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Future Electric Utility Regulation Advisory
Group Meeting
March27,2014
FutureElectricUtilityRegulationSeriesReport#8:RegulatoryIncentivesandDisincentives
forUtilityInvestmentsinGridModernizationMay31,2017
SteveKihm – SeventhwaveJaniceBeecher– InstituteofPublicUtilities,
MichiganStateUniversityRonaldLehr– attorneyandconsultant
LisaSchwartz,BerkeleyLab,ProjectManager
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Agenda
• Abouttheseries• Webinarhousekeepingitems• Threeperspectivesonregulatoryincentivesanddisincentivesforutilityinvestmentsingridmodernization(15min.each)– Financialanalyst– SteveKihm– Institutionalframework– JaniceBeecher– Publicpolicy– RonaldLehr
• Q&A(25min.)
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FutureElectricUtilityRegulationSeries(1)• A series of reports from Berkeley Lab taps leading thinkers to grapple
with complex regulatory issues for electricity • Unique multi-perspective approach highlights different views on the
future of electric utility regulation and business models and achieving a reliable, affordable, and flexible power system to inform ongoing discussion and debate
• Expert advisory group provides guidance and review • Primary funder of initial six reports: U.S. Department of Energy’s Office
of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability - Electricity Policy Technical Assistance Program
• Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy’s Solar Energy Technologies Office is co-funding new reports under DOE’s Grid Modernization Initiative
feur.lbl.gov
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FutureElectricUtilityRegulationSeries(2)1. Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), Industry Structure and Regulatory Responses2. Distribution Systems in a High DER Future: Planning, Market Design, Operation and
Oversight3. Performance-Based Regulation in a High DER Future4. Distribution System Pricing With DERs5. Recovery of Utility Fixed Costs: Utility, Consumer, Environmental and Economist
Perspectives 6. The Future of Electricity Resource Planning7. The Future of Centrally-Organized Wholesale Electricity Markets8. Regulatory Incentives and Disincentives for Utility Investments in Grid Modernization –
Today’s topic9. Value-Added Electricity Services: New Roles for Utilities and Third-Party Providers
(underway)
• Additional reports forthcoming: feur.lbl.gov• Expert advisory group (next slide) provides guidance and review
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AdvisoryGroup• CommissionerLorraineAkiba,HawaiiPublicUtilitiesCommission• JaniceBeecher,InstituteofPublicUtilities,MichiganStateUniversity• DougBenevento,XcelEnergy• AshleyBrown,HarvardElectricityPolicyGroup• PaulaCarmody,MarylandOfficeofPeople’sCounsel• RalphCavanagh,NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil• SteveCorneli,consultant• TimDuff,DukeEnergy• PeterFox-Penner,BostonUniversityQuestromSchoolofBusiness• ScottHempling,attorney• ValJensen,CommonwealthEdison• CommissionerTravisKavulla,MontanaPublicServiceCommission• SteveKihm,Seventhwave• ChairNancyLange,MinnesotaPublicUtilitiesCommission• LoriLybolt,ConsolidatedEdison• Sergej Mahnovski,EdisonInternational• KrisMayes,ArizonaStateUniversityCollegeofLaw/UtilityoftheFutureCenter• JayMorrison,NationalRuralElectricCooperativeAssociation• DeliaPatterson,AmericanPublicPowerAssociation• CommissionerCarlaPeterman,CaliforniaPublicUtilitiesCommission• SonnyPopowsky,FormerconsumeradvocateofPennsylvania• KarlRábago,PaceEnergy&ClimateCenter,PaceUniversitySchoolofLaw• RichSedano,RegulatoryAssistanceProject• PeterZschokke,NationalGrid
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Webinar Housekeeping Items
• We’re recording the webinar and will post it on our web site.
• Because of the large number of participants, everyone is in listen mode only.
• Please use the chat box to send us your questions and comments any time during the webinar. You may want to direct your question to a specific author.
• The report authors will each have 15 minutes to present.
• Moderated Q&A will follow, with the report authors responding to questions typed in the chat box.
