Field Security Brief EISF Content 8 20110310

8/7/2019 Field Security Brief EISF Content 8 20110310

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Flashpoints

Ivory Coast

Location: West, North

Incident: The continuing deterioration in the west of Ivory Coast has seen some local medical personnel desertingtheir health posts. On 3 March a mobile Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) team was also forced to halt its activities inthe north of the Duekoue district because of security concerns. In response, MSF has asked both sides of the conflictto allow its medical teams to care for patients. Meanwhile, UN peacekeeping forces will be reinforced by 2,000 soldiersand have received two combat helicopters to try to prevent the country from entering civil war. Separately, on 7 Marchforces loyal to incumbent president Laurent Gbago ordered the national power company to shut off electricity andwater to the north of the country. Over the preceding days, large scale violence had broken out near the Liberianborder, with NGO personnel reporting at least one shell falling on the Liberian side of the border.

AKE Comment: Gbagbo's defense minister Alain Dogou has repeatedly called for the removal of all UN’s 8,000-strong troop commitment and has accused the UN of arming rebels and becoming a party in Ivory Coast’s conflict.Taken together, the incidents are evidence of an escalation of violence in Ivory Coast, which had previously beenconfined primarily to Abidjan. With Gbago’s support coming from the south and opposition leader Alassane Ouattara’scoming from the north, there have been fears since the election that the crisis could lead to a resumption of civil war.The eruption of fighting outside the de facto capital, along with Gbago’s indiscriminate targeting of the north, indicatesthat this may already be the case. Aid agencies and NGOs should expect increasing violence along the border between north and south as well as in Abidjan. Operations in the north of the country will be hampered by the lack of power and water, and travel between north and south may become increasingly difficult. If violence continues toescalate, internal and external displacement is likely to accelerate, particularly to neighbouring Liberia.

Libya

Location: Western Region

Incident: Two medics working for Red Crescent in Libya were injured while trying to retrieve a body near the town of Misratah. They were hit by shots from a nearby military installation belonging to the Hamza Brigade, a military forceloyal to Colonel al-Gaddafi. It was said to be a deliberate attack on the medical professionals by pro-Gaddafi militaryforces. The workers arrived in full medical uniform and in two clearly marked Red Crescent ambulances.

AKE Comment: Aid agencies are calling for the Libyan government and opposition forces to grant safe passage toviolence-stricken regions of Western Libya. The UN, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other organisations have been unable to reach western Libya because of security risks. Since pro-government forcesassumed control of the border area on 3 March, the number of people crossing Libya's western border into Tunisia hasdropped sharply. This has raised concerns that civilians are facing restrictions on leaving areas of heavy conflictfollowing several days of intense fighting in the western cities of Zawiya and Misrata. Humanitarian organisations havebeen operating freely in eastern Libya where anti-government forces have a greater degree of control.

Location: Benghazi

Incident: A group of armed men entered the Uzo hotel and detained a Jordanian doctor who claimed to be working for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).

AKE Comment: Details of the incident are difficult to verify at present and there is a lot of speculation on the subject.MSF has denied having any of its employees kidnapped. Personnel should note that foreigners are facing heightenedscrutiny in the city following concerns that foreign governments may be attempting to manipulate the situation to their advantage. Many people are concerned at the possibility of pro-Gaddafi elements infiltrating in an attempt todestabilise conditions. NGOs which are clearly visible with recognisable branding are not being subjected to suchscrutiny but individuals who appear out of place are at risk of being detained for questioning.

Sudan

Location: AbeyiIncident: The UN compound in Abeyi was attacked by around 400 young Ngok Dinka while UN officials were meetingwith leaders from north and south Sudan in an effort to stop the latest round of violence engulfing the area. Twelve UN



vehicles were destroyed, and the compound’s fence was set on fire.

AKE Comment: The renewed hostility towards the UN comes as the oil-rich South of Sudan prepares to declareindependence from the north in July after a January referendum. Abeyi, which is still being claimed by both sides,remains an unresolved issue. Abeyi did not take part in the vote in January; a separate plebiscite is promised at anunspecified later date on which side it will join. Rebel leader George Athor is believed to be behind a majority of the

recent incidents. Athor was a senior member of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) - the military wing of themovement that governs southern Sudan - until April 2010 when he took up arms against the state after being accusedof election fraud. Since losing the election for the governorship of southern Sudan’s Jonglei state, he and his forceshave been attacking villages and clashing regularly with the SPLA. While there have been accusations linking thenorth to Athor’s forces, President Omar al-Bashir has previously voiced his acceptance of the referendum, and asenior northern official stated that stability in the south will be a reflection of stability in the north. SPLA spokesmanPhilip Aguer nonetheless believes there to be signs that the northern government is arming militias in an attempt todisrupt the south and maintain control of its oil.

