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    United States Court of Appeals

    Third Circuit

    No. 12-3977

    Democratic-Republican

    Organization of New Jersey, et

    als.,

    Appellants,

    vs.

    Kimberly Guadagno, et als.,

    Appellees.

    Appellants Joint Supplemental Written Argument Requesting

    Expedited Sua Sponte Final Summary Declaratory Relief and Expedited

    Sua Sponte Summary Permanent Injunctive Relief

    Oler & Luzzi, L.L.C.6 Apple Tree Lane

    Sparta, New Jersey 07871

    Telephone: (973) 983-7020

    Telefax: (973) 983-7030

    By: Richard Luzzi, Esq.

    Attorney for Appellants Democratic-Republican

    Organization of New Jersey, Frederick John

    LaVergne, Leonard P. Marshall, Scott Neuman,

    Tracy M. Caprioni, Kimberly Sue Johnson andDonald E. Letton

    Eugene Martin LaVergne, Appellant Pro Se

    543 Cedar Avenue

    West Long Branch, New Jersey 07764

    Telephone: (732) 272-1776

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    1

    Introduction:

    Appellants hereby submit the following Joint Supplemental Written

    Argument as permitted by the Courts Order of October 25, 2012. In the

    referenced October 25, 2012 Order the Circuit Court has provided the

    required notice and opportunity to be heard to all litigants required by 3d

    Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 before the Court may sua sponte consider and take final

    summary action.

    Appellants, in furtherance of their pending and yet to be addressed

    request that this Circuit Court, to the extent that may even be necessary, take

    judicial notice under F.R.Evid. 201 of certain facts to the extent that may

    be necessary to meaningfully and timely address Appellants claims1, now

    hereby formally request that this Circuit Court sua sponte grant and enter

    expedited final summary declaratory relief and sua sponte grant and enter

    expedited summary permanent injunctive relief in their favor.2 There is no

    1 The standard of review to be applied by the Circuit Court to determine

    whether the District Court below erred in failing to issue a preliminaryinjunction requires deference to the factual findings of the District Court and

    is limited to the record. The standards for summary disposition are not so

    limited.2 Specifically, Appellants request that this Circuit Court (1) summarily

    declare the challenged specific statutes and overall statutory scheme

    unconstitutional both facially and as applied, (2) summarily enter final

    permanent injunctive relief with specific directions that all 21 County Clerks

    prepare the November 6, 2012 General Election Ballots giving all candidates

    an equal opportunity to appear in the first column on the November 6, 2012

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    question that this Circuit Court has such powers to act, and to do so

    summarily. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 2106, 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6, F.R.A.P. 2, 3d. Cir.

    I.O.P. A (2012) (Objectives), 3d. Cir. I.O.P. B (2012) (Implementation);

    Barnes v. United States, 678 F.2d 10 (3d Cir. 1982) (Gibbons, Sloviter and

    Becker); Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th

    Cir.

    1969), cert. denied394 U.S. 1012 (1969).

    I. THE CIRCUIT COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO SUMMARILY

    ENTER EXPEDITED FINAL DECLARATORY AND

    EXPEDITED FINAL PERMENANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN

    FAVOR OR APPELLANTS IN THIS APPEAL AND SHOULD

    DO SO:

    A. Initial Appellate Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. sec.

    1291(a)(1):

    In the Notice of Appeal Appellants asserted as a threshold matter that

    this Third Circuit Court now has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28

    U.S.C. sec. 1292(a)(1), which provides as follows:

    General Election Ballot, and in so doing to use uniform and identical

    standards in all 21 Counties throughout New Jersey when configuring theNovember 6, 2012 General Election Ballot; (3) that the slogan Democratic-

    Republican shall appear associated with each Appellants name on the

    General Election Ballot, and (4) that in all Counties where Appellants have

    multiple candidates that all Appellants appear in the same column to the

    exclusion of any candidates unaffiliated with Appellants. The foregoing is

    all reasonable and necessary under the facts of this case to adequately ensure

    that the Federal Constitutional rights of Appellants and of all other minor

    party candidates and the Federal Constitutional rights of voters in New

    Jersey are adequately.

