Final Report for EFDA and BP

Final Report for EFDA and BP

Thomas Flüeler David Goldblatt

Jürg Minsch Daniel Spreng

October 2007

Contract EFDA/05-1255

Towards an Agenda for

Meeting Global Energy Challenges:

Social-Science Research

Quality Assurance

Contract EFDA/05-1255, carried out within the framework of the EURATOM-Swiss Confederation Association, Plasma Physics Research Centre (CRPP/EPFL), con-ducted by ETH/ESC/CEPE EFDA disclaimer: This work, supported by the European Communities under the contract of Associa-tion between EURATOM/Swiss Confederation, was carried out within the framework of the European Fusion Development Agreement. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission.

ASRELEO Final Report

3

Table of Contents Note on the EFDA contract .......................................................................................4 Summary ....................................................................................................................5 Cumulative list of participants .................................................................................8 1. Introduction: Objectives, aim, and procedure ....................................................9 2. Challenges ...........................................................................................................11

2.1 General observations...................................................................................... 11 2.2 Challenges to be addressed by social-science research ................................ 13 Security and Access.............................................................................................14 Climate Change and other Environmental Impacts ..............................................16 Economic and Social Development......................................................................19 From Knowledge Management to Knowledge Integration across Boundaries .....21

3. The role of social science: Potential for cutting-edge research .................22

Equal footing for social science and engineering .................................................24 Central functions of social-science energy research ............................................25 The concrete role of the social sciences ..............................................................26

4. Issues covered in social-science research .......................................................26

4.1 Empirical state of research.............................................................................. 27 Findings................................................................................................................41

4.2 Overview of social-science research on energy (invited paper) ...................... 43 5. Towards an agenda .............................................................................................52

5.1 Four-level integrative approach to an R&D agenda ........................................ 52 5.2 Illustrative examples of future research........................................................... 53

6. Conclusions and outlook....................................................................................59

6.1 Conclusions: Basic consensus and key topics for the agenda........................ 59 6.2 Outlook: Embedding – normalisation – platform ............................................. 61

Appendices ..............................................................................................................64

Appendix 1: Participants ....................................................................................... 64 Appendix 2: Papers presented at Workshop I....................................................... 67 Appendix 3: Issues proposed during the ASRELEO process.............................. 168 Appendix 4: Initial outline of ASRELEO .............................................................. 173


4

Note on the EFDA contract This note aims at communicating the rationale and the main practical results of the present research project to an EFDA community that is less familiar with the methods and the language of social scien-tists. Reason why activities were enlarged The European Fusion Development Agreement (EFDA) approached the Centre for Energy Policy and Economics (CEPE) of ETH to review the achievements of the EFDA Socio-Economic Research on Fu-sion (SERF) made thus far “in view of enlarging the reflection to a wider social science community” (contract). In order to truly give a “new impulse to social studies for fusion” and to “trigger a discourse on societal aspects for long-term energy-environment options among diverse social science communi-ties”, the project’s Advisory Board, henceforth called Organising Committee (Appendix 4) decided to depart from the standard – reactive – review of existing (SERF) approaches and to embrace instead a new twofold rationale: first to refrain from technology-centred solutions and second to start out with challenges given by the overall energy discourse. This was an inversion of the traditional division of tasks: Whereas until now the agenda for social sciences had been dictated by EFDA, this new agenda was proposed by social scientists, using the methods and the language of social scientists. Yet the so-cial sciences are confronted with externally set challenges facing current and future societies. Results useful to EFDA and EFDA-related research communities Environmental threats (such as climate change); inherent uncertainties due to the time frame given by the project provisions (introduction of technology several decades from now); and complex interrela-tions between ecology, society, economy, technology and research require new perspectives. This re-port aims to raise EFDA’s awareness of non-technical perspectives on these critical issues. The first deliverable required by the contract with EFDA (“A list of organizations, including EFDA as-sociates, capable of conducting social researches and possibly interested in co-financing them”) is spread across different parts of the report. Section 4.1 lists main social-science researchers and orga-nisations that have been active in fields related to energy during the most recent years. This is supple-mented by a listing of many researchers and organisations that have contributed to this task (Appendix 1). Furthermore this project has identified at least two other organisations actively interested in using and supporting social sciences to explore the problems of a sustainable energy system: BP plc, which co-financed CEPE in this research, and the European Science Foundation, which sponsored an exploratory workshop. This provides an example for future EFDA-SERF related tasks and potential connections. The second deliverable (“A list of research topics”) is spread across several parts of the report. The main energy issues covered by social sciences until now are listed in section 4.1: the 36 research do-cuments exemplify important issues for research. A list of new research issues is given in Appendix 3 and examples of how to design them in Appendix 2. From the approach chosen it was decided to refrain from specifying the third deliverable (“A coherent line of action for SERF in the next few years”). Based on the systematics proposed in section 5.1 and the research issues recommended in section 5.2, EFDA may choose the topics more suitable to re-direct its research programme in social science, according to the desired level of generality and scope.


5

Summary Long-term energy-environment issues (40 to 100 years hence) pose complex techni-cal and societal problems as society and technologies develop over time. The inade-quacy of technology introduction as a “technical” solution to these problems argues for a larger role for the social sciences. Non-technical aspects of energy systems have become highly relevant if not decisive in forging a sustainable energy future. Processes of technological innovation and institutional and societal decision making about energy futures are embedded within and shaped by a host of social, economic, and political factors. The need for greater engagement, reflection, and cooperation of the technical sciences with the wider social-science community was the driving force of the project Agenda for Social-Science Research on Long-term Energy Options (ASRELEO). ASRELEO aims at defining the role and responsibility of the social sciences in long-term energy and technology research and at taking steps toward an energy-related research agenda in the social sciences. This presupposes that the social sciences speak for and explain themselves. Methodologically this goal was achieved through an extensive participatory process with two international workshops that served as important milestones. One workshop was attended by scientists from social-science energy research; the other brought together scientists and practitioners from re-search policy and research promotion. This allowed for an extensive overview of the diversity and significance of existing so-cial-science energy research, as well as future challenges. There are good reasons why there cannot be the voice of social science. After all, the various disciplines and their approaches to problems are too diverse. Nonetheless, the goal remains to (1) clearly elaborate and (2) communicate the basic consensus on the role and signifi-cance, responsibility, ability and potential of the social sciences in long-term energy research, as well as the key topics as raw material for a research agenda. Point (1) was the subject of the above-mentioned and documented participatory process. Point (2) is the goal of this publication, of various presentations to research policy bodies, a book project, and of the project application for EuroSOSCILEO (European Social-Science Research Related to Long-term Energy Options) within the framework of EUROCORES’ Call for Themes 2007 (www.esf.org/activities/eurocores.html). Society faces a wide range of serious problems connected to the energy system and its foreseeable development (Chapter 2): Energy-related Challenges Security and Access Security has technical aspects relating to plants and infrastructure; it also involves institutional arrangements, including international trade treaties. Similarly, access can be seen as a simple technical issue, but whether or not someone has access to ener-gy has more to do with his or her identity or social and economic status than with technical issues. Whether the secure access promotes peace, equality, and develop-ment or is instead a source of conflict and lasting inequality depends largely on the institutional environment. Climate Change and other Environmental Impacts Developing methods to cope effectively with long-term global environmental threats is a social-learning process in need of social-science research. Special attention has

http://www.esf.org/activities/eurocores.html


6

to be paid to combining efficiency strategies and institutional innovations to avoid re-bound effects. Economic and Social Development Combining the partially opposing goals of short-term economic efficiency and long-term system stability poses an unresolved challenge for research in designing corres-ponding policies and institutional solutions. Focusing purely on the technical problem of increasing energy conversion efficiency has not led to, and in fact has at least indi-rectly frustrated, lower overall energy use. Stepping up from the elemental efficien-cies to the efficiency of the system as a whole also involves analysing & develop-ing solutions in the fields of behaviour, social practices and trends, institutional and industrial cultures, lifestyles, and economic arrangements and institutions. Knowledge Management and Knowledge Integration across Boundaries In open, democratic societies the need for policies and institutional arrangements capable of achieving long-term goals requires greater engagement, understanding, and concern about the future from the public, companies, governments, and other stakeholders. This social process embraces (1) classical education connected to a comprehensive process of inclusive, participatory learning, (2) a responsive, global research community with interdisciplinary ventures, expanded cooperation in teach-ing and research, and collaboration among traditionally exclusive academic niches, as well as (3) the (re-)integration of heterogeneous, sometimes contradictory (modes of) knowledge to overcome boundaries between man and the environment, between scientific communities, between science and society, at different spatial, temporal and functional scales. Active role of social science: Social-science research is required to meet the mentioned challenges successfully Social-science research in all its disciplinary diversity has a pivotal role in this task, and full use must be made of its main functions: reflection, contextualised analysis, design and realisation (Chapter 3). There is a general consensus that the role of so-cial science should not be reduced to questions of winning public acceptance or mar-ket introduction of new technologies. Using social science only as a tool for such pur-poses runs counter to its reflective nature and would in itself be symptomatic of the current deficiencies in sustainability of the energy system, as characterised by the challenges listed above. In order to solve the pressing problems, technology re-search/natural science and social science should become equal and synergic part-ners. Appeal to social scientists and research-policy professionals Social science is already active in long-term oriented energy research (viz., in the area of defined energy challenges) and can point to significant achievements (Chapter 4). Among these, the various activities in transformation management can be mentioned as an example. Nevertheless, the contribution of social science as a whole to long-term oriented energy research has fallen short of its true potential. The project compiled the building blocks of an agenda for social-science research on long-term energy options. The first building block on the road to an agenda is a pro-posal for structuring the various topics to be worked on within the framework of the four challenges (section 5.1). The structuring proposal leaves room for reflection and the search for new challenges and topics (“roof terrace”), for developing concrete questions which can be formulated in the more narrow sense of a research agenda


7

(“open window” and “study”), and finally for an exchange among scientists as well as between research and its environment, including society (“front yard”). The second building block consists of a catalogue of research topics (section 5.2). The topics at a glance: “Roof Terrace” – Energy cultures – Energy behaviour – Paradoxes of energy efficiency – Limiting energy use: Sufficiency in energy consumption “Open Window”: – Climate change and energy systems – Analysing trade-offs between the social and the technical – Energy peace – Energy visions “Study”: – Policy measures to limit energy consumption – Energy certificates – Improving understanding & accelerating innovation processes in the energy field – Investment behaviour of house owners with respect to their buildings’ energy use – 2000-Watt scenario – Improvement of climate policy – Forecasts and society’s views – insights from social science to bridge the gap – Institutional innovations – Institutional frameworks for sustainability – Socio-technical infrastructure design – Energy access and development – Carbon capture and storage (CCS) – Sustainability assessment – the case for integration – Analysis of energy-relevant decision-making processes – Commercialisation of new renewable energy technologies “Front Yard”: – Social learning in energy systems – Discourses on energy policies – Involvement of end-consumers – The construction and practice of energy markets The 27 brief project sketches are meant to inspire the readers to formulate their own topics. This is not a “final” research agenda but extensive raw material for other to-pics and a tool for compiling research agendas. This report is therefore not only aimed at individual researchers but also at all the governmental and non-governmen-tal bodies involved in research policy and promotion on all levels. Need for communication, embedding and community building The basic consensus must be communicated competently and to the right audience if social sciences are to be repositioned and become securely embedded in long-term national and international energy research programmes and in research and teaching in universities and polytechnics.


8

Cumulative list of participants Organising Committee Justin Adams Gotthard Bechmann Matthias Finger Thomas Flüeler (Core Team) David Goldblatt (Core Team) Arnulf Grübler Eberhard Jochem Jürg Minsch (Core Team) Ruth M. Mourik Knut H. Sørensen Gert Spaargaren Daniel Spreng (chair, Core Team) GianCarlo Tosato Minh Q. Tran Workshop I, Oct 5/6, 2006 Thomas Berker Frank Hardeman Ulrik Jørgensen Wolfram Jörss Urs Luterbacher Tom O’Donnell Shonali Pachauri Harald Rohracher Audun Ruud Oliver Schilling Roland W. Scholz Michael Stauffacher Nico Stehr Geert Verbong Shiqiu Zhang Workshop II, Feb 1/2, 2007 Christian Eherer Boelie Elzen Wesley K. Foell Lukas Gutzwiller Daniel Hersson Tony Kaiser Frank Kuhn Christian Pohl Jan-Peter Voss Ellen Wiegandt Other contributors Peter S. Hofman, Andreas Kemmler, Adrian Müller, Thomas Sterner Affiliations and further contacts: Appendix 1


9

1. Introduction: Objectives, aim, and procedure Long-term energy-environment issues (40 to 100 years hence) pose complex techni-cal and societal problems as society and technologies develop over time, and they challenge all relevant scientific communities across national boundaries. The inade-quacy of technology introduction as a “technical” solution to these problems argues for a larger role for the social sciences. Non-technical aspects of energy systems have become highly relevant if not decisive in forging a sustainable energy future. Processes of technological innovation and institutional and societal decision-making about energy futures are embedded within and shaped by a host of social, economic, and political factors. The need for greater engagement, reflection, and cooperation of the technical sciences with the wider social-science community was the driving force of the project Agenda for Social-Science Research on Long-term Energy Options (ASRELEO). The social sciences analyse individual behaviour and aspirations, policies and goals, actors, actor networks, as well as markets and other institutions. They support im-provements in these institutions through conventional as well as experimental analyti-cal techniques. They are particularly well-suited for knowledge management, includ-ing the integration of heterogeneous knowledge to create well-supported and resilient energy regimes. Stimulated by the European Fusion Development Agency’s (EFDA) request for a re-view of their commissioned social-science research, ASRELEO was initiated in mid-2005. BP plc joined the project as a sponsor just as it got underway. The agenda to be formulated was not meant to be a plan for either of the sponsors; it did not con-cern itself with existing programmes, single projects, single energy carriers, or bud-gets. It was, however, intended to list research areas and explain their importance. ASRELEO’s aim was threefold:

• To articulate the need for social science to study (long-term) sustainable energy systems;

• To raise and help maintain awareness among social scientists for the need to ad-dress energy-related issues and challenges; and

• To support decision makers in formulating corresponding research policies. The two-year undertaking was ambitious. To avoid offhand and, from an individual social-science disciplinary viewpoint, incompetent work, it was decided to follow an open, discoursive, and process-based review approach, comprising six steps (partici-pants are listed in Appendix 1): 1. A broad-based and large international Organising Committee (OC) was invited to

discuss a first outline prepared by the ETH team (Core Team, Appendix 4). 2. The OC proposed and contacted over 80 renowned social-science researchers of

diverse professional and national backgrounds in the broader energy-environment field. Half of them submitted contributions on approaches, methods, results, and challenges on topics proposed by the OC.

3. A dozen key presentations from distinguished researchers (Appendix 2) were se-lected to stimulate discussion in a dedicated two-day workshop (Workshop I of


10

October 2006, with 24 participants from eleven countries). Its objective was to de-lineate research issues and ways to approach them (Appendix 3).

4. Based on the outcome of this, the report team sketched a working paper. 5. The paper was reviewed at (an ESF-sponsored Exploratory) Workshop II on 1–

2 February 2007 by a broader audience, namely practitioners and research policy officers, the OC and invited participants of Workshop I.

6. The Core Team integrated the feedback and drew up a second draft, to be com-mented on by participants and invited reviewers, and wrote this final report under the auspices of the Organising Committee.

It was the role of the Core Team to transform “research on research” into a practical proposal for EFDA, BP and for social scientists, especially to relate the problem-dri-ven energy challenges to the research perspective of social sciences and humanities. The organisation of the report is as follows (see Figure 1): Chapter 2 describes the major challenges facing the energy sector as the basic starting point and driving force for this project. The global energy sector has generated severe unintended con-sequences and has an uncertain future that clouds the world’s economies so closely dependent on it. Chapter 3 describes what social-science research can and should contribute to meeting these challenges. The structure proposed therein should serve as an aid to future actors for systematically formulating specific R&D topics:1

• Researchers: For building research collaborations incorporating a range of ap-proaches and methods;

• Administrators and evaluators: For providing a means for choosing criteria for specific work programmes, and calls as well as allocating resources;

• Policy makers and others interested in research policy: For defining funding stra-tegies and objectives, deciding on the choice of instruments; and assessing per-formance.

Chapter 4 offers a chronological overview of the social-science research conducted thus far in this area as well as a thematic reflection by an invited author. For this we also draw on the input of the participants in the ASRELEO Workshop I of October 2006. (All written contributions to the workshop are reproduced in the Appendix 2 of this report.) Chapter 5 develops a tool for an R&D agenda and illustrates this with pertinent examples. The tool encapsulates a methodology for setting agendas for so-cial-science research dedicated to steering energy supply and demand in a sustain-able direction. Chapter 6 concludes some insights from the process and gives an out-look.

1 In line with Jahn & Hubert (2004): Criteria for sustainable development research. Conference “Science et technologie pour le développement durable/Forschung und Technologie für eine nachhal-tige Entwicklung”, Paris, June 2004.


11

Figure 1. Overview of the report.

2. Challenges The project’s point of departure is problem-driven – we describe major challenges we hold the world is and will be faced with and the social sciences should address.

2.1 General observations We live in times of rapid change and development. Many of today’s economic entities and policies are designed to match this speed and flexibility. In many countries it is an explicit policy to accelerate change in the energy sector. The European Union, for example, builds its energy directives on the notion that energy is a good or service like any other and that the energy market should especially facilitate competition and easy entrance of new players into the market. Energy corporations are increasingly forced to focus on short-term gains in order to survive in open competitive markets. However, energy systems, comprising physical plants and institutions, are about more than just markets. The global energy sector includes not only super-tankers but is, so to speak, a super-tanker itself; it has long lead times, investments with long technical lifetimes, and ex-tremely long-lasting effects on resource availability and the environment. Building a nuclear power station, including going through the licensing procedure, takes around 20 years; the electro-technical parts of a hydroelectric power plant can be run without replacement for perhaps 50 years; the dam effectively lasts forever; and CO2’s resi-dence time in the atmosphere is several hundred years. Infrastructure dominates energy supply systems and gives energy supply something of the character of a pub-lic good. It is crucial that policies and institutions dealing with energy systems have a long time horizon. Otherwise, the energy sector and society that depends so heavily on it will

Issues covered in research Chapter 4

Role of social sciences Chapter 3

Tool for Agenda and examples Chapter 5

Energy challenges Chapter 2

Conclusions and Outlook Chapter 6


12

run into severe difficulties. To adequately steer the energy sector in a direction with a future is one of the main challenges of our age. While the energy sector resembles a massive and lumbering super-tanker, as an in-put to society and the economy, energy itself has a large potential to speed up pro-cesses. We use high-powered vehicles to get quickly from place to place, requiring much more fuel than a gentler journey would consume. Fast mass-production of dis-posable goods gobbles up more energy than the production of custom-tailored du-rables. Historically, economic growth and increased energy use have tended to go hand-in-hand. The link is not iron-clad, but it cannot be changed overnight. Although in the short to mid-term, a continuous supply of energy to the economy is absolutely necessary and to some extent irreplaceable, there is no natural law dictating that energy use need be maintained indefinitely at the high levels which industrial society has gotten used to. Modern civilisation has been built on cheap oil, coal, and gas: fossil fuels have ar-guably been the primary sine qua non for the North’s industrial and post-industrial de-velopment; and high energy consumption is one of modern civilisation’s defining cha-racteristics. Techno-economic systems have become dangerously dependent on in-expensive (compared to current market prices), readily-available fossil energy car-riers that provide some 90% of global commercial total primary energy supply. Conti-nued long-term reliance on fossil fuels is not tenable – for many reasons, but particu-larly for the following four:

• The increasing insecurity of supply of cheap oil and gas cannot be easily re-medied. As many countries with high demand have insufficient or no reserves of these resources, unconditional supply cannot be taken for granted;

• The global long-term environmental effects of supplying and consuming energy, especially climate change, threaten the biosphere, human health, and the stability of the energy system itself.

• The higher fossil fuel prices stall the development of developing countries, which are deprived of clean, affordable energy; consequently, international wealth in-equities are exacerbated.

• The geopolitical concentration of fossil fuel resources causes a huge transfer of funds to resource-rich countries, where they can be used for non-economic, non-productive, or destructive purposes;

These pressures challenge global society to develop policies and institutions that support the following:

• moderate final energy demand and limit the use of fossil fuels and/or the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG), especially CO2;

• diversify supply; • encourage durable and constructive innovation processes (technological and so-

cial); and • aim at the right balance between flexibility and stability of institutions. Increasing energy efficiency is a necessary but not sufficient means of limiting either energy use or GHG emissions. As long as engineers have been at work, improving energy efficiency has been one of their primary goals. They have been very success-ful; specific energy efficiency in the past has increased continually. In spite of this – indeed, in part because of this – energy use has been increasing rapidly. Technical


13

progress has not only increased energy efficiency but has generated economic growth. The general failure of policies aimed at limiting energy use can be explained in various ways (in political-economic, psychological, or sociological terms), but more research is needed to settle this question. The modern economy’s dependence on fossil fuel is so great that neither a switch to carbon-free fuels nor carbon-capture and storage (CCS) can possibly be achieved fast enough to make efforts at curbing energy use redundant. Whatever progress is made here, heightened awareness, stronger willingness, and more effective policies and institutions are also needed to both limit energy use and to diversify supply. A better scientific understanding of the factors frustrating energy conservation will help to achieve this goal. The chapter sections below begin to explore avenues that sup-port this improved understanding. At the same time, energy also has to be supplied and employed efficiently in an eco-nomic sense. Social-science research is needed to devise policies and institutions that provide an appropriate degree of and balance between short-term efficiency and economic sustainability.

2.2 Challenges to be addressed by social-science research Society faces a wide range of serious problems connected to the energy system. In this report, we subdivide these problems into the following four groups of challenges:

• Security and Access, • Climate Change and other Environmental Impacts, • Economic and Social Development, and • Knowledge Management and Knowledge Integration across Boundaries. These four groups of challenges are neither very original nor have they been directly taken from some other source. They were the product of considerable discussion at both Workshops 1 and 2 (see the appendices). Most national energy policies aim to provide energy that is (1) safe; (2) affordable; (3) environmentally benign; and (4) socially acceptable to citizens. Our four groups of challenges partially echo these four goals. A cursory comparison might suggest we left out the fourth goal. This is not at all our intention; on the contrary, the four groups of challenges all comprise and emphasise the societal dimension. This has the ad-vantage of showing that energy systems should not only be “socially acceptable” but also socially robust, comprising components of both hardware (e.g., infrastructure, buildings, plants and equipment) and software (e.g., actors, laws, norms, and institu-tions) which positively influence and co-evolve with each other. Furthermore, we highlight the importance of knowledge management for making lasting progress to-wards the other three goals by treating it as a goal in its own right. The grouping of topics under these challenges was done with particular care, after extended discus-sion, because it was hoped these groups could be the factual and problem-driven ba-sis for shaping the agenda for social-science research that is the final objective of this report.


14

Security and Access From a technical perspective, it is not obvious what security and access have in com-mon. Even what is lumped under the term security is technically very diverse. The security of Western Europe’s oil supply is something entirely different than the security of a power plant or an electricity network (protection of equipment from un-wanted intrusion). And access, from a technical point of view, is rather banal, where-as the secure functioning of an electricity network is technically highly sophisticated. However, from a social-science perspective the two dimensions security and access make an interesting pair. Security has technical aspects relating to plants and infra-structure; it also involves institutional arrangements, including international trade treaties. Similarly, access can be seen as a simple technical issue, but whether or not someone has access to energy has more to do with his identity or social status than with technical issues. A secure access provides one the choice to use or not use the securely accessible energy; to acquire and defend a secure access requires political, economic, and perhaps even military power. Differences in access point to differences of power both within countries and between countries. Insecurity of supply often points to unstable institutional arrangements. The present energy system challenges us to improve the security of international energy trade. A high percentage of fossil fuel resources is located in countries with political tensions vis-à-vis the countries with the greatest demand for them. Now more confident and independent, these resource-rich countries have begun to sup-plant foreign firms and extract and transport their fuels through their own national oil companies. They are calling for “demand security” to assure the economic viability of their investments in greater production and transport capacity. In light of this new situation, countries with high fossil fuel imports have started dis-cussing the need to develop a dedicated “energy foreign policy”, even a multinational energy policy. An independent social-science analysis of these developments is ne-cessary for informing such a policy. To develop an “international energy policy”, various elements are necessary funda-mentals:

• Knowledge is required about the resources in terms of geology, management of the oil and gas fields, and maintenance and development of production facilities.

• Knowledge is required concerning transport capabilities (very important in the case of gas), current and future customers, and likely future domestic demand (very important in populous countries like Iran and Venezuela).

• Most of all, knowledge is required about the politics, culture, society, and econo-my of the various resource-rich countries. The standard knowledge taken out of daily newspapers is insufficient.

• Social science has many facets. Some scholars have a profound knowledge of a particular country or a particular aspect of society, such as religion, that inf-luences politics; others are specialists in modelling political behaviour and conflict. A combination of several academic fields of expertise is likely to be the most fruit-ful approach to dealing with this complex issue.

• In the mid-term, it would be productive for IEA and OPEC to work out common goals. In the long-term, an international organisation is needed to mediate among the interests of all global actors, including future generations’.


15

This discussion that started with the challenge presented by unequal resource availa-bility between countries has led to the equally daunting challenge presented by un-equal access to resources and energy carriers within countries, as discussed by Lu-terbacher, Choucri, and Wiegandt (see Box 1 and Appendix 2). Often, typically in countries with high population densities, energy poverty is a cause for misery, ill health and deprivation, as well a hindrance to development. The West got rich on cheap oil. It is now not easy for the rest of the world to catch up in economic develop-ment powered by systems using much more expensive energy. This may be com-pounded if energy access is used as a weapon in political and economic power struggles within nations. The lack of access to energy is an expression of these struggles. Box 1: Energy resources and political conflicts (U. Luterbacher et al.) To understand the nexus between energy, natural resources population and conflict, the institutional setting has to be taken into account. A plausible scheme is that politi-cal “tragedy” affects the economic “tragedy” through the negative impact of conflict on property rights protection, which can lead to overexploitation. The economic trage-dy is enhanced by the “demographic tragedy” which is also due to the absence of well-defined property rights and contract enforcement. The economic “tragedy of the commons” influences the risk of conflict through the externality losses from resource extraction. As in the case of mineral resources such as diamonds or oil, the potential short- and medium-run gains of extraction are immense, but the externality losses are small because exclusion is possible. Such goods make it profitable for the elite to launch and then stick to a suboptimal authoritarian and sometimes “warlordism”-pro-duction method. This form of governance often leads to both internal and external forms of conflict. Improving access for poor sections of the population in developing countries is only marginally a technical task. Much social-science research is required to achieve this aim. Benevolent governmental and non-governmental institutions, convinced that vil-lagers had eagerly waited years to switch to new energy technologies and a new way of life so obviously superior to their old ways, have wasted considerable resources on their ill-conceived programs. This is not necessarily the mentality of the populace in deprived regions. Anthropological studies show under what circumstances people can escape from the poverty trap; case studies show which types of programs are successful and which are not; statistical studies show which changes in energy supp-ly go hand-in-hand with changes in lifestyle. In Box 2, Kemmler shows that the elec-trification of Indian households is not so much a question of economics as of educa-tion and access to other “modern” goods and services. Box 2: Factors influencing household access to electricity in India (A. Kemmler) Modern energy sources are important input factors for human development. Although official estimates indicate that 85% of Indian villages are electrified, fewer than 60% of Indian households actually consume electricity. Until recently, the main policy has been to extend the grid to villages in rural areas in order to encourage productive uses for agriculture. Today, there is a new emphasis on making sure rural house-holds have access to and adopt electricity. An econometric analysis of the large India consumer survey data shows that house-hold electrification depends on household characteristics (such as the level of educa-tion of its members), the degree of community electrification, and the quality of elec-


16

tricity supply. Surprisingly, household expenditure and, in particular, the electricity ta-riff show only a relatively small effect on a household’s choice for electricity. It seems that the step to use electricity is part of a broader change in the household towards modernising and joining the new economic system. The switch from traditional fuel wood to liquefied petroleum gas as the main energy source for cooking is different. Here economics, both the available income and the fuel price, plays the decisive role. In addition, this switch does not take place in one step: even well-off households keep using traditional biomass to cook certain dishes and as a back-up in case of supply interruptions. Both the international and the intra-national aspects of the relationship between ac-cess and security on the one hand, and political/economic/military power on the other, are under-researched topics. Political science plays a key role here and in analysing scenarios for international tensions and conflicts as fossil energy resources (and other natural resources) are depleted and the race for access accelerates. Re-search in these areas shows that whether the availability of more modern energy pro-motes peace, equality, and development or is instead a source of conflict and lasting inequality depends largely on the institutional environment. The optimal and the mini-mal institutional requirements for a new energy system to be a blessing should per-haps be determined in each case. Of course, a central task for ensuring energy access and security for the developing nations is to moderate energy consumption in developed countries so that develop-ing countries have the room – in terms of availability and affordability – to increase their consumption to lift their populations above subsistence levels, without thereby exceeding global environmental carrying capacity. This is as much a moral issue as a matter of technology or economics, and therefore, in relation to social science- and humanities research, may call for the input of philosophers, psychologists, sociolo-gists and cultural anthropologists as well. As a (sub-) challenge in its own right, this task has strong connections to each of the other challenge groups. Diversification of energy sources is a solid strategy for making the energy supply more secure. It has a geographic component that is closely related to the above-mentioned energy foreign policy and a component related to alternatives to fossil fuels. This latter aspect is also connected to the environmental and economic chal-lenges discussed below.

Climate Change and other Environmental Impacts Despite (and indeed partly as a result of) continuing technological and efficiency im-provements, the environmental impacts of the energy sector and energy use continue to increase in absolute terms around the world, e.g., acid deposition, fine particulate and ozone pollution, land use changes, depletion of non-renewable and degradation of renewable resources. These are decades-old concerns, although their global scope is relatively new. The more recent concern to reach the top of political agendas and media attention is accelerating climate change from the emission of CO2 into the atmosphere due largely to combustion of fossil fuels and incomplete combustion of biomass. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a political attempt to manage the atmosphere, a global common good, in a responsible manner. It is supported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an impressive collaborative effort of scientists from


17

around the world. These are not well-trodden paths. Developing methods to deal effectively with this kind of very long-term, global environmental threat is a social-learning process in need of support by social-science research. The main political tool that has been adopted by the UNFCCC to deal with first stabi-lising and then reducing CO2-emissions is trade in emissions certificates. This instru-ment is a product of social-science research. How well it will work under varying cir-cumstances and with different designs in a global environment is an open question. Much is at stake. Making this or an alternative instrument effective and acceptable is a task that may be crucial to the survival of millions of people. Today’s tendency to make emissions trading acceptable by giving away free carbon credits may not only make the instrument ineffective but may also have other negative consequences (see Box 3). Box 3: Initial Allocation in Permit Trade (Th. Sterner and A. Müller) In permit trading systems, free initial allocation is common practice. A recent example is the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). With most free allocation schemes significant perverse effects on abatement and output can be identified employing a simple multi-period model. Firms have incentives for strategic action if allocation in one period depends on their actions in previous ones and thus can be influenced by them. Examples are allocations referring to a historic baseline that might be adapted after some years or a sector expecting to be regu-lated by a cap-and-trade system based on historic use. These findings play a major role wherever trading schemes become increasingly popular as environmental or re-source use policy instruments. This is of particular relevance in the EU-ETS, where the current period is a trial-period before the first commitment period of the Kyoto protocol. Many facets of the UNFCCC are in need of detailed investigation. Which elements of international treaties are essential for making this treaty fair? Which elements are es-sential for making it effective? There is considerable danger that compromise will wa-ter down the treaty to the point that it will become ineffective and lead to negative outcomes. Without adequate safeguards, increased corruption and other problems may jeopardise CDM2 projects. There is no world juridical system. However, there is an abundance of international and multi-lateral treaties and conventions relating to resource use and pollution that may be useful, if hard to monitor and enforce, and newer incarnations of organisa-tions like the Court of Human Rights may become involved with issues of environ-mental justice. Such institutions have largely proved inadequate to the task of entic-ing nations, firms, and individuals to be mindful of the global commons. How can they be improved and what other kinds of institutions are needed? What prejudices are at work, and what interests are at stake? What is the cost of suggested measures to the various parties? There is gamut of questions to be answered, most of them social-science research questions. 2 The clean development mechanism (CDM) is one of three “flexibility mechanisms” of the Kyoto Pro-tocol designed to provide cost-effective emissions reduction opportunities. CDM allows developed countries to purchase “cheap” CO2-emissions certificates in developing countries by paying for pro-jects there that, at least on the paper, lead to reduced CO2 emissions. The other two mechanisms are Joint Implementation (JI: receiving credit for implementing emission-reducing projects in other Annex I signatory nations) and emissions trading.


18

In addition, the most commonly proposed technical solution to excess CO2-emissions – carbon capture and storage (CCS) – is ridden with open social-science research questions. CCS provides hope for a (limited) solution, but implementing and safe-guarding it is likely to run up against significant practical and legal problems (see Box 4). Box 4: CCS - A Faustian bargain? (D. Spreng, G. Marland, A.M. Weinberg) The temptation that carbon capture and storage (CCS) offers is the extension of the fossil-fuel era by perhaps a few hundred years. It is a technology designed to limit emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere, but it extends the period during which CO2 is emitted. It is a double-edged sword. Research on CCS and talk of the promise of a technology that can fix the CO2 problem can easily delay more durable measures. CCS could provide temporary relief, but it may also make humankind more depend-ent on fossil fuels, and thus make a change-over later more difficult. The short-term interest of the fossil-fuel industry is to extend the era of fossil fuels. Faustian Bargain comes with temporary relief, commitment, and an uncertain outcome. The commit-ment entails long-term vigilance in managing the captured CO2. Sudden leakage could endanger people, and gradual leakage would endanger the climate system. The worldwide storage capacity may be sufficient. The fraction of CO2 retained in sto-rage sites ‘very likely’ exceeds 99% over 100 years (IPCC), but IPCC acknowledges that ‘site monitoring may be required for very long periods’. The challenge of detect-ing and addressing leaks is a large one. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s task with respect to nuclear waste, by comparison, is difficult but feasible on account of the ease with which small amounts of radioactivity can be detected. Long-term lia-bility issues associated with CO2 leakage have not been resolved. Who will accept this Faustian commitment? The community working on another very long-term environmental problem, the dispo-sal of radioactive waste, seems to have recognised at least some of its social-science research needs (Flüeler in Appendix 2). Results of their analysis of the very complex “Not In My Back Yard” (NIMBY) issue may be useful in other contexts. Continual support for renewables is needed to decrease both the dependence on im-ported energy resources and the emission of CO2. To date, the most effective mea-sure for furthering renewables has been the adoption of feed-in tariffs. Similar to car-bon certificates, this is a measure that can be introduced at little cost to anyone but that in the long run is not without problems. Feed-in tariffs are often either ineffective or may become a victim of their own success: they may be set too low (rendering them ineffective), too high (making them uneconomical), or similarly their decrease may be too fast or too slow. Some countries have used feed-in tariffs for dozens of years by now. In Switzerland, they have helped to forestall the decline of small hydroelectric power and lately, with higher feed-in tariffs, have led to its renaissance. Unlike emission certificates, they are not a product of social-science research, but like them they need to be further de-veloped on the basis of solid analysis and recommendations from the social-science research community: Which fixes are necessary and when; what are the changing in-terests of the various actors and where can consensus be reached? What adjust-ments are needed if the market is dramatically affected by the extensive utilisation of feed-in tariffs? In developing countries with certain combinations of geography, tree-


19

cover, population density, habits and other factors, the extensive use of traditional fuels often has large negative environmental impacts. Depending on the local envi-ronment and given an adequate introduction, appropriate modern commercial fuels may be an improvement. Their availability, in turn, also depends on many factors, price being one of them. High fossil fuels prices may cause environmental degrada-tion in places where the population relies heavily on a robust local environment to provide biomass fuels. The problem of ensuring that renewables play some role in ru-ral development is again only marginally a technical issue and is, rather, predomi-nantly an issue of social change and therefore also of social-science research.

Economic and Social Development In principle, much is known about what measures would improve the performance of economic systems. Energy as well as other resources should be priced so that exter-nal costs are included. This can be achieved by regulation or by fiscal measures, such as taxes or the auction of emission certificates. As second-best measures, more benign products and services can be promoted and introduced to the market by direct subsidies or via regulation, as with feed-in tariffs. However, some of these se-cond-best measures work against energy efficiency by making energy less costly than would the inclusion of external costs. Internationally, just trade arrangements would help to ease inequities. Perceived personal advantages, perceived advantages for one’s own group, inflexibi-lity, and different perceptions of what is just and what the various external costs might be stand in the way of the “best” solutions. Finding ways of taking the environ-ment as well as social goals into account is a huge challenge for all the social scien-ces, including economics. Both energy conservation and renewables have a high initial investment cost and low running cost. An economic system based on competition and trimmed to honour speed and short-term gain will not reward long-term investments. Combining the par-tially opposite goals of economic efficiency and long-term viability in an organised fa-shion and consciously deducing the methods for economic assessment poses an un-resolved challenge for research. In the past years, a strong belief in open markets and competition has been prevalent not only among economists but also in politics and business. It often took on the in-tensity of a religious belief not to be questioned. Other models such as the model of “service public” were in disrepute. Recently, this dogmatic stance has begun to be questioned. Social-science disciplines are also integrally involved in the task of devising effective instruments and institutions for energy conservation. As noted, focusing purely on the technical problem of increasing energy efficiency has not led to, and in fact has at least indirectly frustrated, lower overall energy use. Energy conservation therefore in-volves both (1) development and deployment of higher-efficiency equipment and pro-cesses and (2) analysing behaviours, social practices and trends, lifestyles, and eco-nomic arrangements and institutions with a view to holding down aggregate energy demand.


20

It is true that some amount of energy is irreplaceable for powering economic activi-ties, analogous to the energy needed to support living organisms. Unlike other re-sources, energy is not entirely substitutable. However, much energy can in the course of daily activities be saved by decelerating activities and doing things smarter (substituting with time and/or information).3 Environmental impacts generated in the supply and use of energy also have to be ta-ken into account by the end-consumers. Even today, little is certain about the durabi-lity of consumers’ aspirations and behaviours. Important research questions remain, such as the role of trends, group phenomena, and the like. Involving consumers in the choice of how much of which energy carrier should be used is a strategy of yet unknown potential. Box 5: “Greening the grid – The Ecological Modernisation of Network-bound systems” (P. S. Hofman)4 In his thesis van Vliet5 explores the social practices of consumers both from the ana-lysis of strategic conduct and through institutional analysis. This is relevant as the role of citizen-consumers is, according to van Vliet, underrated in the study of techno-logical change. Based on assumptions derived from ecological modernisation theory, he analyses several case studies of monitoring and differentiation as an expression of environment-induced change in network-bound systems, particularly the way in which consumption is connected to modes of provision. The duality of structure is especially visible through the focus on systems of provision, which connects modes of production to modes of consumption. Consumption practices are partly shaped (or constrained) by the systems of provision enabling them. User routines are shaped by the technological system, but this does not imply that user preferences are fixed, only that it is very difficult to change them as they are interwoven within the system. Thus the central station electricity system with monopolistic organisation has shaped cap-tive, passive consumers. Van Vliet stresses the significance of electricity relying on an expert system, where a shift to another system cannot take place because of sunk costs and the perceived impossibility and inefficiency of such a shift by the dominant actors. Using water and energy is a daily routine; only through an interruption of rou-tines (power failure or removal or a home reconstruction project) does our discursive awareness awaken (awareness of the skills necessary to uphold the system, link-ages, power relationships). This discursive awareness can also be directed to the en-vironmental impacts that characterise the present make-up of the system. The suc-cess of green electricity in the Netherlands, for example, suggests that groups of consumers can change their routines to some extent if the mode of provision enables this and they acquire sufficient motivation and information. According to van Vliet, drawing attention to both environmental impacts and the structures that uphold them is a mechanism to open up the system for change. Van Vliet argues that “environ-mental monitoring can increase the visibility of systems of provision to its users, and thereby lower the threshold for environmental renewal” (2002: 131). Also important here is the symbolic dimension of consumption as an expression of culture: people

3 D. Spreng (1993): Possibility for substitution between energy, time and information. Energy Policy. Vol. 21. Nr. 1. 4 P. S. Hofman (2003): Embedding radical innovations in society. Background report to the CondEcol project based on Dutch experiences, ProSUS. Univ. of Oslo, Oslo, pp. 85-86. www.prosus.uio.no/-publikasjoner/Rapporter/2003-8/Rapp8.pdf (accessed on 2007-7-30). 5 B. van Vliet (2002): Greening the grid. The ecological modernisation of network-bound systems. Dis-sertation. Wageningen Univ., Wageningen.


21

use goods and services to relate to other people or groups. He further concludes that “environmental differentiation is a second core issue because it inherently marks a transition from uniform provision in network-bound systems towards dispersed, plura-list modes of provision.” As for social development, section Security and Access discussed international in-equities in access to energy, but other forms of inter-country inequities ripe for re-search include differences in climate-change-related impacts and mitigation capabili-ties (The IPCC 4th Assessment Report indicates that the countries likely to be most drastically affected by climate change have the least technical and financial re-sources to adapt to it.).

From Knowledge Management to Knowledge Integration across Boundaries We decided to emphasise the role of knowledge management by identifying it as one of the four central challenges. As pointed out in the introduction, foresight, practically realised as precaution, is sorely needed. We need to develop energy regimes that are steered not only by short-term but also by long-term goals. We need natural-science and technological research to find technical solutions for the numerous chal-lenges in time. But equally important, we need policies and institutional arrangements capable of achieving long-term goals. In open, democratic societies this requires greater engagement, understanding, and concern about the future from the public, companies, governments, and other stakeholders, which implies that social learning must take place. To this end, classical education has to be supplemented by teach-ing and encouraging both professionals and the wider public to embrace wise, far-sighted, and sustainable options, based on a comprehensive process of inclusive, participatory learning. We need a responsive, global research community, inclusive of all relevant social-science disciplines. Interdisciplinary ventures, expanded cooperation in teaching and research, and collaboration among traditionally exclusive academic niches to con-tend with urgent transdisciplinary problems6 should be increasingly furthered. We need the (re-) integration of heterogeneous, sometimes contradictory (modes of) knowledge, indeed its co-production (1) to overcome boundaries between man and the environment, between scientific communities, between science and society, bet-ween stakeholders within society, and all at different spatial, temporal and functional scales; and (2) to create well-supported and resilient energy regimes that respond as well as possible to the challenges laid out in this chapter, with a design capable of responding to diverging needs. Local and global problems, as well as ranges of solutions, have to be identified jointly by the sciences and stakeholders from society in trans-disciplinary processes. Science & Technology Studies (STS, see Chapter 4) have a long tradition of exa-

6 “Transdisciplinarity aspires to make the change from research for society to research with society … mutual learning sessions ... should be regarded as a tool to establish an efficient transfer of know-ledge both from science to society and from problem owners (i.e. from science, industry, politics etc.) to science” (R. W. Scholz (2000): Mutual learning as a basic principle of transdisciplinarity. In: R. W. Scholz et al. (eds.): Transdisciplinarity: Joint problem-solving among science, technology and society. Proc. of the International Transdisciplinarity 2000 Conference, Zurich, Feb 27–Mar 1, 2000. Workbook II: Mutual learning sessions. Vol. 2. Haffmanns Sachbuch, Zürich, p. 13).


22

mining the interactions between technological research (institutions) and society. This field will be increasingly called upon to examine future unintended consequen-ces in the social sphere, as they arise, caused by large and small-scale technical de-velopments. It also has a substantial role in identifying and, if possible, aligning di-verging modes of knowledge about and expectations of future energy systems. Uncovering the strong and sometimes very subtle influences points to the lack of easy fixes. If the car is an integral part of society and provides not only transport, but also freedom, easy access to a cosy home, and a guard against depression, one has to be careful of simple-minded tech fixes. If there is as much society inside technolo-gy-development institutions as there is outside of them, then one has to be careful not to expect new technological propositions to be better informed than the old ones. Research questions in urgent need of being answered are: What communication de-ficits exist, what communication channels are effective, what institutional arrange-ments are most conducive to mutual learning

• among various science communities; • between various parts of society (the public, business, government, science); and • internationally, both in further developing energy supply and in using energy wisely?

3. The role of social science: Potential for cutting-edge research The term social science generally subsumes those academic disciplines that theoreti-cally and empirically examine the phenomenon of human and societal behaviour. The structure and function of the social interdependence of societal institutions and systems are analysed along with their interplay with the actions and behaviour of in-dividuals.7 The social sciences especially include the following:

Public administration, cultural sciences (incl. anthropology/ethnology), communica-tion and information sciences, demography, economics, education, geography, histo-ry, law, management sciences, philosophy/ethics, political science, psychology, so-ciology.

In the field of energy research the social sciences as well as the humanities are often called upon for advice concerning public acceptance of new technologies. Heigh-tened acceptance is supposed to make the introduction of new technologies easier or even possible. Another oft-stressed function of social science, especially economics, is the support of the market introduction of new technologies through specific promo-tion mechanisms. Even if these two functions are, in fact, part of their repertoire, the social sciences should not be reduced to fulfilling a mere marketing function for tech-nological developments occurring without any social-science reflection. The sheer existence of unintended ecological, social, and economic consequences counsels

7 For a definition of terms, see for instance N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes (2001, eds.): International en-cyclopedia of social and Behavioral Sciences. Elsevier, Amsterdam.


23

against such a misuse of the social sciences. The challenges described in Chapter 2 require drawing upon the social sciences’ much wider repertoire. A simple look at any of the challenges underlines the truth of these assertions8:

(1) Tensions, conflicts, development prospects, and human rights Changes in the global energy supply can be attributed to various causes, for example, the emer-gence of new providers and the (mid-term or continuing) restriction of supply resulting from exhaustion of resources or limitations in the range of infrastructure. Such adjustments in supply affect economic interests and vested rights as well as regional, national, or international development potentials. Thus, they involve not just economic phenomena in the narrow sense but also political challenges. Fossil fuel scarcities and the associated relatively high energy prices shift, for example, national and geopolitical interests and power positions considerably. Political priorities, programmes, and strategies are affected. Finally, changes in the global energy supply can lead to international tensions and conflicts, to a worsening of the human rights situation in energy-exporting countries and poor energy-importing countries, as well as to an erosion of chances for development. The analysis of the interaction of these various effects is a central task of social-science energy research. (2) Limiting Energy Use, Instruments and Institutions The task of limiting energy use – another challenge mentioned – is, apart from its technical dimensions, largely a question of the general political and institutional framework, lifestyle and consumption patterns, and business models in the energy service sector. It is of central importance to analyse the reasons why suitable conditions are so difficult to realise. Without an adequate integral and transdisciplinary framework, energy-saving techno-logies can even have counter-productive (rebound) effects, and novel business models will remain confined to market niches. Past technical innovations, while admittedly impressive in the concrete individual case for increasing efficiency and reducing energy consumption, have not lead to a stabilisation or reduction in total societal energy use. This is also true for greenhouse gas emissions. Devising a functioning emissions trading system and, generally, politically and economically realistic but simultaneously ecologically sound instruments, strategies, and institutions is a central task of long-term-oriented social-science energy research. For this it is necessary to create institutions that permit a long-term orientation in the economic and political realms.

(3) Energy access As another example, the connection between energy access and development, undeniably has an important technical dimension. However, whether energy access actually contributes to development and to a reduction in poverty de-pends crucially on local institutions, the development model, the political and legal culture (democratic conditions, access to credit, property rights, legal security) but al-so on the framework for international commerce (export possibilities for manu-factured products). Here is a concrete current example illustrating the impact of general conditions and development models: In India, water scarcities have increased since rainfall has begun to decrease. Groundwater is thus being increasingly exploited. This has been encouraged by the practice of not charging farmers for the electricity costs of pumping out groundwater. Seven hundred of the country’s 5000 “water blocks” are already in a critical state (depleted or salinised).

8 For illustration, concrete research topics are suggested in section 5.2.


24

This is true of the Punjab, the country’s breadbasket, where 85% of the aquifers are already depleted. Wheat yield has declined by some 50% to under 2000 kg/ha. Thus, here faulty energy price signals through misguided electricity subsidies are contributing to the destruction of the ecological basis of the agricultural sector.

(4) Support for renewables The above example (subsidies for mechanical ground-water extraction) clarifies the problem of promotion strategies that are not based on a correct general framework but are constructed around isolated innovations and tech-nical solutions. Such strategies are, however, politically popular, can produce fast re-sults, and may even be important for assisting the launch of new technologies. But these specific uses do not justify their application to the complexity of general ques-tions of economic development. Without fitting them to a broadly-encompassing de-velopment concept, technologically-dependent promotion strategies just displace problems rather than solve them (as in the above example) or cause rebound effects. Thus, is it possible in unfortunate cases that an inadequate promotion policy for re-newable energy does not contribute to a substitution of renewable energy for fossil fuel but rather to an increase in total energy supply and demand, along with new un-intended side-effects (for example, exacerbated use conflicts with the agriculture and food sectors, as in the current “tortilla crisis”). These four examples demonstrate that successfully grappling with the energy-related challenges described in Chapter 2 involves a crucial role for the social sciences. We believe these challenges are central for securing the “good life” on earth in the sense of a broadly-construed sustainability. Not meeting these challenges would be a vote for tolerating unintended negative ecological, economic, political, and social impacts. It would be a vote for the tyranny of unintended consequences.

Equal footing for social science and engineering The social sciences are often regarded as merely a substitute for technical solutions (“fixes”). They have sometimes only been called upon after a problem has arisen due to technical failure, and are as such used to fix technical problems with social solu-tions (end-of-pipe). This limited role of social sciences follows from the lack of early involvement of social science in technological development (R&D) processes. Fixes, supposedly more elegant and more quickly realisable, take priority, and social science is seen as almost optional. A substitutive relationship between technical and social-science solutions to “small questions and small problems” is to some extent warranted. Small problems can be solved by technical means or through behavioural changes. However, the details of the challenges facing the energy system and so-ciety makes it clear that here the logic of such simple “either-or” choices no longer holds true. The necessary process of adjustment, both within the technical energy sector and in society in the age of climate change; economic globalisation; and the looming shortages in the supply of commercial energy (and other natural resources such as drinking water and land for agriculture) render such simple choices inade-quate. Rather, technical and social-science solutions are necessarily complementary and should be developed in close cooperation from the start of R&D. The co-evolu-tion of technology and society means that neither of these spheres has priority: they are of equal value at all stages of development. In connection with the question of the contribution of the sciences to sustainability, the double function of the social sciences – a broad repertoire and equality with the


25

natural sciences and engineering – has been variously recognised. For example, in their framework of a broad participatory process9, researchers established that science must supply the goal-oriented, systems, and transformation knowledge to sustainable development for it to realise its overall societal goals. The researchers identified a deficit in the area of social science and concluded with the suggestion that significantly more emphasis be placed in the future on the generation of goal- and transformation knowledge as well as social-science-, humanities-, economic, and systems knowledge (p. 15). What is valid for sustainability science in general also holds true for long-term-oriented social-science research in the energy sector.

Central functions of social-science energy research On an abstract level, at least three central functions of social-science energy re-search can be identified: A. Reflection An important function of social-science energy research is perceiving and reflecting on societal, political, economic (e.g., globalisation), ecological (for instance, climate change), and technological developments significant for the energy sector itself and for society as a whole (both ex-ante and ex-post). In addition, it offers reflection on society's understanding of itself, of its basic values, and basic attitudes towards spe-cific issues including risk, insecurity, trust, rationality, change, and tradition. More-over, the sciences reflect on their societal functions, their possibilities and limitations, and their responsibility. This reflection also includes the following:

• Identifying the central energy-related challenges to the economy, society, and en-gineering;

• Translating these challenges into positive visions and precepts and guiding their implementation;

• Scientifically contributing to society's discussion of broader aims; • Supporting, possibly even initiating, societal, political, and scientific discourse for

problem solving. B. Analysis Analysis is the core function of every science and delves into the trends and chal-lenges identified in the course of social-science reflection. It aims to describe and un-derstand the basic societal mechanisms relating to the energy system. Societal me-chanisms is a deliberately broad term: it encompasses all of the effects and innova-tion mechanisms of the human/society system that can be described by the social sciences. It also encompasses all societal subsystems (e.g., economy, politics, law, education, science/technology, and culture) and actors at all levels (for example, indi-vidual group/company, country/region, nation, and international cooperation). There-fore, all social-science disciplines are a part of this, including law, humanities, and economics. The specific research question determines which discipline will be called upon to contribute solutions. In general, the questions will always require interdiscipli-nary and often transdisciplinary work. Social-science energy research is furthermore characterised by its contextuality: The perception of a research issue, the derivation

9 CASS/ProClim (1997): Research on sustainability and global change – Visions in science policy by Swiss researchers, www.proclim.ch/Reports/Visions97/Visions_E.html (accessed on 2007-7-30).


26

of concrete research questions, the analysis and, finally, also the elaboration of solu-tions always take place in a concrete context in which the issues arise and the solu-tions must be embedded. The context consists of three dimensions: the spatial di-mension (natural, political, economical), the temporal and historical dimension, and the cultural and social dimension (political, social and economic organisation of so-ciety). Part of this contextualisation by social sciences and individually organised ac-cording to the research question is the involvement of the concerned and affected humans themselves, in their diverse roles and identities, with their values, attitudes, interests, needs, and their rooms for manœuvre and limitations. C. Design/Realisation The third function of social-science energy research is to elaborate and sometimes support the implementation of realisable and forward-looking measures and strate-gies aimed at ecological, economic, and societal/social sustainability. It is intricately linked to reflection and analysis. Analogous to analysis, the realisation function ap-plies to the entire human/society system understood in its totality. This realisation function is guided by the normative value of sustainable development.

The concrete role of the social sciences The preceding remarks outline what we consider to be the indispensable function of the social sciences within the area of energy research. They do much more than merely further the design, acceptance and implementation of (apparently) autono-mous technological progress. And they are not just an optional add-on to autono-mous technological development. This is manifestly evident from the discussion in Chapter 2 on the challenges to social-science research on long-tem energy options:

• All of the challenges mentioned zero-in directly on competence areas within the social sciences.

• The social sciences play a key role in addressing these challenges: without sub-stantial social-science competence, they cannot be met.

• Addressing the challenges calls upon the social sciences in all of their three main functions (reflection, analysis, and design/realisation) in varying proportions.

4. Issues covered in social-science research In view of the wide disciplinary and paradigmatic spectrum of the social sciences and humanities, we choose not to present a single “grand” R&D agenda or to delve into detailed associated project descriptions. Instead, in this section we explore the field from two different angles: one is a concentrated overview of past and current re-search and statements of research needs (section 4.1); the other comprises synthe-ses and reflections of a knowledgeable researcher and participant in the ASRELEO project on the major sub-fields and their respective foci in social-science energy research (section 4.2).


27

4.1 Empirical state of research From an extra-disciplinary standpoint, it is difficult to do justice to the state of the art in the entire energy-related social-science research field. Nevertheless, without claiming to be comprehensive, we present a chronological overview of the state of social-science research related to long-range energy options. In selecting studies, we concentrated on calls for R&D and assessments, that means, meta-analytical reports of R&D. Our focus is on issues and not particular disciplinary schools of thought. Our method of screening studies for inclusion was to iteratively build on the following data sources: 1. Workshop I presentations 2. Literature for WS I presentations (see Appendices 2 and 3) 3. IEA database 4. EFDA programme SERF 5. Internet (ISI/Thomson, Sciencedirect, search machines) as described below 6. Approaches in related fields (for example, R&D in dedicated institutions, such as

Battelle, in sustainability science, etc.) as described below. Much of the following are excerpted quotations or paraphrasing of reports10. We highlight key points in bold. No 1 Landsberg et al., 1974, Energy and the social sciences. An examination of re-search needs. This appears to be the first broad-based publication to address the need to integrate social science in energy research11. The authors do not claim to develop a compre-hensive research plan for all of the non-technical disciplines and research areas. No systematic effort was made to inventory “in great detail past and existing research” (p. 10). The list of key research areas is restricted “primarily to economic and certain kinds of policy research” (p. 247). “We are constantly frustrated by a crisis-oriented decision-making process and an inability to establish long-term national energy goals and to steer a path towards them. The apparent breakdown of the legislative and ad-ministrative process concerning energy affairs needs immediate attention …. Our time horizon in energy research has been terribly limited both in the public and pri-vate sector. We need to know why …. There seems to be a limited understanding of the proper strategy to be employed” (p. 249). Reference: Landsberg, H. H., J. J. Schanz, Jr., S. H. Schurr, G. P. Thompson (1974): Energy and the social sciences. An examination of research needs. Resources for the Future. RFF working paper, EN-3. RFF, Washington.

10 Paraphrases are in British English. 11 Of course the issue as such was identified much earlier, for example, Cotrell, R. S. (1955): Energy and society: The relation between energy, social change and economic development. McGraw-Hill, New York. RFF themselves had published predecessor studies in 1968 and 1971 (An Agenda for Re-search, Energy Research Needs, respectively).


