Fictionalism

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Contemporary Music Review1997, Vol. 16, Part 4 , pp. 41-50Reprints available directly rom he publisherPhotocopyingpermitted by license only

9 1997OPA (Overseas Publishers A ssociation)Am sterdam B.V.Published n The Netherlands

by HarwoodAcademicPublishersPrinted in India

F i c t i o n a l i s m : a n e g l e c t e d c o n t e x t fo r

s t u d i e s i n m u s i c a l s i g n i f i c a t io n

Cynthia M. GrundUppsala Un iversity

The a im of th i s e s say i s two fold: f ir st ly , a pa radoxica l amb igui ty sur ro und ing the na ture

of the s ign which i s unde r inves t iga t ion in mus ica l s igni f i ca tion s tudie s i s i dent i f i ed an d

di scussed, and a mean s of r e solving th is amb igui ty i s provided. Secondly , i t i s sugg es ted

tha t t he phi losophica l point o f v i ew kno wn a s f i c tlona l i sm provid es a na tura l and f ru i t fu l

f r amework for theor i z ing about i s sues of t h i s na ture .

KEY WO RD S M etapho r , coun terfactual , f ic t ional ism, intent ional i ty.

M y i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h s t u d i e s i n m u s i c a l s e m io t ic s b e g a n a s t h e r e s u l t o f s o m e

v a g u e , b u t p e r s i s t en t i n t u i t i o n s t h a t a n a p p r o p r i a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e

w a y i n w h i c h t h e t ra n s f o r m a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g a n d r e a s o n i n g r e q u i r e d f o r t h e

c r ea t io n , c o m p r e h e n s i o n a n d a p p r e c i a t io n o f m e t a p h o r m i g h t 1 . p r o v i d e u s

w i t h t h e e l e m e n t s f o r a t h e o r y a s t o h o w i t i s t h a t w e r e g a r d m u s i c a s s o m e t h i n g

w h i c h " m e a n s " s o m e t h i n g : 2 . h e l p u s t o b e t t e r c o n c e i v e t h e n a t u r e o f th i s

m e a n i n g - r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n m u s i c a n d t h e se " s o m e t h i n g s " ; a n d 3 . h e l p

u s t o f o r m u l a t e a t h e o r y a c c o u n t i n g f o r th e i n t en t i o n a li z i n g m e c h a n i s m s w h i c h

e l e v a t e s o u n d s e q u e n c e s t o t h e le v e l o f m u s i c , t h u s e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e s o n i c

s e q u e n c e s w e s u b s e q u e n t l y h a v e c o n s i d e r e d t o b e m u s i c a s s i g n s o f a v e r y

s p e c i a l s o r t. A f t e r al l, a s R a y m o n d M o n e l l e r e m a r k s :

*Semiot ic s is t he th eory o f s igns , f rom the Greek w ord for s ign, s eme ion. Since mus ic s eems

m e a n i ng f u l - - i t is m or e , a ppa r en t l y , t ha n i ts phys i c a l sounds - - m a ny h a ve t a ke n i t t o

be a s ign. Gino Stefani g oes so f a r a s to s ay " i t does not need dem ons t r a t ing" tha t m us ic

is a sign (Stefani 1974, 280).

( M o n e U e , 1 9 9 2 , p . 1 )



42 Cynth ia M. Grund

We will return to this comment shortly. It will be illustrative during our

discussion of (3), the topic among the three listed above which is most relevant

to the concerns addressed in this essay.

In the process of fleshing out the intuitions which I had regarding the

mechanisms which drive metaphor a nd their subsequent three-fold explanatory

utility for a the ory of musical signification, the initial step w as to formulate

an explicit semantics for metaphor in terms of counterfactuals. Here, metaphors

are recast as counterfactuals, which, in turn, are analyzed semantically in

the style of David Lewis ' possible-world approach. 1The first application of

this work regarding me taphor to things musical musical was indirect; it is

suggested in what ways descriptive and evaluate s ta t em e n t s about m us ic wh ic h

themselves are metaphors ma y be accorded truth value, rather than simply

being dismissed as some sort of pure ly subjective, "unscientif ic" statement s

tinged with only some sort of obscure "real world" meaning, if any at all.

