Filozofija Philosophy of Ru|er Josip Bo{kovi}a Bo{kovi}Scarella kritizirao Bo{kovi}ev sustav u drugom svesku svoje Op}e fizike. Drugi dio drugoga sveska Scarella je u cijelosti posvetio

ME\UNARODNIZNANSTVENI

SIMPOZIJ

THE INTERNATIONAL

SCIENTIFIC

SYMPOSIUM

FilozofijaRu|eraJosipa

Bo{kovi}a

Philosophyof Ru|erJosipBo{kovi}

4. studenoga 2011. November 4, 2011

Filozofski fakultetDru`be Isusove

u Zagrebu, Jordanovac 110Hrvatska

Faculty of Philosophy ofthe Society of Jesus,Jordanovac 110, ZagrebCroatia

Program / Programme

9.00 — 9.30 Otvaranje skupa i pozdravne rije~i / Opening ceremony andgreetings

Predsjeda / Chairperson: Ivan [estak

9.30 — 9.45 Simone D’Agostino, Papinsko sveu~ili{te Gregoriana, Rim /Pontifical Gregorian University, RomeFilozof Bo{kovi} u Rimskom kolegiju / Boscovich filosofo alCollegio Romano

9.45 — 10.00 Sre}ko Kova~, Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska /Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, CroatiaLogika opravdanja u Bo{kovi}evoj indukciji / Justification Logicin Bo{kovi}’s Induction

10.00 — 10.15 Ivica Martinovi}, Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska /Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, CroatiaScarella protiv Bo{kovi}eva sustava 1756. godine / Scarellaagainst Bo{kovi}’s system in 1756

10.15 — 10.30 Rasprava / Discussion

10.30 — 10.45 Odmor / Break

Predsjeda / Chairperson: Ivica Martinovi}

10.45 — 11.00 Anto Mi{i}, Filozofski fakultet Dru`be Isusove u Zagrebu,Hrvatska / Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus,Zagreb, CroatiaBo{kovi}evo poimanje prote`nosti / Bo{kovi}’s Concept ofExtension

11.00 — 11.15 Erna Bani}-Pajni}, Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska /Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, CroatiaPo ~emu je Bo{kovi} skeptik? / In What Ways Was Bo{kovi} aSkeptic?

11.15 — 11.30 Mihaela Girardi-Kar{ulin, Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb,Hrvatska / Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, CroatiaBeskona~na djeljivost i kona~nost spoznaje kod Bo{kovi}a /Infinite Divisibility and Finite Knowledge in Bo{kovi}

11.30 — 11.45 Marito Mihovil Letica, Filozofski fakultet Dru`be Isusove uZagrebu, Hrvatska / Faculty of Philosophy of the Society ofJesus, Zagreb, CroatiaBo{kovi}evi metafizi~ki dokazi kontinuiteta / Bo{kovi}’sMetaphysical Proofs of Continuity

11.45 — 12.00 Rasprava / Discussion

12.00 — 12.15 Odmor / Break

Predsjeda / Chairperson: Josip Talanga

12.15 — 12.30 Nikola Stankovi}, Filozofski fakultet Dru`be Isusove u Zagrebu,Hrvatska / Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus, Zagreb, CroatiaPoimanje kontingencije u Bo{kovi}evim dokazima zapostojanje Bo`je / The Concept of Contingency in Bo{kovi}’sProofs for the Existence of God

12.30 — 12.45 Ivan Tadi}, Katoli~ki bogoslovni fakultet, Sveu~ili{te u Splitu,Hrvatska / Catholic Theological Faculty, University of Split, CroatiaBo{kovi}eva misao o Bogu / Bo{kovi}’s Thought on God

12.45 — 13.00 Georg Sans, Papinsko sveu~ili{te Gregoriana, Rim / PontificalGregorian University, RomeZakoni slobode. Bo{kovi} o problemu odnosa tijela i du{e /Gesetze der Freiheit. Bo{kovi} über das Leib-Seele Problem

13.00 — 13.15 Luca Guzzardi, INAF — Zvjezdarnica u Breri, Italija / INAF— Osservatorio Astronomico di Brera, ItaliaJedno i mno{tvo: Philosophia prima Ru|era Bo{kovi}a / TheOne and the Many: Roger Boscovich’s philosophia prima

13.15 — 13.30 Diskusija / Discussion

13.30 Ru~ak / Lunch

Predsjeda / Chairpersons: Hans Ullmaier, Anto Mi{i}

15.00 — 15.15 Inga Lisac, Geofizi~ki zavod A. Mohorovi~i},Prirodoslovno–matemati~ki fakultet, Sveu~ili{te u Zagrebu,Hrvatska / Geophysical Department A. Mohorovi~i}, Faculty ofNatural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Zagreb, Croatia;Ivica Martinovi}, Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska /Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia;Vladis Vujnovi}, Geofizi~ki zavod A. Mohorovi~i},Prirodoslovno–matemati~ki fakultet, Sveu~ili{te u Zagrebu,Hrvatska / Geophysical Department A. Mohorovi~i}, Faculty ofNatural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Zagreb, CroatiaSpoznaje Ru|era Bo{kovi}a o polarnoj svjetlosti, objavljene uraspravi De Aurora Boreali iz 1738. godine / Ru|er Bo{kovi}’sInsights on Polar Light, Published in the Treatise De AuroraBoreali in 1738

15.15 — 15.30 Stipe Kutle{a, Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska /Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, CroatiaPrivla~no-odbojne sile: Bo{kovi}evo otkri}e? /Repulsive-Attractive Forces: Bo{kovi}’s Discovery?

15.30 — 15.45 Snje`ana Pau{ek Ba`dar, Zavod za povijest i filozofijuznanosti HAZU, Zagreb, Hrvatska / Institute of the Historyand Philosophy of Science, Croatian Academy of Sciences andArts, Zagreb, CroatiaRu|er Josip Bo{kovi} i kemija u doba prosvjetiteljstva / Ru|erJosip Bo{kovi} and Chemistry in the Age of Enlightenment

15.45 — 16.00 Diskusija / Discussion

16.00 — 16.15 Odmor / Break

Predsjeda / Chairperson: Stipe Kutle{a

16.15 — 16.30 Ivana Pavla Novina, Hrvatski studiji, Sveu~ili{te u Zagrebu,Zagreb, Hrvatska / Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb,CroatiaRecepcija Bo{kovi}eve filozofije u hrvatskih klerika / Reception ofBo{kovi}’s Philosophy among the Croatian Clerics

16.30 — 16.45 Mile D`elalija, Prirodoslovno-matemati~ki fakultet,Sveu~ili{te u Splitu, Hrvatska / Faculty of Science, Universityof Split, CroatiaBo{kovi}evo i suvremeno shva}anje sile / Bo{kovi}’s andModern Understanding of Force

16.45 — 17.05 Hans Ullmaier, Forschungszentrum Jülich und TechnischeHochschule Aachen, DeutschlandJe li Bo{kovi}eva Theoria prvi poku{aj »teorije svega«? / WarBoskovi}s Theoria ein erster Versuch einer ’Theory ofEverything’? / Bo{kovi}’s Theoria: A First Attempt of a ’Theory ofEverything’?

17.00 Zavr{na rasprava i zatvaranje skupa / Closing discussion andclosing of the Symposium

Organizacijski odbor / Organizing Committee

Predsjednici / Presidents Ivan [estak, Ivica Martinovi}, Josip Talanga

^lanovi / Members Nikola Stankovi}, Stipe Kutle{a

Osoba za kontakte / Contact person Anto Pavlovi}

Sa`eci izlaganja—

Paper abstracts

Hrvatski potpis Ru|era Bo{kovi}a. Prvi put objavljen u: Vladimir Vari}ak,»Ulomak Bo{kovi}eve korespondencije«, Rad JAZU 185 (1911), str. 242. /Croatian signature of Ru|er Bo{kovi}. First published in Vladimir Vari}ak,²Ulomak Bo{kovi}eve korespondencije², Rad JAZU 185 (1911), p. 242.

Simone D’AgostinoPapinsko sveu~ili{te Gregoriana, Rim / Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome

Filozof Bo{kovi} u Rimskom kolegiju

Bo{kovi} je `ivio, studirao, a zatim i predavao otprilike trideset godina u Rim-skom kolegiju (1727–1757). To je bilo bez sumnje najmirnije i najplodnije raz-doblje njegova kozmopolitskog i iznimno aktivnog `ivota. Nu`no je dakle pozna-vati onda{nje prilike Rimskog kolegija da bi se razumjela sva slo`enost ideja o fi-lozofiji prirode Ru|era Bo{kovi}a. Razlog za to ogleda se u ~injenici da su profeso-ri toga Kolegija ve} du`e vrijeme `ivjeli (u znanstvenom smislu) u odre|enoj na-petosti izme|u zahtjeva za »nasljedovanjem Aristotela« i te`nje da se dr`i korak saktualnim dostignu}ima moderne znanosti. U tom smislu, moglo bi se ustvrditi,Bo{kovi} predstavlja vrhunac tih tendencija. No koje mjesto uistinu zauzima Ari-stotelova Physica u slavnom Bo{kovi}evu djelu Theoria Philosophiae naturalis?Uloga koju joj namjenjuje, promatrano iz perspektive peripatetika, marginalnaje, ali ipak vrlo znakovita. Bo{kovi} zapravo osloba|a klasi~ne supstancijalne for-me od znanstveno kvantitativnog mjerenja da bi ih spasio na podru~ju njihove ra-dikalne neopa`ljivosti. No ne nosi li mo`da ovaj proces sa sobom njihovokona~no poni{tenje?