28

No 2 OTA, 1976, Comparative Analysis of the 1976 ERDA Plan and Program. Under the heading of “Environmental and Health Issues List” is the quest for an “In-tegration of Environmental, Health, Social, and Institutional Research Into Technolo-gy Programs”. The “social consequences of energy technology deployment” are emphasised. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that “the interactions between energy, environmental and economic effects of Federal, State, and local air and water quality standards are not sufficiently understood”. The competing demands for water in Western River Basins (Colorado, Missouri) are judged worthy of investigation. And, social research is needed on institutional problems arising from the deployment of offshore oil and gas production and nuclear and fuel transportation facilities. Office of Technology Assessment, OTA (1976): Comparative analysis of the 1976 ERDA Plan and Program. Technology Assessment Board, Washington, DC. No 3 Wilbanks, 1977, Role of social science research in meeting energy needs. ORNL. The paper presents nine actions recommended by the Department of Energy to help remove the barriers, thereby improving the research base that supports energy policy making in the United States. The various potential contributing disciplines include an-thropology, economics, geography, history, law, political science, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, and statistics. Certain characteristics of social-science re-search useful to policy makers are described. Wilbanks, T. J. (1977): Role of social science research in meeting energy needs. OSTI ID: 6158325, Report No. ORNL-5351;CONF-790122-1. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL.

No 4 Dholakia & Dholakia, 1983, From social psychology to political economy: A mo-del of energy use behavior. These marketing researchers present a macro-micro model of energy consumption behaviour as a series of nested and interlocking choices, in which “macro choices delimit and define the scope of micro choices”. “Household energy use is … not just … the result of a choice among behavioral alternatives but … the production of these alternatives is also viewed as the result of a social choice process. In other words, energy use and energy conservation behaviors must be seen within the context of a broader consumption pattern which is socially determined.” The Dholakias used the term “discretionary” to characterise the individual’s scope in making micro choices. Dholakia, R. R. & N. Dholakia (1983): From social psychology to political economy: A model of energy use behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 3:231-247.

No 5 Tait, 1987, Research policy and review 14. Environmental issues and the social sciences. The social sciences’ important contributions to research on a wide range of environ-mental issues are increasingly being recognised, and a major programme of the Eco-nomic and Social Research Council is focusing particularly on aspects of risk, rural land use, environmental economics, and energy conservation. The programme emphasises a cross-disciplinary approach to research. The paper discusses some of the reasons for this emphasis as well as difficulties of implementation.


29

Tait, E. J. (1987): Research policy and review 14. Environmental issues and the social sciences. Jour-nal of Environment and Planning A, Vol. 19(4), pp. 437–445. No 6 Rosa et al., 1988, Energy and society. From the vantage point of over a century of hindsight, we can discern a clear, re-curring pattern in the sociological interest in energy – a pattern of successive intellec-tual paroxysms. Intermittent waves of peaked interest were invariably followed by troughs of indifference. Macrosociological theories based upon energy (energe-tics), typically the work of individual scholars, never generated sustained research programmes leading to cumulative results. Instead, each new version of theory, despite ritualistic homage to earlier formulations, represented a fresh start toward developing the frameworks of inquiry – frameworks too abstract and too ambitious to withstand the critique of more empirically concerned researchers. These theoretical shortcomings of the past persist, leaving the field with a void in empirically tractable theory. Unfortunately, for all societies “The energy crisis is over until we have our next energy crisis.’’ [former Secretary of Energy J. Schlesinger, quoted in Martin 1982] The challenge this poses for sociology, then, is clear: how to sustain scholarly attention to the fundamental energy predicament. Rosa, E. A., G. Machlis & K. Keating (1988):Energy and society. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 14, pp. 149–172.

Nos 7/8/9 Lutzenhiser, 1993, Social and behavioral aspects of energy use. Lutzenhiser, 1994, Sociology, energy and interdisciplinary environmental science. Lutzenhiser, 1997, Social structure, culture, and technology: Modeling the driv-ing forces of household energy consumption12. The author calls for an interdisciplinary, open-minded effort to develop “an over-arching model that can simultaneously capture group dynamics, body use, cognitive processes, and human-machine interactions”. Some of the more interesting studies he reviews investigate patterning of behaviour and energy use; self-awareness and accounting for energy consumption; bi-directional influences of consumption behavior and attitudes; and differential adaptation to price increases across different family types. Lutzenhiser suggests combining social science and marketing approaches in lifestyle analysis to explore lifestyle origins, freedom of choice, dominance of certain lifestyles, boundaries, and possibilities for change with the aging of cohorts and general socio-economic change. The interdisciplinary literature concerned directly with the consumption of energy suggests that social structure and cultural practice are central to the structuring of energy consumption, for significant energy use differences are observed between income groups, across lifecycle stages, and among ethnic subcultures. Conservation behaviour is also quite socially variable. Unfortunately, many of these studies have overlooked important housing and technology differences. Conventional energy policy models do little better, however, often glossing over the sociocultural aspects of energy use and choosing instead to treat “stocks” of buildings and equipment. Although the weaknesses in such approaches are well 12 Some of the following parts are taken from D. Goldblatt (2005): Sustainable energy consumption and society: Personal, technological, or social change? Springer, Dordrecht.


30

known, these models continue to dominate policy discourse and the generation of energy system inputs for environmental systems modelling. Lutzenhiser, L. (1993): Social and behavioral aspects of energy use. Annual Review of Energy and Environment, Vol. 18. Lutzenhiser, L. (1994): Sociology, energy and interdisciplinary environmental science. The American Sociologist, Vol. 25, pp. 57-78. Lutzenhiser, L. (1997): Social structure, culture, and technology: Modeling the driving forces of house-hold energy consumption. In: P. C. Stern et al., Environmentally significant consumption: Research di-rections, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, pp. 77-91.

No 10 Giovannini & Baranzini, eds., 1997, Energy modelling beyond economics and technology, CUEPE, Geneva. Following workshops in 1995 and 1996, the Geneva-based Center for Energy Stu-dies CUEPE published a reader. It is a tentative effort to formulate a “possible com-mon research programme”. Morović & Wortmann suggest matching technical and social models of consumption “instead of ‘add[ing] a few variables’ into existing mo-dels”. In his systems analysis approach, C. Weber suggests three complementary foci: a structural perspective focusing on the network of actors and interactions; an interactional perspective focusing on detailed descriptions of different interactions; and a consumer perspective focusing on an integrative description of consumer be-haviour in the context of interactions. In assessing energy behaviour of companies, L. Weber combines four scientific debates to model their energy-related decisions: energy conservation in buildings, innovations, organisations, and institutions. B. Giovannini & A. Baranzini (eds., 1997): Energy modelling beyond economics and technology. Ener-gy, Environment and Society Series, No. 1. Centre universitaire d'étude des problèmes de l'énergie, CUEPE, Geneva.

No 11 Hennicke & Rahmesol, 1998, Interdisciplinary analysis of successful implemen-tation of energy efficiency in the industrial, commercial and service sector. Given that implementation is influenced by a broad range of fostering factors involv-ing multiple actors inside and outside the firm, actions to exploit cost-effective poten-tials do not follow the classic techno-economic approach “technical potential – econo-mic profitability – implementation”. The findings underline that taking up an energy ef-ficiency project requires a motivational and communicative background which - apart from a limited number of frontrunners - is rarely present among SME in the cur-rent environment. Hennicke, P. & S. Rahmesol (1998): Interdisciplinary analysis of successful implementation of energy efficiency in the industrial, commercial and service sector. Final report. Contract JOS3-CT95-0009 (1.1.1996 to 31.12.1997), University of Kiel, Department of Psychology, Project Klimaschutz.

No 12 Rayner & Malone, 1998, Human choice and climate change. Guidelines from an International Social Science Assessment. Epitomising the vast body of knowledge reviewed in four single volumes, the authors come up with ten suggestions “to complement and challenge existing approaches to public and private sector decision making” with respect to climate change:


31

– View the issue of climate change holistically, not just as a problem of emissions reductions. – Recognise that institutional limits to global sustainability are at least as important as environmental limits. – Prepare for the likelihood that social, economic, and technological change will be more rapid and have greater direct impacts on human populations than climate change. – Recognise the limits of rational planning. – Employ the full range of analytic perspectives and decision aids from the natu-ral and social sciences and the humanities. – Design policy instruments for real world conditions rather than try to make the world conform to a particular policy model. – Incorporate climate change concerns into other more immediate issues, such as employment, defence, economic development, and public health. – Take a regional and local approach to climate policymaking and implementation. – Direct resources into identifying vulnerability and promoting resilience, especially where the impacts will be largest. – Use a pluralistic approach to decision making. Rayner, S. & E. L. Malone (1998): Human choice and climate change. Ten suggestions for policyma-kers. Guidelines from an International Social Science Assessment. Battelle Memorial Institute, Colum-bus, OH. (based on a four-volume assessment of the social-science research relevant to global cli-mate change)

No 13 Shove et al., 1998, Energy and social systems. In: Rayner & Malone. These authors’ approach is strongly informed by Bijker’s social construction of tech-nology (SCOT) theories [Bijker 1995] and the larger STS framework. Actors’ interac-tions at various levels and their motives – competing interests, mutually imposed constraints, situation-specific factors, and varying ascribed social meanings – obfus-cate the line from the individual to his or her impact on energy use. These wide-scale interactions, and not only the energetic or environmental dimensions of individuals’ energy use, deserve illumination: These include “cultural and socio-technical em-bedding of energy-related practices”; co-evolution of norms, practices, and ways of life with energy technologies; cultural norms and “shared expectations”; the role of institutions, and the historical development of infrastructures. “The built environment embodies the expectations of designers, financiers, and occupiers, while also reflect-ing the organization and structure of the construction industries. As such it fossilises past patterns of social relations and creates a form of inertia that slows changes in energy and resource use”. Shove, E., L. Lutzenhiser, S. Guy, B. Hackett & H. Wilhite (1998): Energy and social systems. In: Ray-ner & Malone, No 12.

No 14 Lutzenhiser & Shove, 1999, Contracting knowledge: the organizational limits to interdisciplinary energy efficiency research and development in the US and the UK. The changing balance of power between natural scientists and civil servants illus-trates opposing tendencies. The fragmenting effects of contract research manage-ment appear to have weakened the influence of the natural scientific research com-


32

munity in the UK. The concentration of scarce resources within the national laborato-ries has, by contrast, reinforced the institutional influence of the technical disciplines in the US. The range of legitimate research questions is expanding fast – particularly at the cutting edge of the scientific work on global-scale environmental processes and problems. The forms of truly interdisciplinary research needed to address these problems can thrive in this environment – but only with institutional and intellectual support that is largely channelled through well-worn R&D funding streams. And of course, there is no guarantee that social scientists will respond to emerging opportu-nities for interdisciplinary research in the area of energy efficiency. The roles on offer may still not be especially attractive to researchers schooled in mainstream social-science disciplines, and there are still real tensions regarding the definition of relev-ant inquiry and the relationship between social and technical/economic knowledge. In conclusion, current systems of research management appear to be at odds with current research questions. Social science may well be needed, and even in de-mand in some quarters, but it is genuinely difficult to know how to handle, let alone promote, this form of inquiry within current frameworks of research management. Lutzenhiser, L. & E. Shove (1999): Contracting knowledge: the organizational limits to interdisciplinary energy efficiency research and development in the U.S. and the U.K. Energy Policy, Vol. 27, pp. 217–227.

No 15 Wilk, 1999, Towards a useful multigenic theory of consumption. Expanding general consumption has been the subject of research in all social-science fields and in many humanities, yet on the whole the diverse theories that have been produced have not proved robust enough to explain or predict the phenomenon very well. There is a “divided discourse” on consumption from isolated academic departments, making results limited, difficult to communicate outside the discipline from which they arise, and embedding assumptions of the discipline in the research design. Many theories contain implicit embedded critiques. Wilk insists that many of the diverse theories of consumption can be “correct” or applicable under the right circumstances. He calls for the “develop[ment of] meta-theoretical guidelines specifying which models are useful in which empirical situations”, resulting in a “heterodox multigenic theory, which accepts that there are multiple determinants of consumption ...”. Wilk, R. (1999): Towards a useful multigenic theory of consumption. Proceedings of the 1999 ECEEE Summer Study. Energy Efficiency and CO2 Reduction: The Dimensions of the Social Challenge. Euro-pean Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Paris.

No 16 Jochem et al., eds., 2000, Society, behaviour, and climate change mitigation. Advances in Global Change Research. A key issue of the IPCC Third Assessment Report on mitigation was the role of pre-sent and future behaviour of individuals, households, private and public companies, public authorities and other stakeholders, which differ across world regions and so-cietal groups. The lead authors of several chapters of Working Group III recognised that the social, behavioural and cultural changes necessary for mitigating climate change are poorly understood. The book consists of ten papers presented at a meet-ing intended to broaden the conceptual framework in this direction (one cited below).


33

Jochem, E., J. Sathaye & D. Bouille (eds.) (200): Society, behaviour, and climate change mitigation. Advances in Global Change Research, Vol. 8. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. No 17 Wilhite et al., 2000, The legacy of twenty years of energy demand management: we know more about individual behaviour but next to nothing about demand. In: Jochem et al. The nature and causes of “energy demand” have been oversimplified, reduced or ig-nored in the community of energy research and policy. Energy-related social science has largely been limited to the “behaviour” of the “end user.” As a result, we do not know much more about the nature of energy demand today than we did in 1980. While there have been significant gains in energy efficiency over the interven-ing 20 years, the fact remains that the total energy demand in the United States and most European countries has increased (and in most cases has increased per capita as well). At the same time, the necessity for absolute reductions of fossil fuel use in industrial countries is more important than ever, given climate change and CO2 re-duction agreements. Researchers came from the ranks of social psychology, anthropology, sociology, po-litical science, and related disciplines. Their work ranged across multiple levels of analysis, including the individual, small group, community, firm, and society. Their results were published in a variety of social science and energy policy journals, and by the early 1980s there had been a sufficient growth in knowledge to warrant the formation of a U.S. National Research Council panel on energy and human society. The panel produced a widely-read overview volume entitled “Energy use: The human dimension” (Stern and Aronson, 1984) and called for an expansion of social research on energy. Subsequently, there has been a steady decline in social-science interest in energy per se. Wilhite, H., E. Shove, L. Lutzenhiser & W. Kempton (2000): The legacy of twenty years of energy de-mand management: We know more about individual behaviour but next to nothing about demand. In: E. Jochem, J. Sathaye & D. Bouille (eds.). Society, behaviour, and climate change mitigation. Advan-ces in Global Change Research, Vol. 8. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 109–126.

Nos 18/19/20 Becker & Jahn, 1991, Sustainability and the social sciences. A cross-disciplina-ry approach to integrating environmental considerations into theoretical re-orientation. Jahn & Sons, 2001, Der neue Förderschwerpunkt “Sozial-ökologische For-schung” des BMBF. Entwicklung, Kernelemente und Perspektiven eines neuen forschungspolitischen Ansatzes zur Förderung einer transdisziplinären Nach-haltigkeitsforschung [The new priority area “social-ecological research” of the [Research Ministry] Development, core elements, and perspectives of a new re-search political approach to promote transdisciplinary sustainability research]. Initiativgruppe Sozial-ökologische Forschung, 2007, Perspektiven der sozial-ökologischen Forschung und ihrer Förderung [Perspectives of social-ecologi-cal research and its promotion]. The aim of these documents is to overcome disciplinary barriers and, specifically (2001/2007), to strengthen the socio-ecological research community in Germany, this having received support as a priority programme by the Research Ministry during the 1990s. For example, the thematic areas “societal needs and the fluxes of substan-


34

ces, energy and information” and “social-ecological transformations and societal in-novation” were investigated. The call for working on the interface between international discourses (climate change, sustainability science, transdisciplinarity) and domestic discourses is most relevant for the present purposes. Its proponents emphasise the need for institutio-nalisation to durably address long-term and complex problems. They propose long-term supporting structures similar to those set up to further cancer research. Becker E. & T. Jahn (1991): Sustainability and the social sciences. A cross-disciplinary approach to in-tegrating environmental considerations into theoretical reorientation. ZED Books, London.

Jahn, T. & E. Sons (2001): Der neue Förderschwerpunkt “Sozial-ökologische Forschung” des BMBF. Entwicklung, Kernelemente und Perspektiven eines neuen forschungspolitischen Ansatzes zur Förde-rung einer transdisziplinären Nachhaltigkeitsforschung [The new priority area “social-ecological re-search” of the [Research Ministry]. Development, core elements, and perspectives of a new research political approach to promote transdisciplinary sustainability research]. TA-Database-Newsletter, No. 4, Dec 2001, pp. 90-97. Initiativgruppe Sozial-ökologische Forschung, A. Brunnengräber et al. (2007): Perspektiven der sozial-ökologischen Forschung und ihrer Förderung. Stellungnahme, März 2007.

No 21 Egan, 2001, The application of social science to energy conservation: realizations, models, and findings. This report reviews 25 years of literature in the area of human dimensions research on energy efficiency and conservation. Three general categories are used for orga-nising this work, including: sociological realisations that derive fundamentally from the application of social theory to energy use; models and theories for organizing and predicting behaviour; and intervention strategies and programmatic results that are behaviourally based and linked to one or more social-science disciplines. Highlights include: many of the realisations are still relevant and oft overlooked by policymakers; no overarching model for consistently predicting behaviour has been developed; and there is a rich potential for future exploration of this area of research. Topics as far-ranging as the social and cultural context of markets and technology to the continued pursuit of individual behaviour and motivation are pursued. Egan, C. (2001): The application of social science to energy conservation: realizations, models, and findings. American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy.

Nos 22/23 Elzen et al., 2001, Towards an interactive technology policy. Implications from the social shaping of mobility and transport policies for a new technology poli-cy paradigm. Sørensen, 2002, Providing, pushing and policing. Towards a new architecture of technology policy. The authors define technology policy as an activity that covers the following four broad sets of socio-political concerns: stimulation of innovation (economic growth), construction of infrastructure, regulation (protection and standards), and democra-cy and public participation. These concerns are characteristic of issues in social-science research.


35

Elzen, B., U. Jørgensen, K. H. Sørensen, Ø. Thomassen (2001): Towards an interactive technology policy. Implications from the social shaping of mobility and transport policies for a new technology poli-cy paradigm. Final report from the INTEPOL project. CEC Contract No.: SOE1-ct97-1057. Sørensen, K. H. (2002): Providing, pushing and policing. Towards a new architecture of technology policy. In: A. Jamison & H. Rohracher, Technology studies and sustainable development. Profil Verlag, München, pp. 65–63.

No 24 Craig et al., 2002, What can history teach us? A retrospective examination of long-term energy forecasts for the United States. A common failing, afflicting even sophisticated analysts, is that they seek immutable laws of human behaviour, much as the physicist discovers physical laws through ex-periment. Such generalisations about human and economic systems often fail because these systems are adaptable in ways that physical systems are not. Policy choices affect how the future unfolds, and parameters that embody historical behav-iour are bound to lead us astray whenever a forecast relies on those parameters to forecast far into the future. Assuming that human behaviour is immutable will inevit-ably lead to errors in forecasting, no matter which kind of modelling exercise you un-dertake. The authors summarise the main lessons gleaned from the analysed reports, supple-mented by their own experience: Document Assumptions, Link the Model Design to the Decision at Hand, Beware of Obsession with Technical Sophistication, Watch Out for Discontinuities and Irreversibility, Do Not Assume Fixed Laws of Human Behaviour, Use Scenarios, Use Combined Approaches, Expect the Unex-pected and Design for Uncertainty, Communicate Effectively, Be Modest. Craig, P. P., A. Gadgil & J. G. Koomey (2002): What can history teach us? A retrospective examina-tion of long-term energy forecasts for the United States. Annual Review of Energy and Environment, Vol. 27, pp. 83–118.

No 25 Diamond & Moezzi, 2002, Becoming allies: Combining social science and tech-nological perspectives to improve energy research and policy making. Law-rence Berkeley National Laboratory. The authors identify two main types of social-science analysis. The first type, the more common in energy research, advances knowledge through methods such as field observation (whether anecdotal or formal), surveys, interviews, and the like. The second, which they address through their exemplary deconstructions, is a mode of critical analysis intended to draw attention to the mental models and institutional structures that characterise much of current energy research and policy: what sto-ries (“true” or not) are told, what is assumed, and what is missing? Drawing from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Roadmap for commercial buildings (DOE 2000) as a field of application, they compare typical engineering questions (fo-cusing on energy flows and systems behaviour) with social-science questions of the first type, seeking to uncover distinctions among people that might affect building design and operation:


36

Engineering-Based Questions Social Science-Based Questions How much energy is used in a building, either predicted or measured?

What services do owners and occupants value in commercial buildings?

Where is the energy being used? How are design decisions made that ultimately affect the health, productivity and comfort of occupants?

How much energy can be saved? Who determines changes in the building operation?

What is the time period for technology adoption?

Who gains and who loses in any proposed change? E.g., how do manufac-turers and DOE (US Department of Ener-gy) come to mutually satisfying “solu-tions”?

Engineering questions tend to require answers that are constant over time and space, while social-science questions seek answers that may only be valid for cer-tain times and places. One approach values the collection of data and measure-ments. The other values collection of experiences and anecdotes (social-science questions of the first type), and what may be mistaken as “destructive”, rather than “progressive” analysis (social-science analysis of the second type). The challenge is to regard both the technical and the social scientific as valid approaches, cap-able of joining forces to achieve as yet unrealised ends in the area of energy use in buildings. Diamond, R. & M. Moezzi (2002): Becoming allies: Combining social science and technological per-spectives to improve energy research and policy making. LBNL—50704. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, LBNL.

No 26 Kok et al., 2002, Global warming and social innovation: The challenge of a cli-mate-neutral society. The need to align short-term policies to a longer-term perspective is recognised and specified in this contribution, which is based on the concept of transition management (first proposed by Rotmans et al., 2000, in Dutch). It is rooted in “backcasting”, a forecasting technique that focuses on how a previously agreed future can be achieved, system innovation and improvement, and learning processes on multiple levels by different actors and at different scales. Kok, M., W. J. V. Vermeulen, A. P. C. Faaij & D. de Jager (eds.) (2002): Global warming and social in-novation: The challenge of a climate-neutral society. Earthscan, London.

No 27 Jochem et al., 2003, Steps towards a 2000 Watt-Society. Developing a White Pa-per on research and development of energy-efficient technologies. There are insufficient empirical, socio-economic data for identifying the causal rela-tionships between values, lifestyles, fashions/traditions, building design of tar-get groups, and policy or entrepreneurial measures, lack of knowledge, and lack of technical standards and regulations. Evaluations of recommended policy measures and entrepreneurial innovations (for example, contracting, truck and ma-chinery renting) are scarce.


37

Jochem, E. et al. (2003): Steps towards a 2000 Watt-Society. Developing a White Paper on research and development of energy-efficient technologies. App. 7: Socio-economic aspects and entrepreneuri-al innovations, behaviour, lifestyles, and policies (pp. 167–183).

No 28 Clark & Dickson, 2003, Sustainability science: the emerging research program. In seeking to help meet the sustainability challenge, the multiple movements to har-ness science and technology (S&T) for sustainability focus on the dynamic interac-tions between nature and society, with equal attention to how social change shapes the environment and how environmental change shapes society. These movements seek to address the essential complexity of those interactions, recognis-ing that understanding the individual components of nature–society systems provides insufficient understanding about the behaviour of the systems themselves. They are problem-driven, with the goal of creating and applying knowledge in support of decision making for sustainable development. Perhaps the strongest message to emerge from dialogues induced by the Johannesburg Summit was that the research community needs to complement its historic role in identifying problems of sustain-ability with a greater willingness to join with the development and other communities to work on practical solutions to those problems. This means bringing S&T to bear on the highest-priority goals of a sustainability transition, with those goals defined not by scientists alone but rather through a dialogue between scientists and the people engaged in the practice of ‘‘meeting human needs while conserving the earth’s life support systems and reducing hunger and poverty’’ (National Research Council 1999, Our common journey). Clark, W. C. & N. M. Dickson (2003): Sustainability science: The emerging research program, PNAS, Vol. 100, No. 14, pp. 8059–8061.

No 29 Worrell et al., 2003, Energy forecasting models based on engineering econo-mics. With origins in the economics of resource depletion and having substantially grown in use after the oil price shocks of the 1970s, the [engineering economic] models have price (costs) as their principle drivers. However, non-price-based policies are be-coming more important in the current policy debate. Formerly static parameters turn into policy variables that should change over time. Technology representation has been shown to be a key area in which short-term ef-forts can make an important impact. At issue are the full nature and the dynamics of the technology, including (a) non-energy benefits in the quantitative description of a technology, (b) research in the learning effect of energy-efficient end-use technolo-gies to accurately reflect the dynamics of technology development, (c) the level of disaggregation, and (d) smart categorisation of technologies and target groups. The authors stress the lack of policy evaluations, which are essential to improve modelling of policies and policy impacts. Several workshops have been organised in this area, but generally attention is lacking to policy evaluation in the design and im-plementation of energy policies. Besides refinement of methods and increased atten-tion and discussion among analysts, there is a strong need for increased attention on the policy front. This is a key area where a concerted effort by international agencies is essential for success.


38

Worrell, E., S. Ramesohl & G. Boyd (2003): Advances in energy forecasting models based on engi-neering economics. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 29, pp. 345–381.

No 30 Ekins, 2003, Prospects and policies for step changes in the energy system: Developing an agenda for social science research. Much good research in a variety of relevant areas had been carried out in the past, and this needed to be brought together through systematic reviews and through re-search into the effectiveness of different policy approaches and into the evaluations of policy initiatives that had already been implemented. There were many issues that still needed further work, including assessment of the geopolitical situation, the need to invest in strengthening the electricity distribution network, the whole relation-ship between supply chains and the different interests of the actors they comprised, and the nature and role of public engagement. It should not be forgotten that much was already known about these issues. It is possible that in this situation an invest-ment in networking existing knowledge may be more cost-effective than new pro-jects which seek to add to it. The following areas of research needs are singled out: human behaviour, social acceptability, economic costs (cost parameters of the transition to a low-carbon economy, identifying and reducing the key uncertainties), network and infrastructure issues, stimulation of innovation, security and reliability, and markets and governance. Ekins, P. (2003): Prospects and policies for step changes in the energy system: Developing an agen-da for social science research. Final Report to the Economic and Social Research Council, ESRC. June 2003. Policy Studies Institute.

No 31 Jochem et al., 2004, Steps towards a sustainable development. A White Book of energy-efficient technologies. Achieving a substantial reduction in per capita energy use requires not only technical innovations but also new behavioural patterns in decision making and daily ope-rations, professional energy management, and major entrepreneurial innova-tions. This relates to several social sciences; their theories and research results have rarely been explicitly applied to a more efficient use of energy in the various tar-get groups: the intensification in the use of goods and plants (consumer accept-ance, willingness of innovative companies to invest in pooling services, pilot projects with socio-economic evaluations) and the socio-psychological aspects of behaviour and decision making (type of communication channel, credibility of and trust in communicators and technology producers; for example, research on policies and their optimal mix, taking into account obstacles and market imperfections as well as unfavourable value systems). The significant contributions of the social sciences may have been underestimated in the past by the producers of energy-efficient technologies and efficiency policy makers. Jochem, E. et al. (2004): Steps towards a sustainable development. A White Book of energy-efficient technologies. Novatlantis.


39

No 32 Brewer & Stern, 2005, Decision making for the environment. Social and behav-ioral science research priorities. The National Academies were asked to focus primarily on the social and behav-ioural sciences other than economics, because they have not received much at-tention from environmental decision-making organisations, and to recommend re-search areas that scored well on three criteria: the likelihood of achieving significant scientific advances, the potential value of the expected knowledge for improving de-cisions that have important environmental implications, and the likelihood that the re-search would be used to improve those decisions. They were also asked to consider recommending ways to overcome barriers to the use of research that would have high priority if such barriers could be overcome and invited to make general recom-mendations for infrastructure that could increase the likelihood that the recom-mended knowledge across several fields will be used. This report is addressed to two main audiences: potential researchers and potential sponsors of research. The authors recommend five science priorities that strongly meet the decision criteria: 1. improving environmental decision processes; 2. institutions for environmental go-vernance; 3. the environment in business decision making; 4. environmentally signi-ficant individual behaviour; and, 5. decision-relevant science for evidence-based environmental policy (social-science and natural-science research should be in-tegrated in a comprehensive approach to developing indicators that are relevant and usable for environmental policy; Environmental policy evaluation; Improving environ-mental forecasting; Determining distributional impacts). Brewer, G. D. & P. C. Stern (2005): Decision making for the environment. Social and behavioral science research priorities. Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change Center for Go-vernance, Economics, and International Studies. Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Edu-cation. National Research Council. The National Academies Press, Washington, DC.

No 33 Jackson, 2006, An agenda for social science research in energy. Summary of a Research Council workshop [in the U. K.]. The contribution of social science to energy research can be framed (in part) in terms of the need to understand and to manage systemic change. Participants identified in particular a number of key themes in which clear social-science research needs could be defined. It also articulated some specific illustrative research questions in each of these areas. The themes are: – Changing behaviours and lifestyles, – the product-service shift: incentivising demand reduction (transition from a supp-ly-oriented energy market defined around the concept of energy as a product (oil, gas, electricity) to one in which energy is viewed as the means to a variety of energy services), – equity (inequalities in access to energy services such as heating, lighting, mobility, inequalities in the distribution of carbon footprints, inequalities in the distribution of cli-mate-related impacts and inequalities in access to mitigation against climate related impacts). – security of supply (What do we mean by energy security? What are the factors that constitute energy security? What policy measures are justifiable in ensuring energy security? What is the role of microgeneration and decentralised supply in


40

maintaining energy security? What kind of regulatory system is most responsive to security of supply issues? What is the role of the market in ensuring security of supp-ly?) – governance: The combined threats from energy security, terrorism, and climate change pose unprecedented challenges for conventional notions of governance (What will drive social and institutional change in the energy sector over the long-term? How can Government energy policy escape from the short time horizon im-posed by electoral cycles? What kinds of market structures promote responsible bu-siness behaviour over the long-term?), mechanisms (for example, carbon trading and carbon tax credits), role of community-based energy initiatives, role of Government as a change agent (Who are the ‘right’ decision makers in this context? To what ex-tent should government be led by public opinion in matters of energy policy? What is the role of government in changing people’s behaviours and lifestyles?) Jackson, T. (2006): An agenda for social science research in energy. Summary of a Research Council Workshop held on 6th April 2006, University of Surrey.

No 34 European Commission, 2006, Green paper. A European strategy for sustain-able, competitive and secure energy. Though not a research policy but an energy policy paper, two particularly social-science-related priority areas (out of six) are: – Encouraging innovation: a strategic European energy technology plan (specifi-cally, a strategic energy technology plan); The EU needs an appropriately resourced strategic energy technology plan. This should accelerate the development of promising energy technologies, but should also help to create the conditions to bring such technologies efficiently and effectively to the EU and the world markets. Research in areas of high energy use – housing, transport, agriculture, agroindustries, and materials – should also be addressed. Actions to accelerate technology development and drive down the costs of new ener-gy technologies must be complemented by policy measures to open the market and to ensure the market penetration of existing technologies that are effective in addressing climate change. Competing against entrenched technologies and huge locked-in investments in the current energy system, largely based on fossil fuels and centralised generation, new technologies face high entry barriers. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme, green certificates, feed-in tariffs and other measures can ensure that the implementation of environmentally friendly energy production, con-version and use is financially viable. Such measures can provide powerful policy signals to the market and create a stable climate in which industries can take the long-term investment decisions required. – Towards a coherent external energy policy (i.a., new infrastructure, a pan-Euro-pean Energy community Treaty, energy partnerships with producers, transit countries and other international actors, such as with Russia). European Commission (2006): Green paper. A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and se-cure energy. SEC (2006) 317, COM (2006) 105 final. Brussels, 8.3.2006.


41

No 35 UK Dept. of Trade and Industry, 2006, The energy challenge. Though this is predominantly a policy paper, it highlights some social-science-re-search related issues, such as: – strengthen local authorities and community groups’ ability to play a key facili-tating role in curbing carbon emissions (see Sustainability Communities in California, below); – carry out research into public attitudes and behaviours towards climate change and transport; – secure energy; – protect vulnerable consumers (1.5 million in fuel poverty in the UK in 2003). HM Government/UK Dept. of Trade and Industry publications (2006): The energy challenge. Energy review report. Dept. of Trade and Industry publications. Cm 6887. July 2006.

No 36 California Energy Commission, 2006, Public interest energy research program, 2007–2011. Apart from technological issues, some cross-cutting themes are identified, such as: – the integration of electricity, natural gas, and transportation science and technolo-gy issues; – customer choice and behaviour; – the water – energy connection; – the competitiveness of the California economy; – Sustainable Communities; – safety and security of the energy supply system (Recent terrorist attacks and natural disasters have raised safety and security concerns related to the energy supply system); – efficiency, stability, and reliability of the energy supply system. Krebs, M. et al., California Energy Commission (2006): Public interest energy research program, 2007–2011. Electricity. research investment plan. Commission report. CEC-500-2006-016-CMF, March 2006.

Findings

The key aspects of social-science issues (partly already dealt with and partly to be dealt with in the future) may be centred around three aspects: systems, actors, and methods. Systems: Analytical level (what is): Strategic level (what should be): Actual state Target state

(Unintended) consequences Innovation Barriers Discontinuities – Uncertainty Security System dynamics (Mainly) policy dynamics


42

Context (non-generic setting) Regional and local perspective Real-world perspective Practice Power Governance – Regulation Socio-technical Socio-technical

Actors: Analytical level (what is): Strategic level (what should be): All levels Governance

Behaviour Institutions (individuals to institutions) Practice Motivation Equity/access

Interactions – Experience Participation/involvement Mental models – Values/lifestyles Integration Barriers Barriers

Methods: Issues: Research perspectives: Institutions Combined approaches (pluralistic) (socio-technical approach)

Assumptions Cross-disciplinary, transdisciplinary Research management Systems perspective (behaviour demand)

Theory fluctuations Evaluation

To date those topics have been relatively well explored that are easily accessible by a managerial implementation approach and closely related to a particular technologi-cal development:

• Costs and technical risks related to long-range energy options (engineering);

• Competitive position and innovation potential of energy options and regulatory is-sues related to their markets (engineering economics), usually with a rather short time horizon; and

• Several more highly inclusive notions of risk, public awareness, attitude, and ac-ceptance. These have been driven by the implementers’ and decision makers’ de-sire to impose technologically favoured energy options (through the instrumental use of, for example, social psychology, media, and communication studies).

The focus of these studies has been immediate political interests or the implementa-tion of technocratic solutions, often involving the persuasion of an “unruly” public. The reflection on basic underlying assumptions (“why would people reject our perfect pro-ject?”); mutual learning processes; and the contextual social and institutional em-bedding of technology have been neglected, even though these are repeatedly pos-tulated by social scientists (for instance: What is the real difference between engi-neering- and social-science-based questions? See Diamond & Moezzi 2002). In line with the techno-centric perspective, participatory and inclusive approaches have been rare. In view of the tyranny of unintended consequences, though, they are sore-ly needed. Long-term aspects, interfaces, interrelationships, and dynamics are still badly understood since they are under-researched.


43

4.2 Overview of social-science research on energy (invited paper) Ulrik Jørgensen, IPL, DTU Based on written workshop contributions, oral contributions from workshop partici-pants, and other sources The following pages intend to give an overview and an account of topics related to the energy domain covered by approaches from the social sciences and in some cases from the humanities. References are made to disciplines, empirical fields, mo-dels and methods, in such a way that no detailed or specific understanding of the re-search approaches is a precondition for understanding the topics. The structuring of topics in this overview does not start with the main social-science disciplines, though some of the topics are more closely related to, e.g., economic theory, modelling acti-vities, engineering, or sociology, while others use methods from anthropology, science and technology studies or political science. In many cases the topics bridge, on the one side, problems coming from the energy domain and its path of develop-ment, the schools and disciplines in the social sciences and, on the other, specific in-terdisciplinary approaches relevant to the types of challenges coming from the field of study. The resulting overview may be viewed from a specific position and not provide a balanced presentation of the field, as the choice of themes and topics has been inspired by the different approaches present. Still the intention is to demonstrate the variety of approaches rather than to structure these according to a specific scheme. The focus on approaches and the brief character of the overview means that the re-sults and outcomes of these approaches receive brief treatment here. This section is oriented towards long-term perspectives in the energy sector and so-cieties’ management of this sector, its technologies and its impacts and crucial inter-linkages with developments in modern society and the environment. Several of the topics covered do address long term issues explicitly, some even make an effort to look beyond short or mid-term developments and inter-relations. Others do not ad-dress the time issue or may even in their empirical approach address historical or contemporary cases or processes in contemporary society and politics. This does not imply per se that these are not relevant for a long-term perspective. In many cases the understanding of processes of everyday life and the workings of politics and mar-kets create important and critical assumptions for the long-term perspective on the changes possible. Envisaging the rather radical changes that have characterised the energy sector during the last 50 years it is important to point to the possibility and even probability of quite dramatic changes also happening in the near and long-term driven by challenges of the shortage of conventional energy resources, environmental problems, and the accompanying societal changes. The attempt has been to present an account the social-science research on energy as it has developed and can be structured. This account is then to be used as a basis for conclusions on future perspectives and potentials for social-science contribution to developments in the energy field. These extend beyond the scope of the account itself, though the structuring and elements from the descriptions may already point to future activities. One of the outcomes could be to emphasise the study of change and changing conditions as a new input to the energy sector and its role in society, where models and many studies of behaviour have tended to focus on the assumed stability of institutions and social structures.


44

Strategic energy scenarios, public dialogue, and foresight With the increasing focus from governments, NGOs, and researchers on the need for changes in the energy system to support new sources of energy and new patterns of energy consumption in society, new methods have been developed in the last de-cades. The complexity of the social and technical choices involved and the difficulties in predicting the future developments due to uncertainties has created a need for ins-truments to outline alternative futures and to allow for more adaptive and interactive planning instruments. These methods also respond to the need for a more enligh-tened public dialogue, as expert regimes and political choices are not themselves sa-tisfactory for handling the possible alternatives and their implications. Whether the perspective is to improve the basis for policy, create a basis for exploring the possibi-lities for consensus, or directly to involve the public and create new institutions sup-porting democratic decision making, the role of public understanding and engage-ment is crucial and often goes hand in hand with foresight activities and methods. Scenario techniques focusing on how technologies and societal developments are in-tertwined and point to important choices to be made to prepare for the consequences of continuing existing paths of development are part of this field of research. So are improvements on the methods for mapping out pathways for change and answering questions about which preparations are needed to prepare for eventual future im-pacts. These fields of research are typically not only based on insights from social science but in different ways combine or even produce new interdisciplinary approaches bridging between technology, policy and social theory. This has resulted in some confusion and controversy about the role of foresight and the involvement of experts and political institutions in foresight processes, asking whether foresight has become an instrument to occupy futures space with already existing interests and solutions or to consider important uncertainties and still more important choices to be made. Ne-vertheless, the need to identify the challenges and choices facing societies today de-pends on being open to alternative futures and identifying the possible actions to pre-pare and build capacity to handle them. A growing awareness of the role of expertise and existing interests in identifying future development possibilities and determining outcomes is generating interest in the social sciences’ study of the processes and institutions involved. Institutional and technological regimes and paths of development Another new field of research has resulted from the combination of insights from in-novation studies and evolutionary economics This field tracks the resources, prob-lems and processes involved in creating new technical and social solutions by means of historical studies of large technical systems and the construction of institutions. These structures stabilise technological regimes that organise and sustain paths of development and thereby also resistance to change. This field of research has in re-cent years generated copious evidence concerning the role of existing technological systems and their self-reproduction. It has also produced a number of case studies demonstrating examples of change processes whereby new technologies, new ways of organising innovation, and new ways of building infrastructures and regulatory frameworks have broken down existing regimes and produced transitions to new sys-tem configurations and regimes. Based on these insights, the field supports the de-mand for policies for change and the need for actions to support a variety of energy technologies’ eventually becoming part of new regimes. An outcome of this research


45

is the insight that new energy technologies are heavily dependent on both the crea-tion of infrastructures and adequate regulatory measures as well as the social em-bedding of these new technologies in society’s visions and daily practices. Research here has built a knowledge base of historical cases and generated references for ac-tions to be taken. It can also advise on the construction of test facilities and means for integrating experimental actions in energy innovations. Energy systems transitions and the role of power and controversies One of the newer contributions from research in recent years has been to extend the insights from innovation and technology studies with a perspective on how to ma-nage and give policy support to processes of systems transitions from one composi-tion and type of technological regime to another or even to more complex and hetero-geneous energy systems. The focus of this research is bridging the gap between les-sons learned from historical case studies and the insight in change management and adaptive and interactive policy processes to create a new vision and new methods to handle such transition processes. Also, new lessons from studies of policy processes and outcomes concerned with environmental protection, technological innovation, and energy systems are associated with this field of research. The results on one hand build an understanding of the possibilities and potentials of transitions, and on the other hand point to how to establish a societal management of such transition processes by engaging a variety of actors. While the potential outcomes of this field of research are promising and relevant, problems are also evident as the distribution of power and the controversies and dis-agreements around new technologies and societal changes to a certain extent ham-per the objective of managing transitions. One of the consequences of this is a need for new perspectives on the role of policy making and the constructive utilisation of the diversity of society’s political and professional institutions as part of such transi-tion processes. Long-term energy models and systems approaches Energy supply and demand models have been part of economic planning for quite a long time. The need for predictions of future demand and creating balance in the sup-ply and demand of the different types of energy sources, including capacity planning for energy distribution systems, has stimulated the production of quite sophisticated theories and models supporting these planning endeavours. While the fast develop-ment and the infrastructure and supply-oriented planning activities through the early 1980s proved the value of national models, the energy crisis and the later liberalisa-tion schemes for energy production and distribution has demanded new models be produced for government agencies and the energy sector’s own planning efforts. These new models have changed from energy measures to price-tagged activities and the handling of still more integrated and market-based systems demanding more sophisticated models, including the representation of varying prices, changing de-mand structures, and competition. The energy system itself has most often been represented by rather stable and long-term assumptions of the energy supplies, carriers and the energy demand and effi-ciency of sectors. Here the most critical factors have been related to the vulnerability of prices and international supplies. Lately, the growing focus on climate change has emphasised growing concerns about switching technologies and changing carriers


46

and efficiencies of the elements of the system. The dominance of economic models often coupled with general and national economic models has made the handling of technologies and efficiencies difficult in these types of models. This has led to at-tempts either to take more complex systems perspectives into the models or combin-ing the models with other types of research on the efficiency and choice of technolo-gies. Sometimes such model-based results are called scenarios, not to be confused with the types of scenarios outlined above, though the combination of economic mo-dels and other methods can allow for the identification of critical decisions. Environmental impacts of energy solutions using LCA and sustainability assessment The increasing focus on energy alternatives and the utilisation of marginal fossil fuel resources in less-developed regions of the world has also resulted in a growing inte-rest in the assessment of the lifecycle of energy in society related to the large envi-ronmental pollution coming from the energy sector. This includes not only climate im-pacts but also local and regional air pollution, residues from power plants and refine-ries, and the pollution coming from mining and fossil fuel extraction. This area of environmental assessment was not extensively targeted in research outside the involved companies and governmental regulating authorities before questions were raised concerning the comparative assessment of different energy sources including nuclear power plants. In many cases the environmental problems have been seen as local, and only a few overall assessments based on life cycle methods have been carried out. With the renewed interest in assessing new types of energy technologies and the utilisation of biomass, wind energy, nuclear power, gas technologies, solar cells, fuel cells, and others, the local or restricted assessments have demonstrated their lack of relevance. As with hydrogen-based energy systems, the environmental loads may be removed from the use of the energy carrier but not from the production and distribution of hydrogen. In the case of using biomass for biofuels, the outcome depends on the alternative uses of biomass making the choice of comparison crucial for the outcome as well as for the choice of energy system. While life cycle assessments are still dominated by the environmental measures, the growing complexity of these assessments and the need for policy support has often resulted in other interdisciplinary approaches based on resource flow analysis and studies of the metabolism of society. These studies have emphasised the need for radical reductions in resource consumption and changing processes for handling ma-terials and energy. Among other things, this has pointed to a growing interest in the broader sustainability assessment of energy systems and technologies which are heavily dependent on both the technical components in the system and the institutio-nal structures and dependencies in this system. Technology studies are starting to contribute to this more interdisciplinary approach to sustainability assessments. Environmental regulation, innovation policy measures, and trading schemes Policy processes, networks and institutional arrangements of energy policy-making have been an important field of social-science research in the field of energy. Broader issues, including infrastructure development and regulation of energy sys-tems with different measures, have also proved important. This field of research has been developed from the political science perspective but has increasingly involved many interacting approaches, including environmental studies, technology studies, and studies of innovation economics and processes. While some parts focus on the


47

policy processes as such, increasing numbers are targeting questions of how to create incentives to influence and change the behaviour of people and companies as well as the energy system and its institutions and choice of technologies. With new political regimes embracing economic measures and liberal market regula-tions and reforms, study of the construction of markets and the needed regulatory institutions to define and govern them (competition policy, regulation of natural net-work monopolies) have become a more dominant issue in this field of research. CO2 trading schemes and other similar measures are delegated the task of producing not only efficient energy utilisation but also facilitating energy innovations. In spite of the trust given to market-based systems, research has demonstrated the complexity and vulnerability of these schemes and also supported the need for more conventional in-novation support policies, and examination of how the new governance of energy systems might be developed. The field of policy studies demonstrates some distinctive approaches. Some can be identified as rather advanced in both their theoretical and empirical base in neo-insti-tutional theory and the mapping of policies and outcomes, while others rely more heavily on technology-driven and simplistic and stylised models taken from economic theory and engineering practices in managing energy systems and networks. Technological risk & communication strategies for large-scale infrastructures Out of the controversies following the construction of large energy facilities and infra-structure and the introduction of nuclear power plants in the 1960s, a special field of research has arisen focusing on technological and institutional risks caused by large-scale plants and infrastructure as well as waste disposal. Its starting point has been the uncertainties related to large, managed technical system and their potential vul-nerability. This has lead to the creation of rather new approaches combining technical analysis with probability studies and studies of potential hazards and operations as well as maintenance failures and mistakes. Risk analysis has as such been established as a discipline in its own right. Its methodology is sometimes supported by economic analysis and assessment to improve decision making concerning risk avoidance and comparing risk scenarios between different types of energy technologies. One observes that risk-adverse behaviour as well as people and the public assessment and acceptance of risk seem to be very different for different technologies and situations. This field has explored the background for these differences, demonstrating that risk perception is very closely related to the activity and the feeling of control and responsibility for these activities as well as the trust in the institutions responsible for the technical system in question. This has lead to an increased focus on communication strategies on one hand to inform the public of risk and to establish a common awareness, and on the other as part of attempts to build trust, sometimes even with the aim of changing the risk perceptions of people. Energy innovations and strategies for research and expertise Innovation studies based mostly on case studies including observations and mapping of actors involved, processes over time, and more theoretically founded attempts to create a more generic understanding of innovation processes have been a very im-portant base for knowledge-building on energy technologies and energy systems. This field of research has drawn on innovation economics and technology studies, in-cluding more historical-oriented studies of technologies and methods from ethnogra-


48

phy in mapping actor relations and the crucial communications and object constitu-tions involved in the design processes around new technologies and their embedding in institutions. One important topic is related to the creation and distribution of knowledge in the de-velopment of energy systems, which also includes the role of expertise both for the innovative capabilities of companies and institutions and for policy advice. In addition, the interface between science and policy is important, as some of the studies have demonstrated that technological innovation is only partially linked to technical re-search and often is more the product of and dependent on practical experimentation and piecemeal engineering. Renewable energy sources and carriers and related policies and implemen-tation The separation of this field of research from energy innovations and research policies is motivated in the often broader scope and policy aspects involved in studies related to renewable energy systems development. This is because these systems have at-tracted special emphasis stemming from their role as alternatives and often at first marginal potentials. Consequently, innovations based on renewable sources have slightly different innovation contexts often involving social movements, non-commer-cial entrepreneurs, and a lack of mainstream support from the established energy re-search institutions, at least in the beginning. This has also been important for under-standing how highly socially embedded and context-dependent technological innova-tions often are. At first, when the scale is marginal in terms of commercial perspec-tives, anticipated energy planning relevance, and in the view of top-down research planners, the technical expertise and the strategies are dependent on bottom-up, ex-perience-based activities as well as the resources at hand. These patterns of innova-tion are often ignored in more conventional company-based innovation cases, where the resources and infrastructure already has been established and important know-ledge is more or less already implicitly available in the organisation. In these studies of new technologies, breaking through the need for developing infrastructure, stan-dards, test facilities, and new visions for the relevance and use of this technology be-comes obvious and points to the need for co-production of technology, institutions, and the social sense and importance of the innovations made. This research has been an important contribution to understanding the close relations between techni-cal and social innovations. Separate attention has been given to the visionary ideas of a radical change in the distribution of energy through carriers like hydrogen. This research has drawn on the experiences from alternative energy innovations but has added the role of societal in-frastructure and the importance of supporting additional technology innovations as in the case of hydrogen, fuel-cell systems, new types of engines, facilities for storage and transport, and the like, all embedded in the distributed structures of professional knowledge, regulation, and institutions. Energy-efficiency strategies and conservation policies Industry, the service sector, and public institutions have been seen as obvious imple-menters of energy-saving strategies. Sometimes it has even been assumed that the cost of energy would more or less automatically lead to energy savings based on ra-tional economic decisions. Large numbers of studies have demonstrated to the cont-


49

rary that the use of energy is often considered a marginal activity dependent on other more strategic aims leading to a much more ad-hoc and routine-based set of actions on energy issues. After companies and institutions have collected the so-called ”low-hanging fruits”, energy saving is not a central priority. This field of research has often combined economic analysis with case studies of the practices and competences in companies and institutions. Consequently, the focus has shifted to how campaigns, competence building, and government-induced incentives can change behavioural patterns and establish focus on efficiency strategies and conservation activities, in-cluding schemes for energy management possibly in relation to energy-consuming machinery and energy-labelling schemes for equipment. In relation to environmental and energy-saving product design, research has been undertaken in the field of customer practices and how energy efficiency and other product qualities can be communicated and made relevant in the choice of products. Here energy-efficiency behaviour in, e.g., transportation and social barriers to it have been addressed in the research, and this field of studies has in fact been given much attention. But often the decisions concerning choice of technologies are not made by those carrying the costs of energy consumption or even by those managing the ma-chines or equipments in use. This has led to a renewed focus on an extended pro-duct life perspective where after-sales services and the utility is the focus instead of the product itself. This research includes actor analysis and the mapping of actor re-lations in the process of decision making and the routines for purchase, implementa-tion, maintenance, and use. Sustainable buildings (housing) and components innovations Buildings are another area where energy consumption is significant and where the often complex relationship between owners, builders, and users creates a situation in which energy use and energy costs are decoupled. Here one also finds the imme-diate comfort and single use situations are decoupled from the overall consumption and impacts of energy use. This is a reason for identifying this field of research as separate. It emphasises the distribution of agency and actions based on both theore-tical models of agents’ behaviour, empirical studies based on actor analysis in specific cases, and ethnographic studies of everyday behaviours and changing patterns in the values and knowledge related to energy behaviour and expectations of comfort. Here, at least two specific approaches to research seem to produce different types of insights. The first is based on everyday life approaches focusing on green behaviours and the priorities of building users and their possible engagement in prioritising ener-gy saving in both the construction and the use of buildings. While some of these stu-dies are based on technology studies using ethnographic methods and mapping of actors’ influence on construction and use, others begin from market analysis and mo-dels for consumer behaviour developed from these approaches. The second ap-proach starts from how ways to improve buildings and technologies and changing ownership relations and the involvement of stakeholders can improve and even re-duce energy consumption in buildings. In the most radical strategies, this is assumed to reach zero energy use or even produce a positive contribution to energy flows. In this field of research, technologies and the competences to utilise them as well as consumer behaviour and the distribution of agency also assumes importance. These draw inspiration from, e.g., technology and design studies.


50

Energy innovation in transport and transport behaviour The transport sector is obviously a very important part of today’s energy and climate problem and therefore also an important target area for research focusing on the technologies, regulation, and behaviours involved. There is an almost basic contra-diction between actual policies to govern transport and the excessive use of energy in this sector as well as the potential problems and climate impacts from the growth in transport. This relates to the very basic role transport has in most societies, where mobility as energy is seen as a basic driver and facilitator of growth and wealth crea-tion. At the same time, private transport via cars has become an integral part of mo-dern society’s culture of mobility and freedom, making regulation of this sector a diffi-cult task for many politicians. A great deal of research has been undertaken focusing on the possibility of substituting private transport systems with more energy-efficient public ones; exploring why rather obvious innovations in engine and car technology have not been prioritised and brought to the marked by the car industry; and how people’s daily routines point to different ways of managing transport activities, even though the dominant practice and regime of today’s transport system is defined by private car transportation. This field of research has drawn on a broad variety of so-cial-science approaches covering economic analysis, technology and innovation stu-dies, policy analysis, and ethnographic studies of daily routines and practices. In ad-dition, studies of how society’s norms and values seem to foster and sustain a certain association of mobility and freedom with means and access to transport has been bringing in culture studies and other contributions from the humanities. As indicated above, this field of research also demonstrates some of the basic conf-licts that are also present in the social-science approaches themselves, as the cont-roversy on growth mechanisms and the priorities in policy formation are also at the core of controversies between the different focus areas of the disciplines themselves. Energy usage, communities and everyday life Similarly to the last two fields of research, energy consumption and behaviour of per-sons and households in their daily practices has been targeted with different social-science methods. One perspective is on the everyday practices and awareness in energy usage, where many uses are more or less taken for granted and legitimised with other aims and purposes including the prioritisation of comfort in daily life. Many of these practices and changes in norms and values have even led to growth in ener-gy consumption, even among people who might consider themselves energy and en-vironment-conscious. Some of these practices can be influenced by policy schemes using incentives as, e.g., energy labelling that makes visible lifelong energy con-sumption to the buyer. Others are more subtle and are part of what by societal norms becomes part of the ordinary modern lifestyle. This includes the space accessible for individuals in modern society as well as the standards of comfort for facilities and equipment. Changes in consumption patterns, daily practices, and visions have been taken up in studies of practices inspired by technology studies and ethnographic methods, which themselves come from a longer tradition of studies of everyday life that look for ins-tance at the role of washing, bathrooms, electronic gadgets and machines in house-holds and how they are domesticated and made part of daily routines. Other studies in this field start from market analyses and models for consumer behaviour deve-loped from these approaches.


51

Energy strategies for development In many developing countries, cheap energy supplies have been seen as a core me-chanism for growth in production and wealth, leading to heavy subsidies to the ener-gy sector and the supply of fuel for transportation. This is a core understanding in economic growth models configuring those energy commodities in a different role than other commodities. While the changes in climate policies and not least the limits to fossil fuels force a revision of these basic assumptions and lead to rather dramatic changes in the energy sector at both national and international levels, the new chal-lenge confronting research on development is the transition from these energy de-pendencies. This concerns the technological regimes installed and the technological and institutional dependencies created. It also involves the impact on drastic changes in energy costs for developing countries affecting industrial competitiveness and costs of energy in people’s daily life, where the fastest growing use of energy is re-lated to growth in comfort through the use of air-conditioners and refrigeration as well as the growing dependency on transport for facilitating economic activity and mobility. Increasing focus has been given to the institutional and political reforms needed to handle these challenges, including studies of state formation and government institutions as well as ways to involve civil society, education, and NGOs in strategies for change. Access to energy for rural and poor regions of developing countries Following the assigned role of energy as one of the development agents for growth and change in developing countries, regional inequalities in access to modern energy supplies have been targeted as a special field of research. This implies a focus on the basic problem of investments and policy support for rural energy systems as well as studies of which types of energy technologies are relevant and appropriate for dis-tributed and local maintenance and use. While some studies have focused on the ap-propriateness and use of local, distributed energy technologies including, e.g., bio-gas, solar energy-based systems, and local electricity based systems and how policy and development schemes have been able to support these developments, others have also included the power relations and often ethnic and other conflict issues in-volved in rural and regional developments. Strategic dependences in a geopolitical perspective Growing emphasis has been placed in contemporary research on the global politics of energy and the conflicts arising between different regions and countries having ac-cess to energy sources or needing to secure their supplies. This research is based both on economic and political theories of international dependencies and trade and on the handling of international conflicts resulting from the role energy plays in con-temporary geopolitics. As this research is very closely related to military strategies and the security measures of nation states, the institutions involved are often govern-ment-sponsored institutions dealing with questions of military strategy and national security along with the special aspects of energy in geopolitics.


52

5. Towards an agenda

5.1 Four-level integrative approach to an R&D agenda We suggest that R&D agendas in this area be structured along three “descending” le-vels of discourse, from abstract to concrete, in parallel with an interaction level (D) where researchers meet practitioners and end-users. We use the metaphor of mov-ing down from the top to the bottom of a house to characterise this structure13: A. On the “Roof Terrace”: The research programme is a “learning programme”, that means, it expressly makes room for issues inside and outside established disciplines and across conventional disciplinary boundaries and research communities. This is also the place for “pre-analytic” approaches to issues, research avant la lettre, before full-fledged research topics have been condensed to a form where they can be worked on according to normal-scientific procedure. B. At the “Open Window”: Here, research themes are condensed and characterised in scientific detail, and research windows opened, but the choice of concrete re-search questions is still left to the respective research communities to work on (“re-search is best done by researchers”). We are reminded of Landsberg et al.’s remarks back in 197414 when they explained why they did not cover “all of the non-technical disciplines and research specialities that are capable of contributing to better … ener-gy management”: “… we wish to emphasise the continuing value of research themes which stem from the individual’s own enterprise; this often flourishes best in an ‘un-structured’ research environment. This study is not meant to supplant this traditional approach to research planning” (p. 9). We, in our present proposal, also subscribe to this approach and continue on this still novel, not well-trodden, research path. C. In the “Study”: This is the area of concrete, straightforward, more “conventional” research topics pursued by experts in the appropriate fields. Their choice is informed by and closely associated with specific aspects of the energy challenges driving this project. This research fits most easily into the usual notions of an agenda for long-term social-science research. D. In the “Front Yard”: This is a place for interaction with other researchers, research directors, practitioners, government, business, laypersons, and others. In the trans-disciplinary15 approach we follow in this project, application in the real world and feedback from users is vital to refine the methods and test the results.

