Filamer Christian Institute

8/9/2019 Filamer Christian Institute

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(@) to pay T;R77 T;3>-A# +7-3- (+1,222.22) as

loss of earnings capacityB

(/) to pay T=7#T? T;3>-A# (+&2,222.22) pesos as

moral damagesB

(5) to pay '3>R T;3>-A# '$7 ;>#R7 +7-3-

(+",@22.22) as attorney8s feesB

(-A# +7-3- (+&2,222.22)as

insurance indemnity on the policy contractB

and without prejudice to the right of defendant 'ilamer

Christian nstitute to demand from co%defendant aniel

'untecha part%time employee andor Allan 9asa a full time

employee reim*ursement of the damages paid to herein

plaintiff.

The defendant Agustin 9asa as director of defendant

'ilamer Christian nstitute has also failed to exercise the

diligence re:uired of a good father of a family in the

supervision of his employee Allan 9asa, *eing his son.

;owever, the court a*solved defendant Agustin 9asa from

any personal lia*ility with respect to the complaint filed

against him in his personal and private capacity, cause he

was not in the vehicle during the alleged incident.

'or failure to prove their respective counterclaims filed *y

the defendant aniel 'untecha, r. Agustin 9asa, and

'ilamer Christian nstitute, as against the herein plaintiff,

same are here*y dismissed.

The Denith nsurance Corporation as third party defendant

has failed to prove that there was a policy violation made

*y the defendant 'ilamer Christian nstitute which

a*solves them from lia*ility under the aforesaid insurance

policy. The record shows that the defendant aniel

'untecha while driving the said vehicle was having a

student drivers license mared 7xh. ! and accompanied

*y Allan 9asa who is the authori6ed driver of said vehicle

with a professional drivers license as shown *y 7xh. 1.

This Court finds that defendant aniel 'untecha while

driving the said vehicle is considered as authori6ed driver in accordance with the policy in :uestion mared 7xh. &%

9asa and 'C.

'inding the averments in the third party complaint filed *y

defendant 'ilamer Christian nstitute as supported *y

preponderance of evidence as shown *y their exhi*its to

*e reasona*le and justified, judgment is here*y rendered

in favor of the said defendant and third party plaintiff

'ilamer Christian nstitute as against third party defendant

Denith nsurance Corporation.

The Denith nsurance Corporation as third party defendant

is here*y ordered to pay in favor of the defendant and

third party plaintiff, 'ilamer Christian nstitute, the

following0

(!) to pay T=7#T? T;3>-A#

+7-3- (+&2,222.22) as third party

lia*ility as provided in the Denith

nsurance Corporation policy (7xh. &)B

(&) to pay T7# T;3>-A# +7-3-

(+!2,222.22)as moral damagesB

(1) to pay '3>R T;3>-A# +7-3-

(+",222.22) as Court litigation and

actual expensesB

(") to pay T;R77 T;3>-A# +7-3-

(+1,222.22) as attorney8s feesB


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The defendants aniel 'untecha, 'ilamer Christian

nstitute and third party defendant Denith nsurance

Corporation are here*y ordered jointly and severally, to

pay the costs of the suit. 5

3nly petitioner 'ilamer and third%party defendant Denith nsuranceCorporation appealed the lower court8s judgment to the Court of Appeals and

as a conse:uence, said lower court8s decision *ecame final as to 'untecha.

'or failure of the insurance firm to pay the docet fees, its appeal was

dismissed on -eptem*er !


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ut even if we were to concede the status of an employee on 'untecha, still

the primary responsi*ility for his wrongdoing cannot *e imputed to petitioner

'ilamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has *een

satisfactorily shown that 'untecha was not acting within the scope of his

supposed employment. ;is duty was to sweep the school passages for two

hours every morning *efore his regular classes. Taing the wheels of the+inoy jeep from the authori6ed driver at /012 in the evening and then driving

the vehicle in a recless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third

person were certainly not within the am*it of his assigned tass. n other

words, at the time of the injury, 'untecha was not engaged in the execution

of the janitorial services for which he was employed, *ut for some purpose of

his own. t is *ut fair therefore that 'untecha should *ear the full *runt of his

tortious negligence. +etitioner 'ilamer cannot *e made lia*le for the

damages he had caused.

+rivate respondents8 attempt to hold petitioner 'ilamer directly and primarily

answera*le to the injured party under Article &!


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MA. LOUR0ES (ALEN/UELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,RICHAR0 LI an ALE'AN0ER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.

x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x

.R. N#. 117944 F"+&ua&y 7, 1996

RICHAR0 LI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS an LOUR0ES(ALEN/UELA, respondents.

0 E C I S I O N

*APUNAN, J .-

These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule "@ of the Revised

Rules of Court stem from an action to recover damages *y petitioner

Eourdes $alen6uela in the Regional Trial Court of Hue6on City for injuries

sustained *y her in a vehicular accident in the early morning of Iune &",

!442. The facts found *y the trial court are succinctly summari6ed *y the

Court of Appeals *elow0

This is an action to recover damages *ased on :uasi%delict, for serious

physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.

+laintiff8s version of the accident is as follows0 At around &022 in the morning

of Iune &", !442, plaintiff 9a. Eourdes $alen6uela was driving a *lue

9itsu*ishi lancer with +late #o. ''> @"& from her restaurant at 9arcos

highway to her home at +alan6a -treet, Araneta Avenue. -he was travelling

along Aurora lvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the

direction of 9anila. efore reaching A. Eae -treet, she noticed something

wrong with her tiresB she stopped at a lighted place where there were

people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.;aving *een told *y the people present that her rear right tire was flat and

that she cannot reach her home in that car8s condition, she pared along the

sidewal, a*out !%!& feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from

the car, and went to the rear to open the trun. -he was standing at the left

side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix

the tire when she was suddenly *umped *y a !47R9 9edical9emorial Center where she was found to have a traumatic amputation, leg,

left up to distal thigh (a*ove nee). -he was confined in the hospital for

twenty (&2) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The

expenses for the hospital confinement (+!&2,222.22) and the cost of the

artificial leg (+&5,222.22) were paid *y defendants from the car insurance.

n her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of +!

million, exemplary damages in the amount of +!22,222.22 and other


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efendant Ei8s testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of @@ m.hour

is self servingB it was not corro*orated. t was in fact contradicted *y

eyewitness Rodrigue6 who stated that he was outside his *eerhouse located

at Aurora oulevard after A. Eae -treet, at or a*out &022 a.m. of Iune &",

!442 when his attention was caught *y a *eautiful lady (referring to the

plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening the trun compartmentB henoticed the car of Richard Ei approaching very fast ten (!2) meters away

from the sceneB defendant8s car was 6ig6agging, although there were no

holes and ha6ards on the street, and *umped the leg of the plaintiff who

was thrown against the windshield of defendant8s care, causing its

destruction. ;e came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was pulled out from

under defendant8s car and was a*le to say hurting words to Richard Ei

*ecause he noticed that the latter was under the influence of li:uor, *ecause

he could smell it very well (p. 1/, et . seq., tsn, Iune !5, !44!). ;e new

that plaintiff owned a *eerhouse in -ta. 9esa in the !4528s, *ut did not now

either plaintiff or defendant Ei *efore the accident.

n agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Ei was lia*le for the injuriessustained *y the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its decision, however,

a*solved the Ei8s employer, Alexander Commercial, nc. from any lia*ility

towards petitioner Eourdes $alen6uela and reduced the amount of moral

damages to +@22,222.22. 'inding justification for exemplary damages, the

respondent court allowed an award of +@2,222.22 for the same, in addition

to costs, attorney8s fees and the other damages. The Court of Appeals,

liewise, dismissed the defendants8 counterclaims.1

Conse:uently, *oth parties assail the respondent court8s decision *y filing

two separate petitions *efore this Court. Richard Ei, in J.R. #o. !!54"",

contends that he should not *e held lia*le for damages *ecause the

proximate cause of the accident was 9a. Eourdes $alen6uela8s ownnegligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds him

negligent, such negligence ought to *e mitigated *y the contri*utory

negligence of $alen6uela.

