1 [Type text] CAN DEMOCRATIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION REDUCE CORRUPTION IN EX-COMMUNIST REPUBLICS? A LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY OF BULGARIA A MAJOR RESEARCH PAPER PRESENTED TO THE POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT OF GUELPH UNIVERSITY by EVGENIA KARAKEHAYOVA in partial fulfillment for the degree of Masters of Arts August 29th. 2014
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CAN DEMOCRATIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION REDUCE CORRUPTION IN EX-COMMUNIST REPUBLICS?
A LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY OF BULGARIA
A MAJOR RESEARCH PAPER
PRESENTED TO
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT OF GUELPH UNIVERSITY
reinvented themselves as transitional democratic leaders, and then used the power of the state to
win early elections" (Spendzharova and Vachudova, 40). The view that a superficial democratic
model was adopted in Bulgaria is further supported by Bulanova, who asserts that there exists a
strong link between a ‘minimalist democracy’ and failure of anti-corruption reform:
It is undisputable…that the “minimalist concept of democracy” […] is not enough in order to establish a functioning, sustainable democracy. Democracy does not only mean that people can vote in free and fair elections, but that they can influence public policy as well. I suggest that state failure in anticorruption corresponds directly to the quality of the established (achieved) democratic model (Bulanova, 56-59).
Similarly, Stoyanov describes another feature of Bulgaria’s minimalist democracy in
claiming that for decades, the Bulgarian public had been accustomed to living within a culture
where corruption was the norm (Stoyanov, 10). In a society where corruption perpetuates to be
perceived as the norm for a significant period of time, it becomes an effective means of solving
problems and further increases both the citizenry and officials’ inclination to engage in corrupt
behavior (Stoyanov, 10). In accordance with Stoyanov’s argument, Rose describes yet another
feature of Bulgaria’s minimalist democracy in claiming that besides the acceptance of corruption
as the norm, the Bulgarian public suffers from profound and widespread mistrust in political
institutions (Rose, 19): “Substantial majorities of citizens in post-communist regimes… find that
their societies lack a key ingredient: trustworthy institutions capable of mediating between
individuals and the state” (Rose, 19). Rose and Stoyanov both point to the lack of soft, cultural
norms in Bulgarian society as fundamental obstacles to successful corruption reform. While
Stoyanov emphasizes the acceptance of corruption as a cultural norm, Rose points to the
widespread and persistent public distrust in political institutions. The presence of such cultural
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attitudes within Bulgarian society is in accordance with the definition of a ‘minimalist democracy’.
As Sandholtz & Taagepera assert:
“The swift transition to democratic political reform at the collapse of communism, could not obliterate corruption in post-communist societies…Communism had produced a culture of corruption; entire populations had been socialized into norms and expectations that made corruption part of their way of life. Those cultural legacies of communism were unlikely to simply vanish with the political system that engendered them” (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 110 & 127).
In short, one of the main explanations in the literature for the limited effect of
democratization on corruption is that the simple adoption of a democratic model is not sufficient
to erase corrupt practices arising from cultural customs and behavioral habits, since such habits
change slowly trailing behind even the most comprehensive political and institutional shifts
(Sandholtz and Taagepera, 127)
PRIVATIZATION MAY INCREASE CORRUPTION
Conversely, a group of scholars hold that mass privatization following the collapse of
communism actually created new opportunities and incentives for corruption (Holmes, 2006;
Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005; Sokhey and Yildirim, 2013).One reason why corruption could
increase along with economic liberalization is that post-communist countries are likely to
experience a phenomenon that Holmes refers to as “nomenklatura privatisation” and Sokhey &
Yildirim refer to as “crony economic liberalization”. This is when the old communist power elite
attempt to become the new economic elite by distributing resources amongst each other, under a
new government structure. The old elite may use the privatization process for their own
advantage, selling formerly state-owned enterprises at low prices, either to friends and relatives,
or to themselves (Holmes, 286). Indeed, Sokhey and Yildirim (2013) claim that the “crony
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economic liberalization” in Bulgaria was controlled by small elite of ex-communist party
officials who redistributed the country’s assets and enterprises amongst themselves (Sokhey &
Kildirim, 2013). In essence, Sokhey and Yildirim argue that the communist party that dictated
economic policy before the collapse of communism had successfully adapted to the now
seemingly democratic and capitalist environment. Thus, in Bulgaria, the true tenets of economic
liberalization were not met, but instead, a superficial government decrease in market intervention
was exhibited, in which the elites “maintained extremist ideological core standing in opposition
to democracy and the free market” (Sokhey and Yildirim, 3).