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    3

    (a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of

    this section, the courts of appeals shall have

    jurisdiction of appeals from:(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts

    of the United States, the United States District

    Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the

    District Court of Guam, and the District Court of

    the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof,

    granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or

    dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or

    modify injunctions, except where a direct review

    may be had in the Supreme Court.

    * * *[28 U.S.C. sec. 1292(a)(1)].

    Neither subsections (c) or (d) apply to this case3, nor is this case of a

    type where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. Therefore there

    is no question that this Court, as a threshold matter, properly has subject

    matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1292(a)(1). Indeed, the State

    itself expressly concedes that this Third Circuit Court now has subject matter

    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1292(a)(1) as they openly conceded

    this point in their Motion Opposition brief.

    B. Appellate authority under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2106:

    3 Subsection (c) applies to certain cases where the exclusive jurisdiction

    for appeal is placed with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and

    subsection (d) applies to appeals of decisions of the Court of International

    Trade and the Court of Federal Claims, and to transfer requests from certain

    other Courts. None of these situations apply to this case.

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    4

    A Circuit Court of Appeals, once vested with subject matter

    jurisdiction to hear a case (here, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1292(a)(1)) is

    also then vested with complete authority over the entire case. The issues

    that the Circuit Court may address once jurisdiction exists, and the equitable

    action that may be taken if found reasonable and necessary to timely address

    an Appellants deserving claim, are not limited or in any way restricted or

    confined. A specific and far reaching almost limitless grant of authority by

    Congress to the Circuit Courts to confirm this authority is found in 28

    U.S.C. sec. 2106, which provides as follows:

    The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate

    jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside

    or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a

    court lawfully brought before it for review, andmay remand the cause and direct the entry of such

    appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require

    such further proceedings to be had as may be just

    under the circumstances.

    [28 U.S.C. sec. 2106].

    The Third Circuit has expressly adopted specific procedures to be

    followed when a Circuit Court before acting to adjudicate an appeal in a

    summary manner. Specifically, 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 states as follows:

    The court, sua sponte or upon motion by a party,

    may take summary action affirming, reversing,

    vacating, modifying, setting aside, or remanding

    the judgment, decree, or order appealed from;

    granting or denying petition for review; or granting

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    5

    or refusing enforcement of the order of an

    administrative agency if it clearly appears that no

    substantial question is presented or that subsequentprecedent or a change in circumstances warrants

    such action. Before taking summary action, the

    court will afford the parties an opportunity to

    submit argument in support of or in opposition to

    such disposition if briefs on the merits have not

    already been filed. Summary action may only be

    taken by unanimous vote of the panel. If a motion

    panel determines that summary action is not

    appropriate at that time, it may, in lieu of denial,

    refer the matter to the merits panel withoutdecision and without prejudice.

    [3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6].

    Taken together, 28 U.S.C. sec. 2106, as implemented by 3d Cir. I.O.P.

    10.6, operate to confirm that once the Third Circuit Court is vested with

    initial general subject matter jurisdiction, that the Third Circuit Court has all

    additional authority necessary to enter any orders and equitable relief that

    may be appropriate and required based upon the unique circumstances and

    exigencies of a given case. This additional authority specifically includes

    the clear right of a Third Circuit Court to act and dispose of a case

    summarily, whether by summary reversal or summary affirmance. This

    allows the Third Circuit Court to take whatever action appropriate

    (summary, expedited, or otherwise) and in doing so to actually reach and

    address and adjudicate in final the entirety of the substantive merits of the

    claims at issue in a given case, and to then enter any appropriate final Orders

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    granting final declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. sec.

    2106; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6; see also F.R.A.P. 24

    ; 3d. Cir. I.O.P. A (2012)

    (Objectives) and 3d. Cir. I.O.P. B (2012) (Implementation). In short,

    once the Third Circuit Court has appellate subject matter jurisdiction as it

    does here, the Third Circuit Court has clear authority to summarily dispose

    of all of the claims in the case and to enter any appropriate final and

    permanent orders if appropriate. In Barnes v. United States, 678 F.2d 10 (3d

    Cir. 1982) (Gibbons, Sloviter and Becker) the Third Circuit noted as

    follows:

    Summary disposition by appellate courts, while

    not routine, is certainly not uncommon.