3n the other hand, in J.R. #o. !!@2&", 9a. Eourdes $alen6uela assails the

respondent court8s decision insofar as it a*solves Alexander Commercial,

nc. from lia*ility as the owner of the car driven *y Richard Ei and insofar as

it reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded *y the trial

court."

As the issues are intimately related, *oth petitions are here*y consolidated.

t is plainly evident that the petition for review in J.R. #o. !!54"" raises no

su*stantial :uestions of law. =hat it, in effect, attempts to have this Court

review are factual findings of the trial court, as sustained *y the Court of

Appeals finding Richard Ei grossly negligent in driving the 9itsu*ishi Eancer provided *y his company in the early morning hours of Iune &", !442. This

we will not do. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are

*inding and conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normally distur* such

factual findings unless the findings of fact of the said court are palpa*ly

unsupported *y the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is

*ased on a misapprehension of facts.@

n the first place, $alen6uela8s version of the incident was fully corro*orated

*y an uninterested witness, Rogelio Rodrigue6, the owner%operator of an

esta*lishment located just across the scene of the accident. 3n trial, he

testified that he o*served a car *eing driven at a very fast speed, racing

towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue./

Rodrigue6 further addedthat he was standing in front of his esta*lishment, just ten to twenty feet

away from the scene of the accident, when he saw the car hit $alen6uela,

hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant8s 9itsu*ishi Eancer, from

where she eventually fell under the defendant8s car. -pontaneously reacting

to the incident, he crossed the street, noting that a man reeing with the

smell of li:uor had alighted from the offending vehicle in order to survey the

incident.5 7:ually important, Rodrigue6 declared that he o*served

$alen6uela8s car pared parallel and very near the sidewal,


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his statement that defendant was driving very fast. This was the same

statement he gave to the police investigator after the incident, as told to a

newspaper report (7xh. +). =e see no compelling *asis for disregarding

his testimony.

The alleged inconsistencies in Rodrigue68 testimony are not *orne out *y an

examination of the testimony. Rodrigue6 testified that the scene of the

accident was across the street where his *eerhouse is located a*out ten to

twenty feet away (pp. 1@%1/, tsn, Iune !5, !44!). ;e did not state that the

accident transpired immediately in front of his esta*lishment. The ownership

of the Eam*ingan se am*ingan is not materialB the *usiness is registered in

the name of his mother, *ut he explained that he owns the esta*lishment (p.

@, tsn, Iune &2, !44!). 9oreover, the testimony that the streetlights on his

side of Aurora oulevard were on the night the accident transpired (p.


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plaintiff, notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery. $erily, since, if,

indeed, he was running slow, as he claimed, at only a*out @@ ilometers per

hour, then, inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided hitting

the plaintiff *y the mere expedient or applying his *raes at the proper time

and distance.

t could not *e true, therefore, as he now claims during his testimony, which

is contrary to what he told the police immediately after the accident and is,

therefore, more *elieva*le, that he did not actually step on his *raes *ut

simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the on%coming car with

glaring headlights, from the opposite direction, in order to avoid it.

'or, had this *een what he did, he would not have *umped the car of the

plaintiff which was properly pared at the right *eside the sidewal. And, it

was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to

safely avoid a collision with the on%coming car, considering that Aurora lvd.

is a dou*le lane avenue separated at the center *y a dotted white paint, and

there is plenty of space for *oth cars, since her car was running at the rightlane going towards 9anila on the on%coming car was also on its right lane

going to Cu*ao.!1

;aving come to the conclusion that Ei was negligent in driving his company%

issued 9itsu*ishi Eancer, the next :uestion for us to determine is whether or

not $alen6uela was liewise guilty of contri*utory negligence in paring her

car alongside Aurora oulevard, which entire area Ei points out, is a no

paring 6one.

=e agree with the respondent court that $alen6uela was not guilty of

contri*utory negligence.

Contri*utory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,

contri*uting as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls *elow

the standard to which he is re:uired to conform for his own

protection.!" ased on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to which,

according to petitioner Ei, $alen6uela ought to have conformed for her own

protection was not to par at all at any point of Aurora oulevard, a no

paring 6one. =e cannot agree.

Courts have traditionally *een compelled to recogni6e that an actor who is

confronted with an emergency is not to *e held up to the standard of conduct

normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law taes

stoc of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous

situations and does not re:uire the same standard of thoughtful and

reflective care from persons confronted *y unusual and oftentimes

threatening conditions.!@

>nder the emergency rule adopted *y this Court in an vs. Court of

!ppeals,!/ an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger

and is re:uired to act without much time to consider the *est means that

may *e adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if

he fails to undertae what su*se:uently and upon reflection may appear to

*e a *etter solution, unless the emergency was *rought *y his own

negligence.!5

Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular accident

swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting into

the street, we held, in "c #ee vs. $ntermediate !ppellate Court ,!sing the emergency rule the Court

concluded that oh, in spite of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when

the collision with an oncoming truc occurred, was not guilty of negligence.!4

=hile the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought,

or the opportunity to ade:uately weigh a threatening situation is a*sent, the

conduct which is re:uired of an individual in such cases is dictated not

exclusively *y the suddenness of the event which a*solutely negates

thoroughful care, *ut *y the over%all nature of the circumstances. A woman

driving a vehicle suddenly crippled *y a flat tire on a rainy night will not *e

faulted for stopping at a point which is *oth convenient for her to do so and

which is not a ha6ard to other motorists. -he is not expected to run theentire *oulevard in search for a paring 6one or turn on a dar street or alley

where she would liely find no one to help her. t would *e ha6ardous for her

not to stop and assess the emergency (simply *ecause the entire length of

Aurora oulevard is a no%paring 6one) *ecause the ho**ling vehicle would

*e *oth a threat to her safety and to other motorists. n the instant case,

$alen6uela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora oulevard close to A. Eae

-t., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other

motorists in danger, she did what was *est under the situation. As narrated

*y respondent court0 -he stopped at a lighted place where there were

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people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.

;aving *een told *y the people present that her rear right tire was flat and

that she cannot reach her home she pared along the sidewal, a*out ! !&

feet away, *ehind a Toyota Corona Car. &2 n fact, respondent court noted,

+fc. 'elix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed

that $alen6uela8s car was pared very close to the sidewal.&!

The setchwhich he prepared after the incident showed $alen6uela8s car partly

straddling the sidewal, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists

passing the right lane of Aurora oulevard. This fact was itself corro*orated

*y the testimony of witness Rodrigue6.&&

>nder the circumstances descri*ed, $alen6uela did exercise the standard

reasona*ly dictated *y the emergency and could not *e considered to have

contri*uted to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the

amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to

par her car on a sidewal in Aurora oulevard was not of her own maing,

and it was evident that she had taen all reasona*le precautions.

3*viously in the case at *ench, the only negligence ascri*a*le was the

negligence of Ei on the night of the accident. #egligence, as it is commonly

understood is conduct which creates an undue ris of harm to others. &1t is

the failure to o*serve that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which

the circumstances justly demand, where*y such other person suffers

injury.&" =e stressed, in Corliss vs. "anila %ailroad Company ,&@ that

negligence is the want of care re:uired *y the circumstances.