• The report and webinar slides are posted at feur.lbl.gov
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AbouttheAuthors(inorderofpresentation)
SteveKihm isprincipalandchiefeconomistatSeventhwave,athinktankinMadison,Wisconsin,andseniorfellowatMichiganStateUniversity’s(MSU’s)InstituteofPublicUtilities.Hehasworkedinthefieldofutilityregulationfor36years,including 21yearsattheWisconsinPublicServiceCommission.Hehasappearedasanexpertwitnessinutilityproceedingsacrossthecountry,publishedreportsandjournalarticles,andisco-authorwithJaniceBeecherofthebook,RiskPrinciplesforPublicUtilityRegulators(MSUPress).Kihm holdsabachelor’sdegreeineconomicsandmaster’sdegreesinfinancialeconomicsandquantitativemethodsfromtheUniversityofWisconsin.HeisaCharteredFinancialAnalyst.
JaniceBeecher hasservedasDirectoroftheInstituteofPublicUtilitiesatMSUsince2002,bringingmorethan30yearsofappliedresearchexperiencetotheposition.Herareasofinterestincluderegulatoryinstitutions,governance,andpricing,andshespecializesinthewatersector.Sheisafrequentauthor,lecturer,andparticipantinprofessionalforumsandEditorofUtilitiesPolicy. ShepreviouslyheldpositionsatOhioStateandIndianaUniversitiesandtheIllinoisCommerceCommission.BeecherhasaPh.D.inpoliticalsciencefromNorthwesternUniversityandfacultyappointmentsinMSU’sCollegeofSocialScience,whereshehastaughtgraduatecoursesinpublicpolicyandregulation.
RonaldL.Lehr practiceslawandconsultsforclientsonenergyregulationandbusinessmattersonavarietyoftopicsrelatedtoincreasingtheamountofcleanenergyinelectricsystems,includingsystem,operations,integrationandtransmissionplanningfortheWesternInterconnectionandnewutilitybusinessmodelsandregulatoryreformsthatsupportthem.Heservedforsevenyears(1984to1991)asChairmanandCommissioneroftheColoradoPublicUtilitiesCommission.Hehasservedoncorporateandfoundationboardsofdirectorsandboardsofadvisors,includingasPresidentoftheDenverBoardofWaterCommissioners.
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Please use the chat box to send us your questions and comments any time during the webinar. You may want to direct your question to a specific author. We’ll address as many questions as we can following the presentation.
The report and webinar slides are posted at feur.lbl.gov
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IncentivesandDisincentivesforUtilityGridModernization:FinancialAnalystPerspective
SteveKihm,CFAPrincipalandChiefEconomist
Seventhwave
May31,2017
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Overview
• Canutilitiesraisecapitalforgridmodernization?Yes
• Doutilitymanagersseevalueforshareholdersingridmodernizationprojects?Maybe
• Shareholdervalue(stockprice)– risk,returnandscale
This is the relevant question.
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Properframingoftheproblem
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CreditSuisseDistributingCashtoShareholders
Cost of equity for S&P 500
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Long-termROEabovecostofequity(Iagree)
Xcel EnergyBeyond 2019, we assume a system wide normalized 10% average allowed ROE and 0.5% average annual long-term usage growth. We assume a 7.5% cost of equity in our discounted cash flow valuation. This is lower than the 9% rate of return we expect investors will demand of a diversified equity portfolio. A 2.25% long-term inflation outlook underpins our capital cost assumptions. Our cost of capital assumption is 5.9%.
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Whomakesinvestmentdecisions?
Capitalallocationisaseniormanagementteam’smostfundamentalresponsibility...Theobjectiveofcapitalallocationistobuildlong-termvaluepershare.
Mauboussin,M.,etal.2016.CapitalAllocation:Evidence,AnalyticalMethods,andAssessmentGuidance.CreditSuisse.
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EEIcommentingonlowerFERCROEsfortransmission
AsEEIexplains,“theseprojectsalsocarrythemostupfrontdevelopmenttime,longerconstructionschedules,andoverallrisk.”However,withoutasufficientROE,electricutilities arelikelytochoose short-term,morelocalprojects,insteadofriskier,morestrategicoptions.(Emphasisadded.)
Kuzika,L.S.2013,June17.EEIUrgesFERCtoReformitsROEMethodology.Energy&EnvironmentalLawAdviser.