    Unquestionably we could act summarily on the

    whole appeal. Eg. While v. Sullivan, 474 F.2d 16(5

    thCir. 1973); Groendyke Transport, Inc. v.

    Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th

    Cir. 1969), cert. denied

    394 U.S. 1012 (1969).

    [Barnes v. United States, supra at 678 F.2d at 12].

    4 F.R.A.P. 2 provides as follows:

    On its own or a partys motion, a court of appealsmay to expedite its decision or for other good

    cause suspend any provision of these rules in a

    particular case and order proceedings as it directs,

    except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b).

    F.R.Civ.P. 26(b) (Rule 26(b)) prevents a Circuit Court from extending the

    time for a party to file a Notice of Appeal. That prohibition the only

    prohibition in Rule 2 - is not at issue in this case.

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    In Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. Davis, supra, specifically cited with

    approval by the Third Circuit in Barnes v. United States, supra, the 5th

    Circuit observed as follows:

    We can think of at least two circumstances under

    which summary disposition is necessary and

    proper. Both of them appear in this case. The first

    comprises those cases where time is truly of the

    essence. This includes situations where important

    public policy issues are involved and those whererights delayed are rights denied. Second, are those

    in which the position of one of the parties is clearly

    right as a matter of law so that there can be no

    substantial question as to the outcome of the case,

    or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal

    is frivolous. Without canvassing all other possible

    or likely situations, we hold that where either of

    these circumstances is found, summary disposition

    is proper. (Emphasis added).

    [Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th

    Cir. 1969),

    cert. denied394 U.S. 1012 (1969)].5

    In this case, Appellants assert that they have adequately demonstrated

    with the facts properly presented before the District Court for review6, and

    now before this Circuit Court, their right to immediate and timely relief now.

    5 This principle is consistent with and somewhat parallel to a District

    Courts power to grant partial summary judgment on an issue of liability and

    / or damages, and allow other claims to remain and proceed in due course.

    6 In this case Appellants filed a detailed Verified Complaint, wherein

    each Appellant specifically verified the facts as true. In opposition not a

    single relevant fact was ever disputed by any party below or herein.

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    Appellants maintain that this is a simple case, and that when the correct level

    of judicial scrutiny is applied to the actual claims, it can not reasonably be

    disputed that Appellants are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of

    law on their Constitutional claims. Appellants filed this action in good faith

    on September 11, 2012 and in what they submit is a timely manner based

    upon the attendant circumstances of the case. Now, 6 weeks later, with an

    General Election including one for the office of United States Senate an

    election that takes place only once every 6 years and the issues not yet

    resolved, the need for a decision from the Circuit Court is truly of the

    essence as this case has now become one where rights delayed will be

    rights denied. Id. and Ibid. Appellants submit that notwithstanding the

    thin protestations of the Attorney General7

    and the various County Clerks

    who have responded Appellants position is clearly right as a matter of

    law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the

    case, and as such, it is submitted that summary disposition in Appellants

    favor is proper. Id.

    II. THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER

    BALLOT LOCATION MAKES A DIFFERENCE:

    7 In their opposition the State did not so much as attempt to distinguish,

    and indeed completely ignores and never even cites to Citizens United, the

    case Appellants argue defines the standard of applicable scrutiny on the

    [First Amendment] political associational and speech claims.

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    The exact statutory scheme at issue in this case has long been held to

    confer a preference, even among political parties who have long fought for

    the first column over the second, arguing that the first column is much more

    preferred to the second because ballot location even between the first two

    columns - can affect the outcome of an election. See Axtex v. Caputo, 85

    N.J.Super. 80, 204 A.2d 7 (App. Div. 1964); Richardson v. Caputo, 46 N.J.

