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1 Fighting fraud: embedding ownership
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Fighting fraud: embedding ownership · 5 Background to HE Fraud Typical HEI Frauds – Bank mandate fraud –false email/letters stating that suppliers bank details have changed.

May 29, 2020

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Page 1: Fighting fraud: embedding ownership · 5 Background to HE Fraud Typical HEI Frauds – Bank mandate fraud –false email/letters stating that suppliers bank details have changed.

1

Fighting fraud:

embedding

ownership

Page 2: Fighting fraud: embedding ownership · 5 Background to HE Fraud Typical HEI Frauds – Bank mandate fraud –false email/letters stating that suppliers bank details have changed.

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Page 3: Fighting fraud: embedding ownership · 5 Background to HE Fraud Typical HEI Frauds – Bank mandate fraud –false email/letters stating that suppliers bank details have changed.

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Steve Stanbury

I am the Director of Internal Audit at City, University of London since March 2008,

having previously worked as a Senior Audit Manager within Deloitte, PSIA with a focus

on the public sector.

Over 18 years of experience in internal audit, risk management and corporate

governance. In my previous role, I was involved in managing outsourced internal audit

functions within the higher education sector, housing sector and within central

government.

An audit committee member for Goldsmiths, University of London and the Chartered

Institute of Internal Auditors (UK and Ireland).

BA in Politics and Management from Hull University and an MA in Criminology and

Criminal Justice from City, University of London and is a Certified Internal Auditor (CIA),

Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) and a Certificate in Risk Management Assurance

(CRMA).

Page 4: Fighting fraud: embedding ownership · 5 Background to HE Fraud Typical HEI Frauds – Bank mandate fraud –false email/letters stating that suppliers bank details have changed.

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Overview

– Brief background to HE frauds

– Assessment of current position

– Ownership

– Fraud Risk Working Group

– Board reporting

– Lessons learnt?

Page 5: Fighting fraud: embedding ownership · 5 Background to HE Fraud Typical HEI Frauds – Bank mandate fraud –false email/letters stating that suppliers bank details have changed.

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Background to HE Fraud

Typical HEI Frauds– Bank mandate fraud – false email/letters stating that suppliers bank details have changed.

– Misappropriation or theft of cash, stock, or other assets - this might include the theft of stationery

for private use, or the unauthorised use of University vehicles, computers or other equipment

– Purchasing fraud – this can include approving or paying for goods not received, paying inflated

prices for goods and services, or accepting any bribe

– Misstating claims or eligibility for other benefits – such as overstating or making false travel and

subsistence claims

– Accepting pay for time not worked – this can include failing to work full contracted hours, making

false overtime claims, or falsifying sickness

– Record fraud, often via computers - such as altering or substituting records, duplicating or creating

spurious records, or destroying or suppressing them

– Intellectual Property (IP) theft - such as claiming university intellectual property as your own, or

otherwise using or selling university IP for your own personal gain

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Assessment of Current Position

Activity within HE– Sector position – frauds occurring with HE

– Office for Student (regulator) updates

– Peer Group

– Links to anti-fraud community to assess HE vulnerability

– BUFDG self assessment

– Incidents within City?

Page 7: Fighting fraud: embedding ownership · 5 Background to HE Fraud Typical HEI Frauds – Bank mandate fraud –false email/letters stating that suppliers bank details have changed.

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Assessment of Current Position

Self Assessment – Anti fraud arrangements

Page 8: Fighting fraud: embedding ownership · 5 Background to HE Fraud Typical HEI Frauds – Bank mandate fraud –false email/letters stating that suppliers bank details have changed.

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Assessment of Current Position

Self assessment – internal controls and audit

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Assessment of Current Position

Self Assessment – Experience of Financial Fraud

3.1 Is your current assessment that fraud is a low, medium or high risk? Is this an overall assessment? There could be variability of risk rating across different areas.