The next application is more central to mus ical significat ion studies; it was

time to see whether or not this formal semantic approach which employed

counterfactuals and possible worlds might, indeed, prove to be a candidate

for a mechanism which can account for a theoretical linkage between the

manner in which metaphors "mean something" and the manner in which

m usic i t se l f "means something". Anyone who has given any thought to the

matter cannot agree with the commonplace that "music is the universal

language", but at the same time, there nevertheless does seem to be some

relationship or other between music and language which is worth investigating.

Note that we are no longer tarrying at the level of statements about music,

inquiring as to whether or not what they say about the music is "true", but

we are descending to the level of the music itself. Examination of somecontemporary attempts2 at formulating a characterization of m usic a l work

revealed that they were too broad; the form ally comp lex, historically grounded,

performance-means-stipulated sonic phenomena which were delineated still

permitted as instances sonic material which I argue we wo uld not wa nt to

callmus/c. In order to remedy this, I purpose some formal versions of a necessary

and sufficient condition for an acoustic phenomenon to be music at/ for a

reference group of agents: **in order for a sequence of sounds to be m usic ,

they must be apprehe nded as or as/ fthe y were something else, i.e. something

which itself is not a sequence of sounds3.

Let's relate this to quote (*) at the beginnin g of this essay. There we read:

"Since music seems meani ngful -- it is, more, apparently, than its physical

sounds m many have tak en it to be a sign." This is a good example of thesubtle fashion, in which the two levels -- sonic material simpl ic i ter vs. sonic

material which is music -- to which we refer in the preceding paragraph

may be conflated. If I may permit myself a little Peirce-terminology here, I

will set the stage for the ensuing discussion in such terms: following the



Fictionalism 43

no t a t i ona l conv en t i ons i n Mo nel l e (1992) , p . 194 , i n any g i ven p i ece o f mu s i c ,

t h e p h y s i c a l s o u n d s c o n s t i t u t e a s i g n S w h i c h ti a s a n o b j e c t O - - " m e a n s

O " - - b y v i r t u e o f a n i n t e r p r e t a n t I . N o w , I it s e lf is a s i g n w h i c h h a s t h e s a m e

o b j e c t O a n d S a n d w h i c h r e q u i r e s a n i n t e r p r e t a n t I , w h i c h , i n it s t u rn , h a s

t h e s a m e o b j e c t O a s S a n d I , b u t w h i c h r e q u i r e s a n d i n t e r p r e t a n t I a n d s o

o n a n d s o o n . M o n e U e p r o v i d e s a d i a g r a m a s a n a i d i n c l a ri f y in g t h e s e

relat ionships (Figure 1 ; cf . MoneUe, 1992, p . 194) :

Figure 1

T h e d i a g r a m c o m m u t e s : S " m e a n s " O t h a n k s t o t h e in t e r p r e t a ti o n p r o v i d e d

b y Iv i t sel f a s ign , so actua l ly S " m e a n s " O t hanks t o t he in t e rp re t a t i on p rov i de d

b y 11, w h i c h i t se l f h a s b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d b y I2 , w hic h i t sel f . . . e tc . , e tc . This i s

a l l w e l l a n d g o o d a s a s c h e m a f o r t h e t h e o r y a s t o w h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n t h e

m e a n i n g r e l a ti o n s h ip b e t w e e n s o u n d s e q u e n c e S a n d w h a t e v e r o b j e c t O m i g h tb e . N o t e , h o w e v e r t h a t t h e s i g n w h i c h i s u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n i s s t il l s i m p l y t h e

s o u n d s e q u e n c e S , a n d aLLo f t h e I 1'~ 2 < i <* ~ d o n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n p r o v i d i n g

t he w here wi t h a l t o u nd er s t an d each I1 .1 , un t i l w e f i na l l y a r r i ve a t I~ , wh i ch

t h e n p e r m i t s u s t o u n d e r s t a n d S a s " m e a n i n g " O . W h e t h e r o r n o t o n e th i n k s