    3, 214 A.2d 385 (1965); Mochary v. Caputo, 100 N.J. 119, 494 A.2d 1028

    (1985). The Printing and reading of the text of words in the English

    language is of course from top to bottom, left to right, with all eyes naturally

    gravitating to the top left of a page of text first. All legitimate scholarly

    studies confirm that ballot location matters and can affect the outcome of

    elections. The State does not cite to any studies that posit otherwise,

    because there are none. Courts faced with the question all but uniformly

    confirm and find positional bias. Indeed, it is because it matters and is a

    benefit that the State argues (amazingly) that believe that they can

    Constitutionally confer the preference on the two political parties to the

    exclusion of Appellants. Against this background, it is simply not

    understood how there is any question of this issue. The Appellants again ask

    this Court to take judicial notice to the extent necessary to recognize that

    ballot location matters.

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    III. THE TIMING AND COST ISSUES:

    Appellants anticipate certain arguments in light of the recent

    certification of Appellee Hudson County Clerk Barbara A. Nechert. It is

    expected that there will be non substantive argument to the effect that even if

    Appellants are right and are entitled to the relief they request, that it is

    simply too late in the election process to do anything about re-drawing for

    position and re-printing the Ballots (General Election and Provisional).

    And it may cost additional money to the taxpayers. Neither argument is the

    slightest bit compelling under the circumstances when weighed against the

    clearly established Federal Constitutional and serious rights that have been

    violated. Moreover, such argument, advanced for nothing more than

    undeserved sympathy, is in fact rebutted by actual historical precedent and

    past practices. See infra.

    A. Time and the Ballot Placement Drawing:

    On the issue of the timing of the litigation and the relief and remedy

    available at this point, the District Court noted the following in the Amended

    Opinion only:

    [while the late date would not be an]

    impediment to relief if plaintiffs had demonstrated

    a clear constitutional violation, see Hooks, 121

    F.3d at 883-884 ([i]n the absence of legitimate

    countervailing concerns, the public interest clearly

    favors the protection of constitutional rights.), the

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    public interest in an orderly election certainly

    favors denying injunctive relief where plaintiffs

    cannot establish constitutional harm.

    [Amended Opinion at page 20-21, footnote 8].

    It is submitted that such principles apply equally here, except now

    with the proper standard of judicial scrutiny applied to the Appellants

    claims and the undisputed facts, Appellants indeed have clearly established

    Federal Constitutional harm to themselves and others, and therefore the right

    to relief. Therefore, the time issue should not be any impediment

    whatsoever to the Circuit Court immediately redressing this clear

    Constitutional harm with meaningful and timely equitable judicial relief in

    time for the November 6, 2012 General Election. For practical context, this

    submission is being completed on a computer and filed on a Sunday

    evening when the Court Clerks Office is not even technically open. The

    papers (actually, electrons) will be filed automatically and electronically

    only with the Clerk of the Circuit Court through the internet and the ECMF

    filing system. This entire Circuit Court motion process is digital and

    electronic. Such technology routinely used and readily and inexpensively

    available today in 2012, would be beyond the wildest fantasies of a New

    Jersey County Clerk preparing a General Election Ballot or, for that matter a

    voter (ie. men only, older than age 21) in the year 1898. These technologies

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    common today certainly were not available in the year 1898. Indeed,

    Appellee Nechert, a woman, was neither eligible to hold office as Hudson

    County Clerk nor eligible to vote in a General Election in 1898: Women

    could not vote or hold office in New Jersey until 1920, the year that the

    [Nineteenth Amendment] was acknowledged as ratified. There were no

    elections for United States Senate in 1898, as the [Seventh Amendment]

    which amended the Federal Constitution to henceforth provide for the direct

    election of United States Senators, was not acknowledged as ratified until 15

    years later in 1913. It is assumed that as Circuit Judges the Court is of

    course well aware of this history. The point to make here, however, is that

    in 1898 in New Jersey, the 21 male County Clerks were not required by law

    to finalize and print the General Election Ballots until 5 days before the

    actual General Election, and the General Election Ballots once printed were

    not to be actually distributed to the various Municipal Clerks in each town

    until 3 days before the General Election. In 1898 all ballots were printed on

    paper (to be filled out at the polls in lead pencil) and were produced by an

    arduous process of hand typesetting and hand printing in ink to then be

    distributed by horse delivery to the various Municipal Clerks. See Laws of

    1898, CHAPTER 139, an Act to regulate elections (Revision of 1898)