Boscovich filosofo al Collegio Romano

Boscovich visse, studiò e poi insegnò per circa trenta anni al Collegio romano(1727–1757), fu questo senza dubbio il periodo più stabile e produttivo della suacosmopolitica e vertiginosa esistenza. Il contesto dell’insegnamento al Collegioromano è indispensabile per comprendere la complessità della filosofia naturale diBoscovich, dal momento che i professori del Collegio, già da diverso tempo,vivevano una permanente tensione tra l’esigenza di “seguire Aristotele” e quelladi rimanere al passo con le più recenti conquiste della scienza moderna. Bos-covich, in tal senso, rappresenta forse l’apice di questo processo. Ma la Physicaaristotelica conserva ancora un posto nella celebre Theoria Philosophiae na-turalis? Il posto riservato ad essa, visto con gli occhi dei peripatetici, appare assaimarginale, ma comunque significativo. Boscovich, infatti, sottrae le classicheforme sostanziali alla misurazione scientifica quantitativa, per salvarle sul te-rreno della loro radicale inosservabilità. Ma questo processo non comporterà forsela loro definitiva abolizione?

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Sre}ko Kova~Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska / Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia

Logika opravdanja u Bo{kovi}evoj indukciji

Analiziramo Bo{kovi}evu teoriju indukcije kako je prikazana prije svega u teksto-vima u De continuitatis lege (1745, nn. 134–135), De lumine (1748, nn. 27–30),u Bo{kovi}evim bilje{kama i dopunama uz B. Stay, Philosophiae recentioris... li-bri decem, sv. 1 (1755) i u Theoria philosophiae naturalis (1763, nn. 40–41). Po-kazujemo da »Bo{kovi}eva indukcija« uklju~uje kao svoje sastavnice poop}ava-ju}u indukciju, abdukciju i deduktivno zaklju~ivanje. Analiza se provodi ponaj-prije sa stajali{ta suvremene logike opravdanja (koja potje~e od S. Artemova,1995. i M. Fittinga, 2004).

Uspostavljamo tipologiju opravdanja (evidencije, razlozi) u Bo{kovi}evoj kon-cepciji indukcije, razlikuju}i strogu evidenciju, pojavnu evidenciju (prima fronte)i induktivno opravdanje u u`em smislu. Ti su tipovi opravdanja povezani u jedin-stven nerekurzivan postupak otkrivanja i potvr|ivanja novih spoznaja. Formali-ziramo Bo{kovi}evu teoriju indukcije pro{iruju}i logiku opravdanja njegovom ti-pologijom opravdanja te dodaju}i posebne aksiome opravdanja koji opisuju nje-gove uvjete i ograni~enja u induktivnome zaklju~ivanju i pro{iruju logiku u teori-ju drugoga reda.

Justification Logic in Bo{kovi}’s Induction

We analyze Bo{kovi}’s theory of induction primarily on the basis of the texts in Decontinuitatis lege (1754, nn. 134–135), De lumine (1748, nn. 27–30), in Bo-{kovi}’s annotations and supplements in B. Stay, Philosophiae recentioris... libridecem, vol. 1 (1755), and in Theoria philosophiae naturalis (1763, nn. 40–41).We show that “Bo{kovi}’s induction” includes as its components generalized in-duction, abduction and deductive reasoning. The analysis is carried out primarilyfrom the standpoint of the contemporary justification logic (originating from S.Artemov 1995 and M. Fitting 2004).

We establish a typology of justifications (evidences, reasons) in Bo{kovi}’sconception of induction, distinguishing between strict evidence, phenomenal(prima fronte) evidence and inductive justification in a narrow sense. These typesof justifications are combined together into a unified non–recursive procedure ofdiscovering and confirming new knowledge. We formalize Bo{kovi}’s theory of in-duction extending justification logic by Bo{kovi}’s typology of justifications, andadding special justification axioms that describe Bo{kovi}’s conditions and restric-tions in inductive reasoning and extend logic to a second–order theory.

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Ivica Martinovi}Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska / Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia

Scarella protiv Bo{kovi}eva sustava 1756. godine

»Dosad su tiskani mnogi prigovori protiv moje teorije«, tako je zapisao Bo{kovi} upredgovoru svoje rasprave De materiae divisibilitate et principiis corporum tiska-ne 1757. godine. Na te je prigovore odgovorio u prvom dijelu Teorije prirodne filo-zofije (1758), podijeliv{i ih u dvije skupine: »prigovori protiv teorije silâ« (objectio-nes contra theoriam virium) i »prigovori protiv to~aka« (objectiones contra pun-cta), ali ni tom prilikom nije poimence spomenuo svoje kriti~are. Tko je u tiskunapao Ru|era Bo{kovi}a? Tko ga je napao prvi i na mnogim stranicama svojeknjige? Na to pitanje nije dosad ponu|en odgovor.

U~inio je to Giambattista Scarella u svom ud`beniku Physica generalis met-hodo mathematica tractata et in tres tomos distributa. Prvi je svezak objavljen uBrescii 1754. godine, drugi 1756, a tre}i 1757. U ovoj }u prigodi izlo`iti kako jeScarella kritizirao Bo{kovi}ev sustav u drugom svesku svoje Op}e fizike.

Drugi dio drugoga sveska Scarella je u cijelosti posvetio op}im zakonima gi-banja, koji vrijede kad jedno tijelo djeluje na drugo svojom silom. U sedmom po-glavlju »De Buskovikii systemate« raspravljao je gotovo isklju~ivo o Bo{kovi}evoj

teoriji silâ i o Bo{kovi}evim to~kama tvari, tek je u zavr{nom sholiju pre{ao na dru-gu temu — Bo{kovi}evo rje{enje za prijepor o `ivim silama.

Izlaganje je razdijelio u tri ~lanka. U prvom je izlo`io Bo{kovi}ev »sustav pri-vla~nih i odbojnih sila« (systema attractionum et repulsionum), i to ne premaBo{kovi}evoj raspravi Dissertationis de lumine pars secunda (1748), kako je po-stupio u prvom svesku, nego prema djelu Synopsis physicae generalis talijanskogaisusovca Carla Benvenutija, Bo{kovi}eva privr`enika u zbornici Rimskoga kolegi-ja. Izabrao je, dakle, najnoviju ina~icu Bo{kovi}eva sustava iz kolovoza 1754. go-dine, u ~ijoj je izradi sam Bo{kovi} imao djelatnu ulogu.

U drugom ~lanku profesor iz Brescie izlo`io je svoj stav »protiv Bo{kovi}evasustava« (in systema Buskovikii). Nije nastupio protiv Bo{kovi}eve beskona~neodbojne sile na beskona~no malim udaljenostima, ali je izrijekom tvrdio da niBenvenuti ni Bo{kovi} nisu dokazali vi{estruke izmjene privla~nih i odbojnihsila.

U tre}em ~lanku zapodjenuo je Scarella op{irnu polemiku, odgovaraju}i naprigovore koje su Bo{kovi} i Benvenuti uputili prvom svesku Scarelline Op}e fizi-ke iz 1754. godine. U tu je svrhu on pomno ~itao ne samo Benvenutijev Synopsisnego i Bo{kovi}evu raspravu De continuitatis lege (1754). Prema Scarelli, Benve-nuti je argumentirao protiv »najjednostavnijih i nesastavljenih ~estica tvari, kojesu prote`ne«, {to je bila Scarellina sentencija o strukturi tvari. U Bo{kovi}evojre~enici: »Ima ih koji strahuju da se u na{oj teoriji ni na koji na~in ne razlikuju

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na{e to~ke od duhova« prepoznao je Scarella prigovor koji je on 1754. uputioBo{kovi}u u prvom svesku svoje Op}e fizike. Glavni predmet Scarellina napadaponovo su bile »Bo{kovi}eve neprote`ne to~ke« (puncta inextensa Buskovikii). Sjasnim zaklju~kom: »Dakle, ovaj sustav treba odbaciti.« (Ergo hoc systema repu-diandum est.) U sholiju je Scarella, pristalica Leibnizovih `ivih sila, dodatno pole-mizirao s Benvenutijem jer je u Synopsisu prihvatio Bo{kovi}evo rje{enje gledeprijepora o `ivim silama.

Scarella against Bo{kovi}’s system in 1756

“Until now many objections to my theory have been published,” Bo{kovi} wrotein the preface of his treatise De materiae divisibilitate et principiis corporumprinted in 1757. His arguments against the objections are exposed in the first partof Philosophiae naturalis theoria (1758), divided into two groups: “objectionsagainst the theory of forces” (objectiones contra theoriam virium) and “objectionsagainst points” (objectiones contra puncta), in which Bo{kovi} avoids the men-tion of his critics by name. Who attacked Ru|er Bo{kovi} in print? Whose attackwas the first and elaborated extensively on the pages of one’s book? This questionhas remained unanswered to date.

The man behind the first attack was Giambattista Scarella in his textbookPhysica generalis methodo mathematica tractata et in tres tomos distributa. Firstvolume was published in Brescia in 1754, second in 1756, and third in 1757. HereI shall focus my attention on how Scarella criticised Bo{kovi}’s system in the sec-ond volume of his General Physics.

The latter part of the second volume Scarella fully devoted to the general lawsof motion, which hold when one body acts on the other one by its force. In the sev-enth chapter “De Buskovikii systemate” he discussed almost exclusively Bo-{kovi}’s theory of forces and his points of matter. It was not until the closingscholium that he opened another theme — Bo{kovi}’s approach to the vis vivacontroversy.

Scarella arranged his discussion in three articles. In the first he expoundedBo{kovi}’s “system of attractive and repulsive forces” (systema attractionum etrepulsionum) not according to Bo{kovi}’s treatise Dissertationis de lumine parssecunda (1748), as he had previously done in the first volume, but on the basis ofthe booklet Synopsis physicae generalis by an Italian Jesuit Carlo Benvenuti,Bo{kovi}’s follower in the teaching staff of the Roman College. Therefore, hechose the latest version of Bo{kovi}’s system dating from August 1754, in the con-struction of which Bo{kovi} himself played an active role.

In the second article the professor from Brescia stated his position “againstBo{kovi}’s system” (in systema Buskovikii). He had no objections against Bo-{kovi}’s infinite repulsive force at the infinitely small distances, but explicitly as-

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serted that neither Benvenuti nor Bo{kovi} had proved the many alternations ofattractive and repulsive forces.