t ha t t h is schema t i za t i on i s ad equ a t e fo r r ep resen t i ng t he com pl ex i t i es i nheren t

i n Pe i r ce 's conc ep t i on o f t he s i gn -ob j ec t - i n te rp re t an t r e l a t i onsh ip , i t i s adequ a t e

f o r u n m a s k i n g a p a r a d o x i n h e r e nt i n a n y s e m i o t ic s y s t e m w h i c h e m p l o y s a

s i gn -ob j ec t - i n te rp re t an t t r i ang l e i n o rde r t o exp l i ca te t he em ergenc e o f mus i ca l

s i gn if i cat ion : e i t her t he s i gn S wh i ch und er d i scuss i on i s a sequenc e o f phys i ca l

s o u n d s w h i c h i s n o t " y e t " m u s i c , o r i t i s a s e q u e n c e o f s o u n d s w h i c h i s already

m u s i c . I n t h e l a tt e r c a s e , m u c h o f w h a t i s t ru l y i n t e r e s ti n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l ly

a n d s e m i o t i c a ll y a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s h o l d i n g a m o n g s o u n d , m u s i c a n dm u s i c a l s i g n i f ic a t i o n h a s b e e n p a s s e d b y s i m p l y s t i p u l a t i n g t h a t t h e s i g n S

is already m u s i c ; i n th e f o r m e r c a s e , s o m e c o m p l e x o f s i g n -o b j e c t i n t e r p r e t a n t

w i ll b e p r o v i d e d a s p a r t o f w h a t e v e r m u s i c i s s u b s e q u e n t l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s

b e i n g , b u t t h e n w h a t e v e r m u s i c t u r n s o u t t o b e , it w i ll h a v e b e e n c h a r a c t e ri z e d



44 CynthiaM. Grund

as being i n h e r e n t l y s i g n i f i c a n t , a move which certainly begs the question as

to whether or not it always is significant.

My contention is thus that this conflation of sound-sequence-as-sign and

music-as-sign is intuitivelyunsatisfyingand, indeed, dangerous to an y serious

theory of musical signification. The suggestion put forth here is that in order

to be regarded as music, a sequence of sounds already mus t be intentionalized,

but not in such a fashion as to " mean" something else -- the relationship

represented in the above diagram w but rather to have beeninflected or gestalted

by so mething else. As a r e s u l t of this process we m ay then regard them as

being m u s i c , which, then, in i t s t u r n may be further interpreted by means

of statements, whethe r the y be matter-of-fact ones or ones of the metaphorical

variety discussed in the above. Indeed, it may even be regarded as a sign,

the inte rpretat ion of which may we ll be amendable to the S-O-I 1, 1 < i < .~.

The upshot of all this is t h a t m u s i c itself is already intentionalized, the result

of an interpretative process enacted upon the sound sequences themselves.

The counterfactua l foun d in the condi tion (**) provide s us w ith a "filter "

which separates out those sound sequences which are music at a communi ty

of reference from those which are not s It is crucial to note that is all it does;

it does not ascribe any e x t r a -m u s i c a l m e a n i n g s to the sound sequences which

make it through the filter - - theoretically, it c a n n o t , since it is instrume ntal

i n c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e music to which extra-musical meanings subsequently may

be ascribed -- nor does it attribute any judgements of value. In fact, it does

not ascribe any extra-sonic meanings whatsoever. It simp ly serves to identify

and characterize them as music. Once identifi ed as music, it then makes sense

to discuss intra-musical relationships involving meaning and reference, to

ponder the presence or absence of extra-musical mean ing and significance,or to discuss judgements of aesthetic value.