The circumstances esta*lished *y the evidence adduced in the court *elow

plainly demonstrate that Ei was grossly negligent in driving his 9itsu*ishi

Eancer. t *ears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at a*out &022

A.9. after a heavy downpour had settled into a dri66le rendering the streetslippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was

under the influence of li:uor. >nder these conditions, his chances of

effectively dealing with changing conditions on the road were significantly

lessened. As +resser and eaton emphasi6e0

K>Lnder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automo*ile must *e

prepared for the sudden appearance of o*stacles and persons on the

highway, and of other vehicles at intersections, such as one who sees a

child on the cur* may *e re:uired to anticipate its sudden dash into the

street, and his failure to act properly when they appear may *e found to

amount to negligence.&/

Ei8s o*vious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on

the night of the accident was clearly of his own maing.

=e now come to the :uestion of the lia*ility of Alexander Commercial, nc.

Ei8s employer. n denying lia*ility on the part of Alexander Commercial, the

respondent court held that0

There is no evidence, not even defendant Ei8s testimony, that the visit was in

connection with official matters. ;is functions as assistant manager

sometimes re:uired him to perform wor outside the office as he has to visit

*uyers and company clients, *ut he admitted that on the night of the

accident he came from ' ;omes +arana:ue he did not have *usiness

from the company (pp. &@%&/, ten, -ept. &1, !44!). The use of the company

car was partly re:uired *y the nature of his wor, *ut the privilege of using it

for non%official *usiness is a *enefit, apparently referring to the fringe

*enefits attaching to his position.

>nder the civil law, an employer is lia*le for the negligence of his employees

in the discharge of their respective duties, the *asis of which lia*ility is

not respondeat superior , *ut the relationship of pater familias, which theory

*ases the lia*ility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on

that of his servant (Cuison v. #orton and ;arrison Co., @@ +hil. !


11/55

either officially or socially or even *ring it home, he can *e considered as

using the company car in the service of his employer or on the occasion of

his functions. riving the company car was not among his functions as

assistant managerB using it for non%official purposes would appear to *e a

fringe *enefit, one of the pers attached to his position. ut to impose lia*ility

upon the employer under Article &!tili6ing the &onus pater familias standard expressed in Article &!


12/55

n the ordinary course of *usiness, not all company employees are given the

privilege of using a company%issued car. 'or large companies other than

those cited in the example of the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves

important *usiness purposes either related to the image of success an entity

intends to present to its clients and to the pu*lic in general, or % for practical

and utilitarian reasons % to ena*le its managerial and other employees of ran or its sales agents to reach clients conveniently. n most cases,

providing a company car serves *oth purposes. -ince important *usiness

transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations

and under all inds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a

company car therefore principally serves the *usiness and goodwill of a

company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who

actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. As

such, in providing for a company car for *usiness use andor for the purpose

of furthering the company8s image, a company owes a responsi*ility to the

pu*lic to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts

virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are a*le to use the company

issue capa*ly and responsi*ly.

n the instant case, Ei was an Assistant 9anager of Alexander Commercial,

nc. n his testimony *efore the trial court, he admitted that his functions as

Assistant 9anager did not re:uire him to scrupulously eep normal office

hours as he was re:uired :uite often to perform wor outside the office,

visiting prospective *uyers and contacting and meeting with company

clients. 12 These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours

*ecause, as a managerial employee tased with the jo* of representing his

company with its clients, meetings with clients were *oth social as well as

wor%related functions. The service car assigned to Ei *y Alexander

Commercial, nc. therefore ena*led *oth Ei % as well as the corporation % to

put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter8s goodwill*efore its clientele. t also facilitated meeting *etween Ei and its clients *y

providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.

9oreover, Ei8s claim that he happened to *e on the road on the night of the

accident *ecause he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in

+arana:ue was a *are allegation which was never corro*orated in the court

*elow. t was o*viously self%serving. Assuming he really came from his

officemate8s place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his

officemate had just *een from a wor%related function, or they were together

to discuss sales and other wor related strategies.

n fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our

satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the

family in entrusting its company car to Ei. #o allegations were made as to

whether or not the company too the steps necessary to determine or

ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Ei, to whom it gave full and

unlimited use of a company car .1! #ot having *een a*le to overcome the

*urden of demonstrating that it should *e a*solved of lia*ility for entrusting

its company car to Ei, said company, *ased on the principle of &onus pater

familias, ought to *e jointly and severally lia*le with the former for the

injuries sustained *y 9a. Eourdes $alen6uela during the accident.

'inally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded *y

the respondent court, except as to the amount of moral damages. n the

case of moral damages, while the said damages are not intended to enrich

the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless *ecommensurate to the suffering inflicted. n the instant case we are of the

opinion that the reduction in moral damages from an amount of

+!,222,222.22 to +


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;ospital, the sum of +@2,4&5.


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employee has left the direct route to his wor or *ac home and is pursuing

a personal errand of his own.

III. Us" #$ Ep%#y"&;s ("hic%" Outsi" R"!u%a&


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THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA an SOLE0A0 C. AFRICA, an th"

HEIRS OF 0OMINA ON, petitionersappellants, vs. CALTE' >PHIL.?,INC., MATEO BOQUIREN an THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondentsappellees.

0 E C I S I O N

"!#!-$/!-., J.0

This case is *efore us on a petition for review of the decision of the Court of

Appeals, which affirmed that of the Court of 'irst nstance of 9anila

dismissing petitionersO second amended complaint against respondents.

The action is for damages under Articles !42& and !421 of the old Civil

Code. t appears that in the afternoon of 9arch !


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is su*mitted herewith. it appears in this picture that there are in the premises

a coca%cola cooler and a rac which according to information gathered in the

neigh*orhood contained cigarettes and matches, installed *etween the

gasoline pumps and the underground tans.

The report of Captain Tinio reproduced information given *y a certain enito

9orales regarding the history of the gasoline station and what the chief of

the fire department had told him on the same su*ject.

The foregoing reports were ruled out as Qdou*le hearsay *y the Court of

Appeals and hence inadmissi*le. This ruling is now assigned as error. t is

contended0 first, that said reports were admitted *y the trial court without

o*jection on the part of respondentsB secondly, that with respect to the police

report (7xhi*it $%Africa) which appears signed *y a etective Dapanta

allegedly Qfor -alvador Capacillo, the latter was presented as witness *ut

respondents waived their right to cross%examine him although they had the

opportunity to do soB and thirdly, that in any event the said reports are

admissi*le as an exception to the hearsay rule under section 1@ of Rule !&1,

now Rule !12.

The first contention is not *orne out *y the record. The transcript of the

hearing of -eptem*er !5, !4@1 (pp. !/5%!52) shows that the reports in

:uestion, when offered as evidence, were o*jected to *y counsel for each of

respondents on the ground that they were hearsay and that they were

Qirrelevant, immaterial and impertinent. ndeed, in the courtOs resolution only

7xhi*its I, , %@ and F%/ were admitted without o&*ectionB the admission of

the others, including the disputed ones, carried no such explanation.

3n the second point, although etective Capacillo did tae the witness

stand, he was not examined and he did not testify as to the facts mentioned

in his alleged report (signed *y etective Dapanta). All he said was that he

was one of those who investigated Qthe location of the fire and, if possi*le,

gather witnesses as to the occurrence, and that he *rought the report with

him. There was nothing, therefore, on which he need *e cross%examinedB

and the contents of the report, as to which he did not testify, did not there*y

*ecome competent evidence. And even if he had testified, his testimony

would still have *een o*jectiona*le as far as information gathered *y him

from third persons was concerned.

