FFI study – Military technology trends with special ... · FFI study – Military technology trends with special emphasis on maritime conditions Dr. Tom Arild Blix Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt

FFI study – Military technology trends with special emphasis on maritime conditions

Dr. Tom Arild BlixForsvarets

forskningsinstitutt

Outline

• Technology trends and related driving forces

• MilTek-report

• Future technological developments– Network Based Defence (NBD) under water– The autonomous challenge– Future capacities for the Norwegian frigates– Participation in NATO study of future technology

• Summary

Driving forces

Reduced accept for loss of lives and collateral damage

The Cold War is over

Wish of continued relevance to military power

New tasks for military force

New requirements:- Long-range precision weapons- Information superiority- Unmanned platforms- Force protection

Commercial interests (military and civilian)

Civil development within different basic technologies (ICT, nano, bio, ...) etc.

11. September

Existing advanced systems

Phased array radarPhased array radar

Night visionNight vision

Adaptive opticsand lasers

Adaptive opticsand lasers StealthStealth

GPSGPS

MilTek-report

• Land-based platforms and their subsystems• Naval platforms and their subsystems• Air-based platforms and air-launched weapons• Missiles• Space activity• ARBC-weapons and -protection• Directed energy weapons, RF-, Navigation- and EO-sensors• Info-ops and electronic warfare• C3I-systems• Logistics (Total Asset Visibility – TAV)• Miscellaneous

• Eggereide B, Kråkenes T, Meland B J, Schjelderup T-E, Wahl T (2005): Tek14: Militærteknologiske trender – Oversiktsrappor t 2004, FFI/RAPPORT-2004/03954 (http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2004/03954.pdf)

NBD under water

Main elements:• Communication (under water, to the surface and to elevated

platforms• Sensor technology

NBD under water (barrier concept, Canada)

NBD under water

Consists of sensors on the surface and at the bottom (communication,magnetometers, acoustic sensors, potential detectors etc.)

NBD under water

Newly deployed system After a few days

NBD under water (some potential range of use)

• Communication between submerged units (and to the surface)

• Area surveillance (harbours, inlets etc.)

• May replace/supplement already existing capacities

Maritime (littoral) warfare

AUV systems (HUGIN)

HUGIN from the Ormen Lange field, The North Sea

Ca. 2x2 km; the peaks are 30-50 m high

Courtesy of Norsk Hydro ASA

Sigsbee Escarpment - Gulf of Mexico

Courtesy of BP Amoco

Range 30-170m Range 45-80m

HISAS prototype: Submarine wreck

• AUV Role:– Conduct covert precise area/bottom survey of

multiple approaches to landing zones– Preserve multiple options and enhance

operations planning– Use fully autonomous or semi-autonomous

mission profiles – Post mission data processing complete in the

time it takes to recharge the battery (2-6 hrs)– Optimize search rate (2-3 nm2/hr per AUV)

• Scenario Overview:– Enemy access denial capability includes mines– Assault force must breach– JFMCC must find/ create mine-free fleet operating

areas– Timeline is tightly coupled with other Joint ops– Conduct IPB without alerting enemy to possible

assault location or time

• AUV Impact:– CSG/ESG commander keeps assets out of

the minefield– Minimizes time-to-ID and map threat– Compresses the MCM timeline– Enemy not aware he is being surveyed– Enables better decision making and keeps

multiple courses of action (COA) open

Mine Countermeasures / ISR

AUV ASW Gatekeeper

• AUV role: – Persistent ASW sensor for fleet ASW mission

- Operate undetected near or within sensitive areas

- No crew risk.- Provide persistent ISR and high endurance- Report detections to ASW attack units- Provide bottom search BDA capability

– Search near enemy sub base, and along sortie, transit routes

– Detect at standoff range from US forces and release RF buoy with contact report

• AUV Impact:– Early detection due to optimum sensor position– Improved situation awareness– Complements ASW search capability of other

strike force assets (air, surface, sub)– AUV sensor data rapidly available in host surface

combatant’s Mission Control Center (MCC), linked to commanders via FORCEnet tactical data links