The fact that the counterfactual filter simply identifies and characterizes

sound sequences as music as a feature which has some clear theoretical

advantages; for starters, it is possible to draw the distinctions which were

discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The down-to-earth example which

follows, is, to be sure, anecdotal, but, nevertheless, instructive: It is taken

from a discussion which took place at the Eleventh International Congress

of Aesthetics in Nott ingham, held dur ing the late s umme r of 19886 After

presenting him with some of my newly hatched ideas about the counterfactual

foundations of music, Moorhead State University (Minnesota, USA) philosopher

and aesthetician Ted Gracyk told me that, for him, a heuristic for sound

sequences being music was that th ey caused him build buildings in his mind.Buildings, or perhaps better, building processes thus acted as the counteffactual

filter for his separation of music f rom non-music. Subsequently, man y of us

attended a conference event durin g which a concert of traditional and mo dern

Japanese "art" music was given by a group of Japanese musicians. For a



Fictionalism 45

Westerner, the instruments employed as well as the sounds produced on

them were unfamiliar, to say the least. Afterwards, Gracyk reflected that, for

him, there was no quest ionbu t that what he heard was music. The "building

transfer" unmistakably took place: wheth er or not he h ad been given any

prior information as to what he was going to hear, or whether or not he

knew tha t in another culture, this was, indeed, music, he could assert that

it was music for him. This, in spite of the fact that he had no idea how to

value-judge what he had heard, nor the foggiest notion of what sorts of

interpretive or extra-musical meanings were ascribed to this music in the

Japanese tradition.

As gratifying as this Gracyk example might be in light of my emerging

theor~ please note that I am not suggesting that every time we are confronted

with a new sound sequence, we are compelled to subject it to some sort of

test involving counterfactual attribution to determine whethe r or not it is

music. It is obvious that once we are functioning within a cultural reference

group, we may iden tify some soun d sequences as being music and others

as not being music due to w hat we are taught, by recognizing similarities

between a given sound sequence and others that we have termed as "music",

by recognizing certain situations as ones in which the sound sequences

prod uced are usually regarde d as music, etc., etc.; in short, the way we learn

to apply predicat es of any sort in order to organize experience. What is being

suggested here is a 1. theory for what is "at the bottom of it all", a theory

concerned with how such so und sequences might ever become demarcated

in the first place; 2. what is conceptually and philosophically nteresting about

such a demarcation; and 3. how we migh t be able to put together sufficiently

liberal, yet stringent criteria, for how it co uld interestingly be said of beingsquite unlike ourselves - - but equ ipped with somethi ng like ears which can

receive something like sound waves - - that they have music within their

"cultural reference group ".

The questions addres sed in the preceding theoretical presentation in and

of themselves are ones to which the discipline of musical semiotics is, in

general, amenable; the co unterfactual/possi ble-wor ds-semantics approach

had simply suggested itself to me as an interesting way of coming to grips

with these issues~ At the very least, the condi tion (**) which emerged serves

as a means of resolving the paradox of the nature of the sign in musical

signification studies, by providin g a non-si gnify ing mechanis m of

intentionalization for the soun d sequence before it may properly be regarded

as a musical sign.Research which I have carried ou t d uring the past two years, however, has

convinced me that the interest of this approach to musical semioticians need

not only lie in the insights which it may provide here-and-now. Should the

methods which I have proposed be j udged as having any merit whatsoever



46 CynthiaM. Grund

w i t h r e g a r d t o p r o v i d i n g t o o l s f o r f u r t h e r i n g o f o u r i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e t h o r n y

i s s u e s o f m u s i c a l s e m i o t i c s , m o r e i n s i g h t i s w a i t i n g i n t h e w i n g s . T h e r e a r e

s u b s t a n t i v e w a y s i n w h i c h t h is a p p r o a c h d o v e t a i l s w i t h w o r k w h i c h h a s b e e n

d o n e b y s o m e p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o s e w o r k f a ll s w i t h i n a r e a s w h i c h a r e n o t

o f t e n i n c l u d e d w i t h i n t h e p u r v i e w o f m u s i c s e m i o t i c s . S i n c e t h e i r w o r k h a s

b e e n d o n e w i t h i n o t h e r a r e a s o f p h i l o so p h y , s u c h a s e p i st e m o l o g y , m e t a p h y s i c s ,

o n t o l o g y a n d t h e l i k e, it c a n s e r v e t o c o n t r i b u t e b o t h t o t h e i d e a - h i s to r i c a n d