Furthermore, state officials may attempt to benefit from the process of privatization in
another way, namely by demanding bribes for the sale of certain enterprises. As Sandholtz &
Taagepera claim, “when state officials distribute state properties and enterprises to private
owners, bribes and payoffs become the preferred method for the allocation of the richest assets”
(Sandholtz and Taagepera, 114). A World Bank study in 2000 found that the dual transitions of
economic liberalization and privatization, coupled with democratization removed whatever
mechanisms had been in place to control corrupt behaviors (Pradhan and Anderson, 26). The
report concluded that:
‘the simultaneous transition processes of building new political and economic institutions in the midst of a massive redistribution of state assets have created fertile ground for state capture and administrative corruption… Numerous examples exist in all countries in transition where ownership or control of key state assets was transferred through nontransparent means to those with political influence; corruption played a key part in this process’ (Pradhan and Anderson, xix)
Lastly, it has been theorized that since all of the post-communist states experienced
significant economic hardships throughout the 1990s, it made corruption during privatization a
highly attractive option (Holmes, 282). This is because economic hardships create incentives for
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engaging in corrupt behavior, as relative poverty can increase the motivation for both citizens
and officials to enhance their incomes through corruption (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 40).
To summarize, the literature shows that the economic liberalization which occurred in
Bulgaria after the collapse of communism created a multitude of opportunities – mostly through
mass privatization - for asset grabs and for a crony distribution of state property, dominated by a
monopoly of political elites. Many scholars point out that the period after the collapse of
communism in Bulgaria was characterized by a chaotic transition, in which “the combination of
poor state control with widespread despair and economic hardship was a powerful explicator of
increased rates of general crime and corruption” (Holmes, 282).
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Chapter 3: Accession to the European Union and Europeanization
The chapter will examine a) arguments as to why EU accession should help curb
corruption in Bulgaria; b) countervailing views that that EU accession will not have an effect or
will worsen corruption practices in Bulgaria.
First, it must be noted that once a country enters into EU accession negotiations, it agrees
to concede certain areas of policy making to supranational authority. (For more information on
Bulgaria’s Road to accession, see Appendix Table 4.) Policy-making within the European Union
is a complicated process, referred to as a “balancing act between the European level, the national
level and the sub-national level” (Warleigh-Lack & Dranchenberg, 200). The EU exercises
exclusive supranational competence over policy areas relating to the economic market, but
allows members to exercise considerable national sovereignty over other areas like
administrative coordination and the judiciary (Warleigh-Lack & Dranchenberg, 201). In policy
areas where the EU allows national sovereignty the bulk of the responsibility for reform lies with
the member states themselves.
WHY EU ACCESSION SHOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON CORRUPTION REFORM
A rich body of existing literature suggests that EU accession can help curb corruption
levels in Bulgaria through [1] The adoption of the ‘acquis communitaire’, which requires certain
standards of administrative, and judiciary governance; and [2] The mechanisms of pre-accession
conditionality and post-accession verification.
First, it must be noted that in 1993, the European Commission established a set of
quantifiable criteria (known as the Copenhagen Criteria) that candidate members were required
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to implement in order to successfully accede. These criteria consist of (Accession Criteria,
European Commission, 2009): [a] Political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; [b]
Economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and
market forces; [c] Administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the ‘acquis
communitaire’ and the ability to take on the obligations of membership. As was the case with
Bulgaria in 1997, failure to comply with the conditions outlined in the Copenhagen Criteria
results in postponement of the invitation to join or an overall rejection of candidacy (see
appendix Table 4).
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REFORM
Literature contends that when the European Union demands from its candidate members
to build the administrative and institutional capacity to adopt and transpose the ‘acquis
communitaire’ within domestic law, the EU also demands a certain standard of good governance
within public administration (Grabbe, 2001; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004;
Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2009; Haughton, 2007; Vachudova, 2009). The content of the acquis
itself does not provide a specific administrative model to be followed by candidates, nor does it
explicitly specify corruption control. However, in various policy areas, the acquis commands the
creation and establishment of administrative structures required in order to successfully
implement prescribed policy reform. The creation and establishment of these administrative
structures requires a functioning, transparent, accountable and efficient public administration
system. Thus, in an indirect way, and without being explicitly outlined within its content, the
acquis may positively affect the transparency and accountability of Bulgarian public
administration. As Papadimitriou and Gateva claim, ‘through a mixture of formal and informal
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mechanisms of applying pressure, the acquis could exert tremendous influence on corruption
practices’ (Papadimitriou and Gateva, 5-6).