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Returnonequity>costofequity
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Thevalueproposition
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Thevalueproposition
How does the policy affect the utility’s systematic risk?
How does the policy affect the expected return on equity?
What are the scale differences betweenthe utility’s resource
options?
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Togetthefullpriceimpactyouwouldusesuchamodel
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TheValueLineInvestmentSurvey
2016 2017 2019-21
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TheValueLineInvestmentSurvey
2016 2017 2019-21
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Highreturnsonequitydon’tattractmorecapital
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Newinvestorsexpecttoearnaboutthesamereturnonallutilitystocks
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Highreturnscreatevalueforpresent investors
For every dollar investedAlliant creates more valuefor present shareholders
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Butdonotbenefitnewshareholders(pricing)
Stocks are priced so thatthose providing new capitalto either company expect toearn about the same return.
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Incentiveexample
Can we provide an incentive to invest in the two-way flow project?
Here the project with the larger scalewill create more value per-share for investors.
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Returnonequitycansometimesdrivetheresult
Now the project with the higher returnwill create more value per-share for investors.
Yes, if we set thereturn high enough.
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Butnotalways
10.5% $14,000,000
Now the project with the lower returnwill create more value per-share for investors
(scale again dominates).
But not any higher return will do the trick.
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Don’tconfusetheshareholdergroups
10.5% $14,000,000
New shareholdersprovide all of this
capital
Present shareholderscapture the valuegain as a windfall
New shareholdersearn the cost of equity based on
what they paid for the stock
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Thecurrentstockpriceimpoundsfuturevalue
Notethatanopportunitytoinvestinaprojectofferingmorethanthecostofcapitalgeneratesanimmediatecapitalgainforinvestors.Thisisawindfallgain,sinceitisrealizedexante.Myers,S.1972.TheApplicationofFinanceTheorytoPublicUtilityRateCases.TheBellJournalofEconomicsandManagementScience.
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Incentivesforgridmodernization?
It’s all about the details.There are no general answers.
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Dotheseregulatorypoliciescreateanincentivetomodernizethegrid?
• Differentratesofreturnandcostsofcapitalfordifferentutilityassets(itdependsonr,k,andI)
• De-riskingcertainresourcetypes(itdependsonr,k,andI)
• Providingratebasetreatmentforcertainexpenseitems(itdependsonr,k,andI)
• Formularates(itdependsonr,k,andI)• Pricecaps(itdependsonr,k,andI)• Earningssharingmechanisms(itdependsonr,k,andI)
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Contactinformation
Steve KihmPrincipal and Chief Economist
[email protected]
608-210-7131
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Please use the chat box to send us your questions and comments any time during the webinar. You may want to direct your question to a specific author. We’ll address as many questions as we can following the presentation.
The report and webinar slides are posted at feur.lbl.gov
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InstitutionalPerspectiveTheRoleofIncentivesinPublicUtilityRegulation
JaniceA.Beecher,Ph.D.,DirectorInstituteofPublicUtilitiesMichiganStateUniversity
May31,2017
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Thesis
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• Inthecontextofgridmodernization,thereisastrongimpulsetodaytoprovideutilitieswithpositiveincentivesundera“newparadigm”
• Allregulationisincentiveregulation– thedichotomybetween“traditional”and“incentive”regulationis(mostly)false
• Thetraditionaleconomicregulatoryframeworkcanaccommodatenewutilitybusinessmodelsandpricing
• Theuseofincentivesraisesissuesofwealthtransferandactivismthattakeeconomicregulationbeyonditsremit
• Whatmaybeneededtodayisnotanewparadigmbutanewprudence– andprudenceearnsfairbutnotextraordinaryreturns
• Thisisnotadefenseofthestatusquoforeitherinfrastructureorregulation
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Factorsaffectingutilityperformance
Endogenous forces
Operations
Management
Shareholders
Economic regulation
Standards
Incentives
Accountability
Exogenousforces
Environmental
Economic & technological
Political & policy