c o n c e p t u a l u n d e r p i n n i n g s o f m u s i ca l s em i o t ic s . I n d e e d , m u c h o f w h a t t h e y

h a v e d o n e m a y b e r e c as t a n d r e i n t e rp r e t e d i n te r m s o f t h e m e t h o d s e m p l o y i n g

c o u n t e r f a c t u a ls a n d i n t e n t i o n a l l o g ic w h i c h I h a v e b e e n p r o p o s i n g . T h e

p h i l o s o p h e r s t o w h o m I a m r e f e r r i n g ar e t h o se w h o a r e r e g a r d e d a s a d v o c a t e s

o f th e p h i l o s o p h ic a l v i e w k n o w n a s f i c ti o n a l is m . T h e n a m e w h i c h i s p e r h a p s

m o s t c l o s e ly a ss o c i a t e d w i t h t h i s m o v e m e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y i s t h a t o f H a n s

V a i h i n ge r , a u t h o r o f D i e P h i lo s o p h ie d e s A l s Ob, f i r s t pu b l i s hed in 1911 . Va ih in ge r

h a d a l m o s t n o t h i n g t o s a y a b o u t f i c ti o n a li s m a n d a e s t h e ti c s , w h e r e a s S w e d i s h

p h i l o s o p h e rs A l l N y m a n a n d R o l f E k m a n , b o t h i n f l u e n c e d b y V a i hi ng e r, d i d .

A l t h o u g h n o n e o f t h e s e p h i l o s o p h e r s e x p l i c it l y a p p l i e d f i c t io n a l i s m t o p r o b l e m s

o f m u s i c a l m e a n i n g , N y m a n p u b l i s h e d a l o n g p a p e r i n 1 92 2 en t i tl e d " M e t a p h o r

O c h f i k t i o n " w h i c h p r o v i d e s e n o u g h e x p l ic i t c o n c e p t u a l b r i d g e w o r k t o

e s t a b l i sh c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n h i s f ic t i o n a li s t a p p r o a c h t o m e t a p h o r a n d m y

c o u n t e r f a c t u a l / i n t e n t i o n a l l o g ic o n e , s o t h a t t h e e x t r a p o l a t i o n o f a f i c ti o n a li s t

a p p r o a c h t o a f o u n d a t i o n f o r m u s i c a l s ig n i f i c a t io n s t u d i e s w h i c h r e s e m b l e s

m y s u g g e s t e d a p p r o a c h i s, I f ee l , l e g i t i m a t e d .

S i n c e t h e s t a t e d p u r p o s e o f t h i s e s s a y i s t o a r o u s e i n t e r e s t a m o n g s t u d e n t s

o f m u s i c a l s i g n i f i c a t i o n f o r f ic t i o n a l i s m , i t is o f i n t e r e s t t o n o t e t h a t , a l t h o u g h

i t h a s b e e n n e g l e c t e d i n s t u d i e s o f m u s i c a l s i g n i f i c a ti o n , i t is a s o r t o f s e c o n d -c o u s i n o f p r a g m a t i s m , t h e p h i l o s o p h ic a l m o v e m e n t o f w h i c h P e ir c e w a s a

l e a d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , a l o n g w i t h J a m e s . T h e f i c t i o n a l is m d i s c u s s e d h e r e

w a s a m o v e m e n t s p a n n i n g r o u g h l y f r o m t h e e n d o f t h e 1 9 th c e n t u r y t h r o u g h

t h e e n d o f W o r l d W a r 2 7. V a i h i n g e r w a s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y a c ti v e d u r i n g P e i r ce ' s

l i f e ti m e a n d a l t h o u g h t h e r e a r e i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s, h i s f i c t i o n a l is m m a y

i n m a n y r e s p ec t s b e r e g a r d e d a s a n e x t r em e f o r m o f p r a g m a t i s m . I n d e e d ,

i n K o n r a d M a r c - W o g a u ' s S w e d i s h d i c t i o n a r y o f p h i lo s o p h y e n t i tl e d Fi loso f i sk