– Compatible with future surface ship launch and recovery systems to increase availability

– Fast mission turnaround time supported by containerized support and parts stowage (2 X TEU)

• Scenario Overview:–This is a “hold at risk” ASW scenario–Adversary submarines have multiple port egress

routes–JFMCC wants persistent surveillance without the

provocative/overt presence of US forces–Battlespace too shallow and too risky for SSN–Objective is to detect and engage adversary at

standoff range from Sea Base

Undersea surveillance support usingAdvanced Deployable Systems (ADS)

• AUV role: – ADS Mission Planning Support – Provide survey data for precise deployment of

seabed components – Produce Digital Terrain Model (DTM) and

contour map to determine ADS placement– Assist in ADS deployment– May be used to shuttle information from ADS

covertly

• AUV Impact:– Adds capability for Intelligence Preparation of

the Battlefield• High quality and high resolution

oceanographic and bathymetric data obtained quickly and clandestinely

– Reconfigurable AUV sensor package can complement fixed surveillance array

– Reduced risk to manned platforms

• Scenario Overview:– Joint Force Commander needs continuous

undersea surveillance of a key adversary submarine egress area

– Optimum ADS placement requires bathymetric and oceanographic survey

– Clandestine survey required to support both political and military objectives

SSGN and SEAL/ASDS Operations

• AUV role: – Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS)

Mission Planning Support– AUV transits/operates covertly– High resolution survey data for precise SSGN

deployment and ASDS mission planning– Produce Digital Terrain Model (DTM) and

contour map– Host platform transfer DTM and contour map

to SSGN/ASDS mission planners

• AUV Impact:– Enhances SOF survivability, reduces risk– Contributes to SOF “Mission Assurance”– Clandestine surveillance preserves the element

of surprise– Compatibility with surface combatant launch,

handling and recovery systems

• Scenario Overview:– Clandestine insertion of SOF for Special

Reconnaissance (SR) Mission– Local geography and charts do not support

ASDS route planning– JSOTF Commander wants intel and bathymetric

data to reduce risk– Clandestine survey operation

The Frigates main armament

NSM

Hull mounted SONAR

VLS (ESSM)

SPY-1F

Tug antenna SONAR

NH-90 w/dip sonar and torpedo

Oto Melara(76 mm)

Stingray Torpedo

New sensor capacities

• Surveillance of close range area

– Within coverage area of SPY-1F

– In littoral waters where SPY-1F may be less suitable

• IRST/Fire control radar– Improved tracking precision

• ESM

– SIGINT– COMINT

• Multi static sonar operations

– Covert receivers, less interference, various aspect angles

– Frigate-to-frigate, Helicopter-to-frigate

Fire control radar with electro optical foresight

New self-defence capacities

• Close-in Weapon System– Machine gun (1000-3000 rounds/min)– Short range missile

• New types of decoys– Nulka active dispensable off-board

decoy.• Improved soft-kill launcher capacity

– Separate launchers for torpedo- and missile decoys.

– Manoeuvrable launchers• Hard-kill torpedo counter strike

Nulka off-board decoy

Oerlikon Millenium machine gun

RAM short range missile

New weapon capacities

• Land attack missile– Improved NSM– Tactical Tomahawk

• Area defence– Standard Missile 2

• Anti-submarine weapon– New light weight torpedo (Stingray mod 1, MU-90)– ASROC: missile delivered light weight torpedo– Low cost AU-weapon

New weapon platforms at sea

Must something be taken out of the structure?