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• Guidingparadigmforregulationcentersontheconstructofasocialcompact– Howthecompactisviewedisamatterofperspective– Theviewtakenhereisfromtheperspectiveoftheempoweredstate– Independenceoftheregulatorasanarmofthestateispresumed
• Compactisaliving andevolvingcharterbetweentheinstitutionalstateandtheregulatedpublicutility
• Underthecompact,regulationprovidesaconditionalproxyforcompetition– Regulationimposesdisciplinetopromoteeconomicefficiencyand
“economicequity”– Regulatorsalsoconsider“legalequity”(justandreasonablestandard)– Otherinstitutionsarelargelyresponsiblefor“socialequity,”including
environmentalanddistributivejustice• Compactdoesnotguaranteeinvestmentopportunitiesorreturns,shield
themfromloss,orensuretheirsurvivalinperpetuity
Theregulatorycompact
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Threerisk-basedincentivetoolsusedbyregulators
Incentive returns:for innovation
(active and used sparingly)
Prudence reviews:for efficiency
(reactive and used selectively)
Regulatory lag: for cost control(passive and used on an ongoing basis)
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Incentivesundertraditionalregulation
Inves
tmen
t
Performance
Cost
contr
ol
Efficie
ncy
Innov
ation
Return on investment Premium embedded in the fair return to promote infrastructure investment
✓
Financial accounting and reporting
Transparency in capital and operating expenditures and performance
✓
Cost recovery Disallowance of imprudent capital or operating expenditures
✓
Regulatory lag Time period between cost incurrence and an authorized rate adjustment
✓
Prudence reviews Sound managerial decisions based on knowable information
✓
Financial audits Detailed review of general or project-specific financial indicators
✓
Management audits Detailed review of general or project-specific management practices
✓ ✓
Price freezes or caps Extension of regulatory lag to a multiyear rate period
✓ ✓
Certificate of public convenience
Review of planned capital expenditure to ensure its necessity
✓ ✓
Integrated resource planning Balanced consideration of supply-side and demand-side management options
✓ ✓
Performance standards Specified terms of service to ensure acceptable performance
✓ ✓
Incentive returns
Bonus above fair return tied to performance to promote innovation
✓
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Regulatorylag:potentialtrendsbetweenratecases
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• Mucheffortisdevotedtoreducingregulatorylag– butnotalllagisregulatory• Utilitiesmaylaginstrategicmanagement
– Forecastingcostsandsalesrevenues– Accountingforpriceelasticities andotherfactorsinrateproposals– Makingtimely,complete,andconvincingregulatoryfilings
Efficiencytrendbetweenrateadjustments
Increasingoperationalefficiency
Decreasingoperationalefficiency
Costandsalestrendsbetweenrateadjustments
Fallingcostsand/orrisingsales
Achievingreturnsislikely
Achievingreturnsispossible
Risingcostsand/orfallingsales
Achievingreturnsispossible
Achievingreturnsisunlikely
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Incentivesundertraditionalregulation:parsingregulatoryfactandfiction
• Incentivesthatfavorcapitalexpenditures– Thespendingpropensity
• Incentivesthatfavorratebasetreatment– Thetechnologyneutralityissue
• Incentivesthatfavorsellingoutput– Thethroughputmotive
• Incentivesthatfavorhighfixedcharges– Therate-designdilemma
• Incentivesthatfavorcentralizedtechnologies– Theprosumerproblem
• Incentivesthatfavorthestatusquo– Theinnovationchallenge
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Incentivesaswealthtransfer
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• Incentivescanalsobeunderstoodassubsidiesthattransferwealth– Long-standingcritiqueofeconomicregulation
• Subsidiessupportedbyutilityratesarearegressiveformoftaxation– Low-incomehouseholdsaredisproportionatelyaffected
• Directionofsubsidizationmatters– Subsidiesforincentivesintendedtochangethebehaviorofutilities,their
investors,ortheirratepayersaredistinctfromthosetoadvancethegoalsofuniversalservice
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Incentivesandactivism
• Economicregulationisoneofmanypolicydomainsaffectingutilities• Regulatorsareincreasinglyaskedtoactbeyondtheirremit
– Inparticular,thereissomepressuretomergeeconomicandenvironmentalroles
• Rationaleforregulatoryactivisminthecontemporarycontextoftencenterson:– Thepotentiallydireconsequencesofexternalities– Thelaxnessofotherinstitutionsinaddressingthem
• Taxpayersshouldbearthecostsandrisksofpoliciesthatbenefitsociety– Includingpositiveandnegativeexternalities– socializationofcosts– Electrificationofthefleetandvehiclechargingprovidesacasestudy
• Regulationcanbeunderstoodasaconstrainedoptimizationproblem– Thejoboftheeconomicregulatoristo“getusthereprudently”– Regulatorsshouldbeactivewithintheirpolicydomainandcommunicate
withothers
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Anewparadigmoranewprudence?