U p p s l a g s b o k , t h i s i s p r e c i s e ly t h e w a y i n w h i c h f i c t i o n a li s m is c h a r a c t e r i z e d

i n t h e " V a i h i n g e r " e n t ry . V a i h i n g e r h i m s e l f s a y s i n T he p h i l o s o p h y o f " a s if " ,, , ,

p . v m :

Fictionalism does not ad mit the principle of Pragmatism w hich runs: " A n idea which isfound to be useful in practice proves thereby that it is true in theory, and the fruitful isthus always true". The principle of Fictionalism, on the other hand , or rather the outcomeof Fictionalism, s as follows:"An idea whose theoretical ruth or incorrectness,and therewithits falsity, is admitted, is not for tha t reason practically valueless and useless; for such an



Fictionalism 47

i d e a , i n s p i t e o f i t s t h e o r e t i c al n u l l i t y m a y h a v e g r e a t p r a c t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e . B u t t h o u g h

F i c t i o n a l i s m a n d P r a g m a t i s m a r e d i a m e t r i c a l l y o p p o s e d i n p r i n c i p l e , i n p r a c t i c e t h e y m a y

f i n d m u c h i n c o m m o n . T h e y b o t h a c k n o w l e d g e t h e v a l u e o f m e t a p h y s i c a l i d e a s , t h o u g h

f o r v e r y d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s a n d w i t h v e r y d i f f e r e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s .

( V a i h i n g e r , 1 9 3 5 , p . v i i i )

T h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e t w o s c h o o l s o f p h i l o s o p h y i s s o m e w h a t m o r e

t r e n c h a n t l y e x p r e s s e d b y N y m a n :

Fa lsk t , m e n f6 rm Knl ig t ! vore d~i r fae r ikt ions l~ i rans fo rm el , unde r d e l ta a t t p rag m a t ism ens

sku l le lyda : f6 rm ~nl ig t , s~ i lunda i iven san t ! Det ta b l i r f r ik t ionspunkten m el lan de b / ida

b e f r y n d a d e f i l o s o f e m e n , o c h g e n o m a t t f ra m h /k l l a d e n , h a r o c k s ~ f i k t io n s l i i r a n s

o r i g i n a l i t e t s p u n k t b l i v i t f r a m h i i v d .

( N y m a n 1 9 2 7 , 7 7 . )

( F a ls e , b u t b e n e f i c i al ! w o u l d b e f i c t i o n a li s m ' s f o r m u l a , w h i l e p r a g m a t i s m ' s w o u l d r u n :

b e n e f i c ia l , t h u s a l s o t r u e ! T h a t s t i l l r e m a i n s t h e p o i n t o f f r i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o r e l a t e d

d o c t r i n e s, a n d b y c a l l i n g a tt e n t i o n t o i t , t h e c r u x o f f i c t i o n a l i s m ' s o r i g i n a l i t y is b r o u g h t

ou t . )

( T r a n s l a te d b y C M G )

L e t u s n o w m o v e t o t h e w o r k o f V a i h i n ge r , in o r d e r t o g e t a c l e a r e r n o t i o n

o f j u s t w h a t s o r t o f t h i n g a f i c t i o n i n t h e V a i h i n g e r i a n s e n s e i s:

. . . our sub jec t i s the f ic t ive ac t iv i t y o f the log ica l func t ion ; the p rod uc ts o f th is ac t iv i ty - -

f ic t ions . . .

B y f ic t i v e a c t i v i t y n l o g i c al t h o u g h t i s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d t h e p r o d u c t i o n a n d u s e o f l o g i c a l

m e t h o d s , w h i c h w i t h t h e h e l p o f a c c e s s o r y c o n c e p t s - - w h e r e t h e i m p r o b a b i l i t y o f a n y

c o r r e s p o n d i n g o b j e c t iv e i s f a i r l y o b v i o u s - - s e e k t o a t t a i n t h e o b j e c t s o f t h o u g h t . I n s t e a do f r e m a i n i n g c o n t e n t w i t h t h e m a t e r i a l g i v e n , t h e l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n i n t ro d u c e s t h e s e h y b r i d