+etitioners maintain, however, that the reports in themselves, that is, without

further testimonial evidence on their contents, fall within the scope of section

1@, Rule !&1, which provides that Qentries in official records made in the

performance of his duty *y a pu*lic officer of the +hilippines, or *y a person

in the performance of a duty specially enjoined *y law, are prima

facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

There are three re:uisites for admissi*ility under the rule just mentioned0 (a)

that the entry was made *y a pu*lic officer, or *y another person specially

enjoined *y law to do soB (*) that it was made *y the pu*lic officer in the

performance of his duties, or *y such other person in the performance of a

duty specially enjoined *y lawB and (c) that the pu*lic officer or other person

had sufficient nowledge of the facts *y him stated, which must have *een

ac:uired *y him personally or through official information (9oran, Comments

on the Rules of Court, $ol. 1 K!4@5L p. 14


20/55

court refused to apply the doctrine in the instant case on the grounds that

Qas to (its) applica*ility in the +hilippines, there seems to *e nothing

definite, and that while the rules do not prohi*it its adoption in appropriate

cases, Qin the case at *ar, however, we find no practical use for such

doctrine. The :uestion deserves more than such summary dismissal. The

doctrine has actually *een applied in this jurisdiction, in the case of Espiritu

vs. )hilippine )ower and 1evelopment Co. (CA%J.R. #o. 1&"2%R,

-eptem*er &2, !4"4), wherein the decision of the Court of Appeals was

penned *y 9r. Iustice I..E. Reyes now a mem*er of the -upreme Court.

The facts of that case are stated in the decision as follows0

n the afternoon of 9ay @, !4"/, while the plaintiff%appellee and other

companions were loading grass *etween the municipalities of ay and

Calauan, in the province of Eaguna, with clear weather and without any wind

*lowing, an electric transmission wire, installed and maintained *y the

defendant +hilippine +ower and evelopment Co., nc. alongside the road,

suddenly parted, and one of the *roen ends hit the head of the plaintiff as

he was a*out to *oard the truc. As a result, plaintiff received the full shoc

of ","22 volts carried *y the wire and was noced unconscious to the

ground. The electric charge coursed through his *ody and caused extensive

and serious multiple *urns from sull to legs, leaving the *one exposed in

some parts and causing intense pain and wounds that were not completely

healed when the case was tried on Iune !


21/55

testimony failed to show with reasona*le certainty any negligence on the

part of the -hell +etroleum Corporation or any of its agents or employees.

+laintiff applied to this Court for a =rit of Review which was granted, and the

case is now *efore us for decision.

n resolving the issue of negligence, the -upreme Court of Eouisiana held0

+laintiffOs petition contains two distinct charges of negligence G one relating

to the cause of the fire and the other relating to the spreading of the gasoline

a*out the filling station.

3ther than an expert to assess the damages caused plaintiffOs *uilding *y

the fire, no witnesses were placed on the stand *y the defendant.

Taing up plaintiffOs charge of negligence relating to the cause of the fire, we

find it esta*lished *y the record that the f illing station and the tan truc were

under the control of the defendant and operated *y its agents or employees.

=e further find from the uncontradicted testimony of plaintiffOs witnesses that

fire started in the underground tan attached to the filling station while it was*eing filled from the tan truc and while *oth the tan and the truc were in

charge of and *eing operated *y the agents or employees of the defendant,

extended to the hose and tan truc, and was communicated from the

*urning hose, tan truc, and escaping gasoline to the *uilding owned *y the

plaintiff.

+redicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance of

defendantOs failure to explain the cause of the fire or to show its lac of

nowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evoed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur .

There are many cases in which the doctrine may *e successfully invoed

and this, we thin, is one of them.

=here the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to *e under

the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in

the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its

management or control use proper care, it affords reasona*le evidence, in

a*sence of explanation *y defendant, that the accident arose from want of

care. ("@ C.I. W5/


22/55

Although the soft drins stand had *een eliminated, this gasoline service

station is also used *y its operator as a garage and repair shop for his fleet

of taxica*s num*ering ten or more, adding another ris to the possi*le

out*rea of fire at this already small *ut crowded gasoline station.

The foregoing report, having *een su*mitted *y a police officer in the

performance of his duties on the *asis of his own personal o*servation of

the facts reported, may properly *e considered as an exception to the

hearsay rule. These facts, descriptive of the location and o*jective

circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in :uestion,

strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur , since on their face they called for more stringent measures of

caution than those which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under

ordinary circumstances. There is no more elo:uent demonstration of this

than the statement of Eeandro 'lores *efore the police investigator. 'lores

was the driver of the gasoline tan wagon who, alone and without

assistance, was transferring the contents thereof into the underground

storage when the fire *roe out. ;e said0 Qefore loading the undergroundtan there were no people, *ut while the loading was going on, there were

people who went to drin coca%cola (at the coca%cola stand) which is a*out a

meter from the hole leading to the underground tan. ;e added that when

the tan was almost filled he went to the tan truc to close the valve, and

while he had his *ac turned to the Qmanhole he, heard someone shout

Qfire.

7ven then the fire possi*ly would not have spread to the neigh*oring houses

were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely,

their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames

from leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall was only &%!& meters high,

and *eyond that height it consisted merely of galvani6ed iron sheets, whichwould predicta*ly crumple and melt when su*jected to intense heat.

efendantsO negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of

the fire *ut also with respect to the spread thereof to the neigh*oring

houses.

There is an admission on the part of o:uiren in his amended answer to the

second amended complaint that Qthe fire was caused through the acts of a

stranger who, without authority, or permission of answering defendant,

passed through the gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match in

the premises. #o evidence on this point was adduced, *ut assuming the

allegation to *e true G certainly any unfavora*le inference from the

admission may *e taen against o:uiren G it does not extenuate his

negligence. A decision of the -upreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous

to those of the present case, states the rule which we find accepta*le here.

Qt is the rule that those who distri*ute a dangerous article or agent, owe a

degree of protection to the pu*lic proportionate to and commensurate with a

danger involved we thin it is the generally accepted rule as applied to

torts that Xif the effects of the actorOs negligent conduct actively and

continuously operate to *ring a*out harm to another, the fact that the active

and su*stantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third personOs

innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a su*stantial factor in *ringing a*out

the harm, does not protect the actor from lia*ility.O ( %estatement of the -aw

of /orts, vol. &, p. !!%AfricaB 7xhi*it F%@ AfricaB 7xhi*it F%/ AfricaB 7xhi*it ?%Africa).

n o:uirenOs amended answer to the second amended complaint, he

denied that he directed one of his drivers to remove gasoline from the truc

into the tan and alleged that the Qalleged driver, if one there was, was not in

his employ, the driver *eing an employee of the Caltex (+hil.) nc. andor the

owners of the gasoline station. t is true that o:uiren later on amended his

answer, and that among the changes was one to the effect that he was not

acting as agent of Caltex. ut then again, in his motion to dismiss appellantsO


23/55

second amended complaint the ground alleged was that it stated no cause

of action since under the allegations thereof he was merely acting as agent

of Caltex, such that he could not have incurred personal lia*ility. A motion to

dismiss on this ground is deemed to *e an admission of the facts alleged in

the complaint.

Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the e:uipment

therein, *ut claims that the *usiness conducted at the service station in

:uestion was owned and operated *y o:uiren. ut Caltex did not present

any contract with o:uiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship

at the time of the fire. There must have *een one in existence at that time.

nstead, what was presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored for

purposes of this case, since it was entered into shortly *efore the expiration

of the one%year period it was intended to operate. This so%called license

agreement (7xhi*it @%Caltex) was executed on #ovem*er &4, !4"


24/55

*ought said gasoline from Caltex. #either was there a sales contract to

prove the same.

