Fighting Fire With Fire — Using Hybrid Solutions Against a ...

Fighting Fire With Fire — Using Hybrid

Solutions Against a Hybrid Enemy

By MAJ Ho Jin Peng

October 2020

Fighting Fire With Fire — Using Hybrid Solutions Against a Hybrid Enemy

1

FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE — USING

HYBRID SOLUTIONS AGAINST A HYBRID

ENEMY By MAJ Ho Jin Peng

ABSTRACT

According to the author, hybrid entities are state-sponsored groups which possess training, discipline and

equipment, like state militaries. Where these groups lack high end equipment (e.g. tanks, aircraft), they

compensate with asymmetric tactics of operating in urban environment and exploiting lawfare. When faced with

such a hybrid entity, modern militaries can learn from the enemy and employ a mix of conventional and

unconventional forces. In this essay, the author argues for modern militaries to employ unconventional ‘plain

clothes’ operatives for intelligence and Information Operations, and for conventional forces to employ smaller yet

tighter air-land forces. The author feels that the efficient way to fight hybrid entities is the use of hybrid methods to

fight fire with fire.

Keywords: Hybrid Warfare, Hybrid Entity, Urban Environment, Unconventional, Intelligence

INTRODUCTION

In recent conflicts, the threat of hybrid warfare

has gained prominence due to its efficacy in

undermining the conventional might of modern

militaries. Hybrid entities who are state sponsored

groups, specialise in the use of conventional and non-

conventional means to counter a more superior military

force.1 Such forces have the ability of equalising the

balance of power at a fraction of the cost. This raises

the frustration that developed nations face, where their

multi-billion hardware is unable to quell or stop ‘cheap

tactics’ employed by the hybrid adversary. This essay

will argue that the nature of hybrid warfare is inherently

problematic to modern militaries due to the use of

asymmetric strategies at a large scale and suggests that

the most effective countermeasure against hybrid

adversaries is to use hybrid methods to ‘fight fire with

fire’.

THE NATURE OF HYBRID WARFARE

In an era where conflicts are fought with varying

intensity against a myriad of state and non-state actors,

militaries have found themselves fighting spectrum of

wars which can be categorised in a ‘Capabilities-based

Model’.2 This model proposes three-levels of warfare

which are useful for developed militaries to identify the

means to deal with a threat. The categories are namely

(a) Non-state Irregular, (b) State-sponsored Hybrid, and

(c) State adversaries.

At the lowest end are the irregular adversaries

which have little to no state support. These are typically

the insurgent and terror groups that aim to destabilise a

regime or an area of military control. Examples of these

threats are the Taliban in post-invasion Afghanistan, and

the Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Without direct state support,

these groups lack standoff capabilities, possess only

short-range weapons (i.e. small arms, mortars, Rocket

Propelled Grenade (RPG), Improvised Explosive Devices

(IEDs), etc.), and usually operate in small squads. Such a

threat is capable of acts of terror to induce instability

over a long period of time. To counter such threats will

require the employment of counter-insurgency

doctrines.3

At the highest end are the state adversaries,

where the organisation of regular uniformed militaries

can amass large-scale brigades or divisions. Even at the

lower end of these regular militaries, the amount of

state resource accorded will allow these institutions to

wield a level of sophisticated air defence and stand-off

weaponry (e.g. aircraft, artillery). Dealing with state

adversaries will require conventional doctrine of strike

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and manoeuvre. However, with the widening military

capability between developed and developing states,

the likelihood of lesser equipped militaries winning

conventionally is low. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq was a

good example of this contrast. The might of the

coalition’s superior sensor and shooter capabilities

resulted in a rapid attainment of air superiority and the

subsequent destruction of Iraqi armoured forces. It was

not long before the rest of the Iraqi Armed Forces

collapsed within the 43-day campaign.5 Such examples

revealed the vast disparity in military capabilities, so

much so that the only viable way for the lesser

equipped side to prevail is through fighting a hybrid

war.

In the middle of the spectrum of the capability-

based model are the hybrid adversaries. These are

groups that have state-linked resources, which would

mean that the groups are likely to be well-armed and

well-trained. Where state resources are concerned,

these groups can have similar training, discipline,

cohesion, organisation, Command and Control (C2), and

weapons as a regular uniformed military. A good

example of such a hybrid entity is the Hezbollah in

Lebanon. While Hezbollah ‘doesn’t own planes and

tanks, in every other way its improved capabilities

match those of a medium-level army.’6 As of 2016, the

Hezbollah’s military has around 45,000 ground fighters.