In regards to the acquis itself, the document consists of 80,000-pages of supranational
law, which must be transposed into domestic law (Haughton, 238). Applicant countries have
virtually no bargaining power when it comes to adoption and transposition of the acquis
communitaire, as it is a non-negotiable process in which the acquis takes precedence over
national law (Grabbe, 2001). The largest share of the acquis relates to the functioning of the
internal market, including economic liberalization (Vachudova, 50) (see also the discussion
above on the possible effects of economic liberalization on corruption). Thus, despite of the lack
of a working model in the area of administrative reform within the acquis, the acquis can be
expected to indirectly affect Bulgarian public administration through the demand for a
functioning and transparent administrative capacity.
The judiciary is a second area where the acquis is expected to positively affect corruption
practices. Scholars argue that during the pre-accession negations, the EU demanded from
Bulgaria a solidified establishment of the democratic principle of the separation and
independence of the judiciary, which at the time required deep judicial reform (Frison-Roche and
Sodev, 2005; Grabbe, 2001). In fact, it is argued that in order to meet acquis standards, Bulgaria
has undergone a deep transformational and restructuring process of the judiciary, beginning in
the early ‘90s. First, during the very initial EU accession talks in 1991, Bulgaria adopted the
first- of- its- kind article of the constitution which made official the separation of judicial,
administrative and executive powers for the first time. Article 8 of the Constitution stipulated
that ‘State power is separated into the legislative branch, executive branch and judicial branch’ –
a separation that did not exist during communism (Frison-Roche and Sodev, 72). This separation
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can be attributed to reforms outlined within the ‘acquis communitaire’. Second, in 1994,
Bulgaria adopted the basis for its first democratic judicial system and created the Courts of
Appeal, the Administrative Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Cassation (Frison-Roche
and Sodev, 71). In the period from 2001 until 2005, under EU directive, Bulgaria undertook
another significant long term commitment to further reform and improve the transparency and
impartiality of its judiciary, “replacing the old criminal-procedures code which dated back to the
Communist era; ensuring the openness of the judicial system and reviewing the functioning of
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and improving the training, recruitment and assessment of the
magistrates” (Frison-Roche and Sodev, 71).
Several scholars have argued that these judicial reforms can be expected to hamper
corruption through creating a system of checks and balances, which would decrease favoritism
and nepotism towards political elites implicated in charges of fraud or corruption (Frison-Roche
and Sodev, 2005). For Bulgaria, establishing a satisfactory level of judicial independence and
functionality is crucial, as several authors point to the inefficiency of the judiciary at persecuting
and sentencing corrupt political officials as one of the major contributors to the perpetuation of
corrupt practices (Frison-Roche and Sodev, 2005; Popova, 2012; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008).
It can be argued that for a country with a significant legacy of nepotism and favoritism between
political elites and magistrates, establishing the principle of the separation of powers and
solidifying the independence of the judiciary can aid in increasing the instances of successful
persecution and sentencing of corrupt political officials, thereby resulting in an overall reduction
of corruption (Frison-Roche and Sodev, 2005; Popova, 2012).
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PRE-ACCESSION CONDITIONALITY AND POST-ACCESSION VERIFICATION
The literature also claims that EU membership could reduce corruption in Bulgaria in two
different phases and through two different mechanisms: first, during the pre-accession phase the
EU utilizes a mechanism of conditionality which involves gate-keeping and monitoring, and it
also utilizes peer pressure and mutual persuasion in order to promote good governance or to
reduce corruption. Second, in the case of Bulgaria (and Romania as well) the EU also utilizes a
mechanism of verification and cooperation to ensure post-accession compliance.