As found *y the trial court the Africas sustained a loss of +4,22@.


25/55

-hell8s 9anila 3ffice to excavate the underground pipes of the station. >pon

*eing granted permission to do so, 'eliciano and his men *egan excavating

the driveway of private respondent8s station in order to expose the

underground pipeline. The tas was continued *y one aniel anny

+ascua who replaced 'eliciano, +ascua removed the corroded pipeline and

installed new independent vent pipe for each storage tan.

9eanwhile, petitioner undertoo to settle the criminal complaint filed *y

$illanueva. -u*se:uently, $illanueva filed an Affidavit of esistance, !

declaring, inter alia G

T;AT, after careful evaluation of the surrounding circumstances, especially

the explanation of the representatives of -;7EE +hils., that the gasoline

tans of 9rs. Camacho were su*ject to ;ydro test, in such a way that water

was used for the said test, *elieve that she may not have had anything to

do with the filling of water in the tan of my carB

xxx xxx xxx

T;AT, said representatives of -;7EE +hils. have interceded for and in

*ehalf of 9rs. Camacho and have fully satisfied my claim against her.

T;AT, in view of all the foregoing do not intend to prosecute the case and

am therefore asing for the dismissal of the case against 9rs. Camacho.

Thereafter, private respondent demanded from petitioner the payment of

damages in the amount of +!2,222.22. +etitioner, instead, offered private

respondent additional credit line and other *eneficial terms, which offer was,

however, rejected. cdrep

-u*se:uently, or on 3cto*er !&, !4


26/55

the mode of payment of wagesB (c) the presence or a*sence of a power to

control the putative employee8s conduct, " although the latter is the most

important element. @

n this case, respondent Court of Appeals held petitioner lia*le for the

damage caused to private respondent as a result of the hydro%pressure test

conducted *y Iesus 'eliciano due to the following circumstances0 /

!. 'eliciano was hired *y petitionerB

&. ;e received his instructions from the 'ield 7ngineer of petitioner, 9r.

Ro*erto 9itraB

1. =hile he was at private respondent8s service station, he also received

instructions from #ic 9analo, petitioner8s +oro +oint epot -uperintendentB

". nstructions from petitioner8s 9anila 3ffice were also relayed to him while

he was at .the jo* site at aguio CityB

@. ;is wor was under the constant supervision of petitioner8s engineerB

/. efore he could complete the wor, he was instructed *y 9r. 9analo,

petitioner8s -uperintendent, to discontinue the same and it was turned over

to aniel +ascua, who was liewise hired *y petitioner.

ased on the foregoing, respondent Court of Appeals concluded that

'eliciano was not an independent contractor *ut was under the control and

supervision of petitioner in the performance of the hydro%pressure test,

hence, it held petitioner lia*le for the former8s acts and omissions.

=e are not in accord with the a*ove finding of respondent Court of Appeals. As aptly held *y the trial court, petitioner did not exercise control and

supervision over 'eliciano with regard to the manner in which he conducted

the hydro%pressure test. All that petitioner did, through its 'ield 7ngineer,

Ro*erto 9itra, was relay to 'eliciano the re:uest of private respondent for a

hydro%pressure test, to determine any possi*le leaages in the storage tans

in her gasoline station. The mere hiring of 'eliciano *y petitioner for that

particular tas is not the form of control and supervision contemplated *y

may *e the *asis for esta*lishing an employer%employee relationship

*etween petitioner and 'eliciano. The fact that there was no such control is

further amplified *y the a*sence of any -hell representative in the jo* site

time when the test was conducted. Ro*erto 9itra was never there. 3nly

'eliciano and his men were.

True, it was petitioner who sent 'eliciano to private respondent8s gasoline

station in conduct the hydro%pressure test as per the re:uest of private

respondent herself. ut this single act did not automatically mae 'eliciano

an employee of petitioner. As discussed earlier, more than mere hiring is

re:uired. t must further *e esta*lished that petitioner is the one who is

paying 'elicia8s salary on a regular *asisB that it has the power to dismiss

said employee, and more importantly, that petitioner has control and

supervision over the wor of 'eliciano. The last re:uisite was sorely missing

in the instant case.

A careful perusal of the records will lead to the conclusion that 'eliciano is

an independent contractor. -ection < of Rule $, oo of the 3mni*us

Rules mplementing the Ea*or Code provides0

-ec.


27/55

9oreover, 'eliciano does not exclusively service petitioner *ecause he can

accept other *usiness *ut not from other oil companies. !2 All these are the

hallmars of an independent contractor.

eing an independent contractor, 'eliciano is responsi*le for his own acts

and omissions. As he alone was in control over the manner of how he was to

undertae the hydro%pressure test, he alone must *ear the conse:uences of

his negligence, if any, in the conduct of the same.

Anent the issue of damages, the same has *een rendered moot *y the

failure of private respondent to esta*lish an employer%employee relationship

*etween petitioner and 'eliciano. A*sent said relationship, petitioner cannot

*e held lia*le for the acts and omissions of the independent contractor,

'eliciano.

=;7R7'3R7, premises considered, the appealed decision of respondent

Court of Appeals is here*y -7T A-7 and the decision of the trial court

R7#-TAT7. =ithout pronouncement as to costs.

-3 3R7R7.

H"&ana R. C"&"#, petitioner, vs. 0a@i Tua#n, respondent .

0 E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J .-

Th" Cas"

This is a petition for review on certiorar i K!L to annul the ResolutionK&L dated &!

3cto*er !444 of the Court of Appeals in CA%J.R. -+ #o. @1@5&, as well as

its Resolution dated &2 Ianuary &222 denying the motion for

reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of

the ecisionK1L dated 12 9ay !44@ rendered *y

the Regional Trial Court of AngelesCity, ranch @/ (Qtrial court), in Civil

Case #o. 5"!@. The trial court ordered petitioner ;ermana R. Cere6o (Q9rs.

Cere6o) to pay respondent avid Tua6on (QTua6on) actual damages, loss

of earnings, moral damages, and costs of suit.

Ant"c""nt Facts

Around noontime of &/ Iune !441, a Country us Eines passenger *us with

plate num*er #?A &"! collided with a tricycle *earing plate num*er TC R$!&/ along Captain 9. +alo -treet, -ta. nes, 9a*alacat, +ampanga. 3n !

3cto*er !441, tricycle driver Tua6on filed a complaint for damages against

9rs. Cere6o, as owner of the *us line, her hus*and Attorney Iuan Cere6o

(QAtty. Cere6o), and *us driver anilo A. 'oronda (Q'oronda). The

complaint alleged that0

5. At the time of the incident, plaintiff KTua6onL was in his proper lane

when the second%named defendant K'orondaL, *eing then the driver and

person in charge of the Country us with plate num*er #?A &"!, did then

and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle

in a negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without due regard to traffic