It also possesses capabilities such as mortars, long range

rockets, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guided missiles.

Although groups like Hezbollah are able to wield a large,

well-trained and well-equipped army, being an irregular

entity limits their capability. Without being a regular

military, it is not likely for hybrid adversaries to have the

resources and access to acquire long range air defences,

artillery, armoured formations, or to organise an air

force. This military inferiority of hybrid opponents is

compensated by using asymmetric tactics, such as

complicating the use of standoff fires through operating

in cluttered urban environments, the use of

misinformation and lawfare to shape the conflict as

unlawful, and the use of cheap standoff weapons (e.g.

rockets) to strike a ‘balance of fear’.7

WHY DOES HYBRID WARFARE MATTER?

Hybrid warfare should be examined in detail

because it requires a different manner of warfare than

traditional state on state conflict. The intricacies of

irregular forces frustrate military objectives and denies

the superiority that modern technology provides. The

success of employing hybrid forces was seen during the

2nd Lebanon War. Although the Israel Defence Force

(IDF) was militarily superior, it could not achieve its

objective of halting Hezbollah’s rocket firing. The

conflict showed that Israel, with all its military advances

and impressive military record, could be defeated

Figure 1: Steps in Warfare and Capability.4

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militarily by a lesser equipped entity. Avi Kober, an

analyst, describes this dilemma aptly: ‘It is more logical

to assume that against a regular army of a state, such as

the Syrian Army, where the IDF could make far more

effective use of its technological edge, a battlefield

decision was attainable. Defeating a conventional

opponent is easier for the IDF than winning a war

against a diffused enemy like Hezbollah, just like it is

easier for the United States (US)-led coalition to defeat

Saddam Hussein’s armed forces than to put an end to

the Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) that followed the high

intensity conflict in Iraq.’8

The intricacies of irregular forces

frustrate military objectives and

denies the superiority that

modern technology provides.

The appeal of employing hybrid entities is not just

a phenomenon for irregular groups which receive state

sponsorship. Weaker states might find it profitable to

employ hybrid entities to fight wars against states with

more advanced capabilities. Given the revelation of the

IDF’s inability to win a decisive victory against hybrid

adversaries, ‘the IDF is concerned that Syria may be

adapting, along Hezbollah-like lines, large parts of its

ground forces into hybrid formations with the goal of

presenting an asymmetric challenge to the IDF’s

conventional air and ground prowess.’9 Besides the

Middle East, Russian’s employment of hybrid strategy

was successful during the Annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Due to Russia’s understanding of its relative military

weakness vis-à-vis North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO) forces, Russia had to embark on a hybrid war

during its Annexation of Crimea, with its idea centred

around the philosophy of ‘reflexive control’. The idea

was that Russia could shape the perception of the

situation such that a stronger adversary voluntarily

chooses the action most advantageous to Russia.10 This

is done through denial and deception of Russian

involvement in Crimea while sending ‘little green men’

in uniforms without insignia, as well as the skilful use of

formal and social media to portray the conflict as an

internal affair. In this regard, the use of state sponsored

para-militaries and the effectiveness of the Russian’s

information campaign, denied NATO of a justification to

intervene, and resulted in the inability of NATO forces

to act decisively.

Hybrid adversaries thrive in the urban

environment. This is a natural outcome given that the

biggest challenge which hybrid entities must overcome

is their lack of technological superiority. Advanced

militaries with its Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and stand off precision

munitions have the advantage of fighting in the open.

To deny that advantage, hybrid entities must exploit the

urban terrain as a sanctuary, both to clutter the

airborne sensors, as well as to operate amongst the

populace to prevent strikes. Doing so will force the

developed militaries to fight at close quarter ranges,

soldier to soldier, and exploit the different vantage

points within the urban fortress. In addition, hybrid

entities will exploit the destruction caused to the

populace to bolster their support through an

information campaign.

The inferiority in resources and numbers will also

entail the strategy of protraction. Given that a decisive

force on force battle is not favourable, hybrid entities

will choose to drag out the conflict and wear its

opponents down. As striking at the vanguard is not

favourable, hybrid entities tend to strike at its

opponent’s weak ‘underbellies’. An example is

Saddam’s Fedayeen, a paramilitary group consisting of

over 30,000 volunteers loyal to the Ba’ath regime.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the group put up a stiff

resistance against the coalition forces despite the rapid

collapse of the regular Iraqi Army and the Republican

‘Little green men’ and lorries after the seizure of Perevalne

military base, 9th March, 2014.