First, the pre-accession phase is marked by conditionality and gate-keeping. Gate-keeping
has been argued to be the EU’s most powerful and most commonly used conditionality tool as it
functions by restricting candidate members from advancing in the accession process if they fail
to comply with certain criteria (Grabbe, 1022). In analysis of the effectiveness of gate-keeping,
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004) hypothesize that EU gate-keeping functions based on
an external incentives model, in which the EU sets rules as conditions that members must fulfill
in order to advance to the next step of the accession process or to receive EU rewards. EU
rewards may come in the form of financial aid, trade and co-operation agreements and
investments. Bulgaria is highly economically incentivized to join the EU and to comply with all
EU conditionality, even if it conflicts with national interest or if it necessitates profound reform
(Grabbe, 2001; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Haughton, 2007; Spendzharova and Vachudova,
2012 ) Grabbe elaborates that “EU aid in particular – both current receipts and the prospect of
future transfers – has a direct impact in creating new governance structures [in candidate
countries]” (Grabbe, 1023). Moreover, Noutcheva claims that market sanctions, in the form of
low foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and high costs of external borrowing, combined with
EU sanctions make it very costly for Bulgaria to deviate from the prescribed conditional reform
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pathway (Noutcheva and Bechev, 116). In short, as Spendzharova puts it, Bulgaria simply does
not possess resources to negotiate compliance with EU conditionality (Spendzharova and
Vachudova, 43). Thus, the economic benefits of joining the EU and the gate-keeping tool of
conditionality provide a strong incentive to meet the requirements as they are presented (Grabbe,
2001). In this way, the use of gate-keeping as an essential conditionally tool during the pre-
accession phase, can have a significant and positive impact upon good governance practices and
can thus be expected to reduce corruption.
The second conditionality tool that the EU utilizes during the pre-accession phase is
monitoring. Monitoring is a key mechanism involving continuous official assessment of how
prepared each candidate is in particular policy area. Monitoring is carried out in the form of
‘Regular Reports’ published by the European Commission (Grabbe, 1021). The European
Commission is committed to the reduction of corruption as exemplified in the following quote:
“It is the Commission's firm intention to reduce corruption at all levels [, i.e. political corruption,
corrupt activities committed by and collusively with organized crime groups, private-to-private
and so-called petty corruption] in a coherent way within the EU institutions, in EU Member
States and outside the EU” (“Fight Against Fraud”, 9) Thus, the European Commission utilizes
monitoring during the pre-accession phase in order to point out areas that necessitate reform so
as to incite candidate members to comply with the Commission’s anti-corruption mandate. In
short, considering the Commission’s commitment to the fight against corruption, it can be
expected that monitoring during the pre-accession phase can also aid in reducing corruption in
candidate member states.
Lastly, the final tool utilized by the EU during the pre-accession phase is peer pressure
and mutual persuasion. Authors Nicolescu-Waggonner and Bowler claim that pre-accession
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conditionality tools can indirectly reduce corruption by changing the predominant norms and
beliefs in candidate countries: “Conditionality may be a sufficient condition for good governance
through the spread of norms and ideals” (Nicolescu-Waggonner and Bowler, 6). The EU
employs two main anti-corruption bodies, namely the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and
the “Working Group on Bribery and the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption”
(GRECO) who function based on the principles of peer pressure and mutual persuasion. These
bodies do not contain legal sanctions to ensure compliance. Nevertheless, they can reduce
corrupt practices through the ‘softer’ mechanisms of peer pressure and mutual persuasion
(Nicolescu-Waggonner and Bowler, 6). Several authors show evidence that peer pressure and
mutual persuasion may be sufficient in encouraging the development of good governance
practices and in reducing corruption (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004). In sum, various
literature claims that it can be expected that pre-accession conditionality will reduce corruption
practices in Bulgaria through gate-keeping and monitoring and also though peer pressure and
mutual persuasion.
Now, I will discuss the EU’s impact on corruption practices during the post-accession
period. It has been argued that the EU can continue to positively affect corruption practices in the
post-accession phase by employing benchmarking. Benchmarking is part of the European
Commission’s “Cooperation and Verification Mechanism” (abbreviated as CVM), which was
established in 2007 as the first strong enforcement mechanism to monitor corruption. The CVM
is a highly specialized, unique and unprecedented mechanism, developed and utilized for the first
time as a clause within the Accession Treaty of Bulgaria and Romania (Grabbe, 2001).
According to the Commission, the main purpose of CVM is ‘to smooth the entry in the EU and
at the same time safeguard the workings of the EU’s policies and institutions’ (Vachudova, 53).