    (F.R.A.P. 28 Addendum, Exhibit 9). Today, instead of having to actually

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    reprint millions of paper ballots as the Clerks imply, the actual task of the

    21 County Clerks is not nearly so daunting or complicated: All that need be

    done is, after a fair draw for position8, to then (1) reconfigure and print the

    paper inserts for the face of each voting machine, and then reprogram the

    machines, and (2) to print with ink on paper a sufficient number of

    Provisional Ballots for each district. If the entire Ballot drawing, design,

    printing and distribution process was routinely accomplished over 100 years

    ago by all 21 County Clerks from the start to finish within only 5 days of the

    General Election, surely the same can be accomplished today with the

    advanced modern technology and transportation options available. A desire

    by the 21 partisan County Clerks not to perform what are really simple and

    uncomplicated ministerial tasks is not the same thing as a practical inability

    to actually perform such uncomplicated ministerial tasks.

    B. The County Clerks Drawing for Column Position and

    the Need for Uniform State Standards for Candidate

    Placement:

    The County Clerk drawing for the preferred ballot position between

    the political parties in Columns 1 and 2 (or A and B) on the top and

    left of the Ballot is nothing new and in fact goes back to 1898 also. Initially

    8 All 21 Clerks could easily be Ordered to appear at one location say

    the Federal Court House in Trenton or Philadelphia and that all drawings

    be conducted and the final form of all ballots settled before leaving the Court

    Room.

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    the process was conducted by the County Clerks using paper stock cards

    with names written on them, placed into a box and shaken up, (identical to

    how jury selection is conducted to this day) drawing among political

    parties9

    for the first two columns on the left. All other candidates

    (Nomination and Petition candidates) were placed at various other locations

    way on the extreme right of the ballot. Where such a candidate was placed

    was determined solely based upon the subjective (and overtly partisan) and

    complete discretion of each of the 21 County Clerks, which discretion was

    guided by no legislative standards whatsoever. This is the process -

    absolute and undirected discretion in all 21 Counties - which remains in

    9 A political party was initially defined in 1898 as a political group

    whose candidate polled for members of the general assembly at leasttwo per centum of the total votes cast in the State, county, or other division

    or district in and for which the nomination is made . See Laws of 1898,

    CHAPTER 139, Par. 44, Sec. 1 (F.R.A.P. 28 Addendum, Exhibit ___).

    Then the General Assembly elections were then held every year as per the

    New Jersey State Constitution (1845). A political association or group had

    an opportunity each year to become a political party, and even so within a

    single town or County, by meeting the 2% threshold. The significance of

    this was that once achieving political party status, a local, regional or

    Statewide political partys candidates could be chosen at convention,with the candidates certified and placed directly on the General Election

    Ballot without further action. Access to the General Election Ballot for

    candidates of other groups who had not yet met political party status on a

    local, county or State basis was still available through use of the Nomination

    and Petition Process which was virtually identical to that still in use today.

    In 1930, the Law was changed so that now (and still today) a political

    party had to meet a new higher 10% threshold showing to attain political

    party status, and could only attain such status statewide.

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    place today as to Nomination and Petition candidates.10 See Laws of 1898,

    CHAPTER 139, Par. 144, Sec. 11 and Sec. 14 (F.R.A.P. 28 Addendum,

    Exhibit 9). In 1930, the Law was changed. Now a political party had to

    meet a new higher 10% threshold showing to attain political party status.

    For no specific reason stated, in 1968 the drawing process was suddenly

    changed from cards to the plastic capsule process used today, which was

    then to be conducted 50 days before the election. See Laws of 1948,

    CHAPTER 438, Section 4 (F.R.A.P. 28 Addendum, Exhibit 12). In 1977,

    for reasons not stated, the plastic capsule drawing was moved back 30 days

    earlier to 85 days before the election. See Laws of 1977, CHAPTER 431

    (F.R.A.P. 28 Addendum, Exhibit 13). Despite dramatic increases in

    technology, today the process for the drawing for column 1 and 2 between

    the 2 major political parties and the process for configuration of placement

    of candidates on the General Election Ballot starts 85 days before the

    General Election, a time that is a 80 days earlier than was deemed necessary

    than the 5 days County Clerks were given in 1898. As technology has

    increased, Clerks have been given more time. Time is really a non issue.