These levels are not fixed but are rather, to a certain extent, permeable, allowing a maximum of integration “into the whole”. The D level may come in at any phase – when societal actors raise an issue, when researchers seek feedback or even valida-tion, when issues are scientifically “locked in”, and so on. Work on long-term energy options needs to understand the complexity of the linkages within corresponding so-cio-technical systems and how these systems evolve over time. The research must

13 Like most metaphors, this house metaphor reflects only partially what we mean. Properly, there should be a cycle whereby the roof terrace also draws on informed knowledge from practitioners and end-users, learning programmes are formulated, redefined, and run again through the Open Window and Front Yard. 14 Landsberg, H. H., J. J. Schanz, Jr., S. H. Schurr, G. P. Thompson (1974): Energy and the social sciences. An examination of research needs. Resources for the Future. RFF working paper, EN-3. RFF, Washington. 15 See footnote 6.


53

also be grounded in the specific concrete detail of human practices and sensibilities within these shifting contexts.

5.2 Illustrative examples of future research Below we offer examples of project themes (on various conceptual discourse levels and with various types of treatment) that could be pursued when adapting and refin-ing the specific R&D agenda. A. “Roof Terrace”:

Energy cultures (#116) The natural conditions that form the backdrop for people’s daily life and commerce are formative of their culture. They influence their perceptions and valuation of na-ture, attitudes (carefulness, thriftiness), economics, lifestyle, institutions, legal sys-tems (including property law), and even art, among others. The key resource of ener-gy is of particular importance. Cultures based on renewable energy sources (for ex-ample, agricultural and alpine economies, forest economies, irrigation cultures, fishe-ries), with their multitudinous mechanisms for collective restraint and conflict resolu-tion, are known and relatively well-researched. With modern, conventional energy carriers (fossil energies, nuclear energy) the culture and general population’s con-nection to the natural realm is much weaker or even non-existent. Energy is a good like any other and is plentifully available. The provision of energy is highly centralised. What does this mean for the political and economic culture in various countries? Does it threaten a renaissance of the centralised irrigation dictator (cf. Mesopotamia) in a new form as a new large energy-system dictator? Energy behaviour (2) What is the influence of culture, social relations, poverty and wealth, and others fac-tors on energy behaviour? What mechanisms are at play that create the paradox of civil society demanding strategies to combating climate change while at the same time demonstrating a lack of willingness to contribute on the level of households/indi-viduals? Paradoxes of energy efficiency (3) The potential of energy saving through increases in energy efficiency is very large. However, it seems not to be really utilised, maybe because energy efficiency is less attractive, both technologically and economically. This project explores perceptions of energy efficiency across core stakeholder constituencies; policymakers, industrialists, engineering scientists, consumers. What do they think about energy efficiency, why is it attractive (or not), what are their views of drivers and barriers, and how do they understand the potential of energy efficiency? Is there a misfit between dominant energy cultures and the idea of energy efficiency?

16 The proposals are from: Energy Science Center/D. Spreng (11,12,13,14), T. Flüeler (15,21,22,24), D. Goldblatt (4), T. Horlick-Jones (25), U. Luterbacher/E. Wiegandt (17), G. Marland (20), J. Minsch (1,5,7,9,10,16,26), R. Mourik (2,6,18), S. Pachauri (19), K. Sørensen (3,5,8,23,27).


54

Limiting energy use: Sufficiency in energy consumption (4) How can economic and social institutions be reorganised such that negative biophy-sical feedback on the integrity of the energy resource base and the atmosphere re-gisters in human social systems—such that restraint and sufficiency is placed on equal footing with efficiency as an operating principle in the political economy? How can instances of sufficiency in the energy system – in businesses, communities, and social practices – be scaled up across national and cultural boundaries to effect change on a global level? B. “Open Window”:

Climate change and energy systems (5) The change in the global climate system entails impacts on energy systems. What are these implications? Who are the winners, who are the losers? Which economic, political, and social consequences are to be expected – at local, national, and regio-nal (for example, EU) level? Globally? What is the economic, political, and, for ex-ample, legal need for action? Analysing trade-offs between the social and the technical (6) Social effects (welfare, happiness, risk perception, health, lifestyles) of both fossil-fuel-based and renewables-based energy systems are difficult to quantify, which hin-ders the marketing, cost structure analysis, and implementation of long-term energy options. How can these more qualitative aspects be quantified? Energy peace (7) The impacts of climate change on energy systems and the increasing global energy demand, with associated ecological, economic, and political side effects, pose great challenges to the process of peaceful adaptation and transformation (see latest res-pective IPCC reports: Working Group II Report on “Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnera-bility” with “barriers, limits and costs, but these are not fully understood”; WG III Re-port on “Mitigation of Climate Change” which demands changes in lifestyles and be-haviour). What might be necessary elements of a World Energy Constitution? Energy visions (8) How do various groups of stakeholders perceive the future use of energy? How much energy, from what sources, using what carriers? How important is the continuation of energy-intensive activities like modern transport to the notion of a good life? To what extent does energy at all enter people's thinking about the future? C. “Study”:

Policy measures to limit energy use (9) Energy is the central physical production factor. Limiting overall energy use is thus an enormous challenge for politics and the economy. It cannot be achieved via indivi-dual measures. Rather, a mix of various political measures and initiatives of self-or-ganisation on different action levels is necessary. The goal is to deliberately stimulate social adaptability. This presupposes understanding and conceptualising the society


55

as a learning system as well as the comparative evaluation of past attempts at limit-ing energy consumption. Energy certificates (10) Emissions from combustion of fossil energy carriers are not the only negative side ef-fects of energy use. Others include wastes, dangers and risks (from nuclear energy), and problematic competitive uses (for example, energy from biomass versus agriculture). Energy certificates are a new instrument under the framework of policies to limit energy use (2000-watt society). The technical-administrative, economic, legal, and procedural preconditions of a system of energy certificates must be researched. Improving understanding and accelerating innovation processes in the energy field (11) The surroundings/environment of innovations must be analysed more precisely. Spe-cial attention must be given to the development phase. This will reduce the risk of “useless” technological development while increasing the speed of “technology trans-fer”. Investment behaviour of house owners with respect to their buildings’ energy use (12) The focus is the study of various actor groups using both novel economic and psy-chological methods of behaviour analysis on the basis of technically accurate, broad-ly-encompassing descriptions of the choices at hand. 2000-watt scenario (13) The principle of the 2000-watt-per-capita scenario must be developed into a criterion of sustainability for the appraisal of energy research projects. Technical assessment alone will not suffice. A comprehensive economical appraisal of a 2000-Watt Society on a European or global level requires the close collaboration of, for example, engi-neers and economists. Improvement of climate policy (14) The investigation of the innovation and investment behaviour of companies and their responses to climate-related political measures supports governments in designing more effective measures. The impacts of, for example, the EU trade in certificates on the behaviour of European electric utilities is analysed. Forecasts and the views of today’s society – insights from social science to bridge the gap (15) Energy forecasts are complex and, as such, are a formidable example of asymmetry between experts and “laypeople”. These non-experts – notably today’s consumers, producers, and investors – have to be reached to make the forecasts more valid, more solidly based, and more widely supported. For the non-experts are also actors and decision makers: on policies, on the forward-looking course of technology and society, and on R&D expenses. This asymmetry has been addressed with the deficit model: More information (from expert to laywoman) will eventually reduce the gap, the more the better. Based on lessons from discourses on various contentious is-sues, a complementary way is proposed through more systemic analysis (conditions


56

of problem solving, perception of, for example, probability, agenda-setting), sustained dialogue and mutual learning (advanced participatory tools). Institutional innovations (16) Societal learning processes, economic development, and overcoming underdevelop-ment, and a long-term orientation in politics and the economy require the safeguard-ing and support from institutions (laws, norms, and rules). To reach envisaged ener-gy, environmental, and development goals, existing institutions must be critically eva-luated, reformed, and if necessary supplemented or supplanted by institutional inno-vations. The institutions in question exist on regional, national (industrialised and de-veloping countries), and international levels. Institutional frameworks for sustainability (17) Energy use underlies all viable social systems. The debate turns on the rate and form of this use. It becomes problematic when it leads to depletion of fundamental natural resources (including the atmosphere, hence the dilemmas caused by use of fossil fuels). Traditionally, societies have had to find ways to moderate this use through ins-titutional mechanisms (broadly conceived to include such factors as the enforcement of property rights). The challenge for the future is to maintain economic growth and permit economic development (to foster intra- and intergenerational equity). What po-licies will lead to new forms of property rights, incorporating optimal discount rates while improving intra-generational equity? What national and international negotiation processes will produce such outcomes? Socio-technical infrastructure design (18) The actual implementation of infrastructures for new energy sources and carriers of-ten results in a chicken-and-egg situation, where a market must be developed in or-der for investors to act and investors are needed to create trust for market develop-ment. What strategies (political, institutional, cultural, economic) can be developed to overcome this situation? Energy access and development (19) (1) Identify and profile the energy poor with the aim of identifying groups of house-holds with a predisposition to use energy in welfare-enhancing ways. (2) Improve the understanding of the relationship between energy poverty and other dimensions of poverty and development; merge the views of macro-studies (for ex-ample, IEA energy development index) and micro studies quantifying the benefits and welfare improvements resulting from increased access to commercial energy (for example, benefits of electrification in the Philippines (ESMAP 2002). Carbon capture and storage, CCS (20) In a Special Report, the IPCC suggested that for well-selected, designed, and ma-naged sites, the fraction of CO2 retained in storage sites is “very likely” to exceed 99% over 100 years, but they acknowledge that “site monitoring may be required for very long periods”. What institutions can conceivably be agreed upon to meet the challenge of detecting and addressing leaks and respond to long-term liability is-sues? (D. Spreng, G. Marland, A. Weinberg, “CO2 capture and storage: Another


57

Faustian Bargain? Energy Policy, 35 (2007), 850-857). Lessons may be drawn from other arenas, for example, the radioactive waste disposal field (Flüeler, 2001passim). Sustainability assessment – the case for integration (21) Traditional assessment mechanisms, from environmental impact assessment to “fu-ture assessment”, are in need of integrative tools to encompass all (relevant) aspects to consider long-term effects (equity, adaptability, irreversibility, etc.). Existing new instruments (for example, from transition management, J. Rotmans et al., 2001, W. de Ridder, 2006) will be screened and, if necessary, enlarged by considerations with regard to the four challenges proposed in Chapter 2. Analysis of energy-relevant decision-making processes (22) Conceptually, many of the criteria needed to reach “good” decisions in energy policy are known. Here we explore empirical case studies including politics, economy, and end-user energy consumption. Commercialisation of new renewable energy technologies (23) To what extent are new renewable-energy technologies commercialised? What kinds of companies are active in this; what are their motives, and what kind of strategies do they pursue? To what extent are national and EU policies seen as supportive of such commercialisation? What are the dominant perceptions about the future implementa-tion of new renewable energy technologies? D. “Front Yard”:

Social learning in energy systems (24) Society must develop energy regimes that are steered by both short-term and long-term goals. We need research in science and engineering to find technical solutions for the numerous challenges in time. But equally important, we need policies and ins-titutional arrangements capable of achieving long-term goals. In open, democratic so-cieties this requires greater engagement, understanding, and concern about the fu-ture from the public, companies, governments, and other stakeholders, that means, social learning must take place. This is explored here. Discourses on energy policy (25) How do lay people and various kinds of experts make sense of contemporary de-bates about energy futures? To what extent do patterns of practical reasoning by these groups overlap? What interpretative resources does such practical reasoning draw upon? What is the role of media accounts, and dramatised accounts in novels, television, the film, etc.? How are notions of risk incorporated in such discourses? How are these discourses shifting in time? Involvement of end-consumers (26) Limiting energy use requires not only adjustments in production and consumer be-haviour but also unpopular political decisions. It is therefore necessary adequately to involve the end-user in processes of product development and policy formation. In re-cent years consultation procedures have been developed in various policy fields with the goal of understanding customers’ wishes at the earliest possible stage and letting


58

them influence decision-making processes, product development, and policy forma-tion. The development of long-term energy options requires a comparable evaluation and further development of existing approaches and concepts for integrating the end-user. The construction and practice of energy markets (27) Across Europe, there has been a move towards increased liberalisation of energy markets. What are the main motives behind this move, how are the markets cons-tructed, and how are the efforts evaluated? To what extent do suppliers and consu-mers of energy act according to expectations? Below the suggested projects are arranged in a provisional matrix of Challenges against Discourse levels (Table 1, note diverse characteristics of graphical demarca-tion). The table sets the coordinates to specify and locate projects within the four challenges and along the four working areas (discourse levels). It is not meant to be a clear-cut and selective systematic classification. Researchers must still address the dimensions of their projects and define an appropriate allocation of resources. Speci-fic projects should not necessarily be limited to a single challenge or working level. The examples offered illustrate this. Accordingly, the abstract issues of institutional innovations, socio-technical infrastructure design, or energy-relevant decision pro-cesses may not belong to one of the challenges exclusively.

Challenges Dis- course levels

Access Environment Climate change

Societal development

Knowledge management

A. Roof terrace

Sufficiency; Energy cultures; Energy behaviour; Paradoxes of energy efficiency

B. Open Window

Energy peace Climate change and energy systems

Trade-offs between social and technical

C. Study Access and develop-ment; Understanding innovation processes; Institutional innova-tions/frameworks; Socio-technical infrastructure design; Energy foreign policy

Improvement of climate policy; Energy forecasts and today’s society; CCS

Energy visions; Investment behaviour; 2000-Watt scenario; Sustainability assess-ment; Commercialisation of renewables

Energy-relevant decision processes

D. Front Yard

Involving end-consumers Construction of markets

Policy measures; Energy certificates

Discourses on energy policy

Social learning

Table 1: Relationship between Challenges and Discourse levels.


59

6. Conclusions and outlook We conclude with lessons learned over the course of ASRELEO and recommenda-tions for using the R&D agenda tool.

6.1 Conclusions: Basic consensus and key topics for the agenda ASRELEO aims at defining the role and responsibility of the social sciences in long-term energy research and at taking steps toward an energy research agenda in the social sciences. This presupposes that the social sciences speak for and explain themselves. Within this project, this goal was achieved through an extensive partici-patory process with two international workshops that served as important milestones. One workshop was attended by scientists from social-science energy research; the other brought together scientists and practitioners from research policy and research promotion. This allowed for an extensive overview of the diversity and significance of existing so-cial-science energy research. There was also a trend towards the formation of re-search communities and schools that are sometimes barely aware of each other. In another clearly visible extreme, such communities purposely ignore each other and steer clear of each other in any practical application. While this trait of the contempo-rary research reality can easily be explained through the sociology of science, it re-mains deeply problematic. In both cases, valuable potential for synergy is wasted and the voice of the social sciences is heard only dimly or as chatter in the discourses on energy policy and energy economics, which is problematic for social-science energy research as a whole. It makes it more difficult for actors in politics and economics to recognise social scientists as partners and to approach them specifically. There are good reasons why there cannot be THE voice of social science. After all, the various disciplines and their approaches to problems are too diverse. Nonethe-less, the goal must remain to (1) clearly elaborate and (2) communicate the basic consensus on the role and significance, responsibility, ability and potential of the so-cial sciences in long-term energy research, as well as the key topics as raw material for a research agenda. Point (1) was the subject of the above-mentioned and docu-mented participatory process. Point (2) is the goal of this publication, of various pre-sentations to research policy bodies, a book project, and of the project application for EuroSOSCILEO (European Social-Science Research Related to Long-term Energy Options) within the framework of EUROCORES’ Call for Themes 2007 (www.esf.-org/activities/eurocores.html17, accessed on 2007-10-20).

17 With e-mail of 9 Oct 2007 the European Science Foundation informed the proposers that their sub-mission was not selected as a theme to be put out for tender. The favourable proposal by the scientific committee in charge, the Standing Committee for the Social Sciences (SCSS), and the negative deci-sion by the Science Advisory Board (SAB) are reproduced below: SCSS: “This proposal addresses some of the most important policy challenges that Europe faces. So-cial science can obviously make an important contribution to their solution. Previously the proposer convened an Exploratory Workshop (EW06-237) ‘Transdisciplinary Review of a proposed Agenda for Social Science Research related to long-term Energy Options’, of which this proposal is a direct result. The SCSS finds the proposal coherent and cohesive, addressing important social science issues, al-




60

The basic consensus on the significance and role of social sciences in long-term energy research, as developed within the framework of this project, can be summa-rised as follows: The energy challenges (Chapter 2) Society faces a wide range of serious problems connected to the energy system: – Security and Access – Climate Change and other Environmental Impacts – Economic and Social Development – Knowledge Management and Knowledge Integration across Boundaries The role of social sciences (Chapter 3) Social-science research is required to meet these challenges successfully. Specifically, the following disciplines form part of the social and societal sciences: public administration, cultural sciences, incl. anthropology/ethnology, communication and information sciences, demography, economics, education, geography, history, law, management sciences, philosophy/ethics, political science, psychology, sociology. Social-science research in all its disciplinary diversity and its systematic context orientation is required for this task, and full use must be made of its main functions: – Reflection – Analysis – Design and realisation There is a general consensus that the role of social science in energy research should not be reduced to questions of winning public acceptance or market introduc-tion of new technologies. Using social science only as a tool for such purposes runs counter to its reflective nature and would in itself be symptomatic of the current defi-ciencies in sustainability of the energy system, as characterised by the challenges listed above. In order to solve the pressing problems, technology/natural science and social science must be equal partners. The achievements of the social sciences (Chapter 4) Social science is already active in long-term oriented energy research (namely in the area of defined energy challenges) and can point to significant achievements. Among these, the various activities in transformation management can be mentioned as an example. Nevertheless, the contribution of social science as a whole to long-term oriented energy research has fallen short of its true potential.

though a certain development of these issues – namely focusing the scope of the Programme – is ne-cessary. Researchers from eastern and southern countries should also be included. The Core Group fully supports this proposal and ranks it in second place.” SAB: “The ESF Science Advisory Board did not recommend this proposal to be further developed. This proposal needs focussing since it is too broad. It addresses four huge research areas including access to energy, climate change, economic and social development and management of knowledge of energy options. It also concentrates on all possible functions of social sciences (reflection, analysis, implementation). The proposal also suggests research on different abstraction levels and this creates a huge matrix of research interest which is too diffuse. Therefore, some refocusing of the proposal is needed.” The six chosen themes are listed under www.esf.org/activities/eurocores.html.


61

The basic consensus carries one main message to all researchers in the various so-cial-science communities and networks: Get involved in long-term oriented energy re-search. At the same time, the consensus appeals to governmental and non-govern-mental research promotion on all levels to facilitate long-term oriented energy re-search within a secure framework. The project therefore compiled the building blocks of an Agenda for Social-Science Research on Long-term Energy Options (ASRE-LEO). The four-level integrative approach (Chapter 5) The first building block on the road to an agenda is a proposal for structuring the va-rious topics to be worked on within the framework of the four challenges. The propo-sal was inspired by the idea of a “learning agenda”. Its motto is openness before (strict) systematisation. The structuring proposal leaves room for reflection and the search for new challenges and topics (“roof terrace”), for developing concrete ques-tions which can be formulated in the more narrow sense of a research agenda (“open window” and “study”), and finally for an exchange among scientists as well as bet-ween research and the its environment (“front yard”). The list of topics (Chapter 5) The second building block consists of a list of topics. It contains proposals from the broad base of participants in the process, including the project team. The topics are shown as 27 brief project sketches and illustrate ASRELEO’s vast universe of topics with specific examples. They are meant to inspire the readers to formulate their own topics. This is not, then, a “final” research agenda but rather extensive raw material for other topics and a general manual for compiling research agendas. This report is therefore not only aimed at individual researchers but also at all the governmental and non-governmental bodies involved in research promotion on all levels.

6.2 Outlook: Embedding – normalisation – platform Communicating about and positioning the social sciences The development of a basic consensus and the compilation of a catalogue of key agenda topics as documented in this report – both in view of the strategic goals of ASRELEO – are a first to the best of our knowledge. Although further steps and im-provements are possible and even necessary, the results of this report in our opinion nonetheless form an important basis for (re)positioning social science in energy re-search and for formulating concrete ASRELEO research agendas. The basic consensus must be communicated competently and to the right audience if social science is to be repositioned and become securely entrenched for years to come in energy research, especially in the long-term oriented energy research envi-saged here. Embedding in research programmes In addition to communicating about and convincing others of the potential of social-science energy research, it will be necessary to firmly embed social science in long-term research programmes. Just as energy policy and energy economics affect va-rious levels of action, so should the research programmes be on a European level (e.g., EUROCORES, www.esf.org/activities/eurocores.html), on the national level



62

(e.g., national energy research programmes in the framework of basic research as well as disciplinary research; in Switzerland this is supported and/or coordinated by the Swiss National Science Foundation, by the academies, and by CORE and other organisations). There might even be programmes at the regional and local level (can-tons or states, counties), and also on the level of civil society (NGOs) and the econo-my (e.g., social-science programmes for long-term oriented energy options launched by key players in the energy sector). When developing an agenda, the following considerations should serve as operatio-nal guidelines: – Clearly specify target audience

It is insufficient to state overall issues. Statements or propositions are more pro-ductive if they are addressed to defined audiences, such as a determined re-search policy body or a defined research community.

– Stick to challenges but address several different levels The challenges must be broken down to various levels and scales (regional, na-tional, global; short-term, mid-term, long-term).

– Make the link between the challenges and social science explicit This relates to specifying the audience. The researchers, including research com-munities, must be able to relate to the challenges with respect to their paradigms, ongoing research, and state of the art.

– Show potential users what social science can contribute (“added value”) In turn, users such as politicians or government officials must recognise the re-search value in terms of their own needs.

– Start with examples (“success/failure stories”) Ordinarily users are laypersons with respect to research and, consequently, not familiar with the respective thinking, framework, and terminology. If they are pre-sented concrete examples, for example, in day-to-day applications of their “world”, they find it easier to understand, and indeed accept, research findings.

– Emphasise “learning by doing” Working from externally induced challenges, and not topics defined by scientific disciplines, one finds the issues change over time and evolve, are subject to diffe-rent framing and contexts, and are treated by different players. This fact implies considerable learning abilities by all involved and a lack of a one-size-fits-all ap-proach.

In addition, there are meta-level lessons: Every researcher, irrespective of scientific field, is socialised in his or her research community and school of thought, which makes it a challenge to overcome mental boundaries and reach out to researchers and users with different perspectives. “Normalisation” through embedding in research and teaching Finally, social-science energy research must become entrenched in research and teaching in universities and polytechnics. Securing this over and beyond the research programmes will provide (young) scientists with the necessary long-term perspec-tives. This is the only way to ensure that social-science energy research is more than a short-lived fad. In other words, it is necessary to “normalise” it. This postulate de-rives directly from the energy policy challenges described in this report.


63

Develop scientific networking At this stage it is neither required nor intended to specify agenda management, which one should to avoid over-defining in an early phase. Each project theme in section 5.2 has a specific environment that optimally fits its needs (Level A “Roof Terrace” projects need sufficient interaction, whereas well-defined projects on Level C “Study” should be left alone for deep investigation, Table 1). We suggest, however, that a comprehensive agenda development be guided by some generic rules researchers must follow in case the agenda is meant to be integrated with an optimum of synergy: • There is a minimum of contact points for each undertaking, according to its posi-

tion in the matrix. For example, projects on the “Roof Terrace” level are required to communicate their research direction early on so that their findings may stimu-late projects on “lower levels”.

• Researchers from the Science-Technology-Studies community concerned with the challenge “Knowledge management” interact with projects on each level (shaded in Table 1).

• Undertakings in the “Front Yard” seek contact, and are sought out by, projects on levels “above” (shaded in Table 1).

• Interaction mechanisms are developed by an overall Programme Committee (for example, a national research committee): range of workshops (single projects, “Challenges” and “Discourse level” gatherings as cross-project working parties, etc.), conferences (internal, external, contributions, self-organised); mechanisms to forestall old boys’ clubs; seed money for “reflection time” and networking; small facilitated and specially-structured workshops, instruments to promote ongoing debate within the consortium, for example, by means of electronic bulletin boards, “threaded conversations”, etc.

Significant attention should be paid to developing management procedures that sup-port the interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and cross-cultural aspects of the prog-ramme. These aspects pose particular challenges. How will language issues be ad-dressed? Considerable time and effort will be required to allow people working to-gether in English whose first language is not English to understand each other on a detailed level and to be as creative as possible (especially on the “Front Yard” level D). How should practitioners and end-users be involved in formulating and de-tailing research proposals and methodologies (e.g., open forums for web discussions on relevant challenges and strategies)? Community building: Learning from the IPCC? As mentioned above, formulating the basic ASRELEO consensus and the key topics for the agenda are a first step in a learning process. The basic consensus focuses on justifying the significance of long-term oriented social-science energy research. This is the first step towards the proper societal valuation of this research discipline. Fur-ther steps can and should follow, more closely focused on content. Specifically, this means the achievements of ASRELEO research. This research must be continually documented and regularly updated. The example of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is useful and inspiring in this respect. Despite differences in content and societal expectations, in the underwriters and the financial framework, we believe the founding of a Platform for SOSCILEO (working title) as inspired by the IPCC is well worth considering.


64

Appendices

Appendix 1: Participants Core Team Daniel Spreng (chair), ETH, energy analysis and energy economics [email protected],

www.cepe.ethz.ch/people/profs/spreng, www.esc.ethz.ch Thomas Flüeler, ETH, environmental sciences, decision analysis [email protected],

[email protected], www.uns.ethz.ch/people/associated/thomasfl David L. Goldblatt, economics, environmental sciences, energy analysis [email protected] Jürg Minsch, formerly with BOKU, institutional economics, sustainability [email protected] Organising Committee Justin Adams, BP plc, Director Long Term Technology [email protected], www.bp.com,

www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9013434&contentId=7026361 Gotthard Bechmann, ITAS, sociology, technology assessment [email protected],

www.itas.fzk.de/mahp/bechmann/bechmann.htm Matthias Finger, EPFL, political science (institutions) [email protected],

www2.epfl.ch/Jahia/site/mir/op/edit/pid/19260?matrix=4746#finger Thomas Flüeler Arnulf Grübler, IIASA, physics, long-range analysis [email protected], www.iiasa.ac.at/cgi-

bin/ifinger?login:%5egruebler%24:11:383 Eberhard Jochem, ETH/ISI, engineering, economics, energy conservation [email protected],

www.cepe.ethz.ch/people/profs/jochem Jürg Minsch Ruth M. R. Mourik, ECN, sociology (Science & Technology Studies, STS) [email protected],

www.createacceptance.net Knut H. Sørensen, NTNU, sociology (STS) [email protected],

www.hf.ntnu.no/hf/tverrfaglig_engelsk/Staff/knut.sorensen/personInfo.html Gert Spaargaren, Wageningen Univ., sociology, ecological modernisation [email protected],

www.enp.wur.nl/uk/staff/gert+spaargaren Daniel Spreng GianCarlo Tosato, IEA/ETSAP, systems analysis, research processes [email protected],

1www.etsap.org/contactus.asp Minh Quang Tran, EPFL & EFD, physics [email protected], www.epfl.ch/cgi-

bin/csoldap/simple?sciper=106568 Workshop I, Oct 5/6, 2006

1. Organising Committee Gotthard Bechmann Thomas Flüeler Eberhard Jochem Jürg Minsch Ruth M. Mourik Knut H. Sørensen Gert Spaargaren Daniel Spreng GianCarlo Tosato 2. Invited speakers (see Appendix 2) Urs Luterbacher, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, political science

[email protected], http://hei.unige.ch/ens/prof/luterbacher.html

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.cepe.ethz.ch/people/profs/spreng

http://www.esc.ethz.ch/



http://www.uns.ethz.ch/people/associated/thomasfl




http://www.bp.com/

http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9013434&contentId=7026361


http://www.itas.fzk.de/mahp/bechmann/bechmann.htm


http://www2.epfl.ch/Jahia/site/mir/op/edit/pid/19260?matrix=4746#finger


http://www.iiasa.ac.at/cgi-bin/ifinger?login:%5egruebler%24:11:383

http://www.iiasa.ac.at/cgi-bin/ifinger?login:%5egruebler%24:11:383


http://www.cepe.ethz.ch/people/profs/jochem


http://www.createacceptance.net/


http://www.hf.ntnu.no/hf/tverrfaglig_engelsk/Staff/knut.sorensen/personInfo.html


http://www.enp.wur.nl/uk/staff/gert+spaargaren



65

Shonali Pachauri, IIASA, economics [email protected], www.iiasa.ac.at/cgi-bin/ifinger?name:%53%68%6f%6e%61%6c%69%20%50%61%63%68%61%75%72%69:1:895:1:13; www.mtec.ethz.ch/people/people_alpha/shonalip/index

Geert Verbong, TU Eindhoven, physics, history [email protected], https://venus.tue.nl/ep-cgi/ep_detail.opl?fac_id=98&rn=19900020&taal=NL&hash=x8xckS9il7ugjh3Jsdf0ONEeIl

Audun Ruud, Univ. Oslo, political science, business administration [email protected], www.sum.uio.no/prosus/index.html, www.sum.uio.no/staff/aruud/

Nico Stehr, Zeppelin Univ., sociology (knowledge) [email protected], www.zeppelin-university.de/frameblast_eng.php?url=/english/departments/stehr.php

Ulrik Jørgensen, TU Denmark, engineering, economics [email protected], www.mek.dtu.dk/Publikationer/Publikationer-2005.aspx?lg=showcommon&id=1225&type=publications

Harald Rohracher, Univ. Klagenfurt, physics, sociology [email protected], www.ifz.tugraz.at/index_en.php, www.ifz.tugraz.at/index_en.php/user/view/15

Oliver Schilling, Bielefeld Univ., sociology, STS [email protected], www.uni-bielefeld.de/(de)/soz/iw/personen/personendaten/vorstand/weingart.html

Frank Hardeman, SCK•CEN, physics [email protected], www.sckcen.be/pisa/aspx/viewer.aspx?sectionid=cf4da498-924d-46ca-b73b-46f77ea34b4f&&widget=DOC&rt=RISK_SPIRITS&suffix=_RT_RISK_SPIRITS

Thomas Berker, NTNU, sociology (STS) [email protected], www.hf.ntnu.no/hf/tverrfaglig_engelsk/Staff/thomas.berker/personInfo.html

3. Other discussants Roland W. Scholz, ETH, mathematics, cognitive sciences, environmental sciences (Day 1)

[email protected], www.uns.ethz.ch/people/hs/scholzr/ Michael Stauffacher, ETH, sociology, environmental sciences [email protected],

www.uns.ethz.ch/people/staff/smichael Shiqiu Zhang, Peking Univ., environmental economics, environmental policy [email protected],

www.pku.edu.cn/eacademic/center_inst.html Wolfram Jörss, IZT, Berlin, engineering, future studies [email protected] www.izt.de/institut/wissenschaftliche_mitarbeiterinnen/wolfram_joerss.html Tom O’Donnell, Univ. Michigan, nuclear physics, political science, history [email protected], www-

personal.umich.edu/~twod, www.umich.edu/%7Emctp/ Workshop II, Feb 1/2, 2007 Harald Rohracher Ulrik Jørgensen Christian Eherer, R&D policy, Project Leader Socio Economic Studies, European Fusion Development

Agreement (EFDA), Garching [email protected], http://itp.tugraz.at/~eherer/about.html Jan-Peter Voss (Day 2), Öko-Institut – Institute for Applied Ecology, Berlin, political science,

economics [email protected], www.sustainable-transformation.net GianCarlo Tosato Boelie Elzen, Univ. Twente, sociology (STS), engineering [email protected],

www.mb.utwente.nl/stehps/about/staff/resass/Elzen.doc/ Knut H. Sørensen Thomas Flüeler Lukas Gutzwiller (morning Day 1, afternoon Day 2), R&D policy, Swiss Federal Office of Energy,

Programme director for energy policy fundamentals research programme [email protected], www.bfe.admin.ch/themen/00526/00535/index.html?lang=en

Tony Kaiser (Day 1), R&D policy, Director, Alstom Power Technology Center, President of CORE (National Energy Research Commission) [email protected], www.bfe.admin.ch/themen/00519/00520/index.html?lang=en

Urs Luterbacher (Day 1) Jürg Minsch (Day 2) Daniel Spreng Ellen Wiegandt (Day 2), Institut Universitaire Kurt Bösch (IUKB), Geneva, anthropology

[email protected], http://heiwww.uni.ge, www.iukb.ch/index.php?id=92


66

Daniel Hersson, BP plc; R&D policy, Long Term Technology Strategy, Senior Strategy Advisor, in representation of Justin Adams, BP [email protected], www.bp.com/, http://evs.e-unlimited.com/?id_categoria=34&id_item=728

Wesley K. Foell, Resource Management Associates, formerly with Univ. Wisconsin, resource economics and engineering [email protected], [email protected]

Frank Kuhn (Day 1 and morning Day 2), R&D policy, secretary Standing Committee, European Science Foundation, Strasbourg [email protected], www.esf.org/research-areas/social-sciences.html

Christian Pohl (Day 2), evaluation of transdisciplinary approach, td-net, Swiss Academy of Sciences, STS [email protected], www.env.ethz.ch/environmental_philosophy/people/pohlc/index, www.transdisciplinarity.ch/K_CP_e.html

Links accessed on 2007-7-30/tf Further contacts Frans Berkhout, Wiebe Bijker, Lucas Bretschger, Elizabeth Cecelski, Nazli Choucri, Cutler Cleveland, Laura Cozzi, Anita Engels, Amit Garg, André Gazsó, John Grin, John Groenewegen, Eva Heiskanen, Daniel Hersson, Peter S. Hofman, Thomas Homer-Dixon, Tom Horlick-Jones, Lars Ingelstam, Thomas Jahn, Sheila Jasanoff, Jaap Jelsma, Arne Kaijser, René Kemp, Knut Kübler, William Lafferty, Sabine Maasen, Gregg Marland, Simon Mason, J. V. Meenakshi, Claude Ménard, Martina Merz, Cees Mid-den, Helga Nowotny, Christian Pfister, Gisela Prasad, Rob Raven, Ortwin Renn, Joyashree Roy, Tina Ruschenburg, Marianne Ryghaug, Indira Shakya, Domenico Rossetti, Kurt Spillmann, Leena Srivastava, Rudolf Stichweh, Andrew Stirling, Jane Summerton, Nigma Tamrakar, Paula Tiihonen, Bernhard Truffer, Marjolein van Asselt, Marleen van den Kerkhof, Jan Paul van Soest, Bas van Vliet, Detlef Van Vuuren, Frédéric Varone, David G. Victor, Timon Wehnert, Peter Weingart, Arnim Wiek, Robin Williams, Angelika Willms-Herget


67

Appendix 2: Papers presented at Workshop I Section A. Key Issues: Access, Conflicts, Risks Urs Luterbacher, Nazli Choucri & Ellen Wiegandt: Resources, energy, population, and conflict (slides, s & paper, p) Shonali Pachauri: Poverty and the lack of access to energy in the development process (s) Frank Hardeman: Long-term energy provision and risk (s) Section B. Policy and Governance Thomas Flüeler: Complex issues need comprehensive approaches – the case of radioactive waste governance (s & p) Geert Verbong, Ruth Mourik & Rob Raven: Towards integration of methodologies for assessing and promoting the societal embedding of energy innovations (s & p) Boelie Elzen & Peter Hofman: Socio-technical scenarios. A new method to explore transition paths towards a sustainable electricity system (presented by G. Verbong) (s & p) Audun Ruud: Policies for sustainable development with respect to new energy technologies (s) Section C. Innovation Systems Ulrik Jørgensen: Integration and innovation of wind energy in the Danish electric system (s) Harald Rohracher: Social science support for long-term oriented regional energy management (s & p) Oliver Schilling, Peter Weingart, Anita Engels & Tina Ruschenburg: The globalisation of research networks (s) Nico Stehr: Global knowledge (p) Section D. Everyday Life Thomas Berker: The role of energy users with respect to new energy technologies in buildings (s) Gert Spaargaren: Energy innovation and end-user behaviour (s) The six contributions in paper format (p) are reproduced below: 1. Urs Luterbacher, Nazli Choucri & Ellen Wiegandt pp. 68-93 Resources, energy, population, and conflict 2. Thomas Flüeler pp. 94-100 Complex issues need comprehensive approaches – the case of radioactive waste governance 3. Geert Verbong, Ruth Mourik & Rob Raven pp. 101-112 Towards integration of methodologies for assessing and promoting the societal embedding of energy innovations 4. Boelie Elzen & Peter S. Hofman pp. 113-132 Socio-technical scenarios. A new method to explore transition paths towards a sustainable electricity system 5. Harald Rohracher pp. 133-147 Social science support for long-term oriented regional energy management 6. Nico Stehr pp. 148-167 Global knowledge


68

Resources, energy, population, and conflict

Urs Luterbacher18, Nazli Choucri19 & Ellen Wiegandt20 Introduction This paper intends to focus on the complex relationships between over-exploitation of natural resources, property rights protection and political stability and by extension conflict. As we will try to sow these issues are complex but very important ones. Conflicts and turmoil in the Middle East are often linked to the local abundance of energy resources and the first and se-cond golf wars have been largely linked to the importance of the control of petroleum re-sources. Theories about the interactions between environment, resources, and conflict abound. They invoke various, often opposing relations: people fight because too many are competing for too few or degrading resources (Homer Dixon 1994, Diamond 2004) or, con-versely, because some groups have unfettered access to natural resources, which allows them to finance rebellions (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Journal of Conflict Resolution 2005). Lateral pressure theory postulates that expansion in population and greater use of natural re-sources leads to pressure on others and conflict (Choucri and North 1989). Such opposing views suggest that if a direct causal relationship between environment and conflict exists at all, it is complex and involves many factors (Gleditsch and Urdal 2002). The issue is nevertheless a crucial one. Climate change is already underway. Its effects are predicted to negatively affect production potential and resource availability in many regions of the world where conflict and poverty already take their toll (IPCC 2001). If environmental change combined with existing patterns of conflict and population pressure further degrade already fragile ecosystems, we can expect, in a Homer-Dixon world, widening spirals of vio-lence in the future. On the other hand, if conflict is driven by uncontrolled access to primary commodities, then environmental pressures on natural resources may also spur more con-frontations to secure shrinking resource pools. Both theoretical frameworks suggest a more hostile world in the future. In one, conflict arises from scarcity, in the other from abundance of natural resources. These conflicting views make policy design problematic. A closer exami-nation of the processes underlying each approach, however, reveals some common core factors that resolve the apparent contradictions and untangle the population-resource-institu-tions nexus. Many analyses emphasize one part of the puzzle. We can go back to the early and seminal work of Thomas Malthus to find a rigorous study of the link between population and resources. He proposed an interlocking economic-demographic system in which there is an incompatibility between the arithmetic increase in production (even taking into account changing technology) and the exponential growth of population. In his view, “passion” fueled population increase, reinforced by institutional mechanisms, such as the iron law of wages. Equilibrium is ultimately achieved through “positive checks” (mortality). Conflict is implicit in this framework as one of the ways mortality would be expressed. Abundance was never sus-tained in this system because it was rapidly dissipated through incentives to increase popula-tion in order to capture rising wages. Institutional factors leading to resource scarcities gained prominent attention through the “tra-gedy of the commons” argument put forward by Garrett Hardin (1968). He showed how the nature of property regimes directly influenced resource use and that some forms of collective

18 Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 19 MIT 20 Graduate Institute of International Studies and University Institute Kurt Bösch (IUKB)


69

management created incentives to dissipate the resource. He did not directly address the problem of conflict but showed that the positive feedbacks engendered by the absence of well-defined property rules would lead to scarcities. These could trigger desires to appro-priate or over-use resources at the expense of other groups or individuals. In other words, environmental scarcities do not necessarily lead to conflict, but the absence of an institutional structure that regulates these does. These various components of the population-resource-conflict relations are linked along several key dimensions:

1. Unregulated property structures create incentives to overuse natural resources (Hardin 1968).

2. Overuse of natural resources creates scarcities. This leads individuals or households who experience them to try to appropriate more resources for themselves by, among other things producing more children (Nerlove 1991, Dasgupta, 1995). The result is a po-pulation increase that further aggravates scarcities even more.

3. The absence of regulations and predetermined dispute resolution schemes, along with the scarcities, lead to incentives to appropriate resources by force. Armed conflicts ensue among rival bands whose leaders try to take advantage of the situation for themselves. This has been called the “Tragedy of Coercion” by Konrad and Skaperdas (1999).

A synthesis of these interactions constitutes a “Triple Tragedy of the Commons” which des-cribes the failure to achieve collectively optimal levels of population, resource use, and politi-cal power. We will first present the causal mechanisms of this tragedy within a empirical framework and examine which empirical research and dynamic simulations methods might shed some light on their on their historical evolution. We will then give some results as well as the theoretical basis of our investigations. We will then suggest some major directions for research into the question of the nexus between population resources and conflict. Basic question Our basic framework takes as its starting point the implications in Hardin's influential paper. In effect, Hardin identifies weak or absent regulatory frameworks as the source of environ-mental scarcities. In other words, what matters is not the degradation of the environment per se but the incentive structures that in the long run lead to an inferior social outcome. It is this outcome that is at the origin of the overuse of environmental resources. Hardin thought that the absence of a unique feature is at the root of the deterioration, namely the lack of a private property system. However, shortly after the publication of Hardin’s article, a vast empirical li-terature demonstrated that a balance between people and resources had been achieved in many parts of the world without recourse to private property structures (McCay and Acheson 1987). Moreover, Hardin had presented a “common sense” argument, limited to the very nar-row context of cattle herding on a meadow whose access is open to every one. This open access feature leads then to overgrazing. A formalized version of Hardin’s reasoning and a generalization of his approach were presented later by Dasgupta and Heal (1979). Their work shows that Hardin’s presentation is only a special case of a situation where individual incentives lead to socially inferior outcomes. They also insist upon the fact that many of these incentive structures do not permit the development of long term retaliation strategies such as tit for tat in Prisoner’s dilemma to help foster cooperation. So cooperating for the or-ganization of regulations often presents great difficulties. In order to understand the problem raised by Hardin, one must therefore look at the general question of how regulatory struc-tures such as property rights can be initiated. As suggested by Dasgupta and Heal’s analy-sis, some regulatory structures might not bring about optimal results. Some might be too res-trictive to permit innovation and development; others might be too loose and imprecise to protect natural resources. In both cases, and especially in the latter one, conflicts are likely to develop.


70

Some empirical evidence Several empirical analyses point in this direction. Anthony Cordesman’s analyses of the Middle East emphasize that the oil boom of the 1970’s exacerbated rather than diminished instabilities in the region. He points out that population increases in Middle Eastern countries erase economic gains made from selling oil.

Figure 1. Population projections for several Middle Eastern countries (Anthony Cordesman). He also points out that the productivity of oil producers has in general lagged behind the one of emerging industrialized nations in Asia and South East Asia in the 80s and 90s.

Figure 2. Middle Eastern states and their relatively low growth rates.


71

Several theoretical explanations might be called upon to explain these trends. First, we have the theory of the rentier state first stated by Tilly (1992) and then Herb (2003) which claims that if a government can depend on sources of revenue that does not depend on popular ap-proval it can get increasingly authoritarian and repressive thereby creating instability and conflict. Another explanation is given in terms of a crowding out hypothesis: Since natural re-sources are an abundant source of revenue, they use up most investments, crowding out other type of infrastructure and industrial outlays and thus lowering productivity. To these we might add another consideration that constitutes an explanation for demographic expansion in the region: The establishment of welfare payments based upon oil revenues to the popula-tion generates the impression that wealth is available to families and groups through the number of people who are eligible to government subsidies and that a limitless pool of reve-nue is up for grabs. These policies encourage families to produce children and thus keep the populations growing. The authoritarian natures of the regimes might also encourage this behavior because in the absence of institutional intermediaries and guarantees of rights power can only be in (family) numbers. This hypothesis has been explored by Rana Crevier (2005) in her master’s thesis and the statistical evidence she has assembled seems to be fairly convincing (her results are reproduced in the Appendix, p. 93). A closer analysis of the oil market itself undertaken by Nazli Choucri emphasizes the strange evolution that it can take: Most models missed the low price episode of the 1990’s where oil stayed at below 20$ a barrel:

Figure 3. Model projections of the price of oil versus real prices. This low price situation continued despite the fact that surplus capacities were rather low dur-ing the period as illustrated by the following graph:


72

Figure 4. Evolution of oil surplus capacity, 1970–2004. How can such strange characteristics be explained? Essentially also through mechanisms si-milar to the ones we have evoked so far. One of these is called the Chichilnisky effect (Chi-chilnisky 1994). Chichilnisky shows that if property rights are ill defined or in our case if infor-mation about the asset under consideration is unclear (which amounts to the same thing) it will take a while for supply to react to shrinking prices. In fact, initially, producers because of incomplete information about the size of the resource pool that they have will consider its availability only determined by extraction costs. The amount of the resource will essentially appear limitless. As a consequence, whenever the price of the resource shrinks, rather than limit its supply, they will try to make up for the loss of revenue resulting from the drop of its value by increasing production. This incentive is enhanced by the fact that obligations taken when the price of the resource was rising don’t go away. It will take excessive increases in demand to change this type of behavior. So initially when the price of oil goes down the net effect will be that producers will increase its supply even when surplus capacity is shrinking. This of course has a tendency to increase political instability as revenue surpluses will vanish for a prolonged period of time. Do we find this behavior in other areas? Similar tendencies can be observed in the general relationships between population growth and its associated demographic trends and re-sources and conflicts. In a first stage, strong demographic expansion would lead to political difficulties that in turn lead to autocratic regimes. In a second, these autocratic regimes would eventually collapse as the children produced by the demographic expansion reach adulthood and contribute to an excessive population density. The scarcities resulting from population pressure on resources could lead to civil strife, ultimately overturning the regime. Rwanda re-presents a case where such a sequence might have been at work. We will now report on our study of this empirical case. Rwanda has had a very difficult history of social and economic relations even before inde-pendence in 1962. In 1959 the Tutsi king of the country was overthrown by the majority Hutu group. Some of the Tutsi minority were then killed or forced into exile, mostly into Uganda where they formed The Rwandan Patriotic Front a revolutionary group bent on changing the existing order in Rwanda. At first they were not successful since the government of President Juvenal Habyarimana, was able to promote agriculture, the main economic activity of the


73

country through substantive extensions of the areas under cultivation at the expense of mar-shes, forests but also through the reoccupation of plots abandoned by segments of the flee-ing Tutsi population. Eventually this policy reached limits and was especially unsuccessful at checking population growth. Rwandan agriculture has always been prosperous thanks to fa-vorable climatic and ecological conditions. As noted by Prunier (1995), “the whole country looks to some degree like a gigantic garden, meticulously tended, almost manicured re-sembling21 more the Indonesian or Filipino paddy fields than the loose extensive agricultural pattern of many African landscapes”. The agricultural development strategies implemented by the government are worth studying since they bear a considerable responsibility in the scarcities that occurred from the mid-1980s onward. Indeed, caloric production per capita in-creased by 22% between 1965 and 1982, only to fall back to its 1960s level in the last de-cade of the century (André and Platteau, 1998). To the extent that the per capita production of food crops followed the same pattern (ibid.), one should really question the strategy set up by the Rwandese authorities. In particular, the relation linking the abundance of natural re-sources and the form of social and political controls it implied seems critical to understand the dramatic events that took place in 1994. We will mainly rely on André and Platteau’s (1998) comprehensive work on a highly densely populated area located in the Northwest part of the country which is among the most fertile and densely populated ones. Two aspects of the policies that were put into place stand out. First, the government’s strategy mainly pro-moted developing new land and decreasing fallow, resulting in increasing returns being based overwhelmingly on land extension (by clearing of forests and draining marshes). The limits to such a strategy were reached as population densities eventually converged across the country, as compared to the wide disparities that prevailed until recent times (André and Platteau, 1998). Moreover, the production technology remained highly traditional and faced severe problems of erosion and soil mining (due to the utilization of forested and pasture land for cultivation). The second aspect is the emphasis put on food self-sufficiency, illus-trated by the fact that the country’s per capita exports are among the lowest in the world (André and Platteau, 1998), proscribing the abandon of low yielding, traditional crops22. Thus, in the face of a sustained population growth of well over 3% per year, it is not so surprising that famines made reappearance by the late 1980s in several areas (André and Platteau, 1998). Indeed, the per hectare and per capita production started to fall by the early 1980s, as mentioned above. The indications one can get in the literature about land tenure are difficult to interpret. It seems that the main mode of land acquisition has constantly worked through inheritance (as expected in Sub-Saharan countries). The role of individual ownership and transmission from ascendant to descendant is not clear however. It seems that land was mostly, in accordance with custom, communally owned (Economic commission for Africa: 2004). Colonization seemed to have attempted to introduce landed property rights similar to the Western concept but limited here as in other sub-Saharan African countries in practice to European owners and big firms. As a reaction many post-colonial governments either abolished western style property rights altogether or exerted strict control over land tenure, which was in the case in Rwanda. Thus, well defined property rights were never established and the population was led to believe that the government and not individuals was a provider of land. In fact, in Rwanda, given official policies, the government was probably seen as the provider of land of last resort, especially if more could be appropriated from weaker minority groups. Given such expectations, demographic incentives worked in the wrong direction: the population was led to believe that the possibilities to cultivate land were limitless and thus more children were produced. In accordance with Demsetz’s ideas, a land market eventually developed when population growth and density led to land scarcities. Such a market has seen a rapid in-

21 The purpose of this short comment is not to go through the complex process which led to the geno-cide. It rather aims at highlighting the influence of land scarcities and population growth on the emer-gence of the conflict. 22 As emphasized by André and Platteau (1998), most studies focus on productivity issues while neg-lecting the social impacts of the commercialization of agriculture.


74

crease in activities in the area studied by André and Platteau.23 They report that although parcels of land cannot be sold under a critical threshold of two hectares, transactions in-creased substantially. This implied a wide set of consequences similar to what one would find in a black market: inequalities in access to land rose, conflicts among family members over inheritance increased dramatically, along with disputes over land. Worth noting is the fact that “many land parcels were sold under distress conditions and purchased by people with regular non agricultural income”(André and Platteau 1998: 28), which shows that those who did not have the possibility to earn additional sources of income fell in a sort of poverty trap: by selling their land they lost the ability to get out of poverty. In other words, this type of market was not really legal and was initiated much too late to check, at least in the short run, demographic expansion. In addition this black or grey form of buying and selling land implied the erosion of traditions and customary rules, because, as a good, it became independent of such notions. Thus, one can see that scarcities in resources have tended to magnify inequa-lities through (illegal) market operations. Rwanda has been characterized by a strong authoritarian tradition coupled with the clannish organization of power (Prunier, 1995). This pattern is really consistent with agrarian-types states, where the structure and exercise of power are determined by the possession of land. The key people surrounding president Habyarimana (whose assassination is considered to have set in motion the genocide) were all members of the same clan or belonged to the same region (Prunier, 1995). The organizers of the coup d’etat formed a small group belonging to the regime’s political, military and economic elite, who at a time had once been close to the president, and whose goal was to stop any form of democratization (Prunier, 1995). While they benefited from the involvement of the Presidential Guards - to the extent that it provided a highly organized group capable to target selected individuals and groupings - it is clear that the main agents of the genocide were the peasants themselves. As Prunier puts it, “their [the organizers] effi-ciency in carrying out the killings proves that these had been planned well in advance… but it would not have been enough had it not been for two other factors: the capacity to recruit fair-ly large numbers of people as actual killers and the moral support and approbation of a large segment – possibly a majority of the population”. Thus, the costs of organizing and sustain-ing an uprising had been considerably lowered by (1) the scarcities in land and opportunities of off-farm income and (2) discursive strategies that served to mobilize high numbers of poor, unemployed and uneducated young men without any perspective to inherit land. The capaci-ty of the state to address the demands for relief coming from the bottom of society was low since per capita GDP fell by 34% between the period 1986–1990 and 1994–98 whereas the price of food rose by 21,49% in 1994–98 (Gakusi and Mouzer, 2003). It should be noted that the prize coveted by the plotters was political power whereas peasants acted out of strong grievances: “all these people who were about to be killed had land and at times cows. And somebody had to get these lands and these cows after the owners’ death” (Prunier, 1995). Hence, the issue of ethnicity should be considered more as an instrument in the hands of de-cision-makers than a cause of the conflict. The underlying and ultimate reason is more likely to be found in the combination of resource scarcities and declining state power. Indeed, one should note that Hutu and Tutsi are not tribes but social groups inside the same culture (Pru-nier, 1995). This had allowed mixed marriages and prevented the separation of dwellings. Thus, people had lived together and side-by-side all the time. Furthermore, André and Plat-teau reveal that all the victims in their sample area were Hutus (since there were no Tutsis in the villages studied). The same can be said for Hutu opposition members (Prunier, 1995). The fact that “intra-ethnic” killings nevertheless took place is an indicator of the political (as opposed to ethnic) feature of the crisis.

23 One can reasonably generalize the findings of the study since the area under consideration, as one of the largest and most important, was particularly involved in the outburst of violence in 1994.


75

To summarize the scenario suggested by this historical narrative, we can say that the condi-tions setup at independence lead to expectations of increased land availability either through appropriations from minority groups or through gain from marsh draining and deforestation. As a result, birth rates exploded and a demographic expansion took place. These trends are illustrated in the following graphs. The first one shows the increase in available arable land as the Rwandan government cleared marshes and forests to expand the total area. However this expansion comes to an end in the late eighties and even a decline starts taking place in the early nineties.

Figure 5. Total arable land surface in Rwanda (source: World Bank). The demographic expansion is visible from the graphs below which show population in-crease as well as the persistence of a high population growth rate until 1994.

Figure 6. Population expansion in Rwanda, 1970–1995 (source: World Bank).


76

Figure 7. Population growth rate in Rwanda, 1970–1995 (source: World Bank). A last illustration of these trends can be presented in the form of the population density of ru-ral areas which also increases considerably from 1970 on.

Figure 8. Population density in rural areas, Rwanda, 1970–1995 (source: World Bank). Finally this whole evolution resulted in conflict which then degenerated into the genocide of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus which lasted from April to July 1994 and where between 500,000 and 800,000 people got killed. The progression of the genocide on the Tutsi side can be viewed in the following way:


77

Figure 9. Tutsi population and genocide, 1990–1994. The above graph (Figure 9) shows that about 500,000 Tutsis were killed. The genocide re-sulted in the paradoxical strengthening of the Tutsi army whose resolve as well as recruit-ment increased. This lead to a rout of the Rwanda Armed forces (Hutus) and a power seizure by the rebel Tutsi forces in the country in July 1994. Similar trends with a conflict (but not genocide) outcome can be observed in other regions of the world. An example of related developments can be found in Nepal. There, a rigid caste system reinforced by an authoritarian monarchy has prevailed after the waning of the British influence after 1947. Poorly defined property rights the growing perception of the illegitimacy of the caste system as well as the dismissal of landless workers or share croppers by big land owners led to a Maoist insurgency in 1996. This insurgency became sufficiently strong recently that the King after an increased attempt at authoritarianism had to engage in power sharing with its own parliament and in negotiations with the Maoists that led to a cease-fire. Here also a combination of population growth and shrinking land base seems to be at work.

Population growth

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Nepal Population growth (annual %) Population growth (annual %)

Figure 10. Population growth in Nepal. We can see here how population growth accelerates up until just before 1996 when the re-bellion starts and then diminishes only under the impact of the civil war. On the other hand,


78

arable land and agricultural land tend to stagnate in proportion to total land after an initial up-swing:

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

Permanent cropland (% of land area) Arable land (% of land area) Agricultural land (% of land area)

Figure 11. Agricultural land, arable land and permanent cropland evolution in Nepal, 1960–2003. As a result arable land per capita tends to decline sharply after 1975:

Arable land (ha per person)

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

0.12

0.14

0.16

0.18

0.2

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

Figure 12. Arable land in Nepal per capita, 1960–2004. Finally we see an increase in rural population density:


79

Rural population density (rural population per sq. km of arable land)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

Figure 13. Evolution in rural population density in Nepal, 1960–2004. These trends are then either accompanied or followed by conflict with a significant number of losses on both sides:

Number of victims killed (13.02.1996 - 08.10.2006)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

by State by Maoist Figure 14. Evolution of the number of people killed In Nepal as a result of civil war.