In the third article Scarella embarked upon extensive polemic, responding tothe objections Bo{kovi} and Benvenuti had submitted against the first volume ofScarella’s General Physics from 1754. For this purpose he read most carefully notonly Benvenuti’s Synopsis, but also Bo{kovi}’s treatise De continuitatis lege(1754). According to Scarella, Benvenuti argued against “the simplest and un-composed particles of matter, that are extended”, which was Scarella’s sentenceon the structure of matter. In Bo{kovi}’s sentence “There are those who fear thatin our theory our points in no way differ from spirits,” Scarella recognised an ob-jection that he himself had submitted to Bo{kovi} in 1754 in the first volume ofhis General Physics. The main target of Scarella’s attack were again “Bo{kovi}’sunextended points” (puncta inextensa Buskovikii). With a clear conclusion:“Therefore, this system is to be rejected.” (Ergo hoc systema repudiandum est.) Inthe scholium Scarella, adherent of Leibniz’s vis viva, criticised Benvenuti for hav-ing adopted in the Synopsis Bo{kovi}’s solution to the vis viva controversy.

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Anto Mi{i}Filozofski fakultet Dru`be Isusove u Zagrebu, Hrvatska /

Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus, Zagreb, Croatia

Bo{kovi}evo poimanje prote`nosti

Prema tradicionalnoj kozmologiji prote`nost (extensio) je temeljno svojstvo tijelau prostoru, ekstrapozicija dijelova koja je posljedica kvantitete. Temeljna oznakasvega prote`nog je djeljivost, mogu}nost zbiljske podjele potencijalnih dijelova ukontinuiranoj prote`nosti i mogu}nost njihova rastavljanja. Premda su povezani,prote`nost i kvantiteta nisu isto; po kvantiteti dijelovi se razlikuju, dok se po pro-te`nosti stavljaju izvan (partes extra partes). Koli~ina–prote`nost predstavlja naj-osnovniji element ~ovjekova iskustva bivstovanja u svijetu, po kojem razlikujeneko »ovdje« i neko »tamo«, neko »ovo« i neko »ono«. Opstojnost prote`nosti do-kazuje i stvarnost kontinuuma, jer ako on ne bi postojao, prote`nost bi moralabiti sastavljena od nedjeljivih to~aka, {to se ~ini apsurdnim. Bo{kovi} se protiviupravo takvom, do tada prevladavaju}em poimanju prote`nosti ve}ine prethod-nih filozofa (communis Philosophorum sententia), i smatra da za to ne postoji ni-kakav valjan dokaz. Prema Bo{kovi}u tijela nisu neprekinute prote`nosti, negoupravo suprotno — sastoje se od neprote`nih to~aka: »Nikakvim se argumentomne mo`e potvrditi da materija posjeduje neprekinutu prote`nost i da se ne sastojiod posve nedjeljivih to~aka koje su me|usobno odvojene nekim razmakom, te ni-kakav razlog, izuzev onaj koji se oslanja na predrasude, ne govori u prilog tome damaterija posjeduje neprekinutu prote`nost, a protiv toga da je slo`ena od posvenedjeljivih i neprote`nih to~aka koje ne sa~injavaju ne{to {to bi bilo neprekinutoprote`no.« (ThPhN, br. 163). Bo{kovi} u tijelima dopu{ta fizi~ku neprekinutuprote`nost, ali ne dopu{ta u njima nikakvu matemati~ku neprekinutu pro-te`nost. Neprekinutu prote`nost dopu{ta samo u gibanju te u imaginarnom smi-slu u prostoru i vremenu. Odbacivanje klasi~nog poimanja prote`nosti, utemelje-nog na iskustvu, Bo{kovi} opravdava nepouzdano{}u ~ovjekovih osjetila.Bo{kovi}evo nijekanje neprekinute prote`nosti tijela i uvo|enje neprote`nihto~aka kao osnovne strukture tijela bez sumnje je veliki obrat. Ipak, on svoju teo-riju nije mogao utemeljiti na iskustvu (na eksperimentu) niti eksperimentalnodokazati. Razlo`no se postavlja pitanje njezine opravdanosti i izvori{ta: nije li onasamo »plod« druk~ije filozofije spoznaje, dobre intuicije...? Klasi~no poimanje ne-prekinute prote`nosti je metafizika, koja do svojih zaklju~aka polazi od iskustva(fizike). ^ini se da je Bo{kovi}eva teorija nijekanja neprekinute prote`nosti ustva-ri metafizika koja bi `eljela imati o~itost iskustva (fizike), `eljela bi biti prirodo-slovna znanost. Ako je ova tvrdnja to~na, postavlja se pitanje isklju~uju li seuop}e klasi~no poimanje neprekinute prote`nosti tvari i Bo{kovi}eva teorija ne-prote`nih to~aka tvari ili je rije~ o dva razli~ita poimanja iste stvarnosti: filozof-skom i prirodno–znanstvenom?

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Bo{kovi}’s Understanding of the Concept of Extension

According to traditional cosmology, extension (extensio) is a fundamental prop-erty in space, the extraposition of parts, which is a consequence of quantity. A ba-sic feature of all that is extended is divisibility, or the possibility of actual divisioninto potential parts of the continuous extension, as well as the possibility of theseparability of the parts themselves. Even though they are closely connected, ex-tension and quantity are not the same. Parts are distinguished in terms of quan-tity, and are separated in space or spatially distinct according to their extension(partes extra partes) (a part placed outside of part). The interplay between quan-tity and extension represents the most basic element of human experience in theworld, whereby one distinguishes a “here” from a “there”, and a “this” from a“that”. The existence of extension proves the reality of continuum, since, if therewere no continuum, extension would have to be comprised of indivisible points,which seems absurd. Bo{kovi} rejects the prevalent notion held up to that time bythe majority of the preceding philosophers regarding the understanding of exten-sion (commmunis Philosophorum sententia); in fact, Bo{kovi} maintains that novalid proof exists for such an understanding. According to Bo{kovi}, bodies are notcontinuous extensions but, quite to the contrary, consist of unextended points:«Through no argument can it be ascertained that matter possesses a continuousextension, and that it does not consist of quite indivisible points which are mutu-ally separated by some space. Nor does any proof, save for the ones leaning onprejudice, speak in favour of the view that matter possesses an uninterrupted ex-tension, and against the view that it consists of quite indivisible and unextendedpoints which do not form something that would be continuously extended.”(ThPhN, n. 163). Bo{kovi} allows for the physically uninterrupted extension ofbodies, but he does not allow for any mathematically continuous extension. Fur-thermore, he allows for an uninterrupted extension solely in motion, along withspace and time, in an imaginary sense. Bo{kovi} justifies the discarding of a classi-cal understanding of extension based on experience, due to the unreliability ofhuman senses. Bo{kovi}’s negation of the continuous extension of a body, and hisintroduction of unextended points as a basic structure of a body, without a doubtrepresent a great turn in philosophical thinking. Nonetheless, Bo{kovi} was nei-ther able to base his theory on experience nor to prove it experimentally. There-fore, it stands to reason to question the theory’s justifiability and its starting point;for example, could they simply be the result of a different epistemology, or of goodintuition...? Classical understanding of continuous extension is a metaphysicalconcept which proceeds from the experience (of physics) to its conclusions. Itseems that Bo{kovi}’s theory of negation of uninterrupted extension is in fact ametaphysical concept that, lacking the evidence of experience (of physics), wouldwish to be treated as a natural science.

If this claim is correct, then the question arises as to whether the classical un-derstanding of continuous extension of matter and Bo{kovi}’s theory of un-extended points of matter are mutually exclusive after all, or if they actuallypresent two different ways of understanding the same reality: that of philosophyand that of natural sciences?

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Erna Bani}–Pajni}Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska / Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia

Po ~emu je Bo{kovi} skeptik?

Ru|er Bo{kovi} poznat je prije svega kao znanstvenik koji se istakao na mnogimpodru~jima: od matematike, fizike, kemije, optike, astronomije do glazbe, arheo-logije i pjesni{tva; koji je anticipirao mnoga dostignu}a novovjekovne znanosti, inapokon, koji je autor po mnogima revolucionarne teorije sila. Sve to, ali i njegovivlastiti iskazi, upu}uju na njegovu vjeru u mogu}nost napredovanja ljudskogznanja. Na temelju tog uvida postavlja se pitanje koliko je opravdano dovoditi gau vezu sa skepticizmom spomenutim u naslovu ovog izlaganja, napose kad se znada je u svojim djelima podvrgao kritici i neke oblike skepticizma.

Bo{kovi} je, me|utim, bio i zna~ajan filozof, koji je kao dijete svoga vremenapratio sva klju~na zbivanja i misaone tendencije osamnaestog stolje}a. A to jestolje}e afirmacije »racija«, ali i stolje}e radikalnoga kriti~kog preispitivanja mo-gu}nosti ljudskog spoznavanja.

Analiza njegovih glavnih djela pokazuje da se upravo kao filozof, ondje gdjedoti~e neka bitna filozofijska pitanja, a u vezi s mogu}nostima ljudske spoznaje,mnogim svojim stavovima pribli`ava umjerenom skepticizmu. U radu se nastojeistra`iti razlozi koji su ga naveli na takve stavove. Ujedno se nastoji pokazati kakose u Bo{kovi}u, znanstveniku i filozofu, ve} jasno o~ituje razlika u pristupu zbiljiizme|u novovjekovne znanosti i filozofije.

In What Ways Was Bo{kovi} a Skeptic?

First and foremost, Ru|er Bo{kovi} is primarily known as a scientist who excelledin many fields, ranging from the technical (mathematics, physics, chemistry, op-tics, and astronomy) to the artistic (music, archaeology and poetry), who antici-pated many achievements of modern science, and finally who is the father,according to many, of the revolutionary theory of forces. All those accomplish-ments, in conjunction with his personal expressions, point to his strong faith inthe possibility of the progress of human knowledge. On the basis of this insight, aquestion arises regarding how justified it is to associate Bo{kovi} with the skepti-cism mentioned in the title of this essay, especially since it is known that, in hisworks, Bo{kovi} critically dealt with some forms of skepticism itself.

However, Bo{kovi} was an important philosopher who as a child of his timefollowed all the crucial events and tendencies of thought of the 18th century. And

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that century was not only the century of the affirmation of reason, but also of radi-cal questioning of the all possible ramifications of human knowledge.