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Guard. Without the size to mount a force on force battle

against the coalition forces, they attacked the poorly

defended supplies routes, forcing the coalition to

conduct the slow task of rooting out the group in urban

warfare.

Another common characteristic of hybrid

adversaries is the skilful use of information warfare and

lawfare. Being a non-state actor, not answerable to

international law, it allows them to employ tactics which

would otherwise be ‘unlawful’ for state militaries. For

example, during the 2014 Gaza Conflict, Israeli Prime

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed that ‘Hamas uses

schools, residential buildings, mosques and hospitals to

fire rockets at Israeli civilians,’ a move which the Israelis

condemned as Hamas’ human shield strategy.11

Nonetheless, the incident portrayed the asymmetric

effect of lawfare. On one hand, the Hamas’

indiscriminate rockets firing threatened and harmed

Israeli civilians, which is tantamount to the breach of

the Geneva Convention. On the other hand, operating

amongst the populace forced the IDF to take

exceptional measures in its military campaign to

prevent and minimise non-combatant deaths. Despite

this, Israel was put on a larger spotlight for possible war

crimes due to the sheer number of Palestinian

casualties.12 Such use of lawfare seeks to achieve

military outcomes through the need for state militaries

to maintain the moral high ground and to abide by

international and state laws. This phenomenon arose

because modern popular democracies require a

substantial base of public support to sustain armed

conflict, and ‘that support can erode or even reverse

itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political

objective, if people believe that the war is being

conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.’13

Given that a decisive force on

force battle is not favourable,

hybrid entities will choose to drag

out the conflict and wear its

opponents down.

EMPLOYING HYBRID SOLUTIONS

AGAINST A HYBRID PROBLEM

Since the rise of hybrid warfare stems from the

use a mix of conventional and unconventional means to

counter a developed military, traditional warfighting

doctrines will not prepare soldiers against hybrid

adversaries. Modern militaries need to re-examine their

Map showing location of fighting in eastern Baghdad, March—May 2008.

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doctrine against a hybrid opponent and consider

employing the same hybrid tactics used to counter such

a threat.

Against hybrid entities, employing a large Army is

sub-optimal. Chances are, modern militaries do not lack

fire power or force size against the hybrid enemy.

Rather, the enemy is elusive, and can choose to fight to

its own advantage within the urban environment. Using

fight and flight tactics over time, the hybrid enemy can

slowly attrite modern militaries to the point of

submission. Hence, the most efficient solution is not

through force, but through intelligence. Instead of

sending multiple brigades of combat troops in to the

fray, militaries will fare better by employing a smaller

but more specialised covert force for combat

intelligence. These personnel are ‘plain clothes’

operatives specialising in blending in with the populace

to act as the eyes and ears for the armed forces. Not

only can these personnel collect information, they can

also be trained to call for air strikes. For example, during

the 2008 battle for Sadr City, the coalition forces had to

overcome Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) forces firing rockets into

the ‘Green Zone’. Instead of attacking firing positions

indiscriminately, ‘Brigade intelligence analysts honed

their techniques over time and learned to follow JAM

rocket teams to their source rather than attack them

immediately’.14 Such tactics creates two effects on the

hybrid enemy. Firstly, this will create the perception

that the urban area is equally dangerous for them, as it

is for the conventional military. With a strong

intelligence network nested within the populace, hybrid

enemies can be ambushed and surprised within their

home ground as well. Secondly, the use of ‘plain

clothes’ officers blending into the population creates

mistrust and paranoia between the hybrid enemy and

the local populace, which may pressure them into an

internal conflict. As such, the use of unconventional

‘plain clothes’ soldiers along with regular ones can

overturn the advantage that hybrid adversaries have in

the urban arena.

With the support of an extensive intelligence

network, the role of the conventional military will focus

on targeted offensive operations. That said, operating in

the urban environment will require a different form of

warfighting than fighting in the open. Within the tight

confines of the urban streets, soldiers on the ground

require persistent, responsive, and precise fire support

instead of heavy firepower at long standoff ranges.