80

The question of analytical and predictive models How can such developments be described understood and represented with the help of pre-dictive models? As we hinted in the beginning of the paper, numerous theories have been developed to account for the relationships between natural resources, population expansion and conflict. There exists a well-developed literature about the “resource curse”, the negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. This literature is largely empirical, and only few of the contributing scholars do not only test for the negative impact of natural resources on growth, but do also inquire how natural resources can influence growth. Most of the pa-pers which treat particular relations focus on economic aspects such as the Dutch disease, which refers to the impact of natural resources on relative prices and on the terms of trade. Some articles, however, have found empirically that one reason why natural resources tend to decrease growth is the risk of conflict, political instability and poor institutional quality (see Baland and François, 2000; Gylfason, 2001; Ross (2001); Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003 Bulte et al., 2003). Only a handful of scholars have attempted yet to measure empirically the direct link between natural endowments and civil unrest. Most of these scholars have used a case-study ap-proach and have found that natural resources have been an important reason for conflict within a particular country (see for example, Frynas and Wood, 2001; Englebert and Ron, 2004; Angrist and Kugler, 2005). However, only very few cross-sectional country statistical studies have been performed so far. A notable exception is Ross (2004), who concludes that some natural resources like oil increase the risk of civil war, whereas the existence of other kinds of natural resources such as gemstones and drugs increases above all the length of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) conducted an econometric study about the likelihood of civil war and came to the conclusion, that the effect of natural resources on the risk and duration of ci-vil war is non-monotonic: “The possession of natural resources initially increases the duration and the risk of civil war but then reduces it. (…) In effect, possessing natural resources makes things worse, unless you have plenty of them. The effect is again quite strong. At the means of other variables, a country with the worst amount of natural resources has a proba-bility of war of 0.56 as against one without natural resources of only 0.12.” A few theoretical papers have attempted to explain why an endowment in natural resources can result in conflict. An interesting contribution by Skaperdas (2001)24shows, that a higher availability of rents from resource production leads to more competition among warlords, which ends eventually into more resources being wasted on unproductive arming and fight-ing. Furthermore, Skaperdas shows that rents from natural resources like oil, gas, timber or diamonds, or even foreign aid, can crowd out “ordinary” productive activities in an economy. Reuveny and Maxwell (2001) and also Grossman and Mendoza (2003) show through a dy-namic analysis that natural resources can lead to conflict. Another important consequence of the abundance of natural resources has been described by Tilly (1992): Political entrepreneurs or warlords are less dependent on tax revenues, if they operate within an area rich in natural resources. Because they can completely rely on rents and do not need tax revenues, they are not forced to seek consent, which is required for an operating taxation system. As a result, the democratization process, which has among others characterized Europe, does not take place in those countries. Even though all these papers provide interesting insights in the link between natural resour-ces and conflict, several important problems remain unsolved. This leads us to develop our own theoretical perspective and research questions. To show the existence of linkages bet-ween “the tragedy of the commons” evoked earlier, regulatory schemes and conflict, we will

24 For an alternative treatment see Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1996.


81

start by using the same conceptualization and formal analysis developed by Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and then apply, it with some significant modifications, to our central question. The Dasgupta and Heal theory is based on the simplifying assumption of the availability or production of two goods, one private and one collective within a socio-economic system. This could represent a political structure composed of a productive (private good) sector assuring subsistence and a government with an organization to defend and protect regulatory struc-tures. In this conception, private goods will exclusively affect the utilities (or preferences) of an individual purchaser/producer up to the amount that he consumes. Collective goods, how-ever, will influence the utility of that same individual not only up to the quantity he consumes but also up to the amount consumed by all other individuals of the group. Our analysis estab-lishes the importance of numbers of people in the creation of collective good providing coali-tions. More are necessary if the collective good is relatively expensive, fewer are needed if the collective good is cheap. However, there might be differential prices and thus costs within a society: A group might have cheaper access to collective goods than another which can lead to its domination. Moreover, if two or several groups have cheaper access to collective goods such as defense, armed conflict between them for the control of other resources might erupt. If such collective goods are still relatively expensive, then numbers matter and compe-titive recruitment efforts by each group will occur. Demographic processes play a major role in providing subpopulations from which recruitment efforts can be undertaken. We will now examine their evolution, their links with resources and their depletion, and then their impact. Demographic processes and resource depletion A population problem may occur on a particular delimited area when rates of population growth are overly high. For example, the growth rate of the sub-Saharan African region is between 2 and 3 percent per year, which should lead to a doubling of population in approximately 30 years (UN, 2004). Thus, this can be thought of as an increased pressure upon the environment’s carrying capacity, since land and resources cannot be expanded at will. Demographers and economists have shown that bargaining theory can be applied to re-productive decisions inside the household (Lestaeghe, 1986; Simon, 1986). Indeed, the costs of bearing and rearing children are not equally shared by men and women: pregnancy entails foregone work-capacity and an increased probability of dying. Besides, caring for children is time-consuming and imposes material restraints on the disposal of income. Fur-thermore, in region such as sub-Saharan Africa, one can expect “reproductive free-riding” on the part of men since the costs of rearing children can be spread (or shared) among kith and kin (Dasgupta, 1998). Dasgupta (1993 and 1998) provides two answers to the possible divergence between deci-sions at the level of the household that seem rational and their effect on society as a whole. The first is that households get the wrong incentives because of inefficiencies in the relative pricing of various goods and services. The second is that each household imposes negative externalities onto others. One source of externalities has been put forward in the previous comment on open access resources: because of lack of restrictions to entry, open access to the resource provides an incentive to produce too many children since parents do not have to fully bear the costs of rearing them. Another basis for externalities is simply the social en-vironment: individual behavior can be dictated by norms and culture. Societies may have ac-quired customs and mores that favor high fertility rates. Such norms stem traditionally from historic conditions involving high mortality rates, low population densities and high probabili-ties of war. However, they tend to survive as part of a community’s identity even when the ra-tionale for their existence has disappeared. In such circumstances, each household’s utility is a function of its own actions and of the average actions of all others, that is, as long as all households seem to respect the norm, no one has an incentive to move away from it. For ex-ample, sub-Saharan African fertility regimes seem to a large extent affected by customs like low age at marriage, polygyny, weak conjugal bonds and strong kinship support systems for children of the community (Lestaeghe, 1986). Moreover, such social arrangements favor


82

males who get a disproportional incentive to engender children since they only partially incur the costs of rearing them. The basic conclusion is that society as a whole can be stuck at a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium with households producing too many children (and knowing it) because no one has an incentive on its own to depart from this accepted pattern of behavior. As underlined by Dasgupta (1993), this is a typical coordination problem involving a multipli-city of Nash equilibria which can only be addressed through the regulatory activity of the state. One puzzling feature of the sub-Saharan African demographic regime is that fertility rates have only begun to react to declining mortality rates (UN, 2004). This can be explained by Dasgupta’s first hypothesis: children must be seen as goods providing various benefits to the household. Obviously, the first motivation for having children may be that they are an end in themselves. However, from the view point of their parents, children may be considered as productive assets: given the constraints on saving in rural areas, children represent a sort of insurance for their parents in their old age. This fact is even stronger when thinking about the availability of pensions for the elderly in such regions. More importantly, children in rural areas are viewed as an asset yielding an additional income. When agricultural output is low, energy and water prohibitively expensive (because of lack of basic infrastructures) and the possibility of investing in capital inexistent, people need to engage themselves in comple-mentary activities such as collecting wood, monitor cattle grazing or fetch water. Children are therefore essential as workers for the survival of their family. Clearly, a positive feedback sets in: to the extent that property rights are ill-defined, high fertility rates imply further stresses on the environmental-resource base, which in turn give incentives for expanding the family, which will increase the depletion of the resource. Hence, resource scarcity and deve-lopment are intrinsically related: investments in infrastructure in order to reduce, for example, the price associated to basic commodities such as fuel or water would decrease the value of children as income-earning assets. Similarly, increased savings and investment opportunities would lessen the need for children as a sort of insurance. Nevertheless, development prog-rams thought to assure growth and modernization can also exacerbate resource degradation to a large extent in the absence of clearly defined property rights. Indeed, we can stress with Dasgupta and Heal (1979) that no dominating strategy is avail-able to actors operating in an open-access type of situation. Thus, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is not an apt metaphor for such circumstances. However, one can clearly see that whereas no producer has a dominant strategy to keep on extracting more, no one can oppose a credible threat to prevent others from doing it. Hence, the behavior of actors in an open-access type situation is closer to that of players in a Chicken game (Luterbacher, 2001). The corollary of the absence of credible threats is the existence of an intense competition for the first move: the first mover enjoys a durable advantage over his opponent; this in turn yields a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where gains (or losses) are disproportionately distributed in favor of the first. Given the asymmetry at the equilibrium, it is extremely difficult to reach another out-come, thus patterns of behavior exhibiting strong inequalities can easily be maintained through long periods of time. Moreover, entitlements to the products in managed common-property systems across the globe have mostly been based on private holdings (McKean, 1992): such institutional arrangements tend therefore to replicate the inequalities in terms of wealth among participants at the level of resource use. Hence, even when access to a com-mon pool resource is restricted, it is likely to provide the privileged with greater parts of the benefits. To be sure, the asymmetry in resources and capabilities provides the latter with cre-dible threats when it comes to devise collective agreements to control the exploitation of the environmental base. Besides, one needs not to assume asymmetric players (e.g., elite vs. non-elite) to obtain a stable unequal distribution of benefits accruing from the exploitation of the resource: such agreements are easily supported by specific types of retaliatory strategies (Dasgupta, 2005). Moreover, as scarcities occur (the availability of arable land diminishes) the bargaining power of certain groups of population is altered by changes in relative prices: actors with few resources may put a premium on the short-term. Indeed, in such instances, small parcels of land may be sold to powerful landowners to obtain liquidities rapidly. Further-


83

more, as competition intensifies, it becomes perfectly rational for individuals to overexploit the commons in order not to be the last one without resources to tap (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). Thus, resource scarcities may lead on the one hand to overuse by their users, and on the other, to competition for appropriation between peasants and between peasants and landowners. Finally, the impact of the environmental resource-base’s depletion over custo-mary rules and norms needs to be considered as well: as land becomes a commodity through market operations, it ceases to be ruled by customary norms and restraints (André and Platteau, 1998). Actors are therefore more inclined to overexploitation and short-term calculations. This mechanism both illustrates and gives an answer to the paradox raised by examining the work of different authors concerning the relationships between environment and conflict: Scarcities and abundance of resources are in the short term part and parcel of the same dynamic. Overabundance exists because incentives are present for more resource appropriation even when the price of the resources plummets because the opportunity cost of labor is cheap compared to what can be gained by selling it. However, it is precisely this overexploitation that leads then eventually to scarcities and then to conflicts. Under these conditions, productive activities and economic transactions cannot reach their optimal levels either, because property rights are left unprotected or contracts are not enforced. All econo-mic activities will of course not stop under these conditions, but will be subjected to the pro-tective powers of private individuals, political entrepreneurs, warlords who are the only ones who can make sure that theirs and their clients’ property rights are respected and the cont-racts they have engaged in, enforced. However, instead of the rule of law, possibly enforced by courts governing transactions and productive activities, these will be subject to the arbitra-ry nature of decisions taken by political entrepreneurs and warlords or the results of armed confrontations between them. Three consequences can be deduced from the above considerations. First, if indeed no col-lective authority is able to impose itself and if competition amongst war lords dominates the political scene, each individual or household has an incentive to increase the number of indi-viduals that he can control since as previously noticed, this will allow him to grab more re-sources for himself. The incentive structure is thus set for a demographic increase. Second, since power relations rather than the rule of law dominate and no long term property protec-tion can be maintained, every natural resource appears to be of a fugitive nature: everybody tries to appropriate as much as possible of it today because tomorrow it might become some-body else’s. This leads then to the already discussed economic and thus environmental tra-gedy of the commons. Third, within a society dominated by warlords, the incentive structure tilts severely toward fighting either for one or the other political entrepreneur or for oneself. One can assume here that producing requires usually an investment which no matter how small necessitates a financial sacrifice in the form of a commitment in terms of forgone con-sumption to start with. On the other hand, fighting for a warlord usually leads to an immediate profit from the salary the fighter gets for joining and then from prospects in sharing in looting activities. Moreover, when a significant part of the population is engaged in fighting or war-lord activities, it becomes increasingly difficult to produce at least on an independent basis, since the product of your work is subject to looting and confiscation. Ultimately, only the acti-vities covered by the protection of the lord can still be carried out. These considerations illus-trate the fact that if a society works the way described above, two possible outcomes obtain. One outcome, if the society manages to establish an authority structure that imposes the rule of law and the protection of property rights leads then to a greater desirability of productive activities over fighting. If arbitrary appropriations are punished and if there is very little profita-bility in them, then most members of society will strive to acquire revenues by producing and fighting as a way to greater income and wealth will disappear. In addition the environment should be preserved and respected. However, if property rights and the rule of law are not accepted and protected and if warlord competition prevails, another (equilibrium) outcome will obtain. Here, fighting and a permanent struggle between warlords will be common. This particular outcome constitutes a “Fighting Warlords Trap” because getting out of it will be ve-ry difficult. The reason for this relative stability in fighting and appropriation can be under-stood in the following way: Even when the profitability of certain productive activities goes up,


84

their output can easily be appropriated and or “protected” and extorted by warlords which will then use these new revenues to finance their combat enterprises. Thus even if a centralized but weak state persists, it will not be able to collect the financial resources it needs. Only huge new profits and a systematic clamping down on warlord behavior can get a society out of the trap where environmental abuse contributes also to its persistence. Such an evolution out of a warlord dominated society even though difficult is by no means impossible as the example of China which used to be in the 1920’s and part of the 1930’s dominated by war-lords who controlled the opium production and trade. China, after many upheavals and tre-mendous setbacks25 is nowadays one of the fastest growing economies in the World. Research agenda The hypotheses behind all these considerations have to be examined empirically. We thus have to formulate a research agenda where the following have to be verified:

• Ill-defined property rights systems or “rentier” states with excessive dependence on natu-ral resources lead to excessive demographic expansions

• Ill-defined property rights lead to overuse of natural resources and then to conflicts Why? The following mechanisms have to be empirically tested: • A well defined property rights society is stable, if the present value of the future gains

from such a regime are more important than the commitment required in terms of the ini-tial investment to produce and the immediate gain of becoming a criminal

• If the expected gains of being honest are smaller than the immediate gains of being crimi-nal, people will become criminal, even in an initially peaceful and well ordered society. It only seems natural, that in initially stable and democratic societies in which people stay poor and have no real opportunities, even if they work hard, the risk of loosing the “social peace” is very high

• If the expected gains of being a producer are smaller than the immediate gains of being a fighter, people will become fighters and warlord societies will emerge

• Warlord societies will overuse natural resources even more so that they will get stuck for along time into a warlord- natural resource overuse trap

This research agenda can be summarized along the lines of the following society-population- conflict interactions scheme:

25 As a reminder, China lost about 30 % of its GDP during the Great leap forward and the Cultural re-volution and a population loss of several millions.


85

Figure 15. Possible links between natural and energy resources, population and conflict. All the above links will have to be analyzed and verified. Partial efforts Partial efforts along the lines suggested above have already been done or are being realized. We present here some of these attempts: Nazli Choucri is working on better simulating the oil market with the subsequent effects on political stability and international conflicts. She has also developed system dynamics models linking state’s resources and population expansion patterns to conflicts. Her latest research is described in Choucri, Electris, Goldsmith, Mistree, Madnick, Morrison, Siegel, and Sweitzer-Hamilton (2006) and in Wickblodt and Choucri (2006). Another kind of research along similar lines has been undertaken by Luterbacher, Rohner, Wiegandt and DiIorio (2006). It aims at constructing simulation models of the population resource conflict nexus especially in developing countries. This research is based on mathematical models of environmental, economic and demographic conditions which are then linked to conflict. Dynamic formulations of these models are based upon differential equation systems which are then simulated through time. The research has so far focused on the cases of Rwanda where the emphasis has been put on land resources and then on Nepal where the importance of water resources has been taken into consideration. While the Nepal case is still being investigated, preliminary results are available for the Rwanda case. Further above, we have presented the Rwanda case in a historical narrative and emphasized several trends which lead to a densification of the rural population and to a shrinking arable land base. Given these trends and the kinds of incentives that prevail, land resources are used up and even diminishing and a violent confrontation between two competing groups (roughly the Hutus and the Tutsis with all the caveats that have to be taken in these designations) which can be described in terms of Lanchester combat equations will start. The work evoked here is not the first one to use Lanchester relations to simulate the situation in Rwanda from about 1990 when fighting between (mostly) Tutsi rebels and (mostly) Hutu


86

Rwandan government troops26 intensifies to 1994 to 1995 when the Rwandan genocide took place27. In contrast to other attempts, our work relies on the considerations introduced by Deitchman (1962) in an article that tries to develop a theory of the application of the Lanchester relations to guerrilla warfare. In his theory of combat, Lanchester evoked the two already discussed notions of concentrated and dispersed fighting. Deitchman (1962) presents the strategic situation of guerrilla fighters in the following way: The guerrillas are usually dispersed over a territory which forces government or occupying forces to attack them in a dispersed way for instance by blanketing a whole region with search and destroy missions, artillery fire or even massive bombings. These were tactics used by American forces in Vietnam and also to some extent now in Iraq. Israeli forces use similar methods against the Palestinian armed groups. Guerrilla forces on the other hand can attack targeted governmental or occupying forces in a concentrated way which they do mostly by using ambushes. In addition, guerrilla fighters depend largely for the survival of their efforts, on the existence of a part of a population that supports them and provides with a base for recruitment purposes. There is thus a fundamental asymmetry between the guerrillas who fight in a concentrated way and the government or occupying troops that have to undertake dispersed combat operations. This situation has two important consequences. On the one hand, being forced to fight in a dispersed manner, government or occupying forces will inevitably hit civilians who have nothing to do with the guerrillas and exert some form of “collective punishments”. This will often turn the population that the guerrillas claim to represent even more against the government or the occupier28. Another way to weaken guerrilla forces is to shrink the fraction of the population that supports them through violent action up to and including genocide. Such behavior aims either at intimidating and scaring the population close to the rebels and eventually when the genocide stage is reached to diminish the size of the group who might join guerrilla forces. What might trigger such extreme actions? In our view essentially the fear that otherwise rebel groups will even get stronger and take power. We can thus establish the following assumptions for our combat and “Genocide” scenario:

1. The Rwanda situation can be described as a typical Deitchman guerrilla combat model where Tutsi rebels are dispersed but fight the government troops in a concentrated fa-shion through ambushes. They recruit from about 10% of the total Rwandan Tutsi popu-lation (estimated at about 650,000 in 1990 as opposed to 6,800,000 Hutus). Their initial size is estimated from various sources especially Jermann, Sanglard, and Weber in Kö-nig, Schössler and Stahel (1999) at 5,000 in the beginning of 1990. Government troops (mostly Hutus) are estimated at 40,000 and recruitment possibilities for them at about 100 men per week. Tutsi rebels can inflict much heavier losses on government troops than these can on them.

2. The following scenario may be envisaged from 1990 on, consistent with our earlier narra-tives: The resource crisis due to the overall population expansion leads the (Hutu based) government of President Juvenal Habyrimana to put more pressure on Tutsi controlled land. This leads to an increase in recruits for the Tutsi rebel army which grows rapidly in size. Given the heavy losses this force can inflict upon government troops, parity with the Hutu forces is reached at the end of 1992 and Tutsi fighters continue to deplete them and

26 We are perfectly aware of the fact that both the rebels and the victims of the Genocide included also so-called moderate Hutus, something that the literature we cite also point out. For the sake of conve-nience we will however refer to the rebels/victims as Tutsis and the government troops and killers as Hutus. 27 Work done by Jermann, Sanglard, and Weber and presented in the book edited by König, Schössler and Stahel (1999: 132-136), constitutes a first attempt to use this technique. However, their repre-sentation of the combat interaction is based on very ad hoc formulations driven by particular events which weaken the theoretical coherence of the Lanchester relations that they use without achieving a better rendition of actual events. Nevertheless their work is useful in providing an initial framework and some basic data. 28 On the other hand, if the population attributes the blame to the guerrillas, the government’s populari-ty could then increase.


87

achieve superiority. Maximum superiority is achieved for Tutsi forces in the spring of 1994. This can be considered in a way as a triggering event for the genocide of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus which begins in April 1994. In other words, it is assumed here that what triggers the genocide is a desperate attempt on the part of government forces to re-duce their differential with the Tutsi fighters. In that sense, the bombing of the Rwanda’s President Habyarimana’s plane on the 6th of April, the apparent triggering event mani-fested (whether it was due to Tutsis or extremist Hutus is still unclear) the weakness and loss of control at the top. This then called in the eyes of Hutu extremist and government forces for drastic action to reduce the recruitment base of the Tutsi fighters.

Based upon these assumptions, the following Lanchester type relations can be set up:

otherwisetutsifgovparifpar

pottpottr

pottgovparparpottpardt

dpott

partutsifpardt

dgov

tutsifgovparpottrpardt

dtutsif

00)8(16

1.0

765

43

21

<−==

−=

+−=

−=

29

where tusif stand for Tutsi fighters, gov for government forces, pott for Tutsi population, pottr for recruitment base from Tutsi population. par1….par8 represent various constant parameters. Three of these deserve further explanation, par4 represents the drafting of 100 people per week by the government army which was initially trained and supplied by French forces present in the country. par5 is the rate of increase of the Rwandan population which can be calculated form demographic data up to1994. par6 represents a logical (Boolean) variable with value 1 when the critical differential mentioned above in point 2, between government forces and Tutsi fighters is reached and 0 otherwise. This critical value has been estimated on empirical grounds at the point when Tutsi fighters are equivalent in numbers to 2.5 government forces. par6 represents in some sense the “Genocide” parameter. One can notice that the above differential equations constitute a “typical” Deitchman asym-metric form of the original Lanchester equations with reinforcements where the guerrilla (Tut-si) fighters are attacked by government troops in a dispersed way whereas Tutsi forces fight in a concentrated fashion. This relatively simple model gives then the following results ex-pressed in graphical form below:

29 This whole system was simulated with the help of the SPARE dynamic simulation package deve-loped at the Graduate Institute of International Studies.


88

Figure 16.

Figure 17. It has to be pointed out here that reliable combat data for Rwanda are extremely difficult to get. In particular, a monthly evolution of the number of fighters is practically impossible to evaluate. Nevertheless, the swiftness of the Tutsi rebel response after the start of the geno-cide suggest a relatively effective and superior military force to which allies from Uganda, Bu-rundi and the Congo might have contributed. This conclusion derives from our model and is represented in the Graph of Figure 2. One should also notice that the 2.5 superiority of the Tutsis which triggers the Genocide is close to a 3 to 1 ratio which traditional analyst link to a victorious outcome for the force that achieves it. Despite the Genocide (and maybe because of it) Tutsi superiority is still there at the end of 1994 explaining ultimate Tutsi victory and


89

conquest of power. Moreover the figures we arrive at for the Tutsi rebels (called Rwandan Patriotic Forces) by the beginning of 1994 are a little bit inferior to the post-civil war Rwandan Army mostly now populated by the former Tutsi insurgent forces (around 49,000). Some more reliable data exists only for the pace of the Genocide and its final magnitude of about 500,000 people. The Graph in Figure 3 represents what we can reproduce here solely with the help of our model and without any ad hoc assumption based upon exogenous fac-tors. However more empirical investigations will have to be carried out as more data be-comes available. Conclusions We have tried in this paper to show the importance of crucial institutional settings for the understanding of the nexus between energy, natural resources population and conflict. We have pointed out the plausibility of a scheme in which the political “tragedy” affects the eco-nomic “tragedy” through the negative impact of conflict on property rights protection, which can lead to overexploitation. The economic tragedy is enhanced by the “demographic trage-dy” which is also due to the absence of well defined property rights and contract enforce-ment. The economic “tragedy of the commons” influences the risk of conflict through the ex-ternality losses from resource extraction. As in the case of mineral resources such as dia-monds or oil the potential short-and medium-run gains of extraction are immense, but the ex-ternality losses are small because exclusion is possible. Such goods make it profitable for the elite to launch and then stick to a suboptimal authoritarian and sometimes “warlordism”-production method. This form of governance often leads to both internal and external forms of conflict. What can we conclude here in terms of the development of a research agenda? First, at the theoretical and conceptual levels we have developed a plausible framework that can easily be used for empirical investigations and that has the advantage of linking explicitly resource and energy situations and trends to economic and demographic processes related to conflict. Second, we emphasize the kind of data that we have used and that we need to conduct our analyses. Here we can point out some significant problems that await researchers who want to investigate the nexus of natural and energy resources population and conflict. Whereas demographic, economic, and even natural resource and energy data sets are by now widely available, the same is not true for conflict and political instability indicators. Data about the in-tensity and durations of civil disturbances are hard to get and are usually given in very rough forms with no more than level indicators (such as from 1 to 3). Data about sizes of opposing factions, their losses and the casualties they inflict upon one another are equally difficult to come by. Only in cases where conflicts have very dramatic consequences such as Rwanda and Nepal do we have numbers of losses through time and estimates of opposing armies sizes. The better conceptualization of the problems and the use of more sophisticated com-puter simulation methods constitute a tremendous help for the researcher. However many obstacles in terms of data availability and reliability still remain. A comprehensive research agenda and effort should help to overcome these. References (2005) Paradigm in Distress? Primary Commodities and Civil War, Special Issue. Journal of Conflict

Resolution 49(4). Amin Samir, (1978) Accumulation on a World Scale. New York: Monthly Review Press. André Catherine and Jean-Philippe Platteau (1998) “Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwan-

da Caught in the Malthusian Trap” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34: 1-47 Angrist Joshua and Adriana Kugler, (2005), “Rural Windfall or a New Resource Curse? Coca, Income

and Civil Conflict in Columbia”, NBER working paper 11219. Baland Jean-Marie and Patrick Francois, (2000), “Rent-Seeking and Resource Booms”, Journal of De-

velopment Economics 61: 527-42.


90

Barbier Edward, (2000), “The Economics of Tropical Deforestation and Land Use. What can we learn from Cross-country Analysis?”, Paper presented at the Second International Conference on Envi-ronment and Development, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Sep 2000.

Battalio, R. C., Kagel, J. H., and Jiranyakul, K.: (1990), “Testing Between Alternative Models of Choice Under Uncertainty: Some Initial Results,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 3:25-50.

Battalio, R. C., Kagel, J. H., and MacDonald, D. N.: (1985), “Animals’ Choices Over Uncertain Out-comes: Some Initial Experimental Results,” American Economic Review 75:597-613.

Binmore Ken, (1998), Game Theory and the Social Contract II: Just Playing, Cambridge (MA), The MIT Press.

Brander James A. and M. Scott Taylor (1998) “The Simple Economics of Easter Island: A Ricardo-Malthus Model of Renewable Resource Use,” The American Economic Review, 88, 1, 119-138.

Brunetti Aymo, Gregory Kisunko, and Beatrice Weder, (1997), “Institutions in Transition”, Washington, Worldbank, Working paper 1809.

Bulte Erwin, Richard Damania and Robert Deacon, (2003), “Resource Abundance, Poverty and Deve-lopment”, UC Santa Barbara Economics working paper series 1173.

Camerer, C. F. (1989), “An Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility Theories,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2:61-104.

Cardozo, Henrique Fernando and Enzo Faletto (1979) Dependencia y Desarollo en America Latina, Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno.

Chichilnisky Graciela (1994) “North -South Trade and the Global Environment,” The American Econo-mic Review, 84 (4): 851-874.

Coase Ronald (1960) “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics, 3:1-44. Collier Paul and Anke Hoeffler, (1998), “On Economic Causes of Civil War”, Oxford Economic Papers

50: 563-73. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler(2000) Greed and Grievance in Civil War. In World Bank Working Pa-

per Series. W. Bank, ed. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Copeland Brian R. and M. Scott Taylor (2004) “Trade, Tragedy, and The Commons”, Working Paper

10836 National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138 Conybeare John (1980) “International Organization and Property Rights,” International Organization,

34, 3:307-334. Cordesman, Anthony and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan (2006) The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the

Middle East, Washington DC.: Praeger and CSIS Choucri, N. and R.C. North. (1989). “Lateral Pressure in International Relations: Concept and Theory,”

in M. Midlarski editor, Handbook of War Studies: 289-326.Boston: Unwin Hyman. Choucri Nazli, Christi Electris, Daniel Goldsmith, Dinsha Mistree, Stuart E. Madnick, J. Bradley Morri-

son, Michael Siegel, and Margaret Sweitzer-Hamilton. (2006) “Understanding & Modeling State Stability: Exploiting System Dynamics,” MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4574-06.

Crevier Rana, (2005) Islam and Democracy: A Statistical Study of the Multiple Variables Influencing Democracy in Predominantly Islamic Countries. DEA Diploma Thesis, Graduate Institute of Inter-national Studies, Geneva.

Dacey, R. (1998) “Risk Attitude, Punishment, and the Intifada,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 16:77-88.

Dacey, R. and Gallant, K. (1997),“Crime Control and Harassment of the Innocent,” Journal of Criminal Justice 25:325-334.

Dasgupta, P. (1995) “The Population Problem: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of Economic Literature, 33: 1879-1902.

Dasgupta P. S. and G.M. Heal, (1979) Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Deacon Robert, (1999) “Deforestation and Ownership: Evidence from Historical Accounts and Contemporary Data”, Land Economics 75: 341-59.

Deitchman, S. J. “A Lanchester Model of Guerrilla Warfare,” Operations Research 10, 6: 818-827. Demsetz Harold (1967) “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” American Economic Review 57(2): 347-

359 Diamond Jared (1997) Guns, Germs, and Steel. New York: Random House. Diamond Jared (2004) Collapse: How Societies choose to Fail or Succeed, Penguin Books. Dupont Cédric and Carsten Hefeker, 2002, “Policy Trade-Offs and the Choice of International Institu-

tions: The Gold Standard and Beyond”, paper presented at a Conference on “The Political Econo-my of Globalization: Can the Past Inform the Present?”, Trinity College, Dublin, Aug. 2002.

Englebert Pierre and James Ron, (2004), “Primary commodities and war: Congo-Brazzaville's ambi-valent resource curse”, Comparative Politics 37: 61-82.

Fishburn, P. and Kochenberger, G.: (1979), “Two-Piece von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Functions”, Decision Sciences 10:503-518.


91

Friedman, M. and Savage, L. J.: (1948), “The Utility Analysis of Choices involving Risk,” Journal of Po-litical Economy 56:279-304.

Frynas Jedrzej and Geoffrey Wood, (2001), “Oil and war in Angola”, Review of African Political Econo-my 28: 587-606.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter and Henrik Urdal (2002) Ecoviolence? Links Between Population-Growth, Envi-ronmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict in Thomas Homer-Dixon's Work. Journal of International Affairs 56(1): 283-302.

Grigorian David and Albert Martinez, (2000), Industrial Growth and Quality of Institutions : What do (Transition) Economies have to Gain From the Rule of Law ?, Washington, World Bank.

Grossman Herschel (1991) “A General Model of Insurrections,” American Economic Review, 912-921. Grossman Herschel and Juan Mendoza, (2003), “Scarcity and appropriative competition”, European

Journal of Political Economy 19: 747-58. Gylfason, Thorvaldur, (2001), “Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development”, European

Economic Review 45: 847-59. Hardin Garrett (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 162: 1243-1248. Helpman E. and P. R. Krugman (1985) Market Structure and Foreign Trade. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT

Press. Herb Michael, (2003), “Taxation and Representation”, Studies in Comparative International

Development 38: 3-31. Hirshleifer, Jack (1983) “From Weakest Link to Best Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,”

Public Choice, 41: 371-386 Hirshleifer, Jack (1988) “The Analytics of Continuing Conflict,” Synthese 76:201-233 Hirshleifer, Jack (1989) “Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio vs. Difference Models of

Relative Success,” Public Choice 63: 101-112. Hirshleifer, Jack (1995) “Anarchy and its Breakdown,” Journal of Political Economy, 103, 11: 26-50. Homer-Dixon, T. (1994). “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases”, Inter-

national Security 19(1): 5-40. Jermann, Patrick, Hervé Sanglard and Benno Weber, (1999) “Simulating Future Wars” in Ernst F. Kö-

nig, Dietmar Schössler and Albert Stahel edit. Konflikte und Kriege, Simulationstechnik und Spiel-theorie, Zürich: VDF Hochschulverlag ETH: 115-138.

Johnson, Allen W. and Timothy Earle The Evolution of Human Societies, Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-versity Press 2000.

Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A.: (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions under Risk,” Eco-nometrica, 47:263-291.

Konrad Kai A. and Stergios Skaperdas (1997) The Market for Protection And The Origin of The State. Manuscript, Free University of Berlin and University of California, Irvine.

Kostitzin V.A. (1937) Biologie mathématique. Paris: Armand Colin. Lambelet Jean-Christian and Urs Luterbacher (1979) “Dynamics of Arms Races: Mutual Stimulation

vs. Self-Stimulation”, Journal of Peace Science, 4, 1: 49-66. Lanchester F. W. (1916) Aircraft in Warfare, The Dawn of the Fourth Arm. London: Constable. Lane Jan-Erik and Dominic Rohner, (2004)(, “Institution Building and Spillovers”, Swiss Political

Science Review 10: 77-90. Lestaeghe, R. (1986) “On the Adaptation of Sub-Saharan Systems of Reproduction”, in David Cole-

man and Roger Schofield (eds.), The State of Population Theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell: pp. 212-238.

Lotka Alfred J. (1925) Elements of Physical Biology, Baltimore: Williams. Luterbacher U. (1994) “International Cooperation: The Problem of the Commons and the Special Case

of the Antarctic Region,” Synthese, 100: 413-440. Luterbacher U. Political Rationalities East and West: Are there Fundamental Oppositions? Paper pre-

sented at the State of the Discipline Session on Conflict and Cooperation, IPSA XVIIth World Congress, Seoul, Korea 17–21 Aug 1997 to be published in: Political Science: The State of the Discipline Prof. William Zartman ed.

Luterbacher U. and C. Norrlof (1999) “The New Political Economy of Trading and its Institutional Con-sequences,” International Political Science Review 20, 4 : 341- 358.

McCay, Bonnie and James Acheson, eds.(1987) The Question of the Commons. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

McCormick Michael, (2002) Origins of the European Economy: Communications and Commerce, AD 300-900. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mearsheimer, John (1990) “Back to the Future,” International Security, 15:1: 5-56. Mendelson Robert, (1994), “Property Rights and Tropical Deforestation”, Oxford Economic Papers 46:

750-6.


92

Moulin Hervé (1982, Second Revised Edition 1986) Game Theory for the Social Sciences. New York, N.Y.: New York University Press.

Nerlove, Marc (1991) “Population and the Environment: a Parable of Firewood and Other Tales,” Ame-rican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 73, 4:1334-1347.

Netting Robert Mc. (1981) Balancing on an Alp, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Olson Mancur (1965) The Logic of Collective Action Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Olson Mancur (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations New Haven, CT: Yale university Press. Ostrom, Elinor (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.

New York: Cambridge University Press. Pierre Donald A. (1986) Optimization Theory with Applications. New York: Dover. Pigou A., (1920), The Economics of Welfare, London, MacMillan. Pistor Katharina, (2001), “Law as Determinant for Equity Market Development. The Experience of

Transition Economies”, in Murrel Peter (ed.), Assessing the Value of Law in Transition Economies, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, p. 249-87.

Posner Richard A., 1998, “Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development”, The World Bank Research Observer 13: 1-11.

Rapoport, Anatol (1956) “Some Game Theoretical Aspects of Parasitism and Symbiosis”, The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 18: 15-30.

Reuveny Rafael and John Maxwell, (2001), “Conflict and Renewable Resources”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 45: 719-42.

Rohner Dominic, (2005), “Beach Holiday in Bali or Eastern-Timor? Why Conflict Can Lead to Under- and Overexploitation of Natural Resources”, mimeo, University of Cambridge.

Ross Michael, (2001), “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”, World Politics 53: 325-61. Ross Michael, 2004, “What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?”, Journal of Peace

Research 41: 337-56. Sala-i-Martin Xavier and Arvind Subramanian, (2003), “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Il-

lustration from Nigeria”, NBER working paper 9804 Sandler Todd (1992) Collective Action: theory and Application. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan

Press. Schelling, Thomas (1971) The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2nd edition. Schelling, Thomas 1979 Micromotives and Macro-behavior. New York: Norton. Simon, J. (1986) Theory of Population and Economic Growth, Oxford: Basil Blackwell: pp. 1-42. Singer J. David and Melvin Small (1972) The Wages of War 1816–1965 New York: John Wiley. Skaperdas Stergios, (1992), “Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights”,

American Economic Review 82: 720-39. Skaperdas Stergios, (2001), Warlord Competition, Discussion Paper No. 2001/54, UNU World Institute

for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland. Skaperdas Stergios and Constantinos Syropoulos, (1996), “On the Effects of Insecure Property”, Ca-

nadian Journal of Economics 29: S622-S626. Stephens, D. W.: (1990), “Risk and Incomplete Information in Behavioral Ecology” in Elizabeth Cash-

dan, ed., Risk and Uncertainty in Tribal and Peasant Economies, Boulder, CO: Westview Stevenson Glenn G. (1991) Common Property Economics Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University

Press. Taylor, Michael (1987) The Possibility of Cooperation Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, Charles (1992) Coercion, Capital and European States Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Usher Dan (1989) “The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State,” American Economic Review, 79:

1031-1044. Volterra, Vito (1931) Leçons sur la théorie mathématique de la lutte pour la vie. Paris: Gauthier-Villars. Waltz K. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979. Wickboldt Anne-Katrin and Nazli Choucri, (2006) “Profiles of States as Fuzzy Sets: Methodological

Refinement of Lateral Pressure Theory” International Interactions, forthcoming Wiegandt, Ellen (1977). “Inheritance and Demography in the Swiss Alps”, Ethnohistory, 24,2. Wiegandt, Ellen (1979). The Alpine Village System: A Computer Simulation. Geneva: CRERI Occasio-

nal Paper. Wiegandt, Ellen (1980). Un village en transition, Ethnologica helvetica. Wiegandt, Ellen (2001) “Un cadre institutionnel pour habiter la montagne: le rôle des droits de proprié-

té dans la gestion de ressources en Valais”, Globe, 141. Yarbrough Beth and Robert Yarbrough, (1986), “Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic Hostages:

Self-Enforcing Agreements in International Trade”, International Studies Quarterly.


93

Appendix Regression for all countries that have a Moslem population (by Rana Crevier)

Model Summary

.849a .721 .511 .738Model1

R R SquareAdjustedR Square

Std. Error ofthe Estimate

Predictors: (Constant), unemployment rate FEMALE,gdp per capita (USD) 2003, total fertility rate,2000-2005, percetage of population that belongs toany islamic sect, school life expectancy (expected # ofyears of formal schooling)-FEMALES, PERCMEN

a.

ANOVAb

11.240 6 1.873 3.438 .055a

4.360 8 .54515.600 14

RegressionResidualTotal

Model1

Sum ofSquares df Mean Square F Sig.

Predictors: (Constant), unemployment rate FEMALE, gdp per capita (USD) 2003,total fertility rate, 2000-2005, percetage of population that belongs to any islamicsect, school life expectancy (expected # of years of formal schooling)-FEMALES,PERCMEN

a.

Dependent Variable: my freedom indexb.

Coefficientsa

14.557 6.124 2.377 .045

5.425E-02 .017 .885 3.275 .011

-.443 .139 -1.763 -3.186 .013

.795 .230 .925 3.461 .009

.501 .149 1.188 3.356 .010

1.426E-04 .000 1.211 2.437 .041

-4.19E-02 .027 -.295 -1.532 .164

(Constant)percetage of populationthat belongs to anyislamic sectPERCMENtotal fertility rate,2000-2005school life expectancy(expected # of years offormalschooling)-FEMALESgdp per capita (USD)2003unemployment rateFEMALE

Model1

B Std. Error

UnstandardizedCoefficients

Beta

StandardizedCoefficients

t Sig.

Dependent Variable: my freedom indexa.


94

Complex issues need comprehensive approaches – the case of

radioactive waste governance Thomas Flüeler30 Long-term waste issue and transferability Objective and institutional long-term dimensions in radioactive waste governance are asso-ciated with high uncertainties and a long-lasting process. Twenty years ago, the radioactive waste community was probably a forerunner in dealing with long-term, esp. foresight, issues. By way of half lives of radionuclides of 100s to millions of years, the objective dimension had to be, and was, recognised; it was even thought to be “solved” with final disposal in the deep geological underground. The institutional long-term dimension was perceived to merely con-sist of measures against human intrusion threatening waste isolation. In view of the setbacks of most programmes and the evolving state of the art, nowadays it is acknowledged that the safety “proof” of disposal facilities is far more complex than civil engineering and even geo-sciences. Dealing with complex sociotechnical systems – and long-term energy regimes are such – requires to acknowledge four basics: It 1. needs an integrated perspective. It is not sufficient to “solve” subtopics and to subse-

quently add them together; 2. is “transscientific” in nature. We are reminded of Weinberg’s dictum of 1972 that ques-

tions “which cannot be answered by science” are “trans-scientific” [1]; thus it 3. can only be decided on by society. This does not diminish the role of experts, science

and research – to the contrary, they are more challenged than ever in the sense that the issue

4. is transdisciplinary. Such research goes as far as “to make the change from research for society to research with society” [2].

The analysis of how to tackle the radioactive waste issue might allow for some clues with respect to other supposedly debated policy options in long-term energy-environment issues. In line with the ASRELEO objectives the emphasis lies on challenges with respect to Re-search and Development (R&D)31. Starting point Problems are defined by the perception of the difference between a final state (sought after) and an actual state (unwanted) [6][7]. Decision problems are well-structured if the decider is familiar with their initial state and the goal state as well as a defined set of transitions [8]. Funke defined complex problems as being intransparent, having multiple goals (called poly-tely), situational complexity, and time-delayed effects [9]. Environmental problems usually are complex and ill-structured or ill-defined [10][11]. In such situations decision research does not, up to this very date, offer a dominant paradigm but resorts to concepts and me-thods put forth by many scientific fields, like sociology, administrative sciences, political sciences, or psychology [12]. Cognitive strategies of participants, be they individuals or

30 Institute for Environmental Decisions, formerly Institute for Human-Environment Systems, Chair of Natural and Social Science Interface, ETH Zurich 31 The present contribution is based on Flüeler 2005a, 2005b and 2006 [3][4][5].


95

groups, may greatly differ [13]. “The optimum solution cannot be unambiguously determined. Only the relatively best of the solutions found can be detected” [14]. “Good” decisions are “good” in relation to the goals envisaged. Thus, the problem recognition and – indirectly – the goal discussion are important. Setting the problem(s) Dealing with a complex sociotechnical system such as the disposition of radioactive waste needs an integrated perspective. Much of the widespread blockage faced in this sensitive po-licy area may be ascribed to the neglect of looking at the various dimensions involved. This multidimensionality requires an appropriate reference system. Normatively, the principle of sustainability (incorporating protection as well as control [15]) seems to suggest itself, for two reasons. Firstly, it facilitates a stepwise analysis according to various dimensions: not only the triad of ecological, economical, and social but also temporal, spatial, technical, political, and ethical [16]. Secondly, it forces upon stakeholders, including decision makers, an exami-nation of these dimensions and, consequently, it is apt to incorporate all/most parties’ per-spectives, needs, targets/goals, and knowledge systems [17]. Long-term management of toxic waste epitomises some relevant distributional issues:

• Local cost and risk vs. general benefit (intragenerational equity issue); • Lay persons’ vs. experts’ perspectives (evidentiary equity); • Today’s vs. future generations (intergenerational equity). The long-term objective (ecological) dimension of highly toxic waste is of outstanding ethical relevance: The ones who make the profit (e. g., of energy of which waste is a result) most likely do not bear – possible – risks from the waste (Figure 1). The decisional situation is such that the current generations (we!) have to decide (postponement is also a decision), and: Apart of winners (this waste producing society) there will be losers (locals and future ge-nerations). This is a formidable risk-benefit asymmetry.

Figure 1. Radioactive waste governance has a long-term safety and a long-term project character. It has to be backed up by the technical community, the political decision makers and the general public over decades. While still benefiting from nuclear electricity we, at present, are “Generation 1” having to start implementing the respective programmes. Some duties – of monitoring, etc. – will have to be handed over to “Generation 2” (explored in Flüeler 2005b [4].). Information procedures and knowledge management play a pivotal role in success or failure of the undertaking (Source: Flüeler 2004 [18]).

Licence forpreparatory work

Time

Criteria: inventorydesign, procedure

NPPs Wastediscussion

Implementation Legacy?

benefit from nuclear electricity cost from nuclear waste

0 50y 100y 1000y 10000y ...

Siting

General licence

Construction licence

Operatinglicence

Closurelicence

Decommissioninglicence

Stateownership

??

Generation 0 Gen. 2 Generation 400Gen. 40Gen. 3

Operation

funding

?Generation 1


96

In addition to the difficulty of problem definition it has to be acknowledged with radioactive waste that it poses – in terms of the theory of decisions – a so-called “implicit problem”, i. e., it was caused by a preceding activity or decision (to utilise radioactive substances) and now constitutes a (factual) constraint. In so far it is “rational” to link the issue of radioactive waste with the operation of nuclear power reactors. The uneasy situation, however, also has to be accepted that research in this area – in whatever direction it goes – is “supportive” research, this term coined by the Swedish implementer SKB in their R&D endeavour to implement final disposal, mildly criticised as “supporting research” by the advisory board KASAM 1995 [19]. This underlying factual constraint determines the debate. Sundquist 2002, in an analysis of the Swedish case, calls it the “technological imperative” [20]. Squaring the circle? Fifty years ago, it was proposed to bury radioactive waste in deep geological formations [21][22] – a pioneering idea, bearing in mind that industrial waste, at that time, was usually dispersed and diluted. Thirty years ago, final disposal, without the intention of retrieval, was favoured – consistent with the insight to rely on natural and passive barriers, instead of insti-tutional barriers, due to the long toxic potential of radionuclides [23][24]. Twenty years ago, as to knowledge management the sole issue remained to preserve adequate information for future generations to keep them from inadvertently boring into the underground facility [25][26][27]. During the 1990s the technical community gradually realised that a “repository is, by defini-tion, a long term project, extending over centuries … or even much longer periods for reposi-tories in deep geological formations, receiving [high-level waste] with long lived radionuc-lides. A repository project involves a relatively long lead time (possibly more than 20 years for HLW or spent fuel) and is then anticipated to receive waste during several decades. After closing the repository, a surveillance and monitoring period will almost certainly be carried out even [sic!] for shallow land burial type repositories with [low- and intermediate-level waste]. This underlines once again the importance of the continuity factor not only from a contractual but also from a technical point of view (possibility/obligation to transfer/receive waste, waste acceptance criteria and quality of waste, control and monitoring, etc.). On the other hand, continuity is of equal importance for the proper functioning of the cost sharing ar-rangements and the respective payments” [28]. Still valid today, the “official” philosophy holds “… the disposal concept requires that the presence of waste may safely be forgotten, after a period of institutional control to prevent early inadvertent intrusion” [29]. Having said this, it, nevertheless, is by no means an advocacy of perpetual surveillance. For recent analyses of institutional monitoring of radioactive legacies in the USA demonstrate in frustrating openness: “It is now becoming clear that relatively few … DOE waste sites will be cleaned up to the point where they can be released for unrestricted use. ‘Long-term steward-ship’ (activities to protect human health and the environment from hazards that may remain at its sites after cessation of the remediation) will be required for over 100 of the 144 waste sites under DOE control …. The details of long-term stewardship planning are yet to be spe-cified, the adequacy of funding is not assured, and there is no convincing evidence that insti-tutional controls and other stewardship measures are reliable over the long term” [30]. Strohl was of the opinion in 1995 already: “… institutional instruments, although indispensable with regard to long-term safety, should only be considered as making a contribution of relative im-portance and of limited duration, and this must be made clear” [30]. The predicament is to find an adequate tradeoff between long-term passive safety with res-pective confidence in performance assessments and active control based on a suitable insti-tutional constancy, both to be decided by the present society, with due respect for the envi-ronment and societies to come.


97

Posing research questions Recognising the need to sustainably transfer information, rather: meaningful knowledge, to future generations, puts information and communication aspects to the forefront of radioac-tive waste governance. The exigent topics are listed in an arbitrary order32:

• Acknowledging the “factual” constraints, it is obvious to approach the engineering and na-tural-science community;

• Ethics: The field(s) of conflict can only be sufficiently diagnosed if the values and norms under scrutiny are reflected (passive safety – of whom and what, freedom of intervention – of whom and how long); societal responsibility, the “defender of the future” concept postulated long ago [33], and the natural environment as a stakeholder [34] are to be in-vestigated;

• Decision science: A systematic, coherent and stepwise yet flexible procedure with interim decisions seems to suggest itself, particularly after the many failure stories encountered;

• Science & Technology studies: Robust knowledge has to be generated, consistent along all dimensions and relevant types of expertise, and understandably transferred to our descendants; the specific potential of and challenges to inter- and transdisciplinary work are to be addressed;

• Political science: Among non-experts, including technicians, there is a razzle-dazzle of “consensus”, “compromise”, “dissent” [35], who should be, who could be involved, and how (identification of conflict resolution mechanisms and appraisal of dispute resolving techniques) [36][37];

• Resource economics: Depending on the perspective, spent fuel might be appraised as a resource pool (with valuable heavy metals eventually to be extracted) or as a “negative” resource (with high toxicity never to be touched). At any rate, there are interesting simila-rities to the “Drama of the Commons” to be examined [38][39][4];

• Cognitive sciences, semiotics and media theory: The premises and dynamics of (relev-ant) knowledge and (inter-)cultural competence are the bottom line of handing over the issue to next generations;

• Administrative science: In view of the manifold tasks over decades, institutional designs are of pivotal importance (composition and setting up of oversight bodies, control and monitoring; interplay of local to national and supranational regulatory regimes, etc.);

• Spatial planning and legal accountability: Dispute resolving techniques and regional de-velopment have to be integrated into robust legal and planning procedures with respec-tive process owners and guardians [4][5][40];

• Information and communication technology: Information and task-related/goal-oriented encultured knowledge, as shared and living memory, is to be built into dedicated institu-tions, maintained, understandably transferred and respectively documented in the long term;

• Comparative and cross-cutting studies: It is necessary, productive, and probably efficient, to make a critical layout of international research and expertise in related fields (e.g., the factors and lessons of nation building [41] and failing states [42], drama of the Commons, sustainability learning, intergenerational equity issues in social welfare and security; du-ties of memory [43], strategic environment assessments and other instruments, network-ing with a sound interplay of order and chaos) as well as case studies (e.g., failure and success cases, nuclear and conventional legacies, World Cultural Heritage [44]).

Outlook Our society’s success in credibly addressing intragenerational issues might convince future generations to be willing to carry on the programmes when needed. According to Arie Rip [44] a system, and thus respective knowledge, is “socially robust” if most arguments, evi-dence, social alignments, interests, and cultural values lead to a consistent option. There- 32 A respective array of research topics was suggested in Flüeler 2004/2005 [32].


98

fore, the concerned and deciding stakeholders have to achieve consent on some common in-terests, at least on three levels: the problem recognition, consensus on the main goals, and the procedural strategy (“rules of the game”) [4]. As to knowledge transfer, the challenge is to ensure a continual process so that the broadly consented goals can be understood, agreed to and followed by generations to come. It has become clear that the institutional aspects are more and more getting to be the linch-pin of the issue – and maybe to the solution:

• The long-lasting and entwined project character rests on the constancy of competent and trusted institutions;

• Society may only exert indirect control on such complex technological projects as the one at hand, via institutional paths [45][26][27][46]; the main quality check in science, at that, is institutional peer reviewing [47][48][49][50][51];

• The public appraises technologies, thus nuclear, as a whole, including the respective ins-titutions [52] and their achieved “degree of safety” as Vlek & Stallén [53] put it;

• The debate on risks is also a debate on democracy and progress, it is sparked off by the “controversy over the institutionalisation and regulation of the progress of technological knowledge” (Evers & Nowotny [54]); Kasperson and colleagues went so far as to coin the “risk crisis” to be truly an “institutional crisis” [55].

It is suggested to focus on expanding the procedural equity to link the next and after next ge-nerations, at least (equivalent to the time scale of ASRELEO), to our rationale and decision-making process. The institutional arrangements become so vital as to regard them as social-pool resources [56]. The broader the societal agreement on key issues is (e.g., what is the main goal of a prog-ramme, what are complementary goals? Where is consensus, where dissent, where compro-mise? How safe is safe enough? When shall monitoring be terminated, on what grounds?) the more valuable – “robust” – and useful is the social-pool, and, at that, also the technologi-cal, resource the future generations can draw from. References [1] A. M. Weinberg (1972): Science and trans-science. Minerva, Vol. 10, pp. 209-222, p. 209. [2] R. W. Scholz (2000): Mutual learning as a basic principle of transdisciplinarity”. In: R. W. Scholz

et al. (eds.), Transdisciplinarity: Joint problem-solving among science, technology and society. Proc. Intern. Transdisciplinarity 2000 Conference, Workbook II: Mutual learning sessions, Vol. 2. Haffmanns Sachbuch, Zürich, pp. 13-17, p. 13.

[3] Flüeler, T. (2005a): Long-term knowledge generation and transfer in radioactive waste govern-ance. Setting the scene. In: J. V. Carrasquero, F. Welsch, A. Oropeza, T. Flüeler & N. Callaos (eds.), Proc. PISTA 2005. The 3rd Intern. Conference on Politics and Information Systems: Tech-nologies and Applications. July 14–17, 2005, Orlando, Florida. International Institute of Informatics and Systemics, IIIS Copyright Manager, Orlando, FA, pp. 1-3.

[4] Flüeler, T. (2005b): Long-term knowledge generation and transfer in radioactive waste govern-ance. A framework in response to the “Future as an Enlarged Tragedy of the Commons”. In: J. V. Carrasquero, id., pp. 20-25.

[5] Flüeler, T. (2006): Decision making for complex socio-technical systems. Robustness from les-sons learned in long-term radioactive waste governance. Series Environment & Policy. Vol. 42. Springer, Dordrecht, NL.

[6] R. P. Abelson & A. Levi (1985):, “Decision making and decision theory”. In: G. Lindsey & E. Aron-son (eds.), Handbook of social psychology. Vol. 1. Theory and method. Lawrence Erlbaum, New York, pp. 231-309, p. 270.

[7] H. Mintzberg, D. Raisinghani & A. Théorêt (1976): The structure of ‘unstructured’ decision pro-cesses. Administrative Science Quarterly. Vol. 21, pp. 246-275, p. 253.

[8] K. R. MacCrimmon & R. N. Taylor (1976): Decision making and problem solving”. In: M. D. Dun-nette (ed.), Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology. Rand McNally, Chicago.


99

[9] J. Funke (1999): Solving complex problems: Exploration and control of complex systems. In: R. Sternberg & F. Frensch (eds.), Complex problem solving – principles and mechanisms. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 185-222.

[10] W. R. Reitman (1964): Heuristic decision procedures, open constraints, and the structure of ill-de-fined problems. In: W. M. Shelly II & G. L. Bryan (eds.), Human judgments and optimality. Wiley, New York.

[11] R. W. Scholz, & O. Tietje (2002): Embedded case study methods. Integrating quantitative and qualitative knowledge. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, p. 253.

[12] R. P. Abelson & A. Levi, in [6], p. 269. [13] R. Fernandes & H. A. Simon (1999): A study of how individuals solve complex and ill-structured

problems. Policy Sciences. Vol. 32, pp. 225-245. [14] A. Ninck et al. (1997): Systemik. Integrales Denken, Konzipieren und Realisieren. Verlag Indus-

trielle Organisation, Orell Füssli, Zurich, p. 128. [15] World Commission on Environment and Development (1987): Our common future. Brundtland re-

port. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, p. 46. [16] T. Flüeler (2001): Options in radioactive waste management revisited: A framework for robust de-

cision-making. Risk Analysis. Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 787-799, p. 790. [17] T. Flüeler & R.W. Scholz (2004): Socio-technical knowledge for robust decision making in radioac-

tive waste governance. Risk, Decision and Policy. Vol. 9, Issue 2, pp. 129-159. [18] T. Flüeler (2004): Long-term radioactive waste management: Challenges and approaches to regu-

latory decision making. In: C. Spitzer, U. Schmocker & V. N. Dang (eds.), Probabilistic safety as-sessment and management 2004. PSAM 7 – ESREL '04. Berlin, June 14–18, Vol. 5. Springer, London, pp. 2591-2596, p. 2593.

[19] KASAM (1996): Nuclear waste. Disposal technology and site selection. KASAM’s review of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co’s (SKB’s) RD&D Programme 95. SOU 1996:101. The Printing Works of the Cabinet Office and Ministries, Stockholm, pp. 59-60.

[20] G. Sundqvist (2002): The bedrock of opinion. Science, technology and society in the siting of high-level nuclear waste. Series Environment & Policy. Vol. 32. Kluwer, Dordrecht, NL, p. 222.

[21] L. P. Hatch (1953): Ultimate disposal of radioactive waste. American Scientist. Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 410-421.

[22] US National Academy of Sciences, NAS (1957): The disposal of radioactive waste on land. Report of the committee on waste disposal of the division of earth sciences. NAS, Washington, DC.

[23] US Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), source: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1976-3-27.

[24] Nuclear Energy Agency, NEA (1977): Objectives, concepts and strategies for the management of radioactive waste arising from nuclear power programmes. Report by a Group of Experts. OECD, Paris.

[25] M. F. Kaplan (1982): Archaeological data as a basis for repository marker design. BMI/ONWI-354. Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation (ONWI). Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, OH.

[26] T. Sebeok (1984): Communication measures to bridge ten millennia. BMI/ONWI-532. Battelle, Co-lumbus, OH.