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The CVM periodically establishes specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the
fight against corruption and organized crime (Grabbe, 1022). It sets up teams to monitor
domestic developments in these areas and to publish their findings in periodic reports. The first
such report was published in June 2007 (Vachudova, 53). Bulgaria and Romania are the only two
EU members accepted with such post-accession conditionality requirements and the Commission
applied stricter provisions and conditions to those two candidates than to any other previous
candidate (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008). (For a comparative outline of accession conditionality,
see Table 2) The CVM is a direct, highly specific, and quantifiable post-accession mechanism to
control and curb corruption. The CVM is linked to direct punishment in the form of economic
sanctions. Unsurprisingly, therefore, many authors have expected its effects on corruption levels
in Bulgaria to be sizeable.
WHY EU ACCESSION WOULD FAIL TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON CORRUPTION REFORM
In sharp contrast to the arguments reviewed above, a significant body of literature
maintains that EU accession may fail to have a significant impact on corruption reform in
Bulgaria, because [1] the acquis’ vagueness in the area of administrative coordination and
judiciary is likely to result in unsuccessful reform, and [2] EU’s incentive-based model of
conditionality is likely to cease to be effective after accession.
VAGUENESS OF THE ACQUIS
Many authors have argued that the criteria for administrative reform within the ‘acquis
communitaire’ have been too vague to bring about any real change. Jacoby, for example, claims
that “The extent to which EU-prescribed reforms were successful was not universal across all
applicant countries, due to several factors pertaining to the nature of the acquis itself” (Jacoby,
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16). Where the EU’s requirements are clear, specific and directly linked to a reward, the reforms
are more likely to be successful, but where requirements are embodied in vague or unsettled
sections of the acquis, only limited change occurs (Haughton, 243). An area where the acquis
lacks sufficient clarity is administrative coordination, which can be directly linked to the failure
of effective implementing capacity:
“… the EU does not have competence over the administrative structures and procedures of current member states. Consequently, it lacks any formal rules on the meaning of the concept of effective implementation and/or enforcement. This uncertainty about implementation makes it difficult for the EU to shape particular institutional solutions” (Grabbe, 1019).
Furthermore, it is maintained that in a policy area where the EU has limited competence, its
progress evaluations fail to be effective, because they are unsuccessful in outlining specific goals
to be achieved:
“…the most important aspects are the Commission’s assessments of administrative capacity …. However, the goals are often vague, citing a need for ‘increasing capacity’ or ‘improving training’, rather than stating detailed institutional preferences…candidates are often asked to ‘prepare a national strategy’ in a particular area, with no further details on what it should contain or what the features of particular institutions should be” (Grabbe, 1022).
The outlining of specific goals that need to be achieved in a certain policy area is a crucial part of
the effectiveness of conditionality. Without clear delineation of the next steps to be achieved in
an area, a candidate member is likely to struggle in complying with conditionality requirements.
A World Bank study reported that in the case of Bulgaria, the acquis produced numerous pieces
of legislation which “courts, lawyers, regulatory bodies and others charged with implementation
had difficulty understanding, applying and enforcing,” leading to a serious “implementation gap”
(Noutcheva and Bechev, 133).
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Secondly, literature shows that besides the vagueness of the acquis in the area of
administrative reform, the acquis is also relatively vague in the area of judicial reform. As
Noutcheva and Bechev claim "unfortunately, the EU acquis could not prescribe one single model
of a judiciary system for Bulgaria to follow" (Noutcheva and Bechev, 133). However, as it has
been previously noted, during the pre-accession phase Bulgaria did make some significant strides
in the area of judicial reform, making its judiciary more compliant with democratic principles.
Nevertheless, judicial independence and efficiency remain a key challenge in Bulgaria: “The
judicial systems of both Bulgaria and Romania were considered as slow and inefficient with
trials lasting for years ... the Commission pointed out the reform of the judiciary in almost every
Regular Report”(Noutcheva and Bechev, 133). It can be hypothesized that the incomplete
success of judicial reform can at least in part be attributed to vagueness of the acquis
communitaire in the regard. Without a clear, specific and functioning judicial model to follow, a
candidate member such as Bulgaria, whose judiciary has traditionally not been politically
impartial and has been classified as ‘corrupt and ineffective’, will likely not be able to
successfully reform independently. In summary, it has been argued that the EU’s transformative
capabilities have been limited in the administrative and judicial branches of Bulgarian
government because of a lack of a clear and specific reform model to follow. Since the acquis
does not specify exactly how the judiciary and administration should be reformed, it can be
expected that the EU will not have a sizable effect on corruption in those two sectors.