    10 This process alone, government action by the 21 County Clerks with

    no standards, logically results in different standards in all 21 Counties,

    which itself standing alone, facially violates the Equal Protection Clause of

    the Fourteenth Amendment as to Appellant United States Senate Candidate

    Eugene Martin LaVergne whose name will appear in the ballot somewhere

    in all 21 counties. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

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    C. The 10% Threshold in N.J.S.A. 19:5-1:

    Another new regulation in 1930 was that a political partys

    candidates now had to be chosen at a State Regulated Party Primary Election

    rather than at an unregulated Convention.11

    If the same 10% number of

    voters showed up and participated in the primary as were necessary to

    achieve political party status, the political party would thereby earn the

    additional right to participate in the drawing for the preferred ballot positions

    in the drawing. Failure of a sufficient number of voters to participate in the

    primary election would result in the partys candidates being denied a party

    line and rather being placed on the Ballot on the same location as the

    candidates who achieved access to the Ballot through the Nomination and

    11 Again, while not directly relevant to the disposition of the claims in

    this case, this the appropriate time to dispel a historical misconception. The

    statutory requirement that a political party chose candidates at a State

    regulated Primary Election instituted in 1930 was not enacted to favor the

    political parties per se over all other candidates, but rather (and with 82

    years hindsight, ironically) was enacted as an effort to combat the corruptive

    effects of political party bosses on the selection of political party candidates

    during what to that point had been unregulated conventions such as tookplace in 1920 in Chicago with the unilateral selection by political party

    bosses of Warren Harding as the Republican Candidate. The irony today

    and in this case is that the process being used against Appellants here was

    initially enacted as a vehicle to try to ensure the greatest and fairest

    participation of the people in the selection of candidates for public office!

    Worse, today, and contrary to the actual history, the State argues that they

    have a State interest in favoring the two established political parties to the

    specific exclusion of all others. While that may be the effect, it was not the

    original intent.

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    Petition Process. See Laws of 1930, CHAPTER 187, Par. 44, Sec. 1

    (F.R.A.P. 29 Addendum Exhibit 10), slightly and non-substantively

    modified by Laws of 1948, CHAPTER 438, Section 4 ((F.R.A.P. 29

    Addendum Exhibit 11), now codified at N.J.S.A. 19:5-1. The simple

    statutory scheme was explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court as

    follows:

    Political party is defined to mean a party whichat the election held for all members of the General

    Assembly next preceding the holding of any

    primary election * * * polled for members of the

    General Assembly at least ten per centum (10%) of

    the total vote cast in this State. N.J.S.A. 19:1-1.

    A party which attains that status is entitled to a

    primary election. N.J.S.A. 19:2-1, and such a

    political party is accorded a party column on the

    ballot for the general election unless the party shallhave failed at its primary election to poll the

    percentage we have just mentioned12

    , in which

    12 As noted, in 1999, after the trial division of the Superior Court applied

    the plain and correct meaning of N.J.S.A. 19:5-1 to the facts and ruled that

    neither political party had met the threshold for entitlement to a column,

    on emergent appeal the Appellate Division of Superior Court interpreted

    the manner of calculating the 10% requirement of N.J.S.A. 19:5-1

    completely contrary to the actual language of the statute, contrary to thelegislative history, contrary to common sense, and contrary to the existing

    New Jersey Supreme Courts own and otherwise controlling interpretation in

    Richardson v. Caputo, supra. See New Jersey Conservative Party v.

    Farmer, 324 N.J.Super. 451, 735 A.2d 1189 (App. Div. 1999), leave to

    appeal denied ___ N.J. ___ (1999), on remand to the trial court at 332

    N.J.Super. 278, 753 A.2d 192 (Ch. Div. 1999). With the proper application

    of N.J.S.A. 19:5-1 to the facts of extant here, even if the entire statutory

    scheme is somehow found to be Constitutional, the Republican Party failed

    by @50,000 votes to at the June 2012 Primary Election to earn the right to a

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    event the partys nominees selected at the primary

    shall appear on the general election ballot in the

    column or columns designated Nomination byPetition. N.J.S.A. 19:5-1. (As applied to a voting

    machine ballot, the word column equals the

    horizontal row or line described at the outset of the

    opinion.)