[27] P. H. Tannenbaum (1984): Communication across 300 generations: deterring human interference with waste deposit sites. BMI/ONWI-535. Battelle, Columbus, OH.

[28] International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA (1995): Technical, institutional and economic factors important for developing a multinational radioactive waste repository. TECDOC-1021. IAEA, Vien-na, p. 9.

[29] NEA (1995): The management of long-lived radioactive waste. The environmental and ethical ba-sis of geological disposal of long-lived radioactive wastes. a collective opinion of the Radioactive Waste Management Committee. OECD, Paris, p. 20.

[30] US NAS Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources (2000): Long-term institutio-nal management of U.S. Department of Energy legacy waste sites. NAS, Washington, DC, p. 2.

[31] P. Strohl (1995): Notes sur l’information du public relative aux aspects institutionels de la gestion des déchets radioactifs. In: NEA, Informing the public about radioactive waste management. Proc. of an NEA Intern. Seminar, Rauma, Finland, 13–15 June. OECD, Paris, pp. 125-131, p. 127.

[32] T. Flüeler (2005): Von der Fachöffentlichkeit zum öffentlichen Diskurs. Schweizer Erfahrungen und Ansätze zu einem erweiterten Entscheidungsmodell [From scientific community to public dis-course. Swiss experience and approaches to an extended decision-making model]. In: P. Hocke & A. Grunwald (eds.): Wohin mit dem radioaktiven Abfall? Perspektiven für eine sozialwissenschaft-liche Endlagerforschung. Gesellschaft – Technik – Umwelt. Neue Folge, Vol. 8. edition sigma, Berlin, pp. 219-237. (ITAS Workshop “Zur Endlagerung radioaktiver Abfälle in Deutschland. Per-spektiven für eine sozialwissenschaftliche Begleitforschung”. Karlsruhe, Oct 28/29. Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS), Karlsruhe Research Center, Karlsruhe)


100

[33] R. E. Kasperson, P. Derr & R. W. Kates (1983): Confronting equity in radioactive waste manage-ment: modest proposals for a socially just and acceptable program. In: R. Kasperson (ed.), Equity issues in radioactive waste management. Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Cambridge, MA, pp. 331-368, 366.

[34] D. Bazin & J. Ballet (2004): Corporate social responsibility: the natural environment as a stakehol-der?”. Intern. Journal of Sustainable Development. Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 59-75.

[35] T. Flüeler, in [5]. [36] Flüeler, T., P. Krütli & M. Stauffacher (2005): Tools for local stakeholders in radioactive waste go-

vernance: Challenges and benefits of selected Participatory Technology Assessment techniques.. EU STREP Community Waste Management COWAM 2, Work Package 1: Implementing Local Democracy and Participatory Assessment Methods www.cowam.org/final/docs/pdf_Cowam_2_-WP1_PTA-1_Tools_LONG_version.pdf (accessed on 2007-7-30).

[37] Krütli, P., M. Stauffacher, T. Flüeler & R. W. Scholz (2006): Public involvement in repository site selection for nuclear waste: a dynamic view. In: K. Andersson (ed.): VALDOR 2006 – VALues in Decisions On Risk. Proceedings. Stockholm, May 14–18, 2006. SKI, Naturvardsverket, SGI, For-mas, UK Nirex, OECD/NEA. Congrex Sweden AB, Stockholm, pp. 96-105.

[38] E. Ostrom (1990): Governing the Commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.

[39] National Research Council (2002): The drama of the Commons. Committee on the Human Dimen-sions of Global Change. E. Ostrom, T. Dietz et al. (eds.). National Academy Press, Washington, DC.

[40] M. Bovy & V. Massaut (2005): Why a transparent information support helps democracy: an open common-knowledge process about decommissioning funds. In: J. V. Carrasquero, id., pp. 4-11.

[41] F. Fukuyama (2004): State-building: governance and world order in the 21st century. Cornell Univ. Press, New York.

[42] D. C. Esty et al. (1998): The state failure project: early warning research for US foreign policy planning. In: J. L. Davies & T. R. Gurr (eds.), Preventive measures: building risk assessment and crisis early warning systems. Rowman and Littlefield, Boulder, CO.

[43] A. Margalit (2003): The ethics of memory. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA. [44] G. Hériard-Dubreuil, S. Gadbois, C. Schieber & T. Schneider (2002): Réflexions sur les critères de

performance d’un entreposage de longue durée (ELD) vis-à-vis des situations d’oubli ou de dé-laissement temporaire. Rapport final. Etude Mutadis-CEPN. CEA Contract. Mutadis, CEPN, Paris.

[44] A. Rip (1987): Controversies as Informal Technology Assessment”. Knowledge: Creation, Diffu-sion, Utilization. Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 349-371, p. 359.

[45] R. Kasperson, C. Hohenemser, J. X. Kasperson & R. W. Kates (1982): Institutional responses to different perceptions of risk. In: D. L. Sills, C. P. Wolf & V. B. Shelanski (eds.), Accident at Three Mile Island: the human dimensions. Westview Press, Boulder, CO, pp. 39-46.

[46] M. Buser (1997): Guardianship versus disposal: a modern-day conflict with implications for the fu-ture. nagra bulletin, No. 30, pp. 24-32.

[47] B. Fischhoff (1977): Cost benefit analysis and the art of motorcycle maintenance. Policy Sciences. Vol. 8, pp. 177-202.

[48] K. Thomas, E. Swaton, M. Fishbein & H. J. Otway (1980): Nuclear energy: the accuracy of policy makers' perceptions of public beliefs. Behavioral Science, Vol. 25, pp. 332-344.

[49] S. Jasanoff (1985): Peer review in the regulatory process. Science, Technology & Human Values. Vol. 10, Issue 3, pp. 20-32.

[50] L. Högberg (1997): Closing session. Summary and conclusions. Regulating the long-term safety of radioactive waste disposal. NEA Intern. Workshop, Córdoba, 20–23 Jan., Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, Madrid.

[51] R. D. Wilmot, D. A. Galson & B. G. J. Thompson (1998): Management of safety assessments. Lessons learned from national projects. 8th Intern. Conference on High-level Radioactive Waste Management, Las Vegas. American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, IL, pp. 838-840.

[52] B. Wynne (1983): Technologie, Risiko und Partizipation: Zum gesellschaftlichen Umgang mit Unsi-cherheit. In: J. Conrad (ed.), Gesellschaft, Technik und Risikopolitik. Springer, Berlin, pp. 156-187.

[53] C. Vlek & P.-J. Stallén (1981): Judging risks and benefits in the small and in the large. Organiza-tional Behavior and Human Performance. Vol. 28, pp. 235-271.

[54] A. Evers & H. Nowotny (1989): Über den Umgang mit Unsicherheit. Die Entdeckung der Gestalt-barkeit von Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., p. 247.

[55] R. E. Kasperson, D. Golding & S. Tuler (1992): Social distrust as a factor in siting hazardous facili-ties and communicating risks. Social Issues. Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 161-187.

[56] M. Gelobter (2001): Integrating scale and social justice in the Commons. In: J. Burger et al., Pro-tecting the Commons. A framework for resource management in the Americas. Island Press, Wa-shington, DC, pp. 293-326.


101

Towards integration of methodologies for assessing and promoting

the societal embedding of energy innovations Geert Verbong, Ruth Mourik & Rob Raven33 Abstract The necessity for system innovation is well acknowledged, but inducing system change proves to be very difficult. Three approaches have been developed for analysing and sup-porting radical innovations: Socrobust, Create Acceptance and Strategic Niche Management. This paper gives an overview of these complementary approaches and their theoretical back-ground. The paper also identifies several potential contributions for social scientists to contri-bute to energy research and the implementation of more sustainable alternatives. 1. Introduction: transitions and long-term development patterns It is obvious that our energy system, based on fossil fuels, is not sustainable in the long term. Although the necessity for system innovation – i.e., a transition to a more sustainable system – is generally acknowledged and several alternative technologies are available (renewables), it proves to be very difficult to change the incumbent system. Literature from Innovations Stu-dies and from the Science & Technology Studies (STS) field suggests that inducing system change proves difficult for all (potential) radical innovations, but in the case of the energy system this is in particular hard, because it involves collective goods and large vested inter-ests in infrastructures and energy plants. To understand the difficulties of promising technologies to breakthrough or, complementary, to explain the stability of the dominant system, STS and innovation scholars have developed a Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) on innovations. The essential point of this MLP is that deve-lopments can only be understood as the outcome of multiple interactions and co-evolutionary processes between the various levels (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels 2002). The multi-level perspective distinguishes three analytical levels: a micro- of niches, a meso- of socio-technical regimes and the macro-level of the socio-technical landscape. The central level in understanding the resistance to structural change is the meso-level or the socio-tech-nical regime. This level accounts for the stability of the existing technical system. The regime consists of three interlinked elements: (1) a network of actors and social groups, which deve-lops over time; (2) the set of formal and informal rules that guide the activities of actors who reproduce and maintain the elements of the socio-technical system and (3) the material and technical elements (Geels 2004). For example, the dominant actors in the energy regime are utilities, oil companies, the government, large industrial users and households. The micro-le-vel is formed by technological and market niches that form the locus for the emergence of new technologies (Schot, 1998; Kemp et al., 1998). Such niches are formed by relatively small networks of actors who are willing to invest time and resources in the development of novelties. The networks are usually heterogeneous, made up of universities, public authori-ties, entrepreneurial firms, but also large firms. Niches act as ‘incubation rooms’ for radical novelties, shielding them from mainstream market selection. New technologies need such protection, because they have initially low performance and high price. Much work is needed to improve new technologies, leading to a stable and robust design. Technological niches then can enter the market. The macro-level is the socio-technical landscape, forming an exo-genous environment that influences developments in niches and regimes. The metaphor

33 All Eindhoven Technical University and Energy research centre of the Netherlands (ECN).


102

‘landscape’ is used because of the literal connotation of relative ‘hardness’ and to include the material aspect of society, e.g., the material and spatial arrangements of cities, factories, highways, and electricity infrastructures. Niches and regimes develop against the back-ground of external developments in this landscape, but the landscape is beyond the direct in-fluence of actors, and cannot be changed at will. Material environments, shared cultural be-liefs, symbols and values are hard to deviate from. The socio-technical landscape therefore usually changes slowly, e.g., through demographic, macro-economics and cultural changes (Geels 2004). Fluctuations in global oil prices are an example of such a landscape develop-ments with a major impact on the incumbent energy regime and the more sustainable alter-natives.

TimeTime

Landscape developments put pressure on existing regime, which opens up, creating windows of opportunity for novelties

Socio-technical regime is ‘dynamically stable’.On different dimensions there are ongoing processes

New configuration breaks through, takingadvantage of ‘windows of opportunity’. Adjustments occur in socio-technical regime.

Elements are gradually linked together,and stabilise in a dominant design.Internal momentum increases.

Small networks of actors support novelties on the basis of expectations and future visions.Learning processes take place on multiple dimensions.Different elements are gradually linked together in a seamless web.

New socio-technicalregime influences landscape

Technologicalniches

Socio-technical’landscape

Socio-technicalregime

Technology

Markets, user preferences

CulturePolicy

ScienceIndustry

External influences on niches(via expectations and networks)

Figure 1. Dynamic representation of the three levels in the multi-level perspective (Geels, 2005). In the early MLP literature the main route to a regime shift is by substitution. A technological niche develops into a small market niche by processes of up scaling or branching to new ap-plication domains and it gradually takes over from the incumbent regime. Of course land-scape pressure and regime instability creating ‘windows of opportunities’ are essential, but still this process can be represented by the well-known S-curve. However, in particular for systemic technologies, e.g., the electricity system or infrastructural technologies, a substitu-tion route is not a very obvious one, because of the complexity and the interrelatedness of the components of the system. Geels and Schot argue therefore that there are more transi-tion routes or pathways, including a transformation, a reconfiguration and a de-alignment/re-alignment route. These pathways differ in combinations of timing (of landscape pressures) and nature of the multi-level interactions, e.g., on the role of regime actors and outsiders or between economic and social mechanisms (Geels and Schot, forthcoming). From a policy perspective there are several options to encourage the development of sus-tainable technologies. One way is to increase pressure on the regime, e.g., technology forc-ing by strict environmental legislation, or by using the opportunities offered by more general


103

trends, a modulation approach. Another way is to stimulate the creation of niches by support-ing the development of new technological innovations. This is the most common strategy, but unfortunately these efforts are characterised in general by a strong technology push ap-proach. This results in a large variety of promising technological options, but most technolo-gies never fulfil their promise because not enough attention is paid to the implementation process and to the societal embedding of new technologies. Experimenting with innovations in real life circumstances offers a perspective to the tackle these problems. This is one of the areas where the ASRELEO-initiative can offer a significant contribution and is also the focus of this paper. 2. Transitions and the role of experiments Innovation studies often focus either on the R&D phase or on the diffusion phase. However, there is also an important phase in the innovation trajectory when the innovations leave the laboratory but are not yet ready for entering the market. This is the phase of societal experi-ments. These experiments have to provide insight in the potential of an innovation both in terms of performance and functionality. From an evolutionary perspective societal experi-ments form a nexus between the variation and selection environment. A nexus is a delibe-rately created link for learning about the potential of an innovation by exposing it to a more or less controlled selection market environment. It allows users, policy makers or special-inter-est groups to give feedback to technology developers (Schot 1992). Societal experiments therefore are about learning and creating support for a new innovation. Often innovations fail because of a neglect of this phase or because an exclusive focus on the technological as-pects. This phase therefore is crucial for a successful implementation. This applies in particu-lar for systemic technologies that have a very long trajectory or incubation period, e.g., most energy technologies. According to Hoogma there are several types of experiments, displaying increasing know-ledge about the innovation (Hoogma 2000):

• Explorative experiments; in this early phase learning about potential and impacts of an in-novation takes central stage.

• Pilot experiments. The focus here is on raising more general awareness about applica-tions, feasibility and acceptability by testing in other locations/environments

• Demonstration projects. The essential point is here to demonstrate to potential adopters what the innovation has to offer

• Replication or dissemination experiments. This type of experiments aims at the imple-mentation/diffusion of the innovation by replicating successful earlier experiments (Hoog-ma 2000).

Recent work on the development of niches shows a change in focus from single to multiple projects or experiments (Geels and Raven 2006). This work stresses the importance of a dis-tinction between the local level of concrete projects or experiments and a more global niche-level. The local level consists of the actors that are directly involved in experiment, while the niche level is carried by an emerging field or community. Another characterisation of this dis-tinction between the local and d global in cognitive terms distinguishes between local know-ledge with variability (skills, hands-on-experiences) and more global, abstract, generic know-ledge that is shared within a community. The transformation of local outcomes into generic lessons and knowledge does not occur automatically, but requires dedicated ‘aggregation activities’ (Geels and Raven 2006; Deuten 2003). The niche itself develops against the back-ground of one or multiple regimes. Raven (2005) demonstrates the importance of niche-re-gime interactions for the development of the biomass niche in the Netherlands. A related aspect concerns the societal embedding of (potential) radical innovations. The diffi-culty to change the incumbent system through (potential) radical innovations has to do with a recurrent assumption held by technology developers and policy makers. These often assume that having secured the techno-economic dimension of innovations would be enough for its


104

adoption and diffusion. In practice many energy projects (including wind, bio energy, and hy-drogen) face severe resistance from various stakeholders including actors that are not direct users of the technology. This phenomenon classically labelled as resistance to change has been extensively studied by scholars from Science & Technology studies (STS) and shown to be closely associated with the societal transformation/impact often associated with the technologies, and the sometimes conflicting visions about their consequences and desirable path to follow among different stakeholders. Cases in which such conflicts are emerging have been shown to be conductive to important management problems, in particular when conflicting visions are neglected in the early phase of innovation. The approaches presented here will also address this issue. 3. Approaches to system innovation through radical innovation This section discusses three approaches in which socio-technical experiments play an im-portant role. The following table summarizes the main differences and complementarities. Each approach will be discussed more in depth in the following sub sections.

Socrobust Create Acceptance SNM Type of tool Consultancy tool Consultancy tool Research tool

Consultancy tool Type of activity Ex post evaluation and

monitoring of project management

Ex post evaluation, monitoring

Ex ante strategic market entry

Societal acceptance management

Mainly ex post evaluation

Unit of Analysis R&D project

Single innovation

Pilot project

Program/innovative system

Niches (a series of projects)

Type of innovation Technological and social

Technological (and social)

Technological (and policy)

Phase of innovation

R&D Demonstration Demonstration

Targeted users Innovators

Project managers

Innovators

Project managers

Program managers

All relevant stakeholders

Programme managers

Innovation researchers

Aim Reflective development practice

Diffusion of innovation

Reflective development practice

Method/instrument Vision forming

Learning about non-technological issues

Extending network

Enhancing network alignment

Vision forming


Extending network


Articulation of expectations


Extending network


Enhancing (governmental) protection

Theoretical foundation

STS, in particular Actor-Network theories Project management literature

STS Transition theories

Evolutionary theories Sociology of technology Constructive technology Assessment Transition theories


105

3.1 Socrobust: An introduction

Socrobust is a method developed in 2002 by STS researchers as a support tool for technolo-gy developers and project managers dealing with breakthrough innovations – i.e., innova-tions that potentially raise problems of acceptance as they change existing practices in socie-ty (Laredo et al., 2002). These STS researchers had observed that many technological pro-jects fail due to inappropriate consideration of the societal diffusion side of innovations. Soc-robust was composed as a tool-kit and a protocol for interaction with project managers to help these managers anticipate future consumers and societal reactions to the innovation. 20 years of STS literature was incorporated into an exploratory method for anticipating future stakeholders reactions to innovation. It was then first tested against 8 European small busi-ness innovation projects in areas such as micro-CHP and telemedicine. Socrobust is a tool that is developed with a single stakeholder perspective: the innovator, that aims to allow for a better management of the societal dimension of technological projects. The instrument con-sists of four steps and several instruments (Figure 2) that will be discussed briefly below. All information about these steps is taken from (Jolivet, E. Mourik, R.M. et al., 2006).

Figure 2. The Socrobust process (source: Laredo et al., 2002). Step 1: Project story

The first step focuses on identifying the technological, economic actors and factors involved in the project: the Techno-Economic Network (TEN) as a basis for assessing the project’s current social robustness. Two instruments are used for this purpose. The narrative and the critical moments table. The narrative is a chronological story starting with the start of the project until the present and the identification of the critical moments that occurred which led to a “shift” in orientation and their consequences for future steps. What many narratives showed was that innovation projects have long and changing journeys and can keep something of the original while changing a large part of their constituents. The narrative is a written text, but can also be vi-sualised in a flow diagram. The critical moments table identifies key moments, which modified the aim, tasks and path of the project, sometimes to the effect that the new path becomes irreversible. These critical moments occur, e.g., due to new technical opportunities; problems in the internal alignment of partners; and learning through demonstration and trial activities. As such, the critical mo-


106

ment table highlights the presence of a number of shifts that were not expected in advance and that superpose themselves on the “normal” expected stages of the project. Step 2: Project unfolding

This second steps first aims at identifying the present TEN network in which the project is in-volved (Figure 3). The present network makes the linkages visible within and between the project and its environment in at least four domains: regulation, science, users and producers. The stakeholders involved in the current configuration of the project are identified and visualised in a key actors table that characterizes the stakeholders in terms of their centrality in, involvement in, motivation to join the project and alignment towards the project manager. This second step also identifies the TEN that the innovator identifies as desirable for the future diffusion of the innovation. It is a description of how users, suppliers and regulation bodies relate to each other; what rules and convention govern their interactions; the institutional infrastructure and the practices needed for the emergence and adoption of the innovation (i.e., entry in the market). The comparison between the present and the future TEN identifies necessary actions and the boundaries to room for action to shift from the present situation to the desired future situation.

Figure 3. An example of the present Techno-Economic Network, TEN (source: Laredo et al., 2002). Step 3: Societal robustness assessment

The third step puts the present and future TEN in perspective and identifies alternatives to the desired path and the consequences for the project if these alternatives would actually en-ter the market. By means of an "external check" possible alternative developments and the consistency of the innovator's assumptions are checked through a search on the web, in newspapers and other relevant documents. With the outcome of this external check the pro-ject can be positioned with respect to these alternatives and with respect to potential oppo-nents and allies.


107

Step 4: consultant activity

The last step aims at reflecting on the project visions, objectives and implementation with the lessons learned during the Socrobust process in mind. The result is the development of a short term action plan. The consultant identifies recommendations for action. Possible ac-tions are focused on enrolment of actors to extend and thus strengthen the current network and actions are focused on aligning these actors to maximise the mutual influence and rela-tion between actors and their actions. The consultant also identifies the place, time and room for these actions. To conclude, Socrobust is a consultancy tool that aims to help project managers, innovators to evaluate and monitor the potential societal robustness of innovations in an R&D phase, by anticipating possible present and future societal developments and reactions. The actual market entry phase was not the target of Socrobust. The Socrobust tool was further not de-veloped to work with more than one innovation, and the tool was certainly not developed to work with other stakeholders than the project manager or innovator. 3.2 Create Acceptance

After the Socrobust project ended, ECN continued to test and evaluate the Socrobust tool during a second row of experiments performed internally at ECN. Although the general orien-tation of the Socrobust method was confirmed, a number of lines of improvements were iden-tified in the process, and tools were adapted for better efficiency. Still some major issues re-mained to be solved. First ECN wanted Socrobust not only to function as an evaluation or monitoring tool but also as a tool that could actively promote societal acceptance of innova-tions. In addition, ECN felt that the tool should be extended to be not only useful as a consul-tancy tool for technology managers or single project managers, but that could also be used by the multiple and varied stakeholders that are involved around new innovations. Therefore, in cooperation with 9 European institutes, a new project was established: the European re-search project ‘Create Acceptance’. The main objective of this Create Acceptance project is to transform the existing Socrobust method into a multi-stakeholder methodology that not on-ly includes the innovator's vision, but also a variety of visions and perceptions of other stake-holders. The new tool will be tested and applied in five renewable energy projects in 2007. The Create Acceptance tool will thus be a consultancy tool that targets the market entry phase of a single innovation or an innovative system, aims to enhance the success of this market entry and target not only the project manager but focus more on the alignment of all relevant stakeholders internal and external to the project. 3.3 Strategic Niche Management

In order to tackle the dilemma of breakthrough, researchers from the STS field have deve-loped the approach of Strategic Niche Management (SNM). SNM is defined as “a deliberate attempt to make visible and productive the co-development of technological options, use, po-licy measures and sustainability by the creation, development and controlled break-down of societal experiments for promising technologies” (Weber et al. 1999). SNM particularly builds upon insights from evolutionary theories on technical change (in particular evolutionary eco-nomics) and on Technology Assessment approaches. Later SNM publications introduced in-sights from sociology of technology field (Raven, 2005; Geels and Raven, 2006). This sec-tion gives a brief overview of SNM.

SNM originally emerged from the observation that, in particular in the transport sector, many innovations with (potentially) improved environmental characteristics fail to become commer-cially successful. The car industry, for example, has investigated and experimented with se-veral options in the past (in particular, battery-powered vehicles), but never achieved large commercial exploitation (Hoogma et. al, 2002). SNM has a two track explanation for the lack of success of environmental innovations.


108

First, many authors point to the lock-in of existing energy and transport systems and their re-sistance to change (Cowan and Hultén, 1996; Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000; Unruh, 2000). Systems are locked in through technological, institutional and social path dependency, result-ing in a variety of barriers for new innovations such as the lack of a fuel infrastructure, the lack of clear government regulations or hard competition with a network of incumbent actors that do not support the innovation. Incumbent firms have developed routines and tend to re-produce those activities that they found successful in the past. These firms are therefore blind for innovations that do not fit their scope, such as radical environmental innovations. Moreover, dominant designs continue to improve. The internal combustion engine, for ex-ample, has been continuously improved over the past decades in terms of environmental and technical performance, making it harder for alternatives to breakthrough. On the other hand, existing regimes may also face problems (e.g., because of public pressure to improve envi-ronmental performance), creating windows of opportunities for alternatives. So, dynamics in established regimes are an important explanation for understanding success and failure of environmental innovations and SNM explicitly includes these dynamics as explanatory va-riable (Raven, 2005, 2006). Second, new technologies often suffer from limited technological and economic performance compared to the dominant design, which has already profited from decades of dedicated re-search and development. Therefore, SNM argues that because new technologies lack a competitive advantage, they need nurturing and further improvement. One way of doing this is through experimenting in various niche markets (Schot, 1992; Levinthal, 1998). SNM scholars argue that niche markets such as special geographical locations or application domains can act as stepping stones for innovations. Niche markets are distinct selection en-vironments, where users have different requirements then in mainstream markets. Photovol-taic cells, for example, were first applied in space travelling, where costs of energy produc-tion were less important. Also firms might use niche markets as a strategy to 'test' the inno-vation in different market settings – a strategy which has been nicely coined with the term 'probing and learning' (Lynn, Morone and Paulson, 1996). For sustainable technologies, however, often no clear markets exist. Sustainable technologies require markets to be created in a process of co-evolution of market and technology. This can be done by temporarily protecting the innovation from too harsh selection, for example, with investment grants, tax exemptions or other forms of 'protection'. So a protected space (or technological niche) is created which can serve as a test bed for further improvement (Kemp, Schot and Hoogma, 1998). Several scholars have investigated more precisely how an experimental introduction of sus-tainable innovations in niche markets can benefit the diffusion of the innovation. The level of analysis in this literature is often (a series of) projects such as pilot plants and demonstration plants, covering a substantial number of projects over periods up to thirty years. These scho-lars tend to ask the question why a certain niche trajectory was a success or a failure. They seek the answer in investigating three internal processes that constitute the nature of deve-lopment of a niche technology. The first process is voicing and shaping of expectations: firms, users, policymakers, entre-preneurs and other relevant actors participate in projects on the basis of expectations. Articu-lating expectations are important to attract attention and resources as well as new actors. And expectations also provide direction to development: they act as cognitive frames making choices in the design process.34 The process of voicing and shaping of expectations is consi-

34 The process of expectations guiding design choices follows a 'promise-requirement cycle' (Van Lente, 1993). When a new technological opportunity emerges, its advocators formulate promises about future performance and functionality to attract attention from sponsors. If these promises are ac-cepted, they are translated into a shared expectation or agenda for an emerging field. The expectation is then translated into goals, specifications, requirements and task divisions, for which projects are de-


109

dered to be good when a) an increasing number of participants share the same expectations (expectations are converging), and b) the expectations are based on tangible results from ex-periments.

The second process is the building of social networks. In particular in early phases of an in-novation's life cycle, the social network is still very fragile. Experimentation in niche markets can bring new actors together and make new social networks emerge. Building of social net-works is considered good when a) the network is broad (including incumbent and new firms, users, policy makers, scientists, and other relevant actors), and b) when alignment within the network is facilitated through regular interactions between the actors. A good learning process, the third process identified in SNM, is widely recognized as crucial for successful innovation. It enables adjustment of the technology and/or societal embedding to increase chances on successful diffusion. A good learning process is a) broad – focusing not only on techno-economic optimisation, but also on alignment between the technical (e.g., technical design, infrastructure) and the social (e.g., user preferences, regulation and cultural meaning) – and b) is reflexive – there is attention for questioning underlying assumptions such as social values, and the willingness to change course if the technology does not match these assumptions. Dynamic interactions between these three processes form the basis within SNM for under-standing success and failure of innovation processes (Geels and Raven, 2006). Actors, em-bedded in networks, are willing to invest resources (money, people) in projects, if they have a shared, positive expectation of a new technology. This shared expectation, together with shared cognitive rules, also provides direction to the projects. Projects, carried by local net-works, provide space for local activities. The outcomes give rise to learning processes, which may be aggregated into generic lessons and rules. Outcomes are also used to adjust pre-vious expectations and enrol more actors to expand the social network (see Figure 4).

Accepted visions and expectations (on functionality) form agenda of emerging field

Resources + requirements(finance, protection,specifications)

Artefact-activity: Projects in local practices R&D projects, pilot projects)(

Global network of actors (emerging community)

Outcomes and new promises by local actors

Cognitive, formal and normative rules(knowledge, regulations, behavioural norms)

Local practices

Global level (emerging field)

Learning,articulationaggregation

Enrol more actors

Adjust expectations

Figure 4. The dynamics of niche development trajectories. The SNM framework has been applied to various sustainable technologies such as wind tur-bines (Kemp, Rip and Schot, 2001), battery powered vehicles (Hoogma et. al., 2002), fuel veloped. Sponsors make money and other resources available for these projects, thus creating a pro-tected space where search and development activities may take place. When the projects end, usually after a couple of years, outcomes are assessed and new promises are formulated.


110

cell vehicles (Lane, 2002), photovoltaic cells (Van Mierlo, 2002), biogas plants (Raven, 2005) and biomass co-firing (Raven, 2005, 2006). The focus in these studies was to understand past innovation journeys and, on the basis of the insights, enhance the SNM framework. Less work has been done on managerial aspects of the framework, although some of the studies were used in policy arena's to learn from past experiments (e.g., Schot et al., 1996; Van der Laak et al., 2006). So on important challenge for future research is to enhance the managerial aspects of SNM. This short presentation illustrates that there are many similarities and complementarities bet-ween the three approaches. They focus on socio-technical experiments and the development of a more reflexive practice. Central processes are the forming of visions, the composition and alignment of the social networks and learning processes. The main difference is the unit of analysis and the users targeted. Socrobust and Create Acceptance mainly focus on single projects; they are a consultancy tool used to support innovators and project managers with the implementation of R&D and innovation projects. SNM takes the more cumulative level of the niche as a starting point with program managers as the main user (intended). As a con-sequence, niche development by exchanging experiences between projects is much more important than the result of single projects. Termination of projects and negative results in learning processes still can contribute to the expansion of the niche. 4. Agenda for future practice and theory on long-term energy options Developments in the Netherlands provide an example of what social scientists can offer to energy research and policy. The Dutch government recognised the need for transitions to sustainability in a variety of societal domains. In particular in the energy domain a lot of acti-vities are going on. Recently a taskforce has identified 26 transition pathways (Taskforce Energietransitie 2006). Although encouraging, the approach is exemplary for the technology push approach: an integral and systemic vision is lacking, the focus is on technological learn-ing and the vested interests are (over)-represented. The need to pay more attention to social aspects is recognised, but not (yet) addressed satisfactorily. Social scientists in particular can have a major impact:

• Social research can contribute to a vision forming practice in which visions on future energy systems are not only technological resource based

• Social research can contribute to learning focuses on not only technological aspects but also other (political, institutional, societal, cultural, environmental etcetera)

• Social research can contribute to the formation of social networks around long term ener-gy options who represent not only the vested interests, with a strong presence of the energy research community, but also creative and relevant outsiders.

• One of the challenges for SNM-researchers is to test the historical analyses in new or on-going experiments.

• Also, social research faces the theoretical challenge to enhance the theory, including a more comprehensive view on transition paths and on mechanisms behind those paths.

• Combine the fragmented development of tools such as Socrobust, Create and SNM, and develop a core tool with nice to have add-ons tailored for different target groups and units of analysis.

• Enhance the (business and governmental) understanding that innovation trajectories that have been ended are not necessarily failures, in particular not when learning experiences are transferred to other (new) trajectories. Consequently, evaluation and monitoring of in-novation trajectories should take place in a longer time frame than the duration of the in-dividual project.

• Yet another challenge that social research faces, is to strengthen its potential evalua-tion/monitoring and or even intervention role in energy related issues, by eliciting coope-ration between hitherto fragmented approaches and analysing their complementarities and possible conflicts.


111

• Social research can contribute to the discussion on the role of social science in energy research and policy, i.e., by an analysis of first movers in the process of including social scientists in energy research and policy, such as is the case in the Netherlands.

• Finally, another issue that social research needs to tackle is translating the ongoing de-bate in innovation studies and technology- and society studies at large about the normati-vity of social scientists getting involved in practice and policy through instruments and or procedural facilitation. In other words social scientists also can be used to reinforce the incumbent system.

References Cowan, Robin and Staffan Hultén. "Escaping Lock-In: The Case of the Electric Vehicle", Technological

Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 53(1), pp. 61-80, Sep 1996. Deuten, J.J. (2003), Cosmopolitanising Technology: A Study of Four Emerging Technological Re-

gimes, Twente University Press, Enschede. Geels, F.W. (2005), The dynamics of transitions in socio-technical systems: a multi-level analysis of

the transition pathway from horse-drown carriages to automobiles (1860–1930), in: Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, Vol. 17, No. 4, p. 445-476

Geels, F.W. (2002), Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: a multi-level perspective and a case-study, in: Research Policy, 31, p. 1257-1274

Geels, F.W. (2004), ‘From sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems. Insights about dynamics and change from sociology and institutional theory’, Research Policy 33, 897–920

Geels, F.W., Raven, R. (2006), Non-linearity and expectations in niche-development trajectories: Ups and downs in Dutch biogas development (1973–2003), Technology Analysis and Strategic Ma-nagement, Vol. 18, Nos. 3/4, 375–392, Jul–Sep 2006

Geels, F.W., Schot, J (2006), Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways: Refinements and elabo-rations of the multi-level perspective, submitted to Research Policy.

Hoogma, R. (2000), Exploiting technological niches. Strategies for experimental introduction of electric vehicles, Twente University Press, Enschede, Ph.D.-thesis.

Jacobsson S., and Johnson, A. (2000), The diffusion of renewable energy technology: an analytical framework and key issues for research, Energy Policy (28), 625-640.

R. Hoogma, R. Kemp, J. Schot, and B. Truffer, Experimenting for Sustainable Transport: The Ap-proach of Strategic Niche Management (London and New York: Spon Press, 2002).

Jolivet, E., Mourik, R.M., Poti, B., Raven, R.P.J.M., Socrobust: Towards a Multistakeholder Tool to Evaluate and Promote Societal Acceptance, Workshop on ‘Unpacking Intervention: Action-Oriented Science and Technology Studies, part II, May 23–24, 2006, Arhus Denmark.

R. Kemp, J. Schot and R. Hoogma, Regime shifts to sustainability through processes of niche forma-tion: the approach of strategic niche management, Technology Analysis and Strategic Manage-ment, 10, 1998, pp. 175-196.

Kets, A.; Burger, H.; Zoeten- Dartenset, C. (2003). Experiences with Socrobust at ECN. Micro com-bined heat and power generators and fuel cell vehicles. Energy research Centre of the Nether-lands Petten, Nederland

Kets, A.; Mourik, R.M. (2003). Inbedding van innovaties? Over de waarschijnlijkheid en wenselijkheid van toekomstbeelden. In: “ArenA, jaargang 9”, Dec 2003, p.148-150.

Lane, B. (2002), Implementation Strategies for Fuel-Cell powered road transport systems in the UK, Open University, UK, thesis.

Laredo P., Jolivet E., Shove E., Garcia C.E., Moors E., Penan P, Poti’ B., Raman S., Rip, A. and Schaeffer G.J. (2002). SOCROBUST Final Report (supported by the EU TSER Programme) www.createacceptance.net/fileadmin/create-acceptance/user/docs/Socrobust_final_report.pdf (accessed on 2007-07-30).

Levinthal, D.A., 1998. The slow pace of rapid technological change: Gradualism and punctuation in technological change. Industrial and Corporate Change 7(2), 217-247.

Lynn, Morone and Paulson (1996), ‘Marketing and discontinuous innovation: the innovation communi-ty framework’, Research Policy (25), 91-106.

Mourik, R.M.; Kets, A.; Thuijl, E. van; Roos, C. (2005). An analysis of stakeholder perspectives on ener-gy infrastructures in a future sustainable transport sector. Energy research Centre of the Netherlands ECN. Petten, Nederland.

R.P.J.M. Raven, Strategic Niche Management for Biomass (Eindhoven University of Technology, 2005).


112

Rip, A., Kemp, R., 1998. Technological change, in: Rayner, S., Malone, E.L. (Eds), Human Choice and Climate Change. Battelle Press, Columbus, Ohio, pp. 327-399.

Schot, J. (1992), The policy relevance of the quasi-evolutionary model, in Cooms, R., Saviotti, P & Walsh, V. (eds.), Technological change and company strategies: economic and sociological per-spectives, Academic Press, London.

Taskforce Energietransitie (2006), Meer met energie. Kansen voor de Nederlandse industrie, Den Haag, rapport.

Unruh, G.C., 2000. Understanding carbon lock-in. Energy Policy 28, 817-830. Van der Laak, W., Raven, R., Verbong, G. (2006), ‘Strategic Niche Management for Biofuels: Analys-

ing past experiments for developing new regional policies’, Submitted to Energy Policy H. Van Lente, Promising Technology: The Dynamics of Expectations in Technological Development

(Delft: Eburon, 1993). B. Van Mierlo (2002), Kiem van Maatschappelijke Verandering: Verspreiding van Zonnecelsystemen

in de Woningbouw met behulp van Pilot Projecten, Amsterdam: Aksant. Weber, M., Hoogma, R., Lane, B., Schot, J. (1999), Experimenting with Sustainable Transport Innova-

tions. A workbook for Strategic Niche Management, Seville/Enschede.


113

Socio-technical scenarios. A new method to explore transition

paths towards a sustainable electricity system Boelie Elzen & Peter S. Hofman35 Introduction Developing a sustainable energy system is an enormous challenge. Despite many reports that suggest otherwise the main challenge does not seem to be of a technical nature: with proven technologies it is possible to design an energy system that produces only a fraction of the emissions (CO2 as well as pollutants) of the current system (IPPC, 2001). Rather than a lack of good technical solutions the problem seems to be that there are too many potential (partial) solutions. Since each of these solutions has its own advocates it is very difficult for decision-makers and others to make an assessment of their potential and to decide which of these options to support and/or implement. An additional problem is that a transition to a sus-tainable energy system will require a combination of a variety of alternatives and it is very dif-ficult if not impossible to oversee where such new combinations could lead to. A major tool to deal with such uncertainties is scenario-analysis. For decades, various ener-gy companies, research organisations and international bodies (e.g., IEA/OECD) have deve-loped energy scenarios to help assess which strategies would seem most promising (EPRI, 1999; IEA, 2006). From the transition perspective, however, these scenarios have a serious shortcoming: they have a strong technical bias, typically describing the (economic) diffusion of specific technologies. Thus they ignore one of the basic features of a long-term transition process which is that technical change and societal/behavioural change go hand-in-hand. In other terms, these scenarios typically only look at the energy supply side while they ignore that energy demand will change (quantitatively as well as qualitatively) in the same process. To remedy this omission requires the inclusion social science insights. In this paper we will contribute to this challenge by describing a new method which pays due respect to the socio-technical nature of innovation processes, called the “Socio-Technical Scenario” (STSc) method. In earlier work we have described a crude version of the methodo-logy and demonstrated it for the passenger mobility domain. (Elzen et al. 2004) In this paper, that results from an ongoing project, in which we collaborate with natural scientists, we are elaborating the methodology and will demonstrate it for the electricity domain. Requirements for transition scenarios If scenarios are to be used as a tool to induce transitions towards sustainability they should display the basic features of transitions. This implies that a transition scenario should feature the following characteristics:

1. Transition scenarios should show socio-technical development, i.e., it should describe the co-evolution of technology and its societal embedding. This is called ‘leapfrog’ dynamic, i.e., a continuous leapfrogging of technical and societal change. – This implies a scenario should pay attention to technical development as well as societal or behavioural aspects such as institutional change, different types of actors, their goals, strategies and re-sources, etc. It should show how radically new innovations, that misfit the regime initially, are developed further (in so-called technological niches) and how learning processes take place in which such innovations can eventually ‘breakthrough’ and may start a trans-

35 Both University of Twente.


114

formation of the regime characterised by technical, institutional as well as societal change.

2. Continuous development: Transitions are rarely the result of the ‘simple’ diffusion of a new technology but the technology changes continuously, combines with other technolo-gies, splits into different lines of development, etc. – This means that innovation is seen as a continuous process of change, not only of technologies but also of rules and institu-tions and the societal embedding. Historical studies show, for instance, that radically new innovations which, in retrospect, can be seen as the seeds of a transition are often tried out in a variety of successive application domains (via a process called niche-accumula-tion) until they find a domain where a major ‘breakthrough’ starts.

Because it should address qualitative change a transition scenario should tell a qualitative story rather than a linear diffusion story of technologies. It should present the story of pos-sible future socio-technical developments as a good historian would tell it. Thus, a transition scenario could be read as a possible ‘history of the future’. The need for a new “Socio-technical” scenario method There are several scenario methods and projects for the long-term exploration of fundamen-tal and systemic change processes (30–50 years). We have evaluated a range of scenario projects from different classes of methods in order to establish their appropriateness for ex-ploring transitions. In a forthcoming report we assess these methods and projects in view of the specific transition requirements mentioned in the previous section (Elzen and Hofman 2006). Below follows a brief summary of these findings. Forecasting methods, especially those in combination with narratives, pay some attention to the co-evolution of technology and society at an aggregate level, and allow for the uptake of radical technologies as they are assumed to follow certain learning curves. However, there is limited attention for the processes that underly the co-evolution of technology and society, i.e., learning processes and interaction processes at the level of actors, the way they initiate and navigate changes in institutional settings, regulatory policies, infrastructure develop-ments, and changing user preferences. Overall, these methods therefore tend to produce scenarios that have a mostly linear character based on extrapolations of the present. Foresight methods pay attention to potential outcomes of processes of co-evolution of tech-nology and society and the uptake of radical technology. The likelihood of these outcomes is assessed by looking at driving forces and the way these may unfold. This often takes the form of a focus on two dominant driving forces in combination with opposite directions in which they may develop, effectively leading to four different scenarios. While these scenarios are of a less linear nature than those produced through forecasting, limitations lie in their macro-orientation and lack of attention for the way learning processes and co-evolution take place through interactions at the micro and meso levels. Overall, these methods are useful in producing alternative futures that differ widely, but provide limited insight in the way these fu-tures may unfold through interactions and learning processes at different levels and between a variety of actors. Backcasting methods have a strong focus on the co-evolution of technology and society. They start from normative futures based on the premise of both technological and societal change. Changes in actor networks, shifts such as those from a product to a service econo-my (implying also cultural changes) are important cornerstones of the scenarios. Interactivity is also key to these methods, with stakeholders participating in the development of scena-rios, such as to create some shared vision regarding the future. More limited in these me-thods is attention for the way these transition paths may occur, also because of a lack of spe-cification of how learning processes occur that may lead to uptake of radical practices


115

Technological roadmapping methods have a strong focus on technical aspects, without taking into account how actors, their strategies and interactions may influence the rate and direction of that technological change. The interaction with society tends to be limited to how a research agenda is given shape. Breakthrough methods focus on individual projects, companies and technologies and much less on the way a broader process of socio-technical change is set into motion. This leads to a strong focus on the micro level, with a bias towards the innovators and consumers as core actors. Moreover, these methods are specifically designed to indicate actions for companies to be taken in the short-term and are less suited to explore long term processes of systems change. An overall picture of the state of the art regarding scenario making indicates that there is in-creasing attention for the construction of future worlds through a process of foresighting and through backcasting from a desired future world towards the present. There is increasing at-tention for societal, cultural and institutional factors that influence the way our future may un-fold, relative to the focus on ‘hard’ factors such as economic growth, prices, population growth in forecasting oriented projects. But only a limited number of projects are able to cap-ture some of the complexity of the dynamics of technological change, with a focus on actor strategies and interactions, and processes of learning. Our main conclusion from the analysis above is that none of scenario projects and methods satisfies the requirements for transition scenarios described above, although most score well on some aspects. But to encompass the entire complexity of system innovations, there is a need for a new tool which we call “socio-technical scenarios” (STSc). To be able to account for the main characteristics of a transition the STSc-method will be rooted in the so-called ‘multi-level perspective’ (MLP) on transitions. The dynamic of transitions – MLP Three interacting levels

The so-called ‘multi-level perspective’ has been developed to analyse and explain transitions and system innovations. This perspective distinguishes three levels (Kemp, 1994; Schot, Hoogma and Elzen, 1994; Rip and Kemp, 1998, Kemp, Rip and Schot, 2001; Geels, 2005):

1. The meso-level of ‘socio-technical regimes’ (S-T regimes) which denotes an existing so-cio-technical system that is embedded in society and links together a wide variety of so-cietal actors (e.g., companies, public authorities, users/consumers). Regimes change continuously but the change, technical as well as societal or behavioural, is of an incre-mental nature, building further upon an existing socio-technical configuration (following ‘path dependencies’). – In the domain of electricity, for which scenarios are described in an appendix, the socio-technical regime is characterised by fossil-based supply chains and energy technologies, an important role for the electricity grid, rules for connection and transmission tariffs, and grid operators, and increasing competition and concentration across national borders as domestic electricity market become more open. Processes of liberalisation and internationalisation have reduced stability of national electricity regimes in the past decade and provide starting points for transition paths.

2. The micro-level of ‘technological niches’. This denotes protected spaces in which radical innovations are developed. In their initial stage, these innovations cannot compete with existing technologies and need to be protected against regular market forces. Niches are important as a learning space on issues like technology, user-preferences and -practices, regulation, etc. – In the electricity domain a large number of niches is and has been deve-loped in recent years, such as a range of renewable energy sources and technologies, fuel cells and micro cogeneration, and clean fossil options. Some options are increasingly embraced by regime actors, such as biomass co-combusted in coal-fired power plants,


116

others are supported by more diverse networks of actors such as in the case of off-shore wind farms where incumbent energy companies work with wind turbine producers and off-shore firms, while for fuel cells and photovoltaic power development firms based in other industries tend to be dominant.

3. The macro-level of ‘socio-technical landscape’. This denotes the ‘external environment’ and consists of factors that not only affect the regime under analysis but a variety of other regimes as well. – Relevant landscape factors in relation to the electricity domain include the development of oil prices, the process of European integration, the increasing perva-siveness of ICT technologies, and societal and political attention for environmental and climate concerns.

Figure 1 sketches a multi-level configuration and indicates how the levels may influence each other.

Figure 1. Sketch of the multi-level model. The niches are indicated by the small ovals N1 - N4. They typically have a partial overlap with the re-gime (e.g., by using shared technical elements or through actors that operate in the regime as well as in a niche). Some niches may have a partial overlap with each other (e.g., N2 and N3). A niche may al-so transform into a market niche (MN1, MN2) meaning that it can survive without protection as a sub-section of the regime. – Various landscape factors are indicated by the hexagons LF1 – LF4. Land-scape factors can be ‘all around’ and may influence the regime, various niches or the links between niches and regimes. Niches and the regime may also influence each other as indicated by various dashed arrows. – Landscape influences and developments in niches may create tensions (arrow-shaped pentagons T1 – T3) or opportunities (O1) in the regime. Tensions can also emerge internally within the regime (T4). – From the tensions and opportunities new developments start as is indicated by the bended arrows. The bended shape indicates that the developments are not straightforward al-though there is a sense of direction due to path dependencies, at leas in the short term. Some deve-lopments may ‘link up’, e.g., the developments emerging out of T1 and T2 in the figure. Radical innovations in niches cannot easily break through in an existing regime because the latter is very resilient. If a new radical innovation ‘threatens’ the regime (e.g., wind- or solar power), actors in the regime usually try to improve the performance of the dominant techno-logy to counter the threat (e.g., by end-of pipe emission reductions). Furthermore, there is of-ten a mismatch between the characteristics of the new innovation with existing user preferen-ces and existing regulations. (Freeman and Perez, 1988).

Regime

LF1 N1

MN1

N3

N2

MN2 N4 LF2

LF4

LF3

T1

T2

T4

O1

T3


117

Still, as various historical studies show, radical innovations can form the seeds for transitions. Their chance of breaking through can increase when the existing regime becomes less stable which may result from internal problems or negative externalities that cannot be solved adequately. Usually, such breakthroughs follow from mutual reinforcement of several technologies and they do not happen suddenly but result from successive small steps. In the MLP this is called ‘niche-accumulation’, i.e., first application in small market A, then small market B, and only after various such steps, mass market C (Cf. Geels, 2005). The dynamic of transitions: pathways, patterns and mechanisms

Transitions take a long time, typically in the order of decades. Although they are very comp-lex processes, the multi-level approach makes it possible to distinguish a limited number of characteristic patterns that a transition may follow. First, we can distinguish an overall pattern that describes a transition from start to finish as it were. This is called a transition pathway and in a forthcoming paper, Geels and Schot have distinguished four typical transition pathways. Which path develops depends upon two critical factors which are (1) the nature of the multi-level interactions and (2) the timing of the crucial interaction(s):

1. Nature of interaction: Do niche-innovations and landscape developments have reinforcing relationships with the regime or disruptive relationships through pressure or competition?

2. Timing of interactions: Different timings of multi-level interactions have different outcomes. Especially the timing of landscape pressure on regimes with regard to the state of niche-developments is important. If landscape pressure occurs at a time when niche-innovations are not yet fully developed, the transition path will be different than when they are fully developed.

Using combinations of these two criteria, Geels and Schot have developed four different tran-sition pathways: transformation, reconfiguration, technological substitution, and de-alignment and re-alignment. In their analysis, they also pay attention to social groups and interactions, thus complementing a structuralist ‘outside-in’ approach with an ‘inside out’, agency-oriented perspective. Table 1 summarises the four transition routes and the roles of main actors therein (not all actors).

Transition pathways

Main actors Type of interaction Characterisation

1. Transformation Regime actors and outside groups (social movements)

Regime outsiders voice criti-cism. Incumbent regime ac-tors adjust goals, guiding principles, search heuristics

Outside pressure, ins-titutional power struggles, negotia-tions, adjustment

2. Technological substitution

Incumbent firms versus new firms

Newcomers develop novel-ties, which compete with tech-nologies from regime actors.

Market competition

3. Reconfiguration Regime actors and suppliers

Regime actors adopt compo-nent-innovations, developed by new suppliers. Competition between old and new sup-pliers

Cumulative compo-nent changes and new combinations

4. De-alignment and re-alignment

New niche actors Incumbents lose faith and le-gitimacy. Emergence of many new actors, who compete for resources, attention and legi-timacy

Erosion, collapse, co-existence of multiple novelties, prolonged uncertainty, competi-tion restabilisation

Table 1. Taxonomy of transition pathways and the main actors (Geels and Schot, forthcoming). To refine the analysis, these transition pathways can be broken down into various shorter-term patterns of change. Specific combinations of these patterns then make up the various transition pathways. Given the characteristics of transition processes discussed earlier and the typology of transition pathways these patterns should at least cover the following:


118

• describe technical as well as societal/behavioural change; • describe developments in the regime under different circumstances, viz.

♦ independent from landscape development as well as under pressure from it; ♦ independent from niche development as well as under pressure from it; ♦ links between niche and regime developments;

• describe internal niche developments, with and without landscape pressure. Some examples of such patterns are:

• Market diffusion of a new technology (a typical pattern that is often used as the primary dynamic other scenario methods);

• Hybridisation: a new combination of two options that were separate before; • New user preferences (e.g., emerging from landscape pressure or new regulation) that

diffuse further; • Niche accumulation (an innovation moving to various successive new application do-

mains); • Niche proliferation (spreading of an innovation to new domains).

We want to stress that these patterns are, compared to the overall transitions pathway, rela-tively short-term phenomena. Many consecutive patterns together make up a transition and by a combination of patterns of technical and societal change the overall dynamic of co-evo-lution emerges. A ‘mechanism’ describes a short-term phenomenon that triggers the onset of a new pattern. A mechanism zooms in to the actor level to describe how specific actors create something new, e.g., a technical novelty, new user behaviour, new policy, etc. A mechanism creates or enables a new link between entities that were not linked before. This new entity can subse-quently become the starting point for a development that follows one of the patterns above. The result of a mechanism can be a novelty that can either be a technical innovation or a so-cietal/behavioural innovation (or a combination of both). A specific combination of mechanisms and patterns leads to a specific pathway and thus de-fines a transition in a specific case. We can then use these same mechanisms and patterns to construct transition scenarios. STSc methodology Main characteristics of STSc

A transition scenario does not have to display all the complexity of historical transitions. What it needs to do is to display the basic features of transition processes to produce some scena-rios with sufficient contrasts to serve as a foundation strategic or policy advice. On the basis of the discussion above we have identified the following main characteristics of STSc:

• A strong emphasis on the socio-technical nature of change processes (co-evolution); • This results in ‘leapfrog’ dynamic with sequences of changes, sometimes more on the

technical, sometimes more on the societal and behavioural side. • The analysis concerns developments within and between three different levels, viz.

niche, regime and landscape – The regime is the central level at which transitions may take place. Regimes account for stability (showing path dependencies) but broad trans-formations may occur over long periods of time through pressures that may come from within the regime, from the landscape level and from novelties in niches that try to hook on to the regime (sometimes re-enforced by the landscape or internal regime pressures). A novelty may then start to grow at the expense of the regime and by ‘eating it from the inside’ (basically by making its users desert to the novelty) gradually transform it.


119

• Other scenario methods have a ‘macro-bias’ (all of them?): they use a small number of ‘driving forces’ that define a number of contrasting scenarios. In an STSc there are no specific driving forces and contrasts are created by different qualitative links within or between the three levels that trigger developments in new directions.

• Zooming in/zooming out: When a ‘stable situation’ is at hand (a dynamic equilibrium) we zoom out to the regime level and only look at ‘broad patterns’. However, when crucial new links are emerging we zoom in to the individual actor level. Here we look at the concrete actions, strategies, expectations, links, etc., i.e., the mechanisms that may start new patterns to develop. When repetitive general patterns emerge we zoom out again and look at these patterns rather than at individual actors.

STSc Core methodology: building boxes and episodes Based on the discussion of the multi-level perspective above we can define what we call the ‘STSc Core methodology’, i.e., that part of the methodology that applies to any STSc. This core does not yet suffice to actually make an STSc in a specific case because that also de-pends upon the objectives of making a scenario in a specific case as will be discussed fur-ther below. Historical transitions have followed a wide variety of courses. To be able to develop scena-rios, however, this variety needs to be reduced although we should take care not to end up with a model in which outcomes are completely determined by ‘driving forces’ and ‘factors’. What we are looking for is the middle course between ‘chance’ and ‘necessity’, in line with a long-standing debate within evolutionary theories. A first reduction of complexity is to limit the infinite range of possible scenarios to the four ‘idealtype’ transitions distinguished in Table 1 above. Which of these pathways are actually used will depend upon the specific scenario objectives discussed later. Within these pathways, however, developments can follow an infinite array of courses. In this STS method this variety is used by only using the patterns and mechanisms that are dis-cussed in the section on the dynamic of transitions above. The four transition pathways to-gether with the patterns and mechanisms define the conceptual building box of an STSc. All of the above patterns and mechanisms in principle can occur at any time in a transition. Yet, to highlight the transformational aspect of a transition it is helpful to focus on different aspects in different stages of a transition. Loosely based on a model by Rotmans et al. (2001) we distinguish four stages in a transition that are translated into four consecutive epi-sodes that make up a transition pathway in an STSc. These episodes are:

1. Disconnection episode: in the first part of the scenario the emphasis is on how regime and landscape pressure create room for the development of various niches, what type of learning takes place, how niches try to address the problems in regime and landscape, how links between niches develop (hybridisations), etc. Concurrently, the regime also evolves (possibly, partly under landscape pressure) but there is relatively little interaction between niches and the regime (hence the phrase disconnection).

2. Linking episode: in the second part of the scenario some niches link up or affect what happens in the regime which starts having a visible impact, e.g., by the development of a niche market or hybridisations between niche and regime configurations or by the regime seeking to improve to counter possible niche-threats (sailing ship effect). The existing system is still dominant but there is a ‘serious threat’ that the novelties resulting from the linkages have better longer term prospects than the existing regime configuration;

3. Transformational episode: in the third part the novelties (either evolved niches or new re-gime configurations) gradually take the upper hand. The reasons may include better per-formance, better potential to tackle problems, new regulation, etc. This happens not only through diffusion of the novelties but in a continuous process of new links and socio-tech-nical change;


120

4. Evolution episode: In the last stage of the scenario, the novelty has taken the upper hand and defines a new regime. Subsequently, a ‘conventional’ process of incremental change follows to improve performance and/or tackle newly emerged problems. At the same time, new niches may emerge and evolve, initially separate from the regime. The dyna-mic in the fourth episode resembles that of the first but now after a transition, i.e., with a new dominant regime.

Following these episodes, an STSc can be seen to consist of four chapters in which the dy-namisms described follow one another. They form the main structure in the design of a sce-nario and define the overall architecture, as it were. Steps in making an STSc On the basis of the discussion above we have defined 8 steps in the STSc methodology that should be followed in making a scenario and use it as a tool for strategic or policy advice. The steps should not be taken to rigidly in a consecutive fashion and there can be some jumping back and forth, especially in the process of developing the scenario architecture(s) (up to step 5). Where to start may partly depend upon how well the analyst is acquainted with the domain in question. For instance, if the analyst is not well acquainted it might be ad-visable to start with step 2, mapping the current dynamics. The steps are defined as follows:

• Step 1: Specification of scenario objectives • Step 2: Analysis of recent and ongoing dynamic • Step 3: Inventory of potential linkages • Step 4: Design choices • Step 5: Develop scenario architectures • Step 6: Elaborate all scenarios • Step 7: Reflection and evaluation • Step 8: Developing recommendations

Each of these steps will be briefly elaborated in the following sub-sections. Step 1: Specification of scenario objectives

Scenarios can be targeted at different types of users and serve different functions. To ex-plore future transitions we distinguish four broad categories of scenario objectives for the STSc, notably:

1. Stretch mental maps and increase awareness and acceptance of ‘radical’ alternatives; 2. Explore potential of portfolio of promises by sketching different transition paths; 3. Inform policy-making and business strategy; 4. Serve as co-ordination and alignment tool. These functions partly determine the requirement for a specific scenario in a concrete case. The objective to inform policy and strategy, for instance, would require lengthier scenarios with more detail than is required to stretch mental maps. Choices will have to be made on se-veral issues that will result from the analysis in step 2, including:

• Which regime to look at (regime of focus); • Which niches to look at; • Relevant landscape factors; • Possible other relevant regimes.