Therefore, operating small squads of trained personnel,

armed with airborne ISR and on-call fighter or attack

helicopters may prove to be more effective. In the case

of Israel, the lessons from the 2006 Lebanese war

forced the IDF to improve its warfighting tactics,

particularly in Air-Land integration.15 Firstly, because

urban warfare is weighted heavily on ground forces

fighting at close ranges, the IDF realised that airpower

must be accorded to the lower echelons for responsive

firepower. Secondly, instead of the traditional air

support for ground forces, the IDF started to utilise the

ground force to aid the air force. This was done by

shaping the enemy disposition such that an

unobstructed field of fire was available for the IAF

fighters and attack helicopters.16

Operating in the urban

environment will require a

different form of warfighting than

fighting in the open. Within the

tight confines of the urban streets,

soldiers on the ground require

persistent, responsive, and precise

fire support instead of heavy

firepower at long standoff ranges.

At the Information Operations (IO) and lawfare

front, developed militaries should consider the concept

of employing combat IO units to the battlefield.17 These

IO units are ‘plain clothes’ operatives that specialise in

collecting and creating materials on the ground to shape

the perception of the conflict. Such a tactic can be

extracted from hybrid groups themselves. For example,

the Hamas invited reporters to the battlefield to

document the destruction caused by the Israelis.

However, ‘the last thing it wants is a press corps

reporting both sides of the conflict—documenting not

just the result of Israeli airstrikes but also the Hamas

rockets and missiles that drew Israeli fire in the first

place.’18 Therefore, the Hamas staged the reporters

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through carefully scripted narratives, which helped

shape the media reports through its lens. Learning from

the enemy, the job of the IO battalion is also to

proactively guide reporters to uncover the truths

behind the conflict from the military’s lens. In addition,

in the current era where the use of social media has

bypassed traditional media institutions as a source for

information, the IO units should also cover contents on

the ground as ‘freelance’ reporters.19

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES (SAF)

In order for the SAF to overcome all spectrum of

conflict ranging from conventional to hybrid

adversaries, it might be worthwhile to consider

converting some of the combat forces to Intelligence

and IO outfits that specialises in a conflict against hybrid

entities operating in an urban environment. These

intelligence and IO personnel must be highly trained in

the art of blending in with the populace yet possess the

combat skills to survive and evade. Processes must also

be in place for these forces to co-ordinate with the

uniformed conventional forces in order to work

together and prevent fratricide. As for the conventional

forces, it is worthwhile to review the lessons learnt from

Israel and US to be urban ready when faced with a

hybrid adversary.

CONCLUSION

In summary, Hybrid entities are state-sponsored

groups which possess the training, discipline, and

equipment like state militaries. Where these groups lack

high end equipment (e.g. tanks, aircraft), they

compensate with asymmetric tactics of operating in

urban environment and exploiting lawfare. When faced

with such a hybrid entity, modern militaries can learn

from the enemy and employ a mix of conventional and

unconventional forces. In this regard, this essay argues

for modern militaries to employ unconventional ‘plain

clothes’ operatives for intelligence and IO, and for

conventional forces to employ smaller yet tighter air-

land forces. The efficient way to fight hybrid entities is

the use of hybrid methods to fight fire with fire.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnard, Anne, and Jodi Rudoren. 2014. “Israel Says That Hamas Uses Civilian Shields, Reviving Debate.” The New York Times. 23 July. Accessed 20 Feb, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/world/middleeast/israel-says-hamas-is-using-civilians-as-shields-in-gaza.html.

Beaumont, Peter. 2015. “UN accuses Israel and Hamas of possible war crimes during 2014 Gaza conflict.” The Guardian. 22 Jun. Accessed 20 Feb, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/22/un-accuses-israel-and-hamas-of-possible-war-crimes-during-2014-gaza-war.

E.Johnson, David, M.Wade Markel, and Brian Shannon. 2011. Urban Warfare: The 2008 Battle of Sadr City. Rand Corporation.

Ezra, Ovadia. 2015. “Israel’s Human Shields Defense.” Tikkun, 32-35.

Garden, Timothy . 2003. “Iraq: The Military Campaign.” International Affairs 701-718.

Harel, Amos, and Gili Cohen. 2.16. “Hezbollah - From Terror Group to Army.” Haaretz. 12 July. Accessed 20 Feb, 2018. https://www.haaretz.com/st/c/prod/eng/2016/07/lebanon2/.

Hussain, Murtaza. 2017. “The New Information Warfare.” The Intercept. 25 Nov. Accessed 20 Feb, 2018. https://theintercept.com/2017/11/25/information-warfare-social-media-book-review-gaza/.