An analysis of his major works demonstrates that Bo{kovi} as a philosophertouches upon some fundamental and essential philosophical questions. Regard-ing the possibilities of human cognition, Bo{kovi} comes close to adopting a mod-erate skepticism in his many ideas, especially in his attempt to resolve somecrucial philosophical questions. This essay attempts to research the reasons thatled Bo{kovi} to support such views. At the same time, this essay aims to demon-strate how the differences in the approaches to reality between modern scienceand philosophy are clearly manifested in the works of this remarkable scientistand philosopher.

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Mihaela Girardi–Kar{ulinInstitut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska / Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia

Beskona~na djeljivost i kona~nost spoznaje

u Bo{kovi}a

Pojam beskona~ne djeljivosti prostora i vremena Bo{kovi} nikako ne dovodi u pi-tanje i smatra ga dokazanim na geometrijski i metafizi~ki na~in. Ako se nekomebeskona~na djeljivost ~ini neuvjerljivom, Bo{kovi} to svodi na »djetinju predrasu-du«, {to zapravo predstavlja »predrasudu« prirodnog nazora na svijet — dakle ono{to do`ivljavamo prije ili mimo poznavanja znanstvenih ~injenica.

Nasuprot tome, ono realno Bo{kovi} sagledava kao sastavljeno iz najmanjihnedjeljivih entiteta.

Problem predstavlja mjerenje onog realno opstoje}eg, koje pretpostavlja be-skona~nu djeljivost prostora i vremena. Kad Bo{kovi} ka`e »mjerenje«, to, mi-slim, trebamo shvatiti kao primjenu matematike (primjenu ideje beskona~nedjeljivosti prostora i vremena) na ono realno.

Nezavisno od pojma beskona~ne djeljivosti koji je dokazan (ali kao matema-ti~ki i metafizi~ki pojam), ovdje se Bo{kovi}u javlja problem (ne subjektivni, negoobjektivno spoznajni — dakle subjektni) to~nog uspore|ivanja onoga realnogmjerilom — jednako mjerilom prostora, kao i mjerilom vremena.

Dakako, ta pote{ko}a ne navodi Bo{kovi}a da odustane od mjerenja (primje-ne matematike na ono realno), ali konstatira da se mjerenjem uvijek mo`e utvrdi-ti samo aequalitas, a da se nikada mjerilom ne mo`e utvrditi istost mjerenog imjere. Pote{ko}u, me|utim, ne stvara niti ono realno za sebe, niti ono matema-ti~ko–metafizi~ko za sebe, nego problem mogu}nosti primjene matemati~ke ideje(beskona~ne djeljivosti) na ono realno.

Infinite Divisibility and Finite Knowledge in Bo{kovi}

Bo{kovi} does not question the concept of divisibility of space and time, but con-siders it proved in a geometrical and metaphysical way. If infinite divisibility ap-pears unconvincing, Bo{kovi} reduces it to “childish prejudice” which in fact is a“prejudice” of a natural world view — i.e. that which we perceive before or re-gardless of knowing scientific facts.

Contrary to that, Bo{kovi} views the reality that we experience as composedof the most minute and indivisible entities.

Under that view, what poses the problem is the actual measuring of that “realexisting”, presupposing infinite divisibility of space and time. According to Bo-

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{kovi}, we should interpret the measuring as an application of mathematics (ap-plication of the idea of infinite divisibility of space and time) to that which is real.

Independently of the concept of infinite divisibility, which was proven (butonly as a mathematical and metaphysical term), Bo{kovi} here encounters a diffi-culty (not a subjective one, but rather that of objective cognition — i.e. that per-taining to the subject) of accurate comparison of that which is equally real by acriterion of space as well as by a criterion of time.

To be sure, such difficulty does not lead Bo{kovi} to give up on measuring (i.e.on the application of mathematics to that which is real). Instead, Bo{kovi} claimsthat by applying measurements only aequalitas can be deduced, and that throughmeasurements alone one can never ascertain the equality of the measured andthe measure. However, the difficulty here is created neither by that which is realin itself, nor by that which is in itself mathematical–metaphysical, but rather bythe practical problem posed by the possibility of applying a mathematical idea(specifically, that of infinite divisibility) to that which is real.

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Marito Mihovil LeticaFilozofski fakultet Dru`be Isusove u Zagrebu, Hrvatska /

Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus, Zagreb, Croatia

Bo{kovi}evi metafizi~ki dokazi kontinuiteta

Autor se u ovom izlaganju bavi Bo{kovi}evim dokazima zakona kontinuiteta, za-kona koji je uz na~elo jednostavnosti i sli~nozna~nosti prirode osnova i polazi{tenjegove prirodne filozofije, te obrazla`e da Bo{kovi}evi razli~iti pristupi dokazi-vanju ovoga zakona bijahu u svim slu~ajevima zasnovani na metafizi~kim na~eli-ma i razvijeni u misaonoj perspektivi ocrtanoj metafizi~kim pojmovnim instru-mentarijem. Preuzimaju}i zakon kontinuiteta od Leibniza, Bo{kovi} u nastojanjuda zakonu o~uva nu`nost odbacuje Leibnizov i lajbnicijanski pristup kojim je za-kon kontinuiteta dokazivan na~elom dovoljnog razloga, povezanim s iskustve-nim i kontigentnim istinama, te ga dokazuje dvama drugim dokazima, od kojihse jedan zasniva na metafizi~kim na~elima, a drugi na indukciji. U ovomizlaganju je argumentirano ukazano na okolnost da je i Bo{kovi}evo induktivnodokazivanje tako|er metafizi~kog karaktera, budu}i da se u njemu susre}u aprio-rizam, metafizi~ka vjera u jednostavnost i sli~nozna~nost prirode te aristotelov-sko–skolasti~ka analogija bi}a.

Snaga Bo{kovi}eva metafizi~kog mi{ljenja o~ituje se u posvema{njem nepov-jerenju u podatke dobivene posredovanjem osjetilâ: nasuprot op}enitim isku-stvom podr`anim uvidima da se zakon neprekinutosti prilikom gibanjâ u prirodinaru{ava, Bo{kovi} uvjereno zastupa neprekinutost, a kod gra|e tvari gdje se ne-prekinutost ~inila o~iglednom i neupitnom, govori o prekinutosti i nau~ava datvar svoju prividnu neprekinutost zahvaljuje silama — koje su izravna posljedicabezuvjetnog o~uvanja neprekinutnosti — ~ije djelovanje dr`i razmaknute to~ketvari na okupu.

Autor ovog izlaganja u svojoj nepokolebljivoj odanosti metafizi~koj tradicijiisti~e da je Bo{kovi}eva prirodoznanstvena teorija toliko ukorijenjena u metafizi-ci i njome pro`eta da ovu teoriju s pravom mo`emo smatrati jedinstvenim prim-jerom o{troumnog, domi{ljenog i dalekose`noga metafizi~kog prirodoslovlja.

Bo{kovi}’s Metaphysical Proofs of Continuity

The author of this paper deals with Ru|er Bo{kovi}’s proofs of the law of continu-ity. This law, along with the principles of simplicity and analogy of nature, is thebasis and the starting point of Bo{kovi}’s natural philosophy. The author explainshow Bo{kovi}’s diverse approaches to proving this law were in all cases basedupon metaphysical principles, and were developed in a reflective way that was

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shaped by a metaphysical conceptual instrumentarium. Bo{kovi} adopted thelaw of continuity from Leibniz; however, in his efforts to preserve the necessity ofthe law, Bo{kovi} rejected Leibniz’s (and Leibnizian) approaches by which thelaw of continuity used to be proved by the principle of sufficient reason, whichwas related in turn to the empirical and contingent truths. Instead, Bo{kovi} at-tempted to prove the law by means of two additional proofs, one being based onmetaphysical principles, and the other being based on induction. This paper argu-mentatively points to the circumstance that Bo{kovi}’s inductive reasoning isalso of a metaphysical character, since in it one can distinguish apriorism, meta-physical belief in simplicity and analogy of nature, and the Aristotelian–scholasticanalogy of being.

The impact of Bo{kovi}’s metaphysical thought is manifested in a generalmistrust in the facts perceived by means of the senses alone. Contrary to the in-sights attained through general experience, according to which the law of conti-nuity is disrupted in motion in nature, Bo{kovi} convincingly upholds continuity.Regarding the structure of matter, wherein continuity seemed obvious and un-questionable, Bo{kovi} alluded to the possibility of discontinuity, and teaches thatthe apparent discontinuity of solid matter is due to forces (which are direct conse-quences of the unconditional preservation of discontinuity) whose action holdstogether the individual and distant points of matter.

The author of this paper, in his firm loyalty to the metaphysical tradition,points out that Bo{kovi}’s theory of natural sciences is so rooted in the metaphys-ics, and so impregnated by it, that one can hold this theory as a unique example ofastute, well thought out, and comprehensive metaphysical natural science.

