disappearance
is."50Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs reference to enforced
disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or
involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g)
of RA No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases,
courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No.
9851.From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus,
we can derive the following elements that constitute it:(a) that
there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation
of liberty;(b) that it be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;(c) that it be followed by the State or political
organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition;
and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective
writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons
subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown
and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts
of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply
put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the indispensable element of government
participation.In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony
that Navia had a menacing attitude towards Ben and that he slapped
and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the circumstances and
the pugnacious character of Navia at that time, his threatening
statement, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na
si Ben," cannot be taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his
predisposition at that time. In addition, there is nothing on
record which would support petitioners assertion that they released
Ben on the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath.
Lolita sufficiently explained how she was prodded into affixing her
signatures in the logbook without reading the entries therein. And
so far, the information petitioners volunteered are sketchy at
best, like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never
identified or presented in court and whose complaint was never
reduced in writing.But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo
petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is
likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried
out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State
participation is not present in this case. The petition does not
contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the
evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its
agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its
agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in
Virginias amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons.51Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the
government or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that
they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating
his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its
agents either as responsible or accountable persons.We are aware
that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may
lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person
sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition
is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in
the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here,
petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in
Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a
private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has
been presented that would link or connect them to some covert
police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to
fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No.
9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental
involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an
enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing
person.WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby
DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 189155September 7, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OFAMPAROAND THE WRIT
OFHABEAS DATAIN F