rules and regulations, there *eing a Q-low own sign near the scene of the

incident, and without taing the necessary precaution to prevent loss of lives

or injuries, his negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe

damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus maing

him una*le to wal and *ecoming disa*led, with his thum* and middle finger

on the left hand *eing cutK.LK"L

3n ! 3cto*er !441, Tua6on f iled a motion to l it igate as a

pauper. -u*se:uently, the trial court issued summons against Atty. Cere6o

and 9rs. Cere6o (Qthe Cere6o spouses) at the9aati address stated in the

complaint. ;owever, the summons was returned unserved on !2 #ovem*er

!441 as the Cere6o spouses no longer held office nor resided

in 9aati. 3n !< April !44", the trial court issued alias summons against the

Cere6o spouses at their address in arangay -ta. 9aria, Camiling,

Tarlac. The alias summons and a copy of the complaint were finally served

on &2 April !44" at the office of Atty. Cere6o, who was then woring as

Tarlac +rovincial +rosecutor. Atty. Cere6o reacted angrily on learning of the

service of summons upon his person. Atty. Cere6o allegedly told -heriff

=illiam Canlas0 Q)unyeta, ano ang gusto mong mangyari6 usto mong

hindi ka makala&as ng &uhay dito6 /eritoryo ko ito. Wala ka sa teritoryo

mo.7 K@L

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/141538.htm#_ftn5


28/55

The records show that the Cere6o spouses participated in the proceedings

*efore the trial court. The Cere6o spouses filed a comment with motion for

*ill of particulars dated &4 April !44" and a reply to opposition to comment

with motion dated !1 Iune !44".K/L 3n ! August !44", the trial court issued

an order directing the Cere6o spouses to file a comment to the opposition to

the *ill of particulars. Atty. 7lpidio . $alera (QAtty. $alera) of $alera and

$alera Eaw 3ffices appeared on *ehalf of the Cere6o spouses. 3n &4

August !44", Atty. $alera filed an urgent ex%parte motion praying for the

resolution of Tua6onOs motion to litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of

new summons on the Cere6o spouses to satisfy proper service in

accordance with the Rules of Court.K5L

3n 12 August !44", the trial court issued an order resolving Tua6onOs motion

to litigate as a pauper and the Cere6o spousesO urgent ex%parte motion. The

order reads0

At the hearing on August 12, !44", the plaintiff KTua6onL testified that he is

presently jo*lessB that at the time of the filing of this case, his son who is

woring in 9alaysia helps him and sends him once in a while +122.22 a

month, and that he does not have any real property. Attached to the 9otion

to Eitigate as +auper are his Affidavit that he is unemployedB a Certification

*y the arangay Captain of his po*lacion that his income is not enough for

his familyOs su*sistenceB and a Certification *y the 3ffice of the 9unicipal

Assessor that he has no landholding in

the 9unicipality of 9a*alacat, +rovince of+ampanga.

The Court is satisfied from the unre*utted testimony of the plaintiff that he is

entitled to prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper under existing

rules.

3n the other hand, the Court denies the prayer in the Appearance and

>rgent 7x%+arte 9otion re:uiring new summons to *e served to the

defendants. The Court is of the opinion that any infirmity in the service of

the summons to the defendant *efore plaintiff was allowed to prosecute his

complaint in this case as a pauper has *een cured *y this 3rder.

f within !@ days from receipt of this 3rder, the defendants do not :uestion

on appeal this 3rder of this Court, the Court shall proceed to resolve the

9otion for ill of +articulars.K


29/55

9rs. Cere6o received a copy of the decision on &@ Iune !44@. 3n !2 Iuly

!44@, 9rs. Cere6o filed *efore the trial court a petition for relief from

judgment on the grounds of Qfraud, mistae or excusa*le

negligence. Testifying *efore the trial court, *oth 9rs. Cere6o and Atty.

$alera denied receipt of notices of hearings and of orders of the court. Atty.

$alera added that he received no notice *efore or during the < 9ay

!44@ elections, Qwhen he was a senatorial candidate for the E +arty, and

very *usy, using his office and residence as +arty #ational

;ead:uarters. Atty. $alera claimed that he was a*le to read the decision of

the trial court only after 9rs. Cere6o sent him a copy.K!!L

Tua6on did not testify *ut presented documentary evidence to prove the

participation of the Cere6o spouses in the case. Tua6on presented the

following exhi*its0

7xhi*it ! % -heriffOs return and summonsB

7xhi*it !%A % Alias summons dated April &2, !44"B

7xhi*it & % Comment with 9otionB

7xhi*it 1 % 9inutes of the hearing held on August !, !44"B

7xhi*it 1%A % -ignature of defendantOs counselB

7xhi*it " % 9inutes of the hearing held on August 12, !44"B

7xhi*it "%A % -ignature of the defendantOs counselB

7xhi*it @ % Appearance and >rgent 7x%+arte 9otionB

7xhi*it / % 3rder dated #ovem*er !", !44"B

7xhi*it /%A % +ostal certification dated Ianuary !1, !44@B

7xhi*it 5 % 3rder dated 'e*ruary Killegi*leLB

7xhi*it 5%A % CourtOs return slip addressed to Atty. 7lpidio

$aleraB

7xhi*it 5% % CourtOs return slip addressed to -pouses Iuan

and ;ermana Cere6oB

7xhi*it < % ecision dated 9ay K12L, !44@

7xhi*it


30/55


31/55

has *een proven that jurisdiction over the other defendants was validly

ac:uired *y the court a quo.

The defendant spouses admit to having appeared in the initial hearings and

in the hearing for plaintiffOs motion to litigate as a pauper. They even

mentioned conferences where attempts were made to reach an amica*le

settlement with plaintiff. ;owever, the possi*ility of amica*le settlement isnot a good and su*stantial defense which will warrant the granting of said

petition.

x x x

Assuming arguendo that private respondent failed to reserve his right to

institute a separate action for damages in the criminal action, the petitioner

cannot now raise such issue and :uestion the lower courtOs jurisdiction

*ecause petitioner and her hus*and have waived such right *y voluntarily

appearing in the civil case for damages. Therefore, the findings and the

decision of the lower court may *ind them.

Records show that the petitioner previously filed with the lower court a

+etition for Relief from Iudgment on the ground that they were wrongfully

declared in default while waiting for an amica*le settlement of the complaint

for damages. The court a quo correctly ruled that such petition is without

merit, jurisdiction having *een ac:uired *y the voluntary appearance of

defendant spouses.

3nce again, it *ears stressing that having availed of a petition for relief, the

remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer availa*le.

ased on the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration could not *e given

due course and is here*y 7#7.

-3 3R7R7.K&2L

Th" Issu"s

3n 5 'e*ruary &222, 9rs. Cere6o, this time with Atty. aga alone

representing her, filed the present petition for review on certiorari *efore this

Court. 9rs. Cere6o claims that0

!. n dismissing the +etition for Annulment of Iudgment, the Court of

Appeals assumes that the issues raised in the petition for annulment is

*ased on extrinsic fraud related to the denied petition for relief

notwithstanding that the grounds relied upon involves :uestions of lac of

jurisdiction.

&. n dismissing the +etition for Annulment, the Court of Appealsdisregarded the allegation that the lower courtKOsL findings of negligence

against defendant%driver anilo 'oronda KwhomL the lower court did not

summon is null and void for want of due process and conse:uently, such

findings of negligence which is KsicL null and void cannot *ecome the *asis of

the lower court to adjudge petitioner%employer lia*le for civil damages.

1. n dismissing the +etition for Annulment, the Court of Appeals ignored the

allegation that defendant%driver anilo A. 'oronda whose negligence is the

main issue is an indispensa*le party whose presence is compulsory *ut

KwhomL the lower court did not summon.

". n dismissing the +etition for Annulment, the Court of Appeals ruled thatassuming arguendo that private respondent failed to reserve his right to

institute a separate action for damages in the criminal action, the petitioner

cannot now raise such issue and :uestion the lower courtOs jurisdiction

*ecause petitioner KhasL waived such right *y voluntarily appearing in the

civil case for damages notwithstanding that lac of jurisdiction cannot *e

waived.K&!L

Th" C#u&t;s Ru%in!

The petition has no merit. As the issues are interrelated, we shall discuss

them jointly.