    The provisions for the draw for position on

    the general election ballot appear in N.J.S.A. 19:4-

    12. (Emphasis added).

    [Richardson v. Caputo, 46 N.J. 3, 214 A.2d385, 388 (1965)].

    The manner in which entitlement to a column is calculated as per New

    Jersey Conservative Party v. Farmer, see note 12, is clearly arbitrary and

    irrational and therefore unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal

    Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    CONCLUSION:

    The following observation on the sustaining legitimacy of our

    Democratic form of government is sadly exponentially truer today than

    when it was penned by its author over 20 years ago:

    Party Column. However, Appellants contend that this Circuit Court need

    not necessarily address the contorted meaning of the 10% requirement in

    N.J.S.A. 19:5-1, as this is really a collateral matter, as the entire statutory

    scheme regarding ballot placement and use of slogans is unconstitutional

    anyway in light ofCitizens United.

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    There is a growing concern in our country about

    public life - - a sense that government is no longer

    accountable to the people but rather advances itselfor the interests of groups other than its

    constituencies. Voter turnout continues to decline

    because of the perception that votes do not count.

    Voters feel alienated from their elected

    representatives. The Kettering Foundation reports

    that the public perceives our political system as so

    autonomous that the public is no longer able to

    control and direct it. The voters, Yes. But Which

    Ones, N.Y.Times, April 10, 1992 at A36.

    [Save our Shore District v. New Jersey Redistricting Commission, 131 N.J.

    594, 622 A.2d843 (1992) (OHern, J., Concurring).].

    Appellants, former members of the established Republican and

    Democratic and Conservative Parties in New Jersey do not want to waste

    another 20 years before action, and as such have banded together to try to

    bring about peaceful positive change. Appellants have the right to do so,

    and the right to associate together under the common slogan Democratic-

    Republican and the right to convey their message to all voters and supporters

    on the General Election Ballot, to do so in column reserved for them, and

    with an equal opportunity to appear in the most preferred of all ballot

    locations. Appellants have the right stand for election on a General Election

    Ballot where all candidates who have earned the right to appear on the

    General Election Ballot are treated fairly and equally. That is all they ask.

    ____/s/ Richard Luzzi_________________

    By: Richard Luzzi, Esq.

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    Attorney for Appellants Democratic-Republican

    Organization of New Jersey, Frederick John

    LaVergne, Leonard P. Marshall, Scott Neuman,Tracy M. Caprioni, Kimberly Sue Johnson and

    Donald E. Letton

    Dated: October 28, 2012

    ____/s/ Eugene Martin LaVergne_______

    Eugene Martin LaVergne

    Appellant Pro Se

    Dated: October 28, 2012

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    COMBINED CERTIFICATIONS AND PROOF OF SERVICE:

    RICHARD LUZZI, ESQ. hereby certifies as follows:

    1. I am a member of the Bar of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in

    good standing and the remainder of the representations in this Combined

    Certifications and Proof of Service are true and accurate.

    EUGENE MARTIN LaVERGNE hereby certifies as follows:

    1. I am a party and Appellant appearing Pro Se in this appeal and the

    remainder of the representations in this Combined Certifications and Proof

    of Service are true and accurate.

    WORD COUNT: The word count and page length are within the

    parameters of what is allowed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

    and the Third Circuit Local Appellate Rules for motions and responses.

    VIRUS CHECH: The Motion and papers filed herewith in PDF form have

    been checked with McAfee and are clear of any virus.

    SERVICE UPON COUNSEL: All defendants below were served wellprior to the return date of the Order to Show cause, and most County Clerk

    defendants entered an appearance and relied upon the Attorney Generals

    submissions, while some did not appear or enter any appearance. The

    defendant Democratic Party entered and appearance and appeared, though

    the Republican Party, properly served, chose not to enter an appearance or

    otherwise respond in any way.