121

Step 2: Analysis of the current dynamic

The next step is to map the current dynamic and state of affairs in the domain of interest us-ing the MLP. This implies having to analyse all three levels, i.e.,

• Regime dynamic, problems, strategies and trends • Relevant landscape factors (including ‘enabling technologies’) • Relevant niches: dynamic, opportunities and barriers for transition

Which factors to take along was determined in the previous step. A protocol has been deve-loped to map the dynamic within and between these three levels that has been described elsewhere.36 Step 3: Inventory of potential linkages

We will discuss this step in considerable detail since it concerns a crucial feature that distin-guishes the STSc method from other scenario methods. One of the shortcomings of the latter in exploring transitions is that these methods often leave the current basic features of techno-logies untouched as well as how they are used while historical studies of transitions show that new combinations and/or new user behaviour often form the ‘seeds’37 of a transtion. STSc does allow such qualitative changes and to exploit this the analyst needs to make an inventory of possible new links. Such a linkage can by any type of ‘qualitative’ new relation-ship between different elements, e.g., a landscape pressure linking up to a niche and/or a re-gime technology, to a new type of user behaviour. Some typical examples are:

• hybridisations: the merger of two options to create something new (e.g., hybridisation of gas turbine and steam turbine leading to combined cycle gas turbines;

• changing user patterns: a combination of institutional and technological change may in-duce (initially small) groups of users to change their behaviour and these groups may grow under specific circumstances (e.g., the emergence of green electricity in the Ne-therlands as a separate customer product due to an increasing market orientation within the sector and public concern regarding climate change)

• links between technical development and political developments: for instance an electric vehicle with zero emissions (a technical element at the regime level) can get linked to strong determination to cut city pollution (a political element at the regime level).

• links between various regimes that enable certain niche developments. Multiple regime developments can create momentum for niches such as in the historical example of the gas turbine (military aircraft industry, aircraft industry, and power generation sector play important roles in the development of the niche, and in the current example of the fuel cell, which is both driven by opportunities for use in the transport and power sector.

The potential of such new links to occur is the main distinctive feature of STSc compared to other scenario methods. These linkage possibilities we call ‘transition elements’ which are defined as elements at each of the three levels (regime, niche, landscape) that could link up to create novelties as a potential prelude to a transition. For instance an electric vehicle with zero emissions (a technical element at the regime level) can get linked to strong determina-tion to cut city pollution (a political element at the landscape level). The result could be a new type of ‘city electric vehicle’ that starts having noticeable effects at the regime level. Transitions imply the breakthrough and take-up of new technologies along with a transforma-tion of behaviour of various actors in relation to these. A starting point to identify them could be to identify a number (for example, 5 to 10) novelties (technologies, concepts, new forms

36 Rob Raven, Protocol for regime analysis, Internal report “Energy transition project”, Eindhoven, 2006. 37 i.e., the novel (S-T) combinations that could start a small initial change of the ‘course of develop-ment’ of a regime but, when consistently followed through, in the long run could lead to a transition (possibly by (re-) combining with other ‘seeds’).


122

of societal embedding) that could be part of linkages between niche, regime and/or land-scape level) with good ‘sustainability performance’. Also potential ‘enabling technologies’ (e.g., generic technologies, like ICT, that could be taken up in a variety of regimes) could have a substantial impact on the dynamic of either one or both of our two domains. Transition elements not only concern technologies. Transition theory distinguishes several articulation processes that play a role in the breakthrough of niches. Each of these processes defines a specific type of dimension that could play a role in a transition implying the follow-ing types of dimensions should be addressed:

• technical dimensions • policy dimensions • cultural and psychological dimensions • market dimensions • production dimensions • infrastructure and maintenance dimensions • societal and environmental (problems) dimensions • financial dimensions

The linkage opportunities identified in this step can be used when actually making the scena-rio. Whether they will indeed be used will be decided during the actual construction of the scenario when, based upon transition theory, it can be made plausible that such a new link will occur. Step 4: Design choices

This step can be seen as a further elaboration of step 1 but with the additional information on the regime collected in step 2. In the fourth step further design choices will have to be made, e.g., on the number of scenarios to make, the time-frame to be used (e.g., 30–50 years) and main distinctive features between the scenarios. This step sets the stage for the steps to come in which these general characterisations are filled in in further detail. Traditional scenario methods often work with a two dimensional matrix, e.g., with one dimen-sion related to economic growth and the other to the urgency of environmental problems. This matrix defines four scenarios. From the perspective of a transition, however, the cont-rasts between scenarios thus defined is not very large in the sense that all scenarios typically are technology diffusion scenarios, not leading to any substantial change on social dimen-sions. As the main feature of STSc is that it does provide for a sociotechnical dynamic the method should illustrate potential contrasts along social as well as technical dimensions. Above, we distinguished for functions for STSc transition scenarios. In a forthcoming report (Elzen and Hofman 2006) we have elaborated various requirements for each of these func-tions which are briefly summarised below:

1. Stretch mental maps: Two rather brief scenarios (say, 5 pp. each) could suffice to make acceptable for the audience that radical changes are quite plausible as the result of small steps over a longer period of time.

2. Explore portfolio of promises: This would require lengthier scenarios (say, 15-20 pp.) to il-lustrate how several of those promises could develop further, link up to each other and/or the regime to form ‘the seeds of a transition’. The number of scenarios would have to de-pend upon how many of those promises need to be explored and what possibilities there are for various cross-linkages. Two scenarios is a minimum to create sufficient contrast but in other cases several more may be needed.

3. Inform policy-making: The general requirements are comparable to the previous point but in the scenario a variety of policies should be highlighted and explored. Thus an assess-ment can be made of possible effects of various policies under different circumstances in terms of the multi-level dynamic. To explore the ‘robustness’ of various policies additional


123

scenarios could be made with diverging relevant landscape factors (e.g., very different petroleum prices or a different sense of urgency on the need of curbing CO2 emissions).

4. Co-ordination and alignment: we have only started to elaborate this option. On the basis of an earlier experience it does not seem very fruitful to develop a ‘complete scenario’ in an interactive session as a lack of focus makes such an exercise very messy. What seems more useful is that the organisers of such a session develop one or two so-called ‘framework scenarios’ and that the interactive session focuses on crucial ‘bending points’ (the point where a niche links to the regime and starts transforming it) in these scenarios. The discussion in the interactive session could focus on the factors that could either make such a bending likely or that might create barriers for it.

These general requirements should be further specified. Concretely, choices have to be made in relation with the following:

1. Timeframe 2. Number of scenarios 3. Which transition pathways to include (the four distinguished by Geels/Schot)? 4. Which regime(s); include multi-regime interactions 5. The role of the S-T Landscape 6. Which niches to incorporate; linkages to use 7. Miscellaneous items: there are a number of concrete things that need to be addressed,

mostly under one of the other points above, for example: ♦ Level of detail for each scenario; ♦ Variables to use ♦ Specific points of focus (e.g., specific technologies (to be more precise: socio-techni-

cal configurations), specific policies, etc.); ♦ Patterns and mechanisms to use

Step 5: Develop scenario architecture

For each scenario, first a ‘scenario logic’ should be described which is a very brief general story (app. ½ page) of how the scenario will develop. The scenario logic uses some of the potential linkages identified in step 3 to describe a dynamic that is formulated following the main characteristics that Geels and Schot (2006) identified for each transition pathway (i.e., the type of niche-regime interaction and how this is affected by (the timing of) landscape pressure). Having followed the earlier steps results in an inventory of potential linkages (the result of step 3), some variables to use and a number of selected transition pathways (with scenario logics). The linkages and variables should subsequently be distributed across the different scenarios. The main criterion for this distribution is that the linkages and variables fit the logic of the scenario for which they will be used. The goal should not be to aim at an ‘even distri-bution’ but to develop a number of ‘plausible’ scenarios, i.e., scenarios that are consistent with the multi-level dynamics. This results in the definition of a number of different scenarios in which each scenario is de-fined by a scenario logic and a number of linkages that should be used. The linkages will al-low filling in the scenario logic with much more detail to develop a complete storyline (called the ‘scenario skeleton’) for each scenario. The time-frame of the skeleton should follow the four episodes distinguished earlier for easy comparison of the scenarios. Step 6: Elaborate all scenarios

The STSc-skeleton provides the last step before the actual writing of the scenario. What re-mains to be done is to put flesh to the bones of the skeleton by adding a level of detail that makes the various new links plausible in view of the multi-level model and that thus helps to pinpoint various concrete factors crucial in inducing and supporting a transition.


124

If we would have the ambition to write a six page history of a transition (for instance the ener-gy supply regime in the period 1900–1950) from a multi-level perspective, it would have to be rather superficial, i.e., we could only use a ‘broad brush’ to sketch the regime developments and could only treat a couple of niches with hardly any detail. Other niches we would have to let emerge and affect the regime in just a few sentences. In connection with an STSc we face exactly the same problem, implying we very much have to limit ourselves. This begs the question to what the ‘minimal requirements’ are for an STSc to be ‘convincing’. Some suggestions:

• Address all three levels to some extent. Use the regime-level as the thread through the story. Discuss a limited number of exemplary niches. Indicate how a limited number of landscape developments affected expectations and subsequent developments in the re-gime and the niches discussed.

• In the niches, pay attention to articulation processes. When a niche ‘breaks through’, make plausible all relevant ‘articulation barriers’ have been overcome. A niche is not only a technology but also a domain of use that should be described. Within a niche, an ‘or-dering principle’ could either be specifc technologies or a specific domain of use.

• Watch out for (too) linear stories. Also introduce some cross-links, bifurcations, hybridisa-tions, etc.

• Make the role of various actors clear (producers, users, government). Describe how they are guided by their expectations and how their expectations are influenced by develop-ments and experiences at the three levels.

• Treat technical and social/behavioural issues ‘symmetrically’; pay serious attention to co-evolution. Describe, e.g., how new technology leads to new experiences and then to new behaviour.

• Patterns and mechanisms; the theory provides a wide range; use them selectively and name them explicitly.

Step 7: Evaluation and recommendations

In the final step the scenarios will have to be evaluated against the background of the objec-tives from the first step. They can be used, for instance, to develop policy recommendations as will be illustrated at the end of this paper. Scenarios for the electricity regime Above, we showed that that STSc method allows the construction of a wide variety of transi-tions scenarios. Which type is chosen depends on the more specific reason a scenario is made in a specific case. In this paper, our main purpose is to briefly describe the method and to give the reader ‘some feel’ for the type of scenarios that could result from this. For that reason, the scenarios below illustrate how different multi-level dynamics may lead to two di-verging transition paths. The different steps within the methodology are summarised below, followed by brief scenarios. Step one: scenario objectives

Regarding the scenario objectives, step 1 in the methodology, a main objective here is to il-lustrate the type of multi-level and multi-regime patterns and mechanisms that may characte-rise fundamental long-term transformations of existing sociotechnical systems and shifts to new sociotechnical systems. This is relevant for a range of potential users and should parti-cularly function as a means to stretch mental maps, enabling actors to envision new techno-logical, organisational, and institutional configurations of the sociotechnical system for electri-city production and use, and to envision possible routes towards those configurations. It could help to overcome prejudices about what is or is not realistic.


125

Step two: analysis of ongoing dynamic in the electricity system

The scenarios start from the current dynamics within the electricity system. The first episode of the scenarios (disconnection) concerns the ongoing transformation of the electricity sys-tem and the main characteristics of the initial dynamics are briefly described in the next para-graph. Rules and routines in the regime and the way they are evolving strongly impact the scope, variety, direction and speed of potential transition paths. Especially the control of electricity flows and the design of electricity networks are in transformation with one trend towards stronger involvement of network operators regarding high voltage transmission (Tennet in the Netherlands) and increasing European coordination, and one trend towards more diverse electricity flows with a diversity of private actors and organisations organising electricity sys-tems at local scales. Private actors are reluctant to invest in new power plants, especially those of significant scale, as the (long-term) conditions under which these plants may be economic are unclear because of volatile public frameworks as well as volatile energy prices. Finally there is uncertainty regarding the type of technology that is future-proof as regulatory frameworks regarding carbon emissions beyond Kyoto are unknown and because it is diffi-cult to assess which fuels are the best bet in the medium term. Summarising, the electricity regime is regarded to be in flux and is characterized by traditio-nal actors trying to cope in diverse ways with this flux, while new entrants try to exploit on-going processes of change within the system. Steps three to five: Design choices and architecture of the scenarios

For the sake of brevity, we have taken these steps together in this paper. Two contrasting scenarios are constructed, in order to show how different multi-level dynamics can lead to di-verging transition paths. In step 1 above, two contrasting types of transition pathways were chosen that need to be filled in further taking the main characteristics from step 2 as a start-ing point. The first scenario follows the pathway of reconfiguration, where the electricity re-gime becomes increasingly international of character, facilitated by developments in trans-mission networks and coordination among countries. The second scenario follows the path-way of dealignment and realignment, where the large-scale and central orientation of regime actors becomes increasingly discredited and local systems developed by new actor networks gain increasing legitimacy. Table 2 summarises various the design choices we have made to create these contrasts (at the landscape, regime and niche level) and some key characteris-tics of the scenarios:

Scenario title Reconfiguration pathway: Towards European electricity systems

Dealignment and realignment pathway: Towards distributed generation

Main characteristics

Regime actors develop more internatio-nal orientation facilitated by develop-ment of an international electricity high-way. EU policy and integration plays a leading role in the process. Renewables adapt to the system.

New networks of actors develop more lo-cal based systems facilitated by increas-ing difficulty of regime actors to cope with landscape pressures. Competition bet-ween large-scale supply orientation of re-gime actors and the local demand orienta-tion of new actor networks.

Dominant networks

Networks with traditional electricity pro-ducers, distributors and central go-vernment actors; oil and chemical sec-tor become part of electricity regime

Networks of energy distributors, engineer-ing & ICT firms, construction companies, housing associations and municipalities

Policy Strengthening of international grid, EU energy policies, European security of supply

Local energy policy, stimulation of alterna-tive infrastructures, integration of energy in built environment

Landscape factors

EU integration Strong influence as European energy policy focuses on energy security and

Some influence through institutional frameworks but main development in local


126

climate change energy policy ICT penetration Mediocre influence in fine-tuning supply

and demand Strong influence as ICT enables distance control of plants and local networks

Fuel prices Important influence to support feed-in of bio-fuels and efficiency increases

Important influence to support shift to-wards renewables

Security of supply

Strong influence to develop self-sup-porting European electricity system

Strong influence to develop local systems with high resilience based on diverse energy technologies

Regime factors

Infrastructure Regime actors press for grid reinforce-ment to enable investments in large-scale power plants

Crumbling off of dominance of centralised network as range of actors develop more local systems

Multi-regime interaction

Collaboration between energy compa-nies, oil and gas sector to enable CCS

Actors from other regimes (ICT, gas, transport, housing) support niche develop-ment of local systems

Niche development

Hybridisation of niches with regime; niches adapt to dominant design of central station electricity

First niches because of differentiation in regime; niches slowly built new power system design of distributed generation

Main niches Fossil generation with carbon capture and storage (CCS); Offshore wind power farms; coal/biomass gasification; based on international niche prolifera-tion

Micro cogeneration with small-scale elec-tricity generation technologies; Local po-wer generation because of overburdened grid; ICT demand for reliable power; New housing districts with low energy impacts

Table 2. Design choices and architecture of the two scenarios and transition paths. In the following sections, the ‘skeleton’ version of the scenarios from the table is elaborated into brief stories that shows the interplay between the various levels. Scenario 1: Reconfiguration towards European electricity systems

Note: The scenarios are written in the past tense, as a history of the future as it were. This is done to make the user focus on the plausibility of the story as it is. Using the future tense might easily trigger a reaction that something else could also happen (which is always the case) and divert attention away from the scenario character.

Overview

In this scenario political decision-making and more hierarchical forms of steering played a core role, with the European Union as a central actor both for the development of a Euro-pean electricity grid and the achievement of Kyoto targets and beyond. This ongoing process was accelerated due to recognition that stronger international control and capacity of trans-border flows could increase efficiency of electricity systems at a European scale and in-crease reliability of national power systems. Increasing collaboration and fine-tuning between transmission system operators was the consequence, while also long term planning of power plant investments shifted to the international level. Linking episode (2005–2015)

Increasing international trade in electricity and growing dependence of the reliability of natio-nal systems on crossborder capacity stimulated expansion of transmission capacity at bor-ders across Europe. One factor was increasing pressure from the EU on countries to expand transmission capacity as to guarantee reliability of electricity systems and to enable free trade of electricity. The role of the EU in the electricity regime became steadily stronger as conflicts increased between countries regarding unfair competition and the lack of cross-border transport capacity. The EU therefore intensified its role in the harmonisation of the processes of liberalisation in the national electricity sectors, and the role of international bo-dies in the organisation of crossborder trade strengthened relative to the national grid mana-gers. Energy companies were only prepared to invest in new power plants on the condition that the capacity for international flows of electricity was expanded. The lack of new invest-ments in power plants of significant capacity led to the initiation of public-private partnerships where national governments in collaboration with energy and oil companies made some


127

large-scale investments in power plants (multiple resources, with carbon capture and sto-rage, CCS) in order to increase security of supply and reduce carbon emissions from the system. As some of their investments came underway this is also reinforced the need for crossborder transmission capacity. Especially the development of thermal power plants with CCS that were located near fields where carbon could be injected triggered further demand for stronger electricity grids. All in all this led to an increase in capacity for crossborder elec-tricity transport and agreements regarding international reserve capacity. Transformational episode (2015–30)

Landscape pressures peaked. On the one hand, security of supply was at risk as a lack of reserve capacity in certain regions led to large power failures and could be prevented by suf-ficient crossborder capacity while. On the other hand, the political and societal need to deal with the climate problem became inevitable through combinations of prolonged extreme wea-ther and failure to reduce significant carbon reduction which mobilised international action. Until then renewable options remained confined to rather specific niches and had difficulty breaking through due to the stability of the regime and its specific technological demands. The amount of R&D in renewable energy at the European level also increased, and some large-scale projects were initiated. While regime actors perceived that they were able to assimilate landscape pressure through incremental innovations, other actor groups increasingly felt that the existing system was un-able to provide solutions for the challenges at hand. It was increasingly recognised that the initial Kyoto targets were well below what was needed to make any significant impact and more ambitious goals were set for 2020 and beyond. This coincided with an increasing need for replacement of obsolete fossil-based power plants that reached a peak after 2015. The combination of these two factors with a strong European grip on energy policy triggered a stronger technology-push of large-scale options, also facilitated by the process of EU integra-tion, involving thermal power with CCS, gasification plants, nuclear energy and nuclear fu-sion. In the portfolio, however, large-scale development of renewables also started to play a more significant role: off-shore wind farms, biomass, and large-scale PV. The strengthening of the international grid and increasing international coordination of electricity flows also enabled further integration of off-shore wind farms within the system. Domestic offshore power grids start to expand (UK, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands), and master plans were developed and implemented to integrate these grids and to reduce overall intermittency of offshore wind farms. The uptake of a number of offshore windfarms within electricity systems increased the demand for international grids that could balance the volatility of large-scale wind power as, for example, hydropower from Norway and southern Germany served as back-up for Dutch and German wind power. Evolution episode (2030–2050)

The process of European unification continued and political power increasingly shifted to the European level. Authority over high voltage grids had shifted from the national to the Euro-pean level and the reliability of electricity supply was guaranteed through European law, rules and agreements. Infrastructure became geared for large-scale generation and long dis-tance transport and power plants became more and more located close to potential carbon storage fields. The regulatory system disfavoured local generation, as distributed generation was not generally viewed and accepted as a potential route to a carbon free electricity sys-tem. The electricity infrastructure development facilitated large-scale integration of off-shore wind, while an infrastructure and legal framework for carbon storage was developed. Expectations regarding large-scale solar power increased as further strengthening of the grid, long distance transport at higher voltage, and improvement of cable and conduction technologies, led to reduction of transport losses and made transport at longer distances


128

possible. The EU intensified its collaboration with North-African countries on solar hydrogen systems that were developed in southern regions (Europe and Africa) as they served local hydrogen need and produced power for the international grid. In 2050, then, electricity de-mand in the Netherlands was met half by national power production with several highly effi-cient combined cycles based on inputs of gas, biomass and coal (with CO2 removal) and off-shore wind-hydrogen systems, leading to a halving of CO2 emissions compared to the 1990 level. The other half was met by import of electricity based on combined cycles, offshore wind farms, solar hydrogen systems and hydropower. Scenario 2: Dealignment and realignment towards distributed generation Overview

Gradually, the legitimacy of the existing regime corroded as it was not expected to be able to deal with the climate problem. Market based support for large scale options continued but public funding focused more and more on new networks of actors that were developing re-gionally oriented projects where a combination of demand-orientation, smart mixes of various energy technologies, and regional infrastructure and control development took place. In this scenario broader public and societal actors played a more important role in devising bottom-up strategies for emission reduction and sustainable development, in interaction with instru-ments for climate change on the local and regional level and oriented towards users of ener-gy and electricity. Local climate policy gained in importance within national and international climate policy making. Linking episode (2005–2015)

Changing user preferences facilitated by liberalisation induced increasing divergence in stra-tegies of mainly internationally operating electricity producers and more nationally focussed energy distribution companies. Producers supplied cheap base load electricity by full utilisa-tion of their large-scale power plants based on coal, oil, gas or nuclear energy. Distributors were more focussed on customers with smaller electricity demand, such as households and small firms. They were attracting customers mainly by highlighting the specificity of their pro-duct and service. Distributors aimed to further expand market niches such as industrial com-bined heat and power production, in collaboration with industrial actors, and they further ex-plored technological niches such as micropower in coalition with gas utilities and electric equipment producers. Gas utilities were involved to expand the market of gas relative to central produced electrici-ty. Several industries were involved because they needed electricity in combination with high quality heat that could be provided by microturbines. In the Netherlands powerful gas actors and electricity distributors initially played an important role through the development of micro-cogeneration. Initial projects on micro-generation led to further adjustments with projects in-volving a range of modular technologies as actors learned more and explored new combina-tions between more traditional energy technologies and more radical technologies involving fuel cells, storage technologies, and virtual control technologies. The promise of alternative energy technologies and its perfect match to the digital economy also got an increasingly stronger voice, even in regime circles (Yeager, 2004). ICT companies started to develop their own electricity systems as power interruptions were perceived as a major source of econo-mic loss and customer dissatisfaction. Leading edge companies followed examples in the USA and installed fuel cell stacks to se-cure their electricity supply. Several users needed more reliable power delivery for on-line fi-nancial transactions, exchanges and ICT operations. These companies installed local power back up that could handle short black outs. Also electricity contracts were settled between ICT, financial companies and energy companies that combined high reliability with high liabi-lity, and energy companies installed reliable local capacity with fuel cells for these compa-nies. Agricultural companies also increasingly exploited ways to develop energy production as a way of diversifying their dependence on the volatile agricultural market. This took the


129

form of exploiting side-products such as manure and waste products for electricity generation systems and expanding wind and solar power for local systems. Combinations and spin-offs of energy consultancies, engineering firms and distributors created energy service compa-nies that organised electricity flows and contracts between co-producers, users within and between local systems and increased reliability of local systems by co-management of small-scale power sources based on (bio)gas turbines, (bio)diesel engines, hybrid fuel cells-gas turbines. Some trials were designed in which fuel-cell cars were utilised as power sources to fill gaps produced by the intermittency of renewable based power systems. Transformational episode (2015–2030)

Rules were increasingly adapted to work towards favouring regional and local systems. In-vestments in large-scale transmission remained difficult due to political discussion and ex-pectations that local systems could meet rising demand. The success of local systems led to a range of small-scale applications being offered by energy service providers and engineer-ing firms. Government schemes supported investment in carbon-lean systems through tax in-centives. Different actors worked together in projects where energy provision was organised at the regional level, such as housing organisations, construction companies, project de-velopers, municipalities, NGOs, ICT companies and agricultural businesses. Energy provi-sion was less viewed separately but more as integrated in the development of housing areas, commercial areas, rural areas and industrial areas. Integrating various energy technologies into the built environment in combination with energy saving was more and more seen as the most promising route as it advanced by new owners of electricity systems such as housing organisations and ICT companies. Also agricultural businesses increasingly exploited side-products for energy provision and became owners of electricity systems. New energy service companies emerged that dealt with the organisation of electricity flows within and between systems also based on contracts that discerned between different quali-ties of electricity and enabled demand management from a distance through the application of smart metering systems. Actors from different regimes worked together to tailor energy technologies and systems to specific demand. Closed loop thinking became more and more dominant for industries and agriculture; energy-neutral houses were becoming the standard. Thus multiple component innovations started to work together, and this involved both new or-ganisational concepts and systems of a variety of energy technologies, and slowly a new re-gime started to grow out of the old regime. Strong regulatory frameworks and incentives for carbon regulation emerged at the local level, carbon quota were also related to specific areas (with differentiation in types of zones), and municipalities played an important role in regula-tory control and promotion of ways to reduce carbon emissions. Evolution episode (2030–2050)

As the process towards distributed generation continued, around 2030 gas was still exploited as a resource for the production of hydrogen but its share in power generation was falling. Al-ternative options for the production of hydrogen steadily increased their share, such as hy-drogen from biomass sources, wind energy and solar energy. Investments in power genera-tion virtually all took place in flexible power systems that offered power close to the custo-mers and were based on sources varying from wind and sun, to biomass and hydrogen. The systems were designed for specific local or regional demand for electricity, with connections to specific industrial users, commercial users and neighbourhoods. Also micropower systems continued to take a significant share of the power market. Investment in central capacity was absent in this period, although some larger power plants were built related to specific electri-city and heat demand of industrial users. In 2050, around 25% of electricity generation capacity was handled by relatively autonomous distributed generation systems. This emerged through the connection of previously inde-pendent small-scale power generating technologies in local systems, facilitated by on-line monitoring and power management. Newly built neighbourhoods became self-supportive for


130

power generation while existing neighbourhoods increased their share of locally produced power. This was stimulated by new legislation that prohibited the construction of housing areas that drew external power. Standards were developed to increase the share of locally produced power in existing houses. Apart from wind and photovoltaic power, also locally pro-duced biomass was becoming part of a local cycle of power and hydrogen production. An-other 50 % of electricity generation was provided by decentral systems with a connection to the central grid. Around 25% was provided by central power plants that were not connected to specific users. Overall this resulted in a halving of CO2 emissions compared to the 1990 level. Reflection and policy recommendations The two scenarios can be used as an aid to assess current strategies and policies within electricity circles, and to develop strategic recommendations. The two scenarios point out that ongoing dynamics in the current electricity system can offer starting points for diverging transition paths, which are both plausible but which may lead to very different outcomes in the long term. In our view this could provide clues for the development of policies, which are robust in the sense that they hold strength and relevance in both scenarios. This implies that policies need to be flexible in the sense that they are able to exploit changing conditions with-in and outside electricity systems. Based on the two scenarios we draw two main policy re-commendations to support a transition to a sustainable electricity system. Stimulate diversity of developments

In current processes of the formulation of policies and R&D agendas there is often a relative narrow range of actors involved. For example, in the visioning process towards a transition of the electricity system in the Netherlands, there is a bias to a business approach to the energy transition, with strong representation of multinationals and energy companies, but under-re-presentation of actors such as construction firms, housing companies, and consumer groups as reported in the initial visions and in the stakeholder consultation (Hofman, 2005). The strong focus on incumbent companies (regime actors) should be assessed critically as many have pointed out how difficult it is for incumbents to deliver more radical innovations (Hender-son and Clark, 1990; Utterback, 1994; Christensen, 1997). Especially new start-ups, small firms, and outsiders are found to play a pivotal role in studies of radical innovation and sys-tems change (Van de Poel, 2000; Geels, 2005). Incumbents are sometimes able to provide new products and markets, but evidence shows that it is often small, creative, new entities and networks developing new practices that provide the seeds for new sociotechnical sys-tems. The leading role of regime actors leads to a focus on large-scale renewable energy develop-ment, especially large-scale wind energy and the development of biomass applications within existing configurations. While the first scenario shows the promise of this path, a sole focus on large-scale integration has the risk of locking out other promising routes. This is unwise because there is much uncertainty whether large-scale integration will succeed. Factors that contribute to uncertainty are the shaky path of European convergence, problems of spatial integration and societal opposition, and the difficulty to integrate the various technologies into a reliable system. It is therefore sensible to encourage the formation of new networks and the inclusion of niche actors (such as ICT companies, agricultural firms) that are more likely to in-vest in other promising routes, such as distributed generation. It would be a fail-safe strategy to invest more effort in exploring other routes, rather than betting on one horse. The scena-rios show that most of the promising niches do not easily adapt to the central station electri-city model and have other kinds of systems and infrastructure requirements. Hence, there is a need to build up experience with alternative infrastructures, such as those for biomass, hy-drogen, and local microgrids. Real-life experiments are a good way to do this, also enabling further refinement of future visions on the basis of concrete learning experiences.


131

Overall, the general approach should be to stimulate diversity of developments in terms of in-frastructure and actor networks and reduce the dominance of incumbents in R&D and policy. Improve coordination between individual technologies and integration within systems

Much of the dynamic in the scenarios comes from new linkages that are created between dif-ferent technologies. For example, the development towards an international electricity high-way enables further development of off-shore wind-farms but also requires coordination bet-ween actors such as national governments and system operators. Similarly, the development of smaller scale energy technology depends upon integration of a variety of energy technolo-gies within urban areas. Policy, however, tends to focus too much on individual technologies, and not on the type of coordination that is necessary to enable the technology to develop, and the type of combinations of technologies that play a role. These types of policies are too limited, because individual technologies may be unable to break out, because of specific constraints (such as wind, photovoltaic power and its intermittent character). Overall therefore, there is a need for more focus on how the creation of new linkages bet-ween technologies and integration of sets of technologies within systems can be facilitated by adapting rules and increasing coordination. Conclusion The primary aim of this chapter is to show the promise of sociotechnical scenarios as a re-flexive tool for transition policy. Sociotechnical scenarios are not predictions of the future but can help to design more robust transition oriented policies. They can give insight in the va-rious complex processes at work in systems change, in driving forces and promising combi-nations of technological, societal and institutional change. The development (e.g., in an inter-active setting with various stakeholders from the domain of interest) and use of sociotechni-cal scenarios (e.g., expert-based scenarios) by policy makers can make them more reflexive for strategic considerations related to promising technologies and their potential to link up with other technologies and changing user preferences. The two examples of transition paths illustrate that the methodology can indeed lead to scenarios in which a transition emerges, not as a deus ex machina but as the result of plausible new linkages under specific condi-tions. Specific innovations and changing user preferences have been identified that can form the seeds for a transition and thus are good options for experimentation in the near term. Very importantly, these options should not be treated separately but possibilities to create links between them should be explored. Processes of hybridisation and linkages between technologies and specific user preferences are core aspects of transition policy, not just single technologies. Thus the two scenarios illustrate that the construction of sociotechnical scenarios can not only help to create visions of a sustainable future, it can also help to identi-fy potential transition paths that can lead to such futures. We have demonstrated that the STSc method can be used as a tool to develop policy recom-mendations for transitions towards sustainability. In this brief paper we cannot sufficiently acknowledge the richness of various other methods to explore possible futures but we can claim that in comparison to these the STSc method has at least two strong features, notably:

• The method is based on a scientific theory of transitions. The patterns and mechanisms used in the method thus provide an insight into why certain linkages and developments occur. This renders better clues for policy intervention than more deterministic methods.

• The method not only pays attention to outcomes but also focuses on transition paths. In contrast with most other methods this does not render simple diffusion paths but the sce-narios show a variety of linking options and pay attention to qualitative change and leap-frog effects.


132

Compared to other methods, the STSc method has also less developed sides and disadvan-tages. In its present form, the method is not suited to compute the effects of (combinations of) policy instruments. Furthermore, there is a subjective element in the scenarios presented. This partly results from the nature of transitions which are complex and undetermined which leaves room for subjectivity. In the scenarios above, for instance, we had to choose a limited number of niches in view of the limited overall length. A policy maker who is interested in an-other niche may still use the method to (let) explore its possibilities which may refine or amend the conclusions we have drawn here. Thus, the method provides for flexibility which adds to its usefulness as a tool for a specific case that a policy maker (or other actors) may be interested in. References Christensen, C.M. (1997) The Innovator’s Dilemma, (2000 edition), HarperBusiness, New York. EPRI (1999) Electricity Technology Roadmap, Powering Progress, EPRI, Pleasant Hill, California. Elzen, Boelie, Frank W. Geels, Peter S. Hofman and Ken Green (2004), ‘Sociotechnical scenarios as

a tool for transition policy: an example from the traffic and transport domain’, in Boelie Elzen, Frank W. Geels and Ken Green (eds.), System Innovation and the Transition to Sustainability, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., pp.251-281.

Elzen, Boelie and Peter Hofman (forthcoming 2006), Socio-Technical Scenarios: Methodology and ap-plication for the Electricity Domain, Enschede.

Freeman, C. & C. Perez 1(988), ‘Structural crisis of adjustment, business cycles and investment be-haviour’, in: G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg & L. Soete (eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory, London: Pinter, 38-66

Geels, F.W (2005), Technological Transitions and System Innovations: A co-evolutionary and socio-technical analysis, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. (2005).

Geels, Frank and Johan Schot (forthcoming), ‘Typology of sociotechnical transtions pathways: Refine-ments and elaborations of the multi-level perspective’, Submitted to Research Policy.

Henderson, R.M. and K.B. Clark (1990) Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Pro-duct Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms, Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 1: 9-30.

Hofman, P.S. (2005) Innovation and Institutional Change – The transition to a sustainable electricity system, dissertation, University of Twente, Enschede.

IEA (2006) Energy Technology Perspectives – Scenarios and Strategies to 2050, International Energy Agency, Paris.

IPPC (2001) Climate Change 2001: Mitigation, Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assess-ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press.

Kemp, René, Arie Rip and Johan Schot (2001), ‘Constructing Transition Paths through the Manage-ment of Niches’, in Raghu Garud and Peter Karnøe (eds.), Path Dependence and Creation, Lon-don: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, pp.269-299.

Kemp, R. (1994), ‘Technology and the Transition to Environmental Sustainability. The Problem of Technological Regime Shifts’, Futures, Vol.26, nr.10, 1023-1046.

Rip, A. & R. Kemp (1998), ‘Technological Change’, in: S. Rayner & E.L. Malone (eds), Human Choice and Climate Change, Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Press. Volume 2, 327-399.

Rotmans, J., R. Kemp & M. van Asselt (2001), ‘More Evolution than Revolution: Transition Manage-ment in Public Policy’, Foresight, 3(2001)1, 15-31

Schot, J., R. Hoogma & B. Elzen (1994), ‘Strategies for Shifting Technological Systems. The case of the automobile system’, Futures, Vol.26, nr.10, 1060-1076

Utterback, J.M. (1994) Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation, Harvard Business School Press, Bos-ton.

Van de Poel, I. (2000) On the role of outsiders in technical development, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 12: 383–397.


133

Social science support for long-term oriented regional energy

management Harald Rohracher38 1. Introduction: Social-science research and long-term energy options There is a widely perceived need to give social sciences a stronger role in understanding and shaping technological change and assessing its effects on society. The ‘European Research Advisory Board’, for example, suggests to better integrate social sciences into technology oriented programmes. A recent EU workshop in June 2006 explored “why many of their col-leagues from other disciplines largely ignore the social, economic and ethical impact of their work, despite increased public concern about scientific and technological advances and choi-ces. (…) The EU already recognises that social sciences are necessary to understand socie-ty and shape tomorrow's technology, but making the leap from rhetoric to reality is more complicated.” (EU Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Issue 4, 2005, p. 5) In a si-milar vein the ‘European Research Advisory Board’ develops a rather strong commitment for the inclusion of social sciences in the 7th Framework Programme. In a recent document it states: “There seem to be a significant number of areas within the Specific Programmes where inclusion of the Social Sciences could add obvious value. Contributions will be needed here from social scientists as well as the Commission. During the process of developing the FP7 Work Programmes, it is strongly recommended that attention be given to identifying So-cial Science research which can add value to the S&T goals. To help this discussion, EURAB provides here some examples of activities and themes where there is a prima facie case for including the Social Sciences: “Human development and ageing; translating clinical research into clinical practice; integration of technologies; personal and home environments; meeting societal challenges for health; ICT for trust and confidence; energy efficiency and savings; ensuring sustainable urban mobility and strengthening competitiveness (…). EURAB be-lieves that there is scope in many of these fields for the inclusion of complementary but closely coupled Social Science research, and for interdisciplinary projects with social scien-tists as active partners.” (European Research Advisory Board, 2005, 16). But how can such an integration of social sciences into research on long-term technical change be best achieved? In this paper we will discuss this question with a particular focus on energy systems. Social science research most likely has only limited capabilities to as-sess or forecast long-term transformations of the energy system in advance – be it at regio-nal, national or international level. Nevertheless, societal strategies in general and energy policy in particular aiming at a long-term transition of our current energy system towards in-creased sustainability may profit from social sciences in various ways. Socio-economic re-search may well contribute to a better understanding of socio-technical transformation pro-cesses, their embedding in broader socio-economic trends and the development of instru-ments for a long-term oriented, adaptive and reflexive policy. Social sciences thus may help us in dealing with long-term energy options in the present, in gradually ‘appropriating’ these options by learning about socio-economic requirements (embedding in regulatory regimes, institutional contexts, changes of actor constellations and strategies, etc.) and about possible impacts on social systems. This way, social sciences may be functional in improving our non-technical knowledge about various options, e.g., the increased use of renewables, nuclear energy use (fusion or fission), radical decentralisation, the ‘hydrogen economy’ or ways of significantly reducing energy demand, within the broader long-term vision of a non-fossil fuel

38 Inter-University Research Centre for Technology, Work and Culture (IFZ), Graz.


134

based energy system and may help us find strategies how such assessment processes may be organised in a socially inclusive way and feed into policy strategies supporting the transformation of energy systems towards sustainability. With the aim of sustainable development in mind we thus should ask: How can we develop conscious strategies to manage the transformation process of energy systems and “push” it towards a more sustainable pathway? Social learning and a reflexive management of the transformation of energy systems certainly need specific strategies and institutional frame-works to be successful. As I will argue, social sciences can definitely play a role in improving such learning processes and increasing the reflexivity of the transition process. During the past decades, social sciences have gained an improved understanding of the in-terdependent processes of social and technical change. Energy systems are socio-technical configurations where technologies, institutional arrangements (e.g., regulation, norms), social practices and actor constellations (such as user-producer relations and interactions, interme-diary organisations, public authorities, etc.) mutually depend on each other and are em-bedded into broader contexts of cultural values, socio-economic trends (globalisation, indivi-dualisation, etc.) and other socio-technical regimes. Innovation processes are becoming in-creasingly complex and are an outcome of the interaction between a multitude of actors, dis-tributed over many different institutions and locations. While central steering of such transfor-mation processes becomes increasingly difficult, processes of social learning, coordination and socio-technical experimentation gain importance. Within such a context of social learning and experimentation, the regional level may become an important ‘testing ground’ for the implementation and social embedding of new technolo-gies (the development of contexts of application, the formation of actor-networks, institutional adaptations), for socio-technical experiments within confined niches and processes of joint vision building and scenario development for future energy systems. In this contribution I will outline a framework within which social sciences may play a relevant role in dealing with the long-term dimensions of energy system change. I will first give a short introduction to a socio-technical approach for understanding energy systems and their dyna-mics and draw attention especially to the issues of visions, expectations and social learning as important ingredients for dealing with long-term transformation processes. In a next step I will discuss some instruments which make use of social science input for shaping long-term transformation processes: transition management, interactive scenario development, adap-tive foresight methods, and socio-technical experiments. Finally I will discuss the regional di-mension in such processes and draw up a simple typology of social science contributions to research on long-term options for energy systems. 2. A socio-technical perspective Technologies are always embedded in social and cultural contexts – institutions, values, ac-tor constellations, etc. – and shape these contexts as much as they are shaped themselves in the co-evolution of technology and society. As an effect of this mutual relationship of tech-nological and social structures, socio-technical systems such as the energy system often show a remarkable stability over time and as a result a resistance to change even if more sustainable long-term options have been identified. One of the approaches conceptualising this embeddedness of technologies which is especially appropriate to analyse the stability and dynamics of socio-technical change is the multi-level model of innovation (see e.g., Rip and Kemp, 1998, Geels, 2004). A strength of this model is the integration of the local activi-ties and practices of users and other social players (e.g. intermediaries) with technologies and broader social and economic structures. The multi-level model of technological change separates the 'breeding' of new technologies in confined technological niches from a meso-level of sociotechnical regimes (e.g. the system of mobility) and a broader context of the so-


135

ciotechnical landscape, which encompasses cultural norms, values or dominant economic or governance regimes (such as the present trend to liberalise former infrastructure monopo-lies). A 'sociotechnical regime' refers to the temporal stability of sociotechnical configurations and means a rule set or grammar that structures the sociotechnical co-evolution process. The way such a regime evolves "is structured by the accumulated knowledge, engineering practices, value of past investments, interests of firms, established product requirements and meanings, intra- and interorganisational relationships [and] government policies" (Kemp et al., 2001, 273). The creation of novel technologies thus is shaped by the interactions of the micro level of users, firms and households, the meso level of technological regimes and the macro level of sociotechnical landscapes. The value of such a concept is to point to the multi-dimensionality of processes of sociotechnical change, to the multiplicity of actors involved in the process and to the embeddedness of local practices and niches in various contexts with their own specific history and dynamics. The following picture (Figure 1) tries to capture this embeddedness and the co-evolution of sociotechnical elements such as artefacts, practices and meanings at different levels of in-tegration. Many strategies of environmental policy such as regulation and standards are fo-cusing on the regime level – but highly depend, as our picture indicates, on both broader so-cio-economic structures and on practices, expectations and strategies of actors at the micro-level. Figure 1. A multi-level model of innovation (cf. Rotmans et al., 2001). Closely related to the concept of sociotechnical regime or system, Jacobsson and Bergek speak of technology-specific or sectoral innovation systems meaning sociotechnical configu-rations around specific technologies (such as photovoltaics), industry sectors (energy sys-tem) or societal demand areas (mobility). For a successful evolution and performance of such systems several ‘functions’ have to be fulfilled (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, 212):

• “Creation and diffusion of ‘new’ knowledge • The guidance of the direction of search among users and suppliers of technology (…) • The supply of resources such as capital and competencies • The creation of positive external economies, both market and non-market mediated • The formation of markets. Since innovations rarely find ready-made markets, these may

need to be stimulated or even created. This process may be affected by governmental actions to clear legislative obstacles and by various organisations’ measures to legitimise the technology.”

Macro level (landscape)

Meso level (regimes)

Micro level (niches)


136

Long-term energy options may be such an orientation mark for the evolution of new socio-technical configurations or the transition of existing socio-technical regimes. Nevertheless, the question is how socio-technical systems can gradually evolve around such options. Func-tions of innovation system direct our attention to both, the prerequisites needed and the indi-cators for a successful transformation process towards these long-term options. 3. Visions, expectations and learning processes With respect to long-term system transformations the issue of orientation of change pro-cesses – and thus the topic of visions, expectations and continuous adaptation of such vi-sions in social learning processes – is of special importance. In this section we will shortly discuss the role of visions, expectations and learning within the context of socio-technical change. Visions and expectation may play an important role in the integration and alignment of diffe-rent constituencies of actors towards a common aim, they signify existing or possible techni-cal alternatives and provide a framework towards which to orient the perceptions, decisions, and behaviour of individual and collective actors during processes and networks of technolo-gy development. Examples of such visions that align various actors have been elaborated, among others, for the case of the Diesel engine (as a thermodynamically perfect machine), the telephone and the idea of universal service or visions such as the data highway or the car-friendly city. At the basis of this concept of visions lies the idea that innovations are generated not by divi-sion of work between different disciplines but by an interference between different knowledge cultures (within engineering but also firms, politics, etc.). Visions serve as a bridge between these different cultures. The main functions of visions are threefold (Dierkes et al., 1996, 43):

• collective projection, as visions bring together people's intuitions and other types of know-ledge about what appears feasible and desirable to them;

• synchronic preadaptation, as visions integrate the various forms of perception and eva-luation of the different actors producing technical knowledge and align them in the same direction;

• functional equivalent, as visions stand in for shared, binding rule systems that do not yet exist in the communication between representatives of different knowledge cultures.

The effects generated by such integrative visions are on the one hand cognitive activation as these visions may be used to make new technical knowledge conceivable for different actors, on the other hand personal mobilisation, as visions "activate the cognitive as well as the emotional, volitional, and affective potential of people, they mobilize the whole person" (ibid., 52). Finally visions may serve as an interpersonal stabiliser as they support the co-operation between and internalisation within the representatives of such interfering knowledge cultures. While the concept of ‘guiding visions’ centres around stable metaphors serving as boundary objects between different knowledge cultures and actor groups, research on the role of ex-pectations in technological change puts more emphasis on the dynamics and performativity of such long-term visions. Similar to ‘guiding visions’, expectations mediate across different boundaries – horizontally as a coordination of different actor groups or vertically across diffe-rent levels of organisation (micro, meso and macro) (Borup et al., 2006). Visions and expec-tations operate at micro-, meso- and macro-level – ranging from rather short-term expecta-tions of individuals or small groups of actors to collective long-term visions. Expectations such as the nanorobot cleaning up blood vessels constitute ‘communicative spaces’ which facilitate meaningful communication across different discourse logics (e.g., science, economics, mass media) and both limit and enable communication processes about the future of nanotechnology (see Lösch, 2006). Case studies on the dynamics of expecta-tions moreover have been able to reconstruct the performativity of expectations, i.e., their


137

role in creating agendas for relevant actors in innovation processes, attracting the interest of necessary allies, stimulating resources and support, and thereby to some extent ‘perform’ the futures they envision. However, expectations about the future of technologies and applica-tions often exhibit their specific dynamics, e.g., Gartner consultancy’s ‘hype cycle’ (Borup et al., 2006) claiming that in the early phase of technology development expectations often sore high and are followed by a ‘trough of disillusionment’ before they follow a more realistic ‘slope of enlightenment’. Not least because of the performative and shared character of ex-pectations, “visions, images and beliefs cannot sharply be demarcated from knowledge” (Nowotny et al., 2001, 232). As Eames and others argue, the example of the ‘hydrogen economy’ which has proved a po-werful vision and active arena for the generation of technological expectations in the energy sector also shows us how heterogeneous such expectations often are: “At one extreme we find highly decentralised systems based on local production of hydrogen from domestic re-newables, with hydrogen used to balance intermittent supplies and act as a major energy carrier. Others see hydrogen only as a transport fuel, based on centralised systems with large-scale production of hydrogen from nuclear power or fossil fuels, with an accompanying distribution infrastructure” (Eames et al., 2006, 363). The authors identify six overarching narrative themes around the hydrogen economy: ‘community empowerment and democratisation’, ‘ecotopia’, ‘technical fix’, ‘independence and power’, ‘inevitability and technical progress’, and ‘staying in the race: hydrogen and the competitiveness agenda’. Visions about the technological future of a hydrogen economy thus possess a remarkable ‘interpretative flexibility’. To become eventually realised such visions “must move from performative expectation to niche experimentation, demonstration and use. In so doing it must become grounded in particular actor networks and specific places.” (ibid., p. 372) We will come back to this ‘grounding’ of expectations in the next section. First, we will shortly stay with another central issue for transition processes, the topic of so-cial learning. Learning has often been identified as a core element in successful innovation processes and it has been pointed out that learning cannot be reduced to a cognitive act of knowledge appropriation, but that we can observe a number of different learning mecha-nisms and sources of learning which are also referring to the embodiment of knowledge or the social character of knowledge creation. Various authors thus have expanded on learning-by-doing (cf. Arrow, 1962), learning-by-using (cf. Rosenberg, 1982) or learning-by-interacting between producers and users (cf. Lundvall, 1988), the latter one being especially interesting for transition processes and the actor reconfigurations coming along with these. With respect to the reflexivity of transition processes and the requirement of changes at sys-tem level, a further useful differentiation of learning processes can be applied: single-loop learning (sometimes also called first-order learning) versus double-loop learning (second-or-der learning) (cf. Argyris, 1999). Chris Argyris developed this discrimination in the context of organisational learning, and refers with single-loop learning to a situation where a mismatch between intentions and outcome is corrected without questioning the underlying values of the system (comparable to the steering of a car), while double-loop learning may lead to a se-rious questioning of these values and attempts to identify “governing variables” which are in-fluencing actions and ultimately the outcome of these actions. Double-loop learning thus is more reflexive with respect to the context of action and underlying assumptions guiding ones activities. This type of learning is especially needed for profound system changes where simple adaptive strategies will not work any more. 4. Strategies and instruments to shape socio-technical transformation processes So far we have discussed some consequences of a social scientific conceptualisation of technology: the social embedding of technologies and technical change, i.e., a systemic per-spective of integrated socio-technical systems, and the importance of visions, expectations


138

and social learning processes for shaping and orienting the transformation of socio-technical systems. We will now turn to some strategies and elements of dealing with socio-technical transformation processes towards long-term aims – beginning with the broader view of shap-ing transition processes and then turning to some instruments of integrating long-term visions into policy strategies. Transition management Building on an understanding of innovation processes as described above, the concept of transition management (Rotmans et al., 2001, Elzen et al., 2004) aims at developing an ex-ploratory, flexible way of policy making with constant evaluations and adaptation of transition objectives and instruments, which decidedly focuses on long-term changes and changes at system level. Technological transitions which have been addressed in these discussions are large-scale transformations of “societal functions” such as transportation or energy provision. Such functions do not only include the technical level, but also changes in other elements such as user practices, regulation, industrial networks or symbolic meaning (Elzen et al., 2004). The main challenge certainly lies in the question how these general principles congeal into concrete policy as well as specific analyses and actions, but still these principles are va-luable guideposts for a process-oriented view to policy making in a context characterised by uncertainty and complexity as we have encountered in our discussion on the change of ener-gy systems. Some of the “core authors” of the transition management literature characterise “transition management” by the following items:

• “Long-term thinking (at least 25 years) as a framework for shaping the short-term policy, • Thinking in terms of more than one domain (multi-domain) and different actors (multi-ac-

tor) at different scale levels (multi-level); • A focus on learning and a special learning philosophy (learning-by-doing and doing-by-

learning); • Trying to bring about system innovation alongside system improvement; • Keeping a large number of options open (wide playing field)” (Rotmans et al., 2001, 22). At the heart of instruments to shape transition processes are strategies to organise proces-ses of social learning, to set up sociotechnical experiments and allow for an experimental way of policy making, as well as strategies to collectively develop visions of transition goals, e.g., images of possible futures of the energy sector, and develop pathways to get there. Po-licy in such a context mainly takes over a role of coordination and facilitation – also ad-dressed in concepts of policy networks and policy learning (for a more detailed discussion see Schienstock, 2004). Without going into detail, Figure 2 below shall convey a sense of the ideas and strategies ly-ing behind the transition management concept. The picture especially points to the adaptive and iterative character of transition policies and summarizes the iterative circles of develop-ing visions and strategies, mobilizing actors and implementing activities, monitoring progress and adapting visions and strategies again. We now turn to some instruments within this context of transition management which on the one hand help to develop socio-economic visions around long-term energy options and on the other hand support learning processes about the implementation and embedding of such visions.


139

Figure 2. Ideas and strategies of Transition Management (source: Loorbach and van der Brugge, forthcoming). Interactive scenario building and foresight In our social science perspective on technological change and specifically long-term system transformation processes the importance of orientation, visions and expectations has already been highlighted. Social sciences also play a role in developing strategies to create spaces for learning and reflection in transition processes, such as the interactive creation of joint vi-sions and images. The creation of several possible images of the future allows for an assess-ment, e.g., of the contribution to sustainable development, and subsequently the systematic development of pathways and measures required to direct the transition process towards the direction of the “best case image”. There is a considerable variety of scenario methodologies and ways of using scenarios (see e.g., van Notten et al., 2003, Börjeson et al., 2006). Scenarios are “typically defined as sto-ries describing different but equally plausible futures that are developed using methods that systematically gather perceptions about certainties and uncertainties. Scenarios are not in-tended to be truthful, but rather provocative and helpful in strategy formulation and decision-making.” (Selin, 2006, 1) As Weber points out, scenarios in general have moved away from a pure focus on science and technology and increasingly include market and social considera-tions; they become an increasingly participatory activity; and they have an emphasis on the contribution of foresight activities on shaping rather than predicting the future (Weber, 2006). One of the fundamental distinctions is whether a scenario is explorative or normative. Explo-rative scenarios ask ‘What can happen?’ and explore different consistent visions of the future under varying external factors or perspectives. An example is the UK Futures scenario exer-cise where four basic types of development have been discerned along the dimensions ‘so-cial and political values (individual vs. community) and ‘nature of governance’ (interdepend-ence vs. autonomy): world markets, global responsibility, local stewardship and national en-terprise (Berkhout and Hertin, 2002). Sectoral visions such as the development of energy systems can then be modelled on the basis of these four fundamental types. Normative sce-narios are also referred to as prospective, strategy, policy and intervention scenarios, and are rather about ‘How can a certain target – e.g., sustainable energy system – be reached?’ Normative scenarios are often followed by a ‘backcasting’ process, asking about necessary steps and strategies to reach the envisioned future.

Evaluating, monitoring

and learning(transition-adaptation)

Developing sustainability visions and

joint strategies (transition-

agenda)

Organizing a multi-actor network

(transition-arena)

Mobilizing actors and executing projects and experiments

(transition-action)

Evaluating, monitoring

and learning(transition-adaptation)

Developing sustainability visions and

joint strategies (transition-

agenda)

Organizing a multi-actor network

(transition-arena)

Mobilizing actors and executing projects and experiments

(transition-action)


140

Scenarios may fulfil a number of functions for long-term transition processes (see Wiek et al., 2006): Most obviously they help to generate and integrate knowledge about complex future states and developments of the system and its contexts, discuss interrelationships, uncer-tainties or inconsistencies, but they may also contribute to building competence of the actors involved, to facilitate and organise team work (e.g., enable negotiating different viewpoints) or to counsel decision makers. However, Berkhout and others point out that not enough effort has been put in picturing social and economic futures as an essential component of the as-sessment of, e.g., climate change impacts. However, this deficit also has to do with some fundamental problems: “indeterminacy (imperfectly understood structures and processes), discontinuity (novelty and surprise in social systems), reflexivity (the ability of people and or-ganizations to reflect about and adapt their behaviour) and framing (legitimately diverse opi-nions about the state of the world).” (Berkhout et al., 2002, 93-94) Similar to the procedural functions of scenarios mentioned above, Berkhout and Hertin also point to the importance of scenarios to engage actors in a process of social and organisational learning (often more im-portant than the analytical results of scenarios), i.e., setting a frame for “iterative processes of self-reflection, change and adaptation within organisations” (ibid., p. 94). Similarly to claims made for technology assessment in general, participative scenario development could play an “important role in reaching congruent meanings, which could then serve as the basis for joint action undertaken by different types of actors.” (Grin and Van de Graaf, 1996, 96) Foresight may thus be an important element of reflexive and adaptive governance strategies. Foresight in combination with adaptive planning may especially support strategic thinking about portfolios of options across different scenarios and during different phases of the policy cycle (Weber, 2006) and may thus enable second-order learning in policy making. However, to be effective the principles behind adaptive foresight have to be closely tied not only to poli-cy design, but also to policy implementation and learning, at strategic as well as at local le-vel, Weber points out. The type of foresight and planning has to adapt to different phases and requirements as well: while initially system analysis and problem identification are on the agenda, the methods subsequently have to change to foresight with explorative and norma-tive elements, backcasting processes to design pathways sustainable system configurations, portfolio analysis to identify robust and adaptive policy options, and finally strategy formula-tion which turns the so far open and participative into a closed process. After monitoring imp-lementation success and changing framework conditions the forecasting-planning cycle can be repeated to learn form past experiences and adjust to changes (Weber, 2006): Figure 3. The process of backcasting (source: Weber et al., 2003).