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Nikola Stankovi}Filozofski fakultet Dru`be Isusove u Zagrebu, Hrvatska /

Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus, Zagreb, Croatia

Poimanje kontingencije u Bo{kovi}evim dokazima za

Bo`je postojanje

U radu se istra`uje poimanje kontingencije u dokazima za Bo`je postojanje u»Dodatku« (»Appendix, ad metaphysicam pertinens, de anima et Deo«) u Teorijiprirodne filozofije (Theoria philosophiae naturalis) Ru|era Josipa Bo{kovi}a. Ontamo govori o beskona~nom nizu kontingentnih pojava (series contingentiuminifinita) koji se ina~e odbacuje u argumentu koji se, kako ka`e, i ne razlikuje odnjegova argumenta iz determiniranosti svakog stanja materije u zadanom vreme-nu, a za to stanje ju je moralo determinirati prethodno stanje, ovisno o tome kakoje i samo determinirano. Svako je dakle stanje determinirano onim prethodnim, asvako prethodno njemu prethode}im. Tu je, naravno, rije~ o nemogu}nostivra}anja u beskraj glede uzroka. U prirodi ne postoji nijedno bi}e koje bi, neovi-sno o drugom bi}u, u sebi samom sadr`avalo determiniranost za postojanje, pa dabi onda determiniralo druge. Iz toga Bo{kovi} izvodi zaklju~ak: »A zbroj svih nula,makar ih bilo neizmjerno mnogo, uvijek je nula.«

Budu}i da zna~enje rije~i »contingentia« ima svoju povijest i da se opirezna~enju razli~itih gr~kih i latinskih rije~i, valja istra`iti kako je Bo{kovi} razumi-jeva. Je li vi{e rije~ o mogu}nostima (ex per se possibilibus) iz kojih se bira onukoju }e se determinirati za postojanje ili je pak rije~ o kontingentnosti ilinenu`nosti prirodnih bi}a, o njihovoj mogu}nosti da i ne budu, naravno ne isto-dobno i pod istim vidom? Toma Akvinski (S. th. I q. 86 a. 3) definira kontingen-tno bi}e (contingens) kao ono koje mo`e biti i ne biti (quod potest esse et nonesse). Time isklju~uje ono nemogu}e i nu`no. U dokazivanju Bo`jeg postojanjaobi~no se ne polazi od ~isto mogu}ih, a nepostoje}ih bi}a, nego od onih koja po-stoje tako da mogu i izgubiti bitak.

The Concept of Contingency in Bo{kovi}’s Proofs forthe Existence of God

This article explores the concept of contingency in the proofs for the existence ofGod, presented in “Appendix” (”Appendix, ad metaphysicam pertinens, de animaet Deo”), included in Theory of Natural Philosophy (Theoria philosophiaenaturalis), by Ru|er Josip Bo{kovi}. In that document, Bo{kovi} deals with an infi-nite series of contingent phenomena (series contingentium infinita), which are

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otherwise discarded in the argument, which, according to Bo{kovi}, does not dif-fer from his “determination–of–each–state–of– –matter–in–a–given–time” argu-ment, which postulates that a state had to be determined by a previous state,depending on how its own self had been determined. It follows that each state isdetermined by a previous one, and each previous state by one preceding it. Whatis at stake here is, of course, the impossibility of an infinite regress in respect tocausation (infinite regress of causes). There exists no entity in nature, which, in-dependently from some other entity, would in itself entail a determination to ex-ist so as to determine others. From this observation, Bo{kovi} draws the followingconclusion: “The sum of all zeroes, even though there be infinitely many, alwaysequals zero.”

Since the meaning of the word “contingentia” has its own history, and as thisword encompasses the meaning of various Greek and Latin words, careful consid-eration must be given to what Bo{kovi} understands by it. Would it denote the se-ries of possibilities (ex per se possibilibus) from which one selects a possibilitywhich will be determined for existence, or could it perhaps represent the contin-gency of natural beings, and their potentiality to be and not to be (naturally) not atthe same time and not in the same respect? Along these lines, Thomas Aquinas(S.T. I q. 86 a. 3) defines contingency of being as a potentiality to be or not to be(quod potest esse et non esse), and in doing so he excludes that which is impossi-ble and necessary. In proving the existence of God, one usually does not proceedfrom purely possible non–existent beings, but from those existent in such a waythat they also can lose their being.

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Ivan Tadi}Katoli~ki bogoslovni fakultet, Sveu~ili{te u Splitu, Hrvatska /

Catholic Theological Faculty, University of Split, Croatia

Bo{kovi}eva misao o Bogu

Autor iznosi Bo{kovi}evu misao o Bogu iz »Dodatka« njegove Teorije prirodne fi-lozofije. Da bi dokazao da je svijet Bo`je djelo, Bo{kovi} osporava tvrdnje onih kojismatraju da je nastao slu~ajno odnosno nekom nu`no{}u ili da postoji oduvijek,sam po sebi, i da se ravna po svojim zakonima. Prvu tvrdnju odbacuje dokazuju}ida je broj mogu}nosti svega onoga {to treba za sastav svijeta beskona~an, a nekona~an, pa bi se neizmjerno vjerojatnije trebalo o~ekivati neki nered, a ne red.Da bi se izabrala jedna od mogu}nosti u kojoj vlada red, trebala bi Bo`ja besko-na~na sila. Drugu tvrdnju odbacuje dokazuju}i da je beskona~na mo} slobodnogabi}a razlog za{to negdje postoji odre|eni broj to~aka, a ne neki drugi i za{to je ko-liko}a neke tvari tolika, a ne neka druga. Tre}u tvrdnju odbacuje razlikuju}i pret-hodnu i budu}u vje~nost, obrazla`u}i da tvar nije imala vje~no gibanje i nije mo-gla postojati oduvijek, pa zaklju~uje da ju je Bog stvorio. Na temelju toga Bo{kovi}zaklju~uje da Bog ima beskona~nu mo}, slobodu, spoznaju i mudrost. Iznosi nje-govu misao, primjerice, o zraku, sili te`i i o drugomu, {to upu}uje na Tvorca pri-rode.

Budu}i da se Bo{kovi} suprotstavlja Leibnizovu optimizmu, autor ukratkodonosi glavne misli Leibnizova optimizma, spominje i Kantovu misao o optimiz-mu i na koncu prikazuje Bo{kovi}evu misao o tomu.

Bo{kovi}’s Thought on God

The author presents Bo{kovi}’s thoughts on God found in the “Appendix” of hisTheory of Natural Philosophy. To prove that the world is God’s work, Bo{kovi}disputes the claims of those who believe that the world was created by accident orby necessity or that the world exists from all eternity of itself and is governed by itsown laws. He rejects the first assertion by proving that the combination of all thatis needed for the composition of the world is infinite and not finite, hence it wouldinfinitely be more likely to expect some disorder and not order. For one of thecombinations in which order rules to be chosen, would require the infinite powerof God. He rejects the second assertion by proving that the infinite power of a freebeing is why sometimes there is a certain number of points and not others, andwhy the quantity of some substance is such and not otherwise. He rejects thethird criterion by distinguishing between the previous one and future eternity, byarguing that substance did not have eternal motion and could not exist from infin-

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ity, and hence he concludes that God created it. Based on this, Bo{kovi} con-cludes that God has infinite power, freedom, knowledge and wisdom. Otherthoughts of his, such as on air, gravity, and other things that point to the Creator ofnature are also presented.

Since Leibniz’s optimism contrasts Bo{kovi}’s the author briefly presents themain points of Leibniz’s optimism, as well as Kant’s thoughts on optimism and fi-nally Bo{kovi}’s thoughts on it.

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Georg SansPapinsko sveu~ili{ta Gregoriana, Rim / Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome

Zakoni slobode. Bo{kovi} o problemu odnosa

tijela i du{e

Bo{kovi} obra|uje problematiku odnosa du{e i tijela u prvoj metafizi~koj dopunisvom glavnom djelu iz prirodne filozofije. U sredi{te svog priloga `elio bih posta-viti njegovu tezu prema kojoj ne postoje nikakve psihofizi~ke zakonske povezano-sti, odnosno da nije mogu}e spoznati nikakvu me|usobnu zakonsku povezanosttjelesnih i duhovnih stanja. Da bi se teza u~vrstila, treba prije svega razmotritirazli~ite na~ine uzajamnog djelovanja tijela i duha. Nakon toga }u pokazati daBo{kovi} obra|uje problem psihofizi~kih poveznih zakona u u`em smislu kao pi-tanje o mjestu duha u prostoru prirode. Za kraj istra`it }u argumente kojimaBo{kovi} postavljanje takvih zakona progla{ava nemogu}im.

Gesetze der Freiheit. Bo{kovi} über dasLeib–Seele–Problem

Bo{kovi} behandelt das Leib–Seele–Problem im ersten metaphysischen Anhangseines naturphilosophischen Hauptwerks. In den Mittelpunkt meines Beitragsmöchte ich seine These stellen, der zufolge es keine psychophysischen Brüc-kengesetze gibt, das heißt dass wir keinen gesetzmäßigen Zusammenhang zwis-chen körperlichen und geistigen Zuständen erkennen können. Um die These zuerhärten, ist zunächst auf die verschiedenen Arten einzugehen, in denen Körperund Geist miteinander wechselwirken. Danach werde ich zeigen, dass Bo{kovi}das Problem psychophysischer Brückengesetze im engeren Sinn als die Fragenach dem Ort des Geistes im Raum der Natur behandelt. Zum Abschluss will ichdie Argumente untersuchen, mit denen er die Aufstellung solcher Gesetze für un-möglich erklärt.

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Luca GuzzardiINAF — Zvjezdarnica u Breri, Italija /

INAF — Osservatorio Astronomico di Brera, Italia

Jedno i mno{tvo: Philosophia prima Ru|era Bo{kovi}a

»De Spatio et Tempore«, dodatak Bo{kovi}evu djelu Theoria philosophiae natura-lis (1763), zajedno s nekoliko napomena Stayeva djela Philosophia recentioris,sadr`ava sveobuhvatno obrazlo`enje pojma prostora (Suplement 1) i njegova od-nosa s ljudskom spoznajom (Suplement 2). Kao {to je dobro znano, Bo{kovi} je`elio posti}i kompromis izme|u Leibnizove »relacijske« koncepcije prostora iNewtonove ideje o prostoru kao pukom koordinatnom sustavu.

Bo{kovi} nije bio jedini koji je u okviru znanstveno–istra`iva~kog konteksta18. stolje}a tra`io srednji put (via media) izme|u ova dva velikana 17. i 18. stol-je}a. Jo{ jedan zanimljiv, neovisan i posve opre~an primjer bio je Immanuel Kant,koji, po{ava{i od relativizma Leibniza i Eulera, razvija u svojoj Kritici ~istog uma(1781, 1787) koncepciju prostora koju duguje Newtonovoj ideji apsolutnog pro-stora (koncepcija u kojoj se dade naslutiti utjecaj Leibniza i Eulera). U kantovskojzavr{noj ideji jedinstveno{}u reda, koji stvarima name}e intuicija prostora i vre-mena, poni{tava se pluralitet svijeta.