• Newbusinessandpricingmodelsdonotconstituteanewregulatoryparadigm• Regulatorsmayneedanewandobligatoryprudence
– Basedonenforceablestandardsandgenerallyacceptedpractices– Bothcanbestrengthenedinlightoftechnologicaladvancesandopportunities
aswellasdynamicsupplyanddemandconditions• Legalstandardforprudencebasedon“knownandknowable”remainscore
– Variousregulatorytoolscanbeusedtoenforceprudencewithintheparadigm– Certificatesofneeddonotensureprudenceorcostrecovery
• Prudencetodayisnotjustaboutefficiencybutaboutoptimizationunderdynamicsupplyanddemandconditions,facilitatedbynewtools– Toolsforenhancingutilityperformance– Toolsforenhancingregulatoryenforcement
• Burdenofproofremainsontheutility– Ifnot,whynot?– Utilitiesmustmakethecase– notvendorsorotherstakeholders
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Anewprudence:toolsforenhancingutilityperformance
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managementplanning
capitalcontrol
adaptive analysis asset bidding competitive comprehensive
construction contingency cyber decision design development
digital diversification dynamic ecological engagement firm forecasting gis imaging
infrastructure integrated intelligence load
mapping market modeling
modular operating options outreach portfolio
pricing resilient resource rs scada security services spatial storage supply-chain systems
technologies threats
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Anewprudence:toolsforenhancingregulatoryenforcement
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rules
empiricalimprovement
management metricsperformanceplans
service
analysis audits benchmarking bonuses codes comparative compensation compliance
comprehensive contracts cost design development education
evaluation franchising
informed interconnection interoperability
investor market
model monitoring penalties
prevention procedures process productivity professional programs protection providers
rate satisfaction sizing standards
statistical systems targets technical technological uniform
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• Incentive-orientedregulationshouldbepurposeful,targeted,andconsistentwithpolicymandatesandmeasurableperformancecriteria
• Theuseofincentivesshouldbelimitedintimeandscope,withtheultimategoaloflettingmarketforcesandpricesworkassoonaspractical
• Incentivemechanismsshouldbesymmetrical,presentingthepotentialforbothupside(rewards)anddownside(penalties)consequences
• Incentivesshouldbecloselymonitoredandrigorouslyevaluatedintermsofintendedandunintendedconsequencesaswellasinteractiveeffects
• Evaluationmethodsshoulddisentangletheeffectsofincentivesfromotherendogenousorexogenousfactorsaffectingutilityperformance
• Theregressiveimpactsofrate-supportedincentivesshouldbeconsidered,aswellastaxpayersubsidiesorcorrectiveratedesign,toprotectdisadvantagedhouseholds
Incentivedesignprinciples
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Conceptualframeworkforconsideringincentives
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Concludingobservations
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• Therushtoreplacetheparadigmmaybeafunctionofinstitutionalmemoryloss• Regulatorshavealsolostindependenceandtechnicalcapacity(preemption)• Failureoftheparadigmmaybelessafailureoftheorythanofimplementation• Utilitieshavebecomerisk-averseandpolicymakershavebecomeconflict-averse• Utilitiestodaymightactuallyfacenottoomuchrisk,buttoolittlerisk• Realincentiveproblemmightactuallyberegulation’sgreatlymodifiedform• AnewlydesignedsystemtomotivatemodernizationmightlookalotlikeRBROR• Gridmodernizationcombinedwithregulationprovidespowerfulincentives• Regulatoryprocessescanbeimprovedandnewcapacitiesmaybeneeded• Ifregulationnolongerservesthepublicinterest,itsinstitutionaltimemaybeup
SeeAppendixatendofthisslidedeck
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Please use the chat box to send us your questions and comments any time during the webinar. You may want to direct your question to a specific author. We’ll address as many questions as we can following the presentation.