a n d a m b i g u o u s t h o u g h t - s t r u c t u r e s , i n o r d e r w i t h t h e i r h e l p t o a t t a i n i t s p u r p o s e i n d i r e c t l y ,

i f t h e m a t e r i a l w h i c h i t e n c o u n t e r s r e s i s t s a d i r e c t p r o c e d u r e . W i t h a n i n s t i n c t i v e , a l m o s t

c u n n i n g i n g e n u i t y , th e l o g i c a l f u n ct i o n s u c c e e d s i n o v e r c o m i n g t h e s e d i f f ic u l t ie s w i t h t h e

a i d o f i t s a c c e s s o r y s t r u c t u r e s. T h e s p e c i a l m e t h o d s , t h e b y - p a t h s o f w h i c h t h o u g h t m a k e s

u s e w h e n i t c a n n o l o n g e r a d v a n c e d i r e c t l y a l o n g t h e m a i n r o a d , a r e o f m a n y d i f f e re n t

k i n d s , a n d t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n i s o u r p r o b l e m . T h e y o f t en l e a d t h r o u g h t h o r n y u n d e r g r o w t h ,

bu t log ica l though t i s no t de te r red thereb)6 even though i t m ay lose som eth ing o f i t s c lea rness

a n d p u r i t y . I t i s r e l e v a n t a l s o t o r e m a r k h e r e t h a t t h e l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n , i n i t s p u r p o s e f u l

ins t inc t ive ingenu i ty , cancar ry th is f ic t ive ac t iv i ty f rom the m os t innocen t and u npre ten t iou s

b e g i n n i n g s o n t h r o u g h e v e n f i n e r a n d s u b t l e r d e v e l o p m e n t s r i g h t o r t o t h e m o s t d i f f i c u l t

a n d c o m p l i c a te d m e t h o d s .

( V a i h i n g e r , 1 9 3 5 , p . 1 3 )

A s t h e f o r e g o i n g i n d i c a t e s , V a i h i n g e r w a s n o t o n e t o s h r i n k a t t h e p r o s p e c to f d o i n g i n t u i t i v e l y s a t i s f y i n g s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s a s l o n g a s o n e w a s

a w a r e o f w h a t o n e w a s d o i n g . A r m e d w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e s e l f - a w a r e n e ss a n d

t h e p r e c e d e n t s s e t b y V a i h i n g e r i n t h e a n a l y s i s o f th e w a y s i n w h i c h s c ie n t if i c



48 C y n t h i aM. Grund

and mathematical theories are grounded, one might say that we here have

embarked on a like-minded project which seeks to identify and formulate

some steps which need to be taken to constitute the musical sign which we

ma y then e ndea vor to ana lyze semioticaUy. The result is a theory whic h account s

for the appropriate intentionahza tion of soun d sequences prior to a discussion

of whatev er semiosis in which they may be theorize d to take part. Indeed,

fictionalism seems to be a natural conceptual fram ework in which to embed

at least some important parts of the theory which has been proposed here

for the nature of the sign under investigation in musical signifidation studies.

The schem a for the fictions of interest in this respect is tha t of "c~ - t h e - x , "

wher e c~ is a sou nd sequen ce a nd x is some elemen t of a class T of non-s onic

objects, the "someth ing-else" to which reference was m ade earlier in the essay.

The analysis of this "pre-semiotic" activity which we posit as necessary and

sufficient for the elevation of mere sound to music -- so that in fact, we

ultimately come to deal with music-as-sign, rather than with mere sound-

as-sign -- may be usefully unde rstoo d in terms of such fictions and in terms

of the Vaihingerian distinction between a r t if i c es a n d r u l e s :

We make a distinction between rules and artifices of thought. In other functions also thisdistinction is of value; the rules are the totality of all those technical operations in virtue

of which an activity is able to attain its object directly, even when more or less complicated.

In logic too we call such operations, and in particular those of induction, "rules of thinking".