EU’S INCENTIVES AFTER ACCESSION
The literature shows a pessimistic outlook regarding the continuous effectiveness of
conditionality-driven reform after Bulgaria’s approval for accession (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2007 ;
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2002; Dimitrova
for the day after accession, when conditionality has faded, the influence of the EU will vanish
like a short-term anesthetic” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1). Likewise, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier
(2004) predict that the incentive-based model utilized in pre-accession conditionality is likely to
cease to be effective once accession is achieved. “The absence of these incentives should
significantly slow down or even halt the implementation process” [after accession]
(Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 676). Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004) explain that
while adherence to EU rules prior to accession is in the best interest of candidate members, as it
is the most rational option to maximize their own power; this no longer becomes the case once
accession is achieved (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 678). This is because once accession is
achieved, new members have significantly less to lose – in terms of both economic rewards and
other forms of rewards – should they choose to deviate from EU rules. Thus, employing a
rational cost-benefit calculation, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004) expect that
conditionality-driven reform in Bulgaria will see a significant slowdown or even a standstill after
accession. Several other authors support Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier’s predictions in
claiming that once membership is achieved, the externally imposed costs of not pursuing reforms
or complying with the EU will diminish (Dimitrova, 47); and “the most likely lesson will be that
EU leverage is more powerful well before accession than after it, regardless of the EU’s new
tools to encourage post-accession compliance” (Vachudova, 44).
In terms of encouraging post-accession compliance, as previously discussed, the most
powerful post-accession EU compliance tool is the CVM. It must be noted that the CVM has not
enjoyed significant attention in the literature and the authors cited in this literature review have,
for the most part, not discussed its effectiveness. The CVM’s benchmarking mechanism does
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indeed create an incentive for Bulgaria to carry out specifically outlined reform and it also
presents the threat of economic sanctions and cessation of financial aid in case that Bulgaria fails
to carry out these reforms. However, inferring from the incentive-based model, it can be argued
that the power of post-accession sanctions is weaker than the threats presented during the pre-
accession phase. Once accession is granted, not only does a candidate country receive entrance to
EU markets, but it has already built significant capital through pre-accession funds. It seems that
the stakes are much higher at the threat of denial of accession, as compared to the threat of
cessation of certain post-accession funds. For this reason, although the CVM does provide some
incentive to continue the path of reform, this incentive may not be as strong as pre-accession
conditionality and it can be expected that reform implementation process may significantly slow
down or even come to a halt once accession has been granted. If the CVM is not powerful
enough to incentivize continued reform after accession, it can be expected that the EU’s
influence upon reducing corruption will be limited as “substantial improvements in the rule of
law and in the fight against corruption require a sustained domestic commitment to institutional
change, which does not seem to be present in Bulgaria, especially after the incentives of EU
accession conditionality disappear” (Spendzharova and Vachudova, 45). However, as mentioned
above, few scholars have investigated the conditionality effects of the CVM in detail, and
therefore much of this reasoning remains speculative in the absence of systematic research on the
subject.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Political corruption remains a significant issue in Bulgaria both in the views of the
domestic Bulgarian public, and according to CPI statistics (see Appendix Table 1). Despite the
large scale anti-corruption campaign launched in the course of the democratization and
Europeanization processes, Bulgaria continues to fail to effectively counter political corruption
(Bulanova, 53). In this literature review, I showed that Bulgaria’s communist era was a period
plagued with political corruption and crony distribution of resources (Holmes, 2009; Ganev,
2013). When communism collapsed in 1989, many anticipated the introduction of good
governance. Scholars anticipated that the collapse of communism would be followed by the
spread of democratic principles, including the rise of a civil society, the overall reduction of
corrupt political practices, and increased accountability and transparency to the public. The
accompanying market liberalization, insertion into international markets, and increased
economic competitiveness were also expected to reduce corruption practices within the ex-
communist republics. As time shows however, scholars who held more pessimistic views
regarding the impact of the collapse of communism upon good governance practices proved to
be closer to the truth. The importation of democracy brought only limited democratic change and
was not sufficient to reinvent longstanding cultural practices held by political officials and by the
public. Privatization created numerous opportunities for asset grabs and for corrupt resource
distribution, while the public remained distrustful of public institutions.