Remedies Available

to a Party Declared in Default

An examination of the records of the entire proceedings shows that three

lawyers filed and signed pleadings on *ehalf of 9rs. Cere6o, namely, Atty.

aga, Atty. $alera, and Atty. Cere6o. espite their num*er, 9rs. Cere6oOs

counsels failed to avail of the proper remedies. t is either *y sheer

ignorance or *y malicious manipulation of legal technicalities that they have

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managed to delay the disposition of the present case, to the detriment of

pauper litigant Tua6on.

9rs. Cere6o claims she did not receive any copy of the order declaring the

Cere6o spouses in default. 9rs. Cere6o asserts that she only came to now

of the default order on &@ Iune !44@, when she received a copy of the

decision. 3n !2 Iuly !44@, 9rs. Cere6o filed *efore the trial court a petitionfor relief from judgment under Rule 1


33/55

for certiorari , the appellate court may declare void *oth the order of default

and the judgment of default.

Clearly, 9rs. Cere6o had every opportunity to avail of these remedies within

the reglementary periods provided under the Rules of Court. ;owever, 9rs.

Cere6o opted to file a petition for relief from judgment, which is

availa*le #n%y in ")c"pti#na% cas"s. A petition for relief from judgmentshould *e filed within the reglementary period of /2 days from nowledge of

judgment and six months from entry of judgment, pursuant to

Rule 1< of the Rules of Civil +rocedure.K12L Tuason v. Court of

AppealsK1!L explained the nature of a petition for relief from judgment0

=hen a party has another remedy availa*le to him, which may either *e a

motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and

he was not prevented *y fraud, accident, mistae or excusa*le negligence

from filing such motion or taing such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this

petition. ndeed, relief will not *e granted to a party who sees avoidance

from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was dueto his own negligenceB otherwise the petition for relief can *e used to revive

the right to appeal which has *een lost thru inexcusa*le negligence.

7vidently, there was no fraud, accident, mistae, or excusa*le negligence

that prevented 9rs. Cere6o from filing an appeal, a motion for new trial or a

petition for certiorari . t was error for her to avail of a petition for relief from

judgment.

After our resolution denying 9rs. Cere6oOs petition for relief *ecame final and

executory, 9rs. Cere6o, in her last ditch attempt to evade lia*ility, filed *efore

the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the trial

court. Annulment is availa*le only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lacof jurisdiction. f *ased on extrinsic fraud, a party must file the petition within

four years from its discovery, and if *ased on lac of jurisdiction, *efore

laches or estoppel *ars the petition. 7xtrinsic fraud is not a valid ground if

such fraud was used as a ground, or could have *een used as a ground, in a

motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment.K1&L

9rs. Cere6o insists that lac of jurisdiction, not extrinsic fraud, was her

ground for filing the petition for annulment of judgment. ;owever, a party

may avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule "5 only if the

ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or

other appropriate remedies are no longer availa*le through no fault of the

party.K11L 9rs. Cere6o could have availed of a new trial or appeal *ut through

her own fault she erroneously availed of the remedy of a petition for relief,

which was denied with finality. Thus, 9rs. Cere6o may no longer avail of the

remedy of annulment.

n any event, the trial court clearly ac:uired jurisdiction over 9rs. Cere6oOs

person. 9rs. Cere6o actively participated in the proceedings *efore the trial

court, su*mitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The defense of

lac of jurisdiction fails in light of her active participation in the trial court

proceedings. 7stoppel or laches may also *ar lac of jurisdiction as a

ground for nullity especially if raised for the first time on appeal *y a party

who participated in the proceedings *efore the trial court, as what happened

in this case.K1"L

'or these reasons, the present petition should *e dismissed for utter lac of

merit. The extraordinary action to annul a final judgment is restricted to the

grounds specified in the rules. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this

extraordinary action from *eing used *y a losing party to mae a complete

farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long *ecome final and

executory. There would *e no end to litigation if parties who have

unsuccessfully availed of any of the appropriate remedies or lost them

through their fault could still *ring an action for annulment of judgment.K1@L #evertheless, we shall discuss the issues raised in the present petition to

clear any dou*t a*out the correctness of the decision of the trial court.

Mrs. Cereo!s Liability and t"e

Trial Court!s Ac#uisition of Jurisdiction

9rs. Cere6o contends that the *asis of the present petition for annulment is

lac of jurisdiction. 9rs. Cere6o asserts that the trial court could not validly

render judgment since it failed to ac:uire jurisdiction over 'oronda. 9rs.

Cere6o points out that there was no service of summons on

'oronda. 9oreover, Tua6on failed to reserve his right to institute a separate

civil action for damages in the criminal action. -uch contention *etrays a

faulty foundation. 9rs. Cere6oOs contention proceeds from the point of view

of criminal law and not of civil law, while the *asis of the present action of

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34/55

Tua6on is :uasi%delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised

+enal Code.

The same negligent act may produce civil lia*ility arising from a delict under

Article !21 of the Revised +enal Code, or may give rise to an action for a

:uasi%delict under Article &!


35/55

action is clearly for the :uasi%delict of 9rs. Cere6o and not for the delict of

'oronda.

The Cere6o spousesO contention that summons *e served anew on them is

untena*le in light of their participation in the trial court proceedings. To

uphold the Cere6o spousesO contention would mae a fetish of a technicality.K"


36/55

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. an FELI'PANALANAN, plaintiffs%appellants, vs. PHILDAMERICANFOR


37/55

The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether the termsemployers and owners and managers of an esta*lishment or enterprise(due;os o directores de un esta&licimiento o empresa) used in article &!


38/55

SPS. BUENA(ENTURA JAME AN0 ROSARIO JAME, petitioners,vs.

RO0RIO APOSTOL, FI0EL LO/ANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAORFERNAN0O Q. MIUEL, MUNICIPALIT OF *ORONA0AL >NO< CITOF *ORONA0AL?, PRO(INCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, &"p&"s"nt" +yth" MUNICIPAL TREASURER an#& MUNICIPAL MAOR FERNAN0O Q.MIUEL, an THE FIRST INTERATE0 BON0IN AN0 INSURANCECOMPAN, INC., respondents.

0 E C I S I O N

REES, R.T., J.-

9A? a municipal mayor *e held solidarily lia*le for the negligent acts of the

driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrianM

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the ecision! of the

Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the decision of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), +olomolo, Cota*ato City, ranch 14, insofar as

defendant 9ayor 'ernando H. 9iguel is concerned. The CA a*solved 9ayor

9iguel from any lia*ility since it was not he, *ut the 9unicipality of

oronadal, that was the employer of the negligent driver.

Th" Facts

3n 'e*ruary @, !4


39/55

'irst ntegrated onding and nsurance Company, nc., the vehicle insurer, it

insisted that its lia*ility is contri*utory and is only conditioned on the right of

the insured. -ince the insured did not file a claim within the prescri*ed

period, any cause of action against it had prescri*ed.

RTC 0isp#siti#n

3n Ianuary &@, !444, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of spouses

Iayme, the dispositive portion of which reads0

=;7R7'3R7, in view of the foregoing, the defendant 9unicipality of

oronadal cannot *e held lia*le for the damages incurred *y other

defendant (sic) *eing an agency of the -tate performing a (sic)

governmental functions. The same with defendant ;ermogenes -im*ulan,

not *eing the owner of the su*ject vehicle, he is a*solved of any lia*ility. The

complaint against defendant 'irst ntegrated onding nsurance Company,

nc. is here*y ordered dismissed there *eing no cause of action against said

insurance company.