S druge strane, Bo{kovi} u svom djelu Theoria oblikuje op}i »pluralisti~kistav« (u kojem u potpunosti nije odsutan Newtonov utjecaj), gdje red stvari bivazna~ajkom njihovih interakcija (vidi npr. nauk o modusima izra`en u Suplemen-tu I, 1–4). [irina ove perspektive tako|er se o~ituje u njegovu odbijanju ideje ne-prekidnosti materije i prostora u djelu Theoria i nekim va`nim pismima (svomprijatelju G. S. Contiju), gdje poku{ava dati cjelovito i jednostavno obrazlo`enjefilozofskog utemeljenja svoje prirodne filozofije.

The One and the Many:Roger Boscovich’s philosophia prima

The supplement “De Spatio et Tempore” to Roger Boscovich’s Theoria phi-losophiae naturalis (1763), together with some notes to Stay’s Philosophia re-centioris, contains the more comprehensive explanation he gave to the concept ofspace in itself (Suppl. I) and in its relationship to human knowledge (Suppl. II). Aswell known, Boscovich wanted to reach a compromise between Leibniz “rela-tional” space conception and Newton’s views about space as a sheer system of co-ordinates.

Boscovich was not the only one in 18th–century scientific and scholarly com-munity to seek for such a via media between the two great masters of 17th and

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18th–century science. Another interesting, independent and — to some extent —opposite case was Immanuel Kant, who from an initial inclination to Leibniz’ andEuler’s relationalism developed in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) aspace conception mostly due to Newton’s idea of an absolute space (a conceptionin which, however, the Leibniz–Euler flavour is not completely unperceivable). Inkantian final idea, the plurality of the world is cancelled out by the uniqueness ofan order superimposed to the things by the space–time intuition.

On the other hand, Boscovich shapes in his Theoria a general “pluralisticview” (but one in which Newton’s influence is not entirely absent) where the or-der of things is an emergent property of their interactions (see for instance the“doctrine of modes” expressed in Suppl. I, 1–4). The broadness of this perspecitveis also shown by his rejection of the idea of the continuity of matter and space inthe Theoria itself and in some important letters (mostly to his friend G.S. Conti)where he tried to give a complete and plain account of the philosophical under-pinnings of his natural philosophy.

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Inga Lisac1 / Ivica Martinovi}2 / Vladis Vujnovi}3

1Geofizi~ki odsjek A. Mohorovi~i}, Prirodoslovno–matemati~ki fakultet, Sveu~ili{te uZagrebu, Hrvatska / Geophysical Department A. Mohorovi~i}, Faculty of Natural

Sciences and Mathematics, University of Zagreb, Croatia2Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska / Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia; ,

3Geofizi~ki odsjek A. Mohorovi~i}, Prirodoslovno–matemati~ki fakultet, Sveu~ili{te uZagrebu, Hrvatska / Geophysical Department A. Mohorovi~i}, Faculty of Natural

Sciences and Mathematics, University of Zagreb, Croatia

Spoznaje Ru|era Bo{kovi}a o polarnoj svjetlosti,

objavljene u raspravi De aurora borealiiz 1738. godine

Bo{kovi}eva rasprava De aurora boreali (O sjevernoj zori), objavljena 1738. u Rimunakon {to je zavr{io studij filozofije, zaslu`uje da bude istra`ena iz perspektive po-vijesti filozofije prirode i suvremene fizike atmosfere. S latinskog na hrvatski ra-spravu je preveo Ivica Martinovi}, radi koautorskog rada na njezinoj iscrpnoj znan-stvenoj ocjeni. To je ujedno prvi prijevod spomenutog rada na neki `ivi jezik, a oda-brani rezultati njegove analiti~ke obrade predmet su ovog izlaganja.

U 17. stolje}u, za razdoblja neaktivnog Sunca, koje je poznato pod nazivomMaunderova minimuma, polarna se svjetlost nije doga|ala, a u 18. stolje}u po-stala je velikim izazovom za prirodoznanstvenike i o njezinoj su naravi postojaletri konkurentne pretpostavke. U raspravi De aurora boreali Bo{kovi} je zabilje`ioda je polarnu svjetlost 16. prosinca 1737. »promatrala cijela Europa«, pa je i onhtio doprinijeti boljem poznavanju te pojave.

Pri istra`ivanju polarne svjetlosti mladi se Bo{kovi} najvi{e oslonio na ~etirizapa`ena rada: raspravu Traité physique et historique de l’Aurore Boréale (1731)francuskoga akademika Mairana, motrila~ko izvje{}e Observatio Aurorae Borea-lis, visae nocte insequenti diem XVI. Decembris, Anno 1737. Giovannija Poleni-ja, profesora matematike na Sveu~ili{tu u Padovi, i dvije razli~ite rasprave podistim naslovom De luce boreali (1728, 1735), koje je Friedrich Christoph Mayerobjavio u ~asopisu Commentarii Academiae scientiarum imperialis Petropolita-nae. Stavove i matemati~ke izvode iz tih radova on je razradio, ponekad i dopunionovim rje{enjem.

U prvom i drugom stavku rasprave Bo{kovi} je odredio Zemljin polumjer i vi-sinu Zemljine atmosfere. U tre}em i ~etvrtom stavku odredio je visinu polarnesvjetlosti motrene 1726. i 1737. iz Rima. U oba slu~aja izra~unao je da je visinabila ne{to ve}a od 1000 km. U petom stavku geometrijskom je metodom rije{ioMayerov problem: odrediti visinu polarne svjetlosti kru`nog oblika, usporedne sekvatorom i centrirane na osi ekvatora, kad se opa`a iz samo jednog polo`aja.

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U {estom, posljednjem stavku svoje rasprave Bo{kovi} je potanko raspraviotri pretpostavke o fizi~kom uzroku polarne svjetlosti. Prema prvoj pretpostavci,sjevernu zoru uzrokuje pove}ana gusto}a atmosfere oko pola, gdje se Sun~eve zra-ke jako lome i tako proizvode pojavu. Gdje je tijelo koje tako reflektira zrake, pro-turije~io je Bo{kovi}. Druga pretpostavka izvodi sjevernu zoru iz izgaranja atmo-sfere, a Bo{kovi} je takvu obja{njenju uputio dva prigovora. Napokon, Bo{kovi} jepristao uz Mairanovo obja{njenje: Sun~eva vrtnja izaziva deformaciju Sun~eve at-mosfere, koja poprima »oblik konveksne le}e« {ire}i se u ravnini ekliptike; »vrlorijetka tvar Sun~eve atmosfere« utje~e u visoku Zemljinu atmosferu i `ari je.»Drugim razlogom pojava jedva da bi se mogla objasniti«, naglasio je Bo{kovi}.

Prema modernim znanstvenim spoznajama, Sun~ev vjetar — tok razri-je|enog plina ekstremno visoke temperature, sastavljen od atomskih ~estica,iona i elektrona — prodire kroz geomagnetsko polje, pobu|uju}i sastavnice Zem-ljine atmosfere na svijetljenje, te tako dovode do pojave polarne svjetlosti. Stogase Bo{kovi}eva obrazlo`enja o fizikalnom tuma~enju polarne svjetlosti mogusmatrati bliskima modernom pogledu. Osobita je slu~ajnost da 300. obljetnicaro|enja Ru|era Bo{kovi}a, istra`iva~a polarne svjetlosti, neposredno prethodi na-stupu sljede}eg maksimuma Sun~eve aktivnosti 2012.–2014., a to zna~i i s mo-gu}no{}u da se iz Hrvatske ponovo motri polarna svjetlost.

Ru|er Bo{kovi}’s Insights on Polar light,Published in the Treatise De aurora boreali in 1738

Bo{kovi}’s treatise De aurora boreali (On polar light), published in Rome in 1738,after he had completed his studies in philosophy, ought to be examined from theperspective of the history of natural philosophy and modern physics of the atmo-sphere. The treatise was translated from Latin into Croatian by Ivica Martinovi}with the purpose of interdisciplinary collaboration on its comprehensive scientificassessment. This is also its first translation into a living language, and the resultsof its analysis are the subject–matter of this lecture.

In the seventeenth century, during the period of inactive Sun known asMaunder minimum, aurora borealis did not occur. In the eighteenth century,however, it became a great challenge to the natural philosophers and its naturewas explained by three rival hypotheses. In the treatise De aurora boreali Bo-{kovi} wrote that on 16 December 1737 the polar light “had been observed by thewhole of Europe,” so that he too wished to make his own contribution to a betterunderstanding of that phenomenon.

The young Ragusan’s research on aurora borealis is based chiefly on four sig-nificant works: Traité physique et historique de l’Aurore Boréale (1731) byFrench academician Mairan, observation report Observatio Aurorae Borealis,visae nocte insequenti diem XVI. Decembris, Anno 1737. by Giovanni Poleni,professor of mathematics at the University of Padua, and two different treatises

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under the same title De luce boreali (1728, 1735), which Friedrich ChristophMayer published in Commentarii Academiae scientiarum imperialis Petropo-litanae. Bo{kovi} elaborated the views and mathematical derivations from theseworks, introducing new solutions at times.

In the first and second proposition of the treatise Bo{kovi} determined theEarth’s radius and the height of the Earth’s atmosphere. In the third and fourthproposition he determined the aurora height on the basis of the observations fromRome in 1726 and 1737. In both cases he calculated that the height slightly ex-ceeded 1,000 km. In the fifth proposition by geometric method he solved Mayer’sproblem: to determine the aurora height, if it has circular form, which is parallelto equator and centred on the axis of equator when the phenomenon is observedfrom a single position.

In the sixth, last proposition of his treatise Bo{kovi} explained in detail thethree hypotheses of the physical cause of polar light. According to the first hypoth-esis, the aurora is caused by the increased density of the atmosphere around thepole, where the solar rays are subject to greater refraction, producing this phe-nomenon as result. Where is the body that reflects the rays, Bo{kovi} contra-dicted. The second hypothesis derives the phenomenon of polar light from thecombustion of the atmosphere, to which Bo{kovi} made two objections. Finally,Bo{kovi} adhered to Mairan’s explanation: the rotation of the Sun causes defor-mation of the solar atmosphere, which then takes “the shape of convex lens,” ex-panding in the plane of the ecliptic; “very rare matter of the solar atmosphere”enters the high atmosphere of the Earth and heats it. “By another argument thisphenomenon could hardly be explained,” Bo{kovi} emphasised.