The report and webinar slides are posted at feur.lbl.gov
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PublicPolicyPerspective:RegulatoryIncentivestoSupportGridModernization
RonaldL.LehrMay31,2017
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CostofServiceRegulationUnlikelytoCaptureGridModernizationBenefits
• Utilityfinancialincentivesmisalignedwithpublicpolicies– Equityearningincentivesforcapitalinvestments
oCAPEXincentivesnottargetedforgridmod– Incentiveslackingforexpensesthatsupportoperatingchanges,consumerengagement
– Innovation,R&D+D&DnotfocusedoninCOSR– Relianceonlitigatedcaseprocesses
o Lackofconsensus,poorcommunicationsandrelationships
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Incentives,Disincentives,andJudgmentCalls
• Financialincentives– Efficiencyincentives– Couldsomeoftheseapproachesbemodifiedto
supportgridmodernization?
• Financialdisincentives– Imprudenceanddisallowances– Regulatoryrisks
• Monopolyincentives• Monopsonyincentives• Incentivesinratemaking• Judgmentcallsinaccountingandallocations
– Jointcostofproduction problem
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PlanningandPerformanceRegulation
• Planningtoidentifyopportunities,managerisks,R&D, D&D
• Providesinformationfordecisionmakers• Buildsconsensustohelpmanageregulatoryrisks
• Performancestandards• “Werecorrectamountspaidforwhatwegot?”• “Whatdowewantandhowdowepayforthat?”
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Formal,InformalDueProcess
• Fiveelementsinadministrativedueprocess– Notice,hearing,record,fairdecisionmaker,appeal
• Litigatedcaseprocedures— quasijudicial– Findfactsbasedonexpertwitnesstestimony– Drivestoextremes,informationimbalance
• Quasilegislativeprocedures— noticeiskey– Rulemaking,policiesforfutureapplication– Policydialogue,informationmeetings– Driveforconsensus,buildsharedbenefits
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PublicandPrivateDecisionMakers
• Publicapprovals— recordevidence
• Privatedecisions— investment“duediligence”
• Decisionmakers’inquiry:questionsuntilreadytovote“yes”or“no”
• Whatquestionsdodecisionmakersneedtoaskaboutgridmodernization?
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Contact
[email protected]
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Questions?
?Please use the chat box to send us your questions and comments. You may want to direct your question to a specific author.
The report and webinar slides are posted at feur.lbl.gov
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AppendixforBeecher’spresentationAppendixforJaniceBeecher’spresentation
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Incentivesthatfavorcapitalexpenditures–thespendingpropensity
• GiventhestrongincentivesforcapitalinvestmentundertheRBRORmodel,theinsinuationthatitmaystandinthewayofgridmodernizationseemsabitdisingenuous
• Threespendingpropensities– Capitalinvestmentgenerally– Averch-Johnsoneffect(capex overopex)– Temptationtogoldplate
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Deathspiral?Industryfinancesandinvestment(EEIdata)
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Incentivesthatfavorratebasetreatment
• Ratebasetreatmentisasolutioninsearchofallproblems• Generallyacceptedaccountingprinciples(GAAP)aresometimesseen
asabarrier– butregulatoryaccountingsupersedesGAAP• Cloudcomputingprovidesacasestudy
– NARUCresolution(2016)maintainsaprudentinvestmenttest– “Regardlessofhowcloudcomputingistreatedforregulatory
accountingpurposes,regulatorswillstillexaminewhethertheinvestmentisprudent…”
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Incentivesthatfavorsellingoutput
• Isthereathroughputincentive?– Utilitiesenjoyhighersalesbutcandolittletoeffectthembutunderprice– Betweencases,theywillfocusmoreonwhattheycancontrol– costs
• Decouplingismeantto“neutralize”thethroughputincentive– Largelyreactiveandcompensatory– utilitiesarenot“revenue
maximizers”– Shieldsutilitiesfromtheeffectsofvariouschanges– includingchanging
consumerpreferencesandeconomicconditions– Asacounterpoint,waterusagehasfallendramaticallylargelywithout
decoupling• Theoreticalissues