The artifices, on the other hand, are those operations, of an almost mysterious character,

which run counter to ordinary procedure in a more or less paradoxical way. They are

methods which give an onlooker the impression of magic if he be not himself initiated orequally skilled in the mechanism, and are able indirectly to overcome the difficulties which

the material in question opposes to the activity. Thought also has such artifices; they arestrikingly purposive expressions of the organic function of thought.

(Vaihinger, 1935, p. 11)

In conclusion, it is instructive to compar e Vaihinger's comme nts a bout the

differences between artifices and rules in the above quote and the way in

which the role of the counterfactual filter has been contrasted with that of

the semiotic correspon dences earlier in this essay. The use of the counterfactual

filter, the "something else which itself is not a sequence of sounds" it (**)

would seem to fit readily into the category of a r t i f i c e in this Vaihingerian

scheme of things, whereas the kinds of correspon dences sketched within a

semiotic triangle structure are natural candidates for r u l e s . Indeed, the

contentions expressed in the first part of this essay may be recast in this

fashion by s aying that semiotic analysis relies far too exclusively on the useof r u l e s i n its investigation of musical signification and the inclusion o f a r t i f ic e s

among its theoretical equipment would be of value.





5 0 C y n t h i a . G r u n d

G r u n d , C y n t h i a M . ( 1 99 5 ) H o w p h i l o s o p h i c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s o f a m u s i c a l

w o r k l o s e s ig h t o f t h e m u s i c a n d h o w i t m i g h t b e p u t b a c k . I n T a ra st i, E e r o

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G r u n d , C y n t h i a M . ( f o r th c o m i n g b ) J e r e m y B e n t h a m ' s t h e o r y o f f ic t io n s : s o m e

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to the In te rna t iona l Doc tora l and Pos t -Doc tora l Seminar o n M us ica l Semiot ics ,

N o v e m b e r 2 - 7 , 1 9 9 2, D e p a r t m e n t o f M u s ic o lo g y , U n i v e r s it y o f H e l s i n k i

Kurk e la , Kar i (1986) No te and tone: a semantic analys is o f conventional m usic

notation. Acta Musicologica Fenn ica, 15. Hels inki : Suo me n Mus ikki i t i e t ee ll inen

S e u r a

L e v i n s o n , J e r ro l d ( 1 98 0 ) W h a t a m u s i c a l w o r k i s . Journal o f Philosophy. 77/1,p p . 5 - 2 8

Lewis , David (1973) Counterfactuals. C a m b r i d g e , M a ss .: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y

Pres s

Lewis , D avid (1983) Truth in f i c t ion . In Vol . 1 of Philosophical Papers. N e w

York: Oxford Univers i ty P res s , pp . 261-275 ( f i r s t publ i shed in American

Philosophical Quarterly, 15, 1978, pp . 37-46)

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32 5

M o n e l l e, R a y m o n d ( 19 92 ) Linguistics and semiotics in music. C h u r: H a r w o o d

N y m a n , A l f . ( 19 2 2) M e t a f o r o h f i k t io n . Lunds Universitets •rsskrift A v d . 1 B d18. Nr 6 . Lund: C .W.K. Gleerup , pp . 3-81

N y m a n , A l f ( 19 2 7) Nutids t i~nkande. Lur id : C .W.K. Gleerup

R a n t a l a, V e i k k o ( 19 8 8) M u s i c a l w o r k a n d p o s s i b l e e v e n t s . I n V e i k k o R a n t a l a ,

L e w i s R o w e l l a n d E e r o T a r a s ti ( e d s .) Essays on the phi losophy o f music , Vol.

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o f F i n l a n d

R a n t a l a , V e ik k o ( 1 99 1 ) T h e w o r k o f a r t: i d e n t i t y a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Semiotica

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S t e f a n i , G i n o ( 1 9 7 4 ) P r o g e t t o s e m i o t i c o d i u n a m u s i c o l o g i a s i s t e m a t i c a .

International Revie w of the Aes thetics and Sociology of M usic , 5/2, pp . 277-89

T o r m e y , A l a n ( 1 9 8 3 ) M e t a p h o r s a n d c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s . I n Jo h n F i s h e r ( e d .)

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Fictionalism

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