According to modern scientific results, solar wind — flux of rarefied gas of ex-tremely high temperature, composed of atomic particles, ions and electrons —penetrate through the geomagnetic field, inducing the components of the Earth’satmosphere to produce light, and thus lead to the phenomenon of polar light.Therefore Bo{kovi}’s explanation of the physical cause of polar light might be con-sidered very close to the current view. The 300th anniversary of the birth of Ru|erBo{kovi}, investigator of polar light, curiously coincides with the onset of the pe-riod of the next solar maximum 2012–2014, and hence the possibility to observeagain aurora borealis from Croatia.

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Stipe Kutle{aInstitut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska / Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia

Privla~no–odbojne sile: Bo{kovi}evo otkri}e?

U radu }e se pokazati kako je Bo{kovi} do{ao do pojma odbojne sile. Ponekad sedr`i da uvo|enje odbojnih sila nije bila njegova ideja, nego da je ona postojala i ra-nije. Ako je i postojala, nitko je do Bo{kovi}a nije eksplicitno razradio. Neki navo-de Gowina Knighta kao za~etnika ideje odbojnih sila. Analizirat }e se njegovo dje-lo iz 1748. An attempt to demostrate that all the phaenomena in nature may beexplained by two simple active principles, attraction and repulsion. Bo{kovi}me|utim govori o odbojnoj sili tri godine prije Knighta, pa tvrdnja o Knightu kaoza~etniku ideje odbojne sile nije utemeljena.

Repulsive–Attractive Forces: Bo{kovi}’s Discovery?

It will be shown in this paper how Ru|er Bo{kovi} came to the concept of repul-sive forces. Bo{kovi}’s introduction of the repulsive forces is sometimes consid-ered not to be his own idea, since the concept itself existed before him. However,if the idea even existed at the time, no one worked it out in detail before Bo{kovi}did. Some authors introduce Gowin Knight as the originator of the idea behind re-pulsive forces. Knight’s work dating from 1748, An Attempt to Demonstrate thatAll the Phenomena in Nature May Be Explained by Two Simple Active Principles,Attraction and Repulsion, will be analysed. Bo{kovi} explained the idea of the re-pulsive forces three years before Knight did, so the claim about Knight’s priority inintroducing the repulsive forces is not convincing.

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Snje`ana Pau{ek–Ba`darZavod za povijest i filozofiju znanosti HAZU–a, Zagreb, Hrvatska /

Institute of the History and Philosophy of Science, Croatian Academy of Sciences andArts, Zagreb, Croatia

Ru|er Josip Bo{kovi} i kemija u doba prosvjetiteljstva

Gotovo ~itavo 18. stolje}e u kemiji je vladala flogistonska teorija, sve dok je A. L.Lavoisier nije oborio i postavio temelje modernoj kemiji. Smatralo se da flogiston(hipotetska tvar) gorenjem nestaje iz tvari. Stoga su se flogistonskom teorijomtuma~ile prave naravi vatre, topline i plamena, razlike izme|u zapaljivih i neza-paljivih tijela te postupci oksidacije i redukcije. U ovom posljednjem slu~ajukemi~ari nisu znali protuma~iti za{to metali nakon `arenja pove}avaju svojute`inu i prelaze u metalni kalks (oksid). Problem pove}anja te`ine metala,mogu}om apsorpcijom topline ili svjetlosti, nastojao je rije{iti i R. Bo{kovi} u svo-joj raspravi O rjetko}i Sun~eve svjetlosti, objavljenoj u »Giornale de’ Letterati«(1747). Nije koristio naziv flogiston, ve} toplinska, svjetlosna ili sumporna sup-stancija, {to je ~inila i ve}ina poznavatelja Newtonova djela. Bo{kovi} je protu-ma~io pokus oksidacije kositra `arenjem i le}om pomo}u sun~evih zraka, koji jeprvi izveo Robert Boyle. Budu}i da nije znao engleski, Boyleova gledi{ta je preuzeoiz Von Muschenbroekove Fizike na latinskom jeziku. Izra~unavanjem te`inesun~anih zraka Bo{kovi} je pokazao da su one suvi{e lagane da bi dovele dopove}anja te`ine metala te je postavio tezu o flogistonu kao »pozitivno laganojtvari«. To je na~inio tri godine prije francuskog kemi~ara Gabriela Françoisa Ve-nela i time utjecao na Edinbur{ku {kolu kemije (J. Black, J. Hutton, J. Leslie, J.Thomas, R. Robinson i drugi).

Ru|er Josip Bo{kovi} and Chemistry in the Age ofEnlightenment

The “phlogiston theory” pervaded chemistry throughout almost all of the 18thcentury, up until A.L. Lavoisier refuted it and set up foundations for modernchemistry. It was held that the phlogiston (hypothetical matter) disappeared fromthe matter in the process of burning. That is why the phlogiston theory was usedto interpret the true nature of fire, heat and flame, as well as the differences be-tween the flammable and inflammable bodies, and between the processes of oxi-dation and reduction. In the latter case the chemists did not know how to accountfor the weight increase in metals after calcination, and for the conversion of met-als into metallic calx (oxide). R. Bo{kovi} tried to solve the problem of the weightincrease of metals by attributing it to the possible absorption of light and heat inhis treatise “Dissertatione della tenuità della luce solare”, published in Giornale

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de’ Letterati (1747). He was not using the term “phlogiston”. Instead he was usingthe following terms: “heat substance, light substance and sulphuric substance”,as did the majority of those familiar with Newton’s work. Bo{kovi} used his the-ory to interpret the experiment of oxidation of tin by a heating process induced us-ing a lens to focus the energy of sun rays, an experiment which was firstconducted by Robert Boyle. As Bo{kovi} did not know the English language, headopted Boyle’s perspective from the Latin version of Physics by P. Von Mus-chenbroeke. By measuring the weight of the sun rays he demonstrated that theywere too light to induce a weight increase in metals, so he proposed the thesis de-scribing phlogiston as “positively light matter”. Bo{kovi} did that three years be-fore the same thesis was proposed by the French chemist Gabriel François Venel,and he thus influenced the Edinburgh school of chemistry (J. Black, J. Hutton, J.Leslie, J. Thomas, R. Robinson and others).

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Ivana Pavla NovinaHrvatski studiji Sveu~ili{ta u Zagrebu, Hrvatska /Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb, Croatia

Recepcija Bo{kovi}eve filozofije u hrvatskih klerika

Ru|er Josip Bo{kovi} je velikan svoga vremena, kao i svih predstoje}ih vremena.U prilog toj ~injenici ponajvi{e govori velik broj autora koji su se bavili i koji sebave njegovom mi{lju. Zanimljivo je uo~iti da veli~inu svoga duhovnog subratanisu zaboravili ni hrvatski klerici. Dostupna gra|a upu}uje na vi{e od trideset au-tora ~ijih se sedamdeset djela, {to knjiga {to ~lanaka, doti~u `ivota i veli~ine togazna~ajnog isusovca, po~ev{i od 1869. pa do dana{njih dana. Isto tako mo`emoprimijetiti da je osobitost podru~ja djelovanja kao i dubina filozofijsko–znanstve-ne misli Ru|era Josipa Bo{kovi}a jo{ od njegova vremena privla~ila zanimanje ina{la mjesto me|u hrvatskim klericima. Veli~ina i zna~aj njegove filozofije usvim njezinim dimenzijama tek treba biti otkrivena, a {to uvelike isti~u upravohrvatski klerici. U skladu s time mo`emo zaklju~iti da zanimanje za filozofskumisao Ru|era Josipa Bo{kovi}a i njezino prou~avanje ima tendenciju pozitivnograsta.

Reception of Bo{kovi}’s Philosophy among theCroatian Clerics

Ru|er Josip Bo{kovi} was a great man of his time, as well as of the times to come.What attests most to this fact is the great number of authors that have dealt andare still dealing with his thought. It is also interesting to note that the Croatianclerics have not forgotten the significance of their brother in faith. Accessible doc-uments enumerate over thirty authors who have spoken about the life and signifi-cance of this prominent Jesuit in seventy articles dating from 1869 to the presentday. Further, it can be noticed that the specificity of the field of Ru|er JosipBo{kovi}’s work, as well as the depth of his philosophical and scientific thought,have ever since his days attracted interest, and found a place in the works of theCroatian clerics. The magnitude and significance of the philosophy of Ru|er JosipBo{kovi} in all its dimensions are yet to be discovered; a fact that is always em-phasized by the Croatian clerics. Given all these facts, we can conclude that theinterest for the philosophical thought of Ru|er Josip Bo{kovi} and its study have atendency towards positive growth.

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Mile D`elalijaPrirodoslovno–matemati~ki fakultet, Sveu~ili{te u Splitu, Hrvatska /

Faculty of Science, University of Split, Croatia

Bo{kovi}evo i suvremeno shva}anje sile

Bo{kovi}eva rasprava O `ivim silama (De viribus vivis) zanimljiva je za suvreme-ne teorije o temeljnim silama u prirodi, posebno sa stajali{ta fizike visokih energi-ja. Iz Bo{kovi}eve rasprave vidljivo je da je temeljito poznavao razvoj tada{nje mo-derne fizike i prirodne filozofije, od Galilea, Leibniza, pa do Newtona. Kriti~ki jeraspravio mjerljivost i zna~enje pojma »`ivih sila«, a u temeljnom smislu i samuopravdanost uvo|enja tog pojma. Ras~lanjuju}i i raspravljaju}i primjer odabraniheksperimentalnih ~injenica, Bo{kovi} zaklju~uje i predla`e jedno temeljno i traj-no rje{enje za sve tada poznate i nepoznate sile u prirodi, uvode}i svoj oblik te-meljne sile kroz funkcijsku ovisnost o udaljenosti. Pored ovisnosti o udaljenosti,Bo{kovi} jasno ostavlja mogu}nost i za funkcijsku ovisnost temeljne sile o nekimdrugim poznatim i nepoznatim svojstvima u prirodi. Zaklju~no se govori ozna~enju i odr`ivosti njegovih temeljnih zaklju~aka i u odnosu na druga svojstvau prirodi, a sve sa stajali{ta suvremenih shva}anja u fizici.