3.2 Do you believe that there is an effective anti-fraud culture in your organisation, with high levels of fraud risk awareness amongst all staff?

3.3 In the last two financial years how many frauds or suspected frauds have you experienced that were above the HEFCE reporting threshold? How many were below

the threshold?

3.4 If you have trained fraud-response staff (Q1.5), are there any recent instances of these staff being deployed in an investigative capacity?

3.5 Have you disciplined, dismissed or, with the relevant authorities, prosecuted any members of staff for fraud in the period?

3.6 Have you involved the police in any action to deal with suspected or actual fraud in the period?

3.7 Have you reported any frauds, successful or attempted, to NAFN via the [email protected] email address? Have you used the email address to request counter-fraud

advice or advice on running an investigation?

3.8 Do you have grounds to suspect that there have been any other attempts to defraud the University either by staff or by outside organisations such as suppliers in the

period?

3.9 Have you reviewed your fraud policy in the light of any actual frauds you have experienced? Have any gaps in your policy, or failures in its implementation, been

identified and addressed as a result?

Page 10: Fighting fraud: embedding ownership · 5 Background to HE Fraud Typical HEI Frauds – Bank mandate fraud –false email/letters stating that suppliers bank details have changed.

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Ownership

Where to start?

– Audit Committee support obtained

– Buy in from the CFO

– Cross City membership

– Created a group to drive the agenda

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Fraud Risk Working Group

What does the group do?

– The Fraud Risk Working Group promotes

greater awareness of fraud risks within City

and encourages a counter fraud culture to

identify and promote good practice

initiatives, both existing and new.

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Fraud Risk Working Group

Membership

– The Fraud Risk Working Group consists of

relevant senior staff from each business

area (Finance, Research, HR, Procurement,

Estates, Registry, IT, Development &

Alumni, and Internal Audit) and is chaired by

the Chief Financial Officer.

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Fraud Risk Working Group

Clear AimsThe Group will aim to ensure that City and its agents have in place end-to-end processes which

prevent losses due to fraud and, in doing so, reduce substantially the occurrence of fraud and loss.

The Working Group will achieve this by:

– ensuring the development and implementation of appropriate counter-fraud strategies

across all business areas;

– ensuring effective co-ordination and liaison in counter-fraud activity; and

– monitoring the effectiveness of counter-fraud strategies through the development of

appropriate performance indicators and reporting mechanisms.

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Fraud Risk Working Group

First Tasks

– Fraud risk assessment

– Fraud risk map

– Functional area fraud risk registers

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Fraud Risk Working Group

First Task

A Fraud Risk Assessment helps Management understand risks that are unique to its business

activities, identify gaps, weaknesses in controls and priorities of controls to manage those risks

and develop a realistic plan for targeting the right resources and controls to reduce fraud risks.

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Fraud Risk Working Group

Fraud

Risk Map

Page 17: Fighting fraud: embedding ownership · 5 Background to HE Fraud Typical HEI Frauds – Bank mandate fraud –false email/letters stating that suppliers bank details have changed.

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Fraud Risk Working Group

Fraud Risk Register

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Fraud Risk Working Group

Meeting Agendas:

Situation reports from all business areas

– Review of Fraud Risk Map

– Updates on further actions identified in

business area fraud risk assessments

– Issues/fraud arising within functional areas

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Board Reporting

The Chair of the Working Group will provide a synopsis of

key counter fraud issues to the Audit and Risk Committee in

September each year.

A summary of the key activities and developments of the

Working Group will be provided annually to UET and ExCo,

for information. Additional reports will be made if

circumstances require it.

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Lessons Learnt

Ensure you have:– Audit Committee buy-in

– A firm set of actions driven by an assessment

– Establish a group to implement actions

– A group which has cross organisational input

– Formal responsibility to report to management team

– Board level reporting allocated to management

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Contact

[email protected]

+44 7920 055 140

[email protected]

www.spsriskassurance.co.uk

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