Information Operations. n.d. . RAND Corporation. Accessed 20 Feb, 2018. https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html

Johannsen, Margret. 2011. “Asymmetric Threats and Tit-for-Tat Strategies in Gaza.” Journal of Palestine Studies 45-56 .

Johnson , David E. . 2011. “The Relevance of the Israeli Experience for the U.S. Joint Force .” In Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza , by David E. Johnson, 145-182. Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corporation.

Johnson, David E. 2010. Military Capabilities for Hybrid War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Kober, Avi. 2008. “The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?” Journal of Strategic Studies 3-40.

Lambeth , Benjamin S. 2012. “Israel's War in Gaza: A Paradigm of Effective Military Learning and Adaptation.” International Security 81-118.

Lambeth, Benjamin S. 2011. “Introduction.” In Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza, by Benjamin S. Lambeth, 1-11. Rand Coporation.

Otaiku, A. 2018. A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solution. Journal of Defense Management 8, no. 3. doi: 10.4178/2167-0374.1000178.

Ramamurthy, Anandi . 2016. “Contesting the Visualization of Gaza.” Photographies 31–50.

Reisman, W M, and C T Antoniou. 1994. The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflicts. New York: Vintage Books.

Smith, Lee. 2014. “Hamas's Media Strategy.” The Weekly Standard, 1 sep: 8-9.

Snegovaya, Maria. 2015. Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine. Washington, DC : Institute for the Study of War.

ENDNOTES

1. Otaiku, Ayodele A. 2018. A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solution. Journal of Defense Management 8, no. 3. doi: 10.4179/2167-0374.1000178.

2. Johnson, David E. 2010. Military Capabilities for Hybrid War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Pg 5. Accessed from https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP285.html.

3. Discussion of counter insurgency doctrine is out of the scope of this essay.

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4. Johnson, David E. 2010. Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon & Gaza, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP285.html

5. Garden, Timothy . 2003. “Iraq: The Military Campaign.” International Affairs 701-718.

6. Harel, Amos, and Gili Cohen. 2.16. “Hezbollah - From Terror Group to Army.” Haaretz. 12 July. Accessed 20 Feb, 2018. https://www.haaretz.com/st/c/prod/eng/2016/07/lebanon2/.

7. Johannsen, Margret. 2011. “Asymmetric Threats and Tit-for-Tat Strategies in Gaza.” Journal of Palestine Studies 45-56.

8. Kober, Avi. 2008. “The Israel Defece Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?” Journal of Strategic Studies. Pg 38

9. Johnson , David E. . 2011. “The Relevance of the Israeli Experience for the U.S. Joint Force .” In Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza , by David E. Johnson, 145-182. Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corporation. Pg 169 Accessed from https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1085.html

10. Snegovaya, Maria. 2015. Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine. Washington, DC : Institute for the Study of War.

11. Barnard, Anne, and Jodi Rudoren. 2014. “Israel Says That Hamas Uses Civilian Shields, Reviving Debate.” The New York Times. 23 July. Accessed 20 Feb, 2018.

12. Beaumont, Peter. 2015. “UN accuses Israel and Hamas of possible war crimes during 2014 Gaza conflict.” The Guardian. 22 Jun. Accessed 20 Feb, 2018.

13. Reisman, W M, and C T Antoniou. 1994. The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflicts. New York: Vintage Books. Pg xxiv.

14. E.Johnson, David, M. Wade Markel, and Brian Shannon. 2011. Urban Warfare: The 2008 Battle of Sadr City. RAND Corporation. Pg 2. Accessed from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9652.html

15. Lambeth , Benjamin S. 2012. “Israel's War in Gaza: A Paradigm of Effective Military Learning and Adaptation.” International Security.

16. Ibid., Pg 99.

17. According to RAND, Information Operations is the collection of tactical information about an adversary as well as the dissemination of propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent.

Information Operations. n.d. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html

18. Smith, Lee. 2014. “Hamas's Media Strategy.” The Weekly Standard, 1 Sep. Pg 8

19. Hussain, Murtaza. 2017. “The New Information Warfare.” The Intercept. 25 Nov. Accessed 20 Feb, 2018.

MAJ Ho Jin Peng is a helicopter pilot by vocation and is currently a Project

Officer in Ops Development Group, HQ Participation Command. MAJ Ho

graduated from University College London with a Bachelor of Science in

Economics (First Class Honours), and a Master of Science in International

Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, United

Kingdom.