Attempts to reduce corruption intensified when Bulgaria acceded to the European Union.
Scholars anticipated that the EU’s pre-accession conditionality and post-accession verification
mechanism would have sizeable effects on good governance practices in Bulgaria, as the EU
requires candidate members to be on par with European standards. Although Bulgaria’s judiciary
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and public administration systems saw some improvement as a direct result of EU pressure, the
effects of pre-accession conditionality seem to have lost potency since accession has been
achieved. A temporary reduction in corruption was observed in Bulgaria as a result of EU
pressure, but the longevity of this effect is yet to be tested.
The most important lessons we can learn from this review are twofold. The first lesson is
that powerful domestic elites can manipulate periods of institutional reform to their advantage. We
have seen much evidence for this in the period immediately after the collapse of communism when
economic privatization and political democratization were carried out as a ‘clientelistic, internal
coup’ throughout which political elites manipulated power in order to gain personal advantage
(Vachudova, 2009; Haughton, 2007; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Bulanova, 2008).
Consequently, both the economic liberalization and political democratization of the 1990s
produced limited results and artificial reforms, as a direct consequence of the political elite’s
unwillingness to commit to profound reform. More recently, during the period of accession to the
EU, we have seen that powerful elites have taken advantage of the reform process by selectively
implementing some mandated reforms but not others. EU conditionality and the overall EU
accession reform process in Bulgaria were carried out in a selective manner, with political elites
implementing only so much reform as to comply with top-down supranational norms, while
maintaining as much of the old ‘backdoor’ politics as they could (Trauner, 2009; Andreev, 2009;
(Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Vachudova, 2009). As Trauner claims, we can observe a
persisting dominance of “old” political elite which signed up for (EU-oriented) reforms in
rhetoric, but not in action (Trauner, 2009). Thus, by selectively introducing compatible norms or
by prolonging the transition period during which the rules of the new system were rewritten, the
predatory elites profited from their stay in office and diverted public resources toward favored
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interest groups and political clientele (Noutcheva and Bechev, 115). This resulted in corrupt state
institutions, mismanagement of the economy and partially reformed polities (Noutcheva and
Bechev, 115). In other words, political elites managed to transform corruption practices in
Bulgaria over the last two decades to comply with norms institutionalized through the political
democratization and accession to the EU, but they did not display sincere commitment to reform
(Ganev, 31).
The second main lesson that we can take away from this literature review is directly linked
to the first lesson, and it is that when mandated reforms are not clear enough, it is relatively easy
for political elites to take advantage of the reform process. For example, neither political
democratization nor accession to the EU provided clear and specific administrative and judicial
models to be followed in order for Bulgaria to transform its public administration and judicial
sectors into functioning transparent bodies (Noutcheva and Bechev, 128). While political
democratization left administrative practices in a chaotic state, the European Union could do
little in providing Bulgaria with sufficient guidance for this sector. Although the judiciary saw
some successful reforms, including three sets of constitutional reforms to solidify its
independence, to this day the Bulgarian judiciary remains politically dependent and inefficient at
persecuting and sentencing corrupt officials (Noutcheva and Bechev, 128). The entrenched
sociopolitical structures continue to hinder complete success in the judicial sector, with
persecution and sentencing of corrupt political officials being limited and ineffective (Noutcheva
and Bechev, 128). Thus, much evidence exists that in areas (such as public administration and
the judiciary) where transformational processes do not mandate clear, specific and tangible
reforms, political elites are at liberty to maneuver and to utilize these transformational processes
for their own advantage. In sum, the second lesson that we can take away from this literature
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review is that when mandated reforms are not clear and specific, it is easy for political elites to
manipulate the reform process.
Two questions which remain unanswered in the literature and may require further
attention are: a detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of the post-accession Cooperation and
Verification Mechanism (CVM) and the progress and evaluation in the area of administrative
reform. First, in terms of the CVM, many scholars have expressed the anticipation of a negative
outcome and a limited effectiveness of the CVM. Yet, aside from media articles, little scholarly
critical pieces have been written evaluating the observed effects of the CVM upon political
corruption in Bulgaria. Second, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding
administrative reforms in Bulgaria, possibly because public administration practices are largely
chaotic and difficult to observe. Also, the fact that administrative reform is a ‘grey’ area within
the EU’s ‘acquis communitaire’ renders the measuring of reform in this sector relatively
challenging. Thus, more scholarly attention is recommended on the topics of CVM effectiveness
and administrative reform for a more complete overview of corruption reform in Bulgaria.