;owever, defendants 'idel Eo6ano, Rodrigo Apostol, and 9ayor 'ernando

9iguel of oronadal, -outh Cota*ato, are here*y ordered jointly and

severally to pay the plaintiff (sic) the following sums0

!. 3ne ;undred -eventy Three Thousand 3ne ;undred 3ne and 'orty

Centavos (+!51,!2!."2) +esos as actual damages with legal interest of !&P

per annum computed from 'e*ruary !!, !4


40/55

.

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Ou& Ru%in!

Th" #ct&in" #$ @ica&i#us %ia+i%ity #& iput" %ia+i%ity $ins n#app%icati#n in th" p&"s"nt cas".

-pouses Iayme contend, inter alia, that vicarious lia*ility attaches to 9ayor

9iguel. ;e was not a mere passenger, *ut instead one who had direct

control and supervision over Eo6ano during the time of the accident.

According to petitioners, the element of direct control is not negated *y the

fact that Eo6ano8s employer was the 9unicipality of oronadal. 9ayor

9iguel, *eing Eo6ano8s superior, still had control over the manner the vehicle

was operated.

Article &!


41/55

held that an employer%employee relationship still exists even if the employee

was loaned *y the employer to another person or entity *ecause control over

the employee su*sists.&& n the case under review, the 9unicipality of

oronadal remains to *e Eo6ano8s employer notwithstanding Eo6ano8s

assignment to 9ayor 9iguel.

-pouses Iayme argued that 9ayor 9iguel had at least supervision andcontrol over Eo6ano and how the latter operated or drove the su6u pic%up

during the time of the accident. They, however, failed to *uttress this claim.

7ven assuming arguendo that 9ayor 9iguel had authority to give

instructions or directions to Eo6ano, he still can not *e held lia*le. n Benson

v. 'orrell ,&1 the #ew 7ngland -upreme Court ruled that mere giving of

directions to the driver does not esta*lish that the passenger has control

over the vehicle. #either does it render one the employer of the driver. This

Court, in 'oliman, Jr. v. /ua3on,&" ruled in a similar vein, to wit0

x x x The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the

security guards assigned to it, #"s n#t, *y itself, &"n"& th" c%i"nt&"sp#nsi+%" as an "p%#y"& of the security guards concerned and lia*le for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those instructions or directions are

ordinarily no more than re:uests commonly envisaged in the contract for

services entered into with the security agency. x x x&@ (7mphasis supplied)

-ignificantly, no negligence may *e imputed against a fellow employee

although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle8s

operation.&/ n the a*sence of an employer%employee relationship

esta*lishing vicarious lia*ility, the driver8s negligence should not *e attri*uted

to a fellow employee who only happens to *e an occupant of the

vehicle.&5 =hatever right of control the occupant may have over the driver is

not sufficient *y itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicariouslia*ility. (andley v. -om&ard i &nfortunately for -pouses Iayme, the

municipality may not *e sued *ecause it is an agency of the -tate engaged

in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is

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42/55

illustrated in "unicipality of 'an Fernando, -a Anion v. Firme,15 where this

Court held0

t has already *een remared that municipal corporations are sua*le

*ecause their charters grant them the competence to sue and *e sued.

#evertheless, they are generally not lia*le for torts committed *y them in the

discharge of governmental functions and can only *e held answera*le only if it can *e shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. n permitting

such entities to *e sued, the -tate merely gives the claimant the right to

show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the

injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions

recogni6ed *y law. 'ailing this, the claimant cannot recover .1<

$erily, lia*ility attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his

direct employer. The CA o*servation along this line are worth restating0

-ettled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and

severally lia*le with the driver for damages incurred *y passengers and third

persons as a conse:uence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the

operator of record continues to *e the operator of the vehicle as regards the

pu*lic and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsi*le for

the conse:uences incident (sic) to its operation x x x.14

The accidental death of 9arvin Iayme is a tragic loss for his parents.

;owever, justice demands that only those lia*le under our laws *e held

accounta*le for 9arvin8s demise. Iustice can not sway in favor of petitioners

simply to assuage their pain and loss. The law on the matter is clear0 only

the negligent driver, the driver8s employer, and the registered owner of the

vehicle are lia*le for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent

operation of the vehicle.


43/55

SPOUSES BENJAMIN C. MAMARIL AN0 SONIA P.MAMARIL, +etitioners,vs.

THE BO SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AIB SECURIT AENC, INC.,CESARIO PEA,G AN0 (ICENTE A00I, Respondents.

7 C - 3 #

PERLASDBERNABE, J.:

This is a +etition for Review on Certiorari assailing the 9ay 1!, &225

ecision! and August !/, &225 Resolution&of the Court of Appeals (CA) in

CA%J.R. C$ #o. 5@45


44/55

n its Answer,5 -+ denied any lia*ility contending that not only did -ps.

9amaril directly deal with A with respect to the manner *y which the

pared vehicles would *e handled, *ut the paring ticet


45/55

3n the matter of damages, the CA deleted the award of +@2,222.22

representing the value of the accessories inside the lost vehicle and

the +&[email protected] a day for loss of income in the a*sence of proof to support

them. t also deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages and

attorney8s fees for lac of factual and legal *ases.

-ps. 9amaril8s motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in the August!/, &225 Resolution.!1

ssues efore the Court

;ence, the instant petition *ased on the following assignment of errors, to

wit0

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n fine, -ps. 9amaril maintain that0 (!) -+ should *e held lia*le for the lossof their vehicle *ased on the Juard -ervice Contract and the paring ticet it

issuedB and (&) the CA erred in deleting the RTC awards of damages and

attorney8s fees.

The Court8s Ruling

The petition lacs merit.

Article &2 of the Civil Code provides that every person, who, contrary to law,

willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter

for the same. -imilarly, Article &!5/ of the Civil Code states0

Art. &!5/. =hoever *y act or omission causes damage to another, there

*eing fault or negligence, is o*liged to pay for the damage done. -uch fault

or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation *etween the

parties, is called a :uasi%delict and is governed *y the provisions of this

Chapter.

n this case, it is undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of -ps.

9amaril8s vehicle was the negligent act of security guards +eNa and Jaddi

in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the su*ject vehicle. +roximate

cause has *een defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous

se:uence, un*roen *y any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury

or loss, and without which the result would not have occurred.!@

9oreover, +eNa and Jaddi failed to refute -ps. 9amaril8s contention !/ that

they readily admitted *eing at fault during the investigation that ensued.

3n the other hand, the records are *ereft of any finding of negligence on the

part of -+. ;ence, no reversi*le error was committed *y the CA in

a*solving it from any lia*ility for the loss of the su*ject vehicle *ased on fault

or negligence.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_179382_2013.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_179382_2013.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_179382_2013.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_179382_2013.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_179382_2013.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_179382_2013.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_179382_2013.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_179382_2013.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_179382_2013.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_179382_2013.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_179382_2013.html#fnt16


46/55

#either will the vicarious lia*ility of an employer under Article &!


47/55

unconditional and uncompensatedB (@) The third person communicated his

or her acceptance of the favor *efore its revocationB and (/) The contracting

parties do not represent, or are not authori6ed, *y the third party.&& ;owever,

none of the foregoing elements o*tains in this case.

t is undisputed that -ps. 9amaril are not parties to the Juard -ervice

Contract.>wphi #either did the su*ject agreement contain any stipulationpour autrui. And even if there was, -ps. 9amaril did not convey any

acceptance thereof. Thus, under the principle of relativity of contracts, they

cannot validly claim any rights or favor under the said agreement.&1 As

correctly found *y the CA0

'irst, the Juard -ervice Contract *etween defendant%appellant -+ and

defendant A -ecurity Agency is purely *etween the parties therein. t may

*e o*served that although the whereas clause

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