Bo{kovi}’s and Modern Understanding of Force

Bo{kovi}’s work On Living Forces (De viribus vivis) is intresting for modern theo-ries on fundamental forces in nature, especially for modern physics of elementaryparticles. From his work we can see that he was thoroughly familiar with the de-velopment of the natural philosophy and modern physics at that time, from Gali-leo, Leibniz until Newton. He discussed critically the measurability and themeaning of the concept of “living forces”, and in the fundamental sense even thedoubt of introduction of that concept. Analysing and discussing an example of se-lected experimental facts, Bo{kovi} concludes and suggests one fundamental andpermanent solution to all known and unknown forces in nature, giving the shapeof the fundamental force as a function of distance. Besides its dependence on dis-tance, Bo{kovi} clearly leaves the possibility for the dependence of fundamentalforce on some other known and unknown properties in nature. At the end the sig-nificance and tenability of his fundamental conclusions in relation to other prop-erties in nature has been discussed, all with a view of modern understandings inphysics.

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Hans UllmaierIstra`ivala~ki institut Jülich i Tehni~ka visoka {kola Aachen, Njema~ka /

Forschungszentrum Jülich und Technische Hochschule Aachen, Deutschland

Je li Bo{kovi}eva Theoria prvi poku{aj »teorije svega«

(“Theory of Everything”)?

Ljudski duh o~igledno ima svojstvenu potrebu reducirati slo`ene stvarnosti isadr`aje na jednostavnija i temeljnija na~ela. U prirodnim znanostima, na koje seovdje `elim ograni~iti, ova tendencija dolazi do izra`aja u nastojanjima da se {toje mogu}e manjim brojem elementarnih sila i elemenata protuma~i gotovo ne-pregledna slo`enost materije i njezinih svojstava. U ovom smislu Bo{kovi}evaTheoria philosophiae naturalis nedvojbeno predstavlja prvi poku{aj »teorije sve-ga« (»Theory of Everything«, TOE). U njoj Bo{kovi} postulira, izme|u ostaloga,jedinstvene elementarne dijeli}e (puncta), umjesto ~etiriju vrsta atoma klasi~nog»atomizma«, te nadomje{ta Newtonove tri temeljne sile jednom jedinom univer-zalnom silom (curva Boscovichiana). S ovom je teorijom bio ispred svog vremena,pa stoga ne ~udi {to njegov model materije iz dana{nje perspektive ne bismoozna~ili kao teoriju u modernom smislu rije~i, ve} prije kao hipotezu ili genijalnonaslu}ivanje (»inspired guesswork«), koje istodobno predstavlja zna~ajan misaonipoticaj te neophodan korak na putu do dana{njeg shva}anja materije.

U ovom prilogu `elio bih razmotriti promjenu u zna~enju nekih pojmova po-put »teorija« i »objasniti« [njem. »erklären«] u vremenskom razdoblju izme|u ob-javljivanja Bo{kovi}eve Teorije (prije vi{e od 250 godina) i danas, te potom rasvi-jetliti probleme vezane uz zahtjeve »teorije svega«, o kojima se danas raspravljapod nazivom »redukcionizam i konstruktivizam nasuprot emergenciji«.

War Bo{kovi}s Theoria ein erster Versuch einer’Theory of Everything’?

Der menschliche Geist hat offenbar das inhärente Bedürfnis, komplexe Dingeund Sachverhalte auf einfachere und grundlegendere Prinzipien zu reduzieren. Inden Naturwissenschaften, auf die ich mich hier beschränken will, äußert sichdieses Bestreben in den Anstrengungen, die fast unübersehbare Vielfalt derMaterie und ihrer Eigenschaften durch möglichst wenige Elementarbausteineund –kräfte zu erklären.

In diesem Sinne war Bo{kov}s Theoria philosophiae naturalis unzweifelhaftder erste Versuch einer ’Theory of Everything’ (TOE), postulierte er darin dochu.a. einheitliche Elementarteilchen (puncta) anstelle der vielen Atomsorten des

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»klassischen« Atomismus und ersetzte Newtons drei Grundkräfte durch eineeinzige universelle Kraft (curva Boscovichiana). Er war damit seiner Zeit weitvoraus und deshalb ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass wir aus heutiger Sicht seinMateriemodell zwar nicht als Theorie im modernen Sinn, sondern eher alsHypothese oder geniale Vermutung (»inspired guesswork«) bezeichnen würden,die aber gleichwohl ein wichtiger Denkanstoss und ein unverzichtbarer Schrittauf dem Weg zum bisher erreichten Verständnis der Materie war.

In meinem Beitrag möchte ich auf die Veränderung der Bedeutungen vonBegriffen wie ’Theorie’, ’Erklären’, etc. im Zeitraum zwischen der Veröffent-lichung von Bo{kovi}s Theoria vor mehr als 250 Jahren und heute eingehen unddanach die Probleme beleuchten, die mit den Anforderungen an eine TOEverknüpft sind und derzeit unter den Schlagworten Reduktionismus/Konstruk-tivismus versus Emergenz diskutiert werden.

Bo{kovi}’s Theoria: A first attempt of a ’Theory ofEverything’?

The human mind has obviously the inherent urge to reduce complex things andfacts to simpler and more basic principles. In science (to which I will confine my-self) this endeavour manifests itself by efforts, to explain the vast variety of matterand its properties by only a few (possibly one) elementary particles and types offorces. In this sense Bo{kovi}’s Theoria philosophiae naturalis was doubtless afirst attempt of a ’Theory of Everything’ (TOE). In his Theoria he postulated thatmatter consists of assemblages of one kind of elementary particles (undistin-guishable puncta) instead of the many different sorts of atoms in “classical” atom-ism, and replaced Newton’s three basic forces by one universal law of forces(curva Boscovichiana). With these ideas he was far ahead of his time and it is thusnot astonishing that today we regard Bo{kovi}’s qualitative model of matter as aningenious hypothesis or inspired guesswork rather than a theory in the modernsense. But however we call it and whatever its weaknesses are: devised more than250 years ago, the Theoria is an indispensable step on the way to our present un-derstanding of the nature and the properties of matter.

In my contribution I will go into the changes of the meanings of terms such as’theory’, ’explanation’, etc. which occurred in the period between the publicationof the Theoria and today. Then I will try to throw some light on problems arisingfrom the requirements of a TOE which are vividly discussed at present (catch-words: reductionism/constructivism versus emergence).

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Adresar izlaga~a / Addresses of the speakers

Erna Bani}–Pajni}

Institut za filozofijuUlica grada Vukovara 54HR–10000 [email protected]

Simone D'Agostino

Pontificia università GregorianaPiazza della Pilotta, 4I–00187 [email protected]

Mile D`elalija

Sveu~ili{te u SplituPrirodoslovno–matemati~ki fakultetTeslina 12HR–21000 [email protected]

Mihaela Girardi–Kar{ulin

Institut za filozofijuUlica grada Vukovara 54HR–10000 ZagrebCroatiamihaela.girardi–[email protected]–com.hr

Luca GuzzardiINAF–Osservatorio Astronomico di BreraVia Emilio Bianchi, 46I–23807 Merate [email protected]

Sre}ko Kova~

Institut za filozofijuUlica grada Vukovara 54HR–10000 [email protected]

Stipe Kutle{aInstitut za filozofijuUlica grada Vukovara 54HR–10000 [email protected]

Marito Mihovil LeticaFilozofski fakultet Dru`be IsusoveJordanovac 110, pp 16910000 [email protected]

Inga LisacSveu~ili{te u ZagrebuPrirodoslovno–matemati~ki fakultetGeofizi~ki odsjekHorvatovac 95HR–10000 [email protected]

Ivica Martinovi}Institut za filozofijuUlica grada Vukovara 54HR–10000 [email protected]

Anto Mi{i}Filozofski fakultet Dru`be IsusoveJordanovac 110, pp 16910000 [email protected]

Ivana Pavla NovinaSveu~ili{te u ZagrebuHrvatski studijiBorongajska c. 83dHR–10000 [email protected]

Snje`ana Pau{ek–Ba`dar

Zavod za povijest i filozofiju znanostiHAZUAnte Kova~i}a 5HR–10000 [email protected]

Georg Sans

Pontificia università GregorianaPiazza della Pilotta, 4I–00187 [email protected]

Nikola Stankovi}

Filozofski fakultet Dru`be Isusove

Jordanovac 110, pp 169

10000 Zagreb

Croatia

[email protected]

Ivan Tadi}

Sveu~ili{te u SplituKatoli~ki bogoslovni fakultetZrinsko–Frankopanska 1921000 [email protected]–com.hr

Hans Ullmaier

Forschungzentrum Jülich und TechnisheHochschule AachenWilhelm–Johnen–StraßeD–5242 JülichGermanyh.ullmaier@fz–juelich.de

Vladis Vujnovi}

Sveu~ili{te u ZagrebuPrirodoslovno–matemati~ki fakultetGeofizi~ki odsjekHorvatovac 95HR–10000 [email protected]

I Z D A V A ^ / P U B L I S H E R

Filozofsko–teolo{ki institut Dru`be IsusoveJordanovac 110, Zagreb

Z A I Z D A V A ^ A / F O R T H E P U B L I S H E R

Ivan Cindori

U R E D N I C I / E D I T O R S

Ivan [estak / Ivica Martinovi} / Nikola Stankovi}

G R A F I ^ K A P R I P R E M A I T I S A K /G R A P H I C D E S I G N A N D P R I N T

Durieux, Zagreb

ISBN 978–953–231–114–3

CIP zapis dostupan u ra~unalnom kataloguNacionalne i sveu~ili{ne knji`nice u Zagrebu pod brojem 784251.

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available fromthe National and University Library in Zagreb under 784251