Preliminary Ideas of System (IoS) cards

• Sub-sea NCW• MPA + UAV in maritime surveillance• High Energy Laser on ships• Portable translator• Autonomous intelligent platforms and

systems• Tactile vests• Portable security systems and

sensors• Dazzling laser (blue force)• High Power Microwave (red force)• Platform based High Power

Microwave (blue force)• HPM projectile (blue)• Remote weapon stations

• Unmanned ground verhicles with sensors

• Personal robots• Future Soldier Systems• (Constellation of) micro satellites • Radiometric sensors for security

(camera through clothes)• Launch and recovery from sea

platforms (UAVs) • Launch and recovery from sea

platforms (UUVs)• Decision support including cognition • Health monitoring systems• Camouflage system for soldiers• Multi-static sonar• Underwater sensor systems

SAS TG-062 “Assessment of Technologies with a disru ptive effect on Defence and Security”

2. Critical Performances of the IoS

• Levels of performance involving an operational stat e:The system must accept all classes of UUV:

• Man-portable• Light weight• Heavy weight• Large vehicle (incompatible with the use of a torpedo tube)

A minima, the system must allow launch and recovery operations in the following conditions:• Ship in hovering mode• Depth between 45 and 60 m (Shallow water operations)• Sea State 3

Minimal impact on existing UUV or submarines (possibility to retrofit existing systems).

3. State of Art of the capability concerned by the IoS• Current systems:NMRS (Near Term Mine Reconnaissance System) program completed (US): Torpedo launch and recovery for tethered vehicles.

• The UUV backs out of the tube under its own power. Outside the submarine, coupled to it via a steel cable and drogue assembly, it is towed to its mission area. The UUV then releases from the drogue; a fiber optic cable begins to pay out from drogue and vehicle, and the UUV independently transits and conducts its mission. When the mission is finished, the UUV rendezvous and mates the drogue. A winch located in the torpedo room pulls the complete combination back into the tube. • Dry deck shelter (US).

• Armament programs in progress:• LMRS (Long Term Mine Reconnaissance System) program (US): Torpedo launch and recovery for untethered vehicles.

• Two torpedo tubes are used, the lower one for the UUV, the upper one for a recovery arm. The UUV is impulse-launched. The UUV is programmed to acoustically home and dock to the recovery arm using high frequency sonars. Once the UUV is docked, the recovery arm manipulates it back into the lower tube, where it is retrieved, backhauled and ultimately refurbished for reuse.• Sea trials in 2005.

• PLUSNet program (US): ULRM (Universal Launch and Recovery Module) missile tube launch and recovery (See figures above: principal components, sequences of a typical retrieval operation).

• The UUV and the launch and recovery mechanism are housed in the same tube.• Feasibility study completed.

• SUBROV (SE): A ROV, launched from a torpedo tube and equipped with a gripping tool allowing it to be used to dock with an incoming UUV. The ROV can then move the UUV into a torpedo tube for recovery.

I - 022

Idea of System : UUV launch and recovery from a submarineUrbanAsymmetric

1. Description and Operational Interest

The deployment of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) by a submarine has the potential to extend the capabilities of submarines while reducing the risk for the crew and the platform significantly during difficult operations. Covertness plays a major role which makes it necessary to launch and recover the vehicle submerged during the whole mission.• Main Components:� House of the UUV� Stowage / handling subsystem� Interface handling subsystem / UUV• Operational capability concerned by the IoS:Utilization of UUV from submarines:

� lntelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance� Mine Countermeasures� Anti-Submarine Warfare� Inspection / Identification� Oceanography� Communication / Navigation Network Nodes� Payload Delivery� Information Operation� Time Critical Strike

• Conditions of use:• No restriction of area: shallow water operations must be envisaged.• Reactivity.• Expected effects:Easy, quick and reliable implementation of UUV aboard submarines, with reduced manning.• Possible indirect impacts on other operational capa bilities or doctrines :UUVs change the rules in naval warfare.

Land Navy X Air

SUBROV

Recovery arm

ULRM Dry deck shelter

Scenario – Zoran Sea Crisis

Summary

• Todays platforms, systems etc. are al a result of yesterdays development!

• It is important to perform a vigilant and continuous survey of the technological development, especially on the civil sector.

• Cooperation between countries is an important and necessary tool to gather information on the technological development and trends as early as possible.