– Disconnectingoutputfromprices– Economistscritiqueofrevenuecaps– Overwhelmedbyinvestmentincentive(r>k)
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Incentivesthatfavorhighfixedcharges
Recovering more costs from fixed charges
(static world view)
Recovering more costs from variable charges
(dynamic world view)Enhances revenue stability
(less sales revenue risk)Reduces revenue stability(more sales revenue risk)
Weakens price signals and customer control
(less resource efficiency)
Strengthens price signals and customer control
(more resource efficiency)Less affordable for low-income
households (more regressive)
More affordable for low-income households
(less regressive)Encourages self supply and grid
defection(higher total cost)
Preserves grid supply and participation
(lower total cost)Possible advantage for combined
households (one customer charge)Possible stability from first blocks
(relatively inelastic usage)
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Incentivesthatfavorcentralizedtechnologies
• Assumptionsaboutscalearechanging– Prosumerism appearstobeontherise– Otherdemographictrendsmaycontradict
• Utilitypricingmustconsiderbothefficiencyandequityfordifferentcustomers– Interclassandintraclass– Programparticipantsandnonparticipants
• Alternativemethodsofratedesigncanbeaccommodatedbythetraditionalparadigm
• Netmeteringprovidesacasestudy
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• Innovationhasalwaysbeenachallengeforpublicutilities– Innovationisnotnecessarilyincompatible
withgrids,monopoly,orregulation– Utilitieswillbenefitfrominnovationthat
reducescostsbetweencases– Modernizationwillinvolveinvestmentin
innovativetechnologies• Modernutilitiesareoptimizersunderdynamic
supplyanddemandconditions• NewYork’sREVandUK’sRIIOascasestudies
Incentivesthatfavorthestatusquo
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Anewprudence:toolsforenhancingutilityperformance
• Real-timedigitalintelligence&communicationplatforms,big-datastorage,analytics• Decisionsupport(e.g.,construction,supply-chain,project,andriskmanagement)• Comprehensiveandintegratedresourceplanningandportfoliodiversification• Capitalassetandecologicalplanning,management,andcontrolsystems• Contingencyplanningandsecurityprotocolsforphysicalandcyberthreats• Optimizationmodelingforcapitalandoperatingoptions• Dynamicloadandcongestionmanagementtechnologiesandcontrols• Spatialimaging,mapping,forecasting,andanalysis(e.g.,RS,GIS,andSCADA)• Marketmechanisms(e.g.,competitivebiddingandtime-variantpricing)• Consumerinformation,services,outreach,andengagement• Researchanddevelopmentandpilotstudies(firmandindustry)• Flexible,adaptive,modular,andresilientinfrastructuredesign
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• Uniformtechnicalstandards,codes,andrules(e.g.,franchising,siting,sizing,interconnection,interoperability,andsoon)
• Statisticalbenchmarkingandcomparativecompetitionwithmetricsandtargets• Certificationofalternativeserviceprovidersandmodelcontracts• Informedandconsistentrulesforcostandriskallocationandratedesign• Technological,structural,andmarketneutralityinplanningandapproval• Empiricalanalysisofproductivityandotherperformancemetrics• Outcome-basedcompensationmechanisms(e.g.,managementorinvestorbonuses)• Comprehensiveempiricalevaluationofprograms,services,andcustomersatisfaction• Managementandperformanceauditsandimprovementplans• Transparentanddata-drivencompliancemonitoringandreportingsystems• Consumerprotectionrules,procedures,andpenalties(e.g.,fraudprevention)• Processimprovement,organizationaldevelopment,research,professionaleducation
Anewprudence:toolsforenhancingregulatoryenforcement
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ForMoreInformationontheSeries
LisaSchwartzElectricityMarketsandPolicyGroup
LawrenceBerkeleyNationalLaboratory(510)486-6315
[email protected]
Join BerkeleyLab’sElectricityMarketsandPolicyGroupmailinglist(https://emp.lbl.gov/mailing-list) andstayuptodateonourpublications,webinarsandotherevents.FollowtheElectricity
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EnergyAnalysisandEnvironmentalImpactsDivision 70