FIN 40500: International Finance Anatomy of a Currency Crisis.

FIN 40500: International Finance

Anatomy of a Currency Crisis

What Constitutes a “Crisis” ? Large, rapid depreciation of a

currency Sudden, dramatic, reversal in

private capital flows

Note: The names and dates have been changed to protect the innocent!

The “Crisis” period is typically followed by a recession.

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Per

cen

tag

e D

iffe

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rom

“P

re-C

risi

s” E

xch

ang

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ate

Note the short run “overshooting” of the exchange rate!

Crisis Date

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Foreign Direct Investment Portfolio Investment

Note that portfolio investment is quicker to flow out than foreign direct investment

Crisis Period

Cap

ital

Flo

ws

Imagine yourself driving down a straight stretch of road. If the alignment on your car is good, you can let go of the steering wheel and the car stays on the road……

However, if your alignment is not perfect, you need to act to stay on the road. Otherwise…

On the other hand, your alignment could be perfect, but if the road has an unexpected curve….

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A peg at the equilibrium price can be maintained forever!

A peg above the equilibrium will involve buying your currency (loss of reserves)

A peg below the equilibrium price will involve selling your currency (increase in reserves)

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e

*e

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Your pegged exchange rate needs to be consistent with a market equilibrium!!

Foreign currency per $

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Suppose that a country is pegging at or near the equilibrium value of its currency

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An incompatible policy could pull the equilibrium away from the pegged level – this forces a loss in reserves!

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Suppose that a country is pegging at or near the equilibrium value of its currency

alternatively, suppose that demand drops – this lowers the equilibrium exchange rate and forces the central banks to act (buying back currency and losing reserves)

What causes these sudden reversals?

Just the facts ma’am.

•Persistent inflation

•High Money Growth

•Low Economic Growth

•Large Deficits

•Public

•Private

•Political Events

•Natural Disasters

•Market Sentiment

Bad Policy

Bad Luck

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US Average Inflation

Crisis Period

Note the sharp reversal in inflation following the crisis periodIn

flat

ion

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Crisis Period

Steadily deteriorating growth rates is not a good sign!!

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Crisis Period

Average = 14% Average = 4%

Note the significant drop in money growth after the crisisM

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wth

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Crisis Period

Note that the government deficit gets worse before it gets betterG

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icit

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Crisis Period

Note the sharp reversal in the trade accounts following the currency crash

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icit

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Crisis Period

Note the rapid drop in the interest rate following the devaluation!O

vern

igh

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end

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Rat

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0.00

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Foreign Exchange Gold

Note the sharp loss in reserves as the central bank attempts to defend the currency!

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erve

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Go

ld R

eserves

Relative Money Stocks

Relative Outputs

Relative Interest Rates

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*

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i

i

Y

Y

M

Me

Recall, the monetary framework with flexible prices (long run) resulted in the following

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P

High money growth and low economic growth generate inflation (Domestic Money Market)

Domestic inflation generates a currency depreciation (PPP)

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Domestic Inflation Foreign Inflation

yiL ,M

M

P

*1% iieE t

If the current depreciation leads to expectations of future depreciations, the domestic interest rate must rise to compensate foreign investors

A rise in the interest rate lowers money demand even further – this causes another round of inflation!

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LM

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In the short run, it’s a question of the sustainability of current account deficits (i.e. can the country attract enough foreign capital to finance their CA deficit)

This point is unsustainable!

Rapid money growth pushes interest rates down in the short run and “over-stimulates” domestic consumption – this creates trade deficits that are difficult to finance!

i

i

yIS

LM

0BOP

In the short run, it’s a question of the sustainability of current account deficits (i.e. can the country attract enough foreign capital to finance their CA deficit)

This point is sustainable!

As the IS sector increases (high domestic investment, low savings, large fiscal; deficits), the trade deficits worsen, but interest rates rise – this makes it easier to attract foreign capital

i

i

yIS

LM

0BOP

In the short run, it’s a question of the sustainability of current account deficits (i.e. can the country attract enough foreign capital to finance their CA deficit)

This point is unsustainable!

However, as debts get too big, foreign capital becomes more reluctant to flow in (investors are afraid of the country’s ability to repay.

How big is “too big”? When does a trade deficit become unsustainable?

PV(Lifetime CA) = 0 (all debts must be repaid) We need to examine the country’s ability to run trade surpluses

in the future (i.e. repay its debts!) Generally speaking, a trade deficit greater than 5% of a country’s

GDP is considered “too big”

Productivity measures the ability of a country to transform inputs into output

Revenues

Labor Capital (Shareholders)

Creditors (bondholders)

With high productivity, producers can raise revenues without having to raise prices (high growth with low inflation!)

Labor Productivity =Per Man-hourReal Output = Y

N

Real GDP

Total Hours

$10,397

Real GDP (2004)

Subtract out Farm Output

$8,317

Divide by total hrs (Employment * Average Hrs * 52)

$8,317244.3 = $34/hr

Suppose that Output/hr in 1992 was equal to $28.hr, then

Prod(1992) = 100Prod(2003) = 100*(34/28) = 121.4

Labor Productivity

Multifactor ProductivityLabor productivity doesn’t correct for changes in the capital stock!!

Y = A KβN 1-β (Production function) β = 1/3

Real GDP Capital

LaborMFP

Growth Rate of MFP = y – βk – (1-β)n

Labor Growth

Capital Growth

Real GDP Growth

Multifactor Productivity

Step 1: Estimate capital/labor share of incomeK = 30%N = 70%

Step 2: Estimate capital, labor, and output growth

%Y = 5%%K = 3%%N = 1%

%A = 5 – (.3)*(3) + (.7)*(1)

= 3.4%

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1919-1929 1929-1941 1941-1948 1948-1973 1973-1989 1989-2000 1995-2000

Labor Productivity MFP

An

nu

al G

row

thMFP Growth dropped in the 70s and 80s as IT was introduced!

Contagion refers to the transmission of a currency crisis throughout a region The Thai Baht in 1997 was followed shortly by

crises in Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea The Mexican Peso crisis in 1994 spread to

Central and South America (“The Tequila Effect”) The Russian collapse (2000) was followed

immediately by Brazil

Reasons For Contagion Common Shocks Trade Linkages Common Creditors Informational Problems and “Herding”

behavior