    A copy of Appellants Joint Supplemental Written Argument and supporting

    papers (the F.R.A.P. 28 Addendum) are being served simultaneous to the

    electronic filing with the Third Circuit Clerk as follows:

    (1) Upon the following counsel for the Appellees who entered an appearance

    below electronically through ECMF only as follows:

    Brendan J. Kavanagh, Esq. at: [email protected] and

    [email protected]

    Donna Kelly, D.A.G. at: [email protected] and

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    [email protected]

    Edward Florio, Esq. at: [email protected]

    James B. Arsenault, Jr., Esq. at: [email protected] and

    [email protected]

    James Ferguson, Esq. at: [email protected]

    John Carbone, Esq. at [email protected] and

    [email protected]

    Michael David Witt, Esq. at: [email protected]

    Moshood Muftau, Esq. at: [email protected] and

    [email protected]

    Robert B. Campbell, Esq. at: [email protected] and

    [email protected]

    (2) Upon the following counsel for the Appellee(s) who entered an

    appearance below as counsel entered an appearance but is not a registeredECMF filer, a hard copy of the moving papers via hand delivery at the

    following address:

    Joseph A. Bilal, Esq.

    Middlesex County Counsel

    Administrative Building

    75 Bayard Street Room 230

    New Brunswick, New Jersey 08901

    (3) Notwithstanding the fact that the Republican Party was properly and

    timely served and failed to enter an appearance, failed to oppose the

    application below, and failed to otherwise respond in any way, a hard copy

    of the moving papers were also served via hand delivery at the following

    address:

    Republican State Committee

    150 West State Street Suite 230

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    Trenton, New Jersey 08625

    I DECLARE AND CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURYTHAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

    Executed on October 19, 2012.

    ____/s/ Richard Luzzi_________________

    By: Richard Luzzi, Esq.

    Attorney for Appellants Democratic-Republican

    Organization of New Jersey, Frederick John

    LaVergne, Leonard P. Marshall, Scott Neuman,

    Tracy M. Caprioni, Kimberly Sue Johnson and

    Donald E. Letton

    Dated: October 19, 2012

    I DECLARE AND CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY

    THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

    Executed on October 19, 2012.

    ____/s/ Eugene Martin LaVergne_______

    Eugene Martin LaVergneAppellant Pro Se

    Dated: October 19, 2012

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    Continuing F.R.A.P. 28 Addendum to Joint Supplemental Written Argument:

    (Redacted)

    Exhibit 9 Laws of 1898, CHAPTER 139, an Act to regulate

    elections (Revision of 1898) as officially published in

    ACTS of the ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND

    LEGISLATURE of the State of New Jersey, and the Fifty-

    fourth Under the New Constitution, MacCrellish &

    Quigley, Current Publisher, Trenton, New Jersey (1898)

    (Title page and pages 254 to 269 and pages 330 to 333only).

    Exhibit 10 Laws of 1930, CHAPTER 187, an Act to regulate

    elections (Revision of 1930) as officially published in

    ACTS of the ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH

    LEGISLATURE of the State of New Jersey, and the

    Eighty-Sixth Under the New Constitution, MacCrellish &

    Quigley Co., Printers, Trenton, New Jersey (1930) (Titlepage and page 689, pages 720 to 723, and pages 736 to

    741 only).

    Exhibit 11 Laws of 1948, CHAPTER 438, Section 4, as officially

    published in ACTS of the One Hundred and

    Seventy=second Legislature of the State of New Jersey,

    and the First Under the New Constitution, MacCrellish &

    Quigley Co., Printers, Trenton, New Jersey (1948) (Title

    page and pages 1696-1697 only).

    Exhibit 12 Laws of 1968, CHAPTER 226, as officially published in

    ACTS of the One Hundred and Ninety=second

    Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and the Twenty-

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    first Under the New Constitution, Trenton, New Jersey

    (1968) (Title page and pages 676-679 only).

    Exhibit 13 Laws of 1977, CHAPTER 431, as officially published in

    ACTS of the One Hundred and Ninety=seventh

    Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and the Twenty-

    sixth Under the New Constitution, Trenton, New Jersey

    (1977) (Title page and pages 1530-1533 only).