Present

Framework Scenario 1



Image of the Future 1



Explorative Phase

Normative Phase

Transition pathways

Portfolio-based policy strategy

Scenario assessment

Selection & specification of transition fields


141

The figure above gives an example of such a process of “image creation”, assessment and “back-casting” (as this creation of pathways starting with future images is called). Socio-technical experiments or strategic niche management, as pointed out below, are examples for experimental implementation, which can then feed back into the adaptation of foresight processes and policy portfolio development. Sociotechnical experiments; Strategic Niche Management Strategic niche management (SNM) and bounded sociotechnical experiments (see, for example, Szejnwald Brown et al., 2003; Szejnwald Brown and Vergragt, 2006) both specifi-cally refer to the creation of protected spaces (e.g., market niches, controlled field experi-ments) to broaden the design process by involving a broader range of actors and facilitate in-teractive learning of the actors participating. Socio-technical experiments are “driven by a long-term and large-scale vision of advancing the society’s sustainability agenda, though the vision needs not be equally shared by its participants. Its goal is to try out innovative ap-proaches for solving larger societal problems of unsustainable technologies and services.” (Szejnwald Brown and Vergragt, 2006, 6) A central aim of the development of niches similar-ly is to learn about needs, problems and possibilities connected with the environmental inno-vation experimented with, and to help articulate design specifications, user-requirements or side-effects of the innovation. Managing the development of environmental technologies in niches (and finding the right timing to open these niches to the wider market and competition) certainly is one of the more advanced and reflexive forms of managing environmental inno-vations and technologies by organising social learning process involving producers, techno-logy designers and users in a joint process. Experiences with SNM have, for example, been gained in the area of sustainable transport. An evaluation of a number of these examples discusses niche management processes at the level of transport technologies (e.g., various field experiments with electric cars and ultra-light electric vehicles) and at the level of experiments with the aim of reconfiguring mobility, such as car-sharing initiatives, bicycle-pool schemes or pilot projects on individualized public transport in France (cf. Hoogma et al., 2002). Niche management is a form of broadening design processes by facilitating interaction of a broader range of stakeholders and integrating the design process in a wider transition per-spective (at least in the sense that current practices and social contexts are reflected). Re-ferring to the related concept of constructive technology assessment, Johan Schot empha-sises a number of characteristics of broadened design processes (cf. Schot 2001): They should be anticipative, as users participating in the design process are expected to be more likely to bring up social issues and acceptance problems very early; they should be reflexive in the sense that actors are encouraged to recognize their own and others' perspectives and to consider technology design and social design as one integrated process; and they should finally lead to social learning processes, including second “order learning”, i.e., not only arti-culating market demands but also questioning existing preferences and requirements in or-der to open up possibilities for more radical developments. Long-term energy transitions in a regional perspective In which respect could long-term energy options profit from a regional perspective? Long-term options per se are hardly related to regional aspects, they are usually rather presented as technological opportunities at an even global level. However, the socio-technical perspec-tive on long-term options of technological change we have discussed so far has shifted focus on how such long-term visions and expectations can feed into a reflexive and adaptive politi-cal practise. Social learning turned out as a central element of system transformation, as continuous adaptations between the outcomes of successful steps of system change on the


142

one hand and long-term visions and expectations of relevant actor groups on the other are required. We have to learn continually how long-term options can best be embedded in wider socio-economic contexts and how they can contribute to socially desirable outcomes. With respect to this social embedding of technological options – be it at a conceptual level in scenarios or in experimental implementation processes in niches – the regional level may be of special interest. At a regional level long-term perspectives may be situated within perspec-tives of regional development and associated long-term social trends, they may be grounded in concrete settings and ‘tested’ before the backdrop of different actor perspectives and inte-rests. Regions can be interesting contexts to stimulate learning processes with respect to long-term options: “Due to their proximity and flexibility, regional networks provide an ideal platform for carrying out social innovation experiments which are often very complex and in-volve a great number of actors, needing close interaction between various kinds of firms, consumers and government agents.”(Schienstock, 2005, 108) In general, sociotechnical sys-tems such as the energy or the mobility system have a strong regional focus in their ‘applica-tion dimension’ and may be useful to study the interaction between supply and demand side, intermediary actors, institutional frameworks, etc., ‘in situ’. Various case studies analysing the social shaping of technologies point out the importance of the ‘downstream side’ of inno-vations, i.e., their implementation into specific contexts, processes of appropriation and con-sumption – a phase where innovations often go through an iterative process of mutual adap-tation of technological design and institutional/social context (see e.g., the contributions in Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2003 or Rohracher, 2005). Geographical and socio-cultural proximity as important features of regional innovation sys-tems may also support closer relations between users and producers (potentially resulting in learning effects about use contexts and product improvements) and also between producers and policy making or public authorities (potentially resulting in better institutional embedding of new products or technologies). Not least regional programmes around specific technolo-gies or application fields (sustainability in general – see e.g., Gerstlberger, 2004, new mobili-ty concepts, new energy technologies, use of information technologies, etc.) may help to in-tegrate a broader range of social groups in the region into the innovation process – for ex-ample, user groups, advocacy groups and other civil society organisations – and may pro-vide joint guiding visions orienting the expectations and activities of the heterogeneous ac-tors involved. In a similar vein, Schienstock argues that the development of environmental beneficial products and processes “depends to a great extent on the exchange of tacit or sticky knowledge on the basis of trust and social capital. Also, the fact that concerned people and households have to be involved in the creation of a new development path points to the great importance of spatial proximity.” (Schienstock, 2005, 105) Before this background re-gional technology-related transition strategies may indeed be a valuable ‘learning space’ for broader and more long-term transitions of the energy system. Regions may be an important stepping stone in establishing and widening technological or market niches. Experiments or new concepts for transport, energy or communication often take place at a municipal or re-gional level. Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that sociotechnical regimes usually have a much wider scope and usually also require national and international efforts to be trans-formed. It is thus of special importance to integrate regional efforts into a multi-level govern-ance approach with national and international levels of policy and activity. There are already various examples, how long-term visions have been dealt with at regional level. Regional foresight processes have been carried out in, e.g., in Finland (Harmaakorpi and Uotila, 2006). Regional visionary capabilities have been developed to define future po-tential development paths and to promote the functioning of regional thematic innovation net-works. However, as an evaluation of regional foresight processes in Finland revealed, a com-mon problem is that “Visions and strategic goals remain far too general, and in technology foresight processes, one ends up creating new and exciting trends that, in fact, are neither connected to the reality at the regional level not to the practices of different organisations in a region.” (ibid., p. 784) In the case of the vision of the ‘hydrogen economy’, which has already


143

been mentioned in an earlier section (Eames et al., 2006), the city of London has been used as a ‘test-bed’ for ‘real-life experimentation’ of technology, studying the design, construction and operation for the necessary infrastructure for hydrogen production and refuelling sta-tions, or testing customer acceptance in detailed ground-level demonstration projects (e.g., testing fuel-cell buses). A regional example from Austria is the ‘energy-self-sufficient district’ of Güssing in Burgen-land (roughly 30,000 inhabitants in an area of 500 km2). The aim of this regional vision is to cover the district’s energy demand (including transport) completely by regional renewable energy and thus bringing the net-CO2 emissions to almost zero. Within this project, which in a way is a large socio-technical experiment, workshops with regional actors have been orga-nised and various new technologies – often still in a prototype phase – have been imple-mented by the regional energy centre. Examples are a (woody) biomass gasification plant (internationally one of a few which have been practically implemented), a biodiesel produc-tion unit, or the implementation of ‘poly-generation’ concepts in ‘energy hubs’ where heat, electricity, gaseous and liquid fuels are simultaneously produced from diverse organic raw materials or waste products. However, the project not only consists of new pilot technologies, but also integrates various conventional and well-tested technologies such as biomass dis-trict heating systems, etc. The innovative part in this case rather resides at a system level facing the challenge of linking all these technologies together for a 100% supply with renew-ables. At a regional level, these technologies have to be embedded into a concrete socio-economic context (institutional frameworks, user practices and acceptance, new agricultural practices, infrastructure systems etc.), and much can be learnt about critical problems which have to be solved before such options can be widely adopted by other regions. However, in the case of the energy-self-sufficient region Güssing there would certainly be more potential for the use of social sciences – as pointed out in this paper – to accompany and evaluate the process and draw lessons generalisable to other regions and for the long-term option of a re-newables-based energy system. To sum up this section about the role of regions in long-term transition processes: regions are an especially appropriate level to study the interplay of infrastructure, technologies, insti-tutions and actors such as users, producers and others. The long-term perspective may either refer to the time horizon until specific technologies can be brought to the market or to the time dimension required to achieve specific system characteristics such as energy self-sufficiency. In both cases regions can be either a context for demonstration projects of tech-nologies (or sociotechnical systems) or for forecasting exercises (how could these technolo-gies be implemented in our region?). A social science research agenda In this paper I have elaborated a perspective on long-term energy options before the back-drop of socio-technical system transitions. The strategies suggested have been designed within a social science perspective on technological change and require the contribution of social sciences at different levels to be implemented. The final section of this paper will thus reflect on different types of social science contributions to long-term transition processes of the energy system. The following four categories describe different types and functions of social science re-search within such an endeavour (though the separation of these types is not always clear cut).

1) At a first level sociological research can contribute within a rather instrumental relation to technological projects, e.g., by investigating user attitudes, by assessing social impacts and the social acceptance of new technologies or by analysing user experiences. This is usually what engineers or research programme managers call for when they want to integrate social science research. While such a type of social science usually does not contribute to a re-


144

thinking of the interactions of long-term options with its social contexts and opportunities or li-mitations accruing from these dependencies (Guy and Shove, 2000, consequently call this type of research ‘end-of-pipe’ sociology), it may nevertheless be useful for assessing poten-tial acceptance problems or for adapting energy technologies according to user needs and experiences. This also applies to the regional level where attitudes towards long-term per-spectives can be researched, experiences and acceptance levels of demonstration projects may be assessed, or expectations of potential users and other stakeholders may be eva-luated. Research on long-term socio-economic trends and resulting requirements for energy systems which can in turn be integrated in system simulations, etc. can be put into this basket as well. Such a type of social science research may thus especially improve our un-derstanding of the present situation of energy systems in their social and institutional con-texts – the interests, attitudes and expectations of different groups of actors about existing energy technologies and towards long-term options, the long-term trends which we already experience and so on.

2) A different type of sociological research may contribute to the research on long-term ener-gy options in a more procedural role, by, e.g., organising participative processes of user or stakeholder involvement (e.g., for regional scenario development). Sociological knowledge about social relations and interaction can be highly useful for developing instruments and procedures which bring a broader range of actors into the development of long-term perspec-tives of the energy system. Discursively oriented approaches to the assessment of long-term technology options may bring other results (and maybe more valid ones, as they are closer to real-life situations in decision making) than quantitative surveys. A case study on success-ive consumer surveys and representation techniques to assess the acceptance and possible take-up of electric vehicles convincingly demonstrates (Brown, 2001) that the design of such studies and the techniques employed may have considerable effects on the type and charac-teristics of users that are represented. Where the individualised and unreflective setting of market surveys overemphasises a narrow conception of short-term preferences of con-sumers and citizens’ self-interest, other studies which put more emphasis on experiential learning, the context of use and public deliberation among participants arrived at representa-tions of much more other-regarding, politically aware citizens. Sociology may thus provide procedural knowledge in how to design interactive scenario development exercises and how to develop appropriate methodologies to project current experiences and attitudes on long-term options. Social science contributions of this type can thus deal with the involvement of various stakeholder groups, the organisation of workshops as platforms for the interaction of project participants and stakeholders, etc. At its best, sociological contributions reflect and evaluate these processes at the same time. As pointed out earlier, regions can be a favour-able context of developing joint visions, as actors involved into the process have cultural pro-ximity and can often built on a joint understanding of the present situation.

3) At a more integrative level, contributions with a background in social studies of technology may help embedding technological long-term options into strategies of transforming socio-technical systems. This has been the level especially addressed in this paper, as social sciences are not often integrated in long-term change processes in such a way. Contributions of this type may focus on socio-technical regimes, on governance issues, or on the embedding of technologies in a wider social context. This kind of research rather takes on a contextualising role and facilitates long-term processes of technology diffusion and implementation in particular and system change in general by taking into account the importance of institutions, social practices or actor constellations for technological change. Social sciences may contribute by mapping and analysing socio-technical systems (i.e., tech-nologies, social practices, actor constellations, institutions), by developing a better under-standing of the interactions of actor strategies, technologies, institutions and expectations or by identifying critical problems and barriers for further system transformation towards sus-tainability. Projects on (technical, institutional, cultural) barriers to a wider dissemination of building technologies in most cases also belong to this category. As mentioned earlier, the regional level is very much appropriate for socially contextualising long-term energy options. Social science may play a crucial role in designing and evaluating socio-technical experi-


145

ments or strategic niche management projects such as the above-mentioned energy-self-suf-ficient regions or experiments with hydrogen technologies at regional level. Social science support will also be needed for accompanying transition processes – analysing socio-techni-cal systems, developing long-term visions together with relevant actors, designing policy strategies, evaluating outcomes and feeding them back into the policy process.

4) Finally, sociological or socio-technical research may contribute to a more reflexive ap-proach by the actors (such as other researchers) involved in long-term transition processes with respect to technological change and to the basis of their actions and strategies. Such a role of social science research is what Joas has coined the ‘dialogical turn’ (Joas, 2004). So-ciology might be especially appropriate to trigger such processes of dialogue and interdisci-plinary reflection, as it “has more than any other discipline always reflected on the shakiness of its disciplinary basis since it has neither a clear relationship to a profession nor an undis-puted constitutive abstraction on which it can rely. Sociology therefore should not be blamed for its ‘metadisciplinary’ ambitions, because it thus offers an institutional location for the re-flection on questions that otherwise might not find a place at all in the competition of disci-plines.” (Joas, 2004, 305) An example for this function are, e.g., interactive scenario develop-ment processes, which for many participating actors can be an opportunity to reflect their embedding in a broader sociotechnical system or regime. In examples carried out in Austria, e.g., the use of biorefineries for combined production of energy and various chemical pro-ducts from biomass in regional settings, the participating actors stated never to have had the chance to systematically think and discuss about the socio-cultural embedding and precondi-tions of the technologies and innovations they were dealing with. Reflecting on and adapting strategies to shape the long-term transition of energy systems also belongs to this category. Summing up, social-science-based strategies developed before the background of socio-technical system transitions rather follow a communicative rationality than an instrumental ra-tionality. Strategies presented in more detail above, such as sociotechnical experiments with-in limited niches and the interactive creation of scenarios and future visions, usually have in-teractive and reflexive learning processes at their centre. Energy policies striving to manage the long-term transition towards sustainable energy systems have a range of strategies at hand which are inspired by a sociotechnical understanding of transition processes. To give a few examples, such strategies could include

• a new culture of experiments and pilot projects; • support of interactive vision building processes for the development of sustainable ima-

ges of future energy systems and pathways to get there; • user involvement at different stages; • strengthening sociotechnical systems (instead of isolated innovations) / focusing on sys-

tem innovations; • providing spaces for learning and interaction; • keeping options open (avoiding early lock-in). In the perspective presented in this paper the focus thus is on the embedding of long-term options in ongoing transitions of the energy system and on gradually adapting and differen-tiating long-term options through the outcomes of social learning processes gained in socio-technical niches, foresight exercises and actual implementation processes. References Argyris, C. (1999), On Organizational Learning, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Arrow, K. J. (1962), 'The economic implications of learning by doing', Review of Economic Studies 29,

pp. 155-173. Berkhout, F. and Hertin, J. (2002), 'Foresight futures scenarios. Developing and applying a partici-

pative strategic planning tool', Greener Management International 37, pp. 37-52. Berkhout, F., Hertin, J. and Jordan, A. (2002), 'Socio-economic futures in climate change impact as-

sessment: using scenarios as 'learning machines'', Global Environmental Change 12, pp. 83-95.


146

Borup, M., Brown, N., Konrad, K. and van Lente, H. (2006), 'The sociology of expectations in science and technology', Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 18 (3/4), pp. 285-298.

Brown, M. B. (2001), 'The civic shaping of technology: California´s electric vehicle program', Science, Technology, & Human Values 26 (1), pp. 56-81.

Börjeson, L., Höjer, M., Dreborg, K.-H., Ekvall, T. and Finnveden, G. (2006), 'Scenario types and tech-niques: Towards a user's guide', Futures 38, pp. 723-739.

Dierkes, M., Hoffmann, U. and Marz, L. (1996), Visions of Technology. Social and Institutional Factors Shaping the Development of New Technologies, Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag.

Eames, M., McDowall, W., Hodson, M. and Marvin, S. (2006), 'Negotiating contested visions and place-specific expectations of the hydrogen economy', Technology Analysis & Strategic Manage-ment 18 (3/4), pp. 361-374.

Elzen, B., Geels, F. W. and Green, K. (2004), System Innovation and the Transition to Sustainability, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

European Research Advisory Board (2005), The Social Sciences and the Humanities in the 7th Frame-work Programme, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Geels, F. W. (2004), 'From sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems. Insights about dynamics and change from sociology and institutional theory', Research Policy 33, pp. 897-920.

Gerstlberger, W. (2004), 'Regional innovation systems and sustainability—selected examples of inter-national discussion ', Technovation 24, pp. 749-758.

Grin, J. and Van de Graaf, H. (1996), 'Technology Assessment as Learning', Science, Technology, & Human Values 21 (1), pp. 72-99.

Guy, S. and Shove, E. (2000), A Sociology of Energy, Buildings and the Environment, London and New York: Routledge.

Harmaakorpi, V. and Uotila, T. (2006), 'Building regional visionary capability. Futures research in re-source-based regional development', Technological Forecasting & Social Change 73, pp. 778-792.

Hoogma, R., Kemp, R., Schot, J. and Truffer, B. (2002), Experimenting for Sustainable Transport. The Approach of Strategic Niche Management, London: Spon Press.

Jacobsson, S. and Bergek, A. (2004), 'Transforming the energy sector: the evolution of technological systems in renewable energy technology', in: Jacob, K., Binder, M. and Wieczorek, A. (Eds.) , Go-vernance for Industrial Transformation. Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Berlin: Environmental Policy Research Centre, pp. 208-236.

Joas, H. (2004), 'The changing role of social sciences. An action-theoretical perspective', International Sociology 19 (3), pp. 301-313.

Kemp, R., Rip, A. and Schot, J. (2001), 'Constructing transition paths through the management of niches', in: Garud, R. and Karnře, P. (Eds.), Path Dependence and Creation, Mahwah, New Jer-sey/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 269-299.

Loorbach, D. and van der Brugge, R. (forthcoming), 'Governance of social complexity. Transition ma-nagement for the Dutch energy transition', International Journal of Environmental Technology and Management.

Lundvall, B.-Å. (1988), 'Innovation as an interactive process: from user-producer interaction to the na-tional system of innovation', in: Dosi, G., Freeman, C., Nelson, R., Silverberg, G. and Soete, L. (Eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory, London/New York: Pinter, pp. 349-369.

Lösch, A. (2006), 'Anticipating the futures of nanotechnology: Visionary images as means of communi-cation', Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 18 (3/4), pp. 393-409.

Nowotny, H., Scott, P. and Gibbons, M. (2001), Re-Thinking Science. Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Oudshoorn, N. and Pinch, T. (2003), How Users Matter. The Co-Construction of Users and Technologies, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Rip, A. and Kemp, R. (1998), 'Technological change', in: Rayner, S. and Malone, E. L. (Eds.), Human Choice and Climate Change: Resources and Technology, Vol. 2, Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Press, pp. 327-399.

Rohracher, H. (2005), User Involvement in Innovation Processes. Strategies and Limitations from a Socio-Technical Perspective, Munich: Profil Verlag.

Rosenberg, N. (1982), Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press.

Rotmans, J., Kemp, R. and Van Asselt, M. (2001), 'More evolution than revolution: transition manage-ment in public policy', Foresight 3 (1), pp. 15-31.

Schienstock, G. (2004), 'From path dependency to path creation: A new challenge to the systems of innovation approach', in: Schienstock, G. (Ed.), Embracing the Knowledge Economy. The Dyna-mic Transformation of the Finnish Innovation System, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 3-27.


147

Schienstock, G. (2005), 'Sustainable development and the regional dimension of the innovation sys-tem', in: Weber, M. and Hemmelskamp, J. (Eds.), Towards Environmental Innovation Systems, Berlin: Springer, pp. 97-113.

Selin, C. (2006), 'Trust and the illusive force of scenarios', Futures 38, pp. 1-14. Szejnwald Brown, H., Vergragt, P., Green, K. and Berchicci, L. (2003), 'Learning for sustainability tran-

sition through bounded socio-technical experiments in personal mobility', Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 15 (3), pp. 291-315.

Szejnwald Brown, H. and Vergragt, P. J. (2006), 'Bounded socio-technical experiments as agents of systemic change: The case of a zero-energy residential building', Technological Forecasting & So-cial Change.

van Notten, P. W. F., Rotmans, J., van Asselt, M. B. A. and Rothman, D. S. (2003), 'An updated sce-nario typology', Futures 35, pp. 423-443.

Weber, K. M. (2006), 'Foresight and adaptive planning as complementary elements in anticipatory po-licy-making: A conceptual and methodological approach', in: Voss, J.-P., Bauknecht, D. and Kemp, R. (Eds.), Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 189-221.

Weber, K. M., Leitner, K.-H., Oehme, I., Rohracher, H., Späth, P. and Whitelegg, K. (2003), 'Middle-range transitions in production-consumption systems: The role of research programmes for shap-ing transition processes towards sustainability', in: Proceedings of the Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change: Governance for Industrial Transformation, Berlin: IHDP.

Wiek, A., Binder, C. and Scholz, R. W. (2006), 'Functions of scenarios in transition processes', Futures 38, pp. 740-766.


148

Global knowledge

Nico Stehr39

Knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can easily travel the world, enlightening the lives of people everywhere. Yet billions of people still live in the darkness of poverty – unnecessarily.

World Bank (1999:1) To what extent is, can -- and maybe even should -- knowledge generally be accessible around the world?40 Is knowledge a public good whose opportunities, for example, in the field of health care (cf. Chen, Evans and Cash, 1999) can be equitably exploited? As the quote from the World Bank Report on Knowledge for Development suggests there are apparently huge gaps and barriers to the actual dissemination of knowledge around the world but these disparities appear to constitute “problems”, thus, they may be overcome in principle. The question of whether among modern societies a “global” world of knowledge can exist is, from the viewpoint of sociology, a largely unexplored terrain.41 Among long standing, basic and complicated questions that form part of such territory would be: How dependent is the world-wide dissemination of knowledge systems on social structure (for example, “global” job markets)? Does knowledge change as it travels? Is an equal or uniform distribution of know-ledge even possible in modern societies? If knowledge becomes global what are its benefits or drawbacks?42 Why is new knowledge in demand? Given the wealth of basic issues con-nected to the question of a global world of knowledge, I have to restrict myself to but a few questions. Thus, the approach chosen can only have a limited aim.

39 Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen, Lake Constance, Germany. This is a substantially revised ver-sion (Oct 2006) of a lecture given at the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (Center for Interdisci-plinary Research) at Bielefeld on 15 Jan 2003. Thanks to Yves Gingras, Marcus Kleiner, Wolfgang Krohn, Paul Malone, Martin Schulte and Hermann Strasser for their constructive suggestions. 40 The unusual issue relating to the sense of global knowledge (which I cannot investigate profoundly here) is nourished lately, as I see it, by a series of convictions: Assuming, for example, that “Western science” is only one out or a number of possible paths of knowledge, leading to diverging results any-how, then the issue of the sense of global knowledge is an issue of the possible dominance of one of the plural forms of knowledge as well. If one assumes, following an economical rationale for instance, that globally accessible and utilizable knowledge eliminates comparative advantages associated to a regional monopoly of knowledge, then global knowledge is an undesirable development (Freeman, 2006). 41 A restriction of the question under investigation to the world of modern societies is needed in order to take the take note of the almost taken-for-granted assertion that the emergence of divided world of knowledge is a distinctly modern phenomenon. Reference can be made, for example, to Emile Durk-heim ([1955] 1983:76) who in his lectures on pragmatism stresses, “it is in the very early ages that men, in every social group, all think in the same way. It is then that uniformity of thought can be found. The great differences only begin to appear with the very first Greek philosophers. The Middle Ages once again achieved the very type of the intellectual consensus. The came the Reformation, and with it can heresies and schisms which were to continue to multiply until we eventually came to realize that everyone has the right to think as he wishes.” 42 It is almost unnecessary to point out that the assumption that global knowledge is good is hardly ever put into question. One of the exceptions is Richard Freeman’s (2006) examination of the erosion of the U.S. dominance in research and development as the result of the emerging of a global job mar-ket for science and engineering workers. Freeman concludes that the changes underway in the global job market for high trained workers “diminishes comparative advantage in high tech production and creates problems for American industry and workers.”


149

I begin with a reference to a few contemporary considerations of the global context of my own observations. There is, first, a re-evaluation of the nature and the value of “local” or “in-digenous” knowledge against the backdrop of globalization processes and their impact around the world. More specifically, the assessment of the economic value of local know-ledge or the appraisal of indigenous knowledge as source of sustainable development is changing (Fernando, 2003). Reference to an initiative of the World Bank (1998) that pro-poses to utilize indigenous knowledge in developmental processes, represents one side of the re-evaluation of local knowledge; growing efforts to protect indigenous agrarian, technical or botanical knowledge constitutes a major part of the other side of the re-assessment of the value of local knowledge (see Agrawal, 2002; Leach und Fairhead, 2002). At the same time there is, second, the growing stress in various forms of discourse including policy discussions on the rapid and perhaps unstoppable diffusion, and therefore the local as well as ubiquitous (global) relevance of scientific-technical forms of knowledge. Although experts with narrow competences generate contemporary scientific knowledge in highly specialized settings such as laboratories and field stations, such knowledge is supposed to be having ubiquitous qualities (Livingstone, 2003). When the World Bank (1999) in its World Development Report on Knowledge for Development refers, for example, to the social risks of the modern “information revolution”, especially in the form of “knowledge gaps” and “infor-mation problems” between developing and developed world, the Report takes it for granted such steep gradients can be narrowed, especially with the help of institutional transforma-tions in developing regions of the world. The ease with which specialized knowledge (and information given that these terms are often liberally conflated) is assumed to be able can travel is echoed in recent transnational treaties designed to protect intellectual property, for example, in the so-called TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) treaty of the World Trade Organization (WTO).43 In contrast to such measures and the convictions that underlie the need for such treaties are developments in science studies that reject any need to differentiate among forms of know-ledge. At the same time, science studies stresses that the generation of knowledge takes place in distinct places and under special circumstances. The spaces and circumstances touch the substance of what is produced. The questions that then arises, can such know-ledge travel and if it moves around does it travel as part of the baggage of knowledge car-riers such as scientists and engineers? Or, if it diffused, isn’t it transformed by transcending features of its origins? And if it is transformed as the result of travel, can knowledge really only become global if the places of its origins achieve global presence? But aside from distinct local or even global intentions to protect knowledge that threatens to become “placeless” (Livingstone, 2003:3) and the vision that knowledge becomes effortlessly - in a technical sense - connected all over world,44 the question of the possibility or the nature of the limits to globalizing knowledge is an open matter. Perhaps the matter can be put even more succinctly: Is “boundless knowledge” a matter of the growing “standardization” of organizational or social forms (e.g., states, firms and the scientific community) across the globe or are there forms of knowledge (and its carriers) that increasingly transcends locality (cf. Freeman, 2006) and actively promote converging social contexts around the world? The question I pose offers a first indication of my conclusions: sociological thinking can hard-ly escape a fundamental ambivalence toward the very processes of rationalization in which it participates. According to its own self-conception, it is an essential constituent of a novel practice of societal control. By means of this practice, at least in principle, the goals of huma-nity are to be reduced to a formula through a systematic, self-critical, and thereby self-trans-formative collective process of knowledge.

43 WTO TRIPS on www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm (accessed on 2007-7-30). 44 Compare Thomas L Friedman, ”It’s a flat world, after all,” New York Times, Apr 3, 2005: “When the world is flat, you can innovate without having to emigrate.”


150

At the same time, however, sociological thinking is dogged by the constant conviction that ra-tionality, while essential, is never the be-all and end-all. Whether we proceed from Adam Fer-guson’s humanist rhetorical uneasiness with the commercial society he had investigated and affirmed, Comte’s passionate defense of a cult that needed no justification as foundation of the new positivist age, Durkheim’s clever non-rational support of extremely complex pheno-mena of social differentiation and systematization, Weber’s more personal and decisionistic amplification of rationalization, or Luhmann’s blind spot of the observer of the observers – the classical and the modern sociological theories alike have never completely trusted the intel-lectual, institutional and organizational structures that they have identified as the characteris-tic feature of modern society. Sociology has repeatedly conceded this fact to the opponents of its worldview and of its world, though without thereby giving up its demand for a compre-hensive alternative way of thinking and of human relationships, be it in the name of classical virtues, traditional pieties or romanticization of the most various kinds. The great theoretical designs, in the final analysis, have presented theoretical and social strategies by which this limited responsivity in the face of contradictory considerations or forces can be steered, eva-luated or included constitutionally; and they insisted that it is just such integrative projects that reach that vital recognition of dark and irresistible human needs without which not even a minimum of rationality is possible. Not the elimination, but rather the rational explanation, of the irrational has been the fundamental theme of sociological theory in its now almost 200-year-old history.45 I. Overview I will present my observations on my theme, “Global worlds of knowledge” or, to employ a less static concept, “globalizing worlds of knowledge,” in a series of steps: I begin by offering a simple conceptual model that specifies various sociological aspects of the idea of “global knowledge”.46 What follows is reference to allegedly already existing glo-bal worlds of knowledge and I indicate where they are supposed to found. After this skeptical enumeration of knowledge that has already achieved the status of global knowledge, I at-tempt to delimit my topic with greater precision drawing on the conceptual model outlined earlier. I draw attention to a series of assumptions meant to aid me as explanatory guides. Next follows a brief reference to my conceptual view of knowledge. The subsequent observa-tions are divided into two parts, beginning with a discussion of those aspects that raise one’s hopes for the fair chance that globalizing worlds of knowledge might exist. In a second, lon-ger section I draw attention to social processes and to features of knowledge that make it ap-pear more likely doubtful that the implementation of global worlds of knowledge is at hand.47 I close my observations with a series of questions that must remain open.

45 These paragraphs follow Kettler, Meja and Stehr (1990). 46 The notion of “global” knowledge explored in this context cannot possibly mean to refer to “common knowledge” in the strict sense of the term: common knowledge of an event, for example, implies that among a “group of agents if each knows it, if each one knows that the other knows it, if each one knows that each one knows that the others know it, and so on” (Geanakoplos, 1992:54). Global know-ledge if it every approaches such a state will always be imperfect, asymmetric, moving, and stratified but also have elements of commonality, convergence, etc. that distinguishes it from “merely” local knowledge. 47 The concepts used determine the course of the discussion. Therefore, as critics of modern sociolo-gy already object at this point, the reference to “communal” [gesellschaftlich] rather than “social” [so-zial] processes as the limits of a potential “universality’ of knowledge is the expression of a momen-tous professional self-consciousness: Social processes are observed from the view of the community and its history, and thus make no allowance for “facts and constraints of historical processes and con-texts” (Tenbruck, [1989] 1996:77; see also Stehr, 2000:28-34). Let it be noted, therefore, that I will deal with the question of globalization and the diffusion of knowledge over and above the borders of communities. In (temporary) contrast to the viewpoint of an emergent global community and its conse-quences for the cultures of the world there stand the observations of contemporary research on science, which assert that knowledge is always locally bound (e.g., Watson-Verran and Turnbull,


151

II. A simple conceptual model I want to distinguish between the possibility of a horizontal and vertical integration (or their lack thereof) of worlds of knowledge across social boundaries -- assuming from the outset that a strictly uniform distribution of knowledge is impossible (cf. Luckmann, 1982). Horizontal and vertical integration of knowledge may be linked to (1) the degree of concent-ration of the social bases of producing and consuming knowledge (embedded in persons, equipment, books, journals, laboratories). An increase in the horizontal convergence of the social bases of the production knowledge could mean, for example, that there is now com-pared to the past a broader distribution across the world of scholars producing knowledge or, it could mean that the means of production of knowledge are simply less concentrated than before. An increase in vertical penetration of knowledge could imply -- contrary to perspec-tives that diagnose a concentration of knowledge as an instrument of domination in the hands of the powerful -- that the boundaries between highly specialized or expert knowledge and everyday knowledge in different constituencies are not compared to past civilizational periods as steep anymore. (2) The agenda setting, that is, the questions and problems that are posed or the issues that are seen in need of advice and solution converge across boun-daries. (3) The “means” in which knowledge is embedded and the claims that are advanced become more similar independent of political boundaries.48 Knowledge may have horizontally penetrated much of the world but the same must not be the case for vertical integration with-in and across social worlds. Here the issue of the presence and resistance of indigenous knowledge come into play. III. Knowledge about knowledge Without a brief description of my own conception of knowledge, to be sure, I will get no fur-ther: I would like to define knowledge as the possibility of taking action or as a capacity (re-source) for action. 49 My view of knowledge as a model for reality - and not as model of reality - refers to the open connection between action and knowledge.50 This is as true of the production of knowledge as it is of the application of knowledge.51 Knowledge is a resource

1995:116). By means of “overcoming” local contexts, therefore, a global community could be the basis for boundless knowledge. 48 Costs may not be a major barrier to the access to knowledge, as Mancur Olsen (1996:7) notes; it would seem that “most advances in basic science can be of use to a poor country only after they have been combined with or embedded in some product or process that must be purchased from firms in the rich countries.” But a case study the South Korean economic advances in the years 1973–1979 (Koo, 1982) that attempted to quantify the costs of important technologies from abroad shows that “the world’s productive knowledge is, as for the most part, available to poor countries, and even a relatively modest cost” (Olson, 1996:8). The cost of acquiring knowledge from abroad (defined in a broad sense of the term), in the case of the period under consideration in Korea, amounted to less than 1.5 percent of the increase in that country’s GDP. 49 This should not be taken to mean that the capacity for action theoretically stands at the beginning and precedes action. The capacity to act is acquired by means of action and realized by means of carrying action to its completion (see Stehr, 1991; Janich and Weingarten, 2002:115). 50 My view of knowledge is related to a series of parallel sociological observations; for example, to the concept of culture as generalized capacity with whose help actors produce strategies for action. As Ann Swidler (1986:277) underlines, we must imagine culture as a “‘tool kit’ or repertoire from which actors select differing pieces for constructing lines of action. [...] People may have in readiness cultural capacities they rarely employ; people know more culture than they use.” 51 Accordingly, in the context of my argument I do not employ a performative conception of knowledge. A performative definition of knowledge would be maintained in analogy to the phenomenon of the “performative utterance” as described in Austin’s (1962) linguistics; i.e., it would claim that knowledge does that which it describes (see also Osborne and Rose, 1999). It is at least worth considering, however, that the modern process of knowledge production is increasingly concerned with expanding the creation of performative knowledge (see Stehr, 2003:107-108), and thereby, in practice, with a


152

available as practically needed. Knowledge gains in distinction on the basis of its capability of changing reality. 52 Capacities to transform reality are contingent by nature; they are just as contingent as is human life itself.53 Knowledge in general, and scientific knowledge in particular, is not only a potential means of access to the secret of the world, but rather also the coming into being of the world. Are they, however, the coming into being of one world? As Friedrich Tenbruck (1969:63) underlines, “Knowledge that is not purposefully applied, of course, can also have effects. It can alter people’s ideas and values, and with new states of consciousness it can also create new si-tuations for taking action.” The manner in which knowledge and interests, or knowledge and power, interact always re-mains in question. What are the institutional preconditions and constraints under which knowledge emerges and is applied? In periods when the social dynamic is inadequate, knowledge behaves passively to a great extent. As soon as the peripheral conditions of so-cial action change, however, knowledge becomes one of the most important capabilities for taking action.54 Finally, I would like to note that I employ the idea of global worlds of knowledge as a plural concept, and therefore never speak of global knowledge in the singular. Global knowledge suggests not only a knowledge aspiring to indisputability, based on a more or less naturalistic understanding and approach to the word of human beings and of nature, but also additionally a form of knowledge that seeks in principle to exist decoupled from all social relationships, and indeed only thereby distinguishes itself as global knowledge. IV. Assumptions and restrictions I must set limits to my reflections on “global worlds of knowledge.” This can be done in many ways. I shall observe the following restrictions:55 (1) One can only speak realistically of global worlds of knowledge unless knowledge is obli-gated to travel, however such travel is accomplished, that is, if the makers and the consu-mers of knowledge are not identical. Something like a global world of knowledge exists only if a difference can be established between the groups of actors who represent the supply and those who constitute the demand.56 This separation is also valid for knowledge anchored in progressive interpenetration of “theory and practice”: The discovery of a gene, for example, is at the same time the test for this gene. 52 The particular reputation that knowledge has won in society through its ability to cooperate in the al-teration of social and natural processes also has a drawback, however, which is currently becoming increasingly clear, and which is moving into the foreground of the political confrontation with newly-dis-covered knowledge. The capacity to affect socially anchored classifications or boundaries of feasibility leads to efforts to discipline newly discovered knowledge (see Stehr, 2003). 53 The thesis of the contingency of human knowledge (see Easton, 1997:39-40; 1991) does not mean, however, that there can be no convergence of knowledge, as, for example, in the sense of multiple but independent discoveries of possibilities for action. 54 Defining knowledge as the ability to take action makes apparent the particular qualities that differen-tiate information and knowledge: knowledge displays ex ante characteristics, while information pos-sesses ex post facto attributes; that is, transactions or actions taken (decisions) communicate or trans-port information. A motorist’s conduct communicates information about his car, and when a bank re-commends purchasing a stock, then it thereby “transmits” its trust in a listed company; or when a firm offers a warranty for its product, it thereby communicates the credibility of its commodities. Knowledge as the possibility of taking action communicates no information. Only the implementation of knowledge does this, and information once again influences action (see Stiglitz, 2001:485). 55 Insofar as one replies affirmatively to the question of whether global worlds of knowledge exist, this immediately raises the question of why every person does not have unrestricted access to this world of knowledge, and how “universal” knowledge might be differentiated from “non-universal” knowledge. 56 From an economic viewpoint the obvious strategy is to argue that knowledge, which can be dupli-cated in infinite quantities and applied free of charge, does not bring in the same rate of return as a monopoly. In order for “knowledge capital” to be profitable, it must be subject to restrictions in its mig-


153

social constructions or technological artifacts: knowledge that indeed travels as part of a pro-duct, but whose content is not directly “consumed.” Examples of this are, for example, the knowledge inscribed in material substances such as pharmaceuticals (van der Geest, Whyte and Hardon, 1996), foods (Arce and Marsden, 1993), technological artifacts such as cars, but also in pictures or symbols (for instance, in advertising, see Leslie, 1995; or in popular culture, especially as present in the media, e.g., Crane, 2002).57 Global worlds of knowledge relate to the “horizontal” and not the “vertical” (for instance, in the sense of class- or social stratum-specific) distribution of knowledge. (2) I assume that we are dealing with forms of knowledge that, for whatever reason, are not be subject to regulations -- whether this be, for example, in the context of self-interested pro-fessional, commercially-motivated limits or restrictions generated by knowledge policies (see Stehr, 2005) -- placed on the circulation of ideas; or, as hotly debated recently, for reasons of so-called “national security.”58 I will take up this problem again at a later point. (3) I do not concern myself with the worldwide dissemination of the institution of science (see Drori, Meyer, Ramirez and Schofer, 2003), the structural convergence of scientific practice (Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez, 1997; Boli and Thomas, 1997), or at the methodological level, the disciplining of observations (Livingstone, 2003:171-177) as a precondition for its global mobility, the global dissemination of the role of the scientist/engineer and/or its integ-ration into worldwide networks, global job markets or that of the growing world-wide number of state-sponsored and non-governmental scientific institutions (Schofer, 1999; Schott, 1998, 2001).59 Global worlds of knowledge should not be taken to refer to the observation that in almost every society we encounters educational systems, professional occupations (Freidson, 2001), universities (as a locus of education in “universal” knowledge; see Fuller, 2003), the internet (Mattelart, [1996] 2000; Lessig, 2004) or electronic systems that integrate software and hardware (Ernst, 2005), particular technical practices and school curricula (Benavot et al., 1991; Meyer, Kamens and Benavot, 1992; David, 1993).60

ration and/or it must not be a public asset, but rather must assume the characteristics of property. But it is exactly on this point that there lies the material for an immense future conflict (cf. Lessig, 2004). 57 A further relevant restriction to my theme relates to a closer examination of the widespread thesis that scientific knowledge already represents global worlds of knowledge because can be implemented without regard to borders (e.g., Drori, Meyer, Ramirez & Schofer, 2003:8-9). 58 The American National Academy of Sciences is now discussing the question of whether the publica-tion of research results should be prevented for reasons of “national security,” and how such publica-tion could be prevented. The currently prevailing political climate in the USA promotes arguments call-ing for further restrictions (for there already exists a large number of such restrictions) on the publica-tion of research results, particularly in the context of the war on terrorism (see “Scientists discuss ba-lance of research and security,” New York Times, 10. Jan 2003). And as the New York Times (“Jour-nals to consider U.S. security,” Feb 16, 2003) reported a month later, the publishers of “more than 20 leading scientific journals [including Science and Nature] have made a pact to censor articles that they believe could compromise national security, regardless of their scientific merit.” (It would be interesting at this point to refer to the new American media laws, which more than ever “promote” the building of monopolies.) 59 In this context, I omit a discussion of the intriguing question of who exactly the strata and intellectual proponents are that advance and defend or deny the thesis that there are global world of knowledge. These are important yet open issues that can be examined with reference to a wide range of pertinent matters such as nationalism, globalization, modernization, world views, religious systems, etc. (com-pare, for example, Huntington, 2004 and his lament about a growing denationalization of the American elites). Finally, I cannot address the difficult question whether the kind of social and economic transfor-mations that are broadly speaking discussed under the heading of globalization may contribute to an even speedier spread of knowledge around the world than may have been the case under different historical circumstances. 60 The observation by John W. Meyer and his colleagues that we are able to witness a global conver-gence of school curricula resonates with a functional perspective. A functional perspective would maintain that either similar functional necessities in modern societies or similar power relations in these societies account for the convergence in school curricula. Meyer and his colleagues suggest


154

Institutional organizations and technical platforms of this kind that are increasingly available globally61 serve the hierarchical organization, circulation and regulation of knowledge. Un-questionably, widespread epistemic institutions not only generate real bases for global forms of discourse, but also react to problems that are defined as global (such as air pollution, cli-mate change, health) and produce worldwide forms of governance (Mörth, 1998). And many of these institutional scientific organizations indeed act with the claim to generate universal worlds of knowledge; whether, however, successful global cognitive cultural frames of refe-rence (Meyer, 1999:126-128) truly exist, or ought to exist, and which frames of reference these might be (see Harding, 2002), is debatable. Institutional boundaries might also help de-lineate the exact boundaries beyond which knowledge cannot expand.62 V. Global worlds of knowledge as thought experiments, normative frames and business plans The approach to and/or even the implementation of global or globalizing worlds of knowledge have hitherto been realized above all in normative speculations, by decree, as a thought ex-periment or as a business plan.63 Here is a mélange of such ideas:64 (1) Freedom is the daughter of knowledge: One of the first modern optimistic theorists, and an ardent advocates of global worlds of knowledge and their social and political potential, was the social philosopher Otto Neurath (see Hartmann and Bauer, 2002). Even as an emig-rant in 1941, Neurath wanted to give himself, in his capacity as a consultant for the recons-truction of the slums of an English industrial town, the title Consulting sociologist of human happiness. The question of how to increase the happiness of all is, according to Neurath, the question of the conditions for democratizing knowledge. The democratic right to “global

that the standardization of curricula “is closely linked to the rise of standardized models of society …and to the increasing dominance of standardized models of education as one component of these general models (Benavot et al., 1991:86). 61 The C.E.O. of the Indian corporation Infosys Technologies in Bangalore, Nandan Nilekani describes the consequences of the worldwide accessibility of such platforms in an interview with the New York Times (Thomas L Friedman, ”It’s a flat world, after all,” 3 Apr 2005): The available technical platforms allow that “intellectual work, intellectual capital, could be delivered from anywhere. It could be disag-gregated, delivered, distributed, produced and put back together again – and thus gave a whole new degree of freedom to the way we do work, specially work of an intellectual nature. And what you are seeing in Bangalore today is rally the culmination of all these things coming together.” 62 There is doubtless a whole series of further, almost intuitive restrictions on the topic of “global” worlds of knowledge that I cannot explicitly draw attention to here, but which should not therefore be overlooked. Among these are, for example, the question of whether global worlds of knowledge can even exist, if this concept is bound to the demand that knowledge be to some extent equally distri-buted, or – analogous to the neoclassical market model – that in such a case the transparency of knowledge be (completely) guaranteed. [Knowledge is always incomplete, that is, stratified, asymmet-rical and therefore not (completely) transparent.] Likewise, I want to pass over the problem of a diffe-rence between knowledge and ignorance, since it would simply burst the boundaries of my topic (but see Moore and Tumin, 1949; Popitz, 1967; Merton, 1987). 63 The concept “globales Wissen” alone appears about 14,100 times in different documents in the In-ternet (Search engine GOOGLE, Apr 29, 2006), the notion of „global knowledge” 3,850,000 times (GOOGLE search engine Apr 29, 2006). 64 A conception of global worlds of knowledge following the differentiation of social institutions of global knowledge would relate, for instance, to a political, scientific, technological and economic vision of glo-bal worlds of knowledge. The economic and scientific vision will be discussed below. The currently prevailing technological vision assumes that it is the Internet and/or the World Wide Web that makes possible the realization of global knowledge. The Internet transforms local into global knowledge. The political vision dominant today, as manifested in resolutions of the United Nations (for instance the UN World Summit on the Information Society 2003 in Geneva), demands that still-existing boundaries of the most various kinds be surmounted, and in the long term removed, on the way to a global world of knowledge; and indeed global knowledge will be possible once the so-called “digital divide” in and among societies is overcome.


155

worlds of knowledge” (at least as it can be enforced within a society) is advocated in almost all of Neurath’s writings. The medium of this democratization is Neurath’s system of “speaking signs,” or the pictorial language he designed on a scientific basis, which is to instruct the broad masses objectively about their situation. For Neurath (1991:645) there is “no area, in which humanization of knowledge by means of the eye is not possible.” Thus there is no need to stay in Vienna, as the example of Dr. Arthur Schnitzler demonstrates, to have undertaken no far-flung journeys, in order to travel widely (see Gay, 2002).65 Cybernetics, too, saw itself, like many other new fields of knowledge in their origin as center of imperial knowledge, as sanctuary of global worlds of knowledge in theory and in practice. Similarly, from a policy point of view, placing knowledge at the center of the development of all regions of the world will generate immense social benefits that will accrue to all in society independent of their socio-economic status (World Bank, 1999:iv). (2) Knowledge must be a (global) public asset (e.g., Stiglitz, 1999; World Bank, 1998): From an economic viewpoint this means that knowledge lacks the characteristics, otherwise typical for economic assets, of rivalry and excludability. 66 This may be true for the day-to-day social stock of knowledge, of course, but probably hardly for additional, that is, new knowledge. Additional knowledge turns a profit. Therefore, if need be certain forms of knowledge that have already been on the market for some time may be public assets. Even in the sciences, the phenomenon of the privatization of knowledge is increasingly to be observed. A new en-terprise founded by scientists in the USA, the Public Library of Science (www.plos.org, ac-cessed on 2007-7-30), attempts to counter this development.67 The Public Library of Science, that is, the publication of scientific articles on the Internet rather than in journals controlled by commercial concerns, is meant by its founders to guarantee the existence of global scientific worlds of knowledge, or at least the global access to new knowledge. Finally, we find considerations in literature on a successful sociopolitical handling of diverse global challenges in the future, such as terrorism, atomic wars or the current environmental issues, which culminate in the demands that their solutions can only be found in collective and world-wide efforts in the field of education – global efforts in education that should lead to the deve-lopment and implementation of “global mindset” or “global intelligence” as the only conceiv-able solution to these universal problems (cf. Spariosu, 2005). (3) Global worlds of knowledge as business plans and in thought experiments. The (largely globally accessible) internet in particular teems with a large number of enterprises and/or multinational concerns in whose business plans “global worlds of knowledge” have already been implemented and are offered for sale. This is the case, for example, at “Global Know-ledge,” a firm with more than 1,300 employees worldwide, which owns a New York invest-ment bank. The business slogan of the firm Global Knowledge is “Experts teaching experts.” Global Knowledge, as the firm’s name already betrays, offers worldwide applicable know-ledge for improving companies’ earnings.68 Or the firm “Nordmedia,” which offers E-Learning, as it announces, to manage “global knowledge.” Nordmedia describes its working environs as follows: “E-Learning is independent of time and space. Technologically supported know-

65 The contrary is also apparently true: The police in Hildesheim came to the aid of 34-year-old man from Gambia in the wee hours of the night, when he complained that his car had been defaced by be-ing “smeared with paint”: “The patient policemen ascertained, after close examination, that the ‘white coating’ on the car roof was snow; to which ‘the utterly astonished African replied: ‘What? So that’s snow?’” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 8 Dec 2002, p. 12). 66 The economist Fritz Machlup (1979:408), who worked intensively toward a quantification of know-ledge in the 1950s and ’60s (e.g., Machlup 1962), draws attention to the difference between “stock of knowledge” and “flows of knowledge,” and notes that “while the flow [of knowledge] never reduces the stocks of knowledge possessed by the transmitters, it does not does not always increase the reci-pients’ stocks.” Machlup (1979:408) cites a series of reasons to explain why this asymmetry is pos-sible, such as the inability even to keep knowledge, which moreover can quickly become irrelevant or outdated. 67 See “New premise in science: get the word out quickly, online,” New York Times, 17 Dec 2002. 68www.globalknowledge.com/training/generic.asp?pageid=2&translation=English (acc. on 2007-7-30)


156

ledge management enables continuous, personalized learning. Electronic pictures, familiar symbols and personal communication offer learning experiences at a hitherto unachievable level.”69 Similar premises, however, also underlie thoughts found in economic and/or management li-terature. Reflections on the development of a global world of knowledge without borders are found not only in discussions of the extension of a global knowledge-based economy (for ins-tance, in the sense of global production networks, see Chen, 2002), but also in studies or ar-ticles in the field of so-called knowledge management, which ever more frequently deal with global knowledge agendas (e.g., Carillo, 2002), the institutionalization of global knowledge experts (Covaleski, Dirsmith and Rittenberg, 2003) and global knowledge management stra-tegies (Davenport, De Long and Beers, 1998; Desouza and Evaristo, 2003). In addition, global knowledge is alive in thought experiments, for instance in the form of eco-nomic models. Parente and Prescott (1994:302) refer to the existence of a stock of useable “world know-ledge” that (ideally) disseminates instantly and that can be commonly exploited. 70 Parente and Prescott are interested in accounted for wide disparity of incomes around the world. Having failed to establish that savings rates account for differences in national economic de-velopment, Parente and Prescott ask to what extent the stock of usable knowledge available to all countries, namely world knowledge could account for differential economic growth. World knowledge “is meant to represent the stock of general and scientific knowledge in the world (i.e., blueprints, ideas, scientific principles, and so on)” (Parente and Prescott, 1994:302; 2000:84). They assume for the sake of modeling its effect that all firms have equal access to world knowledge. General and scientific knowledge “spills over the entire world equally” (Parente and Prescott, 1994:302). Given the existing wide economic inequalities among nations, the theory of economic development then must explain why some countries adopt and other fail to pass adoption barriers. The model suggests that largely invisible in-vestments in adaptation capacity at the level of the firm account for the different in assimilat-ing world knowledge. In a further extension of their model, Parente and Prescott (2000) add the variable “differential national political policies” (especially in the sense of barriers conf-ronted by firms wanting to exploit world knowledge, for example, disregard for property rights, monopoly rights of the state) in order to account for different patterns of adaptation to world knowledge. (4) Finally, there are empirically based statements that at least appear to point to a globaliz-ing world of technical and scientific knowledge. In a study of the national innovative capaci-ties of the OECD countries (that is, of a country’s ability to develop and commercialize inno-vative technologies) Stern, Potter and Furman (2000:31) come to the conclusion, among others, that a “convergence in measured innovative capacity among OECD countries over the past quarter century” can be observed.71

69 www.nordmedia.de/scripts/contentbrowser.php3?ACTION=SHOWCONTENT&menuepunkt=162 (transl. ns, accessed on 2007-7-30). 70 These propositions ground on the classical, intuitive assumption, for instance from the theory of cognition or economics (Bates, 1988) that once-communicated insights are at the disposition of the potential “consumer” at ease and reasonably priced, that means, without extensive transaction costs, the dissemination costs are low compared to the costs for the generation of the findings. As Steve Fuller (1992:168) critically annotates: “the ‘hard work’ of invention or discovery comes with the original development of an idea, and that the subsequent work of transmitting the idea to others is negligible by comparison ... all the information is seen as packed into the initial conception, with transmission re-garded as mere reproduction, whereby the initial conception is either preserved or lost, depending on the receptiveness of the targeted customers.” This assumption, however, underrates how important (and expensive) the acquisition of intellectual capabilities might be, necessary as prerequisites for the consumption of the insights. 71 The results of the innovative capacity model of Stern, Porter and Furman (2000:6) lead to the con-clusion that “during the 1970s and early 1980s, the predicted level of per capita international patenting by the United States and Switzerland was substantially above the level of other members of the OECD. Since that time, several countries (most notably Japan, some Scandinavian countries, and


157

If one therefore proceeds from the assumption that that scientific and technical knowledge are increasingly independent of location and accessible across borders, this conclusion is not particularly surprising. To be sure, a country’s innovative capacity, as controversial discus-sions of the conditions of the innovation process underscore (Romer, 1990; Porter, 1990; Nelson, 1993), is most certainly determined by a multitude of locational factors, including micro- and macro-economic as well as political, cultural and legal circumstances; so that up to now it has hardly been possible to speak of worldwide disseminated innovative capacities. It is true that at present, these normative visions, promising business plans, decrees of global worlds of knowledge and first empirical observations are not seldom exposed as Eurocentric prejudices that deny non-western actors the ability to govern themselves successfully, to create notable cultural artifacts, or to produce enduring contributions to rational discourse. Such illuminating socio-historic contextualizations show how debatable claims to global rele-vance are, and the degree of interpretative mistrust prompted nowadays by global state-ments that claim to recognize no borders (e.g., Gough, 2002). In the next section I will attempt to concentrate above all on the question of how knowledge operates in society, and not what knowledge is: How and why is it possible, or improbable, that global worlds of knowledge come to exist? VI. Attributes of knowledge that appear to promote the chances of its global dissemination A list of the attributes of knowledge that promote the chances of global worlds of knowledge is relatively brief. By comparison, in the following paragraph I will deal with certain structural or institutional attributes and processes that might enable globalizing worlds of knowledge. In this particular connection I have in mind especially two such characteristics of knowledge, which make it appear not urgently necessary to regulate knowledge, supervise it or steer its dissemination. All in all, these characteristics should then serve as an incentive to leave knowledge as a common good, particularly because knowledge is in no danger of becoming a resource subject to the so-called “tragedy of the commons.” (1) The fact that in many cultures there is a bias against the availability of resources on the commons is understandable. As the metaphor of the tragedy of the commons indicates, un-restricted access to resources on the commons leads to overconsumption of these re-sources. To be sure, not all resources fall victim to this law, since such resources are appa-rently inexhaustible and/or the limits on the growth of these resources are of a different na-ture, or do not come into play at all. Knowledge is obviously one such resource. The primary task would accordingly be to promote access, and not to protect the resource from consump-tion without lasting effect. (2) Knowledge realizes itself: As far as I can see, there are two parallel strands of argument that lead to the conclusion that knowledge – so to speak, largely independent of context – stubbornly realizes itself, and therefore that any form of knowledge policy that aims at regu-lating, i.e., restricting the realization of knowledge is doomed to failure from the beginning (cf. Stehr, 2003, 2004). On the one hand, it is argued that the utilization of knowledge is built into the structure of knowledge itself. The manufacture of knowledge implies its realization and prevents any control of the application of knowledge. In this connection, I recall the once much-discussed conceptual definition of the various (inherent) epistemological interests of the sciences (Ha-bermas, 1964). The often-invisible category of technical epistemological interest thus refers to the fact that fabricated knowledge (or objects) of this sort entail an impetus to realization,

Germany) have achieved levels of predicted per capita international patenting similar to that of the United States. Interestingly, the United Kingdom and France have shown little change in their mea-sured level of national innovative capacity over the past quarter century.”


158

or more precisely, are connected from the beginning to an obstinate sense of utility.72 A less direct path to the self-realization of knowledge refers to the fact that in the case of modern genetics, for instance, any attempt to prevent the now widely publicized manipulation of the human genome is doomed to failure. 73 At least one additional consequence of the argument that knowledge realizes itself would be the conclusion that on the basis of this characteristic, knowledge can relatively easily sur-mount institutional and cultural boundaries. A related assumption, which also supposedly re-fers to characteristics of knowledge that facilitate its dissemination, is based on the difference between codified and implicit knowledge. The development of knowledge runs, it is often claimed, from implicit to codified knowledge. Economic material constraints guarantee, for example, that this course is ever more frequently observable in modern societies (see Co-wan and Foray, 1997). 74 VII. Global constraints in a world without borders The hope, or fear, that we are observing the emergence of a global society has prompted comparative investigations of modern societies under the most various rubrics in the post-war era. The recently prevalent concept of globalization takes the place in these comparative investigations that social theoretical efforts of the past associated with the concepts of mass society, rationalization or modernization. Almost all of these investigations in the last half-century diagnose or warn of an increasing convergence or even a standardization of living conditions. The comprehensive thesis of this inexorable convergence of living conditions, one can probably rightly assume, ought also to include or at least act as vehicle for the emer-gence of global worlds of knowledge. I wish to try to demonstrate that this thesis is question-able and why is might be erroneous. To this end, I begin with some general remarks on the topic of globalization; I then go into se-veral specific limits to the possibility of globalizing worlds of knowledge. Investigations of cultural globalization bear a particularly close affinity to the discussions of modern society as mass society. In many countries in the world there exists, at least among intellectuals, a marked sensitivity to forms of cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism holds the danger that any characteristic local, regional or national cultural forms will be displaced in the face of the massive pressure exerted primarily by trivial American culture. The facts of growing economic and ecological interdependence, but also of the internationalization of knowledge and information, are accordingly hardly questioned any more in the rapidly bur-geoning literature on globalization. I can present this only in very abbreviated form, but the lines of argument pursued by oppo-nents and advocates of globalization contradict each other only at first glance. Both sides

72 In the case of technical objects there is additionally a widespread deterministic viewpoint that as-sumes that technical developments are marked from the beginning by a destiny firmly anchored in them, which excludes ambivalent or even alternative forms of development and thus of “interpretative flexibility” (Pinch and Bijker, 1984: 419-424). 73 Brave (2001:3), for example, represents such a viewpoint and justifies it as follows: “no matter what roadblocks might be placed in the way, the human genome is now and forever in our midst, and its manipulation will be difficult to simply prohibit. Neither the relatively small-scale technology required nor the individual or societal belief in biological benefits will be easily reined in by a regulatory body.” John Kay (1999:12), on the other hand, speaks of the fact that the forms of knowledge typically gained in the sciences, which deal with the ability to perform something (thus, for instance, how to compose an e-mail message or manufacture a videotape player), are extremely easy to pass on and conse-quently can hardly be protected effectively: “scientific knowledge knows no corporate or national boun-daries and is easily transmissible.” 74 Cowan and Forey (1997:596) define the codification of knowledge as “the process of conversion of knowledge into messages which can be processed as information.” And information, these authors as-sume, can be disseminated very much more easily, or at least at less marginal cost, than non-codified knowledge.