In closing, with this paper, I attempted to understand why the processes of political
democratization and Europeanization produced limited results in reducing corruption in
Bulgaria. The puzzle that was the focus of this paper can be summed up as ‘why two major
transformational events, which are typically accompanied by successful corruption reform, have
not produced the same results in Bulgaria?’ The final take away points in response to this puzzle
are [1] when political elites are interested in pursuing their own advantage they may skew the
process of institutional reform and [2] lack of specific, clear reform allows for political elites to
do so. The lessons learned in this literature review can be applied to the future EU rounds of
accession. Currently, there are six ex-communist Eastern European republics which politically
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democratized and economically liberalized at the same time and through a similar process as
Bulgaria. Also, like Bulgaria, these republics are strongly incentivized to become part of the EU
and have posed their candidacy for accession. The ex-communist republics currently in line for
EU accession are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and
Serbia. Should these republics be accepted in the EU, they would make up roughly 4% of the
total EU population (Agence Europe, 2008). Like Bulgaria, these republics struggle with political
and administrative corruption and unfair distribution of resources. Thus, in applying the lessons
learned through this literature review, it is advisable to adopt a more critical view when
anticipating the success of EU-lead corruption reform in these future candidates. In other words, we
must attempt to curb our enthusiasm and to view future EU enlargement to the east with increased
scrutiny. I recommend for the European Union to mandate very clear and specific reform goals for
these future candidate countries. Likewise, I would recommend for the political elites in those
countries to display sincere and sustained commitment to the reform process as tangible results
in reducing corruption require profound domestic commitment to change.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Corruption Perception Indices of EU Members and Candidates
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Table 2: Pre-accession and post accession conditionality of Hungary, Poland, Czech & Slovak Federal Republic, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania
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Table 3: Collapse of Communism Timeline
1989 Winter
Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria’s dictator for over 35 years resigns as Communist Party leader. This event marks the collapse of communism in Bulgaria.
1989 Spring
Former communist party is restructured under the name Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)
1990
Spring
BSP resigns after opposition parties refuse to join coalition until free elections are held. BSP wins first free, democratic elections.
1990
Spring
Process of privatization begins. Bulgaria’s most powerful conglomerate MultiGroup is formed. Board of directors include many former high-ranking government officials
1990
Fall
Zhelyu Zhelev, a communist era dissident, founds a new party called Union of Democratic Forces (SDS)
Name of country is officially changed from “Peoples Republic of Bulgaria” to “Republic of Bulgaria”
1991
Winter
Bulgaria adopts Article 8 of its Constitution, stipulating that ‘State power is separated into the legislative branch, executive branch and judicial branch’ – a separation that did not exist during communism
1991
Spring
First Parliamentary elections held under new constitution; SDS wins a plurality of seats
1992 SDS-led government collapses; BSP replaces failed cabinet
1994 BSP cabinet also collapses and President dissolves the government. Parliamentary elections are held. BSP wins election with a majority of seats
1997 SDS wins elections with a large victory, forming the first post-communist government that did not collapse and managed to carry out a full four year term until 2001.
1990: Grand National Assembly of Bulgaria passes a resolution expressing the country’s will to become a member of the European Community.
1993: The formal transformational process begins in Copenhagen, where the formal accession conditions are set.
1995: Bulgaria receives 476.5 million euros from the EU in aid through the PHARE program aimed at assistance for economic restructure
1997: Bulgaria fails to Meet Copenhagen Criteria. Five other states from the CEE region are invited to begin negotiations
1999: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia are invited to start accession negotiations at the Helsinki European Council
2004: Ten post-communist CEE states are accepted into the EU. Bulgaria and Romania are not accepted yet
2004: Bulgaria completes the accession negotiations of the thirty-one chapters or 80,000 pages of the EU acquis
2005: Accession Treaty with Bulgaria and Romania is signed. In June the Commission sends a “yellow card” to Sofia and Bucharest complaining about the “insufficient speed” of reforms
2006: Bulgaria is strongly recommended to “seriously intensify its efforts to crack down on organized crime and corruption” (May 2006 Monitoring Report), yet the Commission recommends accession on 1 January 2007 for both Bulgaria and Romania, with CVM and Postponement clause provisions
2007: Bulgaria and Romania become officially join the EU
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