Alerts

Colombia

The remnants of the country’s paramilitary groups have long made life difficult for human rights organisations andadvocates operating in Colombia, seeing their work as an attack on their own work and often that of the governmentas well. The Aguiles Negras, a loose amalgamation of surviving paramilitary groups, recently issued a new threats tohuman rights organisations in which it stated that ‘the time has come to exterminate and annihilate all individuals andorganizations that pass themselves off as human rights defenders.’ Some of those threatened include Liga de MujeresDesplazadas (League of Displaced Women), MOVICE, SINALTRAINAL, MINGA, Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo, CODHES, and Corporación Jurídica Yira Castro.

It is important to emphasise that groups such as these target anyone they see as a threat or an undesirable elementwithin their communities, including suspected homosexuals and refugees, even internally displaced Colombians.Nevertheless humanitarian workers are particularly at risk, not least because they fear that the work of these groupswill expose their links with drug trafficking and a rumoured association with the FARC.

On 7 March Ricardo Alberto Sierra, a prominent human rights advocate, was shot outside his home in Medellin. He isone of many such figures who have suffered a similar fate at the hands of paramilitary groups. In addition to attackssuch as this, paramilitaries conduct massacres with alarming frequency. Last year alone, 179 were reported dead inmassacres, making 2010 the most violent year since the demobilisation process began. Ten massacres occurred inthe province of Cordoba alone in the eight months up unto March 2011. The concerning links between paramilitariesand politicians account for the ongoing delay in confronting such abuses. Violence against humanitarian and humanrights groups in the country will continue for the foreseeable future, with Colombian operatives at the greatest risk.

Trend Watch

Afghanistan

An incident in mid-February in the northwestern province of Faryab is of note to field staff in the west of the country,which is rated by AKE as the most benign region in Afghanistan since an uptick in violence in the north. Unknownattackers wounded a security guard when they targeted the antenna site of an INGO. The motivation for the attack isunclear but the issue of profile is important here; large antennas on assets, particularly vehicles, can give a militaryappearance, which greatly increases the likelihood of targeting. Faryab, along with Badghis, has seen a slightdeterioration of the security environment over the past year and field staff operating there should be aware of theincreased incidence of militancy in the west of the country.

Africa

According to a new report released by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, women in civil society Africaare particularly prone to intimidation, harassment and violence. The report explains that women human rightsdefenders (WHRD) are more prone to intimidation and violence even in countries with ratified laws and protocols on

the protection of women’s rights. The report contains testimonies from activists that outline instances wheregovernment officials and security officials have chosen to silence them, through harassment, threats of closure and



arrests. WHRDs in Kenya, Tunisia and Egypt have reported ongoing intimidation from opponents while in theDemocratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone, WHRDs confront increased levels of sexual harassment andviolence.

Risk MitigationIn light of International Women’s Day on 8 March, the Risk Mitigation section will be dedicated to some specificthreats faced by female field staff, although not exclusively, in hostile or fragile environments.

Rape and sexual assault are used as weapons in hostile environments and should be addressed as a specificcategory of threat. Sexual aggression and rape of both male and female aid workers remains a sensitivesubject and often little attention is dedicated to it in security guidelines. It can be both a by-product of a fragilestate and used as a strategic tool in a hostile environment.

Common motives for sexual aggression in the environments where aid agencies often operate includehumiliation, bonding rituals, a weapon of war used to destroy social bonds and a terror tactic.

It is necessary to establish a risk map of what areas in a region sexual aggression is most commonly used.For instance, those working in the DRC and Papua New Guinea face higher exposure. A focused risk analysismust identify specific places, times, situations and categories of people at high risk. For example, in PortMoresby in the PNG, sexual attacks increase on ‘pay Fridays’ due to the increased consumption of alcohol.Information such as this can be sourced through security focal points at embassies, local female staff, long-term aid workers or expatriates within the community. To reduce vulnerability, it is important to dress andbehave inconspicuously in addition to displaying confidence.

When staying in local hotels or field compounds, normal residence security guidelines should be observed.

• The construction of a building will have an obvious effect on the security of the building.Considerations can be broken down into two categories: internal and external considerations.

• Is the building old or new? Old buildings may be more solidly constructed; but they may also be in a

dangerous state of repair (as indeed might be relatively new buildings)?• The location of the building is of crucial importance. Is it next to a main road? Is it inside acompound? What are its surroundings (for example, are there thick woods surrounding the residence? Is itoverlooked by other buildings?)?

• Perimeter: what sort of physical barrier is there? Is it a sturdy/high fence? Does it afford good

protection? Is it alarmed? What types of alarms are there generally?

• How many entrances/exits are there? How are they controlled? Is there CCTV available? If so, whomonitors the CCTV?

• Do they afford protection? If the entrances/exits are manned, are the men local, and are they

reliable/disciplined?

• Consider the grounds of the building. Is the building located on high ground? Is there any deadground around the building, which will offer a better idea of who is approaching the building?

Field Security Brief EISF Content 8 20110310

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