159

display, as does the analysis of the phenomenon of mass society or modernization, a syste-matic overestimation of the efficiency and speed with which a rationalization of the irrational is taking place in the world. Even in the economy one rarely proceeds from the premise that all of the relevant economic changes are moving exclusively in one direction, and thus are converging. It is certainly cor-rect that some of the classic causes of economic backwardness, particularly the hesitant dis-semination of modern technologies and scientific knowledge, as still emphasized in the 1950s and ’60s, no longer play a role today. Multinational companies are present almost everywhere. Nevertheless, these changes have not led to a convergence of economic condi-tions or an equal distribution in the production of knowledge-intensive goods and services. High technology and science-based production plants remain concentrated in regions and countries that possess a superior infrastructure for knowledge and technology (Patel and Pa-vitt, 1991; Storper, 1996).75 Although is may be more and more politically opportune, to in-crease the internationalization of the production of technical knowledge, for the time being, as Patel and Pavitt (1991:18) stress, core features of generating technical innovations -- as well as other reasons --account for their geographical concentration in the home countries of large firms: “the primacy of multidisciplinary and tacit knowledge inputs, and the commercial uncertainties surrounding outputs. Physical proximity facilitates integration of multidisciplinary knowledge that is tacit and therefore ‘person-embodies’ rather than ‘information-embodies’. It also facilitates rapid decision-making needed to cope with uncertainty.” In addition, the validity of the thesis of the importance of economic specialization for econo-mic growth, as already emphasized by Adam Smith, is by no means countermanded by the process described as globalization. Hand in hand with this still significant macroeconomic specialization there probably also occurs a division of labor in learning in society as a whole, which might complicate the emergence of global worlds of knowledge (cf. Stiglitz, 1987). The different learning abilities of each society stand in a specific relationship to the society’s his-tory and culture. And variation in learning abilities indicates that societies will increasingly di-verge from one another in the future. In the final analysis, the often unique fascination with the rapid appearance, the relentless di-rectness, and the evident strength of global processes implies that we underestimate the obstinacy of “national” and local realities and their potential for active resistance, as well as the persistence of traditional possibilities for taking action, 76 and thus we speak of the exist-ence of global worlds of knowledge all too hastily (cf. Mokyr, 1990:186-190). VIII. The constraints of global worlds of knowledge I will focus here on two specific forms of constraints on the development of globalizing worlds of knowledge: (1) on intrasocial and intersocial limits, for example, a society’s legal practices, the cultural traditions of a country that resist any easy assimilation of new ideas, its inherent inequalities (forms of division of cognitive labor; incentives for asymmetrical access to know-ledge, such as in order to defend the power of the market), the boundaries between social organizations (companies, laboratories) and the trade barriers between societies and (2) on characteristics that can be traced directly back to certain characteristics of knowledge.

75 In their empirical analysis of patenting practices by 686 of the world’s largest manufacturing firms, Pari Patel and Keith Pavitt show that the production of technology remains far from global. The pro-duction of technology “remains highly ‘domesticised’” (Patel and Pavitt, 1991:17). What this means is that (1) foreign technological activities of large firms are not a major feature and (2) what happens at “home” still determines in the production of new technical knowledge. In addition, detailed studies of the dissemination of industrial technologies (e.g., Scranton, 1997) show that there is no spontaneous convergence of technologies taking place, but rather that their convergence occurs by virtue of the spatial and temporal diffusion of these technologies, which are of local origin. 76 Moreover, the well-guarded disciplinary boundaries between the social sciences work to conceal the importance of the reciprocal influences between cultural, political and economic forces.


160

Max Weber was among the first social scientists, so far as I am able to determine, to be con-cerned in general terms with the obstacles to the application of modern technology and mo-dern scientific thought outside the Western world. He dealt in much less detail with the ques-tion of the reasons for the application of technology, for instance, in revolutionizing the pro-duction process in Western societies. To be sure, in the Protestant Ethic he draws attention to the fact that it is a stratum of carriers of a particular way of life who are responsible for the rise of technology in Western societies. Here, however, with the aid of Weber’s perspective – that is, through an emphasis on the particular value of cultural practices for social development and the migration of knowledge – we can fill a gap in Weber’s comparative analysis: We know that it was the carriers of techni-cal-scientific knowledge who played a decisive role in the social acceptance of more modern technology and science. Indeed it is generally necessary that the carriers of scientific-techni-cal knowledge have a certain degree of autonomy from the ruling strata of society, in order to be able to break with traditional forms of knowledge. In addition to this, they need access to an organizational infrastructure to be able to disseminate their knowledge. The historian of technology Ian Inkster (1991:32-59) labels the results of these processes the transfer of “in-tellectual capital.” Since we are speaking in terms of a Weberian perspective, it is possible to perceive that such an analysis emphasizes the role of cultural carriers and cultural obstacles (for instance, the prevalence of magic or deep rooted cultural traditions77), and thereby holds cultural conditions responsible for the rise of western (rational) technology (see Schroeder and Swedberg, 2002:390). In the postwar era, the basic conditions of the production of scientific and technical know-ledge in the USA (and consequently in other nations) have twice changed radically. The first revolution, introduced in the US about 60 years ago by Vannevar Bush (1945; also O’Mara, 2005), consisted of the decoupling of the production of knowledge from military-political goals. This led to the extension (though not the emergence)78 of the great research universi-ties in the US, and can be seen as having triggered better conditions for the possible emer-gence of global worlds of knowledge. Knowledge was able to circulate more easily. In their emphasis on the virtue of the autonomy of the sciences as a precondition for gaining “uncontaminated” knowledge and thereby allowing for “scientific progress”, but also of practi-cally effective knowledge, such varied theorists of science as Karl Popper, Michael Polanyi, John Bernal or Vannevar Bush were in agreement during this period. Consequently, the utili-ty of knowledge is the daughter of the truth of that knowledge, and truth is in turn the sup-reme goal of scientific work. The second transformation to be addressed here, which acts to constrain the dismantling of the limits on the free circulation of knowledge, and thus lessens the chances that knowledge becomes a global public asset (Stiglitz, 1999), dates from the 1980 passage of the Bayh-Dole Amendment in the American Senate. The Bayh-Dole amendment permitted researchers to patent their discoveries even when they had been realized with the aid of public funding.79 In fact, prior to the amendment few patents were issued on government-funded research. The result of Bayh-Dole amendment was a dramatic shift in research activities into the pri-vate sector (see Kennedy, 2002).80

77 Deborah Davis (2004) shows convincingly, for example, how in China today deep-seated cultural traditions with respect to the concept of ownership can generate formidable forms of resistance against the globalization of ideas of private ownership of real estate (also Appadurai, 1990). 78 Cf. Geiger (1986) about the rise of American research universities between 1900–1940. 79 The Bayh-Dole amendment has reached the quarter-century mark. The assessment of the legisla-tion varies considerably. On the one hand, observers lament the decline of the size of the “knowledge commons” through increased patenting and the intrusion of corporate interests onto university cam-puses and laboratories; on the other hand, supporters prefer to call it a huge success since it has in-creased the technology transfer from campus and laboratories for the purpose of developing new pro-ducts and services (Kennedy, 2005). 80 The story of the patenting of living entities in the USA has been investigated by Kevles (2001). Phar-maceutical products in particular appear to profit from being patented, especially since even a minimal


161

The associated changes in the dissemination of knowledge, or the material substrata of knowledge, are today becoming particularly clear in the biomedical sciences. Not only are there material substrata of research, such as cell lines or certain mice, whose “production” is cost-intensive, and which are no longer freely obtainable by other groups of researchers; ra-ther, there are also methods, data and research results produced commercially and acade-mically, which are no longer made available for reasons of competition.81 In short, access to the conditions of production of new knowledge and access to the results of this production of knowledge are being increasingly regulated (Pottage, 1998).82 At the same time, it is true that the constraints between various social organizations, whether it is companies or laboratories, are not so permeable and easily disregarded that one can speak of a largely unhindered circulation of knowledge. In a study of thousands of clinical trials of new medicines carried out by pharmaceutical companies in the US between 1995 and 1999, it was evident that the company itself carries out knowledge-intensive clinical trials predominantly internally, that is. Information-intensive clinical trials, the generation and/or processing of symbols in order to produce data, by contrast, are frequently awarded (out-sourced) to external firms (Azouley, 2003).83 Positively formulated: an important intersocial vehicle for the dissemination of knowledge and the development of globalizing worlds of knowledge is trade in services and products.84 An expansion of worldwide trade, particularly the dismantling of trade barriers for developing economies, could lead to an unintended worldwide diffusion of ideas and knowledge as easi-ly as to the reduction of information and knowledge deficits in the world.85 To be sure, one ought not to imagine this as simply the transmission of knowledge and artifacts, but rather as the development of hybrid forms of knowledge. Knowledge protects itself: the thesis of self-protecting knowledge has a demand and a supp-ly side (see Kitch 1980:711-715);86 Knowledge is extremely difficult to steal, or hardly anyone alteration in the composition of a medication in the pharmaceutical industry can result in a new patent. If one broadens the definition of knowledge to include so-called “branding,” or the reputation of a pro-duct (such as Coca-Cola, Nike, Mercedes), then the dissemination – in the sense of “imitation” – of such a form of knowledge by means of the successful branding or reputation of a service or product is greatly limited (cf. Kay, 1999:13). 81 Kennedy (2002:125) draws attention to the following case, among others: The journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences “has, within the past three years, published two papers in which data essential to conforming the claimed result were available to commercial researchers only for a price, and another in which sequence data were not available at all.” 82 Conventional, utilitarian economic theories emphasize that while the protection of intellectual pro-perty by means of patents, copyright laws and comparable state-sanctioned norms does result in a short-term monopolistic profit, it also provides incentives to innovation that in the end serve the com-mon good (first of all Smith, [1776] 1976:277-278; Bentham, 1839:71; Pigou, 1924:151; Arrow, 1962:616-617). Very recently, in contrast, Boldrin and Levine (2002) express the viewpoint that the (competitive) market is very likely in the position to reward entrepreneurial investments in research and development. Thus patent laws are not only superfluous, but they also have negative consequen-ces, such as for the prices of new products (thus Plant, 1934a, 1934b; Hirshleifer, 1971). 83 It is true that Azoulay’s empirical observations of the typical conduct of an entire industry, when they deal with the outsourcing of knowledge- and/or information-intensive projects, are of little help in ans-wering the question of why – apart from economic incentives – companies behave in just this manner. One certainly cannot rule out the possibility, however, as one interpretation of the results of Azoulay’s study permits, that these decisions are also influenced by experiences indicating that the “journey” of knowledge through system-immanent structures and processes is hindered. 84 See the study by Parks (1995), although it is limited to the international diffusion of results from re-search and development activities in OECD countries. 85 As Stiglitz (2001:515) emphasizes, “one of the most important determinants of the pace of growth is, for developed countries, the investment in research, and for less developed countries, efforts at clos-ing the knowledge gap between themselves and more developed countries.” 86 The thesis of the possibly self-protecting characteristics of modern knowledge does not primarily concern itself with certain inherent characteristics of knowledge that make it something like a private asset (this may have been particularly the case in earlier centuries, when scientific knowledge was al-ready protected from laymen by being formulated in one of the least accessible languages and was


162

has an interest in stealing knowledge, since one profits from knowledge only with great diffi-culty. On the supply side self-protecting knowledge refers to the requirement that the use of knowledge be closely tied to the ability to mobilize cognitive abilities which are both rare and difficult to articulate. The difficulty of using knowledge (secondarily) or the difficulties of trans-porting it depend on, for example, the manner in which knowledge is organized.87 At the same time, the self-protection of knowledge signals the fact that knowledge is anchored in a particular knowledge infrastructure, such as the ability to learn how to learn, and thus can neither circulate freely nor be easily reconstituted.88 The self-protecting qualities of knowledge on the demand side might be processes asso-ciated with characteristics or with the application of knowledge, as, for example, the high de-preciation of knowledge. The latter means that acquired knowledge quickly loses its value re-lative to the costs of acquisition and future profits. Moreover, in the context of certain forms of knowledge it can be true that the rights of ownership associated with that knowledge, similar-ly to the case of a famous painting or a very rare book such as the Gutenberg Bible, are easi-ly attributable by others and are therefore primarily of value to the owner. One can accelerate the rate of “wear and tear” on knowledge and information by behaving according to that infor-mation. If one follows the advice to buy a certain stock, for example, that does not mean that afterward it will necessarily be more valuable. The high degree of wear and tear experienced by information implies that “by the time someone steals the information it is worthless which in turn means there is no incentive to steal it” (Kitch, 1980:714). Prospects for the future Knowledge is often considered to be the public common property par excellence; the ethos anchored in the institution of science, for example, demands that knowledge – at least in principle – be accessible to all. But is it really a matter of “equal” knowledge for all? Do globa-lizing worlds of knowledge need a (natural) global language (cf. De Swaan, 2001) or even the spread of societal conditions that then are in place across the world? Is scientific know-ledge that has been converted into technology still subject to the same normative rules? What costs are associated with the transmission of knowledge? Knowledge is almost always, despite its good reputation, disputable. This characteristic is considered by scientific theory to be a great advantage and a virtue; in practice this fundamental contestability of scientific knowledge is frequently suppressed. This results in either a grave overestimation or a syste-matic undervaluation of scientific knowledge. Since knowledge is available in apparently unli-mited quantities, without thereby losing any of its significance, it can only to a very limited de-gree be associated with claims to private ownership (Simmel, [1907] 1978: 438). Modern communications technologies and the spread of learning institutions seem to gua-rantee an easier access to knowledge and possibly contribute to rendering potentially still existing claims to ownership almost ineffective. To be sure the possibility, and the danger,

thus, so to speak, automatically protected); rather, it refers to context-dependent institutional attributes that hinder a simple dissemination of knowledge. Among these attributes in modern society is access to the educational system and its intellectual capital. 87 The forms into which knowledge is organized help to protect knowledge: As Kitch (1980: 712), for example, underscores, “managers can avoid increasing the ease with which information can be trans-mitted by resisting the temptation to assemble the information in organized written form.” 88 The concept of “sticky information,” coined by Eric von Hippel (1991, 1994), refers to the same fact. Implicit stocks of knowledge which is difficult to transfer (tacit knowledge), cognitive abilities and expe-riences reduce the mobility of knowledge, facilitate its control and reduce the necessity of comprehen-sive legal norms to protect these forms of knowledge (cf. also Polanyi, 1958, 1967; Cowan, David and Forey, 1999:6-7). Antonelli (1999:244) refers in turn to structural or cultural processes and argues that it is particularly technical knowledge that is context-dependent; for technical knowledge “tends to be localized in well-defined technical, institutional, regional and industrial situations. It is specific to each industry, region and firm and consequently costly to use elsewhere. The localized character of technical knowledge increases its appropriability but reduces its spontaneous circulation in the economic system.”


163

also exists that it is not unhindered dissemination of knowledge that occurs, but rather con-centration of knowledge. One could indeed just as well assume that it is due to the larger so-cial meaning of knowledge, and not its particularity, that it loses its exclusivity. But the contra-ry appears to be correct. This once again raises the question of the basis of the lasting “power” of knowledge. In spite of its general good reputation, knowledge is seldom indisput-able.89 In marked contrast to the convictions of the classical functionalist theory of social dif-ferentiation, science is in many cases incapable of providing cognitive certainty. Scientific discourse is depragmatized, it can offer no definitive or even true statements (in the sense of proven causal sentences) to practical ends, but rather only more or less plausible assump-tions, scenarios or statements of probability (cf. Stehr, 1991a). Science is accordingly not the provider of reliable knowledge, but rather a source of uncertainty (Grundmann and Stehr, 2000).90 This uncertainty is not an expression of ignorance or a (temporary) deficit in know-ledge. It is a constitutive feature of both knowledge and of the contexts in which knowledge must work.91 And contrary to what rational theories of science say, this problem cannot be solved or even grasped by distinguishing between “good” and “bad” (or between pseudo-scientific and adequate) science. How might this even be possible under conditions of uncer-tainty? References Agrawal, Arum (2002), „Indigenous knowledge and the politics of classification,“ International Social

Science Journal 59: 287-297. Appadurai, Arjun (1990), „Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy,“ Public Culture

2:1-24. Arce, A. and T.K. Marsden (1993), “The social construction of international food: a new research

agenda,” Environment and Development 69:293-311. Arrow, Kenneth J. (1962), “Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention,” in: Richard

R. Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. New York: Princeton University Press.

Austin, John L. (1962), How to Do Things with Words. London: Oxford University Press.

89 The disenchantment of science by means of science leads to the call for a philosophy of research, since scientific research can be what science is not allowed to be. Research produces disputes and may formulate contentious claims to knowledge. Science is supposed to end controversies and dis-tance itself from society, while research should become involved, as Bruno Latour, for instance, ar-gues (1998). 90 Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz, by contrast, express the opinion that modern science has been confronted historically novel problems, and that it is these problems that inject the above-men-tioned degree of uncertainty into the work of science. For example, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990:7) draw attention to the fact that we “amidst all the great progress in scientific theory and in technological development, … are confronted by a new class of environmental challenges and threats. Among these are hazardous wastes, greenhouse effect and ozone depletion. These give rise to problems of a diffe-rent sort from those of traditional science, either in laboratory, classroom, or industry. Science was previously understood as achieving ever greater certainty on our knowledge and control of the natural world; now it is seen as coping with increasing uncertainties in these urgent environmental issues.” 91 To name only one example from the field of climate research: Hardly anyone still doubts that the mean global temperature of the earth has risen over the last century. The causes and the further de-velopment of the climate, however, are shrouded in uncertainty. And this uncertainty is by no means diminished despite intensive research efforts; on the contrary, it seems to be intensifying. This is true not only for possible future global climate changes and their consequences, but also and particularly for climate-related and climate-dependent ecological and social transformations. A study authored by Chris E. Forest (2002) and others was unable to answer the crucial question of climatic sensitivity (i.e., for example, the climate’s reaction to a doubling of the carbon dioxide content in the atmosphere). The researchers in this study indicate a range from 1.4 to 7.7 degrees, while the International Panel on Cli-mate Change, in a sort of compromise, proceed from a range of 1.5 to 4.5 degrees. The probability that the sensitivity lies outside the values established by the IPCC is still estimated by the authors at 30 percent. In other words: The uncertainty regarding the decisive measure for climatic prognoses re-mains great, if it has not become even greater.


164

Azoulay, Pierre (2003), “Acquiring knowledge within and across firm boundaries: evidence from clinical development,” Working Paper 10083, National Bureau of Econonomic Research www.nber.org/papers/w10083 (accessed on 2007-7-30).

Bates, Benjamin. 1988. “Information as an economic good,” in Vincent Mosco and Jane Wasko (eds.), The Political Economy of Information. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 76-94.

Benavot, Aaron, Yun-Lyung Cha, David Kamens, John W. Meyer und Suk-Ying Wong (1991), „Know-ledge for the masses: world models and national curricula, 1920–1986,“ American Sociological Review 56:85-100.

Bentham, Jeremy (1839), A Manual of Political Economy. New York: G.P. Putnam. Boldring, Michele and David K. Levine (2002), “Perfectly Competitive Innovation,” Fed. Reserve Bank

of Minneapolis, Research Department Staff Report 303 www.dklevine.com/papers/pci23.pdf (ac-cessed on 2007-07-30).

Boli, John and George M. Thomas (1997), “World culture in the world polity: a century of international non-governmental organization,” American Sociological Review 62:171-190.

Brave, Ralph (2001), “Governing the genome,” The Nation, Dec 10, 2001. Bush, Vannevar (1945), “As we may think,” Atlantic Monthly 101-108. Carillo, Francisco J. (2002), “Capital systems: implications for a global knowledge agenda,” Journal of

Knowledge Management 6:379-399. Chen, Lincoln C., Tim G. Evans and Richard A. Cash, “Health as a global public good,“ in Inge Kaul,

Isabelle Grunberg und Marc A. Stern (Hg.), Global Public Goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 284-304.

Chen, Shin-Horng (2002), “Global production networks and information technology: the case of Tai-wan,” Industry and Innovation 9:249-265.

Covaleski, Mark A., Mark W. Dirsmith and Larry Rittenberg (2003), “Jurisdictional disputes over pro-fessional work: the institutionalization of the global knowledge expert,” Accounting, Organiza-tions and Society 28:323-355.

Cowan, Robin and Dominique Foray (1997), “The economics of codification and the diffusion of know-ledge,” Industrial and Corporate Change 6:595-622.

Crane, Diana (2002), “Culture and globalization: Theoretical models and emerging trends,” in: Diana Crane, Nobuko Kawashima and Kenichi Kawasaki (eds.), Global Culture. Media, Arts, Policy, and Globalization. New York, New York: Routledge, pp. 1-25.

Davenport, T.H., D.H. De Long and M.C. Beers (1998), “Successful knowledge management projects,” Sloan Management Review 39: 43-57.

David, Paul (1993), “Intellectual property institutions and the panda’s thumb: patents, copyright, and trade secrets in economic theory and history,” in: Mitchell B. Wallerstein, Mary Ellen Mogee and Roberta A. Schoen (eds.), Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, pp. 19-57.

Davis, Deborah S. (2004), „Talking about property in the new Chinese domestic property regime,“ in: Frank Dobbin (ed.), The Sociology of the Economy. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 288-307.

Desouza, Kevin and Roberto Evaristo (2003), “Global knowledge management strategies,” European Management Journal 21:62-67.

Drori, Gili S., John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez and Evan Schofer (2003), Science in the Modern World Polity. Institutionalization and Globalization. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Durkheim, Emile ([1955] 1983), Pragmatism and Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Easton, David (1997), “The future of the postbehavioral phase in political science,” in: Kirsten Renwick

Monroe (ed.), Contemporary Empirical Political Theory. Berkeley, California: University of Cali-fornia Press, pp. 13-46.

Easton, David (1991), “The division, integration, and transfer of knowledge,” in: David Easton and Co-rinne S. Schelling (eds.), Divided Knowledge: Across Disciplines, Across Cultures. Newbury Park, California: Sage, pp. 7-36.

Ernst, Dieter (2005), “The new mobility of knowledge: digital information systems and global flagship networks, in Robert Latham and Saskia Sassen (eds.), Digital Formations. IT and New Architec-tures in the Global Realm. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 89-114.

Fernando, Jude L. (2003), “NGOs and the production of indigenous knowledge under the condition of postmodernity,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 590:54-72.

Frank, David John (1997), “Science, nature, and the globalization of the environment, 1870–1990,” Social Forces 76: 409-437.

Frank, David John, Ann Hironaka and Evan Schofer (2000), “The nation-state and the natural environ-ment over the twentieth century,” American Sociological Review 65: 96-116.


165

Frank, David John, Ann Hironaka, John W. Meyer, Evan Schofer and Nancy Brandon Tuma (1999), “The rationalization and organization of nature in world culture,” in: John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds.), Constructing World Culture: International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1875. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, pp. 81-99.

Freidson, Eliot (2001), Professionalism. The Third Logic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Freeman, Richard (2006), “Does globalization of the scientific/engineering workforce threaten US eco-

nomic leadership?,” forthcoming in Innovation Policy and the Economy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Fuller, Steve (2003), “The university: a social technology for producing universal knowledge,” Techno-logy in Society 25:217-234.

Fuller, Steve. 1992. „Knowledge as product and property,“ in Nico Stehr and Richard V. Ericson (eds.), The Culture and Power of Knowledge. Inquiries into Contemporary Societies. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 157-190.

Gay, Peter (2002), Das Zeitalter des Doktor Arthur Schnitzler. Innenansichten des 19. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.

Geanakoplos, John (1992), “Common knowledge,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 6:53-82. Geest, van der Sjaak, Susan Reynods White and Anita Hardon (1996), “The anthropology of pharma-

ceuticals: a biographical approach,” Annual Review of Anthropology 25:153-178. Geiger, Roger (1986), To Advance Knowledge. The Growth of American Research Universities, 1900–

1940. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gough, Noel (2002), “Thinking/acting locally/globally: Western science and environmental education in

a global knowledge economy,” International Journal of Science Education 24:1217-1237. Habermas, Jürgen (1964), “Dogmatismus, Vernunft und Entscheidung – Zur Theorie und Praxis in der

wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation,” in: Jürgen Habermas, Theorie und Praxis. Neuwied: Luchter-hand, pp. 231-257.

Harding, Sandra (2002), “Must the advance of science advance global inequality?,” International Stu-dies Review 4:87-105.

Hartmann, Frank and Erwin K. Bauer (2002), Bildersprache. Otto Neurath Visualisierungen. Wien: WUV.

Hirshleifer, Jack (1971), “The private and social value of information and the reward to innovative acti-vity,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 63:31-39.

Huntington, Samuel P. (2004), “Dead souls: the denationalization of the American elite,” National In-terest, Nr. 75:5-18.

Inkster, Ian (1991), Science and Technology in History: An Approach to Industrial Development. Ba-singstoke: Macmillan. [32-59]

Janich, Peter and Michael Weingarten (2002), “Verantwortung ohne Verständnis? Wie die Ethikdebat-te zur Gentechnik von deren Wissenschaftstheorie abhängt,” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33:85-120.

Kay, John (1999), “Money from knowledge,” Science & Public Affairs (Apr):12-13. Kennedy, Donald, “Bayh-Dole: Almost 25, Science 307:1375. Kennedy, Donald (2002), “On science at the crossroads,” Daedalus 131:122-126. Kettler, David, Volker Meja and Nico Stehr (1990), “Rationalizing the irrational: Karl Mannheim and the

besetting sin of German intellectuals,” American Journal of Sociology 95:1141-1173. Kevles, Daniel J. (2001), “Patenting life: a historical overview of law, interests, and ethics,” Paper pre-

sented to the Legal Theory Workshop, Yale University, Dec 20, 2001. Kitch, Edmund W. (1980), “The law and the economics of rights in valuable information.” Journal of

Legal Studies 9: 683-723. Koo, Bohn-Young (1982), “New forms of foreign direct investment in Korea,” Korean Development Ins-

titute, Working Paper No. 82-02. Leach, Melissa und James Fairhead (2002), „Manners of contestation: ‚citizen science’ and ‚indige-

nous knowledge’ in West Africa and the Caribbean,“ International Social Science Journal 59: 299-311.

Leslie, D.A. (1995), “Global scan: the globalization of advertising agencies, concepts, and campaigns,” Economic Geography 71:402-426.

Lessig, Lawrence (2004), “The information commons,” in Nico Stehr (ed.), The Governance of Know-ledge. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books.

Livingstone, David N. (2003), Putting Science in its Place. Geographies of Scientific Knowledge. Chi-cago: University of Chicago Press.

Luckmann, Thomas (1982), “Individual action and social knowledge,” in: Mario von Cranach and Rom Harré (eds.), The Analysis of Action. Recent Theoretical and Empirical Advances. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Machlup, Fritz (1979), “Stocks and flows of knowledge,” Kyklos 32:400-411.


166

Machlup, Fritz (1962), The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Mattelart, Armand [1996] 2000, Networking the World, 1794–2000. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Merton, Robert K. (1987), “Three fragments from a sociologist’s notebook: establishing the phenome-non, specified ignorance, and strategic research materials,” Ann. Review of Sociology 13:1-28.

Meyer, John W. (1999), “The changing cultural content of the nation state: a world society perspec-tive,” in George Steinmetz (ed.), State/Culture. State-Formation after the Cultural Turn. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 123-143.

Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas and Francisco O. Ramirez (1997), “World society and the nation-state,” American Journal of Sociology 103:144-181.

Meyer, John W., Kamens, D. and Aaron Benavot (1992), School Knowledge for the Masses. Washing-ton, DC: Falmer.

Mörth, U. (1998), “Policy diffusion in research and technological development: no government is an is-land,” Cooperation and Conflict 33:35-58.

Mokyr, Joel (1990), The Lever of Riches. Technological Creativity and Economic Progress. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moore, William and Melvin Tumin (1949), “Social functions of ignorance,” American Sociological Re-view 14:787-796.

Nelson, Richard, ed. (1993), National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press.

Neurath, Otto (1991), Schriften. Band 3: Gesammelte bildpädagogische Schriften Wien: Hölder-Pich-ler-Tempsky.

O’Mara, Margaret Pugh (2005), Cities of Knowledge. Cold War Science and the Search for the Next Silicon Valley. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Olson, Mancur Jr. (1996), “Big bills left on the sidewalk: why some nations are rich, and others are poor,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 10:3-24.

Osborne, Thomas and Nikolas Rose (1999), “Do the social sciences create phenomena?: the example of public opinion research,” British Journal of Sociology 50:367-396.

Parente Stephen L. and Edward C. Prescott (2000), Barriers to Riches. London: MIT Press. Parente Stephen L. and Edward C. Prescott (1994), “Barriers to technology adoption and develop-

ment, Journal of Political Economy 102:298-321. Park, Walter G. (1995), “International R&D spillovers and OECD economic growth,” Economic Inquiry

33:571-591. Patel, Pari and Keith Pavitt (1991), “Large firms in the production of the world’s technology: an import-

ant case of ‘non-globalisation’,” Journal of International Business Studies 22:1-21. Pickering, Andrew (ed.) (1995), The Mangle of Practice, Time, Agency and Science. Chicago, Illinois:

University of Chicago Press. Pigou, Arthur C. (1924), The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan. Plant, Arnold (1934a), “The economic theory concerning patents for inventions,” Economica 1:30-51. Plant, Arnold (1934b), “The economic aspects of copyright in books,” Economica 1:167-195. Popitz, Heinrich (1967), Über die Präventivwirkung des Nichtwissens. Tübingen: Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Porter, Michael E. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press. Pottage, Alain (1998), “The inscription of life in law: genes, patents, and bio-politics,” The Modern Law

Review 61:740-765. Romer, P. (1990), “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy. 98: S71-S102. Schofer, Evan (1999), “The rationalization of science and scientization of society: international science

organizations, 1870–1990,” in John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds.), Constructing World Cul-ture. International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, pp. 246-266.

Schott, Thomas (2001), “Global webs of knowledge,” American Behavioral Scientist 44:1740-1751. Schott, Thomas (1998), “Ties between centers and periphery in the scientific world-system,” Journal of

World-Systems Research 4:112-144 http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol4/v4n2a3.php (accessed on 2007-7-30).

Schott, Thomas (1993), “World science: globalization of institutions and participation,” Science, Tech-nology & Human Values 18:

Schott, Thomas (1988), “International influence in science: beyond center and periphery,” Social Science Research 17:219-238.

Schroeder, Ralph and Richard Swedberg (2002), “Weberian perspectives on science, technology and the economy,” British Journal of Sociology 53:383-401.

Smith, Adam ([1776] 1976), The Wealth of Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


167

Spariosu. Mihai I. (2005), Global Intelligence and Human Development. Toward an Ecology of Global Learning. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Stehr, Nico (2005), Knowledge Politics. Governing the Consequences of Science and Technology. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Press.

Stehr, Nico ed. (2004), The Governance of Knowledge. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books.

Stehr, Nico (2003), Wissenspolitik. Die Überwachung des Wissens. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Stehr, Nico (2000), Die Zerbrechlichkeit moderner Gesellschaften. Die Stagnation der Macht und die

Chancen des Individuums. Weilerswist: Velbrück. Stehr, Nico (1991), Praktische Erkenntnis. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Stern, Scott, Michael E. Porter and Jeffrey L. Furman (2000), “The determinants of national innovative

capacity,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7876 www.nber.org/papers/-w7876 (accessed on 2007-7-30).

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2001), “Information and the changes in the paradigm of economics,” (Nobel Lec-ture), pp. 472-540.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1999) “Knowledge as a global public good,” in: Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern (eds.), Global Public Goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 308-325.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1987), “Learning to learn, localized learning and technological progress,” in: Partha Dasgupta and Paul Stoneman (eds.), Economic Policy and Technological Performance. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 125-153.

Storper, Michael (1996), “Institutions of the knowledge-based economy,” in: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Employment and Growth in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Paris: OECD, pp. 255-283.

Swaan, Abram de (2001), Words of the World. The Global Language System. Oxford: Polity Press. Swidler, Ann (1986), “Culture as action,” American Sociological Review 51:273-286. Tenbruck, Friedrich H., ([1989] 1996) “Gesellschaftsgeschichte oder Weltgeschichte,” in: Friedrich H.

Tenbruck, Perspektiven der Kultursoziologie. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 75-98. Tenbruck, Friedrich H. (1969), “Regulative Funktionen der Wissenschaft in der pluralistischen Gesell-

schaft,” in: Herbert Scholz (ed.), Die Rolle der Wissenschaft in der modernen Gesellschaft. Ber-lin: Duncker & Humblot, pp. 61-85.

Watson-Verran, Helen and David Turnbull (1995), “Science and other indigenous knowledge sys-tems,” in: Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Peterson and Trevor Pinch (eds.), Hand-book of Science and Technology Studies. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, pp. 115-139.

World Bank (1999), Knowledge for Development. World Development Report. New York: Oxford Uni-versity Press.

World Bank (1998), Indigenous Knowledge for Development. Initiative led by the World Bank in part-nership with CIRAN/NUFFIC, CISDA, ECA, IDRC, SANGONet, UNDP, UNESCO, WHO, WIPO http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTINDKNOWLEDGE/0,,menuPK:825562~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:825547,00.html (accessed on 2007-7-30, keyword “Indigenous Knowledge Program”).


168

Appendix 3: Issues proposed during the ASRELEO process The Organising Committee discussed a first project outline and formulated the programme of Workshop I (left column in Table 1). Upon the debate in and at the end of that workshop (co-lumn 2) we came up with an array of pertinent issues and aspects (column 3).

Project outline (With 5 WS I clusters)

Workshop I (WS I)(As proposed by outline, Appendix 4)

Outcome of WS I (Bold: new issues compared to outline, Appendix 2)

“Gaps” (Not dealt with in WS I)

Generic Change of research approaches

(Yes) Social embedding

Integrative approaches

Research communities

Research network Energy research structures

Features of energy systems

Mega/small, high/low, centralised/decentra-lised, industrial/-research, Low Proba-bility-High Conse-quences/HP-LC

Issues Conflicts Yes Affluence and lack of

property rights Power (Disruptive events)

Poverty Yes Access and political powers – ownership

–

Lack of security Resources Equity Yes/no Poverty Gender Current–future gen. Costs No No Costs Responsibilities (No) No Change of govern-

ment, supranational agreements

Knowledge mgt. Yes Research network

Research network Knowledge issues s. l., integration of knowledge

Methods Uncertainties Sociotechnical

scenarios Sociotechnical scenario analysis

Evaluation Evaluation of political practices

Evaluation of political practices

Long-term issues

Social embedding Experiments Models, scenarios (conflicts,

Socio-tech. scenarios, story lines)

Policy Drivers No (?) Origin of innovation and

change/ Regimes/actors

Drivers

Societal impact Acceptability

Comprehensive approaches

Comprehensive approaches

Effects of large-scale exploitation of global resources

Disruptive events Social embedding Integrative approaches, controversies

Societal stability

Comparative studies (comparative, embedding, evaluation, regional)


169

Innovation systems Parallel story lines Parallel story lines

Transformation –

Overview Regional studies

Comparative studies (regional)

Buildings Experiments Everyday life practices Comparative studies

(embedding)

Output-throughput Learning systems Novel/known risks Educational material Competing systems i.a. Large technical systems Diversity Diversity

Table 1. Research issues put forth by the ASRELEO project.

It is attempted to categorise the topics of needed research given from Table 1 according to the structure proposed in section 5.1. Methodical issues are transversal. References are made to Chapter 2 and Appendix 2 in brackets. Non-referenced statements came up in the discussion. CT denotes proposals made by the Core Team. A. “Roof Terrace” Reflection Identification of paramount challenges

• Analyse mental patterns and attitudes (for example, “cheap energy is good energy”, “small is beautiful”, uncritical notions of social engineering, can-do fervour) (CT);

• Distinguish “real” challenges from myths (for example, “energy gap”) (CT); • Identify other and specify existing challenges to the energy field. Especially: Conf-

licts/Affluence and lack of property rights (Luterbacher et al., Pachauri); Equity/Pover-ty/Access (do.), misuse of political power – ownership; lack of security (section 2.2); knowledge management (Schilling et al., Stehr);

• Reflect on energy features on different scales (mega/small, high/low, centralised/de-centralised, industrial/research, Low Probability-High Consequence /HP-LC systems) (Appendix 4).

Visions

• Transition management (many contributions). B. “Open Window”

• The tenor of the discussion was that comprehensive approaches are needed (esp. Ruud). On behalf of that, comparative studies, parallel story lines, and regional analy-sis may overcome interface issues and serve as validation tools.

• Integrate energy issues into the wider gamut of developmental activities (Pachau-ri/CT);

• Foster interdisciplinary studies of energy systems in the context of livelihood (econo-mics, sociology, anthropology, demography, development studies) (Pachauri/CT).

C. “Study”

• Explore the reasons why policies for limiting energy use have generally not been suc-cessful;

• Learn from failure stories (Flüeler, Verbong et al.); • Obtain a better understanding of the forces that hinder energy conservation (see

section 2.2 for explanation) (CT);


170

• Describe how everyday life is shaped, how it changes and can be changed in indus-trialised countries and countries under development (Berker, Spaargaren), and

• Specify how the respect for the environment can become a stronger influencing factor through the change of attitude and behaviour in relation to energy use.

Regional and country analyses

• Regional and comparative analyses validate novel approaches to integrate heteroge-nic expertise (Rohracher, Berker, Spaargaren);

• Focus on how to scale up from small pilot and demonstration plants (Pachauri); • Examine global price development and international trade in relation of development

(CT); • Study the impacts of the extensive use of traditional fuels In developing countries as

well as the availability/affordability of modern commercial fuels (CT); • Study conflicts that stem from resource affluence, particularly in countries where pro-

perty rights have not been developed to deal with the affluence (Luterbacher et al.); • Study the effects of energy poverty as a cause of misery, ill health, deprivation and as

a hindrance to development (Pachauri). Economic impacts of energy supply change (Geo-)political impacts of energy supply change Social and human-rights impacts of energy supply change Impacts of external factors

• Scrutinise the roles of energy carriers/technologies in diverse countries or world re-gions with regard to their security of energy supply;

• Study dynamic effects of innovations of actual or foreseeable rises in energy prices and of changes of energy security supply on the central factors of energy demand (consumption patterns, lifestyle, technology, product design, energy saving policy measures);

• Investigate into rising energy prices – pros and cons of a policy of energy consump-tion stabilisation, pros and cons of a driving force for a supply-oriented policy of pro-moting/subsidising energy supply;

• Investigate into consequences of rising prices of energy carriers on international mo-ney fluxes, on the currency reserves, and on the stability of the global monetary sys-tem in general;

• Call for “demand security” as necessity to assure that investments for increasing pro-duction and transport capacity are effected ( 1section 2.2);

• Analyse consequences of the new role of the energy supply countries on other (non energy) policy fields.

• Study consequences of an order-politically asymmetrical development in the fields of energy policy, economic policy, and foreign trade policy in important energy exporting countries and in Europe: protectionism (for example, in Russia and Iran) vs. a policy of market opening in Europe;

• Look into the emergence of international alliances and coalitions under the sign of energy supply security – economic and political consequences for individual countries and world regions (for example, Africa, Europe).

Innovation processes Innovation areas Barriers to action and innovation

• Challenges are society-driven and, as such, informal – consequently, non-disciplinary knowledge and expertise has to be incorporated into research so that we achieve so-cial embedding (Flüeler; Verbong et al., Elzen & Hofman) (section 2.2)


171

• Comprehensive approaches are in line with the mostly complex nature of innovation systems and processes, thus an adequate mix of methods is needed (parallel story lines, sociotechnical scenarios, comparative studies, experiments, etc.) (Jørgensen, Rohracher, Berker, Verbong et al., Elzen & Hofman).

• Acquire a better understanding of the driving forces, esp. the ones impeding energy conservation; describe regimes and actors (Rohracher);

• Consider using broad descriptions of technology (mega-small, etc.) for innovation system studies (Appendix 4, CT).

Energy and economic policies

• Acquire a better understanding of the forces impeding energy conservation; • Recognise the need to develop an energy foreign policy on reliable technological and

socio-economic information (see 1section 2.2); • Analyse pathways to Internalise external costs with energy (as well as other re-

sources); • Investigate what measures provide adequate incentives for very long-term invest-

ments. Monitoring and impact assessment

• Use novel methods (sociotechnical scenario analysis, experiments, social-practices approach, interactive navigator tools such as personal energy budgets) (Elzen & Hof-man, Verbong et al., Ruud, Rohracher, Spaargaren, CT).

• Explore and relate energy features on different scales (mega/small, high/low, centra-lised/decentralised, industrial/research, Low Probability-High Consequence/HP-LC systems, Appendix 4).

Evaluation

• Energy research structures, research network, include long-term issues (Verbong et al.), enlarge scope of evaluations beyond market variables (Ruud);

• Regional and comparative analyses validate novel approaches to integrate heteroge-nic expertise (Rohracher, Berker, Spaargaren).

D. “Front Yard”

• Help to set up a comprehensive discourse, as durable solutions to complex and cont-roversial problems have to be socially robust (Flüeler; Verbong et al.).

Strategies of transparency Information and education/knowledge strategies Innovation strategies for companies Innovation strategies for fields of need Innovations in the energy field

• Society-driven (informal, “non-scientific”) challenges imply vertical integration (re-search – practice) and enhanced horizontal integration (research connections world-wide) (do., Schilling et al., Stehr);

• Information and education (focus on groups rather individuals; social practices as new research line, Spaargaren).

• Policies for furthering both the flexibility (demanded by economics) and stability (for safety and reliability reasons) of the energy sector and institutions dedicated to an ap-propriate balance of flexibility and stability ( 1section 2.2).


172

Strategic technology development

• Improve governance by establishing and following an operational and empirical-oriented approach providing a basis for a concrete dialogue with the “technological” sciences and the energy stakeholders (Ruud);

• Diversify energy sources to improve supply security ( 2section 2.2); • Install and follow policies and institutional arrangements to find in time technical solu-

tions to tackle the numerous challenges; overcome path dependency (Ruud); • Ensure social embedding of technologies, analyse and consider contexts and cul-

tures (Verbong et al., Spaargaren, Berker, Ruud). Strategic development of institutions

• Propose policies for furthering both the flexibility and stability of the energy sector and institutions dedicated to an appropriate balance of flexibility and stability ( 2section 2.2);

• Identify factors and measures how to deal with the “NIMBY” issue; • Define legal and safeguard problems as well as countermeasures in the implementa-

tion of CCS (CT); • Design strategies to address conflicts that stem from resource affluence, particularly

in countries where property rights have not been developed to deal with the affluence (Luterbacher et al.);

• Propose policies and institutional arrangements to achieve the long-term goals (for example, IPCC, maritime legislation) (Flüeler, CT).

Contributions to a global energy policy

• Design policies to address energy poverty as a cause of misery, ill health, deprivation and as a hindrance to development.

Integration of knowledge, bridge gaps

• Do not focus on technologies as such but on socio-technical systems and processes (many contributions), socio-technical issues are trans-scientific and transdisciplinary (Flüeler); framing and contextualising are crucial (do.);

• Consider transforming energy research structures into and using them as research networks so that integrative approaches are fostered (Flüeler; Verbong et al.);

• Investigate into perception and reflection as to their significance follows from the fact that energy policies and institutions are in need of long-term orientation since they do have a long time horizon (Rohracher, Verbong et al.);

• Investigate into perception and reflection as durable solutions to complex and contro-versial problems have to be socially robust, that is if and when most arguments, evi-dence, social alignments, interests, and cultural values lead to a consistent option (Flüeler; Verbong et al., Elzen & Hofman);

• Foster foresight, and insight, which is translated into precaution, is most needed (El-zen & Hofman, Ruud, Rohracher).

• Poverty, incl. energy poverty, both can be seen to have two dimensions: lack of free-dom, lack of wealth. Examine how this general concept, put forward by Amartya Sen, translates into energy policy and other policy areas (Pachauri, CT).


173

Appendix 4: Initial outline of ASRELEO 2006-1-12/tf/dsp/ejo (minor rev. 2006-4-26) Introduction: Where do we stand? Malaise with today’s energy-related social research Energy research, obviously, depends on specialised knowledge and expertise. Energy sys-tems are complex socio-technical structures. We argue that a malaise follows from the multi-faceted and extended expert-layperson dilemma. For the sake of clarity, and as a linchpin, we overdraw the actor/institutional analysis and put forward the following propositions (see Figure 1 overleaf):

• The dominance of technical knowledge in energy systems lends natural scientists and engineers a strong position compared to non-experts, that means, laypersons in general and other non-experts in their field, e.g., also social scientists [1][2]92;

• The study of future energy systems is almost exclusively the domain of natural scientists, engineers, and traditional economists;

• The technical experts expect the laypersons – the general public and the decision makers – to finance research and to allow implementation without questioning;

• From the social scientists they expect explanations why the laypersons are a factor of irri-tation and so obstreperous and how this could be overcome [3][4][5];

• Large parts of the public bask in their criticism of the “academic-military-industrial comp-lex” [6] and build up a solid wall of distrust, even mistrust [7]; by virtue of their roles as consumers and voters they may exert leverage on the other actors, for example, demand on technology;

• The majority of social scientists do not want to want to invest the time necessary to tackle (complicated) technical issues, let alone future developments of socio-technical structures;

• The (institutional) decision makers, usually governments, administration, and parlia-ments, act upon and regulate the current trend, usually in concordance with the scienti-fic-industrial establishment, but also according to political calculation;

• The media amplify current issues, trends, and leading voices [8][9]; their role is judged controversially [10][11][12][13].

Engineers(Traditional) Economists

Natural Scientists(Other) Social Scientists

Public / Customers / Voters / Constituents

Governments / Administration

MediaIndustry

LegitimacyPurchasing power Opinion

(Contracts)Contracts Licencing,bans

Pressure

Contracts ExplanationTechnologicaldevelopment

Engineers(Traditional) Economists

Natural Scientists(Other) Social Scientists

Public / Customers / Voters / Constituents

Governments / Administration

MediaIndustry MediaIndustry

LegitimacyPurchasing power OpinionLegitimacyPurchasing power Opinion

(Contracts)Contracts Licencing,bans

Pressure

Contracts ExplanationTechnologicaldevelopment

Figure 1. Actor network with respect to energy research.

92 References are exemplary. Schools are not differentiated (for example, cultural theory [14], social psychology [15], psychometrics [9], sociology [16], and critics [17][18]).


174

Whereas one may assert that in the short- and medium term this framework sustains itself by market and regulatory power balance (among the really existing players), the development of the long term, for example, 50 to 100 years, is not taken into account. Here a more conspicuous role of social science, at large, might come into play. This need is the driving force of the present project, whereby some research topics are suggested below. Why? Setting

Long-term energy options, ranging from 40 years from the present and beyond, pose comp-lex technical and societal problems as society and technologies develop with time and have an intricate relationship. The European Fusion Development Agreement (EFDA) manage-ment has recognised that the achieved and ongoing Socio-Economic Research in Fusion (SERF) needs enlargement to and reflection by a wider social-science community. In the pre-paratory discussions it was agreed to enlarge the scope and open the project up to a multi-client study involving diverse relevant energy technologies. What for? Aim

– Articulate the needs to assess (long-term) sustainable energy systems by social science; – Raise and help maintain awareness among social scientists to address energy-related

issues and challenges; – Support decision makers in formulating respective research policies. For whom? Audience

We envisage two main target audiences as beneficiaries of this undertaking:

– Energy research policy bodies on various levels (supra-national, national, universities, in-dustry) and the

– Energy & environment research community at large (natural science, engineering, social science) in diverse technological arenas such as biomass (possibly including genetic engineering), efficiency, fossil fuels (including carbon disposal), nuclear fission, nuclear fusion (both including waste disposal), solar, wind (both including land use).

Which products? Objectives

– Trigger a discourse on societal aspects of long-term energy-environment options among diverse social-science communities;

– Analyse the pertinent long-term research issues to be published in a White Paper; – Based on the discourse, propose a mid-term research agenda (5 years) for social

science focused on long-term energy options (up to 100 years). What approach? Rationale

The underlying approach of this project is to focus on systemic (including institutional) fea-tures and not technologies as such. Energy systems may be characterised by distinct fea-tures, paired into the following (no hierarchy, no valuation):

• centralised network – decentralised network – stand-alone facilities; • mega-technology – small technology; • renewable energy source – non-renewable energy source; • high technology – low technology; • low probability/high consequence – high prob./low consequence risk situation; • novel – known/familiar risk; • industrial scale – research stage.

This approach avoids possible traps such as so-called supportive or acceptance research but provides roads to analyse – and hopefully cope with – mechanisms, processes and inter-faces of long-term technological developments. This should lead to self-reflection of the parti-


175

cipating disciplinary perspectives and, in the end, to more robust, including sustainable and socially acceptable, energy-environment options. What? (Proposed) Research topics (examples)

The list below is an off-hand enumeration of research topics, which are captured as “Social Research related to Long-term Energy Options”. It will be an essential part of the project ASRELEO to complement and detail this list. The augmented list may lend itself to a more systematic representation and assessment of the pertinent issues along the three dimen-sions “technologies” (technical fields), “research topics” (below), and academic “disciplines” (see Figure 2 overleaf). Research done so far will be characterised, presented and assessed in respect of the systematised list. Following that and the analysis of the needs of research policy bodies a general outline of a research agenda will be proposed. We propose to ex-plore the following issues:

• Generic aspects related to the long-term issue such as: various types of uncertainties (from parameter to decision uncertainty), changing research approaches (extrapolated projections, scenario analyses, quantitative models simulating energy demand), dyna-mics of costs of new technologies, vulnerabilities, responsibilities (change of government, supranational agreements), equity issues (deciders today, risk bearers tomorrow), and knowledge management (guarantee of competent body with sufficient resources);

• Dynamics of energy policy objectives: identification of drivers (resource supply, cli-mate change), changing weights in problem definition (scarcity-, pollution-orientation, changing perspectives and policies), cross-cutting issues;

• Role and organisation of research communities in a globalised world: structure and characteristics of particular science-and-technology systems (attractiveness of “single” technologies, challenges to “multiple”/heterogeneous technology options like efficiency-oriented options, R&D networks; self-reflection of communities; societal context and inter-action with society (influencing as well as influenced by societal trends);

• Risks and chances of technical options and their definition by different stakehold-ers: self-perception of options by scientific communities (technical definition) and external perception by other players (amplification of risks); lines of argumentation (risk minimisa-tion, safety orientation);

• Societal impact of various technical options: political risks of various options; political and social effects of large-scale exploitation of global resources by the economically strong nations (in nations with resources, in nations exploiting them, and in nations not capable of exploiting them); economic development, employment effects, competitive-ness, societal stability (deciders and risk bearers), resilience and vulnerability, impacts from disruptive events (natural, man-induced, and man-made);

• Acceptability of various technical options: contingencies in different societal groups and nations; cost and security of supply aspects, external effects and ancillary benefits and costs

• Cross-cutting methodological research aspects: lessons learned and needs in social science with respect to R&D in energy- and energy-related innovation systems.

The three various dimensions might be structured as follows:


176

Figure 2. The three dimensions of research organisation.

How and when? Format and workplan

The core of the project is the discussion forum provided by two dedicated Workshops (WS): the first one for the presentation and debate of propositions on the research topics (above), the second one to review a draft of findings and a research agenda. A tentative workplan is suggested below:

Role Activity yrs. 2006 2007 Phases mths. JA F M/A JN A O N/D JA/F A/M Preparation Draft outline

OC nominees

Feedback Final outline

Enquiry nominees

OC complete Initial Enquiry

speakers

Sponsors Tender

proposals (1)

Meeting OC M2* Proposals (2) Decision OC Core 1st Workshop:

Presentations WS1

Draft report Final 2nd Workshop:

Review report WS2

(M3)

Final report ENDC C C C C C C C C C OC OC OC OC OC OC S S S (S) (S) D D (D) D R R? R R R Milestones 1

2 3 4 5 6 7

C Contractor (CEPE-ETH) OC Organising Committee S Speakers D Discussants R Reviewers (R?: possibly to be approached in programming already) M Meetings of the OC: M2*Final list of speakers to be invited (topics, background papers), programme, tentative list of discussants; possibly a 3rd Meeting needed WS Workshop (…) possible participation and involvement


177

Milestones Deadline

1 Final project outline 2006-1-12 2 Organising Committee completed 2006-2 3 Second OC Meeting 2006-6 4 OC decision on presentations 2006-8 5 1st Workshop: Presentations 2006-10 6 2nd Workshop: Review of draft report 2007-1/2 (Third OC Meeting) 7 Final report 2007-5 Who? Participants

Renowned social-science researchers and R&D policy specialists in the energy-environment field are approached by a broad-based Organising Committee to participate in two dedicated Workshops and/or present approaches, methods, results and challenges in the mentioned topics. The ETH team will, thereupon, draft findings and a report, to be commented by parti-cipants and invited reviewers (see Workplan), and then formulate a research agenda under the auspices of the Organising Committee. References

[1] Rowe, W.D. (1977): An anatomy of risk. John Wiley & Sons, New York. [2] DeLuca, D.R., J.A.J. Stolwijk and W. Horowitz (1986): Public perceptions of technological risks. A

methodological study. In: V. Covello, J. Menkes and J. Mumpower (eds.): Risk evaluation and ma-nagement. Plenum Press, New York:25-67.

[3] Combs, B. & P. Slovic (1979): Causes of death: biased newspaper coverage and biased judg-ments. Journalism Quarterly. Vol. 56:837-843.

[4] Pearce, D.W. (1980): The preconditions of achieving consensus in the context of technological risk. In: M. Dierkes, S. Edwards & R. Coppock (eds.): Technological risk. Its perception and handl-ing in the European Community. Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Cambridge, Königstein:57-63.

[5] Covello, V.T & J. Mumpower (1985): Risk analysis and risk management. An historical perspec-tive. Risk analysis. Vol. 5. No. 2:103-120.

[6] Jacob, G. (1990): Site unseen: the politics of nuclear waste repository. Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, P. 21.

[7] Slovic, P. (1993): Perceived risk, trust, and democracy. Risk Anal. Vol. 13. No. 6:675-682. [8] Freudenberg, W.R., C.-L. Coleman, J. González & C. Helgeland (1996): Media coverage of ha-

zard events: analyzing the assumptions. Risk Anal. Vol. 16. No. 1:31-42. [9] Fischhoff, B., P. Slovic & S. Lichtenstein (1978): Fault-trees: Sensitivity of estimated failure proba-

bilities to problem representation. Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. Vol. 4:342-355.

[10] Slovic, P., B. Fischhoff and S. Lichtenstein (1980): Facts and fears: understanding perceived risk. In: R.C. Schwing & W.A. Albers (eds.): Societal risk assessment. How safe is safe enough? Ple-num Press, New York: 181-214.

[11] Sjöberg, L. (1998): Worry and risk perception. Risk Anal. Vol. 18. No. 1:85-93. [12] van der Pligt, J. (1985): Public attitudes to nuclear energy: salience and anxiety. Environmental

Psychology. Vol. 5:87-97. [13] Renn, O. (1990): Public responses to the Chernobyl accident. Env. Psych. Vol. 10, No. 2:151-167. [14] Douglas, M. & A. Wildavsky (1982): Risk and culture. An essay on the selection of technological

and environmental dangers. Univ. of California Press, Berkeley. [15] Otway, H. & K. Thomas (1982): Reflections on risk perception and policy. Risk Anal. Vol. 2. No.

2:69-82. [16] Short, J.F. (1984): The social fabric at risk: toward the social transformation of risk analysis. Ame-

rican Sociological Review. Vol. 49 (Dec):711-725. [17] Sjöberg, L. (1996): A discussion of the limitations of the psychometric and Cultural Theory ap-

proaches to risk perception. Radiation Protection Dosimetry. Vol. 68:219–225. [18] Wynne, B. (1982): Institutional mythologies and dual societies in the management of risk. In: H.C.

Kunreuther & E.V. Ley (eds.): The risk analysis controversy. An institutional perspective. Springer, Berlin:127-143.

Final Report for